Contention 1: Inherency

The U.S.-Mexico Trans-boundary agreement has been approved by all parties but the United States Congress

Rampton 13 (Roberta, Reuters, “U.S.-Mexico deal on expanded Gulf oil drilling still in limbo”, 4-29-13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUSL2N0DG0CV20130429)

More than a year after the U nited S tates and Mexico signed a much-lauded deal that would remove obstacles to expand ing deepwater drilling for oil in the Gulf of Mexico, the agreemen t still has not been finalized by the U nited S tates . The delay, for which people close to the administration blame Congress while Republicans in Congress blame the administration, is certain to be discussed

when President Barack Obama visits Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in Mexico City on Thursday. Mexico immediately ratified the pact in April 2012, but the United States has so far been unable to pass a simply worded, one-page law to put the agreement into force. The deal, formally known as the T ransboundary H ydrocarbons A greement, provides legal guidelines for deepwater drilling in the 1.5 million acres (600,000 hectares) of the Gulf that straddle the U.S.-Mexico boundary. It is seen as the key to opening a new era of cooperation on oil production between the two countries. Mexico's state- owned oil company Pemex needs technology and investment to boost its stagnant production, and U.S. companies are eager to help . "The U.S. has a real opportunity now to put energy back on the agenda with Mexico in a way that it really hasn't been able to be on the agenda for the last several years ," said Neil Brown, who worked on the issue during the last Congress as lead

Republican international energy aide in the Senate. But the final step of implementing the deal has languished. "I'm not aware of strong opposition to it. I think it's been a little more inertia," said Jason Bordoff, a top energy official at the White House until January who now runs Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy. In the past several weeks, there have been some signs that the implementing legislation may move forward, but there also could be new complications related to disclosure requirements. DEAL COULD OPEN THE DOOR Oil is critical for the Mexican economy, paying for a third of the government's budget. But production peaked in 2004 at 3.4 million barrels per day and has slipped below 2.6 million bpd. PEMEX says it can revive production with deepwater wells in the Gulf, but needs technical and financial help. The cross-border agreement would be the first step toward joint projects for reservoirs that cross the boundary, providing a way for PEMEX and other oil companies to share production and creating a framework to solve disputes that could arise. " Without the agreement, it creates a barrier to investment," said Erik Melito, a director at the American Petroleum Institute, the oil industry's lobby group. The agreement could help calm Mexico's fears about what is termed the "popote" or drinking-straw effect - fears that U.S. oil companies are going to drain reservoirs that extend into Mexico's side of the border, robbing Mexico of its share, said David Goldwyn, a former State Department official who helped launch negotiations. "This has been an urban myth in Mexico for decades," said Goldwyn, now president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, a consulting firm. Pena Nieto is working toward reforms for PEMEX that would allow for more production and cooperation in projects generally - a delicate issue in a country where PEMEX and oil are symbols of national pride. " If they can see some success here (with the transboundary deal), that's going to change the political conversation in Mexico ," Goldwyn said.

Failing to implement the deal, though, would be a major setback for U.S.-Mexico energy relations , former U.S. Senator Richard Lugar warned in December, in one of his final reports as the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before he left Congress. NEW TWIST IN THE DEAL To finalize the deal, Congress needs to pass legislation that gives the Interior Department the authority it needs to implement the technical aspects of the agreement . But in the Senate last year, dissension over an unrelated Law of the Sea treaty and the heated politics of the U.S. presidential election effectively put the deal on hold . In the waning days of the last Congress, Democrats in the Senate thought they had found a vehicle to move the bill, but they were foiled by procedural objections, said former Senator Jeff Bingaman, a Democrat who at the time was the chairman of the Senate Energy Committee. The administration has sent its proposed text to the Republican-led House of Representatives, which is in favor of expanded oil drilling. Lawmakers from two House committees, natural resources and foreign affairs, promptly crafted a bill . "It was the administration that failed until five weeks ago to give us the guidance that we needed to implement the language," said Doug Lamborn, a Republican congressman from Colorado, at a House natural resources hearing with administration officials last week. In a new twist, the bill includes a measure that would exempt U.S. oil companies drilling in the area from certain disclosure rules that were part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform law. Those disclosures are strongly backed by the White House and Democratic senators. Aimed at curbing corruption, the rules require oil and mining companies to report payments to any foreign government to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Oil and business lobby groups are fighting the rules in court . Interior and State Department officials did not directly comment on the provision at a hearing last week, saying only that the administration wants to work with the House on details of the bill so that the deal can be in place in time for the next sale of drilling leases for the Gulf, expected to be held in August. Bingaman said the exemption "complicates things significantly" for quick passage of the bill. "They've added in some things that are going to make it difficult to pass in that form , " he said, referring to the exemption. Last week, the Senate energy committee quietly filed a one-page bill reflecting the administration's suggested language, word for word, with no mention of the disclosure exemption. The timing of next steps is unclear. "It would really be unfortunate if that process proved to be a protracted one," said Michael Bromwich, Obama's former U.S. offshore drilling regulator, who helped negotiate the deal. "There's no purpose that's served by further delaying."

Now is key—Mexico will leave the deal if we delay passage

Esenaro 13 (Alberto, over 15 years of law practice, Alberto Esenaro has helped many US, European and Asian companies doing business in Mexico for industries such as telecom, IT, energy, pharmaceutical, health services and medical devices, entertainment, ports, financial services, automotive and overseas trading. He has worked as in-house attorney for a major financial services corporation. Likewise, has helped Mexican Government in matters of energy, telecom and ports two Post-Graduate Specialisations from Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), one in Energy Regulation and one in Telecom, “MEXICO’S POTENTIAL OIL BOOM: RESERVES INCREASE AND INDUSTRY REFORMS PROPOSED”, April 7, 2013, http://beforeyoudobusiness.com/archives/758)

Mexico could be on its way to an oil boom; along with the increase in reserves, the current governing party of Mexico, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has been aggressively proposing reforms in its hydrocarbons sector. While it will keep PEMEX as a state-owned company which will continue to enjoy a monopoly, the government will allow foreign investment, participation and limited partnerships if the reforms are approved. The only caveat is that the oil will remain in Mexican

hands. While this may not be ideal for many foreign oil companies, it is far more than what has been offered before, which was nothing at all. Several companies will be eager for the chance to access Mexico’s vast oil reserves, even if it means they will only be working in a consulting role to help Mexico modernize its antiquated oil infrastructure. One deal which got quick approval in the Mexican Senate was the T ransboundary H ydrocarbons A greement; the deal will allow joint oil exploration in the Gulf of Mexico. Experts in the energy sectors of both countries state that if the U.S. acts quickly, American companies will have a head start over other foreign companies in accessing Mexico’s oil. If the deal is not acted upon by the summer of this year, Mexico could likely renege on the deal due to public disapproval , again shutting its energy industry off from much-needed investmen t . Mexico has a “gold mine” in oil; reserves are on the rise, but the country needs help with equipment modernization and extraction technology for a true “boom” to occur. Industry reforms could cause foreign capital to pour in; companies that are willing to share information and act in a consulting role rather than ownership role will find that plenty of profitable opportunities will exist.

