163082053 KnySh on Wahhabism

8/10/2019 163082053 KnySh on Wahhabism

1/25

A Clear and Present Danger: "Wahhabism" as a Rhetorical FoilAuthor(s): Alexander KnyshSource: Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Vol. 44, Issue 1 (2004), pp. 3-26Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1571334.

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2/25

A CLEAR AND PRESENT

DANGER:

"WAHHABISM"

AS A

RHETORICAL FOIL

BY

ALEXANDER KNYSH

Michigan

"We shall not return to the state anterior to discourse-in

which

nothing

has

yet

been

said,

and

in

which

things

are

only just begin-

ning

to

emerge

out of the

grey light;

and we shall not

pass beyond

discourse

in

order to

rediscover

the

forms that it has created and

left

behind

it;

we shall

remain,

or

try

to

remain,

at the

level of discourse

itself.. .A task consists of not-of no

longer-treating

discourses

as

groups

of

signs

(signifying

elements

referring

to contents or

repre-

sentations)

but

as

practices

that

systematically

form

the

objects

of which

they

speak."

Michel

Foucault,

The

Archeologyof Knowledge,

Pantheon Books, New York, 1972, 48-49.

Prologue

In the

giant body

of

literature on

the

political

developments along

Russia's

southern

border over

the

past

decade,

one

cannot

help

but

be struck

by

the

frequency

with

which

"Wahhabism"

and/or

"Wah-

habi" Islam is invoked

by

Western

and Russian

journalists,

academ-

ics,

and

political

analysts

as the

principal

cause of

troubles and

political

instability

in

these

areas.'

This

is

especially

true of the

Muslim areas of

the Northern

Caucasus and

Central

Asia,

although

l For

some

typical

examples

see:

Muriel

Atkin,

"The Rhetoric

of

Islamophobia,"

Central Asia

and the

Caucasus,

1

(2000), 123-132;

Marat

Murtazin,

"Muslims

and

Russia: war or

peace?"

ibid., 132-141;

Svante

Cornell

and

Regine

Spector,

"Central

Asia:

More than

Islamic

extremists,"

The

Washington

Quarterly,

25/1

(Winter

2002),

193-206;

Olga

Bibikova,

"Fenomen

'vakhkhabizma',"

Aziia i

Afrika

segodnia,

8

(1999),

48-52;

Vakhit

Akaev,

Sufizm

i

vakhkhabizm

na

Severnom

Kavkaze,

Issledovaniia

po

?

Koninklijke

Brill

NV,

Leiden,

2004

Also

available

online

-

www.brill.nl

Die Welt

des Islams

44,

1

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3/25

ALEXANDER

KNYSH

some autonomous Russian

republics,

such as Tatarstan

and

Bash-

kortostan,

are also

occasionally

mentioned

in

this context.2

Equally

surprising is the unanimity with which popular Russian and West-

ern

journalism

and

academic studies

depict

the

ongoing

Muslim

resurgence

in

the

former

Soviet Union as a life-and-death

struggle

between the "Sufi" and

"Wahhabi" versions of

the

Islamic

religion.3

These Islamic

movements in the

territory

of

the

former

Soviet

Union

are

frequently

portrayed by

both

laymen

and

experts

as

incompat-

ible and

mutually

hostile

interpretations

of

Islam

adopted

by

their

adherents in an attempt to fill the vacuum left by the implosion of

the

Communist

ideology

and

system

of

values. The

"Wahhabi-Sufi"

confrontation is

frequently

invoked in the

public speeches

of

high

ranking

Russian and

Central Asian

politicians,

such as

presidents

Karimov of

Uzbekistan or

Shaymiev

of

Tatarstan,

who never tire of

invoking

"Wahhabism" as a mortal

threat to the

very

existence of

prikladnoi

i

neotloznoi

etnologii,

Moscow, 1999;

Igor

Dobaev,

"Islamic

Radicalism

in

the Northern

Caucasus,"

Central Asia and the

Caucasus,

6

(2000), 76-86;

"Azer-

baidzan

vydal

Rossii

vakhkhabita,

vzorvavshego

gazoprovod

Urengoi-Pomary-

Uzgorod,"

Lenta.ru,

23.07.2002;

Aleksei

Malashenko,

"Chto khotiat

imenuemye

vakhkhabitami,"

Islamskie

orientirySevernogo

Kavkaza, Moscow, Nauka,

2001,

137-163

et

passim);

Alexei

Savateev,

"'Vakhkhabit' 'vakhkhabitu'

rozn',"

Aziia i

Afrika

segodia,

2

(2002),

5-12,

and 3

(2002),

24-26;

Robert Bruce

Ware,

Enver

Kisriev,

Werner

Patzelt and

Ute

Roericht,

"Political Islam in

Daghestan,"

Europe-Asia

Studies,

55/2

(2003),

287-302;

for further

references

see

subsequent

footnotes to the

present

ar-

ticle. For a recent (hostile) account of "Wahhabi" history and tenets in the West

see: Hamid

Algar,

Wahhabism: A

critical

essay,

Islamic

Publications

International,

Oneonta, NY,

2002.

2

E.g.,

Aidar

Khabutdinov,

"Wahhabism in

Modern

Tatarstan,"

Russia and the

Moslem

World,

Moscow,

10

(100),

2000,

24-26;

for a

recent

"discovery"

of the

so-

called "Wahhabi

cells" in

Moscow see

"FSB

zaiavliaiut,

chto v

Moskve

pri

mechetiakh

sushchestvuiut

shkoly

vakhkhabizma,"

KavkazWeb.com,

6.09.2002

and

"Musul'man-

skie

lidery

otritsaiut

sushchestvovanie shkol

vakhkhabizma

v

Moskve,"

ibid.

3

Akaev,

"Sufizm i

vakhkhabizm";

Uwe

Halbach,

"Islam

in

the Northern

Cau-

casus,"

Archives de sciences

sociales

des

religions,

115

(July-September

2001), 93-110,

see, in particular, 102-104; Dmitri Makarov, Ofitsial'nyi neofitsial'nyi slamv Dagestane,

Moscow,

Tsentr

strategicheskikh

issledovanii,

2000,

passim;

Nadezda

Emelianova

(Emel'ianova),

"Islam in

the

Northern

Caucasus:

The

obvious

and the

concealed,"

Central

Asia and the

Caucasus,

6/12,

2001, 38-47;

Gadzi

Magomedov,

"Chto

strashnee

vakhkhabizma,"

Nezavisimaia

gazeta, Aug.

7, 2001;

Valerii

Tishkov,

Obschestvo

v

vooruzennom

konflikte:

etnografiia

chechenskoi

voiny,

Moscow,

Nauka, 2001,

327-350;

Ware et

al.,

"Political

Islam,"

passim.

4



4/25

"WAHHABISM" S A

RHETORICAL

OIL

their countries.4

Although many

Western

and Russian

observers

agree

that the activism of

these

"mutually

opposed"

movements

is

a

response to the dire economic and social conditions of the post-

Soviet era and

the

ideological

void left

by

the

collapse

of

official

Marxism-Leninism,

they

nevertheless

tend

to

focus their

analysis

on

the

religious

premises

characteristic

of

each

group.5

Let us

review

these

premises,

or

rather,

the

ways

in

which

they

are

construed

and

articulated

by

both Russian and Western

experts

on

Islam

in

the

former

Soviet

Union,

paying

special

attention to the

rhetorical strat-

egies and conventions that inform these discourses.

"Sufism"

and "Wahhabism"

uxtaposed

The

advocates of

"Sufism",according

to

many

Russian

and West-

ern

commentators,

promote

a revival of

"traditional

religiosity,"6

that

is,

one that

organically

integrates

elements of

"pre-Islamic"cultures,

beliefs and social institutions of the area with the Islamic religion

professed by

its

population.

