1973 Military Capabilities and American Foreign Policy

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American Academy of Political and Social Science

Military Capabilities and American Foreign PolicyAuthor(s): Graham T. AllisonSource: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 406, TheMilitary and American Society (Mar., 1973), pp. 17-37Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social

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MilitaryCapabilities nd AmericanForeignPolicy

By GRAHAMT. ALLISON

ABSTRACT:Can the availability of a rapid response capa-

bility lead the United States to intervene militarily in situa-

tionswhere,

without thoseready forces,

the U.S.governmentwould decide that military intervention was not required?

Secretary of Defense McNamara said no; Senator Richard

Russell said yes. After examining the basic approaches to

weapons selection that led McNamara and Russell to opposite

conclusions, this article reviews recent instances-Dienbien-

phu, Laos, Korea, the Bay of Pigs, and Vietnam-in which

the presence or absence of a ready military option may have

affected decisions about the use of force. A conclusion about

who had the better part of the argument provides a base for

drawing some implications concerning the full costs and bene-

fits of military capabilities and the responsibilities of the

secretary of defense.

Graham Allison is a Professor in the John F. Kennedy School of Government andthe Department of Government, at Harvard University. He is the head of the"Political Analysis" area of the Kennedy School's Public Policy Program. His publica-tions include Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971) andassorted articles in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, World Politics, and the American

Political Science Review.For help in preparing this article, the author is grateful to Fred A. Morris.

17



THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

If Americans ind it easy to go any-where and do anything, they willalwaysbe goingsomewhere nd doingsomething.

T HE issue was FDL: Fast Deploy-ment Logistics ships. Secretary of

Defense Robert McNamara proposedthese ships as part of the "balancedmixof airlift, sealift, and equipment pre-positioning to meet U.S. deploymentobjectives." This posturewould, in the

Secretary's words, enable the United

States "to respond promptly to clearthreats to our national interests and the

security of our allies . . . to deter and

to prevent such threats from expandinginto larger conflicts."

The epigraph expresses the view ofSenator Richard Russell, a seasonedobserver of American government.Faced with a choice about this specific

weapons system-FDL--Russellvoted

no on the grounds that creation of a

ready, rapid reaction capability wouldmake it more likely that in a crisis theU.S. government would decide to use

military force.Russell's aphorism played no part of

the systems analysis that led Mc-Namara to proposeFDL. Indeed, after

Congress had once denied funds for

FDL, McNamara's subsequent submis-sions of the proposal took explicit aimat the propositionthat "becauseof the

rapid response capability provided bythe FDL, we would be tempted tointervene in situations where our longrange best interest would dictate other-wise."2 McNamara denied the argu-ment any validity whatever: "I want to

emphasizethat the FDLs, per se, wouldin no way add to or subtract from our

1. Statement by Secretary of DefenseRobert S. McNamara before the House ArmedServices Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and the 1969 DefenseBudget, January 22, 1968, p. 139.

2. Ibid., p. 143.

commitments." McNamara's Assist-ant Secretary of Defense for SystemsAnalysis, Alain Enthoven, reconsiders

this question in his review'of Depart-ment of Defense programsfrom 1961 to1969. "The FDL," Enthoven notes,"ran into opposition from certain Con-

gressmenwho feared that it would onlyprovide the United States with more

capability to act as the world's police-man and thus increase the possibilityof our getting involved in more 'Viet-nams.'"4 But Enthoven finds these

fears unfounded on the grounds that"havingan efficientcapabilityshould be

separated from the question of politicalwisdom about when to use it." 5

As this juxtaposition of judgmentssuggests, Russell's approach to the

problem of force posture differed sub-

stantially from the approachof Messrs.McNamara and Enthoven. The aimsof this article are three:

1. to characterize he approachesthat

brought McNamara and Russell tosuch contraryconclusions;

2. to examine the central issue aboutwhich they disagreed: namely, whetherthe existence of a rapid response capa-bility could lead the United States tointervene militarily in situations where,in the absence of that

capability,the

United States would decide that mili-

tary intervention was not required;and3. to speculate about what an an-

swer to this question implies for future

military forces and for the responsibili-ties of the secretaryof defense.

These issues are usually, discussed

abstractly, with reference to some gen-eral,

unspecifiedcase. Clarification of

the dispute, however, demands a con-

3. Ibid.4. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith,

How Much Is Enough? Shaping the DefenseProgram, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and

Row, 1971), p. 238.5. Ibid.

18



MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

crete instance. Here, the question willbe examined with specific reference toFDL. The first two sections outline

briefly the two approaches to the prob-lem of selecting military forces. This

specification of the argument providesthe base for the third section's reviewof recent historical cases in which the

presence or absence of ready militarycapabilities may have affected decisionsabout the use of force. The last twosections draw some implicationsof this

argumentfor the broader issues of U.S.

military forces and the secretary ofdefense's responsibilities.

FROMCOMMONSENSE TO PPBS

How should one think about the

problem of choosing military forces,that is, manpower and equipment?Faced with questions like the follow-

ing-How many divisions of troopsshould the U.S. maintain? or, How

many strategic missiles? or, Should we

buy FDLs?-how would the reader

proceed?Most people would, I think, start

down the path of common sense a lahome economics. The problem is oneof matching means and ends in the

light of some budget constraint. The

ends for which we maintain forces arenational security and foreign policy in-

terests, in particular the defense ofother nations important to the UnitedStates. The means for achieving these

objectives-deterring potential aggres-sors and defending when deterrencefails-are military forces capable of

performingspecific actions in particular

circumstances. Thus one should buythe military forces-divisions, FDLs, orwhatever-needed to provide the capa-bility, choosingamongalternativeforcesso as to purchasethe necessarycapabili-ties at the lowest cost-or to providethe greatest capability for any givenbudget.

The Planning-Programming-Budget-ing-System (PPBS) that became the

orthodoxy of defense analysis under

SecretaryMcNamarasimply makes thecommon-senseapproachmoresystematicand rigorous. According to Enthoven,

The fundamentaldea behind PPBS wasdecision-makingased on explicit criteriaof the national interest in defense pro-grams.. . . The main purposeof PPBSwas to develop explicit criteria, openlyand thoroughlydebatedby all interestedparties that could be used . . . as mea-sures of the need for and adequacyofdefenseprograms.

Defense Department analysts devotedan immense intellectual effort to speci-fying the links in the chain betweenU.S. national interests and particulardefense purchases.

How does PPBS approacha questionsuch as whether to buy FDLs? Secre-

tary of Defense McNamara's annualForce Posture Statement went to greatlengths to explainthe conceptualframe-work used in determining military re-

quirements. While this analysis canbecome complex and even technical, itneed involve no mysteries. The majorlinks in the chain of reasoning aboutFDL are accessibleto the carefulreaderof the Force Posture Statement.7

6. Ibid., p. 33. Enthoven and Smith's ex-cellent exposition of PPBS outlines a numberof other major strands in the approach, in

particular, comparisons of alternative forcesand judgments of cost-effectiveness. For the

purposes of this article, however, we willfocus on the central idea in PPBS; namely,structuring choices about defense posture.

7. The seventy plus billion dollars of pur-chases are separated on the basis of their

primary purpose or mission into "program

packages." The two principal programs are"Strategic Forces," which consist of capabili-ties for fighting nuclear wars, and "General

Purpose Forces," which consist of capabilitiesfor all military actions short of nuclear war."Airlift and Sealift Forces" form a third pro-gram aimed primarily at transporting generalpurpose forces. FDL was one item in theairlift and sealift package.