Contention 2: PEMEX

PEMEX is failing because of declining exploitable reserves and lack of technological expertise

Wood et al 12 (Duncan, Director of the Mexico Institute at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, also worked on by Ernesto Marcos David Shields David Enríquez Miriam Grunstein Lourdes Melgar Juan Eibenschutz Javier Estrada Marcelo Mereles Enrique Hidalgo Fluvio Ruiz Carlos Berdeja Juan Pardinas Josefina Cortés Tania Ortiz Isidro Morales Eduardo Andrade John Padilla but to be honest I’m not going to read all those names in a cite, “A New Beginning for Mexican Oil: principles and recommendations for a reform in Mexico’s national interest”, November 2012, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/wood_new_beginning_mexico.pdf)RW

Although the purpose of this paper is not to provide a comprehensive diagnosis of the challenges facing the oil and gas sector and the national oil company in Mexico, it is nonetheless important that we state clearly what both the short- and long-term problems are, so that we can then move on to discuss potential solutions. In recent years, these problems have become well-known to the Mexican public and to the political and economic elites in the country. The most notable , and most pressing energy problem facing Mexico , of course, concerns the rapid decline in oil production experienced by the company over the past 8 years. From a high point of 3.4 million barrels a day in 2004, crude production has fallen to a low of 2.55 million in 2012, that is

to say that there has been a 20 percent drop in national production . Although Pemex has had success in 2011 in stabilizing production at this level, the

outlook for the next few years is worrying, as experts are predicting significant declines in the nation’s two most productive fields, Ku

Maloob Zaap and Cantarell, even at faster rates than those predicted by official sources. Declines at these fields could cut as much as half a million barrels per day from national production . The significance of the decline in production to date is a story that has been told many times: not only does the extraction of less oil impact Pemex as a company, it hits national finances hard since oil revenues continue to account for around 30% of the Federal government’s income . Mexico’s dwindling proven reserves present a similarly worrying picture. Although no one now doubts that Mexico has huge remaining reserves of oil to be discovered in the national territory, over the past decade Mexico has failed to add to existing proven reserves. It is only in 2012 that Pemex has been

able to claim a 100% restitution rate, helped in part by a slower rate of exploitation of existing reserves. At the present rate of extraction, the nation has enough oil to last for 9 years , a number that is acceptable for a company, but wholly insufficient from the perspective of the Mexican economy and the national interest. If production is to be boosted and then sustained in the medium term, the discovery and certification of massive new reserves must be ensured at rates much higher than what is currently being achieved. These twin drops in reserves and production have come at a time when the “easy oil” on land and in shallow waters in the Gulf of Mexico no longer represents the future. Having used up most of its reserves in these areas, Mexico now faces the prospect of discovering and extracting more difficult oil reserves in the deep waters of the Gulf and trying to extract oil from complex onshore reserves such as Chicontepec, which has proven difficult and costly to produce. We have passed from a world in which extracting oil from Cantarell cost only a few dollars a barrel, to one in which oil can cost as much as 70 dollars a barrel to produce. This difficult oil represents a growing drain on the budget of Pemex as well as an evolving technological challenge. The current model, which gives Pemex all of the responsibility as operator, gives the Instituto Mexicano del Petróleo all of the responsibility for

technological development, and puts all of the economic cost of extracting oil on the budget, is not adequate for the era of difficult oil. Under the current model, Mexico is incapable of investing in the discovery of new reserves, in the development of new exploration and production (E&P) tech nologies, and in the maintenance and construction of the infrastructure needed to guarantee the future of the sector. Pemex has never been allowed to operate as an independent company, operating instead on the basis of generating rents rather than generating value, and very often having to pay exorbitantly high tax rates. The “milking” of Pemex has meant that resources are stripped away from the firm in a way that leaves it without the necessary funds to be able to replace reserves, or even to cover its own costs in the present time. The fact that Pemex has frequently had to pay more than 100% of its profits to the government in the form of taxes and charges is clearly an entirely unsustainable and irresponsible situation, but increasing its available financial resources alone would not solve the problem. A new model is needed in which Pemex is responsible for its own destiny, and that promotes Mexican economic growth, as well as granting the Mexican state the fiscal resources it needs to reduce inequity and poverty. The strict controls placed on Pemex spending by the Mexican Treasury Department (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público) have also meant that the national oil company is essentially prevented from making its own strategic business decisions, and from the innovation and risk taking that are fundamental to achieving success in the oil industry. The close political controls placed on the firm are understandable in the context of the fiscal importance of Pemex to the federal government, but they prevent Pemex from achieving success and prevent the country from realizing its potential. Not only does Pemex lack the independent ability to invest in its future, but it is also technically bankrupt due to the immense burden of its debt, acquired from years of trying to reverse the decline in production and exploration, as well as from its pensions and benefits liabilities. Decades of yielding to demands by the oil workers’ union, combined with a failure to put aside funds to cover future outlays mean that, at the present time, Pemex will need to make an extraordinary effort and achieve high levels of success in order to cover its liabilities. Unless a radical change in the current model is brought about, it would be irresponsible for the Mexican state to absorb these liabilities, as it would create a moral hazard encouraging Pemex to repeat its error. Pemex’s dismal record is matched by its lack of technological and technical resources. Mexico, and Pemex in particular, have not invested in the development of new R&D and new knowledge in the hydrocarbons industry, despite

having received record budgets from the federal government in recent years. Moreover, due to the nature of the national oil sector, Pemex has remained isolated from new ways of thinking and technological cooperation that have revolutionized the global oil industry. By preventing Pemex from working with private and foreign firms who are on the cutting edge of hydrocarbons technologies, the firm has been condemned to technological obsolescence and dependency . At the same time, the Mexican government has failed to give sufficient financial and technical support to national research organizations, such as the Instituto Mexicano del Petróleo and university-level engineering, law and policy programs that focus on the energy industry. Moreover, due to the extreme limitations on private participation

in the sector, the incentives for investment in R&D by the private sector are few and far between. More investment from both public and private organizations is urgently needed in developing national research capacity, and incentives must be created to attract cutting edge technologies to Mexico, along with the experience and knowledge needed to operate them.