Known

collectively

as

'addt,

or

"custom-

ary

law,"

these

socio-cultural elements are seen as

harking

back to

the

"pre-Islamic" local

tribal and

clan

structures as well

as ancient

belief

systems

such

as,

for

instance,

the

cult of local

shrines,

departed

saints,

tribal/family ancestors,

and

sacred sites or

objects.7

These

4

Atkin,

"The

Rhetoric,"

126;

Alisher

Ilkhamov,

"Uzbek

Islamism:

Imported

ideology

or

grassroots

movement,"

Middle East

Report,

221

(winter

2001),

40-46;

Gregory

Feifer,

"Uzbekistan's

Eternal

Realities:

A

report

from

Tashkent,"

World

Policy

Journal,

19/1

(spring

2002),

81-89;

for a

dissenting

view see

Ghonchen

Tazmi,

"The

Islamic

Revival in Central

Asia: A

potent

force or a

misconception,"

Central Asian

Survey

20/1

(2001),

63-83.

5

A

typical

example

is

Cornell

and

Spector,

"Central

Asia,"

195.

6

See,

e.g,

Nadezda

Emelianova

(Emel'ianova),

"Sufism and

Politics in

the North-

ern

Caucasus,"

Nationalities

Papers,

29/4

(2001),

661-688 and

idem,

"Islam in

the

Northern

Caucasus." For

me,

the notion

"traditional" is

highly

problematic

insofar

as

it

presupposes

the

existence

of an

unchanged

and

unchangeable

"tradition"which

may

occasionally

fall into

abeyance

only

to

re-emerge again

in its

"pristine"

form

under

favorable

socio-economic and

ideological

conditions. In

this

way,

"tradition"

serves

as a

blanket

explanatory

category

that is

deployed

uncritically

to account for

a wide

variety

of

disparate

social

and

political phenomena.

7

Sanobar

Sharmatova,

"Tak

nazyvaemye

vakhkhabity,"

Dmitri Furman

(ed.),

Chechnia i

Rossiia: obshchestva

gosudarstva,

Moscow,

Fond Andreia

Sakharova,

1999,

399-425;

I.

Savin,

"Religioznyi

ekstremizm

v

Kazakhstane,"

Rossiia i

musul'man-

5



5/25

ALEXANDER KNYSH

structures and

beliefs,

goes

the

argument,

serve local

Muslims

as

powerful

sources of

identity

and

pride

vis-a-vis the Muslim

commu-

nity at large and the rest of the world. Outside observers, as well as

educated

representatives

of local Muslim

communities,

routinely

identify

these structures

and beliefs with one or the other

version of

"Sufism"

without, however,

providing any

solid historical

evidence

to

substantiate

their

claims.8

If

we are to

accept

this line of

argu-

mentation,

we should

then

recognize

that "traditional" or "Sufi"

Islam can

effectively

serve as a

natural

vehicle

of

nationalist ideol-

ogy

in

so

far as

it

helps

to

promote nation-building projects

with

their

emphatic

assertion

of

the

exclusivity

of a

given

ethnic

group.9

While,

according

to most commentators

and

historians,

"Sufism"

may,

on

occasion,

become a

means

of

Muslim

mass

mobilization and

armed

struggle against

internal

or

external

forces,

its

otherworldly,

inward-looking

orientation

usually

outweighs

its

militant

potential.10

The

"Wahhabis",

on the

other

hand,

are

usually

presented by

po-

litical

commentators,

journalists

and

analysts

as

intransigent

sup-

porters of the "pure" and "authentic" Islam of the first Muslim

community

at

Medina,

when it was

led

by

the

Prophet

himself

and

thus

divinely

protected

from

any

error. In line

with this

view,

the

chief

goal

of

"Wahhabi"

ideologues

is

to

restore Islam to

its

prime-

skii

mir,

3

(117),

2002, 63-66;

Sergey Bereznoy,

"The Role of

Islamic Factor in

Crisis

Settlement in

Chechnia,"

CentralAsia

and

the

Caucasus,

1

(19)

(2003),

169-

176.

8

This claim is problematic

historically,

since it

ignores

the fact that, in the

Northern

Caucasus at

least,

such

purportedly

"Sufi"

eaders of the

19"h

century

as

Ghazi

Muhammad and

Shamil

distinguished

themselves as

staunch

enforcers of

the

sharn'a,

who

sought

to

eradicate

any vestiges

of

"pre-Islamic"

ults

and beliefs

in

their

society;

in

particular,

Shamil

discouraged

the use of

'adat in

dealing

with

legal

issues

faced

by

his

community

and

insisted

on a strict

application

of the

prin-

ciples

of

Islamic

law;

yet,

at

the

same

time,

in the

course of his

adjudicating

activity

Shamil

generated

a

body

of

legal

rulings

(Arab.

nizam;

Russ.

kodeks)

hat

combined

elements of

the shaWr'aith

those of

'adat;

see

my

article

"Shamil"n

Encyclopeadia

of

Islam,

2d

edition,

9,

283-287.

9 See, e.g., OlivierRoy, "Islamet

politique

en Asie Central,"Archives esciences

socialesdes

religions,

115

(July-September

001),

56-57.

10

See,

Savateev,

"'Vakhkhabit'

vakhkhabitu',"

-8;

Ware et

al.,

"Political

slam,"

287-288.

For

a

critical

discussion of

Sufism's

role in

Muslim

resistance to 19'h

cen-

tury

Western

colonialism,

see

my

"Sufism

as an

Explanatory

Paradigm:

The issue of

the

motivationsof

Sufi

movements in

Russianand

Western

historiography,"

Die

Welt

des

Islams,42/2

(2002),

139-173.

6



6/25

"WAHHABISM" S A RHETORICAL OIL

val

purity

as

they

understand it. This

means,

first and

foremost,

pu-

rifying

it of

"alien,"

"non-Islamic" beliefs and

practices

that have

crept

into the Muslim tradition in the course of the fourteen centuries of

its existence.

According

to

many experts

on

"post-Soviet"

Islam,

the

"Wahhabis"

identify

the cult of local saints and

sacred

objects,

popu-

lar

superstitions

(such

as beliefs

in

the

infallibility

of

"Sufi" masters

and their

ability

to intercede with

God

on behalf

of

their

followers),

and adherence to the

'addt

customs"1

in

legal

practice

as

gross

vio-

lations of the

"pure"

Islam of the

"pious

ancestors"

(al-salaf).12

These

violations

or,

in

"Wahhabi"

parlance,

"(heretical)

innovations"

(bida'),

must

be eradicated

by

all means

necessary,

including

violence

and

coercion.'3 While the "Sufi"

party

is seen

by

most Western and

Russian

journalists,

political

commentators,

military

analysts

and aca-

demics as more-or-less

politically

"benign"

or even

"pacifist,"'4

the

"Wahhabis" are

routinely portrayed

as

politically

"activist,"

"fanati-

cal" and

prone

to

indiscriminate violence

against

non-Muslims as

well as

any

fellow believers who

disagree

with their

precepts.'5

Their

1

Tishkov,

Obschestvo,

340.

12

Hence their

self-denomination-salafiyya

or

salafiyyun,

which is

usually

trans-

lated

from

Arabic as

"[followers]

of

the

pious

ancestors

[of

Islam]."

In

the North-

ern

Caucasus,

rank-and-file

followers

of

salafz

or

"Wahhabi" Islam

tend to

identify

themselves as members of

either a

regional

or

universal Islamic

religious

commu-

nity

and as

followers

of its

spiritual

leader

(e.g.,

the

"Daghestani,

or

Muslim,

Jama'at"

headed

by

Bagautdin

(Baha'

al-Din)

Muhammad

Kebedov or the

"KadarJama'at"

headed

by Jarullah

Rajabaddinov

and a

Jordanian

cleric Habib

'Abd

al-Rahman;

see Mikhail

Roshchin,

"Dagestan

and the War

Next

Door,"

Perspective,

11/1

(Sept.-

Oct 2000) available at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/volll/Roshchin.html; cf. Sharon

LaFraniere,

"HowJihad Made Its

Way

to

Chechnya,"

Washington

Post,

April

26,

2003).