19




Table 1 summarizes the major ele-ments in PPBS calculations of forcesand quotes snippets from SecretaryMcNamara's final Force Posture State-ment that record his judgment abouteach of the elements as it affected hisdecision to recommendFDL.

The structure of the argument could

hardly be plainer. The need for gen-eral purpose forces arises primarilyfrom U.S. interests in other countries

expressed in our commitments to theirdefense. Commitments

giverise to con-

tingencies which U.S. forces must beable to meet. Defense policy judg-ments about the manner and method ofU.S. responses are translated into re-

quirementsfor specific forces which arechosen with the aim of providing the

necessary capability at the lowest cost.Enthoven and Smith spell out

the PPBS calculations about FDLs in

greater detail. Their story begins inpart III of Table 1, defense policy about

deployment. The basic question was:

Do we want to get there quicklyand in

largenumbersand pay the extra cost, ordo we wantto take ourtime, save money,and accept greater risks? A series oflandmarkstudies conducted n 1963 and1964 . . . addressedthis question. Thefirst of these studieslookedat alternative

deploymentstrategies for counteringanenemy assault. . . . The study comparedthree strategies,each requiringalternative

speeds of deployment:(1) a "forward"

strategy...; (2) a "defensive"trategy. . ; (3) an "intermediate"trategy ....

This studyconfirmed common ensecon-clusionderivedfrom World War II andKoreanexperience. During the first fewmonths of each war, the enemy sweptdown quicklyover a lot of territory,and

Americanand Allied forces had to spendmany months painstakinglypushinghimback .... In terms of the cost to fighta conventionalwar, the forwardstrategywas estimated to save more than $10billionover the defensivestrategy.8

8. Enthoven and Smith, How Much IsEnough?, pp. 235-36,emphasisadded.

Enthoven reports that "as a result ofthese studies, it was generally acceptedthat there was very great value to hav-

ing the ability to deploy forces rapidlyto reinforce Allied and U.S. forces inoverseas theaters."9 The question then

became, What combinationof transpor-tation and prepositioning would allowthe United States to achieve this objec-tive in the most cost-effective manner?Enthoven and Smith continue:

Through he joint effortsof the Services,

the JCS, and the SystemsAnalysisOffice,a mathematicalepresentationf the situ-ation-a model-was developedwhich,by1968, tied together some 3,000 separatefactors relating to the cost, capabilities,and limitationsof each major componentof U.S. mobility forces .... We couldcalculate the combinationof ships, air-

craft, and inventoriesof Army equipmentpre-stockedin overseas locations whichwould enable the United States to meet

any of these deployment bjectivesat theleast total systemcost. . . . Severalyearsof analysesof this kind suggested hat abalancedmix of airlift, sealift, and equip-ment prepositioningo meet U.S. deploy-ment objectives consisted of six C-5Asquadrons,14 C-141 squadronsand 30Fast DeploymentLogisticsships (FDLs);prepositionedquipmentn Europeand thePacific;a Civil ReserveAirFleet; and 460

commercial eneral-cargohips.10On the basis of these calculations,Enthoven recommendedto McNamaraand McNamara recommended to Con-

gress that the United States buy

thirty FDLs.

These detailed calculations are impor-tant. Readers seriously interested in

force posture should study them care-

fully. But the trees must not beallowed to obscure the forest.

What is the essence of this PPBS

approachto defense policy and military

posture? It is: first, conception of the

9. Ibid.,p. 236.10.Ibid.,pp.236-37.

20




TABLE 1-SUMMARY OF PPBS CALCULATIONS F FORCESQUOTINGECRETARY

MCNAMARA'S FINAL FORCEPOSTURESTATEMENT

I. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY,INTERESTS,

AND COMMITMENTS

-Our military posture remains rooted in acommitment to collective defense.... Whenthis Nation made the decision at the end ofWorld War II to base its own security on the

principle of collective defense, it was with the

hope that there could be created, in accordancewith the principles of the United Nations

Charter, a world in which even the smalleststate could look forward to an independentexistence, free to develop in its own way,unmolested

byits

neighbors,and free of fear

of armed attack or political domination bythe more powerful nations.a

-We sought to achieve this same high purposeby aligning ourselves with other like-mindednations in a series of multi-lateral mutual de-

fense treaties ... [in which] 40 odd sovereignnations bound together to defend their free-dom and prevent the further extension ofCommunist influence and hegemony.b

-The overallrequirementfor General PurposeForces is related not so much to the defense

of our own territory as it is to the support ofour commitments o othernations....c

II. CONTINGENCIES

-Each of these commitments gives rise to con-

tingencies for which we must plan.d

-Our policy now is to set the size of the General

PurposeForces so that we can simultaneously

meet the more probable contingencies.... Wemust provide, in addition to our NATO re-

quirements, the forces required to meet suchan attack in Asia as well as our commitmentsin the Western Hemisphere. Because of thebasic uncertainty inherent in estimates of such

requirements, we add to these forces a Stra-

tegic Reserve.e

a Statement by Secretary of Defense RobertS. McNamara before the House Armed ServicesCommittee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense

Program and the 1969 Defense Budget, January22, 1968, pp. 2-3, emphasis added.

b Ibid., p. 3, emphasis added.c

Ibid., p. 78, emphasis added.

III. DEFENCE POLICY: CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIES

FOR MEETING CONTINGENCIES

Defense policy consists of complex judgmentsabout a large number of interrelated issues in-

cluding: enemy capabilities; pre-attack warning;deployment strategy; interaction with enemyforces; length of war; reliance on tactical nuclear

weapons and nuclear deterrence; capabilities ofU.S. allies; and numbers of contingencies to bemet simultaneously. Judgments about each ofthese issues affected McNamara's calculationsabout FDLs. The critical choice was that of a

rapid deployment/forwarddefense

strategy.-The ability to respond promptly to clear

threats to our national interests and the

security of our allies possibly in more thanone place at the same time, can serve bothto deter and to prevent such threats from

expanding into larger conflicts.... The signi-ficance of a prompt response was illustrated

by our experience in the Korean war, wherewe came close to being pushed off the Korean

peninsula before we were finally able to stemthe attack and secure a beachhead for later

reinforcement.f

-Further study ... has opened up the possi-bility of an entirely new rapid deploymentstrategy.g

IV. COST-EFFECTIVEGENERAL PURPOSE FORCES(MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT)

-The key to this rapid deployment strategywas the very fast reaction time requiredof the

sealift, a fact which dictated that a ship

assigned to this role could not be used inpeace time for any other purpose such as

point-to-point cargo transport. Rather, theFast Deployment Logistics ships (FDLs)would be used either in the Forward Float-

ing Depot role, or be held in a ready statusin U.S. ports where heavy equipment couldbe quickly loaded when the need to deployarose.h

-Neither of the two equal cost alternativesto theFDL force can do as well in meetingtherequire-ments

ofa

rapid deployment strategy.'

d Ibid., p. 78, emphasis added.e

Ibid., p. 79.f Ibid., pp. 139-42.g Ibid., p. 141, emphasis added.h Ibid., p. 141, emphasis added.i Ibid., p. 143, emphasis added.

21




central problem as one of matchingmilitary forces to specific defense ob-

jectives in a cost-effective manner; and

second, definition of this problem as aprimarily intellectual job consisting offour major tasks: (1) defining U.S.national security, interests, and com-mitments clearly enough to measuretheir achievement; (2) specifying the

contingencies that U.S. forces musthave the capability to meet; (3) deter-

mining the form of the U.S. response;and

(4) comparingalternative forces so

as to select the cost-effective means for

satisfying specific requirements.Advocates of this approach devoted

themselves primarily to producinganalyses that defined each of these ele-

ments clearly, refined it to the point of

measurement,and identified means for

achieving objectives. Secondarily, they

tried to make actual Department ofDefense purchases conform to this

blueprint.And what about an argument like

Russell's? Couldn't the creation of

ready forces affect interpretations ofcommitments and inclinations tointervene?