PEMEX decline will trigger instability throughout Mexico – timeframe is 10 years

Kohl 12 (Keith, Managing Editor, Energy and Capital, A true insider in the energy markets, Keith's research has helped thousands of investors capitalize off the rapidly changing face of energy. For over a year, Keith covered the massive domestic Bakken oil formation — and the companies that would rake in profits — before news broke to the mainstream press. He was there for the Haynesville shale formation and also for the Marcellus natural gas formation, talking to company execs and insiders, uncovering the real stories on the ground, and the real investment opportunities. Keith is one of the only financial reporters around who's actually visited Alberta's remote tar sands region to personally meet every major player in the booming Canadian oil operation. “Crisis of Consumption,” http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/mexican-oil-crisis/2833)

Of course, we all know the story behind the Cantarell field's downfall. Once production started to decline, Pemex began injecting nitrogen to boost output. But this strategy was short-lived, and production at the field has been dropping sharply since — roughly 14% each year for the last six years. Cantarell's decline marked the beginning of the end for Mexican oil production. The country's new finds have also proven underwhelming. The recent discovery by Pemex in Southern Mexico is a perfect example. According to Pemex, the new field holds up to 500 million barrels of crude oil, a trifle compared to the billions of barrels Cantarell once held. But these days, Mexico will take whatever it can get... and pray it can hold off the decline. Crisis of Consumption Mexico's declining oil production means there's less oil available for export. Those 2.5 million barrels flowing from Pemex's wells daily are crucial to the country's stability. When almost 40% of your government budget is paid from oil revenue, exporting less oil is not an option — but that's exactly what's happening During the first eight months of 2012, Mexican oil exports to the United States were slightly above one million barrels per day. Last May oil exports fell below one million barrels per dayfor the first time in 27 years. Barring some miracle taking place in Mexico's oil industry, I believe the country will be a net oil importer within ten years.

Scenario 1: Terrorism

Mexican instability causes a flood of refugees, resulting in terrorism.

Brown 9 (Michael Brown, Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Department of Homeland Security, “Border Control: Collapse of Mexico Is A Homeland Security & National Security Issue,” 1/14/2009, http://michaelbrowntoday.com/journal/2009/1/15/border-control-collapse-of-mexico-is-a-homeland-security-nat.html)

By failing to secure the borders and control immigration, we have opened ourselves up to a frightening scenario. The United States could face a flood of refugees from Mexico if it were to collapse, overwhelming state and local governments along the U.S.-Mexico border . During a time of economic duress, the costs would be overwhelming and would simply add to the already burgeoning costs at the federal level . Immigration and border control never was nor should it ever be

about racism. Immigration and border control are national security and homeland security issues. Sleeper cells from numerous terrorist groups could , and probably already have, infiltrate d the United States, just laying in wait to attack at an appropriately vulnerable time.

Leads to nuclear and bioterror attacks

Timmerman 10 (Ken Timmerman, Newsmax correspondent, “FBI Director Mueller: Al-Qaida Still Wants Nuclear Bomb,” 3/18/2010, http://newsmax.com/Newsfront/mueller-fbi-alqaida-nuclear/2010/03/18/id/353169)

FBI Director Robert Mueller warned Congress on Wednesday of ongoing al-Qaida efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction to attack the United States. “Al-Qaida remains committed to its goal of conducting attacks inside the United States ,” Mueller told a House appropriations

subcommittee. “Further, al-Qaida’s continued efforts to access chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material pose a serious threat to the United States.” To accomplish its goals of new attacks on the American homeland, al-Qaida “seeks to infiltrate overseas operatives who have no known nexus to terrorism into the United States using both legal and illegal methods of entry,” Mueller said. In

February, Sheikh Abdullah al-Nasifi, a known al-Qaida recruiter in Kuwait, boasted on al Jazeera television that Mexico’s border with the United States was the ideal infiltration point for terrorists seeking to attack America . “Four pounds of anthrax – in a suitcase this big – carried by a fighter through tunnels from Mexico into the U.S., are guaranteed to kill 330,000 Americans within a single hour if it is properly spread in population centers there,” al-Nasifi said.

Bioterror leads to extinction

Steinbruner 97 – Brookings senior fellow and chair in international security (John D. Steinbruner, Brookings senior fellow and chair in international security, vice chair of the committee on international security and arms control of the National Academy of Sciences, Winter 1997, Foreign Policy, “Biological weapons: a plague upon all houses,” n109 p85(12), infotrac)

Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not

independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The

use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent

of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the

predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other

direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

Nuclear terror leads to extinction

Ayson 10 - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, July. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7. InformaWorld.)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s

terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties . These risks were considered in the late 1950s and

early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this

high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s

relations with Russia and/ or China , and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst ? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already

involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the

immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its

nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert . In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just

possible that Moscow and/ or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear

force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow , although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability

Scenario 2: Heg

Mexican stability is critical to U.S. power

Kaplan 12 – chief geopolitical analyst at Stratfor (Robert D., With the Focus on Syria, Mexico Burns, Stratfor, 3-28-2012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/focus-syria-mexico-burns)

While the foreign policy elite in Washington focuses on the 8,000 deaths in a conflict in Syria -- half a world away from the United States -- more than 47,000 people have died in drug-related violence since 2006 in Mexico. A deeply troubled state as well as a demographic and economic giant on the

United States' southern border, Mexico will affect America's destiny in coming decades more than any state or combination of states in the Middle East. Indeed, Mexico may constitute the world's seventh-largest economy in the near future. Certainly, while the Mexican violence is largely criminal, Syria is a more clear-cut moral issue, enhanced by its own strategic consequences. A calcified authoritarian regime in Damascus is stamping out dissent with guns and artillery barrages. Moreover, regime change in Syria, which the rebels demand, could deliver a pivotal blow to Iranian influence in the Middle East, an event that would be the best news to U.S. interests in the region in years or even decades. Nevertheless, the Syrian rebels are divided and hold no territory, and the toppling of pro-Iranian dictator Bashar al Assad might conceivably bring to power an austere Sunni regime equally averse to U.S. interests -- if not lead to sectarian chaos. In other words, all military intervention scenarios in Syria are fraught with extreme risk. Precisely for that reason, that the U.S. foreign policy elite has continued for months to feverishly debate Syria, and in many cases advocate armed intervention, while utterly ignoring the vaster panorama of violence next door in Mexico, speaks volumes about Washington's own obsessions and interests, which are not always aligned with the country's geopolitical interests . Syria matters and matters momentously to U.S.

