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“Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational Missions” Stockholm, January 18-19, 2007 Conference Report. Edited by Witold M. PATOKA

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Contents Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4 Panel One

Canadian and Swedish approaches to civil-military coordination in multinational missions Alan Okros: 3D Security: The implications of integrating defense, diplomacy and development in multi-national missions …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….… 7 Chris Cooter: A Canadian perspective on civilian-military cooperation: “making a good idea better” …………. 18 Michael Sahlin: The Swedish approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions ……………...… 26 Helga Haftendorn: PRTs: A successful instrument of civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan ………………… 32 Panel Two

Interagency approaches to post-conflict stabilization in the Middle East. Cooperation in the Israel-Lebanon case: civil-military coordination in UNIFIL II

Yigal Haccoun: The case of the IDF center for the coordination and humanitarian relief ……………………… 36 37 Efrat Elron: Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN and the international community; new and renewed partnerships …….. 45 Panel Three

The transatlantic partnership EU-NATO Reinhard Trischak: The European Union: civil-military coordination and management of operations: EU-NATO relations …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 54 Gale A. Mattox: Remarks ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 60 Gianni Bonvicini: EU-NATO cooperation on crisis management missions ………………………………………. 62 Panel Four

Challenges of civil-military cooperation in multinational missions Fahim Youssofzai: A strategic management framework for successful peace-building and reconstruction in Afghanistan …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 66 Chris C. Demchak: Exploring the knowledge nexus: India’s path in terrorism-drive institutional growth ……… 94 Witold M. Patoka: Civil-military cooperation in fragmegrating world ………………………………………….. 148 Hanna Ojanen: Comments ………………………………………………………………………………………... 170 Lars Wedin: Remarks……………………………………………………………………………………………… 172 Witold M. Patoka: Setting of the research agenda for research on civil-military cooperation in multinational missions. Concluding remarks …………………………………………………………………………………….. 174 Appendix A. Power Point Presentations Kevin Smith: The Canadian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions ………………... 184 Kevin M. Kennedy: Civil-military cooperation in practice: the case of the IDF center for the coordination of humanitarian assistance …………………………………………………………………………………………… 196 Magnus Ekengren: EU solidarity declaration: implications for civil-military coordination ……………………. 199

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Introduction

In 2004 we created a research and study group at the Department of Security and Strategic Studies at the Swedish National Defence College (SNDC) with the purpose of pooling our forces for those interested in research in, and the advanced study of, transatlantic security relations. The group is called Forum for Security Studies. Apart from the 20-25 members of Forum that are based at the SNDC we have made efforts to link our research to a broader international community. This has succeeded very well indeed, as attested to by the fact that we have an international Advisory Board consisting of 14 scholars and other experts are members. The Advisory Board has representatives in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.

This report springs from one of the regular activities that we arrange under the auspices of Forum for Security Studies, a yearly international conference on a topic within transatlantic security relations, broadly defined. Our first conference, in November 2004, focused on “the United States as a Transatlantic Security actor after the U.S. Presidential Election.” The second conference, in late 2005, studied “the European Union as a Strategic Actor.” As a partial spinoff from this conference, yours truly is the editor, together with my colleague Dr. Kjell Engelbrekt, of a volume called “The European Union and Strategy: An Emerging Actor” which will be published by Routledge later in 2007. In this volume, apart from chapters written by regular members of Forum, several of the scholars on the Advisory Board have contributed.

For the third Forum conference held in January 2007, we chose the title “Civil-Military Cooperation in International Missions.” The brain behind this idea, as well as the source for organization of the conference into sessions and the invitation of most, if not all, of the participants was my colleague Dr. Witold Patoka, policy director of Forum for Security Studies.

There are two research questions that we wanted our conference to cover and that are also reflected in this conference report. The first research question is How do mission requirements affect the coordination between civilian and military components in an international mission? The second research question is How do the specific characteristics of various actors in the mission affect the quality of civil-military cooperation.

We – or rather Dr. Patoka – elected to address these questions by way of arranging three panels. The first panel was “Civil-Military Cooperation – The Canadian and Swedish approaches.” For this panel, we were very fortunate indeed to be visited by three distinguished Canadian experts, as well as by a renowned Swedish authority in the field.

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The second panel covered a fairly unknown aspect of the Israeli – Hezbollah war in the summer of

2006 – the IDF Center for the Coordination of Evacuation and Humanitarian Relief, together with some broader aspects of cooperation between Israel and the United Nations. For this panel as well, we were – through the contacts of Dr. Patoka – very happy to receive Mr. Kevin Kennedy, together with one representative of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and one Israeli scholar.

For our final session (on the first day of the conference) we highlighted – as is our practice at the yearly Forum conferences – the relationship between the European Union and NATO, this time in the field of “Civil-Military Coordination in International Missions.” Our speaker on this topic was BrigGen Reinhard Trischak of the EU Military Staff in Brussels. In this case, as was also true for the other panels, we were further enlightened by interventions by members of the Advisory Board. In the case of the third panel, Professor Gale A. Mattox of the U.S. Naval Academy and Professor Gianni Bonvicini of the Istituto Affairi Internationali in Rome provided comments.

On the second day of the conference, a number of papers were presented. Included here are papers by Dr. Chris C. Demchak of the University of Arizona, Fahim Youssofzai of the Royal Military College of Canada and, last but certainly not least, by our own Dr. Witold Patoka. We feel that this was a very successful conference and we are happy to be able to present some of the substance in this conference report.

It should be added that this conference report is indeed just that, a conference report. We never demanded from our participants that they give us full-fledged articles. This is the explanation why the articles in this report are not all formatted in the same way.

Finally, this Introduction would be very incomplete without a mentioning of, a A Thank You, to the extraordinary Ms Sofia Weibull, whose energy and intelligence never ceases to amaze those of us fortunate enough to have the pleasure of working with her. Sofia contrbuted very strongly to the successful way in which the 2007 conferene of Forum for Security Studies was carried out. Stockholm, May 2007 Jan Hallenberg Professor Executive Director, Forum for Security Studies

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Panel One

Canadian and Swedish approaches to civil-military coordination in

multinational missions

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3D Security: The implications of integrating defense, diplomacy and development in multi-national missions Dr Alan Okros Military Psychology and Leadership Royal Military College of Canada

The Post-Cold War period has seen an increase in the engagement of individuals, organizations,

governments and the United Nations in contributing to social, political and economic objectives in other

countries. A number of concepts have been proposed to represent the rationale, purpose or roles

underlying these activities, however, there is little coherence or commonality in the concepts used.

Whether viewed across nations, academic disciplines or key actors, different labels are being used to

describe similar activities and the same label is being given different meaning by various groups. This

paper will examine 3D Security as the Canadian approach to achieving what the Federal Government

refers to as ‘integrated security solutions’.

As reflected in the label 3D Security, the Canadian approach recognizes that, by the time Canada

becomes formally engaged in assisting people in another country, the circumstances will be complex with

requirements to address a range of social, economic, political and public safety issues. Hence, any

intervention will probably have to incorporate the 3 Ds of development, diplomacy and defence. While the

idea that nations in crisis likely require assistance in multiple areas is not new, the Canadian approach of

achieving integrated security solutions incorporates two explicit and one implicit assumptions that serve to

differentiate it from the concepts used by some other states.

The two explicit assumptions pertain to ‘who does what when’. As implied in the label “integrated

security solutions”, 3D requires that the various agents of government work together to achieve a set of

common, overarching goals. Thus, this approach rejects the former philosophy of allowing independent

and often disconnected activities to be conducted by each of the ‘Ds’. Of importance, ‘integration’

requires far more than merely cooperation or coordination.

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Further, the 3D concept recognizes that contributions will likely be required by each of the Ds throughout

the process of providing assistance hence differs from the idea that the focus of activities, and the lead

government agent, necessarily shifts as levels of conflict change. Thus, the Canadian 3D approach is

significantly different than the US Three Block War. While General Krulak’s concept also included the

idea of concurrently conducting military, diplomatic and aid activities (hence the three ‘blocks’), he

assumed that the military was in charge in each of the three blocks with the diplomatic and aid activities

incorporated in mission planning if and when necessary.

At least theoretically, the 3D approach means that there is no longer a ‘military mission’ and the

military can neither act unilaterally nor assume to have the final say in planning activities. Under 3D, the

key question is not how does the military incorporate other government agencies or elements of civil

society in “its” mission but how does the military fit into a broader integrated approach? Especially as

both the development sector and diplomatic corps are invariably active in most fragile nations on an

ongoing basis not just during a crisis, it is important to recognize that the significant conceptual shift that

has occurred in the last fifteen years is not an expansion of the military mission to now include

humanitarian aid, post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building but, for Canada and likely other nations

such as Sweden, that the idea of a separate military mission has now been subsumed under a broader, more

integrated ‘whole of government’ mission.

This paper will touch on some of the potential problems in moving from theory to practice but will

first discuss the implicit assumption in the Canadian 3D approach to integrated security solutions. While

this approach explicitly shifts ‘who does what’, it is based on a particular perspective in defining the basis

upon which ‘we’ justify sticking our noses in somebody else’s affairs. Simplistically, the Canadian

government has drawn on a long standing belief that it is in the interest of all to live in a world that is

relatively peaceful and in which citizens of all countries are assured of basic rights, the necessities of life

and some form of government that is responsive to the needs and aspirations of all of the people(s) of the

nation.

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While few would disagree with these ideas, it is important to note that this approach implicitly gives

greater emphasis to the concepts of universals – fundamental citizen rights or human security with less

importance given to Canada’s political or economic objectives. This stands in contrast to the approach of

some international or regional powers that generally continue to place their own nation’s political and

economic interests over the global good. Recognizing that 3D attempts to strike a balance between

political objectives and Human Security principles, the implicit assumption of contributing to the global

good rather than serving national interests has important consequences for the implementation of 3D

security. Particularly for the military, it serves to expand the moral and philosophical framework that

informs what is to be accomplished and the means to be used to do so.

In presenting some of the issues of 3D Security, it is important to note that the Canadian experience

in actually doing so has been limited to date. The only real test likely has been in Afghanistan however

there are clearly multiple, competing perspectives being pursued by various states and non-Afghan actors

with limited latitude for the implementation of a real 3D approach. To the extent possible, however, there

have been some attempts to integrate activities with both the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar

and the Strategic Advisory Team in Kabul attempting to include all three communities in an integrated

approach. Noting that elements of a 3D type approach were evident in earlier activities such as in Zaire,

East Timor and Haiti, a clearer ‘made in Canada’ approach has been implemented in three recent responses

to natural disasters: the Asian tsunami relief in Sri Lanka, earthquake relief in Pakistan and the Hurricane

Katrina response in the US. The operations in Sri Lanka provide the best ‘test case’ as there were certainly

significant political and security issues that complicated the simple provision of emergency aid hence

really required an integration of all three components.

As an overall comment, anecdotal indicators suggest that the three communities have been generally

successful in developing integrated approaches at the strategic or policy level with indicators of success at

the implementation or tactical levels. It would appear however that this has occurred primarily due to trial

and error and with significant friction.

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Although the following requires rigourous analyses under conditions in which the 3D approach is

able to be fully applied, the following represent four domains that have particular implications for the

military in participating in fully integrated 3D missions. The first pertains to capacities; specifically, who is

available to contribute to which aspects of 3D. While the Federal Government has appropriate procedures

to conduct integrated planning and all three departments have senior officials who participate in the

establishment of the overall policy and overarching goals to be achieved, there are marked differences in

how these objectives are then translated into actions. It is only the military that has the capacities to

actually deploy large tactical units to carry these out and to create the national headquarters and in-theatre

operational level staff to coordinate activities. The diplomatic component has a parallel system to link

strategic and operational level planning between Ottawa and Embassy/Consular staff however our

diplomatic corps is too small to be able to deploy and sustain a mission-specific team especially when the

area of activity is removed from that country’s capitol. The recent activities to evacuate Canadian from

Lebanon provide a good example where the limited Canadian diplomatic capacity became serious

overloaded. Consequently, the diplomatic presence on the ground tends to be small, often comprised of

either an individual or two working with the larger team or, more often, only ‘operational’ level

participation via the Embassy or Consular office. The Canadian development capacity is the weakest with,

in reality, virtually no capacity to have developmental officials deployed into the country for either

coordination or delivery. Following a pattern seen in some other nations, Canada tends to rely on

contracted experts to provide the managerial oversight of development activities with either bilateral or

combined donor funding used to contract external or local groups to actually conduct these activities. A

difficulty, of course, is that contracted development bypasses the normal state political and bureaucratic

decision making structures.

The net result is that, while there may be integrated planning at the strategic level, the follow on

functions of mission-specific planning, coordination and implementation tend to be conducted fairly

independently within each department with limited capabilities for real integration at the operational and

tactical levels. As the defence component is the only one that possesses the structures, procedures and

deployable operational headquarters and tactical units, the military presence and perspective tends to

dominate in theatre.

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Further, the methods used by our diplomatic and development departments means that integration at the

operational level typically involves the military working with Embassy staff and occasional contracted

development representatives while integration at the tactical level typically involves the military working

with NGO or local development agencies and occasional diplomatic representatives.

The second observation pertains to differences in expertise. Each of the 3 Ds have developed

extensive knowledge, skills and lessons learned in carrying out their specific roles and they bring to any

complex security situation valuable perspectives that are needed to ensure success. The difficulty is that

there is very little overlap in their respective expertise. The most effective way to integrated

complementary but not shared knowledge would be through prior learning such as in combined formal

courses, through shared professional conferences, journals and related fora or as part of pre-deployment

preparation. Canada has not yet addressed these requirements. The alternative, which is what appears to

be happening at the present, is to engage in learning using one-on-one, trial and error in theatre. This has

limited effectiveness as, not only is the PRT the wrong place to start exchanging business cards, but, as

already stated, the military presence tends to swamp the development or diplomatic capability. Further,

the action-oriented decision making model in use is not conducive to the sharing of different models, views

or knowledge.

The dominant military model on the ground is particularly problematic as it is likely that the military

is the least integrated of the three. Although the Canadian Forces have been increasing their professional

understanding of the other two domains, this has been done using a primarily military-centric approach as

per the US Three Block War in an effort to determine how the diplomatic and development communities

can contribute to the military mission rather than learning how the military can contribute to a whole of

government mission. Of more critical importance, there is little evidence that the diplomatic or

development communities, especially the humanitarian aid sector with whom the military must operate on

the ground, have more than a superficial understanding of the military perspective.

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It is noted that the military are the ones who have typically done the best job of articulating their theory-

based body of knowledge and codifying their expertise. Based on discussions at various meetings,

conferences and consultations with representatives of the three communities, it would appear that each

engages in what could be called professional snobbery. All three tend to frame the fundamental problem

so that their contribution is the most critical hence in which their professional perspective is assumed to be

the most relevant. The result is that each then marginalizes the others’ knowledge as irrelevant. An

increased level of professional respect would be helpful to overcome a tendency to for each to see

themselves as the real professionals forced to cooperate with amateurs.

As an extension of the issue of differential expertise, the third element pertains to the underlying

philosophy that informs a set of taken-for-granted assumptions about group behaviour and human nature.

A speculative observation is that the most important assumption each of the 3Ds forms concerning human

nature pertains to the likelihood of confrontation versus cooperation. The military view, of course, is a

rather pessimistic one which wishes for the best but assumes the worst while the development perspective

represents the persistent triumph of hope over experience wishing the best and assuming it obviously has

to turn out that way. Beyond the fact that diplomats are masters in playing poker, their fundamental

assumption is that everybody is working from the basis of multiple, hidden agendas making it foolish to

assume anything about anybody.

These differences are not just a comparison of the military’s Hobbesian pessimism versus the

development community’s Pollyanna optimism versus the diplomatic Machiavellian pragmatism but have

practical consequence for how each relates to the other. For example, the dominant set of military values

concerning mission accomplishment, sacrifice for the common good and warrior spirit generates an

orientation towards risk taking while the dominant public service values concerning fiscal prudence,

probity and accountability generate the opposite preference for risk avoidance amongst officials in the

diplomatic and development offices.

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Another problem is that differences in how the ends and means are understood can lead to significant

tensions around issues such as establishing priority for actions (the development after security or security

through development argument), the allocation of resources or in measuring progress with each of the 3Ds

using fundamentally different ‘score cards’ to report back to their respective higher headquarters. Thus,

while Canada has appropriate procedures for the strategic planning to initiate a 3D mission, there is no

central coordinating body to conduct ongoing monitoring to ensure that the operational and tactical

interpretation, decisions and compromises made will ultimately achieve the intended objectives.

The greatest problem arising from differing philosophies pertains to the view that each of the groups

has of the role of the military in 3D. Over the last few years, many in the development community have

become extremely concerned about the militarization of aid. There are both philosophical and practical

reasons why those engaged in development wish to be seen as physically separated and philosophically

independent of the military. A particular issue pertains to the views of the military and the aid community

concerning security. The military constantly sees threats around them and responded to these by trying to

provide physical security – the protective ‘shield’ afforded by living in a defended camp and carrying

weapons when venturing forth. On occasion, soldiers have wanted to extend this protection to the aid

workers around them in the assumption that it was both needed and valued. This ‘protection’ however

actually serves to put these individuals at increased risk as it forces them to compromise their impartiality

and neutrality thus eroding the very reputation that they viewed as their real (and only) protection. The

clash of philosophies regarding security and impartiality was clearly highlighted in the decision by

Médecins Sans Frontières to withdraw from direct involvement in Afghanistan.

The final issue pertains to the underlying doctrine or guiding set of principles that inform decisions

regarding both ends and means. Each of the three communities apply difference ethical and legal reference

points in determining what is appropriate when working in socially and morally ambiguous circumstances.

While the body of international law provides a degree of coherence across all three groups, each tends to

give emphasis to a particular set of norms and obligations.

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The core set of military principles are drawn from the combination of just war concepts and formal, legal

obligations to one’s national government. In contrast, the development community tends to give emphasis

to what are seen as universal principals and broad generalized goal for advancing the human condition

with the concept of Human Security and the Millenium Development Goals forming their core doctrine.

The diplomatic community appear to be the only one of the three that considers the full spectrum of

protocols, conventions, legal obligations and accepted universal principles however, in addressing

international security issues, tends to give a strong emphasis to the interpretations endorsed by the United

Nations.

The net result is that each of the three can approach a mission to achieve integrated security solutions

with very different principles and priorities and, again, likely a limited understanding of the core references

used by the other two. Significant differences that can arise concerning the fundamental purpose and focus

of the mission. The military gives an emphasis to the security sector to achieve a reduction in violence

using means accepted by their own society and endorsed by their nation government. Diplomats focus on

the mechanisms of government to support political objectives using means that are accepted by the

international community and endorsed by the United Nations. Development workers concentrate on local

communities to improve standards of living using means accepted by civil society and (implicitly)

endorsed by major donors. It should be noted that these difficulties are likely not restricted to the

Canadian national level but can also been seen in differing perspectives emanating from various UN

offices such as DPKO, OCHA, UNDP and UNHCR, amongst others.

The primary implication for the military of this consideration of the Canadian 3D Security approach

is to suggest that there is no longer a distinct military mission but that the military must now learn how to

work effectively in a more complex, integrated mission with a range of objectives, standards and principles

to guide actions. In doing so, three recommendations are provided. The first is for the military to examine

activities at the operational and tactical levels in theatre to ensure an equal consideration is given to the

diplomatic and developmental perspective even though neither will likely be represented by a large team.

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The second is to expand professional development from a military-centric to a multi-team integrated

mission approach with emphasis on understanding the key expertise, philosophy and doctrinal principles

that the diplomatic and development communities bring to any security issue.

While senior officers must continue to master the core body of knowledge of the profession of arms, it is

of equal importance that they grasp the concepts, acronyms and implications of MDGs, R2P, Resolution

1325 and be able to effectively differentiate International Humanitarian Law from International Human

Rights Law including understanding the circumstances when each does or does not apply. The third is for

the military to develop a broader framework for understanding core military roles and missions. The

following discussion of the evolution for the Canadian Forces from warfighting through deterrence to

security provides some initial suggestions.

War

During the first half of the 20th Century - in particular, illustrated by the military’s role in the First and

Second World Wars - the focus of the Canadian Forces was on warfighting. Consistent with Clauswitzian

theory, in achieving this central function, the military is given the lead role as the primary agent to be used

in resolving the political situation. Once one military has defeated another, the victorious state can impose

its political will on the other. In other words, the other agents of political activity such as diplomacy take a

secondary role and are, to a large degree, dependent on the relative success of the military. In order to

achieve the key outcome of attaining victory over the other’s military, the core competence of the military

is the commonly referred to management of violence.

Deterrence

For the second half of the 20th Century, under the growth of NATO and the Cold War as well as under the

new UN function of peacekeeping in missions such as Cyprus, the focus of the Canadian Forces was on

deterrence.

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In this case, the military is used to maintain the circumstances in stasis while other means – most often

diplomacy – are used to achieve the desired political outcomes. Thus, the military serves in a supporting

role while other agents of government become the primary actors in resolving the situation. There is a

direct linkage with the warfighting domain as part of the means used to maintain the necessary stasis is the

threat of the actual use of force – one has to possess a sharp blade in order to do sabre rattling. However,

there is a constant concern that the military posturing could inadvertently trigger actual conflict thus the

military has to be adept as providing sufficient deterrence so as to convince the opponent to seek a

negotiated solutions without tipping the balance into outright warfighting. Thus, the core competence of

the military under deterrence is considered to be management of stalemates. This deterrence function is,

therefore, seen as a role expansion for the military such that, whether conducting a confrontational standoff

as illustrated in the NATO allies versus the Warsaw Pact or in patrolling the Green Line in Cyprus, the

military must demonstrate its mastery of managing stalemates while concurrently maintaining its expertise

in the traditional core function of the management of violence in case needed.

Security

The current 21st Century circumstances are seen as a third level of role expansion as the Canadian Forces is

now expected to be an active player in achieving security solutions as an equal partner in a multi-

profession, integrated team. As given emphasis by the development community, the key requirement in

these cases is to establish the conditions in which local communities, meaning not just representatives of

the host nation’s government but all members of the society, can take the lead role in establishing their

own security and stability. In other words, not only is the military no longer the primary agent in resolving

the situation, the government as a whole (of the contributing nation) is not the primary agent. Rather it is

the recipient civil society as represented by both the average citizen and the interconnected democratic

institutions such as justice, education, health, a free press, a regulated economy, etc. which take the lead in

restoring human security.

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As with the expansion from war to deterrence, this new role is built on the responsibilities and expertise of

the other two – as illustrated on the ground in Afghanistan, there will often be circumstances in which the

military will have to revert from ‘community building’ to the sabre rattling of deterrence in order to

convince local militias to either disarm (part of the security activities) or, at least, to return to the

negotiating table (part of the deterrence domain) – and, when deterrence fails, to have to use the

warfighting application of force.

This Afghan example illustrates a core element of multi-party teams in that there will be occasions in

which the military takes a lead role but with the recognition that there are other circumstances in which the

military fills only a support role. Thus, while the military must maintain its proficiency in both the

management of violence and the management of stalemates, the third competency to be mastered is that

needed to create the conditions for human security including the capacity to work as an effective

component of a larger team. The key competence for doing so is the management of trust. Whether

conducted with a mission team, working with international allies or engaging with the local government

and communities, trust building is the new mission objective and has to be approached in very different

ways than maintaining stalemates or defeating an opposing force on the battlefield. The clear starting

point for establishing trust is obviously to first do so amongst an integrated 3D security team from ones

own country.

Stockholm, January 18, 2007

Alan Okros

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A Canadian perspective on civilian-military cooperation: “making a good idea better” Chris Cooter Deputy Permanent Representative Canadian Joint Delegation to NATO

The perspective I’d like to share with you is that of an official of the Canadian foreign ministry who comes

to this topic with a background that is primarily headquarters policy-oriented, but seasoned with some

direct experience with the problems and solutions surrounding civil-military cooperation in the field as

well: in Somalia, the Balkans, and, currently, in NATO. I’d like to take you though the framework for how

we approach this issue, how it is working, and what we can do better. In so doing, I want to focus on how

we organize our own work nationally and internationally, rather than on the substantive issues that we need

to pursue on the ground in stabilization missions themselves.

Let me start by saying that civilian-military cooperation is a very good idea, but not a very

interesting topic in and of itself. It is of interest only because of the context in which the need for it has

become more urgent. That context is the messy post-Cold War environment of crumbling states, massive

violations of human rights, terrorism, extremism, and cross-border conflict.

In that context, Canada has worked with the international community in finding ways to return

stability, and to make it sustainable by rooting it in democracy, respect for minority and individual rights,

and accountable good governance. But as we all now know, those desiderata demand a profoundly

complex application of support to political, security and economic goals, locally, nationally, regionally and

in global fora.

Canadian policy recognized that we couldn’t just rely on old formulas to get to these goals. So we

have been introducing new ideas. Many have been conceptual, focused on getting governments to

recognize that their job, fundamentally, is to respect human dignity. We were advocates of the rights of the

child, and of human security, which provided a basis for the responsibility to protect concept, adopted by

the United Nations in 2005.

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Concepts without concrete steps to back them up are of little value, however. So we also

supported war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court. We pushed

for a ban on blood diamonds, and on anti-personnel mines, which led to the Ottawa Treaty. That gets us

back to civil-military cooperation. As the layered complexity of 21st century conflicts has become clearer,

we have recognized that we need more sophisticated, textured instruments, drawing on both civilian and

military strengths, to deal with multi-dimensional challenges.

From a national angle, we have spent the last several years looking at ways to make our Canadian

contributions to stabilization missions more effective. In so doing, we found that our government

machinery needed major updating. Our military had been geared to threats from the Soviet Union, and to

walking the static greenlines of the first era of UN peacekeeping. Our diplomats were accustomed to

dealing with people in other countries who resembled them, in job function or attitude. And our aid

workers looked mainly to long-term horizons in poor but basically stable countries. Each department had

its own distinct culture, funding base and hierarchy. This meant that there was limited interaction in

finding common solutions to common problems, especially in conflict situations.

Faced with the fast-changing, multi-level and unfamiliar conditions in conflicts of the 1990s, such as

Bosnia or Somalia, it became ever-more apparent that these three departmental solitudes were

unsustainable if we wanted to provide effective support to multinational stabilization missions. There had

to be a more integrated approach, that jettisoned the handicaps and reinforced the strengths of these

departments. Three things were needed in particular:

− Greater speed

− Greater flexibility

− Greater - or at least more accessible - funding

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Frankly, the people in the field led the policy-makers. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

model in Afghanistan - which joined up soldiers, diplomats and aid workers - was the most influential

experience in advancing cooperation among the departments. With that model in mind, plus the lessons

learned in the Balkans, we pushed at headquarters for changes that built on what our people in-country

were achieving. Out of that experience we have been constructing:

− A new, flexible funding structure geared to security needs, such as police training, that can

be deployed rapidly, and that can be adapted to unforeseen demands. The Global Peace and

Security Fund, administered by my department, is one result.

− Establishment of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) in my

department. The idea here was to have a standing group that would build on lessons learned,

have expertise available to plan for the next crisis, and the capacity to respond rapidly.

START is supported by the Global Peace and Security Fund;

− The institutionalization of extensive consultations among the three departments and with the

broader government community, especially departments dealing with security. The default

position in Canada now is interdepartmental cooperation rather than a “silo-ed” approach.

We have also pushed on the international front to improve civil-military cooperation. For example,

we have been consulting closely with the US and with European countries on their thinking as they have

been establishing offices similar to START. Our hope is that these offices can cooperate together to

increase effectiveness in stabilization missions.

We also strongly advocated the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and, like Sweden,

have given it significant financial support during its current, early stage. We see its goal of bringing

together in a more coordinated fashion the elements of the UN family and other national and international

organizations, as meeting a key need in dealing with conflict situations. We hope that the Peacebuilding

Commission can show leadership, drawing on the UN’s unique legitimacy, to get all the players pulling in

the same direction.

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At NATO, we have pushed forward the concept of comprehensive planning and action

(CPA) between NATO and other organizations - language calling for development of the idea is now

found in last November’s Riga Summit Declaration. This approach reflects the broader emphasis we have

placed on the transformation of NATO to meet 21st century security challenges. So, it seems to me that we

have now reached a good consensus in most countries and internationally on the value of more civil-

military cooperation in bringing stability back. But, that said, there is still a long distance to run between

that general consensus and getting things to run as smoothly on the ground as they should.

This still remains new territory involving hard choices, and a field that is evolving every day..

Although a great deal is being accomplished, especially by our people in the field, difficulties emerge once

we go below the concept level and get down to decision-making.

The issues I see as the most significant to making more progress on civil-military cooperation, and

which are closely inter-related, are:

− Culture wars;

− Funding frictions;

− Mission creep and mandates, and;

− Choosing priorities

Regarding culture wars, obviously, understanding of and adaptation to local culture are crucial

requirements for the success of stabilization missions. But, the cultural divide that can be even more

difficult to surmount is that among our institutions.

Our national experience, which I think reflects that of many countries, has been that each department

- aid, diplomatic and military - has a very ingrained culture of its own. To go from ingrained to integrated

is complex. My own department is prone to targeting high-level objectives, and to assuming that securing

the agreement of international actors who speak the same diplomatic language is the primary goal. Others

are left to implement details of these agreements.

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But, of course, not only is the devil in those details, often, so too is success. CIDA, our aid agency, has

traditionally focused on long-term economic and social development, not shorter-term security-related

issues, while National Defence has not been accustomed to the political and development work that goes

with sustainable stabilization.

At the international level, organizations guard jealously their mandates - or what they interpret their

mandates to be in the new security environment. Everyone likes the idea of coordination - but no one likes

to actually be coordinated by someone else. Going beyond the traditional cultural boundaries of each

department within countries and beyond individual institutional cultures internationally, is a significant

challenge. But without doing this, the ability of civilian and military organizations to work seamlessly

together is seriously compromised, not just by “territorial” disputes, but also by what amounts to

ideological resistance from these organizations to the rapid adaptation required in stabilization missions.

So what is needed and how to achieve it?

First, we need to build more of an esprit de corps among civilians and military personnel, so that they

see themselves as part of a cohesive team, and more than just agents of their home organizations. We see

this happening in the PRTs in Afghanistan. But it could be further encouraged. For example, common

training in headquarters could be designed to include training civilians in military practice, even self-

defence. Military personnel could be given large-scale project management training and so on. This joined-

up or crossed-over training could occur nationally and, potentially, between different national and

international organizations.

Another means to achieve an esprit de corps is to provide the civil-military units in-country with

sufficient autonomy. This is important to creating a real team spirit and to letting personnel do what they

are often best-placed to do, that is, to correctly read and respond to local needs. But it is also delicate, not

only because headquarters typically want to exercise considerable policy and operational control, but also

because giving autonomy to civil-military units can challenge traditional reporting relationships and

hierarchies.

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Second, ensure that funding becomes a tool to encourage civil-military cooperation, not

undermine it. A key obstacle to cooperation is the “buck stops here” phenomenon, in which each

agency feels it has money only for its core objectives, and is accountable only for meeting those

objectives, not some new, collective civil-military goal. To get around this, it is important to re-

organize funding not only to flexibly meet evolving needs, but also to oblige and then

institutionalize inter-organizational cooperation. In our case, we took several years to work it out,

but eventually arrived at, for example, a pooled funding mechanism to support the growing

demand for police in stabilization missions. On an international basis, we could look at models

such as the NATO trust funds that could facilitate more cooperation, on a voluntary basis, among

national and international bodies.

This is not to argue that there should be no boundaries between organizations. Good fences

not only make for good neighbours, they can also make for a more efficient allocation of work in

civil-military cooperation, as long as those within the fences know where the boundaries are. It is

particularly difficult to move forward when there are dragged-out disputes over where the

responsibility and accountability for funding lies. And clarity is important, not least because the

sometimes novel initiatives needed in stabilization missions naturally come in for extra scrutiny

by financial oversight agencies in capitals.

This gets to the third issue, mission creep and mandates. Developing an “esprit de corps”,

so that civilians and the military want to work together, and have the funding instruments to let

them do that, doesn’t mean abdicating more specialized roles. Ideally, there should be a

framework agreement between, say, the UN and NATO, that would respect mandates but also

play to each organization’s respective strengths. In saying that, however, I recognize that there

must be flexibility here too: in a given conflict situation, one organization may simply have the

resources to respond while another is not ready. If that is the case, we can’t let more people die

simply out of undue respect for formal mandates or frameworks.

This also raises another issue, the “face” of the civil-military cooperation that we want to

project in-country. We need to be sensitive to the mandate issue in part because of the public

perception of organizations in-country.

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In NATO’s case, the public perception remains that it is a military organization (although in fact

it is a civilian-military institution). That being the case, when NATO acts in an operation, it is

perceived that a purely military organization is being deployed. Whether NATO is involved or

not, in any stabilization mission, given their superior numbers and mobility, it is usually the

military whose face is most visible to inhabitants in a conflict zone. This is inevitable in the

immediate post-conflict phase, but can pose problems quickly - including a perception that

foreign soldiers are in occupation - if the civilian “face” does not quickly start to appear and take

on visible political and development roles.

Linked with this notion, is the importance of projecting the right public diplomacy. The

battle for “hearts and minds” is critical in the unconventional conflicts stabilization missions are

trying to deal with. So it is crucial that the way in which civil-military cooperation is portrayed

sends a constructive message locally. One part of that is a message that we are not only here to

help, but that we are doing so in the most efficient way, so that we can get out of your way and

let you get back to normal life. In fact, in Canada, we talk about the need for “3D” (diplomacy,

defence, development) cooperation, but in reality we need a strong fourth element as well, public

diplomacy, so that we convey the right signals about what our missions are and are not there to

do.

This brings me to a final point: getting the priorities right. I said I would talk about the

mechanics of civil-military cooperation, not the substance of policy in stabilization missions. Yet,

to make civil-military cooperation effective, that substance has to be looked at, least in one

particular aspect: choosing priorities and applying them in the proper sequence. Until that is

done, civil-military cooperation can produce useful results, but they risk being isolated and

temporary improvements, not the lasting overall effects we need.

And, typically, post-conflict, a battered country needs everything, from humanitarian relief

to judicial reform. It is simply overwhelming, especially as such countries will usually have lost

their most experienced and educated people. So everything is a priority; unfortunately, at a

practical level, everything can’t be a priority if we want to get very far ahead. The international

and local communities simply lack the resources.

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And choosing among priorities is extremely difficult. Obviously, the starting point has to

be the views of the national government or local, elected representatives, if there are any. But this

can be supplemented by taking advantage of our civil-military experts, who are in the field, to get

a sense of what local populations want the most. This is one reason why we need civil-military

units to have enough autonomy, both to gather and be able to act on local conditions.

This can be supplemented by polling, as we’ve done in Afghanistan. Occasionally,

polling turns out surprising results, but most often people list as their priorities in war-torn states

the same things people list in other, “normal” states: reasonable security, jobs, education for the

children. These are things that effective civil-military cooperation can support, and they are a

good short-list of the priorities in most stabilization missions.

In addition, getting the priorities right in tackling stabilization depends on incorporating

perspectives other than those of the developed countries, who tend to dominate stabilization

missions. Hopefully, the Peacebuilding Commission will help provide a more global perspective

on priorities. In addition, we need to think about how to get more developing countries involved

in, for example, the PRTs in Afghanistan and in other roles where they can have a bigger say

over policy and operations. Often, their views, especially of local politics, will be more

sophisticated than our own.

To conclude, my final point would be that we need to be careful not to let the weight of

process overwhelm good things coming from practice. As I said earlier, the level of success we

have achieved to date in establishing civil-military cooperation is largely the result of what able

practitioners in the field have done - not the result of the work of headquarters-based

theoreticians. We can spend a great deal of time reviewing lessons learned and fussing over

which structures we need to manage ourselves, while at ground -level our indecision holds up

needed action. Civil-military cooperation has been a dynamic process so far and it is best if we

encourage more of that, letting theory catch up later.

