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Cross-border Regionalism

through a 'South-east Asian'Looking-glassCarl Grundy-Warr

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216 Carl Grundy-Warr

processes or tendencies in that they are in some way transcending the politicaland territorial sovereignty of states. As Taylor (1995;12) puts it

I suggest that a focus on trans-stateness, along with transnationalityand transterritoriality, should imply more than simply ‘across’: we need

to use the strong sense of the prex ‘trans’ to mean ‘beyond’. In thisway our ‘inter’ concepts are set against our ‘trans’ concepts as polaropposites: the former denes processes reproducing the states, nationsand territories, the latter processes that undermine them (Taylor, 1995,p. 12).

Similarly, ‘supranationalism’, in spite of the inherent terminological confusion of ‘national’ to really mean ‘state’, implies that there must be certain ‘trans’,‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ state authorities. Nevertheless, just as globalisation in-volves contradictory ‘inter’ and ‘trans’ processes happening simultaneously, sodoes the process of cross-border regionalism within the EU. Furthermore, the EUmechanisms incorporate ‘inter’ and ‘trans’ elements, the former tending to dilutethe truly ‘supranational’ character of the EU. Even though ‘national’ agendasand state-centred politics remain critical within European space, there is nodenying that, in terms of certain institutional features and politico-economicvisions, the EU goes beyond sovereign-state boundaries. Thus, Scott is able todiscuss ‘new regional development strategies’ and ideas about the ‘Europeanisa-tion’ of national space and society, whilst Kramsch can argue that the forms of regionalism taking shape in the EU are still along way from being ‘beyond state’

politics. The point is that both interpretations are valid. What is happening tospaces and polities within Europe involves contradictory processes that act toundermine, challenge, bolster and maintain aspects of interstateness and territo-riality. Beyond the EU realm, most forms of regional co-operation still rely uponmultilateral and bilateral agreements, intergovernmental bodies and associationsmade up of sovereign states.

Viewed from south-east Asia, the supranational aspects of intraEU regionalco-operation based upon explicit cross-border spatial planning concepts—specic programmes such as the schemes initiated under the Association of

European Border Regions (AEBR), the INTEREG initiatives and a host of genuine trans-border mechanisms—represent peculiar and distant prospects.Scott’s discussion of ‘new interpretations’ of how space, territory, identity andgovernance are being ‘renegotiated (or reterritorialised)’ within Europe would

be hardly applicable in the south-east Asian context. Cross-border regionalisa-tion in south-east Asia is a mostly ‘top–down’ affair orchestrated by politicalleaders, ministers and ofcials in the respective member-states (Abonyi, 1994;Grundy-Warr and Perry, 1996). The most signicant regional body, the Associ-ation of south-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) is fundamentally based upon certain

“cardinal principles of the Westphalian international system” such as the“doctrines of non-interference, non-intervention and pacic settlement of dis-putes” (Acharya, 2001, p. 63). Intraregional co-operation has largely been basedupon what is termed the ‘ASEAN way’, which involves a preference for dealingwith substantive regional matters through the networking of senior policy-mak-ers and bureaucrats involved in consensus-building, ‘non-confrontational bar-gaining’ procedures, discussing sensitive political issues behind closed-doorsand the use of soft diplomacy. There is nothing within ASEAN akin to theEuropean courts, parliaments or executive bodies. ASEAN remains ‘a loose and



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success in achieving cross-border socioeconomic integration. In spite of suchlimitations, the regular meetings between representatives of local government,mayors, business people, trade unionists and others across political space andthrough specic trans-border mechanisms, marks another critical area of distinc-

tion between forms of cross-border co-operation within the EU compared withsouth-east Asia.During the 1990s, there was a proliferation of cross-border projects involving

different parts of south-east Asia and member states of ASEAN. These includedthe ‘growth triangles’ of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (IMS); the ‘northerntriangle’ involving northern Malaysia, southern Thailand and parts of Sumatra(Indonesia); and the ‘east ASEAN growth area’ (EAGA) incorporating parts of Sabah (Malaysia), Brunei, Kalimantan (Indonesia) and the southern Philippines.Research focusing on probably the most advanced of these initiatives, the IMStriangle, reveals that the most important cross-border projects—such as a largeindustrial estate in Batam island, Indonesia, and a tourist resort complex inneighbouring Bintan island—have tended to be functional enclave developmentsinvolving high-level political approval and a high input of political capital fromthe respective central states, as well as co-operation between Singapore state-linked corporations and privileged Indonesian companies (Grundy-Warr et al.,1999; Grundy-Warr and Perry, 2001). In contrast to the Euro-regions, there isrelatively little involvement of local agencies and actors in formalised cross-bor-der co-operation and there tends to be a different arrangement in each of the‘national’ components of the triangle. In federal Malaysia, the Johor state

authorities have been primarily concerned about forging closer links withSingapore. In the strongly unitary city-state of Singapore, state-linked bodieshave taken the lead in growth triangle developments. Whereas, in Indonesia, thedominant triangle initiatives were orchestrated from the central governmentwith the establishment of specic development agencies in the Riau ‘border’province, which tended to bypass and restrict the role of local Riau authoritiesin the cross-border initiatives.