interests, but Mexico ultimately matters more, so one would think that there would be at least some degree of parity in the amount written on these subjects. I am not demanding a switch in news coverage from one country to the other, just a bit more balance. Of course, it is easy for pundits to have a fervently interventionist view on Syria precisely because it is so far away, whereas miscalculation in Mexico on America's part would carry far greater consequences. For example, what if the Mexican drug cartels took revenge on San Diego? Thus, one might even argue that the very noise in the media about Syria, coupled with the relative silence about Mexico, is proof that it is the latter issue that actually is too sensitive for loose talk. It may also be that cartel-wracked Mexico -- at some rude subconscious level -- connotes for East Coast elites a south of the border, 7-Eleven store culture, reminiscent of the crime movie "Traffic," that holds no allure to people focused on ancient civilizations across the ocean. The concerns of Europe and the Middle East certainly seem closer to New York and Washington than does the southwestern United States. Indeed, Latin American bureaus and studies departments simply lack the cachet of Middle East and Asian ones in government and universities. Yet, the fate of Mexico is the hinge on which the United States' cultural and demographic future rests. U.S. foreign policy emanates from the domestic condition of its society, and nothing will affect its society more than the dramatic movement of Latin history northward. By 2050, as much as a third of the American population could be Hispanic. Mexico and Central America constitute a growing demographic and economic powerhouse with which the United States has an inextricable relationship. In recent years Mexico's economic growth has outpaced that of its northern neighbor. Mexico's population of 111 million plus Central America's of more than 40 million equates to half the population of the United States. Because of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 85 percent of Mexico's exports go to the United States, even as half of Central America's trade is with the United States. While the median age of Americans is nearly 37, demonstrating the aging tendency of the U.S. population, the median age in Mexico is 25, and in Central America it is much lower (20 in Guatemala and Honduras, for example). In part because of young workers moving northward, the destiny of the United States could be north-south, rather than the east-west, sea-to-shining-sea of continental and patriotic myth. (This will be amplified by the scheduled 2014 widening of the Panama Canal, which will open the Greater Caribbean Basin to megaships from East Asia, leading to the further development of Gulf of Mexico port cities in the United States, from Texas to Florida.) Since 1940, Mexico's population has increased more than five-fold. Between 1970 and 1995 it nearly doubled. Between 1985 and 2000 it rose by more than a third. Mexico's population is now more than a third that of the United States and growing at a faster rate. And it is northern Mexico that is crucial. That most of the drug-related homicides in this current wave of violence that so much dwarfs Syria's have occurred in only six of Mexico's 32 states, mostly in the north, is a key indicator of how northern Mexico is being distinguished from the rest of the country (though the violence in the city of Veracruz and the regions of Michoacan and Guerrero is also notable). If the military-led offensive to crush the drug cartels launched by conservative President Felipe Calderon falters, as it seems to be doing, and Mexico City goes back to cutting deals with the cartels, then the capital may in a functional sense lose even further control of the north, with concrete implications for the southwestern United States. One might argue that with massive border controls, a functional and vibrantly nationalist United States can coexist with a dysfunctional and somewhat chaotic northern Mexico. But that is mainly true in the short run. Looking deeper into the 21st century, as Arnold Toynbee notes in A Study of History (1946), a border between a highly developed society and a less highly developed one will not attain an equilibrium but will advance in the more backward society's favor. Thus, helping to stabilize Mexico -- as limited as the United States' options may be , given the complexity and sensitivity of the relationship -- is a more urgent national interest than stabilizing societies in the Greater Middle East . If Mexico ever does reach coherent First World status, then it will become less of a threat, and the healthy melding of the two societies will quicken to the benefit of both. Today, helping to thwart drug cartels in rugged and remote terrain in the vicinity of the Mexican frontier and reaching southward from Ciudad Juarez (across the border from El Paso, Texas) means a limited role for the U.S. military and other agencies -- working, of course, in full cooperation with the Mexican authorities. (Predator and Global Hawk drones fly deep over Mexico searching for drug production facilities.) But the legal framework for cooperation with Mexico remains problematic in some cases because of strict interpretation of 19th century posse comitatus laws on the U.S. side. While the United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars to affect historical outcomes in Eurasia, its leaders and foreign policy mandarins are somewhat passive about what is happening to a country with which the United States shares a long land border, that verges on partial chaos in some of its northern sections, and whose population is close to double that of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. Mexico, in addition to the obvious challenge of China as a rising great power, will help write the American story in the 21st century. Mexico will partly determine what kind of society America will become, and what exactly will be its demographic and geographic character, especially in the Southwest. The U.S. relationship with China will matter more than any other individual bilateral relationship in terms of

determining the United States' place in the world, especially in the economically crucial Pacific. If policymakers in Washington calculate U.S. interests properly regarding those two critical countries, then the United States will have power to spare so that its elites can continue to focus on serious moral questions in places that matter less.

Heg solves nuclear war

Brooks et al 13 [Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University.William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. “Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment”, Winter 2013, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pages 7-51, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107]

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment . For one

thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking

provocative action . Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier ” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous

multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations,

regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent , mean that Eurasia’s major states

could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the America n pacifier . Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship , particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages —are either absent or weakly present . There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give

decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want

European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the U nited S tates ha s a substantial military presence ? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas . And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced . Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that J apan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction

from China . It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine

portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the U nited S tates retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences ; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference , with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and

defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other

sciences , however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status,

and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of

territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless

engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree

that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the

security environmen t in at least some of the world’s key regions . We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship.

Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity

complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation , and the like , or bids for regional

hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive

behavior, possibly including regional great power war ). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition , one would see overall higher

levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be

concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the U nited States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might

choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would

likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the

risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics ” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally,

add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions,

acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony

and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that

China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table , at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer

notes, “ The U nited S tates will have to play a key role in counter ing China , because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity

to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive

military capacity to intervene there . The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what

the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult . Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed

so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence , and active management, the U nited S tates lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby

preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals . On top of all this, the U nited

S tates’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals . Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

Scenario 3 is oil competition

Declining Mexican oil production will force the US to compete with China

Clemente 10 (Frank, Professor at Penn State University where he specializes in research on the socioeconomic aspects of energy policy, 1/6/10 “Mexico’s declining oil production will impact the United States,” E&P Magazine, http://www.epmag.com/Production/Mexicos-declining-oil-production-impact-United-States_50598 //TW)