Stockholm, January 18, 2007 Chris Cooter

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The Swedish approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions

Dr. Michael Sahlin Ambassador, Director General Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Mr Chairman, esteemed participants from Canada, Sweden and elsewhere,

I was in Ottawa last summer, and in Cornwallis, for a bilateral visit to Pearson Peacekeeping

Centre, a close sister institution of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, and then I saw at the premises

of the PPC the famous picture of Lester Pearson and Dag Hammarskjold together and jointly

conceiving of modern (t h e n modern) peacekeeping as they were concerned and dealing with

the then acute Suez crisis of 1956. It was a reminder of long-standing, joint Swedish-Canadian

peacekeeping traditions. And well before that historic moment – so I was reminded upon

subsequently visiting the DPKO office in New York and seeing the office portrait gallery of

leading peacekeeping personalities of the UN – Folke Bernadotte was assassinated while

pioneering in decades-long attempts to facilitate dialogue and peace in the Middle East. I

represent a Swedish institution recently created in his honour. So much for the study of portraits

in galleries commemorating history. I mention this for its joint Swedish-Canadian angle and since

I know one of you (Kevin Kennedy) just finished reading Mrs Holbrooke´s, Kati Marton´s book

“Death in Jerusalem”.

So visiting Ottawa is a reminder of a great amount of likemindedness, but also a useful way

of learning about some differences of approach, not least perhaps in today´s area of civil-military

relations (or cooperation or coordination, or communication) in multinational, multifunctional,

multidimensional, complex missions, defining today´s peacekeeping or peace operations realities.

Differences obviously have something to do with geo-strategics, neighbourly relations and

national defence options. We are painfully and sympathetically aware of Canadian casualties in

Afghanistan as a result of Canada´s security commitments as a NATO member, but we, too, in

our particular security role, have had our losses and learnt our lessons. I would like to mention

here that Glyn Berry, who tragically died while performing his duties in Afghanistan, was an

esteemed friend of the FBA and in particular of the Challenges project – we miss him and we

have fond memories of frequent C34-related meetings with him in New York and of his

performance in Challenges seminars in places like Ankara, Abuja and Shrivenham.

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Abstaining from further comparison, I should now like to turn to the subject given to me,

“the Swedish approach” (to the extent Swedish colleagues here present would allow me to use

singular and definite form) to civil-military coordination in the area.

For us here in Sweden the (relevant) cold-war deeper background is armed neutrality

combined in a peculiar Swedish way with political internationalism/multilateralism. These two

roots have, in recent years, since the early 90s, adapted to basic security changes after the end of

the cold war and blended (or synthesized) into something which, we believe, serves our national

interest in today´s world while remaining fundamentally faithful to the roots, even if these are

vaguely perceived. Hence, highest priority in our defence and security policy is now rendered

participation in international peace operations, under various hats (in our case chiefly UN, EU,

NATO/PfP or OSCE), for our armed forces, nominally based on conscription. A huge

transformation process is in progress. As a member of the EU, on the other hand, we have

actively supported the EU´s development into a serious contributor to international crisis

management efforts – not least (in order to maximize value added and a rational international

division of labour) in the civilian side. All this, and more, while remaining truly supportive of the

principle of multilateralism and of the UN and the major capacity and efficiency enhancing

reforms of the UN, based on a massive lessons learning process.

In summary thus far, the Swedish approach, generally, is what we do, how we seek to

adapt, nationally, and what (ideas, reforms, etc) we seek to promote diplomatically

internationally, at the UN level, in the EU and the OSCE, in our close peacekeeping cooperation

with the new, enlarged NATO also in a process of reform. I believe there is consistency between

these levels of activity.

Civil-military coordination/cooperation carries different connotations depending on type of

actor perspective, point of departure (whether civil or military), approach/task, etc – there is a

multitude of buzz-words on the market, some more and some less illuminating – but regardless of

differing approaches and interests (or rhetorical aims) the basic question of civil-military

relations is everywhere and omnipresent. For a good reason, under force of necessity.

Now a quote from the report of the Challenges Project: “Modern peace operations face

enduring and intimidating challenges in a rapidly changing international security environment. In

late 2005 /i.e. before UNSC decisions on Darfur, S Lebanon and Timor Leste/ there were 17 UN

peacekeeping missions involving some 84 000 military, police and civilian personnel.

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Staffing those missions at the same time as other operations not under UN control places high

demands on the international community at large…Complex, multinational, multicultural and

multidimensional operations normally take place in difficult political, security, economic and

humanitarian environments and therefore require effective co-operation and communication. In

most countries and international organizations there is no effective working linkage between field

requirements, available personnel, financial resources, recruitment systems, training needs,

training capabilities, deployment mechanisms and evaluation systems.” (Challenges Project,

2005: 12)1

The text defines, as a categorical imperative, the new tasks and exemplifies current

shortcomings in producing adequate responses. Both parts, the problem perception/description,

the need specification – and also the list of shortcomings – could well apply to Sweden

nationally, “the Swedish approach”, but it is actually a central quote from Phase II Final Report

of the 14 country, broad-based cooperation network Challenges of Peace Operations. The partner

institutions of this FBA coordinated multinational project, including core institutions from

countries such as China, Japan, India, Nigeria, UK, US, Russia and others, had this report

delivered to the hands of the UNSG exactly a year ago, in New York. The report and the quote

shows that the call for a multifunctional, multidimensional etc approach to today´s peace

operations needs is universal and established, setting the basis for peacekeeping reform efforts by

all relevant actors, international or national, civil and/or military. A lot is being done in this

regard, as we know, throughout the spectrum from basic UN peacekeeping doctrine revisited to

peace-building and the security – development complementarity. And this applies not least to the

theme of civil-military coordination/co-operation/communication, or relations, simply,

representing a recognized must, still nonetheless in acute need of operationalization.

I dare say that we in Sweden, due to the background I referred to, are among those that have

come rather far in taking seriously and drawing logical conclusions from this focus on

multifunctionality in missions and, hence, in training and in advancing the notion of civil-military

coordination.

1 Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination, Challenges Project, Phase II Concluding Report 2003-2006, (printed 2005),Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy. Available online: http://www.challengesproject.net/roach/images/pdf/phase_II_concluding_report.pdf

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What we do here nationally, setting some example, and at the EU level in various activities,

and what we seek to promote internationally, concerning operations as well as institutional

reform developments, can be said to follow this logical sequence:

a) Most contemporary crises needing – e g under the new formula of the “responsibility to

protect” – IC help are internal, notably in more or less “failed states”;

b) All lessons learned after a lot of trial and error (and trial and terror) tend to converge in a

“holistic” or comprehensive viewpoint concerning missions, i. e. that all aspects along the

“security – development” spectrum must be considered together, one concrete example

being that as important as policing is as a component, mere policing is useless unless the

mission has competent and relevant representation from the whole justice sector;

c) In such environments, take for instance today´s Afghanistan concerning which the NATO

chief recently stated that “the is no military solution!” (stressing both “is” and “no”),

broad multidimensionality and functional complementarity are perhaps consuming and

costly but nonetheless necessary, with the (indispensable) military component typically

emerging as a supportive function in mission with civilian aims, civilian leadership and a

multitude of civilian peace-building instruments in place, governmental and non-

governmental;

d) For all this, serious, realistic training (and, where possible, exercises) should be necessary

and for such training to be serious and realistic and thus defensibly cost-effective, it must

be correspondingly multifunctional: i. e. joint training between military personnel and

civilians who may be, and are usually, experts in their respective fields but who need

mission training too.

e) Hence, for example, reflecting and guiding these trends, the now implemented

peacekeeping reforms of the UN, notably the concepts of integrated missions and

integrated training service, and, at the EU level, the CMCO (civil-military coordination)

concept and all its institutional and operational implications. Hence the now recognized

need for joint training (and exercises) for joint, integrated missions.

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So, against this background, for us – like some like-minded countries close by – civil-military

coordination has finally grown well beyond what it mainly used to be (if I am allowed to

exaggerate a little): civilian “fig leaves” represented by a selected few NGO:s helping out in

marking civilian”cimic” roles in essentially or massively military exercises, quasi-legitimizing

modernity and relevance. Our supreme commander and the military top brass are, nowadays,

only too keen to stress interest in receiving and need for civilian counterparts in both training and

exercises, perceiving like everyone else of the real field requirements and conditions.

The Swedish Government decided some four years ago to respond to these developments,

trends and needs by creating a new government agency, the Folke Bernadotte Academy, as an

actor, complementing all other players in Sweden with partial tasks in this area, with the core task

to enhance coordination and multidimensionality in peace operations and (to use the EU umbrella

term) crisis management, nationally and internationally.

With time running out, and the Chairman looking increasingly impatient, let me limit myself

to approach conclusion by briefly mentioning some of the areas of activity into which we have

translated this overall core task.

In the training area the FBA has, together with its Swedish partners, developed a course

named Cooperation in Multifunctional Operations, a pre-mission training for a broad spectrum of

military, police, rescue services and a range of civilian participants. A corresponding training at

the EU level, developed and financed in an EU context, is named Civil-Military Coordination in

ESDP operations. The FBA has also contributed to the development and implementation of

special training for a new civilian crisis management staff category, the Civil Response Team

(CRT). Similarly, at the UN level, the FBA, jointly with the Swedish NDC, recently carried out

an SML (Senior Mission Leader) course in cooperation with the DPKO staff. We have also

developed, under the umbrella of a project called “Conflict Prevention in Practice”, a training on

(and in) “dialogue and mediation” chiefly in cooperation with the DPA at the UN. And courses in

“Rule of Law” have tended to become an established FBA profile element.

Carrying out these training schemes, and with the task to explore more fully the concept and

meaning of “lessons learned”, requires us at the FBA also to develop a research and studies

branch.

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There is, we have since discovered, a lot to do in this research area, both the systematic empirical

study of conflict prevention efforts in recent decades and concerning conflict and crisis

management operations in the broadest sense. In one manifestation of activities we seek to bring

together academic researchers and practitioners on themes of particular policy importance. I

should add to this more than abbreviated survey of activities that DDR and SSR are increasingly

areas we focus, both in training and in research.

So much for the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Mentioning this new Swedish institution in a

presentation of “the Swedish approach” is, in all modesty, relevant and reasonable, but of course

incomplete. The umbrella “the Swedish approach” encompasses, more than anything else, the

fact of an abundance of institutions, albeit with other core tasks, whether military or civilian, with

their own traditions as contributors to the total Swedish output to peace operations and to

developments in the area of civil-military coordination. What makes us a little bit special, and

where I believe we differ somewhat from where a country like Canada has chosen to orient

herself, is that we now have in place mechanisms and networks to promote, with unified political

support, a true culture of multifunctionality and civil-military jointness of approach.

Thank you,

Stockholm, January 18, 2007

Michael Sahlin

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PRTs: A successful instrument of civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan

Helga Haftendorn Professor Emeritus, Berlin

The PRT concept was developed by the United States to make up for insufficient forces and funds available for the occupation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The first team was deployed in Gardez in the NE part of Afghanistan in February 2003. It was quickly emulated by Germany to expand ISAF’s reach from Kabul into the Northern region; its first PRT was established in Konduz in March 2003. Currently, there are 25 PRT’s in all parts of Afghanistan, staffed by military and civilian personal from 35 NATO- and partner countries.2

PRTs are basically civilian reconstruction teams with a strong military element for protection; combining both components. They employ an ad hoc approach to security and delevelopment according to the regional situation. They emphasize flexibility; there is no general model on the role, tasks, and composition of PRTs for all of Afghanistan;. A “role model” is KFOR in the Balkans, but it has to be implemented in bigger Afghanistan with much fewer forces.

American PRTs follow a rather uniform model; their main task is to provide for military stability. Because of its emphasis on self-defense and its fenced-in appearance, the first U.S. PRT at Gardez was nicknamed “Fort Apache”. The main mission of the German PRTs is to provide a security umbrella for civil reconstruction; they emphasize Afghan ownership and cultivate subsidiarity and self-restraint.3 As far as possible the German teams try to adapt to regional diversity and choose an open, civil appearance, trying to build close and trusted contacts with the local people. An American PRT is commanded by a military officer at the rank of Lt.Col. and has about 80 men, in most cases with the attachment of a representative from the Afghan Ministry of Interior. A German PRT generally is generally larger in size (the military component at Konduz has about 350 members of the Bundeswehr and 120 soldiers from other nations plus 10 civil personal (incl. POLANDs); it has a less formal structure but integrates representatives from other ministries and NGOs. It is directed jointly by BW officer and a Foreign Office diplomat at the rank of political counselor.

This diversity of the PRTs and their underlying national concepts need central coordination among them and with ISAF, OEF, UN and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Such a framework is provided by the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) in 2 International Security assistance Force, NATO Online Library, 02 January 2007; see also Michael J. Dziedzic and Colonel Michael K. Seidl, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organization in Afghanistan. U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report # 147, September 2005; 3 Michael Schmunck, Die deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Ein neues Instrument zum Nation-Building. SWP-Studie 53, Berlin, November 2005.

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Kabul that is chaired by the Afghan Minister of Interior. The ESC has passed terms of reference that are binding for all teams, complementing but not replacing the instructions from national governments. On the working level the ESC is complemented by a Provincial Reconstruction Team Working Group, meeting weekly, and a Non-governmental Organizations Civil Military Group that serves for a regular exchange of views with the NGOs involved.

U.S. and Germany have also somewhat different concepts on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) that mirror these differences.4 According to the German views, the PRTs mission is:

− To guarantee a secure environment for the civilian component of the PRT, − To strengthen the authority of the Afghan Central government in the area of

responsibility, and mediate between it and local warlords and religious leaders, − To support the establishment of legal procedures5 by establishing local courts, training

police, battling organized crime incl. opium production and trade, − Demobilize and demilitarize and reintegrate former combatants into a new army, − Build and strengthen civil society and its institutions, − Consult with governmental and nongovernmental organizations on reconstruction, − Cooperate with multilateral partners such as UNAMA, UNHCR, UNDP, EU, etc., − Support the physical and economic reconstruction in accordance with Afghan

development plans: infrastructure, agriculture, small industry through micro credits, schools and health centers. Quick impact projects are also done with a view to sustainability.6

Given this large agenda, it is no surprise that neither the German PRTs – nor any other PRT

– so far could fully implement this agenda. Especially great deficits relate to police training, curtailing the power of warlords, guaranteeing the rule of law, and combating opium production and trade.

A new challenge came with the extension of ISAF and ISAF-commanded PRTs to the Southern and Eastern sector where they encountered heavy fighting with remaining or resurgent Taliban, suffering substantial losses in manpower – and credibility as PRTs get indistinguishable from OEF Special Forces.

4 Robert M. Perito, The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons identified. U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report # 152, October 2006. 5 See also Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan. U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report # 117, March 2004. 6 Schmunck, Die deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams, p. 21.

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This is a great dilemma: reconstruction is only possible in a safe environment; and to create it, military force may be necessary causing collateral damages that again incite opposition and conflict with the PRTs primary task “to win the hearts and minds of the [Afghan] people”. 7

In both countries PRTs have been applauded for their contribution to the stabilization of Afghanistan, but they have also been widely criticized. While in the USA there is heavy criticism that PRTs – especially the non-American ones – have too limited a security role, calling for a more robust and more flexible mandate; in Germany there were strong apprehensions that civil reconstruction would be militarized and become a target for Taliban attacks. As a consequence, some NGOs chose not to work under a PRT umbrella. Like in America, in Germany there is also critique whether a “Bundeswehr THW8” was actually needed in Afghanistan, or, as U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice once remarked, that it was not the duty of the 101st Airborne to help children attend kindergarten.9

Central to the overall success of PRTs is a balanced relationship between military and civil elements inherent in their mission. As regional conditions vary across the country a very flexible approach is needed. This contradicts American efforts to provide for more coherence and to streamline PRTs according to a jointly agreed concept. It is understandable that risks should be distributed evenly, but what works in one region might be a sure recipe for disaster in another. Though all PRTs are currently commanded by ISAF and follow NATO rules; it is the national governments – and parliaments! – that lay down the mandates for the missions. Mandates will be especially restrictive in those cases where they have to be approved by a parliament, as in Germany, a country with a long pacifist tradition. National decision-makers thus have to compromise between NATO requests and what their domestic constituents are willing to concede; but they are also expected to display skilful leadership to make the Afghan mission a success. A positive experience with PRTs may even have portability for other areas of crises. They will be most successful in large, sparsely populated countries where active fighting has subsided – not in Iraq, as the U.S. president has recently suggested.

Stockholm, January 18, 2007

Helga Haftendorn

7 See Austin Long, Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research, ISBN 978-0-8330-3926-2, 2006. 8 Technisches Hilfswerk, a civlian agency for disaster assistance. 9 She forgot, however, that during the Cold War it was exactly the 101st Airborne that escorted children to kindergarten from the beleaguered borough of Steinstücken in Berlin.

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Panel Two

Interagency approaches to post-conflict stabilization in the Middle

East

Cooperation in the Israel-Lebanon case: civil-military coordination in

UNIFIL II

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The case of the IDF Center for the Coordination of Evacuation and Humanitarian Relief Lt Col Yigal Haccoun Israel Defense Forces Strategic Division

It is an honor to be invited today to speak of the IDF Center for Coordination of Evacuation and

Humanitarian Relief, a unique and important experience of great personal, as well as professional

and national, significance to me. This activity was done humbly and far away from the limelight

and found hardly any expression in the media. I am talking about.

The Center was a unique example of civil-military cooperation. In my briefing, I will

illustrate the circumstances which made this such a valuable and important initiative. I will touch

on the creation of the center and the work with the UN and various aid organizations. In

conclusion, I will present some of the difficulties and challenges in the center's work and our

lessons learned from this experience. In order to understand the reason for the center's creation

and its mission, we must place it within the context of the last war against Hezbollah. I will not

presume to brief you now on the war – I have neither enough time nor knowledge on the subject

to do so, and this is not the subject for which I was invited. On the morning of July 12, 2006,

Hezbollah launched a massive rocket strike at Israeli towns and military outposts along the

northern border. Using the missile barrage as a smokescreen, Hezbollah terrorists crossed the

border into Israel and ambushed an IDF patrol. In the attack, three Israeli soldiers were killed,

two were injured, and an additional two were abducted.

After six years of recurring attacks by Hezbollah, in which Israel's response was limited to

localized action due to a policy of restraint; Israel was forced to retaliate. In light of the inaction

of the Lebanese government to enforce its sovereignty in southern Lebanon, Israel declared an

overdue strike against Hezbollah.

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The only measure that the government of Israel ordered to take against Lebanon, as a state,

was an aerial and maritime blockade in order to prevent arms and ammunition supplies from

Syria and Iran, the two main suppliers of Hezbollah. The blockade also served as a means to

pressure the Lebanese government into taking responsibility for all its territory, and deploying the

Lebanese Forces along the border with Israel.

The creation

In the early days of the conflict, Defense Attachés and ambassadors from several countries

approached the Strategic Division, responsible for the foreign relations of the IDF, requesting

assistance in the evacuation of foreign nationals from Lebanon. As head of the Europe Branch, I

was on the receiving end of most of these requests.

At first I imagined this to be, at most, a small scale effect that would require little more

than a few ships to pass through the blockade in order to evacuate foreign citizens via the port of

Beirut. However, within hours, we were being swamped with questions and requests. In

retrospect, we can now affirm that, at the time, there were tens, if not hundreds of thousands, of

foreign citizens in Lebanon, potentially desiring evacuation.

What convinced us to establish an ops room for the coordination of the evacuation of

foreign nationals from Lebanon was ultimately our desire to avoid causing harm to uninvolved

people.

Israel’s conflict was with Hezbollah, and not with the people of Lebanon, and certainly not

with any citizens of other nations. For this reason, we deemed it necessary to separate the civilian

population from the terrorists of Hezbollah and to leave them out of the conflict as much as

possible. In fact, Hezbollah's operation from within populated areas led us to encourage

uninvolved people to temporarily evacuate combat zones in southern Lebanon.

Once we realized the proportions of the phenomenon, I gathered a few of my soldiers and

officers and requested the assistance of Brig. Gen. (Res.) Assael Abraham. I explained the

situation, and we began discussing the appropriate response.

The requests, which we thought would stop sooner or later, continued arriving all through the

night. The very next morning we decided to create an ad hoc 24-hour operations room for the

purpose of coordinating a response to these requests.

−38−

Our task was to coordinate, with the Navy, the passage of ships through the blockade in

order to evacuate foreign nationals from Lebanon. Furthermore, we designated a "safety box"

surrounding the port of Beirut in order to facilitate the safe evacuation of foreign citizens by

helicopters.

The operations room we created became, very quickly, the address for foreign officials

regarding the war. Moreover, we were asked to designate certain sites such as hospitals,

embassies and public facilities as non-fire zones.

The concept

The center's concept of operation was its work on both the policy-making level and the

implementation level. Allow me to explain. The IDF, like all other militaries, functions based on

a hierarchy. After receiving the national directive from the government, the General Staff is

required to determine the goals of the operation, the strategy of action, etc. These are translated

into operational values in the Operations Directorate where these orders are then sent down the

chain of command to the forces in the field.

Thus, each level has a different perception of the setting and the context, different skills, a

different "language," so to speak. There are defined responsibilities and authorities, each with

clear boundaries and set commitments and most importantly, different people serving in each

level.

The idea of the Center was, in fact, to present the humanitarian needs at all levels. The

center combined these two worlds. Our representatives were present on the Strategic decision-

making level, and on the Operational decision-making level. We were responsible for preparing

the coordination plan of the evacuation and humanitarian effort, but also responsible for writing

the executive command.

Finally, in order to ensure the implementation of our commands, we were in direct contact

with the operational units. This is explained in the following diagram:

−39−

The center was created within the

Strategic Division. Thus, we were

naturally part of the strategic circle

of discussions and decisions. In this

capacity we created several policy

guidelines as to the idea of creating

the Center for Coordination of

Evacuation and Humanitarian

Relief. These policy guidelines

received the full support of the

General Staff and the Chief of Staff

himself.

Furthermore, we worked directly with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, which, being government offices, are charged with giving national directives and

working hand-in-hand with the General Staff.

In fact, delegates from the MFA were stationed within our center, in order to integrate the

national aspects of our mission.

In order to put our policy into effect, we had to place ourselves in the implementation

circle. A senior representative of our Center participated in the "operational plan approval forum"

– the forum in which the operational plans for the following day were approved.

Our presence in these discussions proved invaluable, as it was there we learned of the plans

for the following day and were able to better plan our mission. We were also able to influence the

operational program to fit our task.

I shall demonstrate this with an example. As I explained, Israel was striving to prevent the

arms supply from Iran and Syria to Hezbollah through the border-crossings with Syria.

Nevertheless, in order to coordinate the evacuation of citizens from Lebanon, we requested that

the Beirut-Tripoli-Al Arida coastal road and the Al-Arida border-crossing itself, remain open.

This information was passed on to all foreign parties with which we were cooperating.

BrigadesBrigades

MODMOD JJ--33

AFAFNavyNavy

JSJS

MFAMFA

JJ--55

NorthernNorthernCommandCommand

strategicoperational

policy ImplementationCCHRCCHR

−40−

At a certain point during the war, word reached the operations branch that ammunition was

being transferred through this route. Clearly, the existence of the "safe route" had reached

Hezbollah's ears.

The option of bombing the Al-Arida route was discussed. We strongly objected to this plan,

explaining that this was the only route we could secure out of Lebanon, and it would be

impossible to alert all of those using this route in time. Our objection was accepted and the plan

was rejected, in spite of the risks involved.

The partners

In order to execute our concept of working on both strategic and operational levels we placed

representatives of our Center, and our unit, in the Operations Division ops. room, where the

entire situation assessment was assembled, 24 hours a day. We were also present in the air force

operations room. We were in constant contact with the naval operations room, staffed by our

colleagues from the navy foreign relations unit. In the northern command we worked with the

liaison center, normally charged with the connection with UNIFIL, and now also responsible for

our contact with the brigades and divisions in the northern command.

But how did it all actually happen?

The Center received requests for coordination of two different natures, evacuation of foreign

nationals, and humanitarian relief. The originator of the request was either a Defense Attaché or

an embassy representative. Later on, when the humanitarian aid mission began, we also received

requests from Non-Government Organizations and Inter-Government Organizations mainly the

UN, the ICRC, “Medecins sans Frontières” and others. The request was submitted in a form we

had devised and included all of the details critical to the coordination. The details included the

number of vehicles, forms of identification, precise routes illustrated on maps, departure and

arrival times, and satellite phone numbers.

Once we had received all of the day's requests we set about planning the following day's

program in consultation with the relevant operational units. It is worth mentioning that, due to

ongoing fighting in certain areas, mainly close to the border with Israel, requests for movement in

those areas could not be coordinated.

−41−

This program was converted into a command presented on behalf of the Operations Directorate

and sent to the northern command, the navy and the air force.

Once we had coordinated the movements with the IDF forces as best we could, we would

return the answer to the originator of the request. Although the IDF never assumed to take

responsibility for those choosing to travel within a war-zone, it was still our mission to try and

prevent any damage from hitting these humanitarian convoys.

While I initially assumed it was pure luck that all of the convoys arrived safely at their

destinations, upon seeing for myself at the ops. room of one the northern brigades how our orders

were plotted on maps, I understood how they were seriously taken into account.

What were the difficulties?

The most difficult part of the operation of the Center, I think, was the constant need to present the

demands of the humanitarian efforts, knowing full well that these will hamper our operational

goals. All this, while Hezbollah was using the same areas, without pause, to fire at the Israeli

northern towns. Personally, I was constantly plagued with the dilemma of finding the balance

between the humanitarian needs and the operational needs.

The operation of evacuating foreign citizens from Lebanon did not come naturally as we

were not responsible for these evacuees; they were not on Israeli soil and we were not on the

ground. It was these circumstances that determined the principles of our operation. It was clear

throughout our work that it was the responsibility of each nation to evacuate its people.

Given that we had no control over Hezbollah's actions we could not fully guarantee the safety and

security of any convoys en route. Our responsibility was merely coordinating their passage by

means of direct contact with our forces.

I’d like to take a moment to try and explain the extraordinary effort necessary in creating an

operations room, from scratch, in a war-time environment. We had to construct entirely new

protocols and principles of action, and introduce these to a wide range of units and services, in

the midst of the most intense fighting Israel has known in years. The fact that evacuation took

place by sea, air and land required the ops. staffs to familiarize themselves with the operational

understanding of all three services.

−42−

To make matters more complicated, we had to take young NCOs (Non-Commissioned

Officers) and officers, with no field experience, and prepare them for work in an operational

environment, making decisions that directly affect the operational activity in the field. These

young men and women, whose usual work deals with the coordination of military delegations

arriving to Israel and visiting other countries, suddenly found themselves working with

professionals from all branches of the military.

These people were not trained to read maps, weren’t fluent in any of the professional

military terminology, and had to learn, under pressure and with no time at all, what terms like

“call-sign”, “IFF” (Identify Friend or Foe), and “nautical mile” mean. Our division, usually a

staff unit, and not an operational unit, had to learn the use of operational computer systems in

order to be able to perform the task of coordinating movements in Lebanon. Fortunately, my staff

has proven themselves to be highly determined men and women, driven to succeed in their

mission, and willing to make up for whatever gaps might exist in their training and experience.

CIMIC

Part of what made the Center's work a unique phenomenon, was the close cooperation with the

UN, ICRC and other civilian NGOs. It is not new for militaries to work closely with aid

organizations, even in war time. However, the cooperation was unprecedented in that the people

of Mr. Kennedy from the UN, and the people of the ICRC sat with us in the same rooms. We

became, practically, one team. The idea of placing a liaison officer in the ops. room was

originally Mr. Kennedy's suggestion, and we responded gladly when we saw that there was a

joint interest in facilitating the coordination, in the most effective way and with a minimum of

casualties. The result has been much more impressive – no casualties from any of the convoys

coordinated through our center.

There were several advantages to working side-by-side in one center. Firstly, we eliminated

the possibility of misunderstanding details. For instance, the names of locations and routes were

completely altered as they were translated from Arabic to English and then into Hebrew.

Secondly, our work together, in physical proximity, enabled ongoing consultations and

enhanced to our efficiency (no phone calls and less paperwork).

−43−

Here, I would like to say, that I believe both sides made a decision to work with a solid

understanding of what could be achieved and what was impossible under wartime conditions,

without falling into pointless arguments.

Thirdly, the close connection served as a short circuit for alerts. The liaison officers

provided an online contact to the convoys in the field. In one case, despite our fore planning,

fighting broke out in an area where a convoy was scheduled to pass. The brigade operating in the

field requested that the convoy leave. Working with the UN liaison officer on duty, we contacted

the convoy via satellite phone and asked them to stop and return to their point of departure. Had

we not had this connection, there might have been no way to alert them of the danger towards

which they were heading.

Conclusion and lessons learned

Throughout the fighting in Lebanon, the humanitarian effort presented a constant constraint on

the IDF's operational plan. Nonetheless, the existence of the CCHR as an address for foreign

nations and NGOs limited uncoordinated movements, thus preventing their injury. To us, this

was worth the operational cost. We, along with numerous foreign officials, see the greatest

success of the Center to be the safe arrival of every single coordinated movement whole and

unharmed (of which there were many).

The Center's success stemmed from its ability to affect both policy-making and operational

activity. For this reason, the presence of the foreign representatives, within the Center itself,

proved to be highly effective and constructive for both sides.

Our experience in the Center has stressed the necessity of training our staff, as well as the

foreign representatives in Israel, for this unique task. Such training would involve joint exercises

in coordinating humanitarian relief during conflicts.

Humanitarian issues during military conflict have always been a major concern for us. The close

work with foreign liaison officers from the UN and the ICRC has proven itself to be necessary

and effective for the success of humanitarian activity in a war-zone.

The interest of our forces to differentiate between innocent civilians in Lebanon and Hezbollah

terrorists fell into line with that of our foreign counterparts.

−44−

I would like to conclude with the words of EU Commissioner, Mr. Louis Michel, after his

visit to the CCHR:

“I must admit that the explanations we received at the IDF Center of Coordination were quite convincing. Of course, we realize the difficulties in coordinating humanitarian assistance in the context of conflict and violence, but it [the center] efficiently completed the task at hand.”

Thank you for your attention,

Stockholm, January 18, 2007

Yigal Haccoun

−45−

Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN and the international community: new and renewed partnerships Dr. Efrat Elron Hebrew University

As a result of the second Lebanon War and in accordance with United Nations Security Council

Resolution 170110 of August 11, 2006, UNIFIL's (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon)

mandate was extended and enhanced, and troop strength significantly enlarged. An important

number of European countries and several Asian countries have responded to the UN’s call,

sending troops to Lebanon and contributing to the creation of an upgraded multinational force

that is currently being deployed on land and at sea.

Traditional peacekeeping operations are used in the region in abundance, mostly deployed

in or around the borders between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. These existing and

longstanding forces all have the mandate of observing and monitoring, among them UNDOF

(United Nations Disengagement Observer Force), maintaining the area on the Israeli-Syrian

border; UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization), the first UN peace mission

whose military officers currently occupy the observation posts of UNDOF and UNIFIL; and the

MFO (Multinational Force and Observers), an independent international organization responsible

for supervising the implementation of the security provisions of the peace treaty between Egypt

and Israel. EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission) at the Rafah crossing point on the Gaza-

Egypt border is a recent creation and the first EU force involved in the area.

Contemporary peacekeeping missions, known as Peace Support Operations (PSO),

however, extend far beyond the monitoring and verification tasks of their predecessors and

include a much more varied force composition11. The mandates of those missions are also

expanding on multiple horizons. Peacekeepers are increasingly charged with nation-building

tasks like economic rehabilitation, democratization and building civil institutions and working

police forces.

10 United Nations Security Council, SC/8808, August 11, 2006. 11 See for example Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (SIPRI: Oxford University Press, 2002), and Oliver Ramsbotham, “Reflections on Post-Settlement Peace-building,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7 No. 1, Special Issue. (Spring 2000), pp. 167-190

−46−

In addition, missions are being deployed in settings considered less and less ripe for conflict

resolution, adding to their mandates authorization for the use of force and intervention

capabilities. UNIFIL II is the most recent example of a force that is mandated to go beyond

traditional peacekeeping, being responsible for some of the broad spectrum of activities

mentioned above.

This paper outlines a model describing the partnership between Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN,

the troop contributing countries, and the international community in large based on an

intercultural perspective combined with themes from organizational psychology and international

relationships. The model presents the knowledge creation, preparations and actions Israeli and all

other parties need to engage in for managing effectively the complex interfaces between them in

order to create closer and more effective partnerships that will facilitate UNIFIL's ability to fulfill

its mission and mandate.

The data leading to the creation of the model is based on more than 50 interviews and

conversations with 28 relevant informants – high level UN officers based in the UN DPKO and

in Israel, IDF officers at all levels related to decision making regarding UNIFIL II and based in

the Northern Command, serving and reserve officers from the liaison unit to UNIFIL, UNIFIL's

liaison officers, defense and foreign ministry officials, representatives from Israel's permanent

mission to the UN, Israeli military attaches serving in relevant countries and military attaches

from relevant countries serving in Israel. The model is also based on documents and reports

produced by the involved parties and on newspaper reports relating to UNIFIL and all parties

related to it.

UNIFIL II and security council resolution 1701

UNIFIL was created in 1978 by the UN following the adoption of Security Council Resolutions

42512 and 42613 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and

security, and help the Lebanese government restore its effective authority in the area. It was (and

is) primarily deployed along the UN-drawn Blue Line dividing Israel and southern Lebanon, and

operated under a Chapter Six mandate, limited to observing, monitoring and patrolling activities.

12 United Nations Security Council resolution 425 (19 March 1978) 13 United Nations Security Council resolution 426 (19 March 1978)

−47−

During its long presence in Lebanon, UNIFIL has operated under difficult conditions —

with Israel, the South Lebanese Army (SLA) and the PLO (and later Hizbollah) not fully

accepting the UNIFIL mandate with all its implications. The force’s difficulties have included the

1982 Israeli invasion, as well as becoming the target of violence from different Lebanese sects

and militias within its area of operation. UNIFIL -- and with it the UN - have also fallen out of

favor with Israel, which was highly critical of the force for, among other things, collaborating

with Hizbollah too closely while not fully assisting with the goal of enhancing the Lebanese

Armed Forces (LAF).

The low point in this complex relationship came in October 2000, with the insufficient

reporting of the abduction of Israeli soldiers at Har Dov, followed by the UN’s denial that it

possessed a videotape related to the kidnapping, to which it admitted in July 2001.

The recently enhanced UN mission, deployed in Lebanon to implement Resolutions 1701

and 155914, now numbers over 12,500 troops from 28 countries, a significant increase compared

to the force of 2,000 that had dwindled since Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

Resolution 1701, which ended 34 days of fighting, provided for a strengthened mandate, coupled

with a complete Israeli withdrawal and the deployment of the LAF in the south.

According to Resolution 1701, UNIFIL's renewed tasks are "accompanying and supporting

the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, as part of the extension of the

control of the government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the

provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and for it to exercise its full

sovereignty; taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River

of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government

of Lebanon and of UNIFIL; monitoring the cessation of hostilities; Assisting LAF in

disarmament of all armed group; assisting the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing

its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon, without its consent, of arms or

related materiel, and extending its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian

populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons." Stated also in the resolution

is the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by

the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers, and the overall goal of securing a

permanent ceasefire and a long term solution to the conflict, and that the situation in Lebanon

14 United Nations Security Council resolution 1559 (2 Septmeber 2004)

−48−

constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Another important statement in the

resolution is the "intention to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate".

