2264044

2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES ROYAL COMMISSION

Letters Patent issued 16 February 2009

SUBMISSIONS OF TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED

Date of document: 30 June 2009 Filed on behalf of: Telstra Corporation Limited (ACN 051 775 556) Prepared by: Freehills Lawyers 101 Collins Street, Melbourne Vic 3000

Solicitor’s Code: 420DX: 240 Melbourne

Tel: +61 3 9288 1234Fax: +61 3 9288 1567

Ref: 81535202Attention: Malcolm Cooke

Email: malcolm.cooke@freehills.com

INTRODUCTION

1. Telstra was asked to prepare witness statements in relation to a number of issues relevant to the initial block of hearings of the Commission1, specifically:

(a) its role in the delivery of the Triple Zero service, the capability and performance of that service on 7 February 2009 (to which the evidence of Jane Elkington2 responds);

(b) the damage to, and performance of, its fixed and mobile networks in the fire affected regions on 7 and 8 February 2009 (to which the evidence of Robert Beresford3 and Maxwell Jennings4 responds);

(c) the nature and performance of its managed radio networks for Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs) on 7 February (to which the evidence of John Cowan5 responds); and

(d) its early warning system offerings, and its understanding of any limitation imposed by the pre-fire status of the Integrated Public Number Database (IPND) (to which the evidence of Michael Consolo6 responds).

2. These submissions are prepared by way of response to the submissions of Counsel Assisting in respect of the Interim Report. As far as Telstra has an interest, the submissions of Counsel Assisting address:

(a) emergency calls in Victoria (Section 13) — these submissions address that issue in paragraphs 3 to 31;

1 Letter from the Solicitors Instructing Counsel Assisting to Telstra’s solicitors dated 30 April 2009. 2 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001; T3809:7-T3874:22. 3 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001; T3589:4-T3628:21. 4 Jennings Ex 119 WIT.50 4.001.0001; T3924:18-T3968:2. 5 Cowan Ex 113 WIT.5001.001.001; T3634:2-T3768:28. 6 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001; T3879:22-T3925:14.

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(b) the Victorian Bushfire Information Line (VBIL) (Section 14) — these submissions address that issue in paragraphs 34 to 35;

(c) community information and warning systems and dissemination of warnings (Section 2.3.3) — these submission address that issue in paragraphs 36 to 70;

(d) incident control and management (Section 9) — these submissions address the communications issues raised by Counsel Assisting in paragraphs 71 to 73; and

(e) communications infrastructure (Section 19.2) — these submissions address that issue in paragraphs 74 to 77.

TRIPLE ZERO (SECTION 13 OF COUNSEL ASSISTING’S SUBMISSIONS)

Summary of key facts

3. Telstra is mandated to perform an important function in the provision of emergency call services throughout Australia. Relevantly, it is required to:

(a) answer emergency calls (000 and 112);

(b) ask the caller whether he or she requires a fire, ambulance or police service and, if so, connect the caller to that service in the caller’s geographic location; and

(c) stay on the line with the caller until a three way conference call is established with the requested ESO answer point.7

This process is normally completed very promptly and the Telstra operator is then free to answer further incoming calls.8

4. On 7 February 2009, the Triple Zero service experienced extreme and unprecedented call volumes.9 Long delays were experienced by Triple Zero operators in attempting to transfer calls to fire services.10 These long delays meant that Telstra operators — who on average spend less than 30 seconds on each call — spent long periods on many of the calls waiting with the caller for an answer from the fire

7 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0004, [7], 0018-0020, [66]-[76]; Emergency Services Commissioner report entitled “Review of the April 08 Windstorm — Melbourne, Victoria”, WIT.005.001.1517 at 1563, [12.3.4], [12.3.5], [12.3.8]; Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) Discussion Paper entitled "Calling the Emergency Call Service — Review of Arrangements", Annexure JLE:8 WIT.5003.001.0223 at 0238. 8 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0004, [5]; Annexure JLE:1 WIT.5003.001.0102, WIT.503.001.0103 - first two Triple Zero call recordings played in the hearing during Ms Elkington’s evidence on 23 June 2009. 9 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0004, [7], 0031, [118], 0036, [121]; Kiernan Ex 63 WIT.3000.001.0001 at 0023, [144]; T2033:6-T2033:8. 10 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0004, [7], 0028, [106], 0030, [114], 0030-0031, [116]; Kiernan Ex 63 WIT.3000.001.0001 at 0023, [144(c)]; T2033:9-T2033:10, T2033:15-T2033:19 (Kiernan).

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service.11 As a result, at times on 7 February callers to Triple Zero in Victoria faced very long delays being connected to the requested ESO.