Advocates of PPBS mostly denied ordismissedthe

possibilityof this kind of

feedback on the grounds that it con-fused the sequence of steps. Basicallythey seem to have thought of the

problem as essentially like that of

programminga computer:

first one selects the basicfunctions he wants the programto perform;

then, hedevises routinesfor performingthese functions

effectively;

then, he writes sub-routinesfor performing these routines

efficiently.

At each stage, ends determinemeans.Means should not, and need not, affectends. The decision to use militaryforce is a separate problem, one thatmust be faced by the president in the

lightof U.S.

objectivesand commit-

ments, unaffected by the existence of

any particularcapability.

"RUSSELL'SALTERNATIVE"

Senator Russell never presented adefinitiveaccount of his approachto the

problem of weapons selection. But

taking his aphorism as a clue, it is

possible to outline an approachroughly consistent with his view; hence"Russell's alternative."

According to this approach, PPBScalculations about cost-effective meansfor well-specifieddefenseobjectives con-stitute one piece of the problem. But

only one. Other pieces emerge fromthe fact that military forces are aninextricable strand in the unwieldyprocesses of the U.S. national securityestablishment. In consequence, it is

22




unreasonable to separate choices about

weapons systems from the larger prob-lem of managing these processes so as

to increase the probabilityof the Amer-ican government'smaking the preferreddecisions and taking the preferredactions.

The processesof the national securityapparatus can be characterizedcrudelyas follows:

1. Foreign policy problemsare inher-

ently difficult. Foreignpolicy problems

are inherently so complex that reason-able men can reach fundamentallyincompatible conclusions about theirsolution.

2. Decisions about the use of mili-

tary force are, and should be, "situa-tional." No one has been able to spec-ify an acceptable set of principles that

identify unambiguouslywhen and where

the United States should and should notuse military forces. Definition of U.S.interests and articulation of presump-tions about responses to contingenciesprovide useful guidelines. They donot permit deductions about particularcases. The numberof factors that are,and should be, taken into account in

deciding to use military force are toonumerous to be summarizedadequately

in a set of principles that yield deduc-tive choices. These factors include not

only American interests, commitments,and the estimated probabilityof successat various levels of cost and risk, butalso such equally important considera-tions as the immediate background,similarities with previous cases, thehistorical trend, and congressionaland

public moods.11

3. As a consequenceof 1 and 2, theindividuals involved in choosingwhetheror not to intervene militarily in a spe-

1l. For elaboration of this point, seeGraham Allison, Ernest May, and Adam

Yarmolinsky, "Limits to Intervention," For-

eign Affairs 48 (January 1970).

cific situation can, and do, and will dif-fer substantially about what should bedone. Rarely have the central actors

in the U.S. government unanimouslychosen to use military force. At anypoint in time, individuals differ sharplyover issues like whether the UnitedStates should respond to a NorthVietnamese attack on Thailand by theintroduction of American troops, orwhether the U.S. troops should aidThai counter-insurgencyefforts. Thesedifferences in conclusion about

militaryintervention stem from sharp disagree-ments about every link in the chain ofPPBS calculations and judgments-forexample,whetherGreece is importanttoU.S. security; how the U.S. commit-ment to Greece should be interpreted;whether the likelihood of a major So-viet attack on Europe is high enoughto justify U.S. maintenance of ready

forces to defend against it; how theU.S. should meet this attack if it oc-

curred; and whether this contingencyrequires ten or thirty rather thanseventeen active divisions.

4. Many differences in judgment are

organizationallygrounded. Individualshave separate responsibilitieswhich re-

quire them to focus on different issuesand thus encouragedifferencesin what

each sees and judges to be important.The president and Congress create or-

ganizations to pay special attention tosome aspect of a problem. Over time-and not much time is required-theseorganizations develop goals and inter-ests of their own related to their defini-tion of their problem. Thus, organi-zations' reactions to problems reflect

organizational prioritiesand

perspec-tives as well as the purposes for whichthe organizationswere created.

5. Capabilitiescreated to increasethegovernment'soptions by generating in-formation and alternatives that wouldotherwise be unavailable, also, and ofnecessity, create interests in, and often

23



THE ANNALSOF THE AMERICANCADEMY

lobbies for, the use of these capabilities.The creation of a capabilitybrings withit officials commissioned to search for

instancesin which that capability mightbe appropriatelyused, a flow of infor-mation about such problems and their

solutions, and groups with interests inthe exercise of that capability. Suchfactors tend to change other govern-ment officials' awareness of, attention

to, and judgments about the use ofthat capability.

In crises, governments tend to "gowith what they've got." Ready optionsdominate potential but not-so-availablealternatives. This resultsnot only fromthe logical truism that at any point intime a governmentmust choose amongactions that it is capable of taking, butalso from the empirical fact that dead-lines tend to narrow the options leaders

seriously consider, highlighting actionssubordinates are best equipped to

carry out.

Moreover, in time, capabilities createdemands. There seems no limit to thenumber of situations around the globethat might, in the judgment of somereasonable citizen, be improved bythe introduction of American militaryforces. Since 1945, we have witnessed

more than a hundred wars between na-tions and a hundred additional civil

wars, in each of which someone pre-ferred that U.S. troops try to play a

peace-keepingrole. One recalls Bangla-desh, Biafra, the Congo, Ruwanda, andNorthern Ireland. How many injus-tices are there today that, in the eyesof some, call for American militaryintervention? And the number of con-

ceivable contingenciesis limited only byone's imagination.

6. Given the fact of substantial dif-ferences among the participants whomake choices about the use of force,such choices must emerge from what isto some extent a bargaining process in

which different individuals, institutions,and substantive views are differentiallyadvantaged and disadvantaged.

If one accepts this rough characteri-zation of the process, then the selectionof a weapons system that creates a new

capability can importantlyaffect proba-bilities of actions. Capabilitiescan af-fect apparent costs and risks of the useof military force; the existence of a

capability can affect politicians' inter-

pretations of national interests, com-

mitments, and defense policies; capa-bilities can affect the advantages and

disadvantages of contending officialswithin a government. Capabilities cancreate temptations. While an issue likeFDL should not be decided apart from

judgments about deployment strategiesand calculations about economic costs,the choice cannot be made reasonably

without attention to its effect on thebalance of forces within the U.S. gov-ernment on questions of use.

In contrast with PPBS, the core ofRussell's alternative approachto weap-ons selection is: first, conceptionof thecentral problem as that of structuringthe processesof the U.S. governmentsoas to increase the probability of the

preferred decisions and actions about

the use of military force; and second,definitionof that problem as a primar-ily managerial ob in which (1) existingprocesses consist of numbers of largelyautonomous and intractable individualsand institutions; (2) each participant'sability to affect the behavior of otherindividuals and institutions is quitelimited; (3) fine tuning of these proc-esses is thereforeinfeasible-and highlyrefinedanalyses that requirefine tuningthus unnecessary and even unhelpful;(4) changing the process is essentiallya matter of gross adjustment; and (5)choices about readymilitary capabilitiesare one important means of makinggross adjustments.