The terms

salafi

and

salafism

seem

to have been

imposed

upon

Daghestani

and

Chechen

followers of the

"pure

Islam of

the

pious

ancestors"

(as

well as "Wahhabism"

for that

matter)

by

their

learned

opponents,

who are

familiar with the

history

of

Islamic

reformism.

13

The

tensions

created

by

these

incompatible

visions of Islam

are not

unique

to the Muslim

areas

of

the

former

Soviet

Union;

they

can be

observed

throughout

the

contemporary

Muslim

world. See

my

article "The

tariqa

on a

Landcruiser: The

resurgence

of

Sufism in

Yemen,"

Middle

East

Journal,

vol.

3

(summer

2001),

pp.

399-414.

14

This,

of

course,

has not

always

been

the

case, as,

in the

19th

century, many

European

and

Russian scholars and

colonial

administrators considered

Sufism to

be

"enemy

number one"

of their colonial

projects

and

mission

civilisatrice,

see

Knysh,

"Sufism as an

Explanatory

Paradigm," passim.

15

Nadezda

Emelianova

(Emel'ianova),

"Tainoe i iavnoe v

severokavkazskom

islame,"

Rossiia i

musul'manskii

mir,

4

(118),

2002,

43-52,

especially,

48.

7



7/25

ALEXANDER KNYSH

willingness

to declare

jihad

against

their

political opponents

and

eventually

to establish

an

independent

Islamic

state in the Caucasus

and even beyond16 is viewed by some Russian journalists and politi-

cians as a

grave

threat to the

very

existence of the Russian state.17

It

should

be

pointed

out that the wholesale

condemnation

by

"Wah-

habis" of local

religious practices

and beliefs

in favor of a strict

application

of the sharn'a18

is often construed

by

academics as

an

attempt

to transcend

the

parochialism

of local Muslim communi-

ties

and to create a

global

movement as envisioned

by early-twenti-

eth

century proponents

of

pan-Islamism,

such as Muhammad Rashid

Rida and Ibn Badis.19

The terms

chosen

by

commentators

and

politicians

to

designate

each

group

often reflect their own

religio-political

views

and

intel-

lectual

preferences

(pro-

or

anti-Sufi;

pro-

or

anti-Muslim;

pro-

or

anti-"Wahhabi"; anti-clerical;

liberal,

etc.).

In

contemporary

Russian

academic and non-academic literature and media

broadcasts,

the

followers of Sufi

Islam

are

usually

called

"traditionalists,"

"tarikatists"

(from the Arabic tarnqa,a term for a Sufi brotherhood), "muridists"

(from

the

Arabic

murid,

the

adept

of a Sufi

master),

"zikrists,"

(from

the Arabic

dhikr,

"recollection of

God's name"-a common Sufi

practice),

etc.20 The

"Wahhabis",

who are

often

described

as

salafts,

are

also

referred to

by

their

opponents

as

"fundamentalists,"

"Islam-

ists,"

"Islamic

radicals,"

"Islamic

militants,"

"puritans of

Islam,"

or

simply

"Islamic

terrorists."21

I

will now

proceed

to

discuss how

16

See Vladimir

Bobrovnikov,

Musul'mane

Severnogo

Kavkaza:

obychai,

pravo,

nasilie,

Moscow, Nauka,

2002, 92-94,

which

quotes

interviews with the "Wahhabi" field

commander Shamil

Basaev,

who declared

"the liberation of Muslims

[living]

be-

tween the

Volga

and

the Don" to be his

ultimate

goal.

17

Andrei

Klochkov,

"Vakhkhabitskii

polumesiats,"

Kommersant-Vlast',

Aug.

24,

1999;

Aleksandr

Borodai,

"Ichkeriia do

moria?",

Zavtra,

33,

20

Aug.,

1999.

18

On

close

examination,

this

appears

to be

nothing

but a

pious utopia,

for it

is not

the sharna but who

interprets

and

applies

it

that

matters.

For a

critical exami-

nation of the

idea

of

instituting

sharfa

legislation

in

the

present-day

Caucasus see

Bobrovnikov, Musul'mane SevernogoKavkaza, 272-281.

19

See

my

"The

tariqa

on

a

Landcruiser,"

412-414.

20

See,

e.g.,

Vladimir

Bobrovnikov,

"Vakhkhabity

Severnogo

Kavkaza,"

Islam na

territorii

byvshei

Rossiiskoi

imperii,

2, Nauka, Moscow, 1999,

20.

21

See,

e.g.,

Bibikova,

"Fenomen

'vakhkhabizma"' and

Shermatova,

"Tak

nazyvae-

mye";

Aleksei Malashenko and

Dmitri

Trenin,

Vremia

uga:

Rossiia v

Chechne Chechnia

v

Rossii,

Moscow

Carnegie

Center,

Gendalf, Moscow,

2002,

78-79 and

passim;

cf.

8



8/25

"WAHHABISM"

S

A

RHETORICALOIL

"Wahhabism"

has become a "catch-all"

explanatory

model that

is

em-

ployed

in a wide

array

of

political, popular,

and academic discourses

both in Russia and its former Muslim dependencies.

"Wahhabism",a

Rhetoric

of

Fear

Accounts

of

the

ideology

and

practices

of

Islamic

political

activ-

ism in Western and Russian

literature

vary significantly

in

points

of

detail and level

of

sophistication.

The

same is true of

the

descrip-

tions of the nature of the supposed conflict between Sufis and

"Wahhabis",

which

is

presented

from a wide

variety

of

perspectives

ranging

from

(at

least

outwardly)

objective

to

wantonly partisan

and

apologetic/polemical.22

Most of these diverse

analytical

approaches

to

the

"Sufism-versus-Wahhabism"

phenomenon

have one feature

in common: whether academic or

journalistic they

are dictated

by

the

writers'

firm

belief

in the

unproblematic

heuristic value and self-

sufficiency of the categories in question.23 Even when differences

between

regional

manifestations of the "Wahhabi"movement

in

Cen-

tral Asia

and the Caucasus are

duly acknowledged,

their similarities

are nonetheless deemed sufficient to

classify

them as variants of

a

single

universal

phenomenon.24

Malashenko,

Islamskie

orientiry,

104-134.

It

should

be

pointed

out that these are

blanket terms that cover a wide

variety

of

religio-political

movements and beliefs

that are

lumped together indiscriminately

into the same

analytical category.

22

For a

relatively sympathetic

account of

"Wahhabism" that

presents

it as a

grass-

root reaction

against

the

rampant corruption

in

high

places

and

gross

social

ineq-

uities

in

post-Communist

societies

see,

e.g.,

Dmitri

Zantiev,

"'Vakhkhabizm'

v

Rossii:

mif ili

real'nost',"

Rossiia i

musul'manskii

mir,

10

(112),

2001, Moscow,

43-48 and

Magomedov,

"Chto

strashnee vakhkhabizma." For a

thoroughgoing

denunciation

of

"Wahhabism"

by

a

pro-Shi'i/pro-Sufi

author see

Algar,

Wahhabism;

cf.

Khaled

M.

Abou

El

Fadl,

And God Knows the

Soldiers,

University

Press of

America,

Lanham-New

York-London, 2001,

passim.

23

For

a

notable

exception

see

Bobrovnikov,

Musul'mane

Severnogo

Kavkaza,

pp.

90-97;

here the

author describes the

rise of radical Islam in

the Northern

Caucasus

as a revival of the

age-old

Caucasian tradition of "noble"

banditry

(abrechestvo),

whose

representatives

use

religious

rhetoric as an

ideological

cover

and

means of

legiti-

mization.

24

For a

typical example

of this

approach

see:

Shermatova, "Tak

nazyvaemye,"

passim;

cf.