In 2008, the United States imported more than 10 percent of its oil from Mexico – over1.3 million barrels per day (Mb/d). In 2005, Mexico produced 3.7 Mb/d of oil and sold 1.7 Mb/d to the United States. By 2020, however, Mexican production will only be about 1.8 Mb/d and one of our most stable and secure sources of oil supply will be gone. Both the United States and Mexico will have to adjust to the harsh geological reality of depletion . Peak oil is staring us in the face. Cantarell, not so long ago the world's second-largest oilfield, has traditionally accounted for 60 percent of Mexican production. But Cantarell is in terminal decline and Mexico's future is deteriorating before our eyes -- revenues from oil sales account for 40 percent of Mexico's federal budget. The potential confrontation between growing demand and declining supply will impact not only Mexico but the United States as well. The National Academy of Sciences recently warned: "The security and sustainability of our nation’s energy system have been perennial concerns since WWII... especially our growing dependence on imported petroleum." There is little question that with the demise of Mexico as a key supplier, America’s fragile oil supply chain will become even more tenuous. North Sea production is in established decline and Canada's potential over the next decade is increasingly limited given the cancellation of so many tar sands facilities because of the economy. Our own deepwater production is very expensive (e.g. Jack Field). Brazil is the only bright spot in our hemisphere and costs are rising there too. We will have to go farther afield for supply and it will be at increased risk and intense competition from China and other nations . Our oil situation has continued to deteriorate while camouflaged by the recession and the decline of our most stable sources of supply is worrisome indeed.

China-U.S oil competition causes war

Zweig and Jianhai 5 (David and Bi, Director of the Center on China's Transnational Relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology AND postdoctoral fellow at university, September/October 2005, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/working_papers/200509-10_workPaper5.htm // TW)

An unprecedented need for resources is now driving China 's foreign policy . A booming domestic economy, rapid urbanization, increased export processing, and the Chinese people's voracious appetite for cars are increasing the country's demand for oil and natural gas, industrial and construction materials, foreign capital and technology. Twenty years ago , China was East Asia 's largest oil exporter. Now it is the world's second- largest importer ; last year, it alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand. Now that China is the workshop of the world, its hunger for electricity and industrial resources has soared. China's combined share of the world's consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore more than doubled within only ten years, from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000; it has now reached about 20 percent and is likely to double again by the end of the decade. Despite calls by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other politicians to cut consumption of energy and other resources, there is little sign of this appetite abating . Justin Yifu Lin, director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University , in Beijing , says the country's economy could grow at 9 percent

per year for the next 20 years. These new needs already have serious implications for China 's foreign policy. Beijing 's access to foreign resources is necessary both for continued economic growth and, because growth is the cornerst one of China 's social stability, for the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since China remains a relatively centralized, government-driven economy, Beijing has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic development strategy. Traditional institutions, such as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the CCP, are still making the key decisions, but a more pluralistic environment is emerging and allowing business leaders to help shape foreign policy. The China Institute for International Studies, a government think tank, holds numerous conferences bringing together academics and leaders in business, the military, and the government to devise strategies for the top rung of the Communist Party.¶ Partly on these people's advice, Beijing has been encouraging representatives of state-controlled companies to secure exploration and supply agreements with states that produce oil, gas, and other resources. Meanwhile, it has been courting the governments of these states aggressively, building goodwill by strengthening bilateral trade relations, awarding aid, forgiving national debt, and helping build roads, bridges, stadiums, and harbors. In return, China has won access to key resources, from gold in Bolivia and coal in the Philippines to oil in Ecuador and natural gas in Australia . China 's resources hunt has been a boon to some states, especially developing countries, as it has allowed them to exploit as yet untapped resources or gain leverage to negotiate better deals with older customers. But for other states, particularly the United States and Japan , China 's insatiability is causing concern . Some governments worry as Beijing enters their spheres of influence or strikes deals with states they have tried to marginalize. In some quarters in Washington , including the Pentagon, the intelligence services, and Congress, the fear that China could challenge U.S. military dominance in East Asia and destabilize the region is rising. Whatever the prognosis, China's boom can no longer be understood in regional terms alone; as Beijing's economic influence brings it international political influence and the potential for more military power, China's growth will have worldwide repercussions.¶ Although China 's new energy demands need not be a source of serious conflict with the West in the long term, at the moment, Beijing and Washington feel especially uneasy about the situation. While China struggles to manage its growing pains, the United States , as the world's hegemon, must somehow make room for the rising giant; otherwise, war will become a serious possibility. According to the power transition theory , to maintain its dominance, a hegemon will be tempted to declare war on its challengers while it still has a power advantage . Thus, easing the way for the United States and China -- and other states -- to find a new equilibrium

will require careful management, especially of their mutual perceptions.¶ Because China 's extraordinary growth also increases its dependence on foreign resources, the Chinese government has developed a new sense of insecurity vis-a-vis the United States . An article published last June in the Beijing-backed Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao suggested that Washington might resort to economic tactics to contain China . Given the White House's current penchant for unilateral intervention and the loud voices in Congress calling China a military threat, Beijing might reasonably begin to fear that the United States will try to block its purchases of natural resources to destabilize it. Washington must be mindful of these worries and not exacerbate them needlessly.¶ Interstate competition is natural, of course, but it need not be elevated to the level of conflict. And concerns over China 's impressive rise, while understandable, should not detract from the vast room for cooperation that the country's new energy needs allow. After all, the United States and China share an interest in viable oil prices, secure sea-lanes, and a stable international environment, all of which can help sustain their economic prosperity and that of the rest of the world.

A war between the US and China would independently collapse the global economy and U.S. Hegemony that escalates

Liu 5 (Henry, Investment Group Chairman and Asia Times Writer, 8/20/5, “Trade wars can lead to shooting wars,” Asia Times, http://atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/GH20Dj01.html //TW)

The danger of trade wars US geopolitical hostility toward China will manifest itself first in trade friction, which will lead to a mutually recriminatory trade war between the two major economies that will attract opportunistic trade realignments among the traditional allies of the United States. US multinational corporations, unable to steer US domestic politics, will increasingly trade with China through their foreign subsidiaries, leaving the US economy with even fewer jobs, and a condition that will further exacerbate anti-China popular sentiments that translate into more anti-free-trade policies generally and anti-China policies specifically. The resultant global economic depression from a trade war between the world's two largest economies will in turn heighten further mutual recriminations. An external curb from the US of Chinese export trade will accelerate a redirection of Chinese growth momentum inward, increasing Chinese power, including military power , while further

encouraging anti-US sentiment in Chinese policy circles. This in turn will validate US apprehension of a China threat, increasing the prospect for armed conflict. A war between the US and China can have no winners, particularly on the political front. Even if the US were to prevail militarily through its technological superiority, the political cost of military victory would be so severe that the US as it currently exists would not be recognizable after the conflict and the original geopolitical aim behind the conflict would remain elusive, as the Vietnam War and the Iraq war have demonstrated. By comparison, the Vietnam and Iraq conflicts, destructive as they have been to the US social fabric, are mere minor scrimmages compared with a war with China. US policymakers have an option to make China a friend and partner in a peaceful world for the benefit of all nations. To do so, they must first recognize that the world can operate on the principle of plentitude and that prosperity is not something to be fought over by killing consumers in a world plagued with overcapacity.