Beyond the different growth triangles, there are other forms of cross-borderco-operation related to exploring, exploiting and managing shared natural

resources. These include the joint development zones for offshore hydrocarbonsharing in disputed maritime border areas involving relevant state agencies andcorporate partners, such as the one between Thailand and Malaysia in the Gulf of Thailand (Forbes, 2001, pp. 225–242). Such agreements enable the respectivestates to shelve tricky border questions and pool sovereignty for the functionalpurpose of sharing the revenues of resource exploitation. A different form of environmental resource co-operation are efforts to enhance the ‘sustainable’management of resources in the lower Mekong River Basin under the ‘Agree-ment on the Co-operation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River

basin’ signed in April 1995 by Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos, andinvolving the intergovernmental Mekong River Commission (MRC) in variouspolicy recommendations, monitoring and consultative tasks. There are moreambitious plans to develop the entire Greater Mekong Region (GMR) into amassive zone of hydropower transfers and transnational road and rail corridorsunder the auspices of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) acting as a broker fortransnational capital involved in the energy and transport projects (Chapman,1995). Notwithstanding the signicant difculties involved in overcoming thelegacy of Cold War geopolitical divisions and long-standing historical rivalries



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A ‘South-east Asian’ Looking-glass 219

between some of the states concerned, these forms of regional development tendto involve powerful agencies setting policy agendas, with little or no directinvolvement of the communities most directly impacted by the projects. Thusthe politics of scale in the Mekong is largely “about power over events that

affect … people’s lives, livelihoods and environments” ( Mekong Update

, 2000).Clearly, the nature and character taken by formal cross-border co-operationrelate to issues of accountability, governance and sovereignty. The EU is helpingto promote new channels of communication and contact between sub-nationaland supranational levels, although Kramsch reminds us not to exaggerate theseaspects due to the continued strength of ‘national’ agencies, agendas andapproaches. Even so, we should also note that ‘trans-sovereign’ contacts aresometimes initiated by local agencies operating in cross-border regions. In earlierpapers, Scott (1993, 1997) has stressed how the development of trans-boundaryplanning mechanisms was often the result of co-operative processes involvinglocal public, private and non-state bodies in order to tackle everyday cross-bor-der concerns, regardless of whether or not the respective central states had givenofcial blessing to such activities (see also Duchacek et al., 1988; Soldatos, 1993).The subsequent institutional developments such as the Dutch–German EURE-GIO with its unique ‘parliament’ (Scott, 1997) and the Stichting of the EuregioMaas–Rhein, whatever the geopolitical limitations of these bodies are, mean thatforms of ‘trans-boundary’ governance are already rmly established within theEU. In contrast, the ofcially sanctioned forms of cross-border regionalismwithin south-east Asia are based upon ‘interstate’ processes with fewer inputs

from local authorities, which reect the ‘ASEAN way’ of fostering regionalco-operation with minimal challenges to national sovereignty (Thant and Tang,1996).

The Political Map as Palimpsest, Differentiated TERRAINs of Power and de facto Cross-border and Trans-national Territorialities

Kramsch raises the signicance of past geo-economic and geopolitical formationswith his analysis of the contradictory forces associated with Dutch imperialism

and ‘the transnational prot imperative’ resulting in essentially ‘new forms of local governance’ in far-ung parts of the world. The boundary-making associ-ated with dividing up colonial spheres of power and trade have continuedrelevance for the way we perceive our political map today—which, as Parkerand Dikshit (1997, p. 187) observe, “is in fact a palimpsest”, containing featuresthat have been erased, partially hidden or altered, revealing “evidences of earliergeopolitical structures lying behind those of the contemporary world”.

The geometries of wealth and power associated with the expansion of Eu-ropean states and capital resulted in forms of governance that were highly

differentiated. As Kramsch notes, initially “the formal constitutional relationshipof the Dutch colonial state with its myriad indigenous societies varied enor-mously” (p. 177), involving variations in shades of colonial political sovereigntyand local control by the multiple indigenous units of authority and juridicaldomains that existed in what was becoming the Dutch East Indies in theimperialist imagination. It was only later that the different forms of governancewere put together as a patchwork quilt under “the uniform imposition of anadministrative Short Declaration” (p. 180). The broader historical implications of this have been examined by Benedict Anderson who notes that the Netherlands