Khasan

Dzutsev and Abram

Pershits,

"Vakhkhabity

na Severnom

Kav-

kaze-religiia,

politika

i

sotsial'naia

praktika,"

VestnikRossiskoiAkademii

Nauk, 68/

12, 1113-1116;

here the authors

seek to

demonstrate the historical

continuity

be-

9



9/25

ALEXANDER

KNYSH

Over the

past

ten

years,

accounts

in

contemporary

Russian

press

and media broadcasts of Muslim movements in the territories of

the

former Soviet Union have grown increasingly negative.25One should,

however,

point

out that such

negative

attitudes

predated

the

col-

lapse

of

the Soviet Union.

They

were

in

evidence

already

in

the

early

1980s and

were

determined,

in

part, by

the

fear of

a

global

Islamic

"explosion"

in the

aftermath of the

Iranian Revolution

and the Soviet

Army's

debacle

in

Afghanistan.

On a more

popular

level these

nega-

tive

perceptions

were fed

by

the

fear that Muslim

ethnic

groups

would soon

"outbreed" the

Russians to become

the

majority popu-

lation

of

the

Soviet Union.26

The

negative

tendency

in

Russian

public

discussions of

Islam and

Muslims

gained

further

momentum after

the dissolution of

the Soviet

Union and the

discrediting

of the

official

Communist

notions

of

"internationalism"

and the

"friendship

of all

nations." The

dramatic

change

in

Russia's

geo-political position

and its

withdrawal from

its

former allies in

the

Middle East over

the

past

decade have

absolved

Russian politicians, journalists and academics from paying lip ser-

vice to

such

"discredited" and

"ideologically-driven"

conceptions.27

tween Arabian

"Wahhabism"

and its

"reincarnation" in the

Northern

Caucasus in

the

1990s;

cf. Leonid

Alaev and Yuri

Tikhonov,

"Vakhkhabity

v

Britanskoi

Indii,"

Aziia i

Afrika

segodnia,

3

(524),

2001,

42-45;

in

this

study,

the

authors draw

a

par-

allel

(far-fetched

it

seems to

me)

between

the Barelvi

movement in the

Indian Sub-

continent and

the situation in

the

Northern

Caucasus in the

1990s.

25

Vladimir

(Archbishop

of

Tashkent

and Central

Asia),

"Is

there

'Islamic

threat'

[sic ]?" Russia and theMoslemWorld,10

(100),

Moscow,

2000,

16-20; Murtazin,

"Mus-

lims and

Russia,"

"Byt'

musul'maninom v

Rossii

(interv'iu

predsedatelia

Soveta

muftiev

Rossii

Ravilia

Gainutdina),

Literaturnaia

gazeta,

17-20

October,

2001;

for a

fine

analysis

of

popular

Russian

attitudes

toward the

idea

of the

introduction of

sharT'anorms

into the lives of

Russian

Muslims

see

Bobrovnikov,

Musul'mane Sever-

nogo

Kavkaza,

264-272.

26

This

view was

particularly

widespread

among

the

Soviet

military,

who

were

concerned

by

the

steep

increase

of

Central

Asian

ethnicities

among

the new

draft-

ees and

their

tendency

to

seclude

themselves from

the rest of the

corps;

the

author's

personal

impressions

during

his

service

in

the

Soviet

Army

in the

late

1970s

and

in

the Soviet Navy, as a reserve officer, in the mid-1980s.

27

See,

e.g.,

Georgii

Mirskiy,

"Islamic

Fundamentalism and

International Ter-

rorism,"

CentralAsia

and

the

Caucasus,

6

(12), 2001,

28-37.

Cf.

"Imidz

sovremennykh

musul'man na

territorii

Rossiskoi

Federatsii"

(a

round-table

discussion

organized

by

the

periodical

Nezavisimaia

gazeta),

Rossiia i

musul'manskii

mir,

1

(115), 2002,

23-

34,

especially,

27-29;

Iurii

Kagramanov,

"Islam:

Rossiia i

Zapad,"

in

Novyi

Mir,

7

(July

2001),

137-157.

10



10/25

"WAHHABISM"

S A RHETORICAL

OIL

It is now an

"us-versus-them"

situation,

in

which Russia's

new

iden-

tity

is

routinely

seen as determined

first

and

foremost

from

its alle-

giance to Orthodox Christianity.28The violent conflicts on the fringes

of the former Soviet

Empire, especially

in

Nagornyi

Karabagh

and

Tajikistan,

and

later also in

Chechnya

and

Daghestan,

have contrib-

uted to the

already strong

anti-Muslim bias of Russian

media outlets

and,

to a lesser

extent,

academic

publications.

This

process

reached

its

peak following

the

string

of

apartment-complex

bombings

in

Moscow and South Russia in

September

1999,

and

more

recently,

the events

of

September

11

2001

in

the U.S.29

While the

alleged

perpetrators

of

the former remain at

large,

the

overwhelming

ma-

jority

of

Russians are convinced that

these

tragic

events

were orches-

trated

by

the

Chechen and

Daghestani

separatists

led

by

their

field

commanders

Shamil

Basaev and Khattab. The duo are

usually por-

trayed by

the Russian

media as

rabid

"Wahhabis".30

In

light

of the

protracted

military

conflicts

in

Chechnya,

Afghani-

stan

and

Tajikistan,

the

actual or

imaginary

Muslim

resurgence

in

Russia and its former satellites has come to be seen by many Rus-

sians as a

grave

threat to

Russia's

stability,

if

not to its

very

existence

as a

sovereign

"Christian"

state.

Occasional calls

from

some Russian

political analysts

and commentators not

to

exaggerate

the "Islamic

threat" and

not to

paint

all

Muslims

with

the

same brush3' have

not

changed

the overall

negative

view

of

Islam

and its

followers

among

the Russian

public

at

large.

The

war

in

the

Balkans,

in

which NATO

forces supported the Muslim Kosovars and Bosnians against the

28

Valerii

Dzalagoniia,

"Islam

na

pereput'e,"

Rossiia i

musul'manskii

mir,

5

(119),

2002, 45-52,

which

quotes

a

contemporary

Tatar

scholar as

saying

that "Russian

civilization as such

does not

exist;

there is

only

Russian

Orthodox

civilization,"

51.

29

"Imidz

sovremennykh

musul'man,"

25;

cf.

V.

Shevelev and A.

Kaid

Musaed,

"'Islamskaia

ugroza'

kak

teoreticheskaia

problema

sovremennoi

sotsiogumanitarnoi

mysli,"

Izvestiia

vuzov.

Severokavkazskii

egion,

Rostov-on-Don,

3

(2001),

25-42;

Mikhail

Epshtein,

"Zametki

o

chetvertoi

mirovoi,"

Zvezda,

5

(May

2002),

203-214.

30

Shermatova,

"Tak

nazyvaemye,"

408-416 and Vladimir

Pavlov,

"Po sledam

'Chernogo

araba',"

Obozrevatel'-Observer,

(2002),

30-38;

Mariia Beloklokova and

Aleksandr

Chuikov,

"Kto

finansiruet

chechenskikh

boevikov?",

Izvestiia,

26

Janu-

ary,

2002.

31

Aleksei

Malashenko,

Islamskie

orientiry,

165-169

et

passim;

Svetlana

Popova

and

Andrei

Petrovskii,

"Konflikt

tsivilizatsii

suschestvuet

v

umakh

politikov,"

Izvestiia,

22

December,

2001.