24




THE CENTRAL ISSUE:

MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DECISIONS

TO USE FORCE

These two approaches to weaponsselection differ in many ways. Reviewof these differencesand careful exami-nation of the strengths and weaknessesof each approach are required, but inthis article, we must limit attentionto the central factual issue in the dis-

pute about FDL: namely, whether thecreation of ready military capabilitiescan contributesubstantially to the like-lihood that the U.S. government willdecide to use military force in somesituations where, without those readyforces, the U.S. government would de-cide not to intervene. Putting theMcNamara assertion as a question:Could the FDL, in some way, add toor subtract from our commitments?

Turning Enthoven's prescriptioninto aquestion: Can the possessionof an effec-tive capability be separated from the

questionof political wisdom about whento use it?

McNamara and Enthoven have an-swered these questions clearly. Buteven within the logic of PPBS, if theissue is taken to its strict logical con-

clusion, their answers are incorrect.

Consider a single rational decision-maker who in some scenarios prefers touse military forces. If he is given anadditional option that reduces the costsand risks of interventionin some situa-

tions, this should increase the probabil-

ity of his deciding to intervene.12 This

12. The extent of impact of an option on

probabilities of a single rational decision-

maker's actions would seem to depend onfurther assumptions about that actor's prefer-ences, risk orientation, and the ratio of changein costs and risks to the full costs and risksof the relevant class of action. Forcingbuyers of wedding licenses to appear in personat the purchasing office prevents few wed-

dings, whereas giving investors the option of

placing orders for common stock by tele-

might not be so if the decision-maker'scommitments to intervene consisted of

inescapable promises to perform speci-

fied actions in unambiguous circum-stances-and if he could act only wherecommitted. But U.S. commitments

promise"to meet the commondangerinaccordancewith its [national] constitu-tional processes" and to "assist the

Party or Parties so attacked by takingforthwith . . . such action as it [theUnited States] deems necessary"13-to

take operative lines from our Southeast

Asia Treaty Organization and NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)commitments. Thus, creating optionsthat affect ease and costs and risks ofaction should, in logic, affect the singlerational decision-maker'sinterpretationof where military intervention is justi-fied-given the costs and benefits ofaction.

Logic, however, is the nub of theargument. The issue is one of fact. Inrecent Americanhistory, has the avail-

ability of ready military options had

any significanteffect on decisions aboutthe use of force? Many formerDepart-ment of Defense officialsare inclined to

agree with McNamara and Enthoventhat the answer is no. In an excellentbut insufficientlynoted critique of U.S.

defense policy, former Assistant Secre-tary of Defense Paul Warnke considersthe issue of "limiting the options of theU.S. national security establishment."

Accordingto Messrs. Warnkeand Gelb,

it is difficult to accept that . . . [mili-tary] "leanness"makes a tough decision

significantly asier. Where the Presidentsits is at the head of the table-both

within the bureaucracyand within theAmericanpoliticalarena. Whenit comes

phone-rather than having to appearin per-son at the stock exchange or brokerage-substantiallyincreases the number of stocktransactions.

13. SoutheastAsiaCollectiveDefenseTreaty,art. 4; North AtlanticTreaty, art. 5.

25



THE ANNALSOFTHE AMERICANCADEMY

to the use of force . . . the President, his

views and values,will continue to be the"critical variable."14

Warnke and Gelb cite two cases in sup-port of their conclusion. "When itcomes to the use of force in particular,"they maintain, "Presidents can resisttheir bureaucracies,as Eisenhower didover Dienbienphu in 1954, and they canlead them, as Kennedy did with Laosin 1961."

These two cases deserve careful in-

spection. There now exists a rich his-

torical record about each. Here wemust summarizebriefly, at the risk ofcaricature. But we will note the judg-ments of historians who have studiedthese events.

Dienbienphu

In late 1953 and early 1954, the fallof Indochina seemed imminent.15 The

U.S. government faced the issue ofmilitary intervention. From the record,it appears that no one involved in the

intra-governmental debate questionedIndochina's value to U.S. securityinterests in the Far East. Rather,participants focused on the issue of the

desirability and feasibility of militaryintervention. Many participants, in-

cluding Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles and Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff ArthurWilliam Radford,recommendedU.S. air and naval action.

Army Chief of Staff Matthew Bunker

Ridgway disagreed. The PentagonPapers reproduces the Army position

14. Paul C. Warnke and Leslie H. Gelb,"Securityor Confrontation:The Case for aDefense Policy," Foreign Policy, no. 1

(Winter 1970-71), p. 20.

15. This summarydraws on The PentagonPapers, the Senator GravelEdition (Boston:Beacon Press, 1971), vol. 1; Melvin Gurtov,The First Vietnam Crisis (New York: Co-lumbia University Press, 1967); ChalmersRoberts,"The Day We Didn't Go to War,"The Reporter, September 14, 1954; andRobert Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside

Story (New York: Harper& Brothers,1956).

paper submitted to the National Secu-

rity Council (NSC) in the first weekof April 1954. It argues:

1. U.S. interventionwith combat forcesinIndochinas notmilitarilydesirable ...

2. A victory in Indochinacannot be as-suredby U.S. interventionwith air andnaval forces alone.

3. The use of atomic weaponsin Indo-china wouldnot reduce the numberof

ground orcesrequired o achievea vic-

tory in Indochina. ..4. Seven U.S. divisionsor theirequivalent

with appropriate aval and air supportwould be required o win a victory inIndochina.

5. Two U.S. divisions can be placed inIndochina n 30 days,and an additional5 divisionsin the following120 days.This could be accomplishedwithoutreducingU.S. ground trengthn the FarEast to an unacceptable egree,but theU.S. ability to meet its NATO com-mitmentwould be seriouslyaffected or

a considerableeriod.l6

The President seems to have been

impressed by Ridgway's argument.17Thereafter, other service chiefs and

Department of Defense officials backed

away from the issue in deference to the

Army. President Eisenhower insistedon congressional approval before anymilitary venture. Dulles and Radford

presented their plan for an air striketo congressional leaders who raised

questions about the position of the

16. PentagonPapers,vol. 1, pp. 92-93.17. Accordingo Ridgway'smemoirs,Soldier

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), anArmy reporton the feasibilityof U.S. troopsfighting in Indochina was strongly negative."As soon as the full reportwas in, I lost notime in having it passedon up the chain of

command. It reachedPresident Eisenhower.To a man of his military experience itsimplicationswereimmediately lear. The ideaof interveningwas abandoned,and it is mybelief that the analysiswhich the Armymadeand presentedto higher authority played aconsiderable,perhapsa decisive,part in per-suading our governmentnot to embark onthat tragic adventure"(p. 227).

26




service chiefs, the need for groundforces if an air strike failed, and sup-port and participationof Allies. Dulles

and Radford could assure them on noneof these issues. In particular, no allywas willing to join in the "unitedaction." On May 7, the issue died withthe fall of Dienbienphu.

In a survey of President Eisenhower'sdecisions as commander in chief, the

diplomatic historian Ernest R. Maywrites:

In 1954, when the Viet Minh closedaroundDienbienphu, he Presidentspokeas if he meant to deal with Indochinaasa new Korea. He compared he nationsof SoutheastAsia to a stack of dominoes,and said at a pressconferenceon April 7that if one fell, all might fall. It is re-

ported that he initialedhis "OK" on aNSC recommendationor limited nterven-tion. Onlythendid he learnfrom General

Ridgwayhat therewere not the

necessarytroopsor transports nd that to carryoutthe decisionwouldmeannationalmobiliza-tion at least on the scale of 1950-1951.