Additional roles for UNIFIL peacekeepers are the continued provision of humanitarian assistance

to the local population, including medical, dental and veterinarian aid. Over the past months

specialized teams of de-miners have destroyed more than 16,000 explosive devices that included

rockets, grenades and cluster bombs. Troops are also involved with the reconstruction of

infrastructures, especially roads and bridges. As in all UN mandates included in resolution is

UNIFIL's role in ensuring the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel.

The mandate given to UNIFIL II is the most robust mandate given thus far to a force

operating in the Israeli-Arab theater. It is positioned between the UN's classic Chapter Six of

monitoring and observing and Chapter Seven, which gives the Security Council broader powers

to take action (i.e., peace enforcement), including warlike actions to deal with threats or breaches

of peace. The new resolution states that UNIFIL can “take all the necessary action in areas of

deployment of its forces, and as it deems with its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations

is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind.” In other words and is stated more explicitly in

UNIIFIL Rules of Engagement, there is a mandate to use force beyond self-defense, including the

"resisting of attempts by forceful means to prevent UNIFIL from discharging its duties."

Partnerships and cooperation

A basic assumption of the model is that Israel, the government of Lebanon, the UN, and the

international community share the goal of regional stability.15 UNIFIL II and its different

constituents is one of the important means to achieve regional stability. Based on a large body of

evidence from the literature in different fields and from the field, including UN and NATO's

mandates and core recent conceptualization and thinking, cooperation and partnerships between

all parties to the conflict is one of the preconditions to peace support operations' success. In the

case of Security Council Resolution 1701, it is the partnerships between all involved parties

mentioned above that will promote a more effective UNIFIL II and the accomplishment of its

mission.

15 The model does take a narrower perspective in this regard than the regional reality

−49−

In the case of Lebanon, deeper partnerships involve a mutual change of previous attitudes,

mentality, and levels of cooperation of all parties. Such bi-lateral and multi-lateral changes are

already in process, and more are needed. As this is a dynamic process, and UNIFIL II is a

reformed military, organizational and political entity, representing an emerging new mentality

and mandate, it is also the best timing for the use of active influence by all parties related to the

fulfillment UNIFIL II goals and performance. It is important to note at this stage that UNIFIL II

is indeed a complex peace support operation, operating in an arena of intra-state, inter-state and

regional conflict all with rich and old history and with many stakeholders involved, not all whom

welcome its presence. For many, it is also a test case for the UN and the DPKO's effectiveness

and for the possibility of the creation of a multinational force in the Israeli-Palestinian arena.

What then are the necessary moves and actions taken and needed to be taken to make it all

work? From a general perspective, and true for all peace support operations in terms of

conditions for effectiveness, including the success for intra-military cooperation within UNIFIL,

is the enhancement of trust and the actual perceptions of partnership, a basic belief in the existing

and possible future enhancement of the mandate and its implications, significant involvement and

commitment of all parties in the drafting of the Mandate and ROEs to achieve a basic agreement

on its principles. More specifically to UNIFIL II, significant involvement and motivations

aligned with UNIFIL's goals of the major participating European countries – Italy, France,

Germany and Spain are necessary, as are their deployment of well trained and well equipped

troops. In practical terms, necessary for the implementation of these moves and actions are

effective formal and informal cooperation mechanisms between all parties and militaries involved

(Lebanese Armed Forces and Israel Defense Forces included).

It is these mechanisms that will also allow achieving a better cooperation at the level of

intercultural understandings – culturally related and deeply embedded interests, motivations,

values, mentality, and military uniqueness. For example, the understanding the major European

contributors' aspirations to strengthen their positions in Europe and NATO through their

contributions and performance in the mission is essential. These in turn allow deeper insights that

enable to the identification and creation of mutual bi-lateral and multi-lateral interests (such as

the safety of UN personnel).

−50−

Again specific to UNIFIL's history, it can pave a way to changes of previous perceptions, both

mentally and emotionally: from “enemies” to partners, from a mission with an irrelevant mandate

to a mission with a promise, from stereotypes to personal and professional perceptions, to the

adjustment of expectations and wishes related to UNIFIL's role.

Implementation of cooperation and liaison mechanism

All the involved parties have taken significant actions to enhance UNIFIL's success under its

mandate. Examples of these actions include:

− DPKO's implementation of a Strategic Cell responsible for UNIFIL II only. The

Cell consists of around 30 officers, proportionally representing the troop

contributing countries.

− The TCCs significant contributions in terms of troops and equipment.

− DPKO, in coordination with the TCCs, managing the quickest deployment of a

force this size to Lebanon.

− Additional liaison units – regiment level, navy and air force at IDF, navy at

UNIFIL.

− Significant enhancement of alle liaison units of in terms of personnel and

resources.

− More direct communication channels between the parties – e.g., UNIFIL officers

based at the IDF Northern Command, enhanced channels between involved units

in IDF.

− Regular and effective tri-partite meetings: IDF-UNIFIL-LAF at a senior officers

level – discussion include major issues such as violations of 1701 on all sides,

enhancement of coordination mechanisms, activities related to Blue Line, Rajar

village, and the enhancing of the coordination.

− EOD trainings of Italian and Spanish units in the IDF.

− Overall formal and informal positive bi-lateral communications between all

parties.

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Although Resolution 1701 and the ensuing UNIFIL II in its new form have been in

existence for only a short time, and a longer process is needed to be able to determine accurately

the effectiveness of its peace support mission and the necessary conditions and factors that lead to

its success, it is a good time to start reflecting on its initial relatively positive results on the one

hand and the problems that still need to be resolved through better coordination and decisions

related to the enhancement of the mandate.

Current state of affairs

At the immediate level, the results of the combined efforts and investment of resources of

all parties are UNIFIL's general pro-activeness in accordance with its enhanced mandate (e.g.,

confiscation of unauthorized weaponry through joint activities of UNIFIL troops with the LAF),

Lebanon's deployment of its troops in Southern Lebanon and its enhanced military capabilities,

the actual separation between the IDF and Hezbollah by the blue line, Hezbollah's containment of

violent activities, a stable and calm situation in southern Lebanon in relation to active violence,

and the continuous positive reports of all sides on their internal activities and the activities of the

other parties.

Despite the generally positive results, in his December 1, 2006 letter to the Security

Council UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan mentioned the reports of incidents of illegal arms

smuggling across the Lebanese-Syrian border, and Hizbollah getting stronger as a result.

Despite UNIFIL's involvement in the disarming of Hizbollah in cooperation with the LAF, the

overall situation has not changed, and arms keep flowing in into Lebanon from Syria and Iran.

This situation puts in jeopardy the safety of UNIFIL personnel, Israel, the fragile internal stability

in Lebanon, and the wider regional stability. Relatedly, Annan also reported there were

"significant deficiencies" in equipment, training and coordination among four different Lebanese

government services responsible for the borders."

One of the most important factors leading to peace support operations effectiveness is the

fit between the situation on the ground the missions' mandate. Rhwanda, Somalia and

UNPROFOR are few examples of a misfit leading to failure. A failed or less than successful

mission not achieving its overall goals, influences other important performance indicators: from

fulfilling the greater vision behind the mandate – the alleviation of human suffering and global

peace, to operational unity within the missions and between the troops, the "attractiveness" of the

−52−

mission to TCCs and highly professional militaries, the commitment and involvement of TCCs

and troops in the fulfilling the mandate, overall positive perceptions of the mission and its

effectiveness, significance and legitimacy by all parties involved as recipients or contributors, the

mission's cost effectiveness, and the effective leadership and authority of the force commanders

to achieve unity and mission goals.

Active learning and re-learning resulting in constant improved effectiveness and adjustment

to conditions the mission operates in is crucial, as are timely and effective reactions to crises and

possible crises. This kind of learning is dependent on the cooperation between all involved

parties, brought about by open communication and discussions, shared agreements with the help

and effective coordination and enhanced deep understandings of the national and cultural

interests and motivations of each of the parties by the others, that can bring a perhaps necessary

change in further enhancing UNIFIL's mandate and ROE that can allow it to fulfill its overall

mission – to help in the parties in conflict to implement a permanent ceasefire and a long-term

solution, perhaps even in achieving, in the words of Resolution 1701," a comprehensive, just and

lasting peace in the Middle East."

Stockholm, January 18, 2007 Efrat Elron

−53−

Panel Three

The Transatlantic Partnership EU-NATO

−54−

The European Union: civil-military coordination and management of

operations: EU-NATO relations

Brig Gen Reinhard Trischak ACOS Policy/Plans EU Mil Staff, Brussels Introduction 1. (Thank you for your kind words of introduction.) It is a pleasure to participate in this high

level forum and to contribute to a stimulating discussion on "civil-military cooperation in

multinational missions", which is an absolutely crucial issue - not only for the European

Union and NATO, but also for the entire international community including the UN.

Considering the collective expertise present today, I hope that you will find the thoughts that I

will share with you useful. Let me start with two general remarks, before I will outline the

EU's current thinking on the issue.

General Remarks

2. Given the topic of our panel - the relationship between NATO and the EU - let me stress from

the outset that we have a strong common interest to deepen this relationship and to make it

work in a constructive way. Both organizations are different in nature - NATO being centred

around the collective defence and military crisis response, the EU being a globally acting

political Union of European States encompassing a uniquely broad spectrum of instruments,

bridging traditional European Community matters, Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy and

Justice and Home Affairs. But both organizations share the same values and widely similar

goals, and have a largely overlapping membership. We thus have the same interest to make

our respective operations a success. In FYROM and in BiH we have shown that we can

successfully manage a smooth transition from a NATO to an EU military operation. And in

challenging environments like Kosovo and may be also in Afghanistan we will operate side

by side. It is therefore in our own best interest to develop a mutually reinforcing partnership

−55−

that brings to bear the respective competences and strengths of both organizations, while

respecting each side's specific institutional setting and prerogatives.

3. As to the overall issue of the civil-military relationship in crisis management operations, I

would like to offer - in a slightly provocative way - the following suggestion: it is not about

traditional CIMIC! The traditional approach to civil military cooperation, namely to carry out

some well-meaning but limited "civilian" activities in support of a military operation, like a

special kind of ‘force enabler’ to facilitate or consolidate the military success, are not

sufficient to meet the requirements of modern crisis management operations aiming at lasting

and sustainable stability. Some would even go as far as to say that we need to invert the

established logic. Today, military operations will in most cases provide a crucial but limited

contribution to support a comprehensive, politically driven response to a crisis. I think that

our recent experiences in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Africa and elsewhere do largely

support that view, in particular when we are seeking sustainable solutions to complex

problems as democratic transition or nation-building. Let me therefore outline how the

European Union seeks to tackle this challenge.

The EU approach

4. The EU, like other organisations active in crisis management operations, has been grappling

with the overarching issue of how to generate greater civil-military coherence. This desire is

well recognised within the European Security Strategy16. As a consequence, the different EU

instruments and capabilities, from humanitarian, reconstruction- and development aid to

economic incentives and sanctions, up to civilian and military operations need to be brought

together more closely. This poses two different challenges : how to better coordinate the EU's

various internal instruments, and how to improve cooperation between the EU and other

actors such as NATO.

5. The EU Security Strategy rightly underlines that security is the first condition for

development, but that development is also a condition for security. This has been confirmed

by our experiences in the field. In the Balkans and elsewhere we have learned that there is no

16 European Security Strategy (doc. 15895/03 dated 12 Dec 03).

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simple sequencing of "military first and civilians later". On the other hand, stabilisation and

reconstruction efforts are never as civilian as one would wish, and are often impossible to

achieve without a robust, deterring military presence that ensures a stable and secure

environment even when the actual fighting is over. Conflict prevention, crisis management

and post-conflict rehabilitation are by nature political endeavours. Military have and will

continue to deliver a crucial contribution and will - in the 'hot phase' of a conflict - shoulder

most of the burden. Without military power, whether used through the deployments of forces

on the ground or as a only potential 'stick' for diplomacy, credible crisis management is in

many cases simply not possible. This explains why the EU - traditionally a 'soft' civilian

power with a strong focus on development and humanitarian aid - is actively developing its

military capabilities. But military power alone cannot deliver a sustainable solution. Successful

expeditionary operations need to be embedded - from the outset - in a broader, comprehensive

and politically driven strategy.

6. Today, almost all military operations need a complementary civilian effort - FYRoM, Bosnia,

but also Afghanistan and Iraq are cases in point. As for the EU's operations, many of our

civilian missions rely on military expertise (EUSEC Congo, AMM in Aceh) and benefit from

military CIS or logistics support. On the other hand, many civilian missions take place in an

environment where security requires military assistance (BiH, Darfur, and Kosovo). Our most

recent military experience - EUFOR DRC during the elections in Congo - has once again

shown that a credible military Force, even if limited in size, scope and time, constitutes a

crucial contribution to push a broader political process over the last hurdles. As a

consequence, we consider a comprehensive approach to strategy, planning and conduct crucial

for mission success.

7. Within the EU we are certainly looking for greater internal EU coherence, not only between

Commission-led activities and our civilian or military ESDP operations, but also between EU

actions and national activities of EU Member States. Ultimately, we should be aiming at

“one-stop” crisis management operations. In addition, there is an important, if not essential,

requirement for inter-institutional complementarity in international crisis management. In

most theatres, members of the wider "UN Family" are involved, and so will other national or

regional players and the International Financial Institutions… and, in certain situations,

NATO. So, just how to ensure that the intra-institutional comprehensive plan fits into the

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broader and bigger inter-institutional plan, ensuring overall coherence? And whose plan is it

any way? Difficult questions to which I am not sure there is yet a coherent answer. But I

would say that flexibility is the key, and again I'm optimistic that we will be able to deliver in

Kosovo, on the basis of the lessons that we've learned in Bosnia.

8. Let me also say a word of caution about the limits of Co-ordination and Co-operation: In

looking at generating better civil-military cooperation or coordination, we must not lose sight

of what it is we are trying to achieve. Within an EU context, the aim is the optimal use of all

the civilian and military instruments to deliver the necessary effects required to meet the EU's

political-strategic objectives. Each of the individual instruments has different characteristics

and requirements: humanitarian or development instruments may need to be seen as neutral;

and the military instrument may need to use lethal force. We should remain mindful of such

implications and their appropriate management. We should, therefore, strive for greater

coherence of effects on the ground. The level and scale of co-ordination and co-operation will

depend on the operational circumstances and the needs of the various instruments or

competencies. And it may well vary at the different levels of management between the

political and field, and between planning and execution.

9. As to the levels of management, I would suggest that we are only going to achieve the optimal

use of all the civilian and military instruments in the field when their use is planned coherently,

starting with coordinated planning. However, there is generally a discrepancy between the

levels of management in civilian crisis management and military command and control:

civilian crisis management tends to transition directly from the strategic level to the field with

an emphasis on planning in the field, whilst within the military chain of command the

operational level plays a key role in operational planning and execution with no natural

civilian counterpart. So in order to generate greater coherence, we must understand the

difference in the civilian and military levels of management, and we must ensure that we can

identify the necessary entry points to facilitate coordinated planning and conduct.

10. As a consequence, Command, Control and Communication Arrangements need to be kept as

simple and clear as possible, with no ambiguities. Organisations and personnel need to know

precisely what they are responsible for, what authority they have and to whom they are

responsible, in particular in an unstable or hostile environment. However, if we ensure that all

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instruments are striving for the same vision and that we can manage operational change and

transition then I believe even this can be overcome. But ultimately this crucial area will be a

matter for the various contributors who will have to determine which arrangement best suits

the collective purpose.

11. Let me conclude by saying that many of the challenges which I have pointed out have been

recognized at the EU's political level. First concrete steps have been undertaken to remedy the

shortcomings:

− Our latest operations have shown that we can significantly accelerate our planning

procedures, when we are put under pressure.

− Fact-finding missions are more and more often carried out jointly by the

Commission and the Council. Despite occasional frictions, this is an encouraging

sign.

− Civil-military cooperation has made progress, too, both at the strategic level in

Brussels, and in the field.

− Finally, since January this year the new EU Operations Centre is ready for

activation. This has added significantly to the EU's capacity to plan and run crisis

management operations that require a joint civil and military response.

12. Let me conclude with some remarks on the cooperation between NATO and the EU in crisis

management. The military cooperation for the Operation ALTHEA in BiH under the Berlin

Plus arrangements are working well. So does the staff-to-staff coordination between the

EUMS and the IMS and SHAPE for the coordinated support of the AU and AMIS in terms of

providing strategic airlift for the African troops. Furthermore, there are a lot of contacts and

meetings on staff level between the HQs on numerous areas. However, as all of you are aware

the cooperation between the political and military committees is - let's say - less encouraging,

due to political reasons which we all know. With respect the planning of the civilian ESDP

operation in Kosovo and maybe Afghanistan there is a new chance to further develop the

relationship between NATO and EU and their cooperation in crisis management, with NATO

providing the military capabilities required and the EU civilian ones and thus complementing

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each other. The respective coordination and cooperation between the staffs both at the

strategic level at Brussels and the theatre is encouraging.

13. Obviously, much scope for improvement remains when it comes to international and multi-

agency co-ordination and cooperation. Again, first encouraging developments are under way.

Today, the EU works much closer together with the UN than ever before - the EUFOR

mission in support of MONUC in the DRC, together with the huge EC support for the

democratic elections, was a good case in point. The US is showing an increasing interest in

the civilian capability development on the EU side and has indicated that they might wish to

participate in the civilian ESDP operation in Kosovo, which is a tremendous step forward.

And we are putting in place pragmatic cooperation arrangements between the military NATO

operation in Kosovo and the future civilian EU mission there. But more needs to be done if

we want to achieve a sustainable success in Afghanistan, and in other challenging missions

that await us in the coming years. I hope that today's discussion will help us to further

contribute to this process.

Stockholm, January 2007

Reinhard Trischak

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Remarks Professor Gale A. Mattox US Naval Academy In our discussions there are three areas that need mention and discussion by this audience for

their importance to understanding the success or failure of NATO-EU relations; 1) within Europe

where we are not sufficiently engaged, 2) outside Europe where both organizations are engaged

to varying degrees, and 3) in the global arena where areas of interest are only beginning to be

defined. All three warrant discussion by this group of experts.

Russia – the fact that there has been virtually no mention of Russia in our discussions is an

indication of how difficult engaging Russia by both NATO and the EU is at this point. In

summits for both organizations over the past year there have been efforts to address Russia, both

through excluding it (NATO) and through coordinated efforts to address vital interests, notably

energy (EU), all without success. As the issues between Russia and member states bilaterally as

well as between Russia and the two organizations proliferate and differences deepen, particularly

on the important issue of energy, there is a need for more innovative approaches that will more

effectively engage Russia.

Kosovo and Afghanistan – both issues remain uncertain and carry a high potential for

instability both internally and for their regions more broadly. If stability is to prevail in the longer

term, it will require greater collaboration militarily and in the reconstruction process. A solution

to Kosovo’s status is important to permit the country to begin to rebuild, drawing heavily on EU

resources. In Afghanistan, it is imperative that member state commitments are met; a failure by

NATO in the country could have dire consequences for the NATO alliance itself, not to mention

Afghanistan.

Global vs. Regional Interests – as NATO begins to think globally and the European Security

and Defense force assumes greater responsibilities, discussion of the use of shared assets,

coordination in planning and differing perceptions of mission must be addressed. Consultation

will be essential and clearer definitions of responsibilities imperative.

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U.S. policymakers fall into three schools that either view the growth of the EU in the

security and defense field as a threat to a necessary U.S. predominance, view the potential for a

truly coordinated European defense very skeptically, or, increasingly, view ESDP as a potential

complement to NATO and positive reinforcement to the shared goal of European security. This

latter will only be possible with enhanced cooperative efforts, including greater European

contributions to the common defense.

Stockholm, January 18, 2007

Gale A. Mattox

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EU-NATO cooperation on crisis management missions

Gianni Bonvicini Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)

Contrary to the recent past, when today we talk today about EU-NATO cooperation it is possible

to start with some positive remarks.

− The rhetoric of cooperation between NATO and the EU has largely improved in

the last years and today it looks pretty good; both organisations have a global

perspective and both are willing to act in a variety of security crisis. Stability and

security at global level are shared aims. Functional and geographical objectives

are the same.

− Under a practical point of views several unexpected progresses have been made,

particularly at the level of cooperative coordination on the ground, but also at

Brussels between the NATO headquarter and EU defence and security

mechanisms.

− Some direct experiences in the Balkans, like EU missions Althea and Concordia,

have proved that Berlin-plus agreement can effectively work and help to reach

common aims in terms of stability and security. It has even helped the EU to

increase its experience in military missions.

Nevertheless on a less positive side, still a number of critical aspects persist.

− In spite of NATO-EU agreements on intelligence sharing, the quality of

coordination is rather low. A lack of confidence from both sides is rather evident

and the flow of classified information is subject to a kind of “corporative – in

house” resistance, in particular by some NATO members unwilling to accept

partnership with “hostile” EU members (eg. Turkey vs Cyprus).

− The two military structures, NATO and EU, are in a way competitive: this feeling

applies in particular to NATO Response Force (NRF) which, since its birth, was

considered a counter-answer to the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and to

the most recently created EU Battlegroups (EUBG).

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In fact, these last European military instruments have been conceived as independent

European forces with their own military command structure, based on the concept of

“framework nation”, that is a leading country providing for an ad hoc headquarter for

all other coalition partners in a military mission. This has been experimented

particularly by the EU in Africa, where the agreement of Berlin-plus has not been

activated. More in general, sometimes the “double hatting” criteria are difficult to be

exercised due to the potential competition between these military structures. With the

EUBG project moving forward, the question remains whether NATO and EU force

planning processes can be made compatible.

− The very peculiar nature of the newly emerging profile of European security

identity is somewhat different from the traditional military character of NATO.

Union’s security “doctrine” is based on three main elements: the need of a

multilateral context (UN) under which to launch a military (or civilian) action; the

coexistence of both military and civilian dimension into the same operation; the

integrative nature of post conflict resolution mechanisms through a variety of

policies like enlargement, neighbourhood policy, association policy, special trade

agreements, etc.

− The sceptical judgement of American politicians and army officials on the

effective military capabilities on the battlefield of European led military missions.

The main, still unanswered, question is to know how European defence

mechanisms and organs will react to the worsening of a military situation on the

ground: in other words, the effectiveness and rapidity of European reaction to

upgrade the level of military response in case of need is still on question.

− On the same line, but seen from an European angle, lies the evident reluctance and

prudence to use existing European military instruments in case of highly risky

conflict situation. The Lebanon crisis is a case in point: the participation of

Europeans to the UNIFIL 2 operation is not under the EU military umbrella but it

is based on individual national decisions. It has been a somewhat missed European

opportunity to show its credibility and responsibility in a Region of crucial interest

for the Union, but the political and military implications of a common military

mission were to heavy for the majority of EU members.

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Which is the perspective for improving relations between NATO and EU on crisis management

missions? Two main scenarios exist:

− An ambitious one: to re-open a Grand Bargain between NATO and the EU in

order to rethink the Berlin Plus agreement with a more balanced approach.

Making in a way NATO and EU inter-exchangeable actors, capable of moving

towards the same target with compatible and cooperative instruments. Some

analysts have proposed a “Berlin-Plus on reverse”. In fact, one of the central

challenges for comprehensive and sustainable crisis management is represented by

the linkage between civilian and military instruments. However, whereas the EU

can rely on a broad range of instruments for civilian peace-building and

reconstruction, NATO lacks the capability to carry out large-scale civilian crisis

management tasks. Therefore a new relationship between NATO and EU might be

built. But this move implies a deep change in NATO’s nature and objective. A

renewal which is hard to be started with the present American administration and

which implies new and different strategies and political coalition of the willing;

− A more practical scenario: learning by doing. This approach leads us back to our

initial positive remarks on how things can move smoothly through a step-by-step

strategy. Better coordination on the high political and military level accompanied

by factual coordination and cooperation on the ground might prove to be more

beneficial for the relations between NATO and the EU than a Grand Design. And

in any case, better practical relations could contribute to make it possible when the

political conditions between Europe and US and inside the EU itself will be

mature for a more balanced pattern of cooperation.

Stockholm, January, 2007 Gianni Bonvicini

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Panel Four

Challenges of civil-military cooperation in multinational

missions

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A strategic management framework for successful peace-building and reconstruction in Afghanistan

Fahim Youssofzai Royal Military College of Canada

SUMMARY

Adopting a strategic management and organizational perspective, this paper proposes a holistic

and integrative framework on how to succeed long-lasting peace-building and reconstruction

initiatives in Afghanistan. This framework is based on field realities some of which are admitted

by important stakeholders (lessons learned) while others are not admitted yet (lessons unlearned).

Afghanistan has been in turmoil since April 1978 when a bloody coup overthrew the

relatively stable regime of this central Asian county. Before, this coup the country was slowly

making economic and social progress. Since then Afghanistan has been known in the West

because of the tragic events that have occurred since then:

“The history of modern armed conflict in Afghanistan began in April 1978, when Soviet backed Afghan communists took control of the government in a coup, …The communists who seized power in Kabul …had little popular support, …and many segments of the country’s army and police opposed the coup…The new government …sought to create a communist economy in Afghanistan virtually overnight through purges, arrests, and terror.” (Human Rights Watch, 2005, pp11-12).

On taking power the Marxist-Leninist Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) purged the

country of “traditional” leaders who did not belong to the party. The religious, political, business,

and community leaders were labeled “anti-revolutionary”.

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A few hours after their success, the apparatchiks of the PDPA started a massive random

imprisonment (and arbitrary killing) of high-ranking officials of the past regime, members of

afghan aristocracy, religious people, and traditional leaders. This was followed by the systematic

arrest of people labeled as “feudal”. But except for a few dozen wealthy farmers, the country’s

average “feudal” had just enough to feed his family decently. The PDPA apparatchiks also

arrested (and killed) those who were educated in West, Maoists, and other non-Marxist political

activists. Life in Afghanistan had suddenly become a mixture of fear, terror, arbitrary arrest and

death.

The widespread arrests congested the country’s prisons and new prisons were built. Still

these not being enough. Growing numbers of arrested “anti-revolutionaries” were imprisoned in

empty villas and the homes of “anti-revolutionaries” who had previously been arrested or had

escaped from the country. An Afghan physician told the author that even the basements of the

famous military hospital in Kabul (known as 400-beds hospital) were transformed to detention

centers where prisoners were systematically tortured during the interrogation. A refugee that the

author met in a camp in Pakistan during the 1980s explained that after the 1978 coup, several

high-ranking members of PDPA kept their own private prisons. Each of these high ranking

members of the PDPA could arbitrarily arrest anyone if he/she felt the victim was “anti-

revolutionary”.

Consequently, “An insurgency was launched against the new regime, and in 1979, the

Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support the failing revolution …” (Human Rights Watch,

2005, pp12). Originally, the insurgents “…included former officers and troops of the Afghan

military, members of exiled Islamist groups in Pakistan and Iran, and militias of numerous other

…political groups. Loosely allied under a common theme—defenders of Islamic and Afghan

values against Soviet occupation and ideology—these diverse parties enjoyed widespread

support within and outside Afghanistan…” (ibid.). They fought an effective guerilla war against

Soviet and Afghan forces during the 1980s. Eventually the Soviet Army withdrew from

Afghanistan in 1989, but “…the war had terrible effects on civilian life in Afghanistan. Both

sides regularly committed serious human rights abuses and violations of international

humanitarian law. The Soviets often targeted civilians or civilian infrastructure for military

attack…”. (ibid.).

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By 1989, over one million Afghans had been killed; over three million were handicapped; and

over seven million were displaced from their homes (1/3 of Afghanistan’s total population). The

cohesion of the Afghan nation, and its national identity were severely compromised. Afghanistan

experienced a deep social, ethnic, religious, and political divisions and much of this country’s

rural infrastructure was destroyed. Military aid during the conflict had led to the stockpiling of

weapons within the country (an estimated of US$ 60 billions military aid was sent to Mujahedin

groups and the communist government).

While the former USSR had officially withdrawn from Afghanistan, it secretly continued

to support the Kabul government – both politically and militarily. With the departure of the Red

Army, the US government turned its attention away from Afghanistan (a lack of attention that the

current US authorities regret now!). Deeply divided and blinded by power struggles, the

Mujahedin groups could not overthrow the Kabul regime as quickly as predicted. Meanwhile, the

regional powers – each with their own specific agendas (political, regional, ethno-linguistic, and

religious) - continued to arm and support their local “protégés” groups; for most part, the

Mujahedin groups. During this period, “Peacemaking efforts were mostly put in the hands of the

UN Secretary-General's office, which lacked the political clout to force the parties to

compromise” (ibid., p. 14).

The Kabul pro-soviet regime fell in spring 1992. At this time the Mujahedin leaders were

still in disagreement on how power would be shared in a post-communist regime and as a result

agree on the nature of government that should form in Kabul. Within the country, to ensure their

survival, powerful ex-communist military and political leaders defected (with arms, men, and

resources) and joined different Mujahedin groups (often, on the basis of their ethno-linguistic

affiliations which accentuated the ethno-linguistic divisions of Afghanistan). This increase in

strength permitted some groups of Mujahedin to enter into Kabul. Outside the country, Pakistan,

Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UN were pressuring different Mujahedin political parties to form a

wider national government. On April 24th 1992, Mujahedin seized total control of Kabul and

within hours, terrible street fighting started and the country fell down deeper into anarchy and

chaos.

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In 1994, in reaction to the anarchy and warlordism prevalent all around the country, a

group calling itself the Taliban arose from the southern regions of Afghanistan in the border town

of Spen Boldak in Kandahar. Espousing very harsh brand of Islam, it announced as its goal the

re-establishment of civil law and order in the country by fighting unconditionally against all

kinds of warlord groups. Soon after, the Taliban captured the city of Kandahar, and, with the

indifferent attitude of villagers all around the country, quickly expanded their control throughout

the rest of Afghanistan. The Taliban took control of Kabul in September 1996 and publicly

hanged the last communist regime’s president, Najibullah, who had been living in asylum in a

UN house in Kabul since he was deposed. By the end of 1998, the Taliban controlled more than

90% of Afghanistan.

By seeking to impose an extreme interpretation of Islam, and by pursuing this aim with

unbridled fervor, the Taliban began to commit well-known Human Rights abuses. Furthermore,

they offered asylum to Osama Bin Laden and to other non-Afghan religious extremists (in the

name of Islamic solidarity). The Taliban regime lasted until 2001 until they were defeated after

9/11/2001 by the US-led coalition. A more pluralistic government leaded by Haamed Karzai has

replaced them since.

To develop an understanding that can form the basis of peace building or reconstruction

of Afghanistan it is crucial to consider Afghanistan’s contemporary history. The quick review

provided here is certainly not enough to understand Afghanistan’s complex contemporary

history. It, however, helps to make sense of the lessons learned and unlearned by actors involved

in the Afghan peace-building process. The following section synthesizes the interrelationship

between historic facts and what involved actors have done in Afghanistan since 2001, in the form

of lessons learned and unlearned.

Lessons learned and un-learned in Afghanistan

It is difficult to find unanimity among all involved actors in Afghanistan about lessons learned

and unlearned. However, one can defend that the majority of them agree on the followings.

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Lessons learned

The majority of those involved actors will agree on the fact that numerous good achievements have

been realized in Afghanistan since the fall of Taliban regime. Let’s read in this regard what President

Hamed Karzai rightly says (interview, Dari service of BBC, 2006/12/08):

“…We have started a new life since the last five years; [we] have put steps towards well

being and security. [General] elections were held [in the country], our economic condition has improved, [the conditions of] our roads have improved, …our health care has improved. But one important thing, of which Afghanistan was suffering, and continues to suffer, …is the lack of security [in parts of our country]”.

This way, involved stakeholders have learned to recognize failures on security matters. President

Karzai details this major failure in the following way (interview, Dari service of BBC,

2006/12/08).

“…[This] failure …is to some extent attributed to Afghanistan…, but the most important part of it goes back to the international community…The international community came to Afghanistan in order to bring stability and security, eliminating terrorism, and [stop] regional and neighboring countries’ intrusions… But the international national community hasn’t paid [enough] attention to places where terrorism is sent to Afghanistan from. This has resulted that only our people pay the sacrifices [of terrorism]. As long as this shortcoming is not resolved, Afghanistan’s people sufferings won’t be diminished…”.

Another admitted lesson – for the international community in particular - is that the end of the

Cold War doesn’t mean the end of threat for the winner. During the 1970s and 1980s, experts and

historians used to believe that Soviet Union’s defeat (in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the world)

would mean total victory of the West. Analyses about Afghanistan’s after Soviet withdrawal

were overly optimistic - both from the within Afghanistan side and in the international

community. Within Afghanistan, the simplistic believe that a democratic regime will naturally

and easily replace the pro-soviet regime of Kabul was dominant. It was widely believed that this

new regime – of course democratic in nature - would rebuild the country’s infrastructure without

difficulty, resettle 5 million refugees, provide them with jobs and shelters, and bring the country

back to be a respected member of the international community. The UNOCHA (United Nations

Co-ordination of Humanitarian Aid for Afghanistan) was created by the United Nations on the

basis of this positive mood (Youssofzai, 2003).

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At the international level, the experts were forecasting the end of totalitarian regimes, the

beginning of liberal democracy, and the victory of individual freedom worldwide. But the events

in Afghanistan related earlier, the wars in Balkans and Rwanda, and ultimately the events of

9/11/2001 in US proved these simplistic dreams to be completely wrong. As a consequence,

people learnt that, life after the Cold War could be more stressful than before.

Another admitted lesson for the internal community is that leaving Afghanistan in chaos

proved to be costly for everybody. As noted earlier when the Kabul pro-soviet regime was falling in

spring 1992, the Mujahedin leaders were still in disagreement on a post-communist power-

sharing and on the nature of government to be installed in the country. Almost all these groups

were influenced – directly and/or indirectly – by regional powers (Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia,

Russia, Turkey, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) as well as by western powers (USA,

United Kingdom, France in particular). In fact, from this perspective, things started to seriously

degenerate from the famous “Geneva Accords”, which formalized the Soviet Union’s evacuation

from Afghanistan in 1988. This accord was signed between the Pakistan and the agonizing pro-

soviet government of Afghanistan, with the United States and Soviet Union serving as

guarantors. No representatives of Afghan freedom fighter groups (who, at that time, controlled

between 80 to 90% of the country) were made parties to negotiations. Consequently, these groups

refused to accept the terms of the Geneva accords. The civil war continued, therefore, after the

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The USSR continued to heavily support its protégé regime

in Kabul until its ultimate fall in April 1992. With the fall of Kabul the common enemy of

different resistance groups disappeared. Clan, religious, and personality differences, then became

reasons for the continuation of the civil war17. By this time, the Americans – followed by their

European and rich Arab states allies - had already abandoned Afghanistan. This abandonment

allowed the continuation of civil war, eventually permitting international Islamic terrorism to

establish itself in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda was created. In a recent BBC News (12 February 2007),

the US Defence Secretary Robert Gates stated that his country would not repeat its error of

neglecting Afghanistan and allow extremists to take over: "After the Soviets left, the United States

made a mistake. We neglected Afghanistan and extremism took control of that country…We won't

make that mistake again. We are here for the long haul".

17 Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm

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A further lesson learnt by actors engaged in Afghanistan is that defeating the Taliban

regime militarily doesn’t necessarily mean the end of “Talibism”, and therefore, not the end of

problems in Afghanistan and in the surrounding region. The unexpected quick military defeat of the

Taliban regime in Afghanistan by the US led international coalition surprised only those who

were not sufficiently familiar with the facts of this country. The US and the European did not

have enough expertise - or reliable intelligence - on the Taliban or their operations. One learns

today that in several regions of Afghanistan, the Taliban only left the bombardments areas for

short periods of time to come back home unharmed quickly after the bombardments had ceased.