11



11/25

ALEXANDER

KNYSH

Christian

Serbs,

was

seen

by many

Russian

public figures

as an

act

of

betrayal

of the "Christian" cause

by

the

wrong-headed

members

of the Western military coalition. While most ordinary Russians are

not

familiar

with the

Huntingtonian

"clash-of-civilizations"

thesis,32

I

have

little

doubt

that

they

would

eagerly

subscribe to

it,

as

they

tend to see the recent and

ongoing

ethnic conflicts in the

former

Soviet Union as driven

by incompatible

religious

and moral

values.33

Mention should

also

be made

of

the

change

in the Russian

pub-

lic

perception

of the Arab-Israeli

conflict,

as

many

Russians

have

in-

creasingly

come to

see

the conflict

in

Israel-Palestine from the

Israeli

perspective,

that

is,

as Israel's

legitimate

struggle against

Arab/

Muslim

terrorism.34 After the

apartment

bombings

in

Moscow and

South

Russia,

it is

only

natural

that

many

Russians

have

come

to

identify

themselves with Israeli victims of

"Muslim

terrorists,"35

es-

pecially

since

the

latter

can

be

construed

as

analogues

of

the

Chechen

separatists,

who,

like

Palestinians,

are bent

on

destroying

the

territorial

integrity

of their

respective

states.

The Russian Orthodox Church has also contributed to the increas-

ingly

dim view

of Islam

among

the

Russians. It has

historically pos-

ited

itself as the sole

legitimate

guarantor

of

"genuine"

Russian

cultural and

moral

values. No wonder

therefore

that its

present

leadership

is

innately

suspicious

of

any religious

denomination in

its

traditional

spheres

of influence.36 In

this

connection,

one should

point

out that over the

past

decade the

influence of

the

Russian

church has grown dramatically at all levels of Russian society, includ-

ing

policy-making

bodies

and the

media.37

Despite

their

lip

service

32

It is

widely

used as an

explanatory

model

by many

Russian

analysts,

see,

e.g.,

Shevelev and

Kaid

Musaed,

"'Islamskaia

ugroza"'

and

Popova

and

Pertovskii,

"Konflikt

tsivilizatsii."

33

Mirskiy,

"Islamic

Fundamentalism," 33-37;

"Imidz

sovremennykh

musul'man,"

23-34;

cf.

Tariq

Ali,

The Clash

of

Fundamentalisms,

Verso,

London and

New

York,

2002,

273.

34

Mirskiy,

"Islamic

Fundamentalism,"

30-31 and

36.

35"Kak zhit'

dal'she?"

Argumenty

i

fakty,

44

(Oct.

30,

2002).

36

Dmitrii

Furman,

"Zeleznyi

zanaves

pravoslaviia,"

Obschaia

gazeta,

21-27

Feb.,

2002;

Dzalagoniia,

"Islam

na

pereput'e,"

50-51;

for a

rare

attempt

to

counter

nega-

tive

attitudes

toward Islam

among

the

Russian

clergy

and

public

at

large,

see

Vladimir,

"Is

there 'Islamic threat'?"

37Alexander

Agadjanian,

"Revising

Pandora's Gifts:

Religious

and

national

iden-

tity

in

the

post-Soviet

societal

fabric,"

Europe-Asia

Studies,

53/3

(2001),

473488.

12



12/25

"WAHHABISM" S A RHETORICAL OIL

to

religious

tolerance,

the leaders

of

the Russian

Orthodox Church

from the

patriarch

down view Islam

as a

dangerous

and

unwelcome

rival, whose values and practices are at odds with those of the ma-

jority

of Russians.38

"Wahhabism"

s the Answer:

An

intricate

intertwining of

discursive

strands

It

is

against

the

background

of

this

complex

and unstable ideo-

logical landscape

that one should view the discussions

of

the

"Wahhabi" threat in the contemporary Russian media. Many Russian

journalists

and media

personalities, including

those

who,

during

the

Soviet

era,

had demonized

the

Sufi

brotherhoods of

the

Caucasus

and Central Asia

by

comparing

them to

"clandestine Masonic

orga-

nizations,"

now have come to see

them

as

a

"lesser evil"

in

compari-

son to the

"genuine

and

deadly

threat"

posed by

"Wahhabi"

fundamentalism.39

Analogous

to the

principle

"my enemy's enemy

is my friend", former Russian critics of "Sufism" have come to praise

it as a more

tolerant

and

therefore

acceptable

version of

Islam,

whose

emphasis

on

individual

freedom,

spiritual

quest

and

self-perfection

makes

it

compatible

with the construction of a

new civil

society

in

Russia.40

Consequently,

"Sufism",

according

to

many

commentators,

should be

encouraged

and

supported by

the secular

authorities of

the

Muslim

republics

in order to forestall

the

impending

onslaught

of

the "militant" and

"retrograde"

ideology

of "Wahhabism".41

38

The

negative

views of Islam

among many

members of

the Russian

clergy

are

fed,

in

part, by

the

growing

numbers

of

purported

converts to Islam

among

ethnic

Russians

(anecdotal

evidence collected

by

the

author

during

his

visits to

Moscow

and St.

Petersburg

in

2000-2002;

there is no

statistical

evidence to substantiate such

claims).

It should

be

pointed

out,

however,

that

similar fears are

expressed by

the

Russian

Church

authorities

about the

proselytizing

activities in Russia of

various

Christian

denominations

and

"Oriental" sects.

39

Mirskiy,

"Islamic

Fundamentalism,"

34-37;

Anatolii

Savateev,

"Dagestan:

istoki

fundamentalizma v

bednosti,"

Rossiia

i

musul'manskii

mir,

10

(112),

2001, 63-68;

according

to the

author,

whereas "Islamic

extremism" is

characterized

by

"rigidity"

and "lack

of

tolerance"

vis-a-vis all other secular

and

religious

systems

of

thought,

"the

tariqas

demonstrate the

ability

to

integrate

into

contemporary

civil

society,"

67;

since no

compelling

evidence is

provided

to

substantiate this

claim,

one is

expected

to take it

for

granted.

40

Savateev,

"'Vakhkhabit'

'vakhkhabitu"',

2

(535),

2002,

6-8.

41

Roy,

"Islam et

politique,"

56-57;

Shermatova,

"Tak

nazyvaemye,"

413-418;

13



13/25

ALEXANDER KNYSH

The media

campaign

in

Russia aimed at

demonizing

the

"Wah-

habi" sect

gained

momentum

in

1998,

when several

"Wahhabi"42

communities in the Buinaksk district of Daghestan declared their

independence

of the central

authority

in the

republic's capital

Ma-

khachkala.43

Muslim leaders of four local

villages

proclaimed

them

to be "enclaves"

of

sharna

legislation,

which were

not

subject

to

the

"infidel" rule

of the secular

government

of

Daghestan.

Armed mi-

litias were created to enforce the

precepts

of

the sharfa

among

the

locals and state

police

units

were

expelled

from the

"Wahhabi"

con-

trolled areas. These

declarations

nearly

coincided

with

several

armed

attacks on

a Russian

military

base

in

nearby

Buinaksk. The reasons

for

the

Daghestani

uprising

are

complex

and need not

be

detailed

here.44

What matters is that it was

presented

by many analysts

and

politicians

as

the

beginning

of a "Wahhabi"

revolution that threat-

ened to

engulf

the

entire Northern Caucasus

and,

potentially,

Cen-

tral Asia as

well.

The

anti-"Wahhabi"

rhetoric

in

the

Russian media

and

analytical

literature became particularly pervasive in August-September 1999,

when a

Chechen-Daghestani

force led

by

the

popular

Chechen field

commanders,

Shamil

Basaev and

Khattab,

invaded

north-western

Daghestan

(the

Botlikh

region)

allegedly

under the

pretext

of

help-

ing

their

fellow "Wahhabis" n

their

unequal

struggle against

the cor-

Bibikova,

"Fenomen

'vakhkhabizma'," 49-51;

for a

dissenting

view

that

presents

"Sufi

Islam" as

equally

intolerant

and totalitarian see

Makarov,

Ofitsial'nyi

i

neofitsial'nyi

islam, 3-7; cf. Magomedov, "Chto strashnee vakhkhabizma," passim; Mikhail

Roshchin,

"Who Holds the

Key

to the Chechen

Problem:

Summary

of a seminar

held at the

Moscow

Carnegie

Center,

19January,

2000,"

available

at

http://www.ca-

c.org/journal/engOl1_2000/02.roshchin.shtml.