The President hesitated. While theChairmanof the Joint Chiefs, the Vice-

President,and others urged him to act,conflicting ounselscamefrom othermem-bers of the administration,enators,and

representatives of allied governments.Dienbienphu fell, and north Indochina

becameCommunisterritory.18

May concludesthat "America's naction

appeared to be the product not of aconscious decision, but of procrastina-tion and indecision."19 Among thefactors fueling that hesitation were theabsence of ready troops and fast trans-

port; the trade-off between committingforces to meet this threat and saving

them for the much more importantNATO contingencies; and the neces-

sity for national mobilization to imple-ment the decision.

18. Ernest R. May, ed., The Ultimate Deci-sion: The President as Commander in Chie.f(New York: G. Braziller, 1960), pp. 220-21.

19. Ibid.

Laos

Laos presented a rather different

issue, one which President John Ken-nedy inherited from his predecessor.20During the transition, Eisenhowerwarned Kennedy that the situation was

deteriorating and recommended U.S.

military intervention if necessary. Ap-proaching the issue with an inclinationfor action, Kennedy acceptedthe advice.

A combination of causes postponedthe President's decision. First was the

military's lack of enthusiasm for a lim-ited intervention. Army Chief of Staff

George Decker opposed interventionunless we were prepared"to go all the

way so as not to get bogged down inan endless war." The reluctanceof the

Joint Chiefs was summed up in Chair-man Lyman L. Lemnitzer'spropositionto Kennedy: "If we are given the right

to use nuclearweapons, we can guaran-tee victory."21 Arthur Schlesingercon-cludes that: "This opposition to limitedintervention had a powerful effect. As

Robert Kennedy said: 'If even the

Marines don't want to go in!' "22

A second factor was the inability of

Kennedy's military advisers to agree on

what forces would be required for vic-

tory.The

JointChiefs of Staff re-

quirement started at 40 thousand U.S.

troops. It quickly escalated to 60

thousand and then to 140 thousand

equippedwith tactical nuclearweapons.A third considerationwas the effect of

intervention on our ability to act else-

where. Kennedy's military aide, Gen-

20. This summarydrawson CharlesSteven-

son, The End of Nowhere: American Policytoward Laos since 1954 (Boston: Beacon

Press, 1972); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A

Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

1965); Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New

York; Harper & Row, 1965); and RogerHilsman, To Move a Nation (New York:

Doubleday, 1967).21. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 338.22. Ibid.

27




eral C. V. Clifton, has written of Ken-

nedy's "stunned amazement" when helearned that if he sent 10 thousand

troops to Southeast Asia, he would haveno strategic reserves left for other con-

tingencies.23 A fourth factor became

especially important in the late Aprilcrisis. At that point, Lemnitzer recom-mended limited intervention. Freshfrom the Bay of Pigs fiasco (April),Kennedy questioned this advice. Heinsisted that his military advisers statetheir views clearly in writing. From

the Pentagon he received eight differentmemoranda-one each from the secre-

tary, the service secretaries, and thefour Chiefs of Staff. As Kennedy re-marked afterwards, "Thank God the

Bay of Pigs happened when it did.Otherwise we'd be in Laos by now-and that would be a hundred timesworse." 24

Further factors may have been ofeven greater importance: congressionalopposition, public opinion, and thePresident's personal values. But canone feel confident that the UnitedStates would not have intervened if amobile strategic reserveof 140 thousandmen had been available and the Chiefshad unanimouslyguaranteedsuccess?

These two examplesdemonstratethat

"leanness," that is, the absence ofready military capability, can indeedaffect interpretations of commitmentsand decisions about responses to con-

tingencies that might be met by mili-

tary force. But are there cases on theother side, that is, instances where theexistence of specific ready capabilitiesencouraged more expansive views ofU.S. interests and commitments (thanwould have prevailed in the absence ofthese capabilities) and actual decisionsto use military force? Again, the

23. "Hail to the Chief," Army 14 (January1964), quoted in Stevenson, End of Nowhere,p. 135.

24. Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 644.

available evidence must be examined

thoroughly; but again, limits of spacepermit only crude summaries.

Korea

Korea is by all accounts an instancein which presidential preferences over-rode all other factors.25 In the periodpreceding the June 1950 invasion ofSouth Korea, the U.S. government ontwo separate occasions considered theissue of Korea's importance to the

United States and even addressed thespecific question of what the UnitedStates would do if Koreawere attacked.All interested parties participated inthese discussions. On both occasionsthe National Security Council reachedformaldecisions, approvedby the Presi-dent. The NSC paper of April 1948read: "The United States should not

become so irrevocably involved in theKorean situation that an action taken

by any faction in Korea or by any other

power in Korea could be considered a'casus belli' for the United States."26

The Army advocated complete with-drawal of its forces from South Korea.General Douglas MacArthur, com-mander of American forces in the Far

East, supported this position with the

judgment that "in the event of anyserious threat to the security of Korea,strategic and military considerationswill force abandonment of any pre-

25. This survey relies heavily on Ernest R.

May, "The Power of History's 'Lessons':

Intervention in Korea, 1950," in E. R. May,The Misunderstood Muse, forthcoming; and

Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision (NewYork: The Free Press, 1968).

26. Robert Sawyer, Military Advisors in

Korea: KMAG In Peace and War (Washing-

t6n, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military

History, U.S. Army, 1962), p. 30; J. L.

Collins, War in Peacetime: The History andLessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1969), p. 29, cited by May, "Power of His-

tory's 'Lessons.'"

28




tense of military support."27 In Mayof 1949 the NSC reaffirmed its 1948decision and authorized withdrawal of

American forces by June. Shortlythereafter, Army Chief of Staff Omar

Bradley sent to the other Chiefs amemorandum entitled "Implications ofa Possible Full-Scale Invasion fromNorth Korea Subsequentto Withdrawalof U.S. Troops from Korea." Bradleyrecommended that in such an eventU.S. nationals be evacuated and the ag-gression be reported to the United Na-tions. But he held open the possibilityof reintroducing American troops as

part of a U.N. force. The otherChiefs overruled Bradley, agreeing onthe following statement:

Fromthe strategicviewpoint, he positionof the Joint Chiefs of Staff regardingKorea, summarizedbriefly,is that Koreais of little strategicvalue to the United

Statesandthat any commitmento UnitedStates use of military force in Koreawould be ill-advised and impracticablenview of the potentialitiesof the over-allworldsituation and of our heavy interna-tional obligationsas comparedwith ourcurrentmilitarystrength.28

In January 1950, Secretary of StateDean Acheson delivered his celebratedNational Press Club

speech defininga

perimeter beyond which the UnitedStates would not try to defend posi-tions. Bordered by Japan, the Ryu-kyus, and the Philippines, that perime-ter excluded Korea. Thus, to whateverextent the U.S. government can everbe said to have made a policy choiceabout future action, it had chosennot to use American troops to defend

Korea.When on June 24, 1950, North Korea

27. Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 28;Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, Years ofTrial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Double-

day & Company, 1956), p. 329, cited by May,"Power of History's 'Lessons.'"

28. Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 30.

actually invaded South Korea, Presi-dent Harry Truman took the lead. HisMemoirs recall his initial reaction to

the news:I remembered how each time that thedemocraciesailed to act it hadencouragedthe aggressors to keep going ahead. ... Ifelt certainthat if South Korea were al-lowed to fall Communist eaders wouldbe emboldened o overridenations closerto our own shores. ... If this was al-lowedto go unchallengedt wouldmeanathirdworldwar.29

Before the first meeting with his ad-visers as a group, he began sendingsignals that he meant to "hit themhard," that he did not intend to "letthe U.N. down." At the initial BlairHouse meeting, he probed his adviserswith questions about the readiness ofU.S. forces in Asia, the ability of theAir Force and Navy to check the North

Koreans unaidedby ground troops, andthe time needed to shift the U.S. divi-sions in Japan to Korea.30 Truman'sdecisions for American involvement es-calated in steps: from logistic support,to air and naval action, to troops. ButTruman'sMemoirs suggests that by theend of the first Blair House Conference,the die was cast. He had determinedto do what was necessary to save South

Korea. Since he sat at the head of thetable, his determinationwas sufficient.

It is impossible to settle speculationabout, What would have happened if.. . . One must consider, however, howthe decision might have come out hadthe United States found itself without

capabilityfor immediateresponse. As it

happened, there were three divisions of

occupationforces in

Japan. Fourteendays after the attack, the first ofthese divisions reached the front line.

Twenty-threedays after the attack, thetwo additional divisions arrived. These

29. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 333.30. See Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 335ff;

and Paige, Korean Decision, pp. 125-43.

29




forces stemmed the attack and secureda beachhead for later reinforcement.Without these divisions, the South Ko-

rean Army would have been pushed offthe Korean peninsula within the firstmonth of war. The first division ofU.S. troops deployed from the conti-nental United States to Korea arrivedon the fifty-sixth day after the attack.31

Had there been no U.S. troops or airand naval forces in the vicinity of

Korea, the Americancommander n theFar East would have been forced to

report the likelihood of South Korea's

being overrunbefore U.S. troopsarrived.In that case, Truman'squestions to his

military advisers on that first night atBlair House would have elicited ratherdifferent answers. Incapable of pre-venting a North Korean takeover ofSouth Korea, the President would havefaced the question of whether to com-

mit the United States to the defenseof South Korea, given the near cer-

tainty that this would mean months of

building up U.S. troops in the Far East

prior to a Normandy-style invasion ofan enemy-held peninsula. The JCS'searlier judgment about the strategicunimportance of Korea might have

loomed larger. The JCS recommenda-tion would certainly have been differ-

ent. Indeed, it might well have beenfor general mobilization in preparation

31. In an entirely different context, and

without reference to this issue, SecretaryMcNamara's Force Posture Statement lends

support to this argument: "We came close

to being pushed off the Korean peninsulabefore we were finally able to stem the attack

and secure a beachhead for later reinforce-ment. What prevented this from happening

was the availability of three U.S. divisions inJapan" (p. 142). General J. L. Collins writesof going to the first Blair House Conference:"I thought how fortunate it was for us thatthe Soviets had picked for this venture theone area of the world where the U.S. militaryforces of all arms were well positioned if weshould decide to intervene" (War in Peace-

time, p. 4).

for major war. What Truman wouldhave decided in these circumstancesis

unclear-though one should recall that

another President, confronting NorthKorean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo,and lacking any ready capability to

respond, chose to do nothing.

The Bay of Pigs

The impact of a para-military op-tion on the President's decision to ini-tiate the abortive Central Intelligence

Agency(CIA)-led invasion of Cuba in

1961 is quite clear.32 When Kennedyarrivedin the presidency,this train wason the track. Invasion forces beingreadied by the CIA in Guatemalawere

growing restless, and the Guatemalan

government insisted that they leave.The CIA guaranteed the operation'ssuccess. The Chiefs of Staff con-

curred-perhaps because they had no

direct responsibility for the venture.Kennedy had a choice between saying

yes on the one hand, or trying to derailthe train on the other. In the cam-

paign, he had taken a strong stand

against Castro. If he now chose thelatter course of action, Cuban refugeesin Miami and disgruntled officials in

Washington would charge that he

stopped an Eisenhower-initiated, quick

fix of the Cuban problem that wascertain to succeed. So he went ahead.As Arthur Schlesingerconcludes:

The determination o keep this schemealive sprang n part, I believe, from theembarrassmentsof calling it off. AsDulles said at the March 11 meeting,"Don't forget that we have a disposalproblem. If we have to take these menout of Guatemala,we will have to transfer

them to the United States, and we can'thave them wanderingaroundthe countrytelling everyone what they have been

32. ThissummarydrawsonHaynesJohnson,The Bay of Pigs (New York: Norton, 1964);Schlesinger, A Thousand Days; Sorenson,Kennedy; Karl Meyer and Tad Szulc, TheCubanInvasion (New York: Praeger,1962).

30




doing." . . . The contingency had thus be-come a reality:havingcreated he Brigadeas an option, the CIA now presented ts

use againstCuba as a necessity. Nor didDulles'sargumentsack force. Confrontedby them, Kennedytentativelyagreedthatthe simplest thing, after all, might be tolet the Cubansgo wherethey yearnedtogo-to Cuba.33

(This case also illustrates how existingcapabilitiescan be resisted. During the

invasion, despite strong recommenda-tions that the United States employ

available aircover, Kennedy refused.)

Vietnam

The most complex and troublingcase is Vietnam. The Kennedy ad-ministration built up U.S. ready con-ventional capabilitiesfor meetingbrush-fire threats, increasing active army di-visions from eleven to sixteen. Theadministration emphasized preparationfor counter-insurgency. The PentagonPapers leaves one with a strong-butperhaps deceptive-impression that itwas essentially a matter of time before

someone, in some circumstance,wouldfind a winning argument for puttingthese forces to use, somewhere. The

availability of this capability plus ad-

vertisements about its effectivenesscer-tainly contributed to the unanimity of

Lyndon Johnson's circle of advisers-with the exception of George Ball.These forces-in-being permitted Presi-dent Johnson to make major war inVietnam without the kind of majorsignal at home that mobilization or a

call-up of the reserves would have

provided.

Perhapsthe point need not be laboredfurther. The availability of a readymilitary option has been one major fac-tor in U.S. decision about the use offorce-not the only factor, not neces-

33. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 242,emphasis added.

sarily the determining factor, and notan insurmountable factor. Other fac-tors have been more important: the

generalpublic consensus about the mainlines of American foreign policy; the

president's deep-seated values. But,however other factors are assessed, oneinfluence on presidential decisions to

respondto crises by the introductionofAmerican troops has been the avail-

ability of a ready military option.

CALCULATINGTHE

FULL COSTS-ANDBENEFITS-OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The preceding argument might seemto lead to the conclusion that theUnited States should slash its militarycapabilities lest they suck us into yetanother tragic war. Given the perva-sive post-Vietnam intervention allergy,many people are tempted by this con-

clusion. The temptation should be re-sisted. That conclusion is no part ofthe argumentof this article.

For the present and for the foresee-able future, the United States will re-

quire substantial conventional militarycapabilities. The stability and benignevolution of Europe depend criticallyon American commitments and militarymight. Japan'sconfidententry into the

international community depends im-portantly on Americansecurity guaran-tees. The deterrent role of U.S. prom-ises and power still seems a linchpin ofthe existing international order. Con-sider the likely consequencesof a totaland complete American conventionaldisarmament. The greatest mistake inour history to date, Vietnam, mightshrink into a short

chapterin what

would become a book of tragedy. For-

tunately, such a drastic reduction ofAmerican conventional capabilities is

politically inconceivable.What then does the preceding argu-

ment imply? Mostly it raises issuesthat carry far beyond the scope of this

31




article. Here we can simply state six

implicationsstarkly.