One example is Musa Qala in Helmand province. Radio Free Europe on February 9, 2007 noted –

that Taliban fighters who captured the southern Afghan town of Musa Qala the week before were

fortifying their positions after rejecting talks on a withdrawal. Villagers at Musa Qala, according

to the same source, reported that about 300 Taliban fighters remained in the town, digging

trenches and laying mines in anticipation of an attack by NATO-led troops and Afghan security

forces. Earlier, in an exclusive interview from Kabul (April 12, 2004), the Taliban leader was

saying to a Pakistani journalist: “We are so many in numbers that our strength cannot be

counted. Before vacating the country, we had dumped the arms and ammunition in huge

quantities at various secret locations. We have enough to fight for decades. Moreover, we snatch

arms and ammunition from the coalition forces just like we seized it from the Soviet forces18”. On

February 10, 2007, Reuters news agency reported that “…more than five years after the U.S.-led

invasion of Afghanistan, NATO and U.S. forces face revived Taliban forces vying for control of

parts of the country”. BBC’s Afghanistan analyst describes very well the rest of this story19:

“…Many express regret over other missed opportunities. Lakhdar Brahimi [previous UN's senior envoy to Afghanistan] worries that he and others were wrong not to bring the Taleban into the political process as early as 2002. Former US envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad told …he wished more attention had been paid to Taleban "sanctuaries" across the border in Pakistan. Five years on, there is consensus on an urgent need to get a grip on the situation. It is more difficult now with the emergence of a new "mafia": a nexus of drug smugglers, criminals, and in some provinces Taleban, filling a vacuum left by the government. Nato forces are now acutely aware their fight is also about jobs and reconstruction. As General Eikenberry puts it: "Where the road ends, the Taleban begins".

18 http://www.rediff.com/ 19 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6205220.stm

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Afghans and the international community involved in Afghanistan’s stabilization have also

learned that promises by neighboring countries to join the war against international terrorism haven’t

always been sincere. After the defeat of the Taliban regime and the installation of a pluralistic

government in Afghanistan, an agreement was reached between different stakeholders in Bonn

(Germany) under “The Bonn agreement”20. In the agreement countries neighboring Afghanistan

promised to actively support the country’s stabilization and rebuilding. In annex III of this

Agreements, it was the Afghan participants themselves who requested the United Nations and the

international community to “…take the necessary measures to guarantee the national

sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Afghanistan as well as the non-interference by

foreign countries in Afghanistan's internal affairs”. In its resolution 1662 (2006), the Security

Counsel of the United Nations “Calls upon all Afghan and international parties to continue to

cooperate with UNAMA in the implementation of its mandate and to ensure the security and

freedom of movement of its staff throughout the country…”21. In addition, at the end of the second

Berlin declaration (1 April 2004), the neighboring countries of Afghanistan promised “good

neighborly relationships” to Afghanistan: respect of principles such as “territorial integrity”,

“non - interference in each other's affairs”, helping “a stable Afghanistan with a strong central

Government”, etc. 22 In reality, things seem to have turned out differently – particularly with

Pakistan who has been repeatedly accused of not doing enough in its efforts to help Afghanistan

and the international community to stop the Taliban attacks against Afghanistan that are

organized and financed on its soil. In this regard, former US envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay

Khalilzad told the BBC that he “… wished more attention had been paid to Taleban

"sanctuaries" across the border in Pakistan…23”.

20 http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm 21 http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_sc/_resolutions/sc1662.pdf 22 http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_Internation-Conferences&Forums/BC/Berlin%20Declaration%2031%20April%202004.doc 23 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6205220.stm

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The following recent statement of the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs24 clearly shows this

country’s unhappiness of the role played by Pakistan:

“…There is a universal recognition both in Afghanistan and around the world, that the Taliban movement was created by the ISI of Pakistan as a military-political movement. … The Taliban continue to receive supports from outside Afghanistan. Such support is the only factor that helps them to inflict damage and suffering upon Afghanistan. Based on the other side of the Durand line, there are distinct entities which provide motivation, training, equipments, financial support and sanctuary for the Taliban who are seeking to reverse the course of developments of Afghanistan towards peace, democracy and institutionalization of human rights. …The Ministry expects the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to sincerely uphold their public commitments to the people of Afghanistan and the international community in fighting terrorism and extremism; and to avoid expressing false assertion which aim to mislead the international community” (MoFAA, Sept. 3, 2006).

Lessons unlearned

Some actors involved in Afghanistan have not fully realized that “Cheap War” and “Outsourcing

the War” do not bring success in this country. Since 2001, the Media and the human rights defense

groups have regularly reported the involvement of some sub-contractor security agencies in

running private illegal prisons, arresting and interrogating innocent people, and, sometimes,

torturing and executing them [the attached sources analyze this phenomenon25). Amnesty

International reports: “…The United States government is outsourcing key security and military

support functions to private companies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Government

reports have implicated these private contractors in serious human rights violations …26”.

Human Rights Watches (HRW) mentions the U.S. government’s failure “…to investigate

allegations of prisoner abuse by U.S. forces in Afghanistan”.

24 http://www.mfa.gov.af/detail.asp?Lang=e&Cat=2&ContID=52 25 http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/occasional_6.pdf http://www.afghanreality.org/politics/SecurityForSale_in_Afghanistan.pdf http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=izA-sPwf0GoC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PA1&sig=nEdvsHmER88EDm9b_6yDO1bL1TI&dq=private+security+contractor+Afghanistan http://www.sam.sdu.dk/politics/nyheder_og_begivenheder/power.pdf 26See :http://takeaction.amnestyusa.org/siteapps/advocacy/index.aspx?c=goJTI0OvElH&b=953489&template=x.ascx&action=7387

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In the meantime, HRW supports the conviction and sentencing of a CIA contractor “…for the

June 2003 beating to death of [Afghan citizen] Abdul Wali at a border post …”, which brings

Sam Zarifi, HRW’s Asia research director to say: "The United States and its allies have promised

to reform the rule of law and the justice system in Afghanistan but until the U.S. is willing to

provide accountability for its own forces, these pledges are not credible." (UIP, News Agency,

Feb. 16). The lesson to be learned here is that sub-contracting and outsourcing Afghanistan’s

security are not adequate responses to this country’s turmoil.

A further important lesson to be learned is the adoption of a common, coherent, and

principled attitude regarding the past “bad guys” in Afghanistan. Evidence from the last five

years (and even the past three decades) suggests that ambiguous and vague positions regarding past

warlords, criminals, and corrupt officials are important ingredients of failure and mediocre

performance in Afghanistan. Ali Ahmad Jalali, a former interior minister of Afghanistan explains:

“…alliances of convenience with warlords perpetuated the influence of the most notorious

human rights violators. Failure to crack down on drug traffickers and provide sustainable

alternative livelihood to farmers led to record increases in illicit drug production that fuels

corruption and funds terrorism and criminality…” (The Baltimore Sun 10/08/2006). Referring to

the same topic, Professor Barnett Rubin of New York University 27 mentions an elder from

eastern Afghanistan - met during one of his numerous trips in Afghanistan during 2006 - saying

that efforts against the Taliban insurgency were weak and ineffective because “…the people

don’t trust any of the people in government offices…”; He reports another elder from northern

Afghanistan saying: “The people have no hope for this government now” (Rubin, 2007, p. 60).

Why such a drop in trust and a lost of hope from Afghans? Answer: vague position regarding

some well-known warlords (even allowing them to remain in power), plus the existence of an

unprecedented level of corruption in the country.

27 Burnett Rubin is Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and author of several articles and books about Afghanistan. He served as an Advisor to the Representative of the UN in Afghanistan – particularly during the Bonn Agreement in 2001.

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In its press release of December 2006, HRW is very critical and direct about these subjects:

“…For the past five years, the Afghan government, the United Nations and the international community, led by the United States, have pursued a counter-productive policy of relying on war criminals, human rights abusers, and drug-traffickers instead of prosecuting them, …Karzai mistakenly tried to bring all political forces under his umbrella, while the US worked with many such individuals as part of its “war on terror…”28

The same source recommends the following policy:

“…President Hamid Karzai should immediately enforce a program to provide truth, reconciliation and accountability for war crimes and major human rights abuses over the past 30 years in Afghanistan, …. The Afghan government should establish a special court to try those responsible, some of whom hold high office, as soon as possible”.

Still about the same subject, Francesc Vendrell, the former UN envoy to Afghanistan

(now working for the EU in Kabul) recalls, “…in 2002, the warlords and commanders were

shaking in their boots fearing they were going to be disarmed or cast aside…. Now it's much

more difficult" (BBC29). All of these considerations indicate there are two important lessons to be

learnt here. First, in comparison to the immense power and enthusiasm of the ordinary Afghans,

the power of warlords is insignificant. Second, vague positions about warlords and corrupted

officials have been very costly for peace building and reconstruction of Afghanistan; they even

have been important causes of failures in Afghanistan.

Another significant lesson to be learned in Afghanistan is to recognize the crucial role of

management and modern administration in any undertaking in Afghanistan’s post-Taliban era. The

author’s own works on Afghanistan over 30 years, his engagement with humanitarian aid during

the 1980s and the 1990s, and his repeated research journeys in this country (the last one being

summer 2006) strongly convince him that imperatives such as “administration-building”,

“organizational-building”, and “institutional-building” are either ignored, or left to people who

lack sufficient expertise in these domains. These domains are central because any small or big

project/program in defense/security, development, diplomacy/international relations or

government needs this social infrastructure.

28 http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/11/afghan14826.htm 29 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6205220.stm

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This need makes effective organizations “imperatives” to any rebuilding or stabilizing effort in

Afghanistan. Effective organization implies accurate structure and systems (information,

decision-making, rewarding, control, feed-back…), accurate human resources and technologies,

and workable coordination mechanisms. Furthermore, in a way, each of the above lessons learned

and/or unlearned can be subordinated to effective management.

But by management, we do not mean the techniques of running profit-driven business

firms. By management we mean the art of driving those organizations (national or international,

public or private, civil or military) engaged in Afghanistan towards effective and resource-

efficient peace building and reconstruction of this country. Looking at things this way,

management and organization become tools of a further important need in Afghanistan: the need

for an integrated strategy. The remaining part of this paper elaborates this topic.

Need for an integrating strategy

This section proposes a framework to consider when reflecting on problems and determining

appropriate actions concerning projects/programs about peace-building in, and reconstruction and

development of, Afghanistan. Based on organizational and strategic perspectives, this framework

will be built step by step, based on facts coming from the field and on the results of known

studies. Each step will end with a concrete proposition, and the combination of these propositions

will shape the final framework.

What is the problem in Afghanistan?

In the collective work of peacemaking in Afghanistan, defining a common mission and objective

is necessary. Otherwise, different people will have different definitions, and different methods for

achieving, performance. Despite the fact that almost all of the concerned actors wish the

realization of peace in Afghanistan, they generally don’t share the same vision, objective, and

method. This means they don’t answer to the same question. For example, NATO defines its

mission in Afghanistan in the following way:

“…Through its leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO is helping establish the conditions in which Afghanistan can enjoy a representative government and self-sustaining peace and security…”30.

30 Source: http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/

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The same source defines the objective of the ISAF as follows:

“…ISAF’s main task is to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in Kabul in the maintenance of security so that the Transitional Authority and United Nations personnel can operate in a secure environment. ISAF supports the Afghan Transitional Authority in expanding its authority to the rest of the country, and in providing a safe and secure environment conducive to free and fair elections, the spread of the rule of law, and the reconstruction of the country…” (ibid.).

These are very legitimate missions and objectives, but very broad; thus, vague. Consider now

Canada’s mission in Afghanistan.

“…Canada is making important diplomatic, defence and development contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Our aim is to support the establishment of a stable environment in which the people of Afghanistan can rebuild their country and their lives…”31.

Mentioning the “people of Afghanistan” makes the mission statement more targeted. However,

there is still a problem because both those who need peace in Afghanistan and those who are

enemies of peace consider themselves an integral part of “the people of Afghanistan”.

Concerning this, Ahmed Rashid of The Far Eastern Economic Review observes in his July 29,

2004 analysis:

“…The Taliban have been launching two to four attacks a day in southern Afghanistan from their bases in Pakistan. Their main targets have been United Nations and Afghan election officials. More than 650 people have been killed in Taliban attacks this year….The Taliban and the warlords have been supported this year by a booming drugs economy. UN officials say this year’s opium harvest will increase 20% from the 3,600 tones that last year turned Afghanistan into the world’s largest supplier of opium. …”.

This lack of clarity and precision about who is clearly targeted by the myriad initiatives in

Afghanistan creates confusion. It is, therefore, important to define more precisely the group of

people in Afghanistan who are the ideal recipients of various contributions. One way of doing

this is to answer a simple, but crucial, question: “WHO should be targeted as the real

beneficiaries in Afghanistan?” Rather than a general and confusing answer such as “the people of

Afghanistan”, one can easily demonstrate that a more focused answer such as “The

Common/Ordinary Afghans” is more accurate, operationally and ethically. These are men and

women, belonging to any ethnic group of Afghanistan.

31 Source: http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/menu-en.asp

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The qualification “common/ordinary Afghans” brings more clarifications: they constitute more

than 90% of Afghanistan’s population, are hardworking, honest and tolerant citizens who never

use their values and their country’s interests for personal enrichment, international terrorism,

genocide or drug trafficking. It identifies also that category of the Afghan population that has

been perpetually victimized since 1978: they were victims of the Afghan communist regime

cruelties, victims of the Soviet invasion’s tyranny, victims of the 1992-1996 era’s anarchy and

chaos of warlords’ fighting, victims of the Taliban’s oppression, and now finally, some of them

victims of arbitrary bombardments, harassment and tortures.

Another valid question at this stage would be: “What will be the gain of ‘average

Canadians or Swedish’ in helping the “Ordinary Afghans”? Canadian officials give the clearest

answer to this question:

"…In short, the mission speaks both to Canadians' altruism--our desire to help others--and to our self-interest--our desire to put down terrorism and enhance our own domestic security,"…32

This important discussion leads us towards the first proposition of the framework about the

Strategic Management of Peace-building, reconstruction and development in Afghanistan -

illustrated in Figure 1a.

Proposition 1: Peace, reconstruction or development in Afghanistan should be clearly, and directly, associated, in a mission statement, with the “The Ordinary Afghans”.

32 Source: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/issue20/01-title-en.asp

Peace: For the Ordinary Afghans

Figure 1.a: Strategic Management of peace building, reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.

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The need for a comprehensive analysis of Afghanistan’s general environment

Once the target population is clearly defined and accepted by important stakeholders involved in

Afghanistan, the next coherent step is to perform a strategic analysis of the external environment

in order to identify objective lists of “Opportunities” and “Threats” that affect the mission

adopted by the international actors in Afghanistan. By “external environment” we mean the

surrounding context of any concerned organization involved in Afghanistan.

According to Strategy, the External environment generates “Opportunities” and “Threats”

affecting peace in Afghanistan. Their impacts (positive or negative) should be assessed in two

levels: (a) the “global environment” level, and (b) the “task environment” level.

Let’s consider the “global environment”. According to the literature, global environment

affects any organization involved in peace making in Afghanistan, and has the following

dimensions: political, economic, psychological, demographic, technological, and sociological. In

the Afghan context, one should certainly add military and security dimensions as part of the

global environment. To sum up, achieving Afghanistan’s security/peace/stability needs a

generalist approach that objectively assesses opportunities and threats coming from the

following factors:

1. Cold War heritage,

2. Globalization/Regional power factors,

3. Economic factors,

4. Social-institutional factors,

5. Geo-strategic factors,

6. Demographic factors,

7. Internal politics and power sharing,

8. Cultural (Islam) factors.

Recalling the impacts of the above factors for organizations involved in Afghanistan leads us

towards the second proposition of the framework about Strategic Management of peace-building,

reconstruction and development in Afghanistan (illustrated in Figure 1b).

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Proposition 2a: The situation’s complexity should be taken into account: peace, reconstruction and development in Afghanistan are affected by combined military, economic, political, psychological (or individual), socio-cultural, demographic, technological, and global/regional dimensions, in a dynamic configuration. Proposition 2b: The concerned decision makers should assess the effects of each of these dimensions in terms of “opportunity” or “threat” to peace, reconstruction and development initiatives mobilized for Afghanistan.

Analyzing the “task environment”

In organizational theory, the concept of “task environment” means the immediate external

environment of an organization, or its surroundings (Thompson, 1967). For example, in the eyes

of economists, the “industry” is the “task environment” of a firm. Based on Youssofzai (2003 &

2004), it could be argued that the “task environment” of any organization involved in peace-

building, reconstruction or development projects is made up of five forces that could affect its

performance, directly or indirectly. Decision-makers should consequently carefully assess these

forces. The forces are described below.

1. The power of the “Beneficiaries/clients” – for whom peace-building activities are

designed - the group of people called in this paper “the Common/Ordinary Afghans”.

Facts about Afghanistan suggest that since the beginning of the War Against Terror

(even before this), for one reason or another, the elementary desires, wishes, and

demands of this group has not been sufficiently taken into consideration.

Peace: For the Ordinary Afghans

Figure 1.b: Strategic Management of Peace-building, reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.

To consider the macro-environment’s dimensions

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One can argue that for the last 29 years, particularly since the end of the Taliban

regime, ordinary Afghans have been struggling for democracy, dignity, liberty and a

better life. In Afghanistan, the most obvious stumbling block to this process is that

high-ranking officials – be it indigenous or exogenous – be it military, administrative,

political or economic – tend to underestimate (or ignore) the power of the “Ordinary

Afghans”. While subtle, this power is a critical asset of any social, political and

economic project in Afghanistan. For example, it was mainly this power that finally

caused the defeat of un-democratic Afghan regimes and the defeat of the ex-Red

Army since 1978. This power also explains the resistance and rejection, by the

Afghan masses, of extremism exported from outside Afghanistan during the 1980s

and 1990s. It is again this power that explains the failures of Al-Qaeda’s billionaires,

combined with the military power behind them, to dominate Afghanistan totally in

order to establish permanent international terrorist nests. To follow this logic, it can be

shown that a constructive management of this power will help achieving the final

success in the War Against Terror and the realization of a meaningful peace in

Afghanistan.

2. The second force within the task environment is the degree of cooperation/competition

among the organizations involved in peace-building in Afghanistan. Talking of

competition in this context doesn’t make sense, for it would mean that, for example,

in Afghanistan, Canada is initiating peace efforts in Afghanistan independent of (or in

competition to) the Afghan authorities and the other international bodies such as

NATO or the UN – which is not true. Therefore, only collaborative scenarios make

sense here. Table 1 presents different scenarios for the possible actions of an actor

such as Canada while Illustration 1 provides a visualization of these scenarios.

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Table 1

Different Scenarios for Canadian Actions in Afghanistan

No. Scenarios Observation

1 Canada alone initiates peace activities in

Afghanistan, independent of the Afghan

authorities and the other international bodies

such as NATO or the UN

Doesn’t Make Sense / Not realistic

2 Canada initiates peace activities together with

the Afghan authorities, but without the other

international bodies such as NATO or the UN

Could be effective if:

* 2 > 4

* The Context is well managed

3 Canada and the rest of the international actors

initiate peace activities in Afghanistan, but

without the Afghan Authorities

Doesn’t make sense / Not realistic

4 Canada and ALL other concerned actors initiate

peace activities in Afghanistan in a

collaborative way

Optimal

Illustration 1

Canadian Actions in Afghanistan (the 3D approach) Related to Other Stakeholders’ Actions

Other Multinational Actors (the US-Army, NATO, the EU, the UN…)

Afghan Authorities’ Actions

Canadian Actions – the 3D approach

2

1

3

4

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3. Substitute undertakings: Peace in Afghanistan could be achieved by directly fighting

the enemies of peace – the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda. But it could also be achieved by

indirect means that are called here “substitute undertakings”. At this level, the Canadian

3D approach makes sense. Indeed, the 3D approach theoretically helps to reach peace by

the combined effects of Defence, Diplomacy, and Development initiatives. Services

offered in these three domains are called “substitute undertakings” for achieving peace.

The rationale behind this is well described by Canadian authorities (see : http://www.dfait-

maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/issue20/01-title-en.asp). It should also be mentioned that Canada is

not alone in its use of “substitute undertakings” for achieving peace in Afghanistan.

However, Canada is one of the rare actors that have conceptualized its overall

contributions in Afghanistan in this integrative way. Therefore, considering the legitimate

“substitutes undertakings” is an important ingredient of success on terrorism, warlordism,

and drug business in Afghanistan, which has the capacity of boosting peace-building

processes in this country.

4. Entry/Exit Barriers (for new actors to become engaged in peace-building activities, or for

partners to disengage themselves from these activities) is the next dimension that has a

potential to affects the performance of peace-building activities in Afghanistan. Let’s

consider an exaggerated example: the easier it is for a terrorist organization to enter into

the “circle” of those organizations that provide security to Afghans (i.e., the entry barrier

is low), the riskier it is for peace-building in Afghanistan. Conversely, the easier it is for

an established organization - that has been engaged in Afghanistan – to exit the country

(exit barrier low - example: MSF withdrawal from Afghanistan), the worse it is for the

image of peace-building activities’ results or performance. Therefore, the height of

entry/exit barriers in the sectors of peace-building, reconstruction, and development can

affect the performance of these activities in Afghanistan.

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5. Suppliers’ degree of collaboration/cooperation is the final dimension that can affect

peacekeeping’s success in Afghanistan. Here suppliers mean those actors that provide

goods and services to different institutions involved in Defence, development and/or

diplomacy in Afghanistan. From a Defence perspective, one can think here, for example,

about an allied country that provides its military bases to the forces that combat the

Taliban/Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. One can also think about the supply of “intelligence”

offered by another allied country, etc. There is a very important issue surrounding this

topic: Given the fact that different regional powers were directly involved in Afghanistan

for the past 26 years, one should seriously ask about the “Quality” of service supplied by

some of them in regard to making peace in Afghanistan, and more generally in regard to

War Against Terror. Also, one should be very cautious about dealing with the

consequences of services supplied by some so-called “security NGOs”, and about the

consequences of “sub-contracting” security issues in Afghanistan. Thus, to achieve

strategic success in fighting Al-Qaeda, or in reconstructing Afghanistan, the quality of

suppliers’ services and their degree of collaboration are very important.

To summarize, achieving lasting performance necessitates that the five dimensions described

above should be objectively and accurately assessed in terms of “opportunity” and “threat” to

peace in Afghanistan – by decision-makers engaged in providing, building or keeping peace in

Afghanistan. This important discussion leads us towards the third proposition of our framework,

illustrated in Figure 1c.

Proposition 3: Important decisions about peace-building, reconstruction, or development initiatives in Afghanistan should be preceded by a sound analysis of the “task environment”; important forces that may affect these initiatives/decisions should be objectively assessed in terms of “opportunities” or “threats”.

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DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE COORDINATION MECHANISM FOR THE SYSTEM

Peace-building, reconstruction and development initiatives necessitate sound strategic analysis of

the complex environment in Afghanistan in order to define strategic objectives. But these

objectives need to be realized. To this end, there is need to (1) objectively diagnose existing

involved organizations’ capabilities and competencies in order to identify their “Strengths” and

“Weaknesses” (discussed in the section above), (2) adapt these organizations with the

requirements of the overall objectives (peace in Afghanistan, for example), and (3) define (or

adapt) a coordination mechanism to harmonize the activities of each organization involved

towards realizing these objectives. In other words, once it is decided by actors and stakeholders

“What to Do?” the next step is to clarify “How to Do It?”. This later necessities an effective

coordination mechanism, beyond adapting involved organizations to the requirements of peace-

building.

It should be mentioned that in the context of Afghanistan, one hears generally many

attractive ideas of “what to do”, but few ideas of “how to do it”. For example, when the current

Afghan President articulates his attractive agenda (cited in the following paragraph),

organizational specialists can’t avoid the question of “how” this magnificent agenda will be

Peace: For the Ordinary Afghans

To perform a sound analysis of the “task environment”

Figure 1.c: Strategic Management of Peace-building, reconstruction or development in Afghanistan.

To consider the macro-environment’s dimensions

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realized (i.e., “How to Do It”), given the extremely poor and unfortunate state of the Afghan

bureaucracy and public management resources because of the past 26 years of destruction of this

sector in Afghanistan:

“My agenda will be to move Afghanistan [GDP] from $200 per capita to $700-1,000 in the next seven to 10 years, … To make Afghanistan a trade and business land bridge between Central and South Asia and build on good relations with our neighbours. To carry out fundamental institutional reforms and to especially institutionalize democracy, to create respect for the rule of law, build an army and police force and create a performance-oriented administration”

(President Hamed Karzai, 2004)33

To answer the difficult question “How to Do It?”, it is very important to carry out,

regularly, an objective diagnostic of any kind of organization involved in the process, be it a UN

agency, a NATO subdivision, an Afghan Government’s Department or a NGO involved in Afghan

peacemaking, reconstruction or development initiatives. The decision-makers and managers of

each organization and institution should be capable of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of

their organizations in the complex and dynamic context of Afghanistan, and in accordance to the

overall mission and objectives. This first step job is necessary for a more important second step:

the need for a coordination body to harmonize the actions of each collaborative organization

with the overall objectives of Defense, Diplomacy and Development in Afghanistan.

Regarding the kind of configuration this coordination mechanism may have, the

specialized literature suggests different possibilities that “link” the activities of different

participating organizations together in accordance with the common objectives. Based on my

own research (Youssofzai, 2003 & 2004), I propose a configuration that links three categories of

stakeholders together: the “Donors” (of resources), the “Implementing Organizations” and the

“Needy Beneficiaries”. Figure 2 illustrates this coordinating mechanism.

In Figure 2, the bold arrows show direct links and interactions between (a) the Donors

and the Implementing organizations, and (b) the Implementing organizations and the

Beneficiaries. On the other hand, links and interactions between Donors and the Beneficiaries

(showed by the dotted arrow) are less systematic and direct.

33 President Hamed Karzai (2004), The Far Eastern Economic Review, July 29, 2004.

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This is because, for example, in the process of Canada’s funds allocation for peace projects in

Afghanistan - that normally takes place in Ottawa-, Canadian officials (representing Donors)

seldom interact directly with the Afghan population (the beneficiaries).

Like all other organizational structures, the “meta-structure” illustrated in Figure 2

allows the coordination of actions of different organizational categories involved in Defence,

Diplomacy, and Development in Afghanistan. This is because the proposed “meta-structure” is,

in essence, “a system of cooperation” that helps different stakeholder groups achieve their

common objectives in an “effective” and “efficient” manner (Barnard, 1938).

Implementing organizations

Figure 2: Design of a coordination mechanism for the “organizational system” involved in Defence, Diplomacy, and Development activities in Afghanistan.

Donors (of resources) or organization representing them

Beneficiaries (the Ordinary Afghans)

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The Donors can, for example, use the proposed “meta-structure” as an effective “tool” for (1)

resource allocation, (2) assessment of the demands of the target beneficiaries (the Ordinary

Afghans), and (3) their communication systems. Each of these three activities is crucial in

Afghanistan; each should be effective and efficient if one wants to avoid wasting considerable

effort and resources.

The “implementing organizations” are those organizations that receive funds from the

Donors for a specific project/program related to peace-building activities in Afghanistan. These

organizations, by accepting and following the rules of the “meta-structure”, gain legitimacy as

well as operational funding.

Like any administrative initiative, the coordination mechanism suggested here implies

administrative costs; the more complex the context, the higher these costs will be. In the mean

time, without these administrative costs it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the

achievement of peace objectives in Afghanistan. These costs may be considered a necessary

investment to prevent misuse of billions of dollars of aid (as it has been reported by the Media

and by some witnesses who return from Afghanistan). Even if only part of the reported corruption

is true, then incurring the administrative costs for coordination will be worthwhile, since it

reduces the possibilities of further harming the most vulnerable Afghans. In a nutshell, if the

involved major stakeholders do not care about the state of the existing organizational system and

its professional and modern management, then all the other efforts, the big discourses, elegant

formulations of intentions, ambitious missions, planning and formulation of objectives and goals

will remain dreams; and worse, the most vulnerable Afghans will suffer even more.

Based on this discussion, we can conclude that the mastery of “organizational building”

and the art of “organizational design” by decision-makers is crucial activity in connection with

effective peace-building activities in Afghanistan. This brings us to the fourth proposition of our

framework, illustrated in Figure 1d.

Proposition 4: An accurate organization and coordination mechanism should be designed in order to achieve the effective implementation of peacemaking, rebuilding and development objectives in Afghanistan.

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DECISION-MAKING: MANAGING THE PROCESS WITHIN THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM

In the context of peace, reconstruction or development projects in Afghanistan – to move

Afghanistan from an insecure situation “A” to a more peaceful situation “B” – correct decision-

making is the most crucial activity. In fact, all of the former elements of the defined framework

are preparations for this critical step: a step that discusses how can the involved leaders shape

their operational and strategic decisions in coherence with the requirements of effective peace-

building in Afghanistan. To come back to the framework, its two primary variables help decision-

makers with comprehensive “thinking” before action, and the third element serves to provide an

accurate “tool” for decision (the “meta-structure” of Figure 2). The ultimate step is the actual

decision-making process. Actually, one can also say that the previous steps are arrangements for

this final step.

Peace: For the Ordinary Afghans

To perform a sound analysis of the “task environment”

To design a coherent “Meta-Structure” for coordinating the actions of different involved organizations

Figure 1.c: Strategic Management of peace-building, reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.

To consider the macro-environment’s dimensions

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According to Herbert Simon, organizations are “tools” for improving the rationality of

decisions (Simon, 1945). Known as pioneer of the “Decision-making School”, Simon affirms that

the administrative process is a decisional process that necessitates considering “vertical

specialization” beside “horizontal specialization” (p. 9). According to Simon, any kind of

“action” is ultimately a series of “decisions” (or “choices”).

Decision-making within a highly complex context requires considering legitimate

demands of various stakeholders as long as they are not in conflict with the overall mission and

objectives (for this paper, targeting the Common Afghans). In this regard, good communication is

vital (see Youssofzai, 2004 – chapters 2, 4 & 8 - for more elaboration on this subject).

Decision-making within a highly complex context also implies taking into account the

specificities of different organizations involved in the process of peace building in Afghanistan

(e.g., UN agencies, national public institutions, domestic and international NGOs, NATO, etc.).

Once again, a minimum knowledge of modern management and organizational theory as well as

knowledge about Complexity Theory is required from top decision-makers as a starting point.

This approach might lessen, for example, the possibility of unnecessary “scandals” being

reported by the Mass Media: the scandals about maltreatment of innocent Afghans, and those

about “sub-contracting” security affairs to “mercenaries”34. These are sad examples of a

malfunctioning decision-making system in a highly complex environment. Alone, “technological

gadgets” – as can be seen in Kabul today - are not sufficient to overcome these kinds of scandals;

managerial know-how is a necessity.

Organizational leadership is a vital element in improving the entire decision-making

system. Knowing the causes and consequences of complexity, organizational leaders become

agents of integration (of apparently conflicting considerations). The process implies regular

contacts with subordinates, encouraging them to contribute to and enrich the system with their

initiatives and inputs rather than acting as simple “bureaucrats”, and collaborating with other

organizations for the realization of the overall objective - peace in and reconstruction of

Afghanistan. The organizational leader does not function with a “black” or “white” mentality.

This means he/she understands listening, and is capable of using, different approaches and logics

to communicate his vision and methods for achieving peace in Afghanistan.

34 http://www.e ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allPrintDocs/8B7EB8CF4029D58387256ECE007E01A3?OpenDocument

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For the leader, integration is concretely possible when he/she (1) thinks about an effective

division of decision-making practice (i.e., vertical division of work) [in the sense of Bower

(1972) and Alison (1971)], (2) takes into consideration the desires of important stakeholders and

their coalitions [in the sense of Cyert & March (1963)], and (3) performs an effective resource-

allocation [in the sense of Barnard (1938) and Bower (1972)] at the level of the organizational

system engaged in peacemaking in Afghanistan. Consequently, accurate decision-making is the

ultimate task that allows effective and efficient peace-building and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

This discussion brings us to the final proposition of our framework about the Strategic

Management of Peace building in Afghanistan.

Proposition 5: The process should be effectively managed; an accurate decision-making mechanism that coordinates the initiatives of different stakeholders involved in the process should be thought out, and implemented.

As a conclusion, Figure 3 presents the final version of the framework.

Peace: For the Ordinary Afghans

To perform a sound analysis of the “task environment”

To design a coherent “Meta-Structure” for coordinating the actions of different involved organizations

To manage the complex process accordingly

Figure 3: Strategic Management of peace-building, reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.

To consider the macro-environment’s dimensions

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References Barnard, Chester I., The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938, 334

pages. Bower, Joseph L., Managing the Ressource Allocation Process: A study of Corporate Planning and

Investment, Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1972. Cyert, Robert M., and March, James G., A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Prentice Hall, New Jersey,

1963. Rubin, Barnett R. (2007), Saving Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs, Washington, V. 86, no. 1, pp. 57-78. Simon, Herbert T., Administrative Behavior, The Free Press, New York, 1945. Thompson, James D., Organizations in Action, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967. Youssofzai, Fahim, Management stratégique et performance des systèmes organisationnels engagés dans

la lutte contre la pauvreté, Les Éditions PubliBook, Paris, France, March 2004. Youssofzai, Fahim, Management stratégique et performance des systèmes organisationnels engagés dans

la lutte contre la pauvreté, Thèse de doctorat en administration, HEC-Montréal, juin 2003.

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Exploring the knowledge nexus: India’s path in terrorism-driven institutional growth Dr. Chris C. Demchak Mr. Eric Werner Security Lab, University of Arizona Abstract The search for knowledge and certainty pushes the evolution of largescale institutions in modernized societies. These organizations then alter and solidify the structural and political landscape of a society through their individual search for operational certainty by growing or competing for control of their environments. In stable westernized societies, this accumulated societal topology of organizational turfs and groupings evolve acceptably enough to manage or ignore the more salient society-wide problems. Occasionally social challenges emerge that escape comfortable status quo definitions and large organizations find themselves trying to reestablish their certainty levels by reaching out for more knowledge or control. Historically the problem most likely to challenge the established turf boundaries of ensconced agencies was war or its equivalent in a recurring natural disaster. Today the search for security from mass casualties in surprise terrorist attacks has emerged with the political potential to challenge these organizational boundaries nearly as well. The westernized world is discussing security agency information-sharing efforts with a level of seriousness unprecedented in peace time. As these institutions act on those discussions by reaching out beyond established institutional walls, they will begin to build a “knowledge nexus” of Interorganizational social and/or digital routinizing links in the empty domain space between their respective communities.

Little is known about this institutionalization of the knowledge nexus among these organizations is proceeding across westernized countries. It is likely that an active need for information among institutions will link them into largescale technical systems (LTS) with unintended consequences domestically. International cooperation on anti-terrorism is further likely to extend this emerging internal superstructure into the global socio-technical infrastructure (GSTI) for security with even less clear implications for future security and civil society options. Since modern counterterrorism is intended to deliberately interrupt threatening individual and group social activities in the name of security, in liberal democracies, such knowledge-driven operations need to be perceived as unbiased and legitimate along with rapid, narrowly targeted and accurate. These exceptional demands on civil and military structures in a rapidly digitizing world require extra care be taken to understand the circumstances under which this knowledge nexus is institutionalizing, as well as the longer term nature and directions of its emergent structures. This work is the first step in longer range and wider focus crossnational research on the extent to which the search for the missing knowledge across civilian and military organizations tasked with counter-terrorism may be developing an unprecedented “knowledge nexus” across the normally quite distinct communities of intelligence, military, and police. Is the desire to counter terrorism having the state-building effects of institutional creation or integration generally only seen in times of war or exceptional circumstances of upheaval? This piece studies a natural experiment in the growth of anti-terrorism squads in and across the exceptionally strong turf boundaries of the local and national security agencies in India using evidence accumulated from an comprehensive search across ten years of public reports of actors involved in counterterrorism responses. The findings are somewhat surprising in that a lower prestige community, the state police, succeeded in developing and retaining control of their anti-terrorism squads (ATSs) with the active support of the other two usually more imperious bureaucracies, the Indian Army and the two main intelligence agencies. In so doing, they have developed the kernel of a nascent CT knowledge nexus from the bottom up in the strongly top down bureaucratic culture of federal India. This case study lends support to our hypotheses that mass casualty modern terrorism has an unusually strong influence on institutional senses of uncertainty if experience but its international framing as an especially critical threat even stimulates organizational efforts to breach their own walls in search for knowledge when domestic events may be in the decline or absent. In either process, institutional growth across the knowledge nexus proceeds and is essential to study as it develops.