Nuclear warHarris and Burrows, 9 (Matt *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, Jennifer **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09aprilburrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may

be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in

the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the

diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated

attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower

in an economic downturn.¶ The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East . Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear- armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an

impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises .¶

Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices . Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to t ake actions to assure their future access to energy supplies . In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their

regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and

modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the

most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will

create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing

water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

Contention 3: Spills

Deepwater oil accident inevitable in the Gulf of Mexico sans the plan

Shields 12 – independent energy consultant (David, “QandA: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf?”, Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor, 2/20/2012,http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/20477/Is%20Mexico%20Prepared%20for%20Deepwater%20Drilling%20in%20the%20Gulf.pdf?sequence=1)

They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders . That is probably how we should understand Pemex's decision to drill the Maximino-1 well in 3,000 meters of water in the Perdido Fold Belt, right next to the shared maritime boundary with the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or

production goals. It is about defending the final frontier of national sovereignty and sticking the Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico to advise U.S. companies that they have no right to drill for oil in the ultradeep waters on the Mexican side. The recently signed deepwater agreement obliges both countries to work together and share the spoils of the development of transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional restrictions, is going alone on the

Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as Pemex and its contractors have no experience in such harsh environments . In fact, Pemex has never produced oil commercially anywhere in deep water. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill . It does not fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon spill, has come and gone. The next disaster is just waiting to happen.

Gulf’s ecosystems on the brink—plan key to solve another accident

Craig 11 – Attorneys’ Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University (Robin Kundis, “Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell”, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2011, http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1326405133_03craig.fin.pdf)

These results suggest that we should be very concerned for the Gulf ecosystems affected by the Macondo well blowout . First, and

as this Article has emphasized throughout, unlike the Exxon Valdez spill, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred at great depth, and the oil behaved unusually compared to oil released on the surface . Second, considerably more toxic dispersants were used in connection with the Gulf oil spill than the Alaska oil spill.164 Third, humans could intervene almost immediately to begin cleaning the rocky

substrate in Prince William Sound, but human intervention for many of the important affected Gulf ecosystems, especially the deepwater ones (but even for shallower coral reefs), remains impossible . Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Prince William Sound

was and remains a far less stressed ecosystem than the Gulf of Mexico. In 2008, for example, NOAA stated that “[d]espite the remaining impacts of the [still then] largest oil spill in U.S. history, Prince William Sound remains a relatively pristine, productive and biologically rich ecosystem.”165 To be sure, the Sound was not completely unstressed, and “[w]hen the Exxon Valdez spill occurred in March 1989, the Prince William Sound ecosystem was also responding to at least three notable events in its past: an unusually cold winter in 1988–89; growing populations of reintroduced sea otters; and a 1964 earthquake.”166 Nevertheless, the Gulf of Mexico is besieged by environmental stressors at another order of magnitude (or two), reducing its resilience to disasters like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill . As the Deepwater Horizon Commission

detailed at length, the Gulf faces an array of long-term threats, from the loss of protective and productive wetlands along the coast to hurricanes to a growing “dead zone” (hypoxic zone) to sediment starvation to sealevel rise to damaging channeling to continual (if smaller) oil releases from the thousands of drilling operations .167 In the face of this plethora of stressors, even the Commission championed a kind of resilience thinking, recognizing that responding to the oil spill alone was not enough. It equated restoration of the Gulf to “restored resilience,” arguing that it “represents an effort to sustain these diverse, interdependent activities [fisheries, energy, and tourism] and the environment on which they depend for future generations.”168 A number of commentators have catalogued the failure of the legal and regulatory systems governing the Deepwater Horizon platform and the Macondo well operations.169 The Deepwater Horizon Commission similarly noted that the Deepwater Horizon’s “demise signals the conflicted evolution—and severe shortcomings— of federal regulation of offshore oil drilling in the United States.”170 In its opinion, “[t]he Deepwater Horizon blowout, explosion, and oil spill did not have to happen.”171 The Commission’s overall conclusion was two-fold. First, “[t]he record shows that without effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry will not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to respond in emergencies.”172 Second, “government oversight, alone, cannot reduce those risks to the full extent possible. Government oversight . . . must be accompanied by the oil and gas industry’s internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a fundamental transformation of its safety culture.”173

Plan spills over past the border to environmental standardization in the entire Gulf of Mexico

Velarde ’12 – attorney and counselor-at-law (Rogelio Lopez, held various positions at Pemex during 1988-1993, including that of Financial Advisor to the Finance Department, In-House Counsel in Houston, Texas, In-House Counsel in New York, and Head of the International Legal Department of Pemex. He was honored with the “Most Distinguished Attorney Award” of Pemex for the period 1990-1991, former Chairman of the Energy Committee of the Mexican Bar Association, and currently he is the President for the Latin America Chapter of the Association of the International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN), as Visiting Professor of Judicial Process on the Mexican Legal Studies Program at the University of Houston Law Center, and he is currently the director of the Energy Law Seminar organized between the Universidad Iberoamericana and the Mexican Bar Association. “US-Mexican treaty on Gulf of Mexico transboundary reservoirs”, International Law Office, 3-19-2012,http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=b9326bf8-f27f-43ff-b45a-1b2b70ccb217andredir=1)

Pemex has indicated that it has no information to confirm the existence of a transboundary field. However, it is unlikely that both countries would take the step of concluding such a treaty without having geological information to suggest the existence of such a field. One of the covenants included in the treaty is particularly significant in this context. It requires the two federal governments to adopt common norms and standards concerning safety and environmental protection for the "activity contemplated under this agreement" . Effectively, this means a harmonised system of offshore technical standards for exploration and production in the Gulf of Mexico - it seems highly unlikely that the relevant authorities in the United States (1) and Mexico (2) would agree to harmonise applicable standards only in respect of transboundary reservoirs.

Even if spills happen, Plan solves cooperation that ensures a spill is contained

Philbin 12 – director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy (John P. Philbin, “QandA: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf?”, Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor, 2/20/2012,http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/20477/Is%20Mexico%20Prepared%20for%20Deepwater%20Drilling%20in%20the%20Gulf.pdf?sequence=1)

P emex is not prepared for risks such as a spill or other serious accident that could happen as it plans to drill two wells in ultradeep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, said Juan Carlos Zepeda, the head of Mexico's National Hydrocarbons Commission, in a Feb.