1. We must recognize the fact thatcreating some kinds of military capa-bilities does affect decisions about theuse of force, and we must find ways of

including this fact in choices about such

weapons systems.Not all weapons systems create new

capabilities or perceptibly affect costsand risks of action. For those that do,

however,Russell's

rangeof considera-

tions cannot be denied. Choices aboutsuch weapon systems inevitably involvehard trade-offsamong a numberof com-

peting objectives: (1) the deterrent-and interaction-effect of the particularcapability; (2) the defense utility ofthe capability; (3) economic costs ofthe capability; and (4) effects of the

capability on probabilities of use.

Objective 4 is the most difficult tocalculate and seems essentially incom-mensurate with the others. People'sjudgmentsabout each of the clusters ofconsiderations will differ. Regardingobjective 4, those who feel that theUnited States is likely to err on theside of inaction or late action will judgecapabilities differently from those who

worry more about action where none is

required. While the author's biaseswill be no secret, the Korean examplecertainly demonstrates the enormouscosts and risks entailed by the lack of

ready forces.2. When, for reasons of deterrence

or defense or cost-effectiveness, itseems wise to create military capabil-ties that do have added, independenteffects on

probabilitiesof

use,we must

find ways of posting warning signsabout these effects, and, where possible,of creating countervailingpressures.

Denials of the impact of capabilitieson decisionshave obscured the few pre-cautionary clues that were available.In the late 1950s and early 1960s,

civilian strategists concentrated on the

problem of alternatives to massive nu-clear retaliation. Consequently, they

advocated a substantial buildup of con-ventional forces. As the Kennedy ad-ministration expanded ready conven-tional capabilities, Defense Departmentanalysts planned an array of conven-tional options that would permit the

president to meet contingencieswithout

having to rely on nuclearweapons. Noone put forward hard analyses of thewider effects of these

capabilitiesand

plans-illustrating once more the wayin which the general weakness ofState Department analysis, as com-

pared to Defense analysis, meant afurther predominance of military over

political considerations within the U.S.

government. It is perhaps too muchto hope that far-sighted White Housestaff could have commissioned careful

examinationsof recent cases that mighthave made vivid to the president andother major officials the probable sec-

ondary effects of the chosen course. Inthe climate of the times, that wouldhave seemed a hopelessly abstract aca-demic exercise. Indeed, if anyone hadbothered to search the products of aca-

deme, he would have found no detailed

analyses of specificways in which capa-bilities can affect official expectations,contingency plans, military and diplo-matic estimates, advisers' recommenda-

tions, and in the end, presidentialdecisions.

What about countervailingpressures?If the creation of a ready military op-tion brings with it professionals-bothmilitary and civilian-commissioned tosearch for

contingencies in which thatoption can be exercised,and committedto finding ways of meeting contingen-cies successfully, a minimum counter-

weight would be proportional increasesin the ability of independentsources toassess the need for and effectiveness ofthat option. Unfortunately, conven-

32




tional capabilities and intelligence esti-mates were regarded as entirely sepa-rate problems. Central Intelligence

Agency estimates of threats were avail-able-and in retrospect, quite respect-able. There existed no independentanalysis of military operations-though,in retrospect, the military profession-als' predictions get higher marks thando the bets of civilian professionalsinvolved in this process. No one famil-iar with the unfolding of U.S. choicesin Vietnam, however, can underestimate

the importance of more systematicanalysis of proposed uses of American

forces, more careful projection of en-

emy reactions, and an attempt to con-sider the consequences if less favorable

projections turn out to be right. Theabsence of competing sources of in-formation and assessment, both aboutlikelihoods in situations where military

intervention is contemplatedand aboutmilitary performance, estimates, and

requirements,remains the major gap inU.S. military posture.

3. As developed and applied byMcNamara and Enthoven, PPBS pro-vides a greatly improved methodologyfor comparingeffectivenessand costs ofalternative military forces. This ap-proach is important in every case and

especially powerful in choices aboutweapons that have few important ef-fects beyond their military mission nar-

rowly conceived. These include, for

example, most choices about tanks,rifles, or tactical aircraft.

4. Even on this home ground, PPBSis simply one analytic tool. In rhetoricand often in practice, PPBS advocatestended to present their calculations as

the dominant determinant of the sizeand shape of our military forces. Areader of Force Posture Statements

might conclude that the secretary ofdefense and his analytic staff had a firm

grip on the defense budget and con-siderable control: that he could, for

example, reduce the budget total by 20

percent-if calculations showed thatwere wise-or adjust the number of

divisions or carriers by 20 percent.This could not be further from thetruth. Though this article has focused

primarily on effects of military capa-bilities outside the Defense Depart-ment, the characterization of the na-tional security establishment appliesinside the Pentagon as well. The im-

pact of President Nixon's 40 percentreduction in the number of contingen-cies the United States is preparing tomeet simultaneously tells the tale: thePresident reduced from two and a halfto one and a half the number of warsthe United States will prepare to fightsimultaneously; service calculations ofthe forces requiredfor meeting one anda half wars called for only slight in-creases over existing levels. (In fact, a

slight decrease resulted.) As Russell'sargument suggests, participants areoften clearer about the conclusions than

they are about the calculations.5. Review of current American forces

in the light of the above considerationsraises serious questions about a numberof weapon systems-none more sothan American tactical nuclearweaponsin Europe.

At present, the United States and itsNATO allies maintain a level of forcesin Europe sufficient,accordingto official

estimates, to provide a conventionalde-fense against a surprise attack by theWarsaw Pact without resort to nuclear

weapons. In addition,U.S. general pur-pose forces are armed with over seventhousand tactical nuclear weapons, the

primary objective of which is to deter

Soviet use of similar weapons in anyconventional war. These weapons are

deployed as part of the standard equip-ment of front line units, both Americanand Allied-under U.S. guard.

What impactwill this tactical nuclear

option have in the case of a major en-

33




gagement between NATO and WarsawPact forces? Civilian defense analysesshow that NATO conventional forces

can withstand an attack. These calcu-lations appear in the Force PostureStatement as the official doctrine andthe rationale for these capabilities. Butmost military officers flatly disagreewith these conclusions.

In the unlikely event that WarsawPact forces actually attacked NATO,no one can be sure what would happen.But one plausible scenario has Amer-ican military forces falling back; a re-

quest by the American commander in

Europe for authorization to use tacticalnuclearweapons to prevent defeat; anda Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendationto the president for such authorization.In this case, the president would nothave an unbiased choice about usingnuclear weapons.

6. The argument of this article pro-vides yet another reason for careful re-examinationof the requirementsfor thecurrent large, standing ready militaryforces-sixteen active divisions, sixteenaircraft carriers, and twenty-one mod-ernized tactical air wings.

Why do we need a fundamental re-evaluation of the rationale for current

U.S. conventional forces? The list ofconsiderationsis long:

a. The emergence of a U.S.-Sovietstalemate in strategic capabili-ties-which makes conventionaladventures less dangerous, thus

perhaps more likely, and there-fore possibly requiring differentconventional forces;

b. changes in the basic political en-

vironment, including U.S.-Soviet

detente; U.S.-Chinese discussions;Soviet-Chinese hostility-thus de-

creasingthe probabilityof WarsawPact attacks on Europe, Chineseattacks on Southeast Asia, and

both attacks occurring simultane-

ously;c. the economic recovery of Western

Europe and Japan-thus permit-ting them to provide more of theirown defense;

d. revised assessments of the impor-tance to the United States of the

security or political regime of

many other countries, includingsome who are our allies;

e. the demonstratedunwillingnessofthe American

publicto

supportwars like Vietnam;f. budetary stringency and the need

to shift resources to domestic

priorities.