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ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................................... 94

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................ 96

II. DEFINING THE KNOWLEDGE NEXUS ............................................................................................ 1011

Figure 1: The Knowledge Nexus Model of Inter-Institutional Domain Formalization............................ 1022 Graph 1. Range of Social and Digital Institutionalization in the Nexus .................................................. 1033

III. INDIA AS A COMPELLING NATURAL EXPERIMENT................................................................. 1044 Figure 2: US Nexus Knowledge Among Security Institutions ...................................................................................1055

IV. METHOD – GROUNDED THEORY AND COMPARISON.............................................................. 1066

V. INDIAN SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES AND INFORMATION-SHARING................................ 1088

A. MILITARY COMMUNITY IN THE NEXUS ......................................................................................... 11010

1. Military Institutions Involved in Counterterrorism.................................................................................. 1100 Figure 3: Military Security Organizations involved in Counterterrorism................................................ 1122

2. Information-Sharing Tendencies of the Indian Army and other services................................................. 1133 B. INTELLIGENCE INSTITUTIONS IN THE NEXUS................................................................................................ 1144

1. Indian Intelligence Institutions Involved in Counterterrorism............................................................... 11414 Figure 4: National Intelligence Organizations involved in Counterterrorism.......................................... 1155

2. Information-Sharing Constraints of the Indian Intelligence Services...................................................... 1166 C. POLICE FORCES IN THE NEXUS..................................................................................................................... 1177

1. Indian Police Forces Involved in Counterterrorism................................................................................ 1188 Figure 5: Police Organizations involved in Counterterrorism ............................................................... 11919

2. Information-Sharing Constraints of the Indian Police Forces ................................................................ 1200

VI. FINDINGS: STATE-LEVEL ANTI-TERRORIST SQUAD AS EMERGENT NEXUS................... 1222

A. HISTORY OF THE ATS CONCEPT BEYOND INDIA.......................................................................................... 1233 B. EMERGENCE OF PROTO-ATSS IN INDIA........................................................................................................ 1244

Figure 6: History of ATS Concept and First Formal Institutionalization ................................................ 1255 C. FROM SIDELINE TO FULLTIME –EXPERIENCE AND URGENCY DRIVE ATSS.................................................. 1255

Table 1. India Fatalities 1994-2005...........................................................................................................................1266 1. Before 2001 – Experience and Localized Urgency.................................................................................. 1277

Table 2: India’s Anti-Terrorist Squads Establishment................................................................................................1277 Figure 7: Composite Institutional Mapping of the Emergent Nexus ....................................................... 1300

2. After 2001 – Urgency and Declining Experience .................................................................................... 1311 Chart 1 : Patterns in Casualties and Incidents Before and After 2001 ..................................................... 1322 Figure 8: The Nascent Indian Knowledge Nexus .................................................................................... 1333

VII. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................................... 1333

Map 1: Pre2001 Existing ATSs in Indian States...................................................................................... 1344 Map 2: 2005 All Old and New (post2001) ATSs in Indian States........................................................... 1344 Figure 9: Summary of India’s Emerging Knowledge Nexus ................................................................... 1366

VIII. APPENDIXES .......................................................................................................................................... 1377

APPENDIX A: INTELLIGENCE BUREAU STRUCTURE .......................................................................................... 1377 APPENDIX B: RESEARCH & ANALYSIS WING STRUCTURE (ESTIMATED) .......................................................... 1388 APPENDIX C BASIC BACKGROUND ON INDIA.................................................................................................. 13939

Figure C.1 Details on Indian Terrorist Groups across States.....................................................................................1400 TABLE 2: INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COUNTER-TERRORISM UNITS................................................................ 1411

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................... 1422

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Introduction The search for knowledge and certainty pushes the evolution of large scale institutions in

modernized societies. These organizations in turn alter and solidify the structural and political

landscape of a society through their individual search for operational certainty by growing or

competing for control of their environments. In stable westernized societies, this accumulated

societal topology of organizational groupings evolve to manage acceptably enough or ignore the

society-wide problems. Occasionally social challenges emerge that escape comfortable status

quo domain definitions to force significant uncertainties on large organizations. Trying to

reestablish their preferred certainty levels, organizations reach out for more knowledge or

control. 35

For well established large public organizations, the threat must be considered dire indeed

to stimulate a search for new knowledge. If undertaken, the search beyond their normal domain

borders moves them into the “knowledge nexus’ for that societal issue – the information-sharing

plaza between communities that may or may not be in use. Such clearcut contingencies are rare

in the modernized world. Generally, sharing information is not seen as beneficial, or needed

information is fragmented beyond recognition or visibility across agencies. As the digital age

emerges, much now needed information has simply never been collected officially, leaving a

largely empty institutional arena beyond normal organizational boundaries.

For security organizations across most westernized states, the counterterrorism (CT)

knowledge nexus has been largely empty up to now. War or an equivalent national level threat is

usually necessary to move the national level institutions to be willing to share internal knowledge

with each other or their domestic colleagues. The preparations for war by militaries have often

involved reaching out to create new institutions and infrastructure just to reduce uncertainties in

35 The classical literature on organization theory and the formation of the modern political state

is voluminous. As a result, we will not cite beyond a few classical authors for the benefit of scholars new to the field. For this paragraph, see Thompson [Thompson 1967] for a discussion of organizations and their search for certainty, see Selznick [Selznick 1984] for a discussion of institutionalization, see Easton [Easton 1965] for a discussion of basic political theory in modern democracies, see Scott [Scott 2003] for a nearly peerless review of the notions of organization theory and institutions, see Easton [Easton 1965] and then Wilson [Wilson 1989] for discussions of how bureaucracies develop their internal notions of what must be pursued and how, and see Hofstede [Hofstede 2004] for a more recent discussion of these prior notions and their crosscultural implications.

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foreseeable conflicts.36 Even in war and among the same military community, however, such

developments are not easy or automatic.

Battle histories filled with stories of military units in conflicts still refusing to cooperate with

others, especially if the help seems to confer advantages to competing services. [Seymour 1988]

[Bindon 1998] The instinct for strong turf protection is as true for police departments [Wilson

1989] as it is for national agencies [Allison 1999] as it is for militaries. [McNaugher1989]

Until 2001, domestic terrorism was not widely viewed as a military or national level

intelligence problem. Most western nations relegated terrorism on homeland soil to a domestic

police problem.37 [Fletcher 2002] [Laqueur 2001] As long as terrorism was viewed as a criminal

event, generally only the police have had responsibility for its control. [Garrison 2003] [Betts

2003] In recent decades, terrorism has waxed and waned in stressing police capabilities, only

solidly becoming of national security concern in westernized countries after the attack on the US

in 2001. [Cronin 2002] With little national level political pressure to do otherwise, national level

military and intelligence did not seek to be involved in the matters of the police, other than

peripherally. Insurgencies in westernized nations have been rare as well and given to the military

to handle. [Cassidy 2004] To the extent insurgency operations have been undertaken, the threat

has not institutionally been considered the same as domestic terrorism. Police or intelligence

agency involvement has been generally seen as one-off and exceptional support, not routinely

involved or integrated to the extent necessary to begin the institutionalization of a CT nexus.

[Long 2006}

The attacks on New York, London, and Madrid, however, internationally underscored the

possibility of mass casualties in surprise terrorist attacks and counterterrorism unexpectedly

developed the political potential to challenge established organizational boundary assumptions.

Modern westernized democracies have become impatient with arbitrary or preventable death.

Citizens have developed unprecedented expectations of safety to be insured by public agencies.

Their societies tend to be complexly interdependent, non-autarchic, dynamically networked

sociotechnical systems with members impatient with dangers framed as avoidable. 36 While few would argue with the destructive consequences of war, the need for certainty under

conditions of widespread survival-threatening surprise historically forced enormous institutional innovation. In Europe, these led to the formation of the modern westernized state. For one of the best explanations of this process, see Tilly’s tour de force on the interactions of war and capital and the Church in the formation of the modern European state. [Tilly 1992]

37 Israel is an exception for obvious reasons.

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In particular, those citizens increasingly have a strong sense of entitlement to be protected against

the arbitrary permanent harm of a mass casualty attack.38

After the 2001, New York attack in particular, the US government and global westernized

media vigorously and internationally framed foreigner-instigated domestic terrorism as a major

national and domestic threat to all westernized democracies. It has become accepted that

terrorism events are inevitable anywhere where certain minorities are found and that the

institutional solution necessarily requires relatively holistic cooperation across the traditionally

separate domains of national security services. [Urry 2002] Under political pressure to be seen as

prepared and to obtain or retain international referent group professionalization status, police,

military and intelligence agencies across western nations are now at a minimum discussing

information- sharing acquisition, analysis, and distribution. This new “not quite national security

but more than routine criminality” framing of terrorism challenges the established operational

distinctions between levels of police domain, intelligence domestic roles, and military

contributions to homeland defense, forcing cracks in institutional boundaries across westernized

liberal democracies. [Cole 2003] In the process, these widely scattered efforts are beginning to

fill the void with organizational and technical elements.

This process is largely unnoticed and uncharted externally. Such fervor in peacetime is

highly unusual and we know very little about how the institutionalization of this “knowledge

nexus” among these organizations is proceeding. Institutionalization of the counterterrorism

knowledge nexus can provide enormous benefits but a need for information and certainty among

institutions often links them into largescale technical systems (LTS) with unintended

consequences.39

38 See Michael Howard’s seminal writings on innocence and war, and the role played by this expectation of

protection by governments. [Howard 1997]. See also Castells tour de force on the evolutions of the modern westernized world and the interdependent ripple effects. [Castells 2000]

39 Scholars in the field of largescale technical systems (LTS) have an enormous brief: to study the societal implications of the massive explosion in organizationally integrating technologies across and expanding widely influential sociotechnical systems. The basic works in this literature first emerged thirty years ago and are nearly drowned today by the vast amounts of support research into the wider institutional and societal realities of the still emerging Information and Terrorism Age. For a basic understanding of the term LTS and the field, see Summerton [Summerton 1994]

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In one nation not yet experiencing terrorism, large institutions may simply have monthly

meetings while, in others such as the United States, a whole new organization such as the

Department of Homeland Security may be created. Effective counterterrorism in mass liberal

democracies with strong civil control of security forces is taken to require public actions that are

preemptive, rapid, and accurate. Inevitably such actions involve the necessary and deliberate

interruption of social activities for the purposes of security. Whatever those actions are, public

law and expectations across democracies also require that the knowledge-driven operations need

to be or at least seen to be narrowly targeted and popularly viewed as unbiased and legitimate.

These exceptional demands on the civil and military structures require extra care be taken to

understand the circumstances under which this knowledge nexus is institutionalizing, as well as

the longer term nature and directions of its emergent structures.

This work is the first step in longer range and wider focus crossnational research on the

extent to which the search for the missing knowledge across civilian and military organizations

tasked with counter-terrorism may be developing an unprecedented counterterrorism (CT)

“knowledge nexus” across the normally quite distinct communities of intelligence, military, and

police. Could counter terrorism operational cooperation in modern democracies be having

nonobvious state-building or -altering effects historically only seen in times of war or exceptional

circumstances of upheaval? What is the general pattern in how CT fervor emerges as powerful as

war to force public institutions out of their boxes? At the very least, could the future evolutionary

paths of specific institutions be altered by their emerging inter-institutional knowledge seeking

efforts? What is the relative and longer term political influence of having an incredible

technological advance – easy to use small package mass casualty attacks – emerge just as the

functioning of westernized nations are inextricably bound together by the ever thickening global

sociotechnical infrastructure (GSTI)? 40 What future paths for future of security, privacy, and

civil control in these democracies emerge from the ways in which their own CT knowledge nexus

is built, employed, and legitimated?

40 The GSTI is a term developed here to capture the infrastructure being built by globalization, one that is likely to

function as an uncontrolled transnational largescale technical system (LTS) with all its inherent surprises and ROGUE outcomes. For an explanation and application, see Demchak (1991) .[Demchak 1991]

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Using a grounded theory approach across a large number of media and other secondary sources,

our work documents the institutional beginnings of a counterterrorism-induced knowledge nexus

in a natural experiment occurring in the largescale, federal democracy of India. It is a nation

dealing with both considerable terrorism and exceptionally strong institutions able to vigorously

defend domain boundaries. The evidence accumulated from an exhaustive search of published

reports suggests that a redefinition of terrorism into a national problem has indeed weakened turf

boundaries across these exceptionally insular security communities in India. To our surprise,

however, the institutional kernel of this nexus did not come from the higher status national level

agencies in the military or intelligence communities, but from the more pedestrian state police

forces. To an unexpected extent, the two national level communities have concretely supported

the growth of state-level anti-terrorism squads (ATSs), even when the actual experience with

terrorism is on the decline, We hypothesize that in India, prompted by experience and then

internationally reinforced urgency, these ATSs have begun the institutionalization of the nexus.

With the institutionalization well underway, although terrorism events began to fall across India

in 2001, the number of these ATSs continued to increase for the next four years. By robustly

crossing local and national level domain boundaries, this nexus is changing the institutional

topology of this federal state.

As an institutional adaptation to surprise in large-scale systems, this evolutionary

development in India falls upon a midpoint in the continuum of a formalized nexus rather than

the end point established by the sudden establishment of a whole organization that occurred in

the US. As such, the Indian experience may provide more nuanced lessons about structuring

responses to terrorism’s knowledge burden under differing circumstances of frequency and

consequence than the example of, say, the DHs in the US. Thus this work is part of a larger

program of research uncovering the largescale technical structures emerging in wide variety of

national contexts. The need for terrorism related knowledge is beginning to ripple through

information sharing arrangements of governments with unknown consequences for their

presumptions about civil liberties and civil-military relations. At the end of the day, this longer

term program will seek to document and analyze nexus developments in states having had

experience with terrorism events or terrorist activities such as United Kingdom, Spain, Germany,

and Australia, and also states where we would be surprised to see similar processes such as

Sweden and Canada. By investigating these emergent structures in several large natural

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experiments across nations, we can over time compare and contrast changing extent of

institutionalization and lessons to be learned across states.

Defining the knowledge nexus In their search for certainty and survival, organizations conduct wars and end up building the

infrastructure to create societies. Militaries historically create organizations and, for example, the

roads they need out of a desire to control the uncertainties of collective behavior while employing

its advantages. highly uncertain behaviors of soldiers, animals, terrain, and other leaders. The

more these emerging organized social groups develop unique identities and an interest in

survival, the more they tend to reach out for knowledge in order to control internal and external

uncertainties themselves. Memberships lists, for example, are used to control the uncertainty of

who may and may not be called upon to perform some task. The more successful they are in

hoarding their information and influence [Allison 1999], the more organizations are able to

insulate themselves from outside intervention by building strongly held domain and resource

boundaries. [Weber 1978], They add internal capabilities to meet contingencies of importance, in

the process expanding in the direction of emerging threats. [Thompson 1967]. As a result, the

larger the state’s recognized political problems are, the larger its agencies become over time, and

the more rigidly defended is the societal topology of turf and entitlements.

A knowledge nexus is where these organizational walls are breached in order for the

institutions to share something of mutual benefit. The definition of knowledge here is broad; it

encompasses anything that reduces the unknowns associated with a contingency and helps the

recipient counter an uncertainty. Knowledge can be found in a spare part, a supplemental external

training course, access to new databases, or seconded experts. [Demchak 1991] Unless

organizations perceive a need to seek knowledge by developing external knowledge delivery ties,

the nexus remains essentially unclaimed domain space among otherwise allocated social

responsibilities. In principle, a nexus should only begin to take shape when an identifiable

largescale problem emerges and is widely recognized to have knowledge demands beyond the

capabilities of any one institution’s internal capabilities.

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To meet their individual obligations, then, each will have to reach beyond their own strongly

maintained boundaries and link with the other organizations in some process of knowledge

exchange. Figure 1 models this process of institutional development.

Figure 1: The Knowledge Nexus Model of Inter-Institutional Domain Formalization

Over time, the more often and intense the data exchanges are, the more altered each player

becomes in dependencies and structural ripple effects. In the commercial world, it has been said

two large organizations cannot exist long in a joint venture unless everything is perceived to be

shared evenly.

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If not, then one will absorb the other or, at least, the shared subsidiary, or the joint venture will

disband. [Hodgetts 2006] In public institutions, however, the process is more gradual with a slow

formalization of routine interactions. The result may be an enlargement of one organization to

absorb the resources associated with the problem, just as in the commercial world, or a

disengagement if the originating problem is resolved or demoted in importance. A third

possibility is a slowly institutionalizing shadow organization sustained by the shared practices

and knowledge stocks moving between two otherwise distinct agencies. This not-quite-formally-

recognized nexus could last for years, finding new reasons to exist as the original problem

dissipates. It could conceivably be the seed of a whole new institution broken off from each of

the prior organizations by political leaders. A fourth possibility is the complete joining of the two

organizations with the shadow organization as the intervening glue and justification. The knowledge nexus varies in its level of institutionalization according to the level of criticality by

which the stimulating problem is socially constructed. War or its imminence is particularly powerful in

forcing interconnections across organizations and communities. Historically the pursuit of war by political

leaders has developed the institutions of the society. France under Louis XIV and Napoleon could be

viewed as classic examples of the massive development of society’s infrastructure and institutions as a

function of the need during war for resources and logistics transcending the traditional bounds of the

military’s internal capabilities. [Tilly 1992] Graph 1 notionally depicts the levels of institutionalization of the

knowledge nexus. Furthermore, the more intrusive the threat, the more long standing the uncertainty, the

more likely the formerly temporary arrangements across organizations will formalize and remain over time.

[Selznick 1984] [Thompson 1967]

Graph 1. Range of Social and Digital Institutionalization in the Nexus

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Given the uniqueness of this issue for increasingly co-dependent complex societies, it is unclear

how this institutionalization might develop in any nation’s counterterrorism knowledge nexus,

but the process is wide open for informed speculation and empirical discovery. When

counterterrorism is taken so seriously that the turf walls around institutional data begin to buckle,

the organizational and wider nexus development becomes clearly of interest to both scholars and

practitioners. [Schmitt 2002] Over time, as Selznick observed about fifty years ago, if informal

information sharing relations become accepted into the structure of processes, over time they

begin to become part of the formal structures among those elements involved. [Selznick 1984

The more compelling the experience with and/or fear of terrorism, the more one expects to find

institutional mobilization to find certainty-enhancing predictive knowledge for future safety, and

the more formally developing the knowledge nexus. It is, however, critical to this larger societal

process is that terrorist events be framed as possibly recurring and national in implication for the

nexus to institutionalize into a largescale technical system with society-wide effects.

India as a compelling natural experiment The United States after 9/11 may be said to have moved near the end of the spectrum in

knowledge nexus institutionalization with the creation of the new Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) in 2003. However effective it may prove, this response was exceptionally rapid,

occurring barely two years after the watershed event. The “new agency” response, however, is

consistent with the historical effects of divided governance on U.S. public agencies.

Congressional partisan disagreements have often led to creation of completely new independent

agencies rather than the overhaul of existing agencies. [Walsh 1978] The US case study is also

critically distinct in its scope, creating an enormous agency of 180 thousand odd members.. The

establishment of this massive new agency involved the direct transfer of twenty odd (especially

border) organizational elements from other agencies to the new department. Elements deemed

related to counterterrorism were simply coerced, including several politically weak formerly

relatively independent and culturally distinct agencies such as the US Coast Guard. [O'Hanlon

2003] [Sloan 2002] Long-established organizational boundaries were unusually disdained in this

process, indicating an extraordinary level of urgency felt among political leaders, despite the lack

of long term direct experience with terrorism. [Wise 2002] [Stevenson 2003]

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In this work, the US CT knowledge nexus example is taken as a defining end of spectrum,

unlikely to be the pattern of institutionalization in other westernized nations but informing in its

efforts to force knowledge sharing from the top down onto and across distinct domains of the

three security communities.

Figure 2: US Nexus Knowledge Among Security Institutions

A more likely pattern in knowledge nexus development in the process of seeking to counter

terrorism is occurring in India. This large westernized and federal democracy provides an

exceptional natural experiment. Several advanced democracies have had problematic and

continuing terrorism problems such as the United Kingdom, Spain, and Israel. [Dalgaard-Nielsen

2005] [Enders 2006] [Lustick 1993] Only India’s circumstances, however, pit exceptional

experience with terrorism and a national bureaucratic culture recognized to be extraordinarily

rigid and hierarchical. [Corbridge 2005] [Tandon 2000] It is a large fractious democracy relying

on large independent highly bureaucratized agencies with a history of very strong turf distinctions

and a generalist, patriarchal civil service with strong power distance preferences. [Morris 2002]

[Heady 2001]

In India, strongly stove-piped and defensive security agencies pose a particularly tough

obstacle to inter-institutional knowledge nexus of any sort, especially one that crosses the state-

national divide.[Roy 1998]

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Like most westernized nations, the Indian military, police, and intelligence agencies have well

entrenched and organizationally distinct cultures, policy preferences, legal status, domains, tools,

competencies, and knowledge filters. [Subramaniam 2000] Similar to many nations, Indian

security institutions do not seek to interact routinely. Even after crises that required cooperative

operations, they usually minimize the innovations or adaptations that would force continuing

cross-organizational boundary crossing. [Sriramesh 1999] [Howlett 2004 ] Indian bureaucratic

path dependence combines the complexities of the structures of British colonial administration

adapted for use with the underlying native Indian caste and ethnic divisions. [D’Costa 2003]

[Mearns 1999] Information sharing faces some of the greatest bureaucratic challenges under

these circumstances. [Rao 2000] [Heeks 2000]

Thus, India provides a reasonable case to investigate for evidence of institutionalization at

the knowledge nexus due to the cross-agency, holistic information requirements of

counterterrorism campaigns. In a sense, if a CT knowledge nexus can be found to be emerging

here, then counterterrorism may be more fairly construed as a institutional topology changing

concept coming close to the power of war in forcing bureaucratic adaptation. In that regard, the

Indian case has much for scholars and practitioners to consider.

Method – grounded theory and comparison Using a grounded theory approach, this work attempts to identify the rise of an Indian

counterterrorism knowledge nexus across national circumstances using the following rough

qualitative hypotheses to guide data collection and interpretation.

Hypothesis 1: More experience with terrorism increases (a) the willingness of agencies with security response obligations to seek greater inter-institutional exchanges of information, and hence (b) the social and/or technical structural development of the counter-terrorism knowledge nexus.

If institutional cross-boundary interactions increase in the presence of, or are clearly related to,

terrorist events considered nationally significant, then we infer that experience is the key driver of

this process. Data sought include but are not limited to the nation’s or region’s quantitative

casualty and incident rates internally and the qualitative evidence of increasing interaction across

the players in this institutions for the same period.

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Hypothesis 2: The greater the international public, diplomatic, and professional referent group framing of terrorism as an urgent, holistic and national social problem, the greater (a) the willingness of agencies with security response obligations to seek inter-institutional exchanges of information, and hence (b) the social and/or technical structural development of the counter-terrorism knowledge nexus.

A sense of urgency is not quantifiable, nor is a prestige-related desire to seen as part of a

professional referent group. There is plenty of international discourse – some quite emotional –

about the imminent threat of foreign-based terrorism since 2001. That year is really only a

watershed for the US and yet the American framing of the “global war on terror” has seemed to

have imprinted in security discourses far beyond the experience of many nations. Therefore, if a

state shows either trivial terrorist experience or declining experience, and yet increases its

institutionalization of a counter-terrorism knowledge nexus, we infer that advance to mean

urgency has supplanted experience as a motivator for such development. The spread in absence

of concrete events suggests a global mirroring across security related referent groups and

portends a very widely distributed ripple effect if the drive to institutionalization can be so

divorced from experience. This process of emulation of other professional developments

(“mimetic isomorphism”) is historically not common in most public service domains, especially

across national borders, because most public agencies do not look at their colleagues in other

nations or even other provinces and states for guidance on how to structure or operate

themselves. [DiMaggio 1983] Such copying, however, is more common in militaries who often

seek to mirror each other in hopes of averting surprise technological or operational advantages.

[O’Connell 1989] This convergence of ideas leading to institutional change can also be

normative, associated with what is taken to be minimum standards for acceptance into the ranks

of this or that profession. [DiMaggio 1983] That police forces – traditionally strongly locally

focused – might be responding to an international message of urgency underscores the possible

power of the post 9/11 framing of counterterrorism and of the growing communications

infrastructure linking nations as levels unprecedented in human history. [Castells 2005]

−108−

In testing these hypotheses quantitatively and qualitatively, we have sought evidence in

public media of a range of interaction events from the low end (announcement of more or new

joint discussions, exercises, or regularized briefings) to the midrange (new or enhanced

sociotechnical networks with national data systems) to the high end of the continuum (full scale

formal creation of a new organizational structures) across cities, states, and national agencies in

India. Public announcements, especially in the wake of terrorist events, constituted the bulk of

our data sources under the presumption that formalization heading towards a true knowledge

nexus could not be held in secret across three large institutions. In short, so many actors would

be involved, that the normal way large organizations communicate – by public actions – would

inevitably be used in the process.

Indian security bureaucracies and information-sharing

With its independence in 1947, India inherited nearly all its large public institutions as well the

organizational structures and class-imbued culture of British colonial administration. [Appleby

1957] For a variety of unique factors including scale and heterogeneity, many of these

organizations remain virtually unchanged internally in their strictly hierarchical structure [Mishra

2001] and strong patriarchal control mechanism, sustained from Nehru forward. [Jain 2001] The

roots of a preference for rigid hierarchy within India lie in Indian history of aristocracy among

humans, animals, and deities. Sustained to a large extent by the Hindu view of humans as

stratified by caste worth and prior life decisions, unabashed elitism allocates power in many

spheres of social activity in India. [Das 1998] Agency managers in most agencies come

overwhelmingly from upper and rising middle castes. [Subramaniam 2000] The strong power

distance and risk avoidance of Indian management culture is consistent with this history.

[Hofstede 2004] Unsurprisingly, decisions made in Indian bureaucracies tend to rationalize and

perpetuate this long-standing institutional distribution of power, access, and information.

[Chaturvedi 1985]

In particular, inaction is encouraged. Operating outside of established procedures and

independent decisions are bureaucratically dangerous, especially those whose wider political

ripple effects are uncertain or whose known effects are strongly opposed by powerful external

political forces.

−109−

For any given official, passing onerous and highly selective national exams is the entrance fee to

lifelong employment, but beyond that gate, survival is tied closely to having the right family,

caste, and network of contacts at the highest levels. Within federal and state bureaucracies,

officials are frequently moved for trivial reasons. This churn has reinforced the tendencies to

avoid decisions that might cause an unhappy superior to suddenly move the offending official.

Fewer than fifty percent of the federal bureaucrats stay in any given position for more than a

year. Most do not stay in place long enough to gain much competence in any specialized areas.

Most become corrupt over time as a way to avoid the political costs of a decision viewed

unfavorably by powerful outside stakeholders. [Mishra 2001] [Kingston 2005]

With social conventions separating castes and gender so strong, complicating the situation

are the number of civil service jobs and legislative positions reserved for ‘untouchables41’ and

women. These equalizing rules are resented by male members of elite caste and that rejection

increases the disinclination to positively respond to interaction requests within and across

agencies. Positive discrimination in reserved positions has indeed recruited some of the most

advanced members into the circle of the Indian elite but it has also tended to help restrict

cooperation to even smaller groups of friends among amongst caste or ethnically homogeneous

bureaucrats rather than encourage synergy among a heterogeneous pool of government personnel.

The normal rule rigidity of the enormous civil service has been made even more sluggish for

otherwise desirable purposes.[Sen 1985] The resulting ossification of internal procedures, in

turn, further encourages the widespread use of “speed money” bribes to ensure that some official

action actually occurs. [Paul 1997] [D’Costa 2003] Senior officials are disillusioned with the

political system and themselves to a greater extent than junior bureaucrats; however, they also

tend to regard corruption and its inefficiencies as inevitable. [Bayley 1992]

These distortions in public agency willingness to cooperate internally extends to other

organizations throughout all levels of federal and state government. [Mearns 1999] Despite

many commissions and efforts to reform the densely turf-bound structures, parliament and

reformers have made little headway. [Jain 1982] [DARPG 2006] Changes to the standard

operating legal codes nominally governing official practices are often simply ignored. [Mishra

2001] Recently the Indian Supreme Court ruled that officials were to be left in place no less than

two years in what was widely seen as an anti-corruption ruling. [Pratyush 2006] 41 Untouchables refers to a group of people in positions of power and influences under positive discriminatory arrangements. These

arrangements contain similar social elements to affirmative action and positive discriminatory arrangements. [Das 1998]

−110−

Its chances of implementation are extremely unclear; this ruling itself was based upon

recommendations first made in 1977. [Negi 2006] In India, all the major players in security have

distinctive histories in their establishment and evolution; the resulting insularity is remarkably

resilient. [Singh 2004]

The information sharing demands of successful counterterrorism in India face a daunting

task in this massively fragmented, well entrenched forest of fiercely guarded domains. In

principle, in any given large India bureaucracy, the authorization for routine or in-depth inter-

agency information sharing and acquisition will have to move upward through a number of

higher levels of management before final decisions can be made. [Krishna 2004] It considered

normal that the highest level managers make most of the decisions; procedures that force

empowerment onto lower levels of the organizations are considered at best uncomfortable.

[Hodgetts 2006]

While some sectors of the bureaucracy do require and eventually obtain information from other

sectors, the process is prolonged by these role and procedural expectations, the low level of

specialized competency of constantly rotated officials, and the deeply engrained suspicions borne

of class, gender, or ethnic distinctions.

Military community in the nexus

The Indian Army is first and foremost a direct descendent of the colonial administrative

structures of the British Empire expressed in the British Army up to World War II. As the oldest

military and most prestigious armed force, the Indian Army has retained a distinctively 19th

century British underpinning to its structures and enduring procedures. Serving under the

Ministry of Defense, the Army’s million-odd soldiers are spread across six operational

commands or field armies. The organization control the regular army, the army reserve, the

homeland defense Territorial Army, and a national cadet corps (aka ROTC). [Chipman 2005]

Military institutions involved in counterterrorism

In recent years, the Indian Army’s attention has widened from a focus on engaging in high-

intensity conflict to include low-intensity, internal security operations. The Indian military has

fought three wars and one conflict with Pakistan and one border war with China.

−111−

In the 1990s, however, in addition to its responsibility for external threats from China and

Pakistan, the Army began counterinsurgency operations in the state of Punjab against Sikh

separatists. Under the umbrella consent of the Ministry of Defense [MOD], the Army established

new -- or reoriented existing -- paramilitary units for use in multiplying locations in Kashmir,

Assam, and the northeast states. Today, the Indian Army’s counterinsurgency trained units such

as the National Security Guards (NSG) are also expected to mount counterterrorism operations

when required. Other services have specialized units or tools applicable to counterterrorism but

the Army is considered the lead service for this mission. [Fair 2003]

From late 1980s on, military interactions with police units began to expand as

counterinsurgency operations – the low intensity warfare domain of the military – began to

overlap with the internal security obligations of the local police forces. [Khalidi 2003] Several

paramilitary forces now serve across military and police domains; however, they are generally

used as military auxiliary forces to the police to minimize Army involvement in internal law

enforcement. [Dasgupta 2003] For example, the 35,000-strong Rashtriya Rifles established by the

Ministry of Defense in 1990s for counter-insurgency acquired internal security duties in areas

considered relatively pacified over the course of the decade. [Rajagopalan 2004] The Assam

Rifles similarly were initially formed by the British in 1917 to battle insurgency in the northeast

but have evolved to participate in internal security operations the northwest areas of Jammu &

Kashmir. [Blank 2003]. Created under the military, these paramilitaries are legally under the

broader legal jurisdiction and strategic control of the Home Ministry along with clearly domestic

security units such as the Home Guard, Border Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police,

Central Reserve Police Force, Special Security Bureau, Central Industrial Security Force, Civil

Defense, Railway Protection Force, State Armed Police, and Defense Security Corps. However,

since the MOD retains operational control of these forces, they are not considered and do not

consider themselves to be police assets. [Khalidi 2003]

Interactions by the military with the national level Indian intelligence services are by

published accounts limited to routine and high level refined intelligence reports; dynamic and in-

depth cooperation is rare at best. Since 1947, military intelligence organizations have been given

the lead in intelligence collection in border areas. [Swami 2004]

−112−

In 2002, under considerable opposition by both national level intelligence agencies and the

services, the Defense Intelligence Agency was created to integrate the separate and insular

intelligence networks of the Army, Navy, and Air Force into a single organization mirroring that

of the US’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Intended to coordinate and share information

across the military services and with the federal intelligence agencies as well, the largely civilian

Indian DIA tracks troop movements in neighboring countries, monitors terrorist groups, and

assesses internal security threats. [Swami 2004] Figure 3 presents the organizations in the

military community with a role to play in counterterrorism operations.

Figure 3: Military Security Organizations involved in Counterterrorism

Source: compiled from multiple sources cited in discussion

−113−

Information-sharing tendencies of the Indian Army and other services

Like any other Indian bureaucracy, the Indian military is noted for the lack of timeliness,

accuracy, or comprehensiveness in its internal information exchange, even in conflict situations.

[Rosen 1996] The same applies to its ability to provide to or obtain intelligence from external

institutions, notably among them the national intelligence agencies. [Fair 2003] Any given

military unit ’s access to external intelligence data strongly depends on network of personalities

in power, the urgency of events, and the character of the knowledge needed. Among military

services, turf battles have long been considered debilitating and, until recently, accepted as

endemic. [Joseph 2004]

Indeed, information sharing across the Indian military or with the national level intelligence

services has not seemed to improve despite the recognition of a need for integrated knowledge in

counterinsurgency or counterterrorism. The Indian Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was

created but immediately fell afoul of the bitter interservice and inter-national agency rivalry over

control of their knowledge assets. Up to the late 1990s, intelligence cooperation between border

counterinsurgency forces and the RAW in particular was infrequent at best. In spring of 1999, a

surprised Indian Army found Pakistani paramilitary forces in place across the Kashmiri line of

control between India and Pakistan; they had infiltrated completely undetected and earlier than

agreed upon dates. The resulting conflict at the Kargil Pass reinstated the status quo. This time,

however, the usual postconflict struggle to blame someone for the intelligence failure converged

on a need to integrate military and national intelligence to avoid a repeat surprise and produced

the Indian DIA. Since then, however, military services have been reluctant to share information,

citing internal efficiencies at risk. Integrated staffs within each military branch have

administratively undermined the transfer of existing operations to DIA divisions or subordinate

organizations. [Bedi 1983] Refusals to share knowledge with the IDIA replicate the enduring turf

battles within the military and have thus far channeled DIA and its liaisons between different

agencies into acceptance of the more archaic and slow system of reporting and analysis long

established in the individual services. [Joseph 2004]

Civilian agencies such as the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing also

tend to avoid lending support to the DIA which is viewed as a competing intelligence agency at

higher levels of the organizations. [Joseph 2004]

−114−

At lower levels, IB and RAW with DIA in attendance occasionally run joint meetings with

coordinated analysis for use by Army commanders in areas governed by Armed Forces Special

Powers Act. [Mishra 2006] The meetings are not technical but designed to encourage some

interaction among field personnel of all the organizations. [Jayal 2005] [Saxena 1999] So far the

new organization has not altered the basic landscape of information-sharing between agencies,

nor the distorting effects of loyalty to specific branches of service.