42

It should be

pointed

out that the

leaders of

these

communities

considered

the term

"Wahhabism" and

"Wahhabis" to be

derogatory

and

demanded

that the

Daghestani

authorities

not

apply

them to their

movement,

Savateev,

"'Vakhkhabit'

'vakhkhabitu',"

3

(536),

2002,

25.

43

For

detailed accounts of

these

developments

see

Makarov,

Ofitsial'nyi

i

neofitsial'nyi,

passim,

Savateev,

"Dagestan"

and

idem.,

"'Vakhkhabit'

'vakhkhabitu',"

passim.

44

Most

observers

attribute this

popular

action

to

the

rampant

corruption

of

the

republican

authorities,

political persecutions

against perceived

or

real

"Wahhabi"

groups

by

local

religious

and

political

authorities,

ethnic divisions

(e.g.,

Avars ver-

sus

Dargins),

as well as the turf

wars of

local

mafias,

which

represent

different ethnic

groups

and

economic

interests,

see

Makarov,

Ofitsal'nyi

i

neofitsal'nyi

islam,

16-28;

Savateev,

"'Vakhkhabit'

'vakhkhabitu',"

2

(535), 2002, 6-12; Roshchin,

"Dagestan

and

the War

Next

Door";

Ware et

al.,

"Political

Islam,"

passim.

14



14/25

"WAHHABISM" S

A

RHETORICAL OIL

rupt government

of the

Republic

of

Daghestan

and its

Russian

backers.45After the

invading

force was

repelled by

the Russian

troops

and the Daghestani militia loyal to the Daghestani government in

Makhachkala,

the rebellious

Daghestani

villages

that had

proclaimed

the rule

of

the sharna were declared

by

the

Daghestani

authorities

"nests of terrorism" and

were

attacked

by

Russian

troops

and

Daghestani

militia. After

almost

two weeks of bombardment and air

attacks

they

were reduced to

rubble

and

eventually

forced to sur-

render.46

The

fierce resistance

put

up by

their

defenders,

who

were

identified as Daghestani and Chechen "Wahhabis", was attributed

to their

support by

militant Islamic

organizations

based in Saudi

Arabia,

Kuwait, UAE, Yemen,

Sudan,

and

Afghanistan.47

"Wahhabi"

ideas and

practices

disseminated

among

the

rebels

by

these

organi-

zations

along

with the financial and

logistical

aid were cited

by

the

Russian media as the

primary

motivation

and

driving

force behind

the

hostilities

in

Daghestan

and

Chechnya.

After

the destruction of

the

villages,

Daghestani

authorities launched an

all-out

campaign

against

"Wahhabis"

and their

"sympathizers,"

during

which

security

agents

would "seize

any

young

man

suspected

of

being

Wahhabi".48

Following

the

"liberation"

of

Daghestan

from the

Basaev-Khattab

rebel

army,

hostilities were transferred to

Chechnya.

"The

Republic

of Ichkeria" was

declared a hotbed of

international

Islamic terror-

ism,

which had to be

extinguished by

all

means

necessary.

The al-

leged

"meddling"

of

foreign powers

and

organizations

sympathetic

to militant "Wahhabism" offered the Russian military a handy ex-

planation

of its

humiliating

defeat

at the

hands

of

Chechen

separat-

ists

in

the 1994-1996

war. This

early

failure and

the current

stalemate

in

the

Russo-Chechen

hostilities,

despite

the

initial

victories

of

the

45

See

an

interview with Shamil

Basaev

in

Bobrovnikov,

Musul'mane

Severnogo

Kavkaza,

92-95.

46

Roshchin,

"Dagestan

and the

War Next

Door,"

6-7.

47

Konstantin

Poliakov,

"Vliianie

vneshnego faktora na radikalizatsiiu islama v

Rossii v 90-e

gody

XX

veka,"

Rossiia

i

musul'manskii

mir,

11

(113),

2001,

32-49;

Beloklokova and

Chuikov,

"Kto

finansiruet."

48

Roshchin,

"Dagestan

and

the War Next

Door,"

8;

cf.

Milrad

Fatullaev,

"Na

vtorom

etape operatsii

v

Dagestane

stali razoruzhat'

boevikov v Karamakhi i

Chabanmakhi,"

Nezavisimaia

gazeta, Aug.

31,

1999;

tellingly,

the author

warns au-

thorities

that "Wahhabism"

is "a

political

rather than

religious

phenomenon"

and

that "one

should not

paint

all

'Islamists'

(islamisty)

with

the same

brush."

15



15/25

ALEXANDER

KNYSH

Russian

army

in late

1999-early

2000,

were

conveniently

attributed

by

its

commanders and

press

services to

the

generous

ideological,

financial and logistical support from "Muslim terrorist organizations"

based

in

Taliban-controlled

Afghanistan.49Vague

and

usually

unveri-

fiable

references

to

elusive

"foreign

detachments" led

by

"Wahhabi"

commanders from Saudi

Arabia,

the Gulf and

Yemen abound

in

the

reportage

of the

second

Russo-Chechen

war,50

which is

closely

cen-

sored

by

the Russian

military

command

in

the Northern Caucasus.51

Following

the

August

1998 attacks

against

American

embassies

in

Africa,

the

Russian press and political commentators routinely linked

the

presence

of

foreign

Islamic militants

in

Chechnya

and

Central

Asia

to

the

international terrorist

networks headed

by

Usama bin

Ladin and his

lieutenants. While

evidence

of

al-Qa'ida's

support

for

the

Chechen resistance has been

rather

scarce,52

the

events of

Sep-

tember

11,

2001

have

gone

a

long

way

in

lending

credibility

to such

assertions,

at

least

in

the

eyes

of the

Bush

administration.53

The

49Savateev, "'Vakhkhabit' 'vakhkhabitu'," Aziia i Afrika segodnia, 2 (535), 2002,

10;

Gennadii

Troshev,

Moia

voina, Moscow,

Vargius,

2002, 36-37,

84-85, 168-177,

348-355,

etc.

50

See,

e.g.,

Pavlov,

"Po

sledam

'chernogo

araba',"

passim;

Savateev,

"'Vakhkhabit'

'vakhkhabitu',"

9-10; Shermatova,

"Tak

nazyvaemye,"

408-425;

Bibikova,

"Fenomen

'vakhkhabizma'," 49-57;

similar

opinions

are

expressed by

authors

of most of the

publications

cited in the

present

study;

for a more

balanced

assessment of the role

of

"foreign fighters"

in Russia's

war with

Chechnya,

see New York

Times,

Dec.

9,

2001

and

Washington

Post,

April

26,

2003;

realistic

estimates

suggest

the

presence

of some

200-300

foreign fighters

in

Chechnya

in

1999-2000.

Some

analysts

argue

that

this

number includes both Middle Easterners (mostly Pakistanis and Arabs) and Mus-

lims from the

republics

of

the

former Soviet

Union,

see Malashenko

and

Trenin,

Vremiai

iuga,

102-103.

51

For

evidence

of

"foreign

involvement"

in

the Russo-Chechen

conflict

see

"Armeiskii

spetsnaz

dobyl fotografii

Maskhadova s

mezhdunarodnymi

terroristami,"

Lenta.ru,

Jan.

20,

2003;

"V

Shalinskom raione

unichtozheny

arabskie

naemniki,"

ibid.,

Jan.

27, 2003;

"Chechneskie

boeviki ne

smogli

dovezti

'Iglu'

do mesta

terakta,"

ibid.,

March

3,

2003;

"Federaly razgromili

bandu

alzirtsa

Mohammeda

Kaddura,"

ibid.,

March

10,

2003.

52

Malashenko and

Trenin,

Vremia

iuga,

99-105;

"Al-Qaeda

Suspect

Tells of

Chechnya Link," BBC News, WorldEdition (available online at BBC.com), 29 Oct.,

2002;

"Ispanskaia

iacheika

'al-Kaedy' gotovilas'

k

teraktam v

Chechne,"

Letna.ru,

Jan.