Effects of capabilities on probabili-ties of use add another reason to thelist. But the connection between these

considerations and reductions of our

conventional forces is less clear than itmight seem. A review of the rationalefor conventional forces will, I think,conclude that reductions are desirable.It will not recommend cutting forcesbelow those required for meeting our

major commitmentsin Western Europeand Japan. These forces are essentiallyfungible, that is, they can be used for

contingencies other than the ones for

which they are designed. Thus theminimum forces conceivable are stillsufficient to allow the president, or the

president and Congress, if they so

choose, to intervenemilitarily in almost

any contingencyin almost any country.Limiting conventional capabilities will

not, in and of itself, foreclose the pos-sibility of an initial commitment offorces

anywhere.Nevertheless, reducing ready conven-tional capabilities can have significanteffects: on expectationswithin the mili-

tary and civilian bureaucracyabout thenumber and kind of situations in whichwe will intervene; on contingencyplansfor such; on general estimates about

34




what we can do; on specific estimatesin particularsituations; and on the per-ceived trade-off between meeting one

contingencyand being preparedto meetothers.

Moreover, certain specific features ofour conventionalcapabilitieshave moreeffect on probabilities of use thanothers. In particular, the location of

forces, their mobility, and the avail-

ability of supplies are little-noted but

importantfactors. Considerthe impactof forwardsupply depots a la FDLs on

expectations, contingency plans, and

specific estimates in crises. For manyyears, the United States has used con-trol of supplies to affect the actions ofallies like the Koreans or South Viet-namese. There may be a clue here for

congressmen, or secretaries of defenseand presidents interested in affectingU.S. behavior.

A final factor deserving careful fur-ther study is readiness. Contrary torevisionist historians, military leadersare rarely eager to go to war. Indeed,they are rarely ready.34 Historically,both American and other national

military services tend to recommend"further preparation" when confront-

ing crises that might seem to requirewar. If the Americanmilitary services

are simply allowed to "do their ownthing," the United States will have few

ready forces. The services have tradi-

tionally prepared for the long haul,concentratingon hardwarethat requiresyears of development. This behaviorreflects-or is at least consistentwith-a theory that the decision to make warinvolves a major national commitmentthat should not be importantly affected

by short-term considerations. The ser-vices have conceived of deterrence less

34. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldierand the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 1957), especially chap. 3,"The Military Mind: 'Conservative Realism ofthe Professional Military Ethic."

in terms of a ready ability to meet

every level of threat, and more in termsof the overall strength and will of the

United States. In the current interna-tional environment, the United States

may need ready, mobile forces for some

contingencies. But the services' long-standing judgments about these issuesdeserve a much more careful hearingthan they have yet received.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE

SECRETARYOF DEFENSE

Full recognition of the independentimpact of Americanmilitary capabilitieson Americanforeign policy would forcea substantial reconception of the re-

sponsibilities of the secretary of de-

fense. That work has not even begun.But taking the case of FDL as a pointof departure,we can suggest some lines

for further investigation.By law, the secretary of defense is

"the principal assistant to the presi-dent in all matters relating to national

security." Though in fact he sharesthat responsibility with the president'sassistant for national security affairsand the secretary of state, his responsi-bility for military policy and postureis paramount.

He takes the responsibility for pro-viding American military forces secondto none. He must determine what ca-

pabilities are requiredto deter potentialaggressors. He must decide what capa-bilities are sufficient for meeting rele-vant contingencies. He must select

among alternative forces so as toachieve the most defense for the avail-able dollars. But can he separate these

responsibilitiesfrom those of interpret-ing American commitmentsor decidingabout when and where to use militaryforce? Evidently not.

With the assistant for national secu-

rity affairs and the secretary of state,he must assume responsibilityfor man-

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aging the complexprocessesof the U.S.national security establishment so thatthe president and the country are well

served. Specifically, that means struc-turingthe processesto assure: (1) iden-tification of the important issues thatdemandpresidential attention; (2) edu-cation of the president on these issues;(3) good maps of these issues includinga detailed layout of alternatives withcareful estimates of the consequencesof

each; and (4) maximumleeway for the

president to choose and to implementactions consistent with his best judg-ment of the country's best interests.

Could such responsibilities requirethe secretary of defense to limit the

president's options? Obviously not-

though the president himself mightwell decide to limit his own options inorder to preservehis freedom of action.Eisenhower's "New Look" in defense

policy seems to have reflected not onlyhis decision that the United Statesshould not fight another war Korea-

style, but also his recognitionthat thisforce posture would shield him againstinevitable demands that he "do all thatwas possible" to prevent a communist

victory in a situation like Indochina.In 1970, President Nixon strongly, but

unsuccessfully, opposed congressional

legislation giving him the power toimpose wage and price controls-an

option which, some twelve months later,he employed.

Do these responsibilities require thata secretary of defense's public rationalefor weapons selections include factorslike the affect on probabilities ofuse? Again, perhaps not-since, to doso might well be counter-productive.(Some of Secretary McNamara's great-est contributions seem to have involved

using a PPBS rationale to bias the

bargaining game in favor of outcomeshe judged right on the basis of calcula-tions broader than PPBS.)

Do these responsibilities require the

secretaryof defense to emphasizeeffectsof weapons systems on probabilitiesof

use, to the neglect of deterrence, de-

fense, and cost-effectiveness? Again,obviously not.

But these responsibilities do requirethe secretary of defense to recognizethe wider effects of narrowerdecisionsabout military posture and policy:the numerous ways in which decisionsabout military forces taken with an eyeto one set of objectives producesecond-

ary consequencesof equivalent or even

greater importance. The impact of

ready military capabilities on decisionsabout the use of force is one. The ef-fect of professionals, especially civilian

professionals charged with finding aneffective way of doing successfully what

may be an essentially undoable job, isa second. (Would professionalalchem-ists charged with making gold for the

price of coal not come up with a con-tingency plan that offered, in their

judgment, a substantial probability of

success?) Furtherexamplesof Defensedecisions that have important, but

mostly neglected, secondary effects in-clude: foreign military bases-and con-

sequences for relations with host coun-

tries; military aid-and effects on U.S.

policy towards developing countries;

and military arms sales-and the im-pact on buyers.35

Americansnaturally resist secondaryeffects, especially unintended effects ofa systemic nature. We tend to operateon the implicit assumption that prob-lems are decomposable; that each mancan concentrate on his piece of the

problem,leaving other pieces to others;that

doingone

aspectof a

jobbetter

will produce a better outcome over-all-rather than tilting some larger

35. For elaboration of this argument, seeAdam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establish-ment: Its Impacts on American Society (NewYork: Harper & Row, 1971), especiallychap. 9.

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interdependent system in favor of oneset of considerations or toward onekind of outcome. Thus, for example,

we minimize such effects as those ofwealth or expertise on outcomes incourts before which every man is equal.And we neglect the effects of technical

competence or expertise on the out-comes of regulatoryprocesses meant tomete out impartial judgments. The

complexity of systems like the proc-esses of the U.S. national security es-tablishment boggle the mind. But isthe system not part of the problem?

In the context of the early 1960s,

given a Democratic president's vulner-

ability to charges about another "loss"of China, and the clout of the military

in Congress and society; the creationof large, ready conventional militarycapabilities, coupled with so much at-tention to the threat of insurgency andso many people devising strategies for

counter-insurgency,had the effect of

making almost inevitable a decision touse these forces somewhere. Yet who

today is trying to calculate the second-

ary effects of substantial reductions inAmerican conventional capabilities inthe post-Vietnamclimate of the 1970s?

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Documents

1973 Military Capabilities and American Foreign Policy