Intelligence institutions in the nexus

Two main agencies constitute India’s national level intelligence community and both are younger

and more prestigious than either the Army or the police services. The Intelligence Bureau (IB),

established in 1920 and subordinate to the Home Ministry, focuses on internal security threats.

The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), established in 1968 and subordinate to the Ministry of

External Affairs, directly serves the Prime Minister’s cabinet in providing intelligence on foreign

security threats. Since these organizations are not subject to public audit or inquiry, little is

publicly confirmed about the internal operations of these organizations. [Swami 2004] There are

several other less prominent and smaller agencies with intelligence responsibilities but these are

generally supporting agencies. [“India’s Intelligence Agencies” 2004]

Indian intelligence institutions involved in counterterrorism

The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is India’s oldest and largest domestic intelligence agency. See

appendix A for the IB structure. Headed by a Director, the organization is subordinate to the

Ministry of Home Affairs with responsibility for domestic counter-intelligence and later

counterterrorism. After the first Indo-Pak War, IB’s portfolio expanded to intelligence collection

in border areas and to some other external intelligence responsibilities generally not publicly

discussed. IB’s influence in national security decisions has risen dramatically and recently with

the growing recognition of the importance of accurate and timely intelligence collection in border

states and beyond. [Mishra 2001]

In the 1960s, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) began as a wing of the larger main

agency, IB. RAW later became a separate agency when its founder, Rameshwar Nath Kao,

persuaded Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to designate the head of the organization as a Secretary.

−115−

This elevated the organization to the PM’s Cabinet and greatly increased the organization’s

ability to influence domestic and foreign policy given the nominal equivalence in power and

status with the other secretaries of the Government of India. The IB head is still a Director to the

enduring resentment of senior IB managers. [“India’s Intelligence Agencies” 2004]

RAW has become India’s most powerful intelligence organization among the three types of

national (military, domestic, and foreign) intelligence agencies. [RAW 2005] Although younger

than IB, RAW is given credit for the creation of Bangladesh. The organization has expanded

beyond its original external intelligence domain to become a powerful stakeholder in domestic

policies as well. [Hali 1999] Technically under the jurisdiction of Ministry of External Affairs,

RAW sits at the behest of the PM’s cabinet and is said to conduct propaganda & disinformation

campaigns, espionage, sabotage, and intelligence gathering in neighboring countries, notably

among them Pakistan. [Mishra 2001]

The two agencies structurally overlap only as members of the Joint Intelligence Committee

(JIC), a component of the National Security Council. [Shahin 2001] However, the increasingly

more politically salient issue of foreign based locally conducted terrorism constitutes a natural

and contentious overlap of domains between the two agencies. The two agencies also cooperate

on an ad hoc basis with the military in counterinsurgency operations. [Hali 1999]

Figure 4: National Intelligence Organizations involved in Counterterrorism

Source: compiled from multiple sources cited in discussion

−116−

Information-sharing constraints of the Indian intelligence services

As Indian bureaucracies enhanced with the right to much greater secrecy in operations, the Indian

Intelligence Services are known for their Inter-organizational insistence on turf boundaries. As

evidence of their insularity and blunt arrogance, for the first time in its history, RAW responded

to a nonofficial request for information in early 2007 but only with solemn reminder to the public

that RAW was not obliged to comply with any “Right to Information” (RTI) laws. [TimesofIndia

2007] Standard external authority controls on insular bureaucracies have been applied to

seemingly limited effect. For example, while not uncommon, the appointment of outsiders to

senior leadership positions in both IB and RAW is known to cause debilitating resentment and

internal withdrawal of cooperation. The recent appointment to head of IB of a retired, former

senior IB counterintelligence official was discussed publicly as a positive step in order to get the

agency’s senior managers on board with new operations. [Kutty 2005] This animosity within an

organization can slow the process of swapping information across agencies in particular.

Avoiding paralyzing internal or cross boundary turf battles often means appealing on the highest

level of government and of each agency to obtain and integrate data; normally this level of

struggle requires considerable political interest and policy benefits to be at stake. [Sahay 2003]

The top-down imposition of integrating organizations has not borne fruit well. Particularly

after 9/11, the public and political concern with intelligence failure that lingered from the Kargil

conflict rekindled into efforts to reform the Indian intelligence agencies’ widely known

reputation for a lack of willingness to share knowledge. The IB was particularly blamed for the

lack of domestic cooperation providing actionable intelligence for internal security. The central

government used the Girish Chandra Saxena Committee Report to force two new wings onto the

IB in late 2001: the Multi Agency Centre and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence. In the next

year, the military would be forced to accept DIA as a new institution as well. Despite these

putatively integrating solutions and that fact that each of the three -- DIA, RAW, and IB --have

counterterrorist obligations and internally developed strategies, improvements in interagency

coordination on joint counterterrorist plans at the national level have not been apparent. [Iype

2006]

−117−

Leaving agency self-interest aside, India’s political leadership appears conflicted in its

support for integrating these insular organizations. On occasion, the political parties use the

intense competition between agencies as a way to control each otherwise imperial bureaucracy.

Despite the formal sanctions of violating the all-India standard bureaucratic procedures, both

Parliament and the central government senior officials have limited direct influence on these

agencies in the face of the life tenure of intelligence officials and the legally supported lack of

openness to public inquiry inherited from the British. Using the disputes between agencies adds

some leverage to a limited toolkit for civil control of operations and policy implementation.

[Subramaniam 2001] [Jain 1982] Furthermore, the situation has continued despite the levels of

terrorism because many senior politicians continue to regard terrorism solely as a law and order

problem not requiring greater attention across cooperating and proactive intelligence agencies.

On the bright side, information not considered critical to bureaucratic battles is usually shared on

the systemic level in some fashion, though it may not be timely or comprehensive. [Saxena 1999]

Exchanges meant to be more substantive involving specialized expertise usually involves

midlevel to midlevel emissaries rather than the wholesale provision of databases in paper or of

access to digital holdings. Both agencies send midlevel officers to meet with military

commanders for specific counterinsurgency operations on an ad hoc basis. These exchanges are

not, however, automatic or routinized. [Mishra 2001]

Police forces in the nexus

Since their state by state establishment under British rule in the early1800s, the structure and

internal presumptions of the Indian state police forces have been virtually unchanged. [Bayley

1983] Built for purpose of maintaining authority for the British Raj, the police’s administrative

role and vast powers were intended for maintenance of the civil order, not for prevention and

detection of crime or, for that matter, terrorism. [Das 1998] In 1860, the first reorganization of

Indian police began and took place and is still in force today, roughly 145 years later and over

fifty years after Indian independence. [Negi 2006] The Indian Police Act (IPA)of 1861 put the

police under the control of the provincial governments (now state governments). and

distinguished between police and military functions.

−118−

The reorganization’s intention was to create an aggressive police force that would be civilian in

character to relieve the British Army of onerous and manpower intensive duties. [Narasimhan

2001]

Indian police forces involved in counterterrorism

In principle, state police forces are standardized in their operations, leadership loyalty to all India

standard operating procedures (SOPs), and critical structures involving lethal force. The Indian

Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure and Indian Evidence Act form the basic legal system for

police operations and apply everywhere in India. Similarly, the laws governing the structure of

the police organization, training of officers, and even the administrative forms and rules are

virtually uniform across the country. A Director General belonging to the Indian Police Service

(IPS), the federally body recruited from across India, heads each state police organization and in

principle this federally trained and selected appointee has jurisdiction over all subordinate units

(districts, urban cities, and rural areas) in that particular state. Furthermore, on the national level,

key players in the larger police referent group are controlled by the federal Ministry of Home

Affairs such as the federal police services, most of the paramilitary forces, and the internal

intelligence capabilities found in the IB.

As it stands, the effective extent of this federally-led standardization is limited. The 1861

IPA added to the large overlapping pyramid of national, state, and local police agencies an

unusual dual internal separation of all police officers everywhere into two vertical branches:

armed or unarmed. This structural bifurcation has had profound fragmenting effects on

organizational development paths, administrative cultures and attitudes across state police forces.

[Bayley 1990]. Indian police forces below the federal level reflect Indian states’ different

ethnicity, language and culture in their recruits, organizational operations, and locally taken for

granted presumptions in roles and behaviors. The result is a wide range in state police

competencies and initiative beyond merely maintaining rough social order. Each urban city has

its own city police with a variety of departments. The larger districts are subdivided into police

station jurisdictions with seventy percent of the staff in beat constables with no investigative

roles.

−119−

Compared to other English speaking countries (UK, US, Australia and Canada) India has only a

small portion of police staff available for investigative duties and associated paperwork. [Bayley

1992] This arrangement limits the knowledge collection and analysis capabilities of most police

units and their potential contribution to counterterrorism programs. [Verma 2006]

In the age of more diffuse terrorism, counterinsurgency forces have been evolving into dual

purpose forces among special police units as well as military units. The Central Reserve Police

Force (CRPF) is national police force that assists State/Union Territories in operations maintain

law and order and fight counterinsurgency. [Fair 2003] Other national police organizations have

been developed to deal specifically with international border patrol. For example, one entity is

the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and Border Security Force. Despite their primary task

specialization, these organizations have also been deployed to Kashmir and Assam for internal

security duties such as counter-insurgency operations, law and order. [Jafa 2005] Nonetheless,

local police in principle have the internal law and order responsibility and this ad hoc

arrangement generally leaves the local forces politically holding the bag for failures to prevent

terrorism.

Figure 5: Police Organizations involved in Counterterrorism

Intelligence Head Ofeach zone

Authority over3-4 Districts

Head of Department

POLICEMILITARY

INTELLIGENCE

Rapid Action Force

Border Security

Force

Indo-TibetanBorder Force

Central ReservePolice Force

General Security Subdivision

28 States &

7 Union Territories

Special Intelligence Subdivision

Police Intelligence Division

Superintendent of Police (SP)

Deputy InspectorGeneral (DIG)

Inspectors-General of Police

Additional Director General

Director Generalof Police

Ministry of Home Affairs(MHA)

Coordinates & HighLevel Management Of Central Police

Organizations

Controls National Level“Indian Police Services”

Intelligence Head Ofeach zone

Authority over3-4 Districts

Head of Department

POLICEMILITARY

INTELLIGENCE

Rapid Action Force

Border Security

Force

Indo-TibetanBorder Force

Central ReservePolice Force

General Security Subdivision

28 States &

7 Union Territories

Special Intelligence Subdivision

Police Intelligence Division

Superintendent of Police (SP)

Deputy InspectorGeneral (DIG)

Inspectors-General of Police

Additional Director General

Director Generalof Police

Ministry of Home Affairs(MHA)

Coordinates & HighLevel Management Of Central Police

Organizations

Controls National Level“Indian Police Services”

Source: compiled from multiple sources cited in discussion

−120−

Information-sharing constraints of the Indian police forces

Information sharing within and among police agencies reflects the trust, reluctance, and narrow

focus problems across India bureaucracies. India police forces are strongly horizontally stratified,

with promotion based on rank and seniority, rarely on critical specializations or particular

demonstrations of competence. Copied from the promotion year groups of military forces; the

police are organized into cadres by rank. The allocation of power and authority by rank, not

position, complicates relations between the central and state police units, since equivalent ranks

may sit in very different positions and circumstances. A tangled pattern of competition and

mistrust throughout these organizations channels cooperation across police agencies in general.

[Das 1998]

The 145 year old strong vertical division of police forces into unarmed and armed units

continues to magnify the lack of cooperation, and to this are added the distinctions of class,

gender, ethnic, and other organizational divisions. The 1861 IPA division gave unarmed police

the administrative/patrolling duties and armed police the more prestigious tasks requiring

physical force.. Due to this functional division, for nearly one hundred years, British colonial

administrative officials, including the military, gave special attention to armed police for their

discipline and training. In so doing, they gave armed police considerably more status,

empowering them with the ability to protect themselves. [Narasimhan, 2001] Since unarmed

police did not have access to this source of prestige, in social terms this distinction reinforced the

power distance inherent in Indian society and further dampens trust and the willingness to share

knowledge. [Verma 2004]

Furthermore, endemic corruption at all levels intensifies the secrecy or friction between

officials. Legislatures routinely try to use funding of police departments as tools to force greater

efficacy in crime control. The resulting struggle to be seen as more effective against crime

routinely leads predatory behaviors between police units and the resort to illegal methods to show

politically acceptable results. In the standard police units, specialized competence on senior

officers is not supported. Promotions occur regardless of the candidate’s qualifications, and many

are governed by caste, favoritism, or nepotism. Ambitious officers eager for early promotions and

choice postings use administrative decisions to curry favor with political leaders. [Chaturvedi

1985]

−121−

With no checks and balances in accountable administrative oversight other than competitive

predation and superficial achievements, the cumulative effect of this system of generalist

training, turbulent working conditions, patriarchal and repressive management rules, and

particularistic and erratic leadership practices is inevitably a lack of trust and cooperative

information sharing.

The constitutionally mandated federal-state superstructure for law enforcement generally

inhibits information sharing as well. It is more complex than most other democracies, trying at

once to be both centralized and decentralized. While states have their own police jurisdiction, the

central government’s history included periods of heavy central control. A great many control

mechanisms from those periods persist in the form of, for example, standard procedures and

recruiting.[Shane 1980] With, state level police forces buffer themselves procedurally and

operationally between the often conflicting demands of these overarching centralizing and

decentralizing administrative forces. The endemic budgetary shortfalls contribute to the burdens

on officers. For the average officer with too little time, technical training, leverage, and

professionalism, joint operations with other departments are unattractive if they involve

additional efforts (as information sharing often does). Furthermore, such activities inevitably

induce disputes over whose budget absorbs what expense. These conditions encourage a

bureaucratic passivity to avoid increases in one’s own agency’s expenses in time or resources, or

in threats to one’s personal political prospects. [Iype 2006]

For state police forces among themselves, routine knowledge sharing is generally sluggish

and reactive; it is as poor if not worse normally when federal forces are involved. In this highly

classed society, if federal forces are called upon to aid state police forces in nonroutine events,

historically in both budgets and authority, the national level forces demand operational

dominance and inevitably get it. Sudden events that overwhelm local state police forces will

usually prompt the central government to send Army or paramilitary forces ostensibly to “aid”

the civil police force. The federal forces, however, are entirely under the control and at the

disposal of the central government and not the provincial government, demeaning the role and

status of the state police forces being “assisted”. [Shane 1980] Efforts by the Ministry of Home

Affairs to intervene in purely state business have noticeably increased since the establishment of

a federal police in the 1970s. [Nath 1983] During such ad hoc and usually reactive “assistance”

−122−

operations, turf battles between state police, paramilitary, and federal police forces often become

matters for public discussion. [Verma 2004]

Findings: state-level anti-terrorist squad as emergent nexus

With this structural, cultural, and institutional history, the evidence of an emergent

counterterrorism knowledge nexus anywhere in the Indian bureaucracy would seem unlikely.

Given the presumptions about power distance, patriarchal management, and centralized control,

if any nascent institutionalization in a CT knowledge nexus was to be found, we expected the

central government’s interest in counterterrorism would drive its birth and development. Yet we

found the evidence of a nascent nexus much more compelling at lower levels, closer to the

experience of terrorism by the organizations more acutely aware of the consequences of a lack of

knowledge. Furthermore, these lower level organizations apparently responded earlier and more

favorably to the status and professionalism boost associated with acting proactively to solve an

urgent and life-threatening problem.

As our research suggests, state police forces breached their organizational walls first to

begin the institutionalization across the Indian CT knowledge nexus and, in a sense, got lucky.

The federal agencies have, unexpectedly allowed this abrogation of prestige and leadership. It is

not clear why the normally rather imperious national level agencies would not have attempted to

supplant, undermine, or control the nascent institutionalization. We speculate that the state police

were first past the post and already clearly owned an in-place institutional forum readily

adaptable for attracting knowledge sharing. For the military and intelligence agencies, such an

outlet was not readily in hand within their communities for local political or international

demonstrations of participation. Furthermore, many of the national level senior officials have yet

to accept that counterterrorism is a long term crosscutting threat. Not making CT a prominent

institutional motif in their ranks, they have also not targeted their heavy political guns on this

potential institutional source of increased state police prestige. Hence, it may be that, in the

Indian bureaucratic circumstances of modern India, only a bottom up initiative would have had a

chance in any case. Because of the external push and prestige, it was possible for the institutional

objectives to converge on jointly building the state-level ATSs without having the overarching

competition impede progress as would ordinarily occur. [Newsome 2006]

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The rest of this section presents the evidence of this development. The conclusion will return to

the explanation and implications.

History of the ATS concept beyond India

The idea of using small formally organized squads of military or police forces to disrupt enemy

organizations first emerged in Europe long before its arrival in India. In 1941, the UK created the

Special Air Service (SAS) with the objective to go behind enemy lines to attack German troops

and infrastructure in Africa. In the 1950s, SAS was transformed from a Special Forces unit to

counter-insurgency institution protecting British-interests around the world. With this change in

target from state militaries to nonstate organizations, the concept of an “anti-terrorism squad”

(ATS) was born. SAS ran counter-insurgency operations in Oman, Malaysia, Borneo, and Aden.

[Globalspecialoperations 2006]

In the 1970s, the experience of terrorism as more than a criminal or crazed activity

prompted the creation of specialized response institutions and evolution of others across several

nations. The Israeli deep reconnaissance and intelligence teams of “Sayeret Matkal” were

created in 1957 but evolved into counter-terrorism in the 1970s based on the model of the British

SAS. After the 1972 Munich massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes, the surprised and poorly

prepared German police formally created GSG-9, Germany’s first anti-terrorism squad. [GSG-9

2006] 42 It drew conceptually on the examples of the British SAS and the Israeli Sayeret Matkal,

the Israeli counterterrorism (CT) team. [SpecWarNet 2006] Having a team specialized in

counterterrorism specifically became more internationally desirable after the 1976 successful

Israeli CT operation called, “Operation Thunderbolt” rescuing 106 passengers at Entebbe Airport

in Uganda. [Catignani 2005] During the 1970s, Belgium, Italy, Australia, and the US all

established ATSs located in military units. [Newsome 2006]

42 “GSG-9 is the German abbreviation of Grenzschutzgruppe 9, Border Guards, Group 9. ….most of the missions are

confidential and not made public. Since the founding of the GSG 9 the group has participated in over 1500 missions, yet reportedly fired shots only on 5 occasions (official count, prior to the 2003 Iraq War). [GSG-9 2006]

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Emergence of proto-ATSs in India

In 1986, the India created its first counter-terrorist units called the National Security Guards

(NSG), which were the “first bricks of India's counter-terrorism architecture.” [Raman 2005]

Numbering about 7500 mixed military and police officers, the NSG is considered a highly

valuable and experienced group in counter-insurgency in the Northern Indian state of Jammu &

Kashmir, and previously in Punjab. It is divided into two roughly equal groups - the Special

Action Group (SAG) and the Special Ranger Group (SRG). The SAG is the elite offensive group,

which recruits its members from the Indian Army. The SRG consists of supporting personnel

recruited from paramilitary and police units such as the Border Security Force (BSF), the Central

Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and others. The SRG has the job of securing and isolating the

target for assault by the SAG.” [Conboy 1992] While officially under the jurisdiction as military

unit, the NSG does not contain any intelligence acquisition and sharing capabilities and depends

on external intelligence agencies. [Marwah 2003]

The establishment of the NSG influenced the subsequent creation, objective, mission, and

training of state-level anti-terrorism squads, especially in states that experienced terrorism for

many years. [Kapila 2006] India became the first federal democracy to have state-level ATSs, in

part because state police clearly have the “law and order” responsibility and in part because

terrorism was historically localized, not considered a national level problem. [Das 1998] As

different types of terrorism began to expand across borders and involve multiple states in

devastating terrorist attacks and public outcry, state governments sought ATSs as relatively quick

solutions to defuse political pressure and possibly prevent similar attacks in the future. Figure 6

charts this history of the ATS concept as it came to India.

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Figure 6: History of ATS Concept and First Formal Institutionalization

Source: compiled from multiple sources cited in discussion

From sideline to fulltime –experience and urgency drive ATSs

Over the past ten – fifteen years, experience with home-grown terrorism across India has

ballooned, and with it, the interest of state police organizations in a visible response. With larger

states like Manipur facing 39 active terrorist groups (Manipur) to tiny Nagaland facing three

active organizations at least, the Southeast Asia Terrorism web Portal lists about 179 religious,

ideological, and ethno-nationalist groups operating across India as of 2006. Through 2001, the

average civilian and security forces casualty result has been the equivalent of one 9/11 per year,

as shown in Table 1 or about 2500 people. [SATP 2006] The number of annual incidents

sometimes is three times the death rate, leaving the police chasing duds, attempted bombings, and

real events throughout the year. In short, before the US had its major attack, Indian forces were

experiencing terrorist surprise frequently across states.

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Table 1. India Fatalities 1994-2005

India Fatalities 1994-2005 (Data does not include fatalities in left-wing extremism) Year Civilians Security Force

Personnel Terrorists Total

1994 1696 417 1919 4032 1995 1779 493 1603 3875 1996 2084 615 1482 4181 1997 1740 641 1734 4115 1998 1819 526 1419 3764 1999 1377 763 1614 3754 2000 1803 788 2384 4975 2001 1693 721 3425 5839 2002 1174 623 2176 3973 2003 1187 420 2095 3702 2004 886 434 1322 2642 2005 913 287 1319 2519 Total 18151 6728 22492 47371

Source: [SATP 2006]

By the end of the 1980s, part-time police attention to terrorism and the strong reliance on the

Army or the paramilitaries to bail out an overwhelmed police force grew less politically

acceptable on the local level.

In 1989, Andhra Pradesh Police created the first anti-terrorism squad, called the Grey Hounds

(reorganized 2005). This unit was specifically dedicated to developing counterterrorism tactics

and procedures acquired from the federal NSG which in turn was modeled on the British SAS,

German GSG-9, and the Israeli Sayeret Matkal. This first official full-time ATS at the state level,

however, served as a training source for other state level units learning anti-terror tactics,

procedures, and operations prior to forming an ATS. This unusual sharing of tactics and

techniques across normally competitive police forces led to the successful establishment of ATS

institutions in other Indian states such as in Orissa, West Bengal, Maharastra, and Chathisgarh.

[AndhraPradesh 2006].

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Before 2001 – experience and localized urgency

By 2001 but before the attack on the US, eighteen Indian states had established ten fulltime and

nine near full time (proto) anti-terrorism squads (ATS). (See Table 2). Since the US had not yet

made terrorism a household word, it is fair to attribute the stimulus for these institutions to actual

experience and the relative urgency passed along among professional referent groups. The

Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh’s early willingness to crosslevel specialized expertise associated

with prestige-enhancing activities is likely to have increased interactions across other related

activities. The social networking across state ATS and proto-ATS (those with part-time CT

duties) is also likely to have increased trust, broader intelligence sharing and more effective joint

state operations against terrorists operating across states.

Table 2: India’s Anti-Terrorist Squads Establishment

Pre-2001 (INCLUDES PROTOTYPES OF ATS)

Proto-types of ATS (PROTOTYPES DO NOT HAVE CT AS MAIN FUNCTION)

2001-2005 Established ATS or Equivalent

Year Established

Rajasthan State Special Branch X 1965 Goa Special Branch X 1966

Tripura Tripura State Rifles & Special Task Force (STF) X 1985 /

2000

Haryana The Haryana Commandos 1988-1989

Punjab Punjab Police Commandos X 1989 Andhra Pradesh Grey Hounds Special Task Force

(STF) 1989 / 2005

Karnataka Special Task Force (STF) X Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS)

1990 / 2005

Pondicherry Special Branch Unit X 1991

Tamil Nadu Special Task Force (STF) / Commando Force 1993 /

1997 Jammu & Kashmir

Special Operations Group (SOG) 1994

Assam Commando Battalion 1996 Gurjat Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS 1996

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Manipur Manipur State Rifles / Police Commandos X 1996 /

2002* National Capital Territory of Delhi

Special Cell 1997*

Chandigarh Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) 1998 Uttar Pradesh Special Task Force (STF) X 1998 Madhya Pradesh Hawk Force 2000

Mizoram Hunter Force 2000*

Jharkhand X Commandos / Special Task Force (STF) / Sangel

2002 / 2003 / 2005

Maharashtra Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) 2003

West Bengal Special Action Force 2004

Orissa Grey Hounds / Special Task Force (STF)

2005 / 2005

Bihar X Special Task Force (STF) 2005

Chhattisgarh Special Task Force (STF) 2005

Source: compilation of various sources including news reports. * indicates explicit establishment date unknown

The surprising aspect of these ATS is their unprecedented level of police, intelligence, and

military cooperation fostered by what is normally seen as a lower level of the national

bureaucracy. Each ATS draws from the military (via the NSG) essential mission training,

planning skills, tactical plans and doctrine. From each major intelligence agency the ATSs

receive seconded officers serving long term rotations up to 18 months. The effect is a constant

flow of contacts, expertise, and personally delivered access to critical data that would otherwise

not be available to state level officials. Furthermore ATSs themselves have an unusual history

given the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh’s early willingness to crosslevel specialized expertise.

The social networking across state ATS and proto-ATS (those with part-time CT duties) is also

likely to have increased trust, broader intelligence sharing and more effective joint state

operations against terrorists operating across neighboring states, as well as with the national level

agencies. Figure 7 shows a composite picture of the structures and shared elements associated

with these ATSs.

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A particularly unexpected attribute of these ATSs - given India’s complex bureaucratic

architecture - is the general acceptance that the local ATS has exclusive right to collect and verify

intelligence information in their jurisdiction and carry out operations in any part of the state.

Tasked with coordinating between the multiple levels of intelligence agencies and analyze inputs

on terrorist activities, ATSs are formally designated as the lead actors confronting terrorist

activities in their jurisdiction, It is rare, if not unprecedented, for a state police organization to

have intelligence preeminence in an area also considered the domain of the national level

agencies. At the federal level, Army, IB, RAW, and federal police forces have occasionally

cooperated briefly for a single, usually nonroutine objective but historically have gone on to clash

repeatedly over operational procedures and aftermath of operations. The creation of ATS and

urgency of anti-terrorism successes has, in this domain, nullified the earlier system where anti-

insurgency operations were the preserve of the Indian army and the paramilitary forces, both of

which report to the central government with no obligation to report to state-level entities. [Kapila

2006]

This special position seems to have been anticipated and embedded into the mandate of

these units from their initial inception in India. For example, an early ATS for Mumbai (1994)

planned in advance to “have members of India’s central intelligence agencies like Research and

Analysis Wing (RAW) and Intelligence Bureau (IB) rubbing shoulders with them in intelligence

gathering.” [Lokhande 2003] At the state level, the ATS organization facilitates more cross-

jurisdictional interactions over the longer term and across objectives than occurs normally in

overlapped federal operations. Hence, all things being equal, participating in an ATS offers

considerable prestige for police officers. ATS organizations are therefore more able to recruit

qualified and trained professionals without as much of the intervention or prior approvals process

found in the more rigid standard police or military command structure.

In particular, ATSs seem better placed to initiate anti-terror operations with greater secrecy

and responsiveness to local conditions. [Sen 2004]. While police forces themselves are distinct

due to their origins and political circumstances, ATSs have specialized over time to reflect the

flavor of terrorist groups in their states [Singh 2004]. An ATS in Chandigarh will confront

terrorist activities with a different ideology in contrast to the ATS in Andhra Pradesh where

terrorist activities reflect Naxalite anti-regime activities. [TNS 1998] [Kapila 2006]

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For example, Jammu & Kashmir’s once protoATS, the Special Operations Group (SOG) (est.

1994), has evolved from relatively passive unit staffed by locally recruited volunteers officers to

a proactive operating unit specializing on knowing the region. Reasons for volunteering range

from passionate dedication to financial incentive. Running larger operations with paramilitary

forces of the Indian army while sharing its intelligence with the central government forces, the

SOG as an ATS has evolved into a relatively robust center of large operations cooperation

focused on the conditions of the Northwest. [RediffNews 2006] Figure 7 captures in detail the

organizational contribution to the Indian institutionalization of its CT knowledge nexus based on

the ATS structures.

Figure 7: Composite Institutional Mapping of the Emergent Nexus

Source: compiled from multiple sources cited in discussion

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After 2001 – urgency and declining experience

Indian terrorism in both numbers of incidents and casualties declined after 2001, as shown in

Chart 1, and yet the rate of establishment of ATSs did not. The critical difference seems to have

been the source of prestige transferred from solving declining rates of local terrorist events to, as

reframed by the US, being a stalwart warrior ready for the coming battles against terror from

globalized radical groups. After 2001, in its efforts to have as much intelligence provided as

possible from all conceivable allies, the US pushed very publicly and internationally to make

anti-terrorism activities status-enhancing across the various international referent groups – police,

military, and intelligence officers. [Urry 2002] The US-framed argument was compelling in light

of the deepening of globalization and dependence of many nations, including India, on the global

socio-technical infrastructure (GSTI) sustaining economic growth. [Donnelly 2003]

Representatives of the US covered the public world arguing that members of the developed and

advancing world of democracies are part of a critically important global socio-technical

infrastructure (GSTI) threatened by terrorism. Attacks on one will inevitably harm others and

hence we must all corral the civil military capabilities of each nation to protect ourselves as well

as others. [Vaicius 2003] This very public marketing had an underlying truth in the objective

reality of interdependence that was – and is – obvious. The power of the remaining superpower,

the US, to force an item to become important on the world’s agenda added to the attraction of

security officials in many nations to be seen as part of the grand alliance saving democracies

from this pathology. For Europeans, the post 9/11 attacks on Madrid and London reinforced the

US message, deepening the worldwide salience of counterterrorism as an issue for senior political

and professional leaders to consider.

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Chart 1 : Patterns in Casualties and Incidents Before and After 2001

Chart 1: Indian Fatalities Each Year (From 1997-2005)

0

1

2

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Tuse

ntal

Years

Fata

litie

s

Civilians Security Forces

Source: SATP 2006

Furthermore, the “global war on terror” (GWOT) so named by the US came with the vague

promise of financial or other support benefits to those democracies signing up to participate.

[Howell 2006] Although the evidence is spotty that this benefit has been widely distributed,

nonetheless, the bilateral possibility has helped spread the prestige of association with the

program. [Moss 2005] For public agencies with few clearcut ways to demonstrate effectiveness,

prestige among stakeholders and referent groups offer a substitute performance measure.

[Thompson 1967]

With the bureaucratic reality of being a public agency in India, all three security

communities in India would in principle find international referent group and local political

prestige advantages to be seen as participating in the transnational the anti-terrorism cause. One

would expect the national level agencies to attempt to take the forefront in order to absorb the

bulk of the prestige available, but their bureaucratic instruments were tied up already in the Army

or paramilitaries with a mixed bag of obligations. To move quickly, there was only one solid

game in town and that was the ATS instrument now firmly within the power of the state police to

create and run. The prestige tended to run to the community with an already working and

workable institutional model. From 2001 to 2005, over a scant four years, despite declining local

experience with terrorism, eight new ATSs were formally designated, five new institutions and

three reorganized from part-time to fulltime ATSs. See Table 2 and Maps 1-2 for graphical

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display of this institutional spread. The timing of this growth strongly suggests that, by this time,

the prestige and possible effectiveness of this institutional instrument were driving its support

across all three communities. Figure 8 below summarizes this acceptance of the central position

of the ATS in the counterterrorism domain and in the Indian CT knowledge nexus.

Figure 8: The Nascent Indian Knowledge Nexus

Source: compiled from multiple sources cited in discussion

Conclusion

By 2005, nearly every state in India had an ATS operating in its territory, each with contacts to

the military and seconded officers from the IB and RAW. Maps 1 and 2 show this growth

graphically. In the process rotation and operation, shared daily experiences and intelligence

otherwise unobtainable were being distributed between these organizations. By our definition, a

nascent knowledge nexus was being constructed as shown by the largely organizational evidence

of collaboration, acceptance, and presence in public reports. We found no evidence of this nexus

being pursued along technical lines in terms of functioning IT systems. It is possible to have

some networked exchanges, especially after a seconded officer has returned to the national

agency and retains some friendship and loyalty for the ATS in which he served. However,

consistent with the history of Indian public agencies and information technologies so far, it is

unlikely extensive systems are being built and used with no external evidence. [Heeks 2000]

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More likely is that rudimentary technical means such as email, occasional data disks, and some

web access are the norm, if at all, of development of the nexus along the technical axis.

Map 1: Pre2001 Existing ATSs in Indian States

Source: compiled from multiple sources cited in discussion Map 2: 2005 All Old and New (post2001) ATSs in Indian States

Source: compiled from multiple sources cited in discussion

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This work explored an idea captured in figure 1 – that a lack of knowledge felt by an organization

concerning something really important would generate action to solve that gap, and that reaching

outside the organization is a reasonable next step unless cultural, organizational, or other

obstacles stop the search. If these obstacles exist routinely in abundance, then our model

suggests the importance of the problem has to be that much greater to push organizational

insiders to reach out to other organizations or be receptive to being contacted for knowledge. As

long as the knowledge is needed and the stimulus elevated, we hypothesized that the sharing

would continue.

Counterterrorism seems to present that kind of powerful stimulus in India as, we presume,

elsewhere. We began by presuming the mass casualty goals of terrorists would be sufficiently

important to inspire a knowledge search outside organizations. The test for this idea was to seek

evidence of such sharing overcoming rather enormous obstacles in order to obtain missing

knowledge, and that terrorism enduring presence would result in the slow formalization of this

sharing into institutional linkages in a nexus. The stronger the need, the more these links would

mature. Hence, we looked at a really tough case, the very turf bound Indian bureaucracy for

evidence that terrorism in particular could force otherwise unlikely knowledge sharing.

However, the surprise for us was the path taken. The least prestigious of the three

communities – the military, intelligence, and police – ended up innovating the kernel of the

nexus. The state police filled in the empty institutional space where such exchanges among the

communities could be had, were definitely needed, and could endure over time as the problem

persisted. In the process, their institution, the state police ATS, became the model for expanding

anti-terrorism activities as more ATSs were established despite a decline in actual domestic

Indian terrorism. Figure 9 summarizes these results.

While this is clearly qualitative work on an emergent phenomenon, it seems consistent with

processes in other nations. When the possibility of a globalized terrorist threat seeping into a

nation unprepared for the consequences, recognition of a knowledge gap sparks at the very least

considerable discussion of counterterrorism. Ultimately it is of interest and concern when

otherwise distinctive security communities develop close ties. The process from that concern to

institutionalization comparatively is the theme for a large transnational work involving a larger

group of scholars. This piece is the opening exploration of this process.

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Figure 9: Summary of India’s Emerging Knowledge Nexus

INTELLIGENCE

MILITARY POLICE

Knowledge Nexus--------------

Anti-Terrorist Squad

−137−

Appendixes

Appendix A: Intelligence Bureau Structure

Source: compiled from multiple sources cited in discussion, notably [Sainis 2001] [Vohra 1998] [Chengappa 1997]

−138−

Appendix B: Research & Analysis Wing Structure (estimated)

Source: [Ashraf 2004]

−139−

Appendix C. Basic background on India43

India is the second-most populated country in the world at over 1.1 billion. About 65% of the

population falls in the ages between 15 and 64. Social and political organizations within the

populations are distinguished by languages, caste system, and religions. Almost three-fourths

of the population is ethnically Indo-Aryan. Over 80% of India’s population is Hindu and

Muslims are the biggest religious minority in India. Indian Muslims are also the second

largest Muslim population in the world with 13% of the world’s Muslims. India is home to

other religious groups such as Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, Jews, Zorastrians, and

Ba’hais. Although Hindi is the country’s national language, it is spoken as a primary language

by only 30% of the people. There are 14 other official languages including English which is

considered the most important language for national, political, and commercial

communication throughout India. India is the seventh largest country in the world and

roughly more than a third the size of the United States. India borders six countries: Pakistan,

Nepal, China, Burma, Bhutan, and Bangladesh.