24,

2003;

Andrei

Riskin,

"Shahidy vzryvaiut

federal'nye

tyly,"

Nezavisimaia

gazeta,

112,

(June

6,

2003).

53

Mikhail

Roshchin,

"Rhetoric

Clouds of 'War

On

Terrorism'",

Perspective,12/

2

(November-December

2001)

available at

http://www.bu.edu/isip/voll2/roshchin.

html;

Vasilii

Bubnov,

"Ben

Laden

pomirit

Rossiiu i

S. Sh.

A.",

Pravda.ru,

Apr.

27,

2003.

16



16/25

"WAHHABISM"

S A RHETORICAL OIL

recent

hostage-taking

tragedy

in

a

Moscow theater54 and

suicide

attacks on

the

Russian

troops

stationed

in

Chechnya

and

Chechen

troops loyal to Moscow were also attributed to Basaev and his

"Wahhabi"

terrorists.55

From

the

outset,

the

secular

post-Communist

(some

would

say

"neo-Communist"56)

regimes

of

Central Asia and of some North Cau-

casian

republics

of Russia have viewed Islamic

political

activism

as

the

greatest

challenge

and

the

gravest

of threats to

their,

for

the

most

part,

authoritarian and

oppressive

rule. This

perception

on

the

part

of the new leaders of some Central Asian

and Caucasian re-

publics springs

from their

lack of

Islamic

legitimacy,

which

they

try

to

overcome

by

paying lip

service to the

(first

and

foremost)

cul-

tural and scientific achievements of Islamic

civilization and

by

very

cautious

attempts

to

sponsor

a

moderate revival

of Islamic

symbol-

ism and educational

institutions.57

Usually

these

half-hearted gestures

fail

to

placate

their Islamic

critics both inside

and outside their

countries,

as such critics view them as

insincere,

cynical

and

oppor-

tunistic. Faced with the criticisms of their domestic policies by per-

ceived or real "Islamist"

groups,

the

"neo-Communist" rulers

routinely

couch their

rejoinders

in an

anti-"Wahhabi" idiom.58 The

54

For an

eyewitnessreport

of

one

of the

hostages,

see

Tatiana

Popova,

Nord-Ost

glazami

zaloznitsy,

Vagrius,

Moscow,

2002.

55

Artem

Vernidub,

"Baraev

deistvoval

vslepuiu,"

Gazeta.ru,

Oct.

31,

2002

avail-

able

at

wysiwyg://http://www.gazeta.ru/firstplace.shtml;

Sergei Iugov,

"Dom

pravitel'stvavzorval odnonogii," Pravda.ru,March 19, 2003 available at http://

politics.pravda.ru/politics/2003/1/1/5/8606_Basaev.html.

For

a

Western

perspec-

tive see Andrew

McGregor,

"AmirAbu

al-Walidand

the

Islamic

Component

of

the

Chechen

War,"

Central

Asia-Caucasus

Analyst,

Johns

Hopkins

University,

http://

www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1000.

ccording

to

unverified

re-

ports,

Shamil

Basaevhas

recentlyacknowledged

his

role

in

orchestrating

he

Moscow

attack.

56

See,

e.g,

Roy,

"Islamet

politique,"

58.

57

Shermatova,

"Tak

nazyvaemye,"

04-408;

Cornell and

Spector,

"Central

Asia,"

194-196.

58

Ivan Aleksandrov, "Real'na li islamskaia ugroza Uzbekistanu," Rossiia i

musul'manskii

mir,

12

(114),

2001,

64-69;

typical

of this

rhetorical

exercise is the

statement of

the

minister of

internal affairs

of the

Karachai-Circassian

epublic,

who

described

"Wahhabism" s a

"time-bomb"

hat must

be

defused at all

costs,

see

Ruslan

Levshukov,

"Religioznyi

ekstremizm

v

Karachaevo-Cherkesii,"

Rossiia

i

musul'manskii

mir,

1

(115),

2002,

42-46;

see

also

Savin,

"Religiozny

ekstremizm,"

passim;

Emelianova

(Emel'ianova),

"Tainoe

iavnoe,"47;

for a

helpful

summary

of

17



17/25

ALEXANDER

KNYSH

critics

are

summarily

condemned

as

"radicals,"

"extremists" and "ter-

rorists"

on the

payroll

of

foreign

powers.

The term

"Wahhabism"

is

deployed by the "neo-Communist" rulers consistently and indiscri-

minately

against anyone

who

dares to raise his voice

against

the in-

equities

of their

rule.59 These verbal invectives are often

followed

by

ruthless

suppression

of

anything

that can

be

interpreted

as "Islam-

ist"

opposition.60

One

might

venture a

guess

that

if

"Wahhabism"

had

never

existed,

presidents

Karimov of

Uzbekistan,

Shaymiev

of

Tatarstan

and

their

colleagues

in the

Northern

Caucasus would

have

invented it.

Or,

perhaps,

invent it

they

did?

Interestingly,

the anti-

"Wahhabi"

invectives

in

the Russian secu-

lar

media and in the

public

pronouncements

of the

"neo-Commu-

nist" leaders

are

often

reiterated

by

the

official Muslim

clergy

of the

Russian Federation

affiliated

with

the so-called

"spiritual

director-

ates"

of

various ethnic

groups

and

regions

of the Russian

Federa-

tion.

Many

of

its

representatives,

from the

supreme

mufti

down to

the

imam-khatib f a

local

mosque,

have

gone

on

record

as vocal critics

of "Wahhabi" tenets, which they dismiss as contrary to the "tradi-

tional"

Islam

of the Muslim

communities

in

Russia.61

The

rhetoric

the debates over

"Islamic radicalism" in

the

Russian

media,

see

Malashenko,

Islamskie

orientiry,

118-120.

59

Ilkhamov,

"Uzbek

Islamism," 44-46;

Vitali

Ponomariov,

"The

Cause of

Insta-

bility

in

Uzbekistan-Political

Reprisals Against

Muslims,"

Russia

and the Moslem

World,

12

(102),

2000, 35-37;

cf.

Malashenko,

Islamskie

orientiry,

119,

which cites an

episode

in

which accusations of "Wahhabism"

was

used

by

a

criminal

group

to elimi-

nate its

business

rival in

Kabardino-Balkariia;

see also

Malashenko

and

Trenin,

Vremia

iuga,

96,

which

mentions the

closure,

in

1999,

of

some

200

religious

organizations

in the

Northern

Caucasus on

charges

of

supporting

"Wahhabism"

and

"religious

extremism,"

cf. Ware

et

al.,

"Political

Islam,"

297-298.

60

Ibid.,

and Ahmed

Rashid,

"Fires of Faith in

Central

Asia,"

World

Policy

Journal,

18/1

(spring

2001), 45-55; idem,

Jihad:

The rise

of

militant

Islam in Central

Asia,

Yale

University

Press,

New Haven and

London,

2002;

"Uzbek

Rights

Defender Sentenced

to

Imprisonment,"

Human

Rights

Watch

(HRW)

(http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/

09/uzbek0918.htm);

cf.

ibid.,

"Class

Dismissed:

Discriminatory expulsions

of Mus-

lim

students"

(11/12 October,

1999)

and

"Religious

Persecution of

Independent

Muslims in Uzbekistan"

(20

August,

2002).

61

See,

e.g.,

"Imidz,"

passim;

Murtazin,

"Muslims and

Russia," 138-141;

Khabut-

dinov,

"Wahhabism;"

Emelianova

(Emel'ianova),

"Tainoe i

iavnoe";

"Byt'

musul'ma-

ninom";

"Dukhovnyi

lider

Azerbaidiana

otvechaet

na

voprosy gazety

'Ekho"',

Rossiia

i

musul'manskii

mir,

3

(117), 2002, 195-200;

for

Chechnya,

see

Bereznoy,

"The Role

of Islamic

Factor,"

171 and

176;

cf.