15 interview with The Wall Street Journal. According to Zepeda, his agency's resources amount to about 2 percent the size of its U.S. counterpart's budget. Pemex officials, however, say that the company is capable of carrying out its plans safely. How prepared is Mexico to deal with a serious accident in the Gulf of Mexico? Is the company sacrificing safety in its bid to improve competitiveness and meet production goals? A: John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy: "Among the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon incident, two are fundamental in determining response preparedness. First is the importance of having a consistent national doctrine at federal, state and local levels. Significant gaps surfaced during the Macondo blowout response because the U.S. Coast Guard operated under the United States' National Contingency Plan (NCP), which uses a top-down approach to manage the response, while state, local and elected officials operated under the Stafford Act, which is a bottom-up approach. The second fundamental concern is awareness and knowledge of the doctrine for those with any role in preparedness and response. Response plans and procedures developed from national doctrine must account for the complexity that will ensue, involving many jurisdictions and response elements. Adequate resources and pre-agreed collaboration mechanisms among resource providers are equally important . Note that the U.S. Coast Guard deployed some 60 boats and 2 aircraft to assist in Macondo response efforts, along with over 3,000 other boats and 127 surveillance aircraft and hundreds of individuals involved in the command and control structure. Mexico's navy, with some 200 ships total, would be severely taxed to respond to an incident, despite having some doctrine in place to deal with a spill and despite some simulations. The fact that the United States and Mexico signed an agreement this week to collaborate on safety and response mechanisms in the Gulf of Mexico is a critical step toward safer Gulf operations—for both Mexico and the United States."

Gulf ecosystems are critical biodiversity hotspots and have a key effect on the world’s oceans

Brenner ‘8 (Jorge Brenner, “Guarding the Gulf of Mexico’s valuable resources”, SciDevNet, 3-14-2008, http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/guarding-the-gulf-of-mexico-s-valuable-resources.html)

The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats, and hosts the only known nesting beach of Kemp's Ridley, the world's most endangered sea turtle. The Gulf's circulation pattern gives it biological and socioeconomic importance: water from the Caribbean enters from the south through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico and, after warming in the basin, leaves through the northern Florida Strait between the United States and Cuba to form the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.

Resiliency is wrong specifically for the Gulf of Mexico—any shock can be the tipping point

Craig 11 – Attorneys’ Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University (Robin Kundis, “Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell”, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2011, http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1326405133_03craig.fin.pdf)

Ecological resilience and resilience theory acknowledge that ecosystems are dynamic—not, as prior theories had assumed, inherently stable systems tending toward an equilibrium .142 Resilience theory recognizes that there are at least three different ways in which ecosystems experience and respond to change and perturbation—three different aspects of “resilience.”143 The first and most common understanding of resilience refers to an ecosystem’s ability to absorb change and persist in function and relationships.144 This sense of resilience refers to “the rate or speed of recovery of a system following a shock.”145 As a practical matter in the law of natural resource management, the law tends to expect that ecosystems will be resilient in this first sense—that is, the law assumes that ecosystems will generally successfully absorb any human-induced perturbations of the system. As a result, natural resources law is what I will term “first sense resilience dependence,” but that dependence reflects a truncated understanding of ecosystems’ resilience and capacity for change. Importantly, however, the second aspect of resilience theory acknowledges that ecosystems can exist in multiple states rather than stabilizing around a single equilibrium state; as a result, changes and disturbances can “push” ecosystems over thresholds from one ecosystem state to another.146 This second sense of resilience “assumes multiple states (or

‘regimes’) and is defined as the magnitude of a disturbance that triggers a shift between alternative states .”147 For example, the boreal forests of Canada can exist in at least two states with respect to spruce budworms: a “no outbreak” state “characterized by low numbers of budworm and young, fastgrowing trees,” and an “outbreak” state “characterized by high numbers of budworm and old, senescent trees.”148 The shift between the two appears to relate to an increase in canopy volume, which in turn affects bird populations and the birds’ ability to control the pest.149 Regime-shift models can also help to explain outbreaks of some human diseases.150 However, natural resources law and policy generally do not acknowledge this second sense of resilience, and, as a result, it generally does not incorporate mechanisms for acknowledging, responding to, or even trying to avoid ecological regime shifts. Finally, resilience theory also acknowledges “the surprising and discontinuous nature of change, such as

the collapse of fish stock or the sudden outbreak of spruce budworms in forests.”151 In other words, the long-time persistence of an ecosystem (or collection of multiple ecosystems) like the Gulf of Mexico in an apparently stable, productive ecosystem state is absolutely no guarantee that humans can continue to disturb and abuse the system and expect only a gradual or linear response. As was true for the second sense of resilience, natural resource law in general and marine resources law in particular do not deal well with the possibility of sudden and dramatic ecosystem changes. Nevertheless, such regime shifts have been documented for a number of marine ecosystems. For example, In Jamaica, the effects of overfishing, hurricane damage, and disease have combined to destroy most corals, whose abundance has declined from more than 50 percent in the late 1970s to less than 5 percent today. A dramatic phase shift has occurred, producing a system dominated by fleshy macroalgae (more than 90 percent cover). Immediate implementation of management procedures is necessary to avoid further catastrophic damage.152 Similarly, the presence or absence of sea otters can significantly influence the structure and function of Alaskan kelp forests because the otters, when present, control sea urchin populations, allowing for more extensive coral growth.153 In some locations, moreover, “sea urchin population changes in response to sea otter predation were rapid and extreme” and could result in “short-term changes in kelp density.”154 The current law, policy, and remedy regime for offshore oil drilling effectively presumes that marine ecosystems have virtually unlimited first-sense resilience with respect to oil spills—in crudest terms, that restoration will always be possible, and perhaps even through entirely natural means.155 Our experience with the last large oil spill in U.S. waters, however, suggests otherwise.

Makes extinction inevitable

Craig 8 (Robin Kundis, Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law, Tallahassee, Florida, “ CLIMATE CHANGE, REGULATORY FRAGMENTATION, AND WATER TRIAGE”, Summer, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 825, lexis)

Marine ecosystems have immense value. Oceans cover more than 70% of our planet, 314 support vast reserves of biodiversity (in all senses), 315 produce at least half of the Earth's atmospheric oxygen, 316 drive the planet's hydrological cycle, 317

sequester carbon dioxide, 318 and play a significant role in the earth's climate and weather. 319 As such, oceans and estuaries are critical providers of ecosystem services - those "myriad of life support functions, the observable manifestations of ecosystem processes that ecosystems provide and without which human civilizations could not thrive ." 320 According to a comprehensive study that appeared in Nature in 1997, " about 63% of the estimated value [of the world's ecosystem services] is contributed by marine ecosystems," especially coastal ecosystems. 321 Specifically, "coastal environments, including estuaries, [*892] coastal wetlands, beds of sea grass and algae, coral reefs, and continental shelves ... cover only 6.3% of the world's surface, but are responsible for 43% of the estimated value of the world's ecosystem services." 322

Plan:

The United States federal government should increase its oil cooperation with the United Mexican States as per the Outer Continental Shelf Trans-boundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act.