India’s economy is the twelfth largest in the world with a GDP of $785.47 billion. With

the second fastest growing economy in the world, its GDP growth rate is 9.3% annually.

GDP per capita is $3,400. The GDP is divided into 19% agriculture, 28% industry, and 53%

services. Three-fifths of laborers work in agriculture. Large numbers of well-educated &

skilled people in the English language have helped make India a major exporter of software

services and software workers. US and other nations’ multinational corporations have

established firms and plants in India, helping upper- and middle-class Indians find

employment. Even though poverty in India has dropped significantly in recent years, 22% of

Indians live below the poverty line. Corruption is considered one of the nation’s most

pervasive problems, usually found in the form of bribes, tax evasion, embezzlement, and

nepotism. Corruption has economically created a unpredictable climate for investment, an

increased cost of government-subsidized services, and programs. The unemployment rate is

7.3%. Despite strong growth, both state and federal budget deficits are currently at 9% of the

GDP. One problematic challenge in India’s economy is the sharp and increasing regional

disparities in poverty, socio-economic development, infrastructure growth, and per capita

income across the different states and territories. [Kronstadt 2003].

India is considered the most populous federal democracy in the world. The government

is a parliamentary system with a two house legislature, a Prime Minister – President 43 Unless otherwise noted, data in this section is taken from the CIA’s Online World Factbook. [CIA 2006]

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executive, and a Supreme Court led judiciary. As a federal democratic republic, India’s

administration is divided into 28 states and 7 union territories, the latter controlled by the

central government. The legal system is based on English common law, with limited judicial

review of legislation and importantly legislators themselves. The legal code accepts separate

religious law codes that apply to religious groups such as Hindu, Muslims, and Christians.

Terrorism in India today can be found throughout cross-border states and increasingly

in other regions throughout the country. In India, terrorist organizations have different

ideologies, agendas, and objectives. Presently there are about 50 known terrorist

organizations across the country, of which 53% are separatists, 21% are religious, and 26%

are Maoists (Naxalites). [SATP 2006]

Figure C.1 Details on Indian Terrorist Groups across States

Source: [SATP 2006]

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Table 2: International Military Counter-Terrorism Units

Country Name Name of ATS Year

England SAS (Special Air Service) 1941 Israel (The Unit) "Unit 69" Sayeret Mat'kal 1972

Belgium ESI (Le Group Diane) 1972 Germany GSG-9 "Border Control Group 9" 1973

France GIGN "Group of Security and Intervention of the National

Gendarmerie" 1973 Netherlands BBE "Close Combat Unit" 1977

Australia TAG (Tactical Assault Group) 1978 Finland ETY (Bear Force) 1977

Italy GGI "Special Intervention Group" 1977 US Delta Force, SEAL Team Six 1980

Korea 707th Special Missions Battalion 1982 Mexico Force F "Zorros" 1983 India NSG (National Security Guards) 1986

Poland GROM 1991 Canada Joint Task Force Two 1993

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Civil-military cooperation in fragmegrating world Dr. Witold M. Patoka Swedish National Defence College Abstract The ultimate goal of humanitarian operations is to conduct an efficient mission that brings failing and rogue states back to the world community. In modern form, such missions involve a wide-ranging spectrum of responsibilities, including imposing stability, post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building. These responsibilities create challenges. The first challenge is to assess the nature of the driving forces of the security milieu and in a matching manner reshape the structure and composition of mission forces. The second challenge is finding a right balance between civilian and military components to assure that the mission will relatively shortly hand over responsibilities to native authorities.

Consequently, this paper rests on two central components. We inspect the utility of James N. Rosenau’s fragmegration theory to determine the appropriate conceptual perspective. Our findings indicate that Rosenau’s fragmegration theory performs the critical functions of highlighting the range of actors, background factors, and trends quite well. It is important that the theory facilitates the comprehension of the security arena as one generated by interlocked sequences of relatively unpredictable causal effects. Ultimately, the theory supports the mapping of “non-military” variables that dynamically reshape the security milieu. Despite that the theory is still one in progress, it is highly useful in the conceptualization of research problems and the formulation of hypothesis.

We use the Kosovo and Darfur cases to map major challenges in humanitarian missions and find answer for the guiding questions How do mission requirements affect coordination between civilian and military components and, How do actors’ specific particularities affect the quality of civil-military cooperation.

In the Kosovo case, our findings indicate that the mission suffered from planning of questionable quality caused by reliance on the two radically polarized scenarios and the erroneous assumption that middle options and solutions can be generated through operational adjustments, such as hybrid ones. In effect, such conceptual framing caused a deficiency in the recognition that middle options require qualitatively different composition of mission forces, and substantial adjustments of organizational and procedural arrangements, especially in respect to civilian and military components. Nevertheless, experienced KFOR commanders reduced the aftermath of these errors by improvising innovative solutions.

In respect to the Darfur case, we found that progress in the peace process caused fragmentation within political opposition and destabilized the entire post-conflict area. We found that mission forces in Africa have to include contingents of native police forces of up to 40-50 percent of total forces,

This study indicates that future research has to examine distinct national approaches towards civil-military cooperation and on such a basis assess a range of compatibility/incompatibility areas as well as map best practices.

Our study also indicates that future research should attempt to establish a “Mission Requirement Model”. Conventional approaches, in essence, tend to calculate by proximity threats assessments and on such basis establish a model of mission forces. That procedure is highly problematic, at least under the conditions of the fragmegrating theory. Therefore, our further research ought to establish a Mission Requirement Model, created entirely on a functional basis.

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Civil-military cooperation in fragmegrating world Dr. Witold M. Patoka Swedish National Defence College

“War is a social activity, rather than simply a military problem, and there is a clear and intimate linkage between social, political and economic reconstruction, along with the security and governance issues that inherently lie within it”44

Change, complexity & continuity

Change, complexity and continuity are becoming the key conceptual categories assisting our

understanding of forces that shape the security arena. On one side, historical ideas, loyalties,

and traditional institutions shape this milieu. On the other, fragmented authorities, shifting

identities and competing ideologies affect this arena. These forces cause the security arena to

dynamically change its nature to accommodate outcomes of technological revolutions,

expanding economies, powerful lobbies and skilled individuals, as well as terrorist networks

and crime syndicates that acquire the means to influence the post-international world. What’s

more, the triad of change, complexity and continuity has its ominous side. Namely, it

generates a swiftly growing gap between countries and regions, and nations and ethnicities,

that benefit from these changes and those who not. Hence, the emerging global pattern of

macro, macro-micro, and micro dependencies has the potential to increase global stability but

also has the strength to generate multiple turbulences.

James N. Rosenau conceptualizes the global arena as a synergy of “integration” and

“fragmentation” and expresses this phenomenon in a single phrase “fragmegration”. He

regards the global milieu as “fragmegrated”, set apart by intense tensions between forces of

fragmentation-integration, localization-globalization and decentralization-centralization. As

emphasized, the theory of fragmegration “treats the world as short on clear-cut boundaries

that differentiate domestic and foreign affairs, with the result that local problems often

become transnational in scope, even as global challenges”.45

44 See: Lock-Pullan Richard: “The US way of war since the Vietnam war”, unpublished paper presented at the National Defense Collage in Stockholm, Sweden, on November 30, 2006 45 See: Rosenau James N.: “Stability, stasis and change. A fragmegrating world” in: Kugler R., Frost E., Fanagan S., Ullman H. [eds]: “The Global Century. Globalization and National Security”, National Defense University, Washington DC 2004, pp. 129 Also: Rosenau J.: “Along the domestic-foreign frontier. Exploring governance in a turbulent World”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997 Compare to: Hock Dee: “Birth of the chaordic age”, Berret-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco 1999 Compare to: Featherstone M., Lash S., Robertson E. [eds]: “Global modernities”, Saga Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1995

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From our perspective, it is central that the fragmegration theory performs the critical

functions of highlighting a broader range of actors, background factors, and trends that draw

our attention to the understanding that “more and more of the interactions that sustain world

politics unfold without the direct involvement of nations and states”.46

The conceptual utility of the fragmergating theory can be illustrated by the astonishing

political phenomenon widely known as the “Asian crisis of 1997-98”. Ultimately, the Asian

crisis had strong disintegrative effects on the East Asian Tigers, but its outcome strongly

affected the entire global arena.

The crisis “starts rolling” in Thailand in June1997 and straight away affected Japan,

which was already experiencing its own long-term economic difficulties.47 Then, the “rolling

ball” hit South Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Laos, the Philippines, China,

Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam. After that, it hit Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, the oil states

of the Middle East, and the United States; it also hit Russia hard, and strongly affected the

entire post-Soviet political space.

With its initial momentum, the crisis caused sharp reductions in currency values and

enormously upset the international stock market. Wall Street’s wizards were shocked when

the Down Jones index rapidly plunged by 7.2 percent. To diminish losses, they quickly

transferred funds from the East Asian Tigers to China, as Beijing demonstrated great

prudence and promptly proclaimed a rescue plan for its national currency. As a result, a large

number of businesses in “tiger” countries collapsed and millions of peoples fell instantly into

extreme poverty.

At that point, security experts warned the White House that a food shortage, especially

during the fasting month of Ramadan, could trigger social unrest in Thailand and Indonesia

and subsequently affect Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea. Wall Street had similar

fears and pressed the White House and the International Monetary Fund [IMF] to allocate a

120 billion dollar “rescue package” for countries affected by the East Asian crisis.

46 See. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A thory of change and continuity, Princeton: Prionceton Universitry Press, 1990, p. 6 Also: Rosenau: Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in Turbulent World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press , 1997. p 38n Also: Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003 47 About 40 % of Japan exports go to Asia. Hence, its is natural that the crisis in East Asian Tigers instantly led to a wave of bankrupties in Japan.

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The White House, as well as the International Monetary Fund, did not hesitate as the crisis

already fuelled anti-American and anti-Western feelings in all affected countries and caused

grave political turbulences in Indonesia and Thailand.48

The crisis is a rare instance of full consensus between security experts, financial

wizards, and political connoisseurs. All groups shared the view that the progressing crisis

could bring about serious political turbulence in Middle East, Latin America, Russia and the

entire post-Soviet political space.

All knew that the stock market shock would reduce oil prices, hitting the fragile

economies of Venezuela and the OPEC countries, as well as Russia and its satellite

economies, especially hard.

Shocking news came out when initial turbulence on Moscow’s stock market caused the

instant collapse of “Long-Term Capital Management” in the United States, with over 4.6

billion dollars being lost. Then, Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve Bank had no choice

but to accept a 3.625 billions dollar bailout, and the IMF supported the Kremlin with a 22

billion dollar “rescue package”. Nevertheless, even these measures did not prevent a deep

economic collapse in Russia. By August 1998, the Kremlin had to devaluate the Russian

currency.

It seems that even security experts did not expect that the East Asian crisis could so

speedily smash the Russian monetary system and damage Moscow’s links with the regions.

For the Kremlin, the most concerning developments were in Siberia, where the governor

Alexander Lebed and local elites saw the currency crisis as a “window of opportunity” to

weaken links with Moscow.49 Also highly disturbing were news that the crisis intensified

socio-political turbulences in Byelorussia and Ukraine. Those were important events that

fueled Moscow’s fears of domino effects. A need to conduct UN peacekeeping operations in

East Timor was another unpredicted outcome, as the crisis aggravated ethnic clashes in

Indonesia.

From our perspective, the key feature of these sequences is the phenomenon that the

Asian crisis of 1997-98 rapidly multiplied itself into a wide spectrum of diverse crises

threatening the stability of various regions across the entire Euro-Asian domain.

48 See for instance: McKenna Barrie: “U.S. reads the riot act to Indonesia. Economic crisis deepens: Suharto shoulders blame”, in: Toronto Globe and Mail, January 10, 1998 49 It seems worth to mention that Lt. Gen. Alexander Lebed was extremely popular and charismatic political leader. For Russian society, he was well known as the commander of paratroops that solved Boris Yeltsin during the Yanayev coup d'état. What’s more, Lt. Gen. Alexander Lebed was well known between politicians as skilful mangers of “hot” situations. He was the one that skillfully managed the 1992 political crisis in Moldavia and succeeded to avoid uncontrolled crisis escalation. In 1995, Lt. Gen. A. Lebed withdrew from the active military duties and entered parliament. In 1998, he was elected as the governor of Krasnoyarsk region, Siberian “centre of gravity”. He died in helicopter accident, in 2002.

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What’s more, the sequential crises showed that even relatively well-managed crises in one

area might generate a powerful cross-regional momentum on its own, crossing not only

national frontiers but also functional boundaries between multiple actors involved in crisis

management. Ultimately, we might conclude that the East Asian crisis of 1997-98 revealed

that in the security realm the global-regional-national distinction varies from circumstance to

circumstance.

The fragmegrating of the global political arena- one of interlocked sequences of

relatively unpredictable causal effects- stimulates the recognition that increasing numbers of

“non-military” variables dynamically reshape the security arena. This, in turn, generates a

need to re-model functional independences between civilian and military spheres within the

national-regional-global security realm.50 Therefore, the greatest challenge for modern

strategy is to study the nature of the paradigmatic shift in the security arena and in a matching

manner remodel the structure and composition of forces, particularly in respect to links

between civilian and military components.

Fragmegrated security arena

Policy makers and strategists consider the core feature of the security milieu arena to be the

fact that national boundaries and the structure of links with military allies no longer define

national security under “fragmegrated” developments, as a crisis in a remote area might have

a surprisingly strong impact on a country. In other words, the “fragmegrated” security arena,

with its multiple sub-arenas, calls for military capabilities shaped in a flexible manner that

make it possible to operate across a wide spectrum of missions, ranging from humanitarian

intervention under relatively permissive conditions to large-scale expeditionary warfare

conducted under extremely harsh circumstances. That, in turn, generates requirements to re-

evaluate the role of military forces. From our perspective, we believe that studies on this

subject should be guided by such questions as Who should act, and How can the risk of a

power vacuum be avoided or minimized, or How should the interface between the military

and civilian actors involved in mission be constructed.

50 See: Boin Arjen, Rhinard Mark: “Shocks without frontiers. Transnational breakdown and critical incidents: what role for the EU”, European Policy Centre, Issue Paper No. 42, Brussels 2005 Also: Clark I.: “Globalization and international relations theory”, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999 Also: Fanagan S., Ullman H. [eds]: “The global century. Globalization and national security”, National Defense University, Washington DC 2004

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It seems that potential answers for these questions might expand our understanding about the

future role and composition of mission forces because the fragmegrated security arena

requires new modus operandi, and that includes the enhancing of organizational flexibility,

introduction of innovative procedures in planning as well as in composing mission forces.51

It also has to be taken under consideration that the “fragmegration” of the security arena

means that the ultimate objective of a mission is not the conquest of territory, but value-

maximizing activities aiming to bring failing states back into world community.52 As a

consequence, we have to recognize that the guiding objective is not the total destruction of the

“old system” and nation building ex nihilo but the establishment of conditions making cost-

effective restoration of a state to modern standards possible.

In praxis, failing states usually have very few, if any, functioning central institutions

and local administration operates only on a residual basis, or does not operate at all.

Frequently, “surrogate” actors such as crime syndicates operate in such environments,

performing equivalent functions. In classical terms, a deployment of forces in such an

environment is conducted in the following stages: [1] deployment of military forces to cease

fighting and seize control over the territory; [2] establishing and maintaining order; [3]

actions facilitating a relief operation; [4] restoration of civil institutions; [5] rebuilding of

infrastructure imperative for the functioning of society. However, the outlined order should

not be seen as a chronological imperative. In practice, identified phases partially overlap each

other and might even occur simultaneously. From our perspective, it is important to

distinguish that the first phase- deployment of military forces to cease fighting and seize

control over the territory- and the second one- establishing and maintaining order- are

interdependent, or could even be considered as two aspects of the same phase. Namely, order

is an imperative condition of control and even the greatest military success has no value if the

victor fails to maintain at least residual social order and the direct aftermath of victory is an

anarchic environment.53

51 Bensahel Nora: “The counter terror coalition. Cooperation with Europe, NATO and the European Union”, RAND, Project Air Force, Santa Monica CA 2003 Also: Echevarria Anulio J.: “The interoperability of future operational concepts of NATO forces”, US Army War Collage, NATO Research Program 2004 Also: Kaplan Robert S., Norton David P.: “The strategy-focused organization”, Harvard Business School Press, Massachusetts 2001 52 See: Ring Stefan: ”Brute force or coercion. Two perspectives on conflict managment”, in: Hallenberg Jan, Karlsson Håkan [eds]: ”The Iraq war. European perspective on politics, strategy and operation”, Routledge, Abingdon 2005 53 See: Ferill Arther: ”The grand strategy of the Roman Empire”, in: Kennedy Paul [ed]: ”Grand strategies in war and peace”, Yale University Press, Yale 1971 Also: European Union: ”Report. The situation in Kosovo III: military and security aspects”, Document 1688, Brussels 2000

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Civil-military cooperation and coordination

The paradigmatic shift of the global political arena set off new requirements for multinational

missions, which in modern form involve a wide-ranging spectrum of responsibilities,

including imposing stability and bringing democracy to failing and rogue states, post-conflict

reconstruction and nation-building.54 These requirements make effective civil-military

cooperation even more important as it is the best way to assure that the mission will remain

cost-effective and of reasonable duration, and that the hand over of responsibilities for the

administration of the territory to native authorities will be done as soon as possible. Such

objectives are achievable only if properly established civil-military cooperation creates

synergy effects and function as “force multipliers”. Only under such conditions can smaller,

more cost-effective mission forces be made possible. From such a perspective, effective civil-

military cooperation/coordination ought to be seen as an imperative component of security

sector reforms [SSR] and a central feature of modern humanitarian missions.

In praxis, patterns of civil-military cooperation/coordination substantially fluctuate from

country to country, from organization to organization and from mission to mission. In formal

terms, NATO defines civil-military cooperation [CIMIC] as “the coordination and

cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commanders and civil actors,

including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and

non-governmental organizations and agencies”.55 The US Army advocates a broader concept

under the title Civil-Military Affairs [CA], understood as activities aimed to “enhance the

relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are

present, and involve the application of CA functional specialty skills, in areas normally the

responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of Civil-Military Operation [CMO]”.

In turn, the CMO is defined as “activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence,

or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and the civilian population in a

friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area”.56 Such conceptual differentiation shows that

even strongly interconnected military organizations view the nature of civil-military

cooperation/coordination from different angles.

54 See: Ring Stefan: “Brute force or coercion. Two perspectives on conflict management”, in: Hallenberg Jan, Karlsson Håkan [eds]: “The Iraq war. European perspectives on politics, strategy and operations”, Rutledge, London 2005 55 See: Mockaitis Thomas R: ”Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operation. The case of Kosovo”, USA Army, Carlisle 2004 Also: Rod Lyon: ”Civil-military relations in an age of terror”, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland 2004 56 See: Mockaitis Thomas R: ”Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operation. The case of Kosovo”, USA Army, Carlisle 2004 Also: Rod Lyon: ”Civil-military relations in an age of terror”, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland 2004

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At this point, it ought to be added that country specific particularities, especially various

patterns of functional interdependences between institutions involved in civil-military

cooperation, as well as mission specific requirements, cause that actors involved in

multinational missions tend to view an optimal level of civil-military cooperation in different

ways. Hence, this paper is guided by such empirical questions as How do mission

requirements affect civil-military cooperation/coordination in multinational missions, and

How do actors’ specific particularities affect civil-military cooperation/coordination in

multinational missions.

Consequently, this paper is based on two central components. In order to determine an

appropriate conceptual perspective for study and analysis of civil-military

cooperation/coordination, under the condition of a paradigmatic shift of the global political

arena, we inspect the utility of the theory of fragmegration to conceptualize and map

parameters essential for civil-military cooperation/coordination. In order to answer the

empirical questions How do mission requirements affect civil-military

cooperation/coordination in multinational missions, and How do actors’ specific

particularities affect civil-military cooperation/coordination in multinational missions, we

will examine essential features of the missions in Kosovo and Darfur.

Multinational mission in Kosovo

The multinational mission in Kosovo provides a unique opportunity to study the effectiveness

of civil-military cooperation/coordination in multinational humanitarian missions. A few

reasons motivate this choice. Firstly, the character of the Kosovo case is representative for

contemporary conflicts, which on the surface are driven by ethnic tensions but whose

dynamics are influenced by multiple factors such as loosely operating guerilla units, ad hoc

created paramilitary groups and the involvement of crime syndicates. From our perspective, it

is particularly important that the Kosovo mission involved a wide-ranging variety of actors

from various countries. The core of the Kosovo Forces [KFOR] was assembled primarily

from NATO units provided by member states, but the mission also included a variety of units

from member countries of the Partnership for Peace, including troops from Russia and

Ukraine. NATO planners, in accordance with the standard procedures of this military alliance,

drew plans for the operation. NATO also acted as the main coordinator of civil-military

cooperation [CIMIC] during the planning stage as well as during implementation. Such

settings are representative for modern multinational missions integrating civilian and military

components.

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What’s more, it is highly likely that forthcoming missions might have similar structural

settlements. It seems worth emphasizing that the multinational mission in Kosovo involved

interactions between civil and military components on political, strategic, operational and

tactical levels and therefore an empirical study of the Kosovo mission might provide an

answer to the guiding question How could the conduct of multinational missions be improved.

In other words, we intend to explore the Kosovo case to map major challenges that

multinational civil-military missions have to deal with.

In general terms, the multinational mission in Kosovo can be described as hybrid one.

The mission planning was based on the premise that the operational arena would be divided

into five regions, run by KFOR.57 From an organizational perspective, it is important that the

mission forces consisted of three distinct components: NATO forces assembled from

member-state units, units operating under the umbrella of the Partnership for Peace, including

forces from Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria, and KFOR forces, in large degree consisting of

troops having prior experiences from peace operations.58

Basically, NATO planners drew the blueprint for the civil-military cooperation

[CIMIC]. The planners assumed that only US and UK troops would run the CIMIC operations

from day one, and units from other countries would initiate CIMIC at a later stage. In essence,

the operational plans were drawn upon the assumption that CIMIC centers would be created

at regional, brigade and local levels. It was also specified that CIMIC activities would

concentrate on such missions as support for forces, establishment of provisional

administration, and would later include coordination of IO/NGO activities. The planners also

assumed that the central coordinating function would be performed by the United Nations

Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK], with assistance from the European Union [EU] and the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. Furthermore, plans specified

that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refuges [UNHCR] would coordinate

numerous IO/NGOs involved in the process of post-conflict reconstruction. Nevertheless,

neither the United Nations, nor the EU or OSCE were directly involved in the planning

process.

57 The KFOR reached the strength of 42.500 troops, from 28 countries. The main contributors were UK [12.000], Russia [10.000], Germany [8.500] France [7.000], USA [7.000] and Italia [2.000]. 58 See: Mackaitis Thomas R: ”Civil-military cooperation in peace operation: The case of Kosovo”, USA Army, Carlisle 2004 Also: Ljung Bo [ed]: ”Aspekter på Kosovo-operationen mars-juni 1999”, FOA, Stockholm 2000 Also: Broberg-Wulff Maria, Ströberg Karin: ”Utvärdering av svenska bataljonens humanitära insatser i Kosovo”, FOI-R-0171-SE, Stockholm 2001

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The implemented mission also had a hybrid structure as it consisted of elements from

both “polarized” contingencies. From the first set of contingencies, which was tailored to the

scenario of a peaceful handover from the Yugoslav Army, and from the second set that was

adapted to the scenario of fighting entry into Kosovo. Naturally, planners were aware that a

generic hybrid situation could occur but apparently considered that a mixture of elements

from both scenarios as a “good enough” solution to cope with a “hybrid” situation.

Nonetheless, the initial days of the mission proved that neither the first scenario of

fighting entry into Kosovo, nor the one of peaceful handover, had occurred, and commanders

had to blend elements from both sets of contingencies, or create ad hoc solutions. What’s

more, these days demonstrated that the mission suffered from a lack of coherence, at least in

respect to cooperation and coordination between civilian and military components. In

consequence, an immediate power vacuum opened between the retreating Yugoslavian Army

and mission forces. In terms of operational assumptions, the US and UK forces should have

launched CIMIC activities from the very first day, but only British troops had the proper

mandate to create foot patrols and reduce the emerging power vacuum.59 The US troops were

much less successful, primarily due to a rigid mandate.60

However, the most critical errors were made already during the planning of the

multinational mission. Firstly, the United Nations, and especially its key agency UNHCR,

was not involved directly in the planning process. That in turn caused UNHCR’s centre

coordinating civil-military activities in the field to not function initially. Negative aftermaths

of this error were partly reduced by experienced KFOR commanders, which responded to

unexpected developments by the creation of ad hoc CIMIC centers at battalion and brigade

levels. Nevertheless, initially even this improvised response did not bring instant

improvements because junior officers had no mandate to act locally.

The second error can be denoted as one of “defective assumptions” and, in essence, it

caused an inadequate view on the role of civil-military cooperation/coordination in the

mission. Simply, effective and well-coordinated civil-military cooperation/coordination was

not an imperative condition of contingencies tailored to the scenario of “peaceful handover

from Yugoslav Army”. In logical terms, “peaceful handover” should not generate a power

vacuum and should not cause a rapid disintegration of local administration.

59 It seems that the UK troops well internalized experiences from operations in Northern Ireland. In contrast, the US Army operates on basis of rigid rules, which in Kosovo proved to be counterproductive. 60 It ought to stressed that commanders and solders from the US had relatively poor knowledge about mission specific conditions and their mandate was not adjusted to the mission specifics, especially in respect to requirements of civil-military cooperation.

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Correspondingly, the scenario of “fighting entry into Kosovo” either did not need

coordination between civilian and military components from day one because it is hardly

viable to organize CIMIC operations under combat conditions and from such a perspective it

is fully understandable to delay the conduct of CIMIC until the next stage of post-conflict

activities. Consequently, contingencies tailored to scenarios constructed on such a polarized

basis did not include components allowing commanders to create effective “hybrid” solutions,

as the “menu” of feasible solutions did not include all necessary components.61 Furthermore,

it seems worth stressing that the division of the mission area into five “kingdoms” also had

some negative consequences, as each brigade acted on the basis of national resources, that

ultimately caused that the quality of civil-military activities varied from “kingdom” to

“kingdom”. It happened too, in some isolated cases, that narrowly interpreted national

priorities took precedence over mission objectives.

Ultimately, the mission in Kosovo succeeded to stabilize the area. A few specific factors

had a positive impact on the ultimate success. The most decisive factor was the fact that most

KFOR commanders had extensive experience from earlier operations and were ready to create

ad hoc innovative solutions. In their favor were such factors as the moderate size of the

Kosovo province and the fact that the power vacuum emerged when the progressing

disintegration of the administration was in a relatively early stage. An appropriate political

climate also could be identified as a highly positive factor, especially that Russia acted as

mediator between conflict parties.

These findings indicate that the planning phase was one of questionable quality. The

gravest error was made by conceptual reliance on the two radically polarized scenarios and

the erroneous assumption that middle options can be generated through operational

adjustments, such as a hybrid solution. In effect, such conceptual framing caused a deficiency

in recognition that middle options require qualitatively different composition of mission

forces, and substantial adjustments of organizational and procedural arrangements, especially

in respect to civilian and military components. These errors caused that a broader spectrum of

middle scenarios was not fully examined, and neither plans nor procedures were adjusted

towards circumstances that even planners considered as the most likely.

61 It seems that the mission forces had an insufficient mandate. For instance, junior officers did not have mandate to act locally. What’s more, UN CIVPOL HQ did not operate since the day one. As result, the forces lack instruments and coordinating procedures allowing actions preventing the emergence of the power vacuum.

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What’s more, it is highly likely that the erroneous conceptual framing was a key factor

causing the exclusion of the United Nations, the European Union and the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe from participation in the mission planning.

These findings indicate that already during the planning stage, planners should examine

a broader spectrum encompassing middle scenarios and construct specific contingencies,

instead of counting on the utility of hybrid ones. In practical terms, this means that all actors

potentially involved in the mission should participate in an evaluation of mission assumptions

and in the mission planning. It is also imperative to introduce joint training between military

and civilian actors, which is the most effective remedy to reduce misperception and build a

bridge between actors used to operating in such different organizational environments. The

military as a rule operates in formal vertical organizations, while civilian actors usually

interact horizontally, in a less formal manner. What’s more, in respect to multinational

missions, joint training is an effective instrument to lessen cultural divides.

Darfur Mission

Sudan is the largest country in Africa but since its independence in 1956 suffers from chronic

instability caused by prolonged civil war between Muslim, Christian, indigenous believers

and politically dominant non-Muslim Sudanese. The most recent conflict broke out in 2003,

in the western region of Darfur. On October 20, 2004, the African Union decided to deploy

the African Union Mission in the Sudan [AMIS] to halt genocide in Darfur. The AU’s Peace

& Security Council decided to deploy a 3320 man strong force to monitor the implementation

of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, signed on 8 April 2004. A few months latter, on 28

April 2005, the Peace & Security Council decided to include a civilian police force, at the

strength of 1560 men, and increase the strength of the AMIS forces to 6171 in total.

The strengthening of forces was found to be an imperative move since the situation in

Darfur constantly deteriorated and military observers reported 496 violent confrontations

between numerous “political factions”, or simply, in most cases, armed banditry by rapidly

proliferating groups of armed militias. For the council, the major concerns were caused by

attacks on NGO convoys bringing humanitarian help.62 Since May 2005, attacks on

humanitarian convoys have become a more or less permanent feature. In June, the situation

deteriorated even further.

62 The Peace & Security Commission of the African Union reports at least 496 cases of armed banditry, stealing of livestock, attacks on NGO convoys, abduction, as well as disruptions of activities in IDP camps.

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Then, the SLM/A launched coordinated attacks on government administrative convoys.63 The

situation became even worse in September 2005. Then, military observers in North and South

Darfur reported an increasing number of attacks on villages, in the areas of Shangil Tobaya,

Malam, Kourbia, Khartoum Djadeed and Saudego.64 Janjawee’s militias were responsible for

these attacks, but military observers were convinced that the Janjawee received some support

from Sudanese governmental troops.

The stability in Darfur was always a highly fragile phenomenon, but this fragmentation

within the SLM/A brought about further deterioration. Firstly, in July-August, tensions in

Nerititi led to armed confrontations within the SLM/A. Then, in November, the internal

struggle erupted within the SLM/A cell in Halif.

In essence, the split went along tribal lines. Especially, between Zaghawa, Meidop and

Berti members of the SLM/A. It was even reported that Zaghawas captured Meidops’

deputies to the 6th Round of the Peace Talks. Ultimately, the split caused wide-ranging tribal

tensions that led to violent confrontation between the Fallata and Masselit, in the Graida

area.65 The fact that parties involved in conflicts, including Sudanese governmental troops,

painted vehicles in the white AMIS color undermined AMIS and NGO’s credibility and

caused a temporary suspension of humanitarian help to provinces controlled by the SLM/A.66

The situation deteriorated even more in the late autumn, when a large number of

Chadian deserters entered into the conflict arena. For instance, on November 14th and 15th,

they attacked a camp of the national nomad guard in N’djamena and the training camp in

Koundou. The Sudanese Armed Forces [SAF] responded with counteractions, especially in

the Jebel Moon area. Subsequently, AMIS patrols at Kulbus were under fire at Girgia village,

roughly 20 km from Kulbus. Ultimately, these incidents caused tensions between war-prone

Sudan and Chad.

63 It was reported that, for instance, the SLM/A launched attacks JEM positions at Kafod, Graida, Bamina and Muhajeria as well as governmental administrative convoys on the routes El - Fasher-Nyala and Kutum – Kafod. The SLM/A attacked too AMIS patrols and is probably responsible on ambush on UN World Food Programme convoy on the route Ishma-Um Zeifah [August 29, 2005]. 64 The struggle affected civilian population in Kharsantougur, Tarmy Martal and Djabain and over 400 inhabitants were relocated to IDP’s camps in Zamzam and Tawilla. It seems worth mention that the African Union reports mentions that the SLM/A attacked Sheiria and Khazan Gadeed, on September 19, 2005, the Janjaweed/Armed Militias attacked the Arusharo IDP camp and Arga and Gosmino villages, on September 28, 2005, 65 Only between 6th and 17th November 2005, over 60 men were killed and over 15.000 of civilian were displaced due to these internal struggles. 66 The disguised in white vehicles were used to launch surprise attacks on government’s opponents. For instance, on November 2, 2005, a white governmental helicopter patrolled the Muhajeria region and white painted governmental vehicles were used to attack the town of Zalinje.

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The African Union dispatched in December 2005 a Joint Assessment Mission to evaluate the

security and humanitarian situation in Darfur. The mission concluded that the situation

remains highly fragile and millions of Sudanese are still highly vulnerable to any tensions,

due to their dependency on humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, in overall terms, the

situation was substantially improved and noticeable progress was made in respect to the

implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of January 9, 2005. The

establishment of the Government of National Unity, as well as the subsequent establishment

of the Government of Southern Sudan, could be seen as a triumph of the peace process.67 In

its aftermath, the AMIS succeeded to establish 34 posts of MilObsers and 26 sites of CivPol.68

Positive effects brought deployment of AMIS forces to Zaliigei, which prevented SLM/A

retaliation against IDPs. Similarly, the deployment of AMIS forces to Muhajeriya prevented a

displacement of 40,000 IDPs and halted the SAF’s attempt to seize control over the town.

Hostile actions against a camp in Kalma were halted when the AMIS deployed a CivPol unit

to the refugee camp in Kalma.

Until the end of 2005, AU experts had noticed a substantial improvement of

humanitarian assistance. The number of aid workers grew from 228 [2004] to 14,000 [2005].

The malnutrition rate dropped from 21.0 percent [2004] to 11.0 percent [2005] and the

mortality rate has decreased from 0.72/10,000 to 0.48/10,000. However, the needs were

growing rapidly too. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA] in

Darfur estimated that while 1,100,000 people were in dire need of humanitarian assistance in

2004, the number grew to 3,700,000 by the end of 2005. Unfortunately, further improvements

were negatively affected by the unwillingness of SLM/A and JEM to cooperate, as well as by

Sudanese governmental sabotage against agencies involved in humanitarian assistance.

By 2006, the AMIS forces had reached a strength of 6171 men, including 1560 CivPol

forces and 722 MilObs. 69 The core forces included three battalions from Nigeria, at a total

strength of 2040 men, and three battalions from Rwanda, 1756 men in total. Senegal deployed

a single 538 man strong unit, and Gambia one company of 196 soldiers.

67 The political landscape in Sudan has been changed in 2005, after the death of the first vice-President John GARANG, on September 8, allowing better implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed on January 9, 2005. The main progress has been made in respect to the establishing of the Government of National Unity [September 8, 2005] and the subsequent establishment of the government of Southern Sudan. 68 During this time, the AMIS has expanded its presence from 16 to 34 locations within Darfur and established permanent civilian police posts in 26 out of 65 sensitive villages and IDP camps. 69 These countries send Military Observes: Algeria [13], Benin [1], Botswana [10], Burkina Faso [4], Burundi [10], Cameroon [30], Chad [31], Congo [14], Egypt [34], Gabon [34], Gambia [20], Ghana [25], Kenya [39], Lesotho [5], Libya [9], Madagascar [9], Malawi [24], Mali [15], Mauritania [10], Mozambique [14], Namibia [23], Nigeria [59], Rwanda [35], Senegal [34], South Africa [44], Togo [8], Zambia [45], EU [13], USA [13], GOS [31], SLM/A [31], JEM [31].

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Chad deployed in Abeche a single platoon of 40 men, and Kenya committed a unit of military

police, counting 60 men. South Africa initially deployed one mobile infantry company, in the

strength of 241 men, one engineering unit counting 38 soldiers and 6 experts on the disposal

of explosive materials. However, in 2006, South Africa in addition deployed a second infantry

battalion, 538 men strong, one reserve company of 120 soldiers, and an engineering unit of

100 specialists.