Roshchin,

"Who

Holds the

Key,"

citing

the

former

mufti

of the

Chechen

Republic

and its

present de-facto

ruler

Ahmad-Hajji

Kadyrov.

18



18/25

"WAHHABISM" S A RHETORICAL

OIL

of the

Muslim officials is aimed

at

proving

that

"traditional,"

"Sufi"-

based

Islam is much better suited than "Wahhabism" to the

diverse

and multi-ethnic society of the Russian Federation, in which Mus-

lims will remain a

minority

for

the

foreseeable future.

By invoking

the

democratic values that have been embraced

by

Russian

society

since

the

early

1990s,

Muslim

critics of "Wahhabism"

argue

that

the

Muslim

community

of Russia can

ill

afford to treat its

non-Muslim

neighbors

as

unbelievers, who,

according

to

the

"Wahhabi"

tenets,

should

be

confronted with the choice to embrace

Islam or to face

death. Nor would it be reasonable, as required by the "Wahhabi"

doctrine,

to declare the

"Wahhabi"

understanding

of

Islam

to

be

the

only

authentic one

and

then

proceed

to

excommunicate or

forcefully

convert those who

disagree

with it.62This

demand,

argue

the

opponents

of

"Wahhabism"

among

Russian-Muslim

religious

leaders,

flies in

the face of the

hard-won

ideological

and

religious

pluralism

of

contemporary

Russia. Even

more

vocally

than

Russian

journalists,

representatives

of the

Muslim

religious

officialdom of the

Russian Federation

emphasize

the

"imported,"

"foreign"

character

of "Wahhabi" Islam.63This

type

of Islamic

piety, goes

the

argument,

may

have

been indeed

highly appropriate

for

the

uncouth

Bedouins

of

Saudi

Arabia,

who at the time of

Muhammad b. 'Abd

al-Wahhab

(d.

1792)64

were notorious for

their

religious laxity.

However,

the

strictures of

"Wahhabism"

are

totally

alien to

the

Muslims of

Daghestan,

Tatarstan,

Kabardino-Balkariia

and other

Muslim

regions

in Russia, who are committed to religious and cultural pluralism and

tolerance.65 In this

view,

the

incompatibility

of

"Wahhabi"

radical-

62

Emelianova

(Emel'ianova),

"Tainoe i

iavnoe,"

51;

"Dukhovnyi

lider,"

200.

63

Thus,

according

the

chairman of the

Spiritual Directory

of

the

Muslims of

Kabardino-Balkariia, Pshikhachev,

"Wahhabism is a

military-political

formation

that

is

funded

from

outside

[the

republic]";

as

such,

concludes

Pshikhachev,

it has to

be

crushed

by

law

enforcement

agencies,

Emelianova

(Emel'ianova),

"Tainoe

i

iavnoe,"

47

and 51.

64

For a

splendid

account of

the

intellectual roots of

the

Wahhabi

movement

see Michael

Cook,

"On the

Origins

of

Wahhabism,"

Journal

of

the

Royal

Asiatic So-

ciety,

Series

3,

2

(1992),

191-202.

65

Thus,

according

to "the

official Muslim

clergy

[of

the

Russian

Federation],

sympathy

for

Salafism and

'Wahhabism'

in Russia can

only

be

bought" by

"forces

interested in

the

spread

of Islamic

extremism,"

Emelianova

(Emel'ianova),

"Tainoe

i iavnoe"

(okonchanie),

Rossiia i

musul'manskii

mir,

5

(119),

2002,

66.

19



19/25

ALEXANDER KNYSH

ism with the

spirit

of "Russian Islam" is demonstrated

by

the fact

that

the

dress code for men and women

and the

comportment

of

the purported "Wahhabis" of Russia are often described as "Arab."66

What

can

be better evidence of

their

foreign

roots?

While

many

Muslim clerics of

Russia

agree

in

principle

with the

negative

view of "Wahhabism"

espoused by

secular

authorities,

they,

nevertheless,

have so far refused to

approve

the

proposed

ban

on

"Wahhabi" Islam

in the

Russian Federation.

The

refusal to do so

was

justified by

Ravil

Gainutdin(ov),

chairman of the Council

of

Rus-

sian

muftis, by

the

vagueness

of this

category, which,

in

his

opinion,

made

it

impossible

to differentiate between "Wahhabis" and non-

"Wahhabis" and thus to

implement

the ban

in

real life.67

Although

never

openly

stated,

the reluctance to endorse such a ban reflected

the

apprehension

on the

part

of the

religious

leaders of the Russian

Muslim

community

that it could be used as a

pretext

for

a

state crack-

down

on all

"suspicious"

Islamic

groups,

"Wahhabi"

or

not.68

As

already

mentioned,

in Russian

academic

and

analytical

litera-

ture, assessments of "Wahhabism" vary considerably. In many ways,

they

reflect

the

media and

popularjournalistic

portrayals

of this

phe-

nomenon outlined

above,

although

Russian

academics

tend to

pro-

vide far more

details

pertaining

to

the

history

of the movement and

its

position

vis-a-vis other trends and schools

of

thought

in

Islam. In

dealing

with the historical

roots

of

"Wahhabism",

Russian

academic

scholars and

political analysts

often

question

the

usefulness

of

this

term when applied to actual Islamic political movements (commonly

called

"Islamist")

on the

ground.69 Many

insist on

the use of the term

Salafism,

which,

in

their

view,

carries fewer

negative

connotations70

66

Tishkov,

Obschestvo,

340-342;

cf.

"Dukhovnyi

lider,"

196-197.

67

Paul

Gobble,

"Who is a

Wahhabi?",

Radio

Liberty/Radio

Free

Europe, July

7,

2000;

http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/07//F.RU.000707151509.html;

cf.

Levshukov,

"Religioznyi

ekstremizm," 44-45;

Emelianova

(Emel'ianova),

"Tainoe

i

iavnoe,"

47.

68

Radio

Liberty/Radio

Free

Europe, July 7, 2000.

69

For a

rather naive

attempt

to

prove

that

the

Arabic term

"Wahhabiyya"

is

incorrect

grammatically,

since it is

derived

from the name of

the

father

of the

founder of

the

movement

('Abd

al-Wahhab),

rather than from

that of his

son,

Muhammad Ibn 'Abd

al-Wahhab,

see

Zantiev,

"'Vakhkhabizm' v

Rossii,"

44-45.

70

Dmitri

Makarov,

Ofitsial'nyi

i

neofitsial'nyi

islam,

69-70;

Malashenko,

"Grianet

li s

Kavkaza,"

passim;

idem,

Islamskie

orientiry,

passim;

Poliakov,

"Vliianie

vneshnego

faktora,"

Rossiia i

musul'manskii

mir,

10

(112),

2001,

62-63.

20



20/25

"WAHHABISM" S A RHETORICAL

OIL

and

is,

moreover,

often used as a

self-denomination of various

Is-

lamic

political parties

and activist

groups

that outsiders

describe,

mis-

leadingly, as "Wahhabi". In academic and analytical accounts of

political

Islamic

movements

in

present-day

Russia conscientious

at-

tempts

to

gage

"Wahhabism"'s

potential

to launch and

sustain

anti-

government

and secessionist

movements7'

travel

side-by-side

with

Marxist-style

inquiries

into its social

and economic roots.72

Dire

pre-

dictions of

the

alleged potential

of "Islamic terrorism"

to undermine

the

very

foundations of

human civilization73

are offset

by

vigorous

dismissals of the

popular

fear of the

"Islamic

threat," including

that

of

"Wahhabism",

as

unrealistic and

overly

alarmist.74

Finally,

there

are those who

argue

that radical

Islam

in

Russia in

general

and in

the Caucasus in

particular

has

no future in

so far as

it

will

eventu-

ally

be

superceded

by

ethnic and

Documents

163082053 KnySh on Wahhabism