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current concern about cross-border regionalism and intraregional co-operationfrequently takes place as if the main players—sovereign bodies—and the domi-nant ‘national’ elements of ASEAN were the only agents and actors worthconsidering, as if the de jure political map is indeed without contradictions and

ambiguities. On the contrary, there are numerous challenges to our ‘taken-for-granted’ spatial sovereignties relating to past geopolitical formations and con-temporary de facto geographies masked or partially ‘hidden’ by our ‘nationalgeo-bodies’ (Grundy-Warr, 1998, p. 2001). To mention a few of the complica-tions: rst, there are numerous separatist, counter-nationalist movements indifferent border regions of south-east Asia. In Burma alone, several politicalorganisations have long histories of resisting military rule from Rangoon andfull incorporation into a ‘united’ national, mostly Burman-centred polity (Smith,1999). These include, disparate ethnic political groups such as the KachinIndependence Organisation (KIO), the Shan State Army (SSA), the KarenniNational Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Karen National Union (KNU), toname but a few. All of these groups enjoyed considerable political autonomy inthe ‘frontier areas’ of British colonial rule, although political sovereignty wasoften uid, allegiances and loyalties waxed and waned, and there were no xedterritorial boundaries until the British insisted upon them. In a sense, it was thexing of geopolitical boundaries that made these groups much more aware of their new status as ‘resident strangers’ within their mountainous homelands(McVey, 1984; Lim, 1984).

Secondly, the various plans aimed at enhancing ofcial cross-border linkages

and trade in south-east Asia are complicated by the fact that not all the stateshave managed to extend effective administrative, economic, political, legal oreven military control over all of their supposedly ‘sovereign’ spaces. With theobvious exception of the city-state of Singapore, all the other ASEAN states havedifcult terrestrial and/or maritime boundaries to administer. These boundariesare highly permeable. Flows of undocumented goods and human beings con-tinue to undermine the ongoing efforts to formalise and increase ‘legal’ interstateand intraregional trade. Two big problems in parts of the ‘golden quadrangle’ of Burma, Laos, Thailand and Yunnan (China) are the international trades in heroin

and amphetamines, and the problem of human trafcking (Grundy-Warr andWong, 2001). In addition, there are various ‘threats’ and ‘challenges’ to statecraft,national identity and political sovereignty posed by large ows of undocu-mented, irregular and forced migrants (Grundy-Warr and Wong, 2002).

Thirdly, the existence of numerous ethnic groups straddling the terrestrial borders of mainland south-east Asia has led to considerable issues of perceived‘loyalty’, ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’ within the state–nation–citizen domains(Wijewardene, 1990; Grundy-Warr, 2001). These groups often have well-devel-oped kith and kin networks and ‘social spaces’ that pre-date and transcend

political boundaries (Dean, 2001). In addition, irredentist sentiments are neverfar from the surface. This has long been the case with the Pattani Malays of southernmost Thailand, particularly in the provinces of Satun, Pattani, Narathi-wat and Yala. As I was writing this commentary, I noticed an alarmist report inThe Straits Times (20 March 2002), which was entitled “Worry over gangs andseparatists in Thai south after violent attacks”, and the report elaborated onvarious “rogue elements” such as the Pattani United Liberation Organisation(Pulo); its splinter group, New Pulo, the Guragan Mujahideen Islam Pattani, anorganisation with only “40 members” but with “suspected links with Al-Qaeda”;



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and another group with similar links to the dispersed territorialities of transna-tional terrorism is said to be Wae Ka Raeh, an afliate of Guragan. To makematters worse, the ‘deep south’ of Thailand is also apparently a hotbed of “Chinese triads comprising Malaysians, Singaporeans and Hong Kong nation-

als … involved in prostitution rackets, illegal gambling and loan sharking”. Thepoint of mentioning this here is that we are also talking about a component of one of the so-called ASEAN growth triangles mentioned earlier, where states are

busily trying to forge closer cross-border ties to foster the economic developmentof contiguous cross-border ‘national’ spaces. The media focus is misleading inthe sense that the vast majority of cross-border movements and relationships inthis border zone are related to the livelihoods and everyday trades of the local

border communities. Clearly, there are contradictions between different ofcialand media representations of these border zones, reecting anxieties about de

facto trans-border criminality, the political loyalties of peoples in borderlandswhere strong cultural, social and economic links exist across border space, andthe need for greater intraregional ‘integration’ in an era of increasing transna-tional ows. This one example, and I could raise numerous others, illustrateshow past and present, old and new geopolitical formations and relationshipshave merged within border spaces. It is somewhat similar to James Anderson’s(1996, p. 149) observations on Europe, where “there is now a complex mixtureof old, new, and hybrid forms—‘territorial’, ‘transterritorial’ and ‘functional’forms of association and authority coexisting and interacting”.