The AMIS mission in Darfur could be seen as a general audition of the African Standby

Forces, as well as an examination of AU capabilities. Working on the concept of the operation

[CONOPS], PLANELM was well aware that, in order to secure the environment for UN

agencies and NGOs, a speedy deployment of capacities allowing a pro-active monitoring was

imperative. That condition in turn generated a need to assemble efficient CivPol units. In

consequence, the Peace & Security Council authorized deployment of CivPol forces counting

1560 men and the African Standby Forces succeeded to deploy 85 percent of the authorized

strength [1320] already during the initial phase of the AMIS mission in Darfur.70

A proper mandate was also considered a top priority. A mandate is the key confidence

building measure between AMIS, CivPol, IDP and native police forces. Hence, the

PLANELM authorized a community-based approach allowing person-to-person contacts with

the local population.71 In essence, the granted mandate assumes that CivPol and Protection

Forces will conduct join patrols outside of populated areas, but within IDP CivPol units,

without assistance from the Protection Forces, will conduct camp and village patrols.72 The

review of the mission, conducted in December 2005, reaffirmed the adequacy of such a

mandate. However, the review also concluded that in order to facilitate AMIS credibility, it

was necessary to impose greater flexibility in interpretation of the mandate.

Unfortunately, a great part of AMIS’ problems were created by the erroneous

construction of a budget, without priorly secured funding.73 The CONOPS was based on the

budget of 465.9 million US dollars, for the period July 1- June 30, 2006. Nevertheless, heads

of the African states pledged only 312.7 million dollars.74

70 The authorized strength of CIVPOL is 1,560. The current strength is 1,320, representing 85% of the authorized strength, comprising 1,077 male and 243 female police officers from 16 countries. 71 In accordance with the Concept of Operation, the entire Darfur province is divided into 8 Operational Sectors. 72 As assumed the Concept of Operation, 26 posts of CivPol were established at IDP camps and vulnerable villages. Addition 39 posts were under construction, at the end of 2005. 73 An additional 4.6 million of US dollars were required at the beginning of 2006, to secure the mission until March 31, 2006. 74 However, until October 31, 2005, the AMIS received only 65.4 million dollars, roughly a quarter of the total requirements. The situation was improved by substantial donations from the European Union, which supported the AMIS with 84 millions dollars, and the Canadian Government that donated 12 millions dollars.

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Consequently, AMIS capabilities were reduced by a shortage of vehicles and by a shortfall of

communication equipment. The Peace & Security Commission estimated that roughly an

additional 462 vehicles, 66 HF and VHF base stations, 50 HF mobile radios, 544 hand held

radios, 245 Thurayas and 16 VSAT phones were needed. Considering the poor infrastructure

in Darfur, the operational capabilities were also negatively affected by a lack of helicopters

and transport aircrafts. During the initial phase, the AMIS mission in Darfur had at its

disposal eighteen helicopters. Canada donated a further seven helicopters and two

multipurpose aircrafts. That improved the situation, and provided satisfactory security for

humanitarian convoys from Khartoum to all eight operational sectors.

The AMIS mission in Darfur confirmed that effectiveness in stabilization and post-

conflict missions ought to be seen in synergetic terms as an outcome of cooperation with all

parties involved in crisis management. Nonetheless, in the case of the AMIS, the pattern of

cooperation is extremely inconsistent. On the one side, the Sudanese authorities more often

than not sabotaged the AMIS mission and deliberately tended to slow down the peace

process. They even attempted to compromise the AMIS mission by painting their vehicles and

aircrafts in white, a color traditionally reserved for humanitarian operations. Similarly, the

mission was deliberately sabotaged by conflict parties, especially by SLM/A, JEM and

Janjawee militias. On the other side, extremely positive effects brought close cooperation with

UNMIS, which supported AMIS with expertise in planning, logistics and budget management

as well as sponsored troop training. Moreover, AMIS commanders highly valued strategic lift

assistance received from Canadian Forces, the European Union and NATO.75

The AMIS mission in Darfur indicates that future missions should strengthen the

protection of civilian populations and introduce a 24/7 CivPol presence in all IDP camps and

conduct 24/7 patrols outside IDP camps and vulnerable villages. The AMIS experiences from

Darfur also underlines the value of mission forces if a Joint Operations Centre is empowered

with a mandate to coordinate humanitarian assistance with CivPol activities. These findings

indicate that future stabilization missions ought to give greater consideration to defining

precise roles and tasks for each component and establish modus operandi assuring stronger

integration between civilian and military components, as well as between mission forces and

international agencies involved in humanitarian assistance.

75 For instance, NATO and EU provided the airlifts for three battalions from Nigeria, three battalions from Rwanda, one battalion from Senegal and one company from The Gambia. They also provided the strategic airlift for the rotation of the troops, conduced February-April 2006.

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The postulated level of enhanced operational and tactical integration can, for instance, be

achieved through the precise examination of high probability scenarios for future stabilization

missions in crisis prone areas.

The core conclusion of this empirical study is the finding that “progress of a peace

process in post-conflict areas can cause fragmentation within political opposition and

ultimately lead to temporary escalation of small and mid-sized armed conflicts and transitory

social destabilization in the post-conflict areas”. That occurred in Darfur. In response, the

Peace & Security Council of the African Union had to enlarge the contingent of CivPol forces

and attune the overall mandate of AMIS forces. From our perspective, when planning a

peace-building mission in Africa it is necessary to take into consideration that a mission force

should consist, by 40-50 percent, of CivPol and native police forces.

In essence, this study indicates that a potential cooperation with African Standby Forces

ought to be based on the assumption that European capacities will primarily be used as

strategic and tactical enablers creating synergetic effects.

Conclusions

The ultimate goal of humanitarian operations is to conduct an efficient mission, bringing back

failing and rogue states to the world community. In modern form, such missions involve a

wide-ranging spectrum of responsibilities, including imposing stability, post-conflict

reconstruction and nation-building. Such responsibilities generate a dual challenge. Firstly,

these requirements make an effective civil-military cooperation/coordination more important

than it was in the past, as it is the best way to assure that the mission in an efficient manner

will as soon as possible hand over responsibilities for administration of the territory to native

authorities. This objective is achievable only if a properly settled civil-military

cooperation/coordination creates synergy effects and function as “force multipliers”. From

such a perspective, effective civil-military cooperation/coordination should be seen as an

imperative component of security sector reforms [SSR] and a core feature of modern

humanitarian missions. The second challenge is to study and assess the nature of paradigmatic

shifts in the global political arena and in matching manner remodel structures and the

composition of mission forces, particularly in respect to imperative arrangements between

civilian and military components.

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Consequently, this paper rests on two central components. In order to determinate an

appropriate conceptual perspective for the study and analysis of civil-military

cooperation/coordination, under the condition of the paradigmatic shift of the global political

arena, we inspect the utility of James N. Rosenau’s fragmegration theory to conceptualize and

map parameters essential for civil-military cooperation/coordination. In order to answer the

empirical questions How do mission requirements affect civil-military

cooperation/coordination in multinational missions, and How do actors’ specific

particularities affect civil-military cooperation/coordination in multinational missions, we

examined essential features of the civil-military cooperation/coordination during the

multinational mission in Kosovo and during the multinational mission in Darfur.

We found that the James N. Rosenau’s fragmegration theory adequately performs the

critical functions of highlighting a range of actors, background factors, and trends. From our

perspective it is important that the fragmegration theory facilitates comprehension of the

security arena as one of interlocked sequences of relatively unpredictable causal effects, as

well as stimulate recognition that an increasing number of “non-military” variables

dynamically reshape the security milieu. From such an angle, the fragmegration theory has a

great utility to conceptualize research problems and facilitate the formulation of primary

hypotheses and research questions. However, we ought to be aware that the explanatory

power of the theory is limited, as this novel theory is still a work in progress.

We use the Kosovo case to map major challenges that multinational civil-military

missions have to deal with. We consider that the Kosovo case is highly representative for

contemporary conflicts, which on the surface are driven by ethnic tensions but whose

dynamics are influenced by multiple factors such as loosely operating guerilla units, ad hoc

created paramilitary groups and the involvement of crime syndicates. From our angle, it is

particularly important that the Kosovo mission involved a wide-ranging variety of actors from

various countries.

Our findings indicate that the mission suffered from planning of questionable quality.

The gravest error was made by the conceptual reliance on the two radically polarized

scenarios and the erroneous assumption that middle options could be generated through

operational adjustments, such as a hybrid solution. In effect, such conceptual framing caused

a deficiency in recognizing that middle options require a qualitatively different composition

of mission forces, and substantial adjustments of organizational and procedural arrangements,

especially in respect to civilian and military components.

−166−

These errors caused that a broader spectrum of middle scenarios were not fully examined, and

neither plans nor procedures were adjusted towards circumstances that even planners

considered as the most likely. What’s more, it is highly likely that the erroneous conceptual

framing was a key factor causing the exclusion of the United Nations, European Union and

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe from participation in the mission

planning. Experienced KFOR commanders reduced negative aftermaths of these errors. They

responded to unexpected developments by the creation of ad hoc CIMIC centers at battalion

and brigade levels. Nevertheless, initially even this improvised response did not bring instant

improvements because junior officers had no mandate to act locally.

Ultimately, the mission in Kosovo succeeded to stabilize the area. The most decisive

factor was the fact that most KFOR commanders had extensive experience from earlier

operations and were ready to create ad hoc innovative solutions. In their favor were such

factors as the moderate size of the Kosovo province and the fact that the power vacuum

emerged when the progressing disintegration of the administration was in a relatively early

stage.

The Darfur case was selected because the African Union and its African Standby Forces

could become a suitable ally to support the EU’s Battle Groups in a mission on African

territory. From such an angle, the AU’s mission in Darfur [AMIS] can be seen as a general

audition of the African Standby Forces.

We found that the progress of a peace process could cause fragmentation within

political opposition and transitory social destabilization in post-conflict areas. In Darfur, the

African Union had to enlarge the contingent of civil police forces and introduce new routines

[SOP]. From our perspective, it is an important empirical finding that peace-building missions

in Africa have to include large, up to 40-50 percent of total forces, contingents of native

police forces.

Our findings indicate that future missions in Africa should strengthen the protection of

civilian populations and introduce a 24/7 CivPol presence in all IDP camps and conduct 24/7

patrols outside IDP camps and vulnerable villages. The AMIS experiences from Darfur also

underline the value of mission forces if a Joint Operations Centre is empowered with a

mandate to coordinate humanitarian assistance with civil police [CivPol] activities. Our

findings also indicate that future stabilization missions ought to consider defining precise

roles and tasks for each component and establish modus operandi assuring stronger

integration between civilian and military components, as well as between mission forces and

international agencies involved in humanitarian assistance.

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This study indicates that potential cooperation between European Battle Groups and

African Standby Forces has to employ a dual framework of pre-arrangements. Political pre-

arrangements ought to be conducted on a continental level, with the African Union, but

executive pre-arrangements ought to be conducted with regional standby brigades.

This study indicates that future empirical research ought to examine distinct national

approaches towards civil-military cooperation/coordination and on such a basis assess a range

of compatibility/incompatibility areas as well as map best practices.

Our future study should also design a “Mission Requirement Model”. Conventional

approaches, in essence, tend to calculate by proximity threat assessments and on such a basis

establish a model of mission forces. That procedure is highly problematic, at least under the

conditions of the fragmegrating theory. Therefore, our further research ought to establish a

Mission Requirement Model, created entirely on a functional basis. A basic Mission

Requirement Model could include the following components: [1] Homeland Defense designed

to value-maximize civil protection capabilities, which include: [a] support of civil security

and emergency response institutions; [b] protection of vulnerable infrastructure. In practical

terms, the Homeland Defense requires auxiliary military support for civil agencies and

protection of key functional spots. [2] Expeditionary Forces capable to [a] conduct operations

in multinational settings; [b] having rapid deployment capabilities; [c] designed as an adaptive

organization capable of executing innovative operational concepts. [3] Stability Operations

Forces designed to act in relatively permissive conditions and with increased functional

capability to interact with civilian actors. It seems that the Mission Requirement Model could

perform a positive function and enhance organizational and procedural interfaces between

civilian and military components.

168

References

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Comments

Dr. Hanna Ojanen The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

In my remarks, I would like to try to reflect not only on what was said this morning, but also

on some issues discussed yesterday. What links these points together is the perspective of new

research needs and the formation of an eventual research agenda. I have three such points.

First, the understanding of what a crisis or a conflict is is constantly changing. It was

pointed out yesterday that one no longer can think in terms of a “conflict cycle” with different

clearly demarcated phases – prevention, management, post-conflict reconstruction or state-

building – and with, accordingly, the possibility to assign different tasks for different actors at

different times. This has implications for the division of labour between the actors, but may

also lead to a broadening or prolonging of each of the phases, and thus for instance of the stay

of the military. Thus, it can be used as a justification for a longer international presence that

what would otherwise be the case. Conflict management then becomes more permanent than

acute; there is no clear start and no clear end. The staying power, or will to stay, becomes

more and more relevant, as in the case of Afghanistan.

Second, the role of the military changes, and one way of expressing this yesterday was

to say that in the future, the military would be providing limited support to civilian operations

rather than the civilians providing limited support to military operations. This, in turn, could

be part of a new way of legitimising the armed forces in European societies. The functions of

the military are changing as territorial defence no longer is so relevant. It has been argued that

the more successful alternatives for enhancing the legitimacy of the armed forces would be

international peacekeeping (with a civilian component in particular!) and internal assistance

for domestic civilian authorities in different cases of calamities and disasters. Internal

assistance, then, may also have a European dimension through the solidarity clause that is by

no means limited to terrorism only. Perhaps the EU Battle Groups will also, increasingly,

perform internal functions within the EU, instead of being sent to operations in faraway

locations?

Third, it was very convincingly argued yesterday that there is need for a new esprit de

corps, need to overcome the ingrained cultural differences of the three communities, the three

D’s, development, defence and diplomacy. This could be done, it was argued, through e.g,

courses and training in common. Here, we are looking once again at the formation of

epistemic communities.

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And we also need to see whether this new thinking really is internalised. For instance, if there

are successful cross-training practices already, are these and the new thinking also transmitted

further through security sector reform and similar projects? It is a pity if we teach things that

we no longer believe in. What about “new” peacekeeping countries such as China? How do

these innovations spread to them, if they do? Finally, I wonder whether today’s notion of

‘sense of urgency’ can be linked here as a push towards the formation of epistemic

communities or knowledge nexuses, or indeed, whether it has been the lack of sense of

urgency that explains the poor progress thus far. If so, who could create it and so help to

overcome the barriers between the three communities?

Stockholm, January 19, 2007

Hanna Ojanen

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REMARKS

Ret Capt [Navy]. Lars Wedin Swedish National Defence College 1. Strategic Theory. Today’s strategic theory includes the notion of Grand Strategy – Crisis

Management Concept (CMC) in EU parlance. This approach is not sufficient. The reason

is that Grand Strategy only co-ordinates at the top. Today, however, we need to be able to

co-ordinate the use of all our tools (military, civilian, police etc.) all the way down to the

field. We need a theory, which gives us a structure, and language that facilitates the

rigorous analysis in time and space, which is needed in order to plan and decide. EBA

(Effects Based Approach) may be helpful in this regard.

2. Learn from history. There are some important lessons to be learnt from the colonial

experience of late 19th century and beginning of the 20th. French generals Gallieni and

Lyautey then developed a doctrine called “oil spot” (tâche d’huile), where one area is

secured at a time and then enlarged (as opposed to raiding the whole territory in question).

One basic feature here is the understanding of the fact that all activities are political.

Another the importance that all personnel understand and respect the traditions and culture

of the inhabitants. However, their doctrine also highlights an important shortcoming in

present day’s peace operations: the short time military personnel including commanders

and staffs spend in the mission area. As it is unrealistic to try to recruit military personnel

to stay in the mission area for years (which Gallieni and Lyautey insisted on), one must

try to handle this problem in other way (training, institutional memory etc.).

3. Not only civil-military but also civil-civil co-ordination. The notion of “civilian” is not

monolithic – there is a great difference between, inter alia, policemen and diplomats. In

reality, not even the military has a monolithic culture. These facts need to be taken into

account.

4. Regarding “interests” versus “humanitarian”. Blood is always national. When soldiers

(and others) are sent into harms way there must be a solid state interest. Politicians must

be able to explain to those left at home why they have lost their loved ones.

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5. Is peace operations the way of the future? In 2005, General Sir Rupert Smith published a

book76 arguing that “war amongst the people” – as opposed to interstate wars – will be the

way of the future. This seems to be the general political idea of Western countries today –

not the least at this conference. At the same time, however, Colin S. Gray argued in

another book77 that interstate wars are not at all dead but will come back again. Against

this background, can European countries, like Sweden, give full priority to peace

operations and other non-interstate wars when it comes to procurement, education and

training? With the constantly reduced defence budgets of EU members this is a vital issue.

Stockholm, January 19, 2007

Lars Wedin

76 Smith, Rupert: The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World. Allen Lane, Penguin Books, London 2005. 77 Gray, Colin S.: Another Bloody Century. Future Warfare. Weidenfeld Nicolson. The Orion Publishing Group, London 2005.

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Everyone likes the idea of coordination, but no ones likes to actually be coordinated by someone else.

Chris Cooter

Setting of the research agenda for research on civil-military cooperation in multinational missions. Concluding remarks By Dr. Witold M. PATOKA

Everyone likes the idea of coordination, but no ones likes to actually be coordinated by someone else.

Chris Cooter

Today, a few hundred thousand soldiers and civilian professionals are deployed worldwide to manage humanitarian crises, to prevent state failure, to bring an end to civil wars, and to manage post-conflict reconstruction and nation building. Nearly all contemporary deployments have a character of complex multinational missions and are as a rule conducted by coalitions formed on a case-by-case basis, but increasingly by the United Nations. Hence, our conference on “Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational Missions” had a twofold objective. On the one side, we searched for an answer to the empirical question How can coordination between military and civilian components engaged in a multinational mission be improved. In particular, we searched for an answer to the questions How do mission requirements affect the coordination between civilian and military components in international missions, and How do specific characteristics of various actors participating in multi-national missions affect the quality of civil-military cooperation. On the other side, our ambition was to set up a research agenda for a comprehensive research program on civil-military cooperation in multinational missions. Therefore, our conference aspired to map variables affecting the quality of civil-military cooperation in multinational missions and review suitable theoretical frameworks. Consequently, the conference incorporated four thematic panels. Panel One compared “Canadian and Swedish approaches to civil-military coordination in multinational missions”. Panel Two examined “Interagency approaches to post-conflict stabilization in the Middle East-cooperation in the Israel-Lebanon case: civil-military coordination in UNIFIL II”. Panel Three inspected conditions for further enhancement of civil-military cooperation within the framework of “The transatlantic partnership NATO-EU”. The concluding Panel Four mapped, from empirical as well as theoretical perspectives, “Challenges of civil-military cooperation in multinational missions”.

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Panel One: “Canadian and Swedish approaches to civil-military coordination in multinational missions”

In essence, the Swedish approach to civil-military coordination is built around multiple

knowledge nexus communities, acting through flexible network arrangements [M. Sahlin]. In

contrast, the Canadian “3D Approach” incorporates Defense, Diplomacy and Development

communities and is built around a functional axis constituted by the elementary question

“who does what and when” [A. Okros]. The multinational mission in Afghanistan, especially

the activities conducted by Provincial Reconstruction Teams [PRT], is the best illustration of

the Canadian approach as the PRTs aim to integrate all three communities into objective

orientated units [C. Cooter]. In Afghanistan, “the three communities have been generally

successful in developing integrated approaches at the strategic or policy level with indicators

of success at the implementation or tactical levels,” despite that states involved in the

multinational missions pursue multiple competing perspectives. [A.Okros]

Nevertheless, the multinational civil-military mission in Afghanistan once again

confirmed that each of the three communities perceive a problem situation through a prism of

differing principles and priorities with limited understanding of the core reference employed

by other communities [A.Okros].

In essence, experiences from Afghanistan point toward a conclusion that the Canadian

“3D approach” made significant progress in integrating strategic and mission-specific

planning, but implementation is still conducted in an asynchronous manner. In practice, the

military perspective tends to dominate in the theater, as only the military community has the

means to deploy operational headquarters and logistic resources necessary to proceed with

implementation [A.Okros]. Hence, a stable institutional balance between civilian and military

components ought to be seen as the prime condition for a successful integration in

multinational missions [H. Hafterndorn].

Panel Two: “Interagency approaches to post-conflict stabilization in the Middle East-cooperation in the Israel-Lebanon case. Civil-military coordination in UNIFIL II”

The subject discussed at the panel can be seen as an analysis of modern crisis management

strategies employed by the Israeli government and the international community to secure

evacuation of foreign citizens from the combat zone, and subsequently to cease the military

confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah’s armed forces.

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It seems worth stressing that the crisis management involved high-precision coordination

between multiple actors, including Israel’s Ministry of Defense, representatives of foreign

nations in Israel, and the United Nations. From the perspective of research on civil-military

cooperation, it is important that the delivered key note speeches made possible a precision

mapping of interactions between actors involved in multinational missions, and presented

empirical findings allowed for the demarcation of further improvements.

The outbreak of the crisis is a classic case of political-military miscalculation that

ultimately caused a grave regional crisis. Hezbollah has for years launched cross border

attacks on Israel and in a few instances successfully used the tactic of kidnapping Israeli

soldiers as leverage for a prisoner exchange. Apparently, Hezbollah’s leaders were convinced

that a new attack would be “routine”. Early on the morning of July 12, 2006, Hezbollah

launched rockets at the Israeli border town of Shlami and the village of Zar’it. In chorus, its

ground forces crossed the border and attacked an Israeli patrol, near Zar’it, killing three,

injuring two and kidnapping two Israeli soldiers, Ehud Goldwaser and Eldad Regev. Within

hours, Hezbollah killed an additional five Israeli soldiers trying to rescue the captured

brothers-in-arms. These events started a grave crisis in the Middle East, known as the

Lebanon War of 2006, a crisis that lasted until August 14, 2006 when the United Nation

succeeded in implementing a ceasefire.

These circumstances motivated ambassadors in Tel-Aviv to approach the Israeli

government with a request for help to evacuate their citizens from the combat zone. This was

a quite challenging request, as Hezbollah traditionally operates from urban areas.

The challenges involved in coordination of the humanitarian mission in the combat zone

were illuminated by Yigal Haccoun in his first hand account “Civil-military cooperation in

practice. The case of the IDF center for the coordination of humanitarian assistance”.

The Centre for Coordination of Evacuation and Humanitarian Relief was created ex

nihilo, even without prior protocols. In military fashion, the Strategic Division, and its head

Col. Yigal Haccoun, was charged with the responsibility to lead this mission. This novel

function involved a need to establish an operational centre, set up links with existing decision-

making and executive structures, and form and introduce new protocols to a wide range of

units involved in the mission. To create a well-balanced coordination with non-military

actors, the centre incorporated experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the

United Nations, and established channels of direct communication with NGOs operating

within the combat zone.

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What’s more, the centre delegated its representatives to the Operations Division and sent a

liaison to the Northern Military Command, and opened links of permanent communication

with Air Forces and Navy [Yigal Haccoun]. Today, the mission is considered a great success.

The evacuation of foreign citizens was completed without causalities.

The success is attributed to the fact that the centre was granted a proper mandate to

participate in key decision-making structures and their executive organs. Such an

organizational arrangement made it possible to maintain the fragile equilibrium between the

requirements of a humanitarian mission in a combat zone, and the strategic and operational

objectives [Kevin Kennedy].

A study on civil-military cooperation cannot be considered thorough without an analysis

of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon [UNIFIL]. The United Nations created the

UNIFIL in 1978 to constrain military activities between Hezbollah and the Israeli army, and

to help Lebanese authorities restore control over southern Lebanon [Efrat Elron]. Following the

July-August 2006 military crisis, the United Nations enhanced the UNIFIL mandate [UNIFIL

II] by adding such new functions as cessation of hostilities and support for the Lebanese

armed forces in disarming Hezbollah. What’s more, the robust mandate of UNIFIL II extends

far beyond the traditional task of monitoring and verification, and also includes the

responsibility of conducting peace enforcing operations as well as nation building. At present,

the mission has reached a strength of over 12,500 troops from 28 countries and is one of the

most crucial missions led by the United Nations.

UNIFIL II is made even more complex by the fact that the mission operates within an

intra-state as well as inter-state Israeli-Palestinian security arena, where the political process

involves a number of stakeholders with conflicting preferences. Hence, from the perspective

of research on civil-military cooperation, the UNIFIL II is a litmus test for forthcoming

multinational peace support operations. So far, the UNFIL II has succeeded in establishing

direct communication with all stakeholders involved in the peace process and has gradually

built up a nexus of knowledge. The situation, however, is still highly fragile due to the flow of

arms into Lebanon from Syria and Iran [Kevin Kennedy & Efrat Elron].

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Panel Three: “The transatlantic partnership NATO - EU”

The management of contemporary security crises is not a straightforward sequencing of

“military first and civilian later” but from the very outset demands politically driven

comprehensive strategy integrating civilian and military instruments to deliver the required

effects [R. Trischak]. On the one side, it is well known that military power alone cannot deliver

a sustainable solution. On the other, all parties involved in the management of security crises

are aware that stabilization, post-conflict reconstruction and nation building are in practice

never purely civilian tasks, and the presence of credible military forces frequently pushes a

broader political process onto the right path. Therefore, the management of contemporary

security crises has to rest on comprehensive strategy, planning and conduct that, in an optimal

manner, integrates civilian and military capabilities into a single synergetic instrument.

In theory, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and the European Union

[EU] are highly complementary organizations. On the one side, both organizations share

values and goals and have largely overlapping members. On the other side, both organizations

are different in nature. NATO is constructed around the collective defense principle, while the

EU is a political union uniquely incorporating all-encompassing policy instruments.

From such a perspective, both organizations can be seen as highly compatible and

supplementary entities, under the condition that NATO is supplementing the EU with military

capabilities. In the contemporary peace operations in Bosnia & Herzegovina [BiH] and the

former Republic of Yugoslavia [FYROM], especially smooth transitions of operations from

NATO to the EU confirms the compatibility of both organizations [R. Trischak]. Nonetheless,

the “double hating” criteria create difficulties in some other instances [Gianni Bonvicini]. A

raison d'être for some tensions and difficulties is that the EU and NATO have just begun to

define their interests in the global arena. [Galle A. Mattox]

Panel Four: “Challenges of civil-military cooperation in multinational missions”

The fourth panel aimed to set up a research agenda for an advanced research program on

civil-military cooperation in multinational missions. One of the major conceptual challenges

originates from the dynamic nature of forces affecting the security environment, which cause

that our view on security crises frequently evolve from case to case [H. Ojanen & W. Patoka].

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In the aftermath, change, complexity and continuity are becoming the key conceptual

categories assisting our understanding of forces driving developments in the contemporary

security arena. On one side, historical identities, loyalties, and traditional institutions shape

the security arena. On the other side, fragmented authorities, shifting identities and competing

ideologies drive developments in multiple security arenas.

What is worse, the triad of change, complexity and continuity has its ominous side too.

Namely, it generates a growing gap and frictions between countries and regions, and nations

and ethnicities that benefit from these frictions and changes, and those who not [W. Patoka].

That is why the panel appraised the utility of James N. Rosenau’s fragmegration theory to

guide our understanding of the forces of fragmentation-integration, localization-globalization

and decentralization-centralization affecting the form and structure of the security milieu [W.

Patoka]. Our findings support a view that the theory of fragmegration is a useful conceptual

instrument for macro analyses, as well as for facilitating the mapping of a structure of macro-

micro dependencies. Nonetheless, we ought to be conscious that, in empirical research, the

theory has limited utility to assist our understanding of organizational processes.

To illuminate the nature of inter-organizational cooperation, the panel assessed the

utility of organizational approaches to study the development and institutionalization of a

“nexus of knowledge”. Chris Demchak, in her keynote “Institutionalizing a “nexus of

knowledge” in civil-military operational planning”, mapped how institutions coping with

terrorism build up and institutionalize a “nexus of knowledge” community to adapt their

posture towards new security challenges. Quite surprising is her finding that in highly

bureaucratic India, the state police succeeded in developing and retaining control of the anti-

terrorism squads through a “bottom-up” building of the ”nexus of knowledge” community,

which links together more prestigious actors such as the Indian Army and key intelligence

agencies with police forces acting as the kernel of the “nexus of knowledge” community.

The presented analyses of complex multinational civil-military missions in Afghanistan,

Darfur and Kosovo strongly support the validity of a probabilistic hypothesis postulating that

progress in a peace process causes fragmentation within political opposition and transiently

destabilizes post-conflict areas [Fahim Youssofzai & Witold Patoka]. That finding has a

highly relevant practical impact on the composition of forces for peace supporting operations.

Namely, such forces ought to assign priority to “low and order” functions and incorporate a

large contingent of native civilian police forces lead by impartial professionals.

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Recommendations

Perfect cooperation is possible only in an ideal world, but our world is not perfect and for the

foreseeable future we have to cope with the question How do we maximize interoperability

between civilian and military components? At present, the question is more important than

ever as nearly all contemporary deployments have a character of complex civil-military

multinational missions. Hence, the maximization of interoperability ought to be seen as an

urgent problem because global changes mean that a nation can cope with security threats only

through inter-state cooperation. What’s more, it should not be forgotten that the nature of

global changes causes a fragmegration of the security arena, and that in turn generates a need

to integrate multiple non-military components into mission forces.

Traditionally, interoperability is rather seen as a military problem associated with

compatibility of hardware, organizational protocols and standard operating procedures [SOP].

From such an angle, an introduction of hardware standards, uniform protocols and matching

SOPs can wipe out the problem, or at least minimize it to a scale that training solves

remaining difficulties. However, the conference showed that the quality of cooperation

between civilian and military components in complex multinational missions is affected by a

much broader variety of factors.

The creation of a stable organizational balance between civilian and military

components should be seen as the key functional imperative in multinational civil-military

missions. At present, only the military community has the organizational resources to deploy

operational centers and logistic resources to lead implementation. Ultimately, that causes the

military perspective to be the dominant one, and as such affects the overall profile of

missions, including mission planning and implementation. Unfortunately, civilian

communities involved in multinational missions frequently act on the basis of incongruous

preferences and priorities, and with limited understanding of the core references of the

military community. In turn, that causes the implementation to be partly conducted in an

asynchronous manner and as such does not generate the intended synergetic effects.

A comprehensive strategy ought to integrate civilian and military components into a

single instrument capable of creating synergetic effects. In praxis, it means that all

communities involved in a multinational mission ought to participate, in a balanced fashion,

in the planning process as well as in the implementation. It seems that one of the key

obstacles is a lack of overlapping expertise.

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Therefore, further study on civil-military cooperation in multinational missions ought to be

conducted from a comprehensive perspective and map the core references of the multiple

communities involved, or concerned, in civil-military multinational missions. Hence, further

empirical studies ought to take into consideration inter-organization processes between

multiple actors involved in cooperation. Especially due to the deficiency of overlapping

expertise, further research on civil-military cooperation in multinational missions ought to

study the formation of “nexus of knowledge” communities and epistemic communities

integrating civilian and military actors.

Past security crises during the Cold War era were effectively constrained by dominant

superpowers. In effect, interactions between parties were relatively well managed and post-

conflict missions were conducted in relatively stable environments. That caused the

management of security crises to have a predominantly sequential character, “military first

and civilian later”. In contrast, the management of contemporary security crises is conducted

in a highly fragmegrated milieu, and crises management has from the outset employed

military as well as civilian instruments to accomplish missions’ objectives. Hence, the

management of contemporary security crises has to, on all levels, integrate civilian and

military actors into a unitary functional entity. Consequently, further research on civil-

military cooperation ought to assess How and to what extent does “professional snobbery”

affect cooperation between civilian and military actors?

Certainly, a diagnosis of a crisis situation can be to some extent affected by the

syndrome of “professional snobbery”, where actors tend to define a mission in terms

consistent with knowledge and past experiences of that specific organization or community.

Therefore, further research on complex civil-military multinational missions ought to examine

the utility of post-international theories in analyzing developments and dependencies in

security arenas.

The setting of a research agenda for advanced study on civil-military cooperation in

multinational complex missions cannot be completed without assessing the impact of

“cultural lenses”. Culture functions as a framework for thinking and acting, as a blueprint for

cognitive assessments and collective behavior. Multinational civil-military missions include

actors and communities with distinct reasoning styles that might interpret situational variables

differently.

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In respect to civil-military complex multinational missions, “cultural lenses” might affect the

understanding of situational specifics ranging from a risk assessment or situational awareness

to patterns of cooperation. Therefore, advanced research on civil-military cooperation in

complex multinational missions ought to take into account “cultural lenses” and assess the

impact of culture-related specifics on the overall quality of civil-military cooperation.

These concise recommendations do not aspire to identify all variables affecting civil-

military cooperation in multinational missions, but I expect that the selected features can be

considered as central ones.

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Appendix A. Power Point Presentation. Lt. Col. Kevin Smith “The Canadian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Candian Force College Toronto, Canada Mr. Kevin M. Kennedy:”Civil-military cooperation in practice: the case of the IDF center for the coordination of humanitarian assistance” UN Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Process Dr. Magnus Ekengren: “EU Solidarity declaration: implications for civil-military coordination” Director for European Security Research Program Swedish National Defence College

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Canadian Forces College Toronto, Canada Slides 1-2

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Canadian Forces College Toronto, Canada Slides 3-4

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Canadian Forces College Toronto, Canada Slides 5-6

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Canadian Forces College Toronto, Canada Slides 7-8

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Canadian Forces College Toronto, Canada Slides 9-10

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Canadian Forces College Toronto, Canada Slides 11-12

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Canadian Forces College Toronto, Canada Slides 13-14

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Canadian Forces College Toronto, Canada Slides 15-16

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Canadian Forces College Toronto, Canada Slides 17-18

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Canadian Forces College Toronto, Canada Slides 19-20

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Canadian Forces College Toronto, Canada Slides 21-22

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Lt. Col. Kevin Smith: “The Candian approach to civil-military coordination in multinational missions” Slide 23

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Kevin M. Kennedy:”Civil-military cooperation in practice: the case of the IDF center for the coordination of humanitarian assistance” UN Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Process Slides 1-3

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Kevin M. Kennedy:”Civil-military cooperation in practice: the case of the IDF center for the coordination of humanitarian assistance” UN Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Process Slides 4-5

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Magnus Ekengren: “EU Solidarity declaration: implications for civil-military coordination”

Director for European Security Research Program Swedish National Defence College Slides 1-2

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Magnus Ekengren: “EU Solidarity declaration: implications for civil-military coordination”

Director for European Security Research Program Swedish National Defence College Slides 3-4

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Magnus Ekengren: “EU Solidarity declaration: implications for civil-military coordination”

Director for European Security Research Program Swedish National Defence College Slides 5-6

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Magnus Ekengren: “EU Solidarity declaration: implications for civil-military coordination”

Director for European Security Research Program Swedish National Defence College Slides 7-8

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Magnus Ekengren: “EU Solidarity declaration: implications for civil-military coordination”

Director for European Security Research Program Swedish National Defence College Slides 9-10

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Magnus Ekengren: “EU Solidarity declaration: implications for civil-military coordination”

Director for European Security Research Program Swedish National Defence College Slides 11-12

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Magnus Ekengren: “EU Solidarity declaration: implications for civil-military coordination”

Director for European Security Research Program Swedish National Defence College Slides 13-14

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Magnus Ekengren: “EU Solidarity declaration: implications for civil-military coordination”

Director for European Security Research Program Swedish National Defence College Slides 15-16

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Magnus Ekengren: “EU Solidarity declaration: implications for civil-military coordination”

Director for European Security Research Program Swedish National Defence College Slides 17-18

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