Contention 4: Solvency

U.S.-Mexico Trans-boundary key—Congressional confirmation is the last remaining step

Brown and Meacham 13 (Neil and Carl, journalists for The Hill, “Time for U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Agreement”, 06/05/13, http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/303739-time-for-us-mexico-transboundary-agreement)RW

The United States-Mexico Transboundary Agreement ( TBA ) would enable cooperation between our two federal governments and our companies to unlock the potential for oil and natural gas reserves that extend across our Gulf of Mexico maritime boundary. Congressional approval of the TBA would enrich U.S.-Mexico relations in the near term while laying the foundation for improved energy security and enhanced environmental protection for the Gulf Coast . Bilateral relations

with Mexico have improved dramatically in recent years, yet energy cooperation has lagged. Oil holds a privileged position of national pride and constitutional protection in Mexico, historically putting it off limits for domestic reform and bilateral cooperation with the U.S. The TBA is, therefore, more than just an energy agreement. Its approval by the Mexican government is a political statement opening a window to richer relations. While the area under future jurisdiction of the TBA could provide incremental domestic oil production, a far greater prize for the U.S. oil portfolio is the prospect of more reliable oil trade with our ally Mexico. The TBA would, for the first time, allow oil majors to work in joint production arrangements with PEMEX and support the confidence building necessary to enable those arrangements more widely in Mexico. That is not only good for oil major shareholders, it is good for our nation’s energy security. Even as U.S. domestic oil production increases, the sources of our imports remain critical for economic stability and national security flexibility. Recently, Mexico was supplanted by Saudi Arabia as our second largest foreign oil source after Canada.

Mexican oil production has dropped by more than a quarter over the last decade, and U.S. refiners geared for heavy oil had to look elsewhere to make up the difference. Canadian heavy crude production is increasing in the country’s oil sands region, but pipeline

infrastructure is insufficient. Therefore, in effect, the U.S. has had to increase imports of Middle East crudes in order to make up for shortfalls in Mexico. The TBA alone will not structurally reverse Mexico’s oil decline, but it is likely a necessary first step along that path. Regardless of TBA approval, Mexico’s PEMEX will continue its deepwater exploration near the U.S. border. With memories of Deepwater Horizon still fresh, it is worrisome that Mexico’s oil safety regulator , known as CNH, has almost no capacity to provide independent on-site inspections. All facilities operating under the TBA would be subject to U.S. inspectors with the ability to stop operations. Moreover, U.S. and Mexican regulators would work hand in hand, offering support for more systematic improvement.

Given the foreign policy, energy security, and environmental benefits of the TBA signed in February 2012, it is disappointing that the Obama administration has delayed taking steps necessary for Congress to approve the agreement. That delay does not make it any less important for Congress to approve the agreement soon. Congress has a critical role in clarifying certain provisions of this international agreement. Dispute resolution mechanisms warrant particular attention. Already, it has been mistakenly argued that the TBA requires greater secrecy in payments of oil deals, encouraging an effort to exempt the agreement from the Cardin-Lugar transparency law. No such secrecy is required by the TBA, which subordinates its confidentiality rules to domestic law. The longer the TBA sits on the shelf, the more likely it will be hamstrung as a proxy for more rancorous energy disputes. Prompt Congressional activity could be a useful vote of confidence in the upcoming domestic energy sector reform in Mexico . Mexico needs new oil production from more complex fields to counterbalance its declining fields, let alone increased production. Leaders in Mexico’s two largest political parties know that under current capital and management constraints, PEMEX alone is extremely unlikely to turn Mexico’s oil and natural gas abundance into prosperity for the Mexican people. International oil majors are needed, but that will take political courage. Congressional approval of the TBA would tangibly demonstrate that the U.S. government and our companies are willing partners. That is good for Mexico and for the U.S.

Solves PEMEX and the Environment

Navarro 12 (Carlos, Editor at University of New Mexico Latin America Database, “Mexico, U.S. Reach Landmark Agreement on Deepwater Oil Exploration”, 2-22-12, http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/19414/SourceMex.Mexico.US.Reach.Landmark.Agreement.2.22.12.pdf?sequence=1)RW

Mexico and the US completed most of the negotiations on the Transboundary Agreement in 2011, but the pact was only formalized with the signatures of Mexican Foreign Relations Secretary Patricia Espinosa and US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at theG20 meeting in Los Cabos. One of the most important benefits of the agreement is an end to the current moratorium on oil exploration and production in the Western Gap portion of the Gulf of Mexico . The US Interior

Department estimates that the area contains as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 300 billion cubic feet of natural gas , but

these are relatively modest amounts when compared with the potential throughout the Gulf of Mexico. "These reservoirs could hold considerable reserves that would benefit the United States and Mexico alike," Clinton told reporters in Los Cabos. The accord would also help facilitate joint

exploration arrangements between PEMEX and US oil companies. And, in the absence of joint exploration agreements, each country has the right to exploit its share of hydrocarbons while protecting the other nation’s interests . The agreement also contains several clauses that allow the two countries to cooperate more closely in preventing and reacting to oil spills. These include creating joint inspection teams to ensure compliance with safety laws and environmental rules. Until now, neither was authorized to oversee the environmental and safety practices of the other, even though oil spills do not respect international borders. The clauses were included in the agreement partly in response to the massive oil spill at the Deep Water Horizon drilling rig in the Gulf

of Mexico in April 2010. "Each of the nations will maintain sovereignty and their own regulatory systems ," Interior Secretary Ken Salazar

told reporters at the G20meeting. "But what this signifies, and what may be the most significant part of the agreement, is that we’re moving forward jointly with Mexico to ensure we have a common set of safety protocols." Salazar and Mexican Energy Secretary Jordy Herrera Flores

were on hand in Los Cabos for the signing of the agreement. Experts believe the cooperation on safety will especially benefit PEMEX. "Mexico doesn’t have the resources to combat a major oil spill, and the United States does ," said energy expert Jorge Piñon, a research fellow at

the University of Texas. "Coordination and sharing communications, training, personnel, equipment, and technology are essential for safe and productive drilling ."