Finally, it is important to mention that both Europe and south-east Asia arecurrently within an era of geopolitical transition following the end of the ColdWar. One implication of this has been the ability of both the EU and ASEAN toovercome the former ideological and geostrategic ‘iron’ and ‘bamboo’ curtainsand enlarge their scope, membership and vision. In this context, I was a littlesurprised that Scott did not discuss in any detail the issues of ‘integrating’ EUand non-EU border spaces where there are often sharp distinctions betweenpolitical administrative mindsets and approaches to regional development, aswell as pronounced socioeconomic asymmetries (Scott, 1997; Gruchman and

Walk, 1997). What does ‘Europeanisation’ of space mean at these outer borderspaces of the EU? Also, it is interesting to speculate how cross-border regional-ism will develop with the future expansion of the EU. Clearly, it would seemthat there are likely to be lengthy processes of ‘territorial’, ‘symbolic’ and‘institutional’ (re)‘shaping’ required (Paasi, 2001).

Similarly, ASEAN has quickly moved from six to ten member-states with theadmission of former Cold War foes—Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—plus Burma(Myanmar) whose membership continues to pose problems in EU–ASEAN tiesdue to EU objections to Burma’s poor record on human rights and the sup-

pression of democracy (Tay and Goh, 1999). Interestingly, Burma and Vietnamwere admitted largely due to geopolitical concerns about the growing inuenceof a huge regional dragon—China. In this sense, the state-centred geopolitics of regionalisation are signicant. In an another sense, it is at the borderlands of south-east Asia and China where we can see that border regional perspectivescause us not only to rethink our ‘national’ sovereignties, but also our ‘regional’perspectives. The Yunnan–south-east Asia borderlands contain many historicaloverlaps, shared experiences, trans-border ethnicities, human movements, econ-omic, social and cultural ties, and shared environmental concerns (Evans et al.,



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2000; Dean, 2001), bringing into question the drawing of rigid ‘spatial limits’around our ‘quest for knowledge’ (van Schendel, 2001).

Local–Global, National–Regional, Local–Regional, Regional–Global, Global–

Local. Cross-Inter-Trans-, Where Are the Border Spaces?

Scott and Kramsch have added very distinctive and valuable insights relating tothe EU and notions of cross-border regionalisation and integration. This com-mentary has not tried to comment too much on the contents of these contribu-tions, but rather to use the opportunity to raise a few observations based uponresearch in a different ‘macro’ region. Border spaces are clearly ‘central’ tocurrent discourses and debates about globalisation, ‘glocalisation’, the construc-tion and politics of scale, territorialisation, reterritorialisation, inter- and trans-stateness, reconceptualisations of sovereignty and ideas concerning the future of nation-states. One of the reasons for the centrality of border spaces is thatresearch often reveals contradictory processes, multiscalar politics and multipleterritorialities occurring within specic cross-border regions at the same time(Sidaway, 2001; Grundy-Warr, 2001). Another reason relates to O Tuathail’s(1999, p. 140) observation about territory “as a regime of practices triangulated

between institutionalisation of power, materialisations of place and idealisationsof ‘the people’”. Within borderlands, these three aspects of the regime becomeeven more complex due to the interplay of different ‘national’, ‘sub-national’,trans-national and cross-border agencies and actors, requiring detailed empirical

enquiry in order to be able to add to our broader theoretical understanding.In conclusion, I would like to reiterate two points raised by the main papers

and relate them to the south-east Asian context. First, Kramsch argues that theEU border regions are “suspended between the promise of cross-border regionalself-determination and the disciplinary power of nation-state rule” (p. 189). Thiscontrasts with south-east Asian cases where border and provincial authoritiesare frequently only minor players in ofcial cross-border regionalism, althoughthey may be more active in de facto forms of cross-border relations, particularlywhere central state authority is weak or where peripheral power domains are

vying with sovereign states for effective control over people, territory andresources. Thus, whilst various locally initiated forms of trans-border contacthave gradually been institutionalised and made ‘ofcial’ within the EU, de factoand unregulated forms of ‘beyond state’ politics continue to thrive in parts of south-east Asia. Furthermore, research has shown that quite contrary statepolicies can apply to different segments of a specic borderland depending uponcontingent interstate and de facto geopolitical relationships (Grundy-Warr, 2001).Thus, general statements about the nature of cross-border relations can some-times be quite misleading, even for a single border region.

The second point is the admission by Scott that, in spite of the grandioseEuro-visions, there continue to exist “multifarious local perspectives on Eu-ropean development” (p. 162) and there is “no room for a hegemonic project of identity-formation” (p. 163). Similarly, in south-east Asia, there is enormousvariation between different border regions, even between different parts of thesame border. All of this suggests that there is still plenty of scope to undertakemeaningful studies of border regions and, as I have tried to suggest, empiricaland theoretical comparative approaches to cross-border regionalism may wellyield fruitful ideas, dreams, departures and questions.



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