5. On 7 February 2009, Telstra presented 3,299 calls to the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority (ESTA),12 which is the Victorian fire service answer point. This placed an enormous burden on ESTA call takers. Of the calls presented to ESTA, 1,534 (approximately 46.4%) were presented to more than one of ESTA’s designated numbers.13 Between 12.14pm and 9.00pm on 7 February 2009, there were 2,393 Triple Zero calls presented by the Telstra Triple Zero service to ESTA. Of these, 1,450 (approximately 60.6%) were presented to more than one of ESTA’s designated numbers, meaning that for each such call the Telstra operator was on the line waiting with the caller for an ESTA operator to answer for in excess of 75 seconds, and in many cases for much longer.14

6. Mr Kiernan, ESTA’s Operations Manager (Support), frankly acknowledged that:

(a) there was unprecedented Triple Zero call activity on 7 February 2009;15

(b) this resulted in lengthy delays occurring before Triple Zero calls could be answered by ESTA operators;16

(c) these lengthy delays meant that many Triple Zero calls were re-presented by Telstra Triple Zero operators, often on numerous occasions, as ESTA call takers attempted to deal with the unprecedented call activity levels.17 In some cases calls were re-represented by Telstra operators to the ESTA answering point up to 15 times, and according to ESTA’s own presentation data, 48 calls were re-presented between 6 and 15 times each;18

(d) some calls were in the ESTA Automatic Call Distribution (ACD) queue waiting to be answered by an ESTA operator (with the Telstra operator on line with the caller) for more than 18 minutes. Based on ESTA’s own presentation data, at least 41 calls were in the ESTA queue waiting to be answered by an ESTA operator for between 8.75 minutes and 18.75 minutes;19

11 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0004, [7], 0030-0031, [116]. See also Annexure JLE:1 WIT.5003.001.0104 - third recorded Triple Zero call played in the hearing on 23 June 2009. 12 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0030-0031, [116]. 13 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0037, [126]. 14 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0037, [127], 0030-0031, [116]; and see too paragraph 6(d) below. 15 Kiernan Ex 63 WIT.3000.001.0001at 0023, [144]; T2033:6-T2033:8 (Kiernan). 16 Kiernan Ex 63 WIT.3000.001.0001at 0023, [144(c)]; T2033:9-T2033:10, T2033:15-T2033:19 (Kiernan). 17 Kiernan Ex 63 WIT.3000.001.0001 at 0023, [139]; T2033:11-T2033:14 (Kiernan). 18 Kiernan Ex 63 WIT.3000.001.0001at 0023, [139]. 19 T2034:9-T2034:17 (Kiernan). In fact, Telstra’s data discloses that 108 calls were in the ESTA queue waiting to be answered by an ESTA operator (with the Telstra operator on line with the caller) for more than 10 minutes. Telstra's data should be preferred to ESTA’s because it is sourced from the ECLIPS data base, which provides a comprehensive log of each Triple Zero call answered by a Telstra operator, whereas the ESTA data presented in Mr Kiernan’s statement is only re-presentation data (not call waiting data) which is subject to the limitations set out in footnote 4 of Mr Kiernan’s statement.

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(e) the simple fact is that ESTA does not have, and did not have on 7 February 2009, the resources - both in terms of staffing and telephone workstations - to handle the unprecedented call activity which occurred on that day;20

(f) the lengthy delays which occurred before calls could be answered by ESTA operators caused a bottleneck at the ESTA answering point;21

(g) a direct and unavoidable consequence of this bottleneck at the ESTA answering point was that there was a large queue of callers waiting to be answered at the Telstra answering point, as Telstra operators were required to stay on the line with callers until their calls were answered by an ESTA operator, and accordingly were not able to answer incoming Triple Zero calls;22

(h) the constraining factor was ESTA’s lack of capacity to handle the unprecedented level of Triple Zero calls made that day.23

7. The bottleneck of Triple Zero calls in the ESTA queue waiting to be answered by an ESTA operator caused there to be a long queue of calls at the Telstra answering point. This in turn led to an unprecedented number of abandoned calls (i.e. calls which reached the Telstra answering point but which were terminated by the caller before they could be answered by a Telstra operator).24 The high volume of abandoned calls no doubt reflected callers’ unwillingness or inability to remain on the line for an extended period awaiting an answer.

8. This was a situation beyond the control of Telstra, and was frustrating and upsetting for Telstra operators.25 Telstra implemented all measures available to it on 7 February 2009 to ameliorate the effect of the bottleneck of Triple Zero calls in the ESTA queue waiting to be answered by an ESTA operator. In particular:

(a) Telstra activated its E000 Extreme Call Management - Call Control Implementation Process isolating Victorian Triple Zero callers from the national queue and placing them into a dedicated State queue, to ensure that the high call volumes from Victoria did not jeopardise Triple Zero calls from other parts of Australia.26 This process has been in place since about 2003 with the endorsement of the Australian Communications and Media Authority

20 T2035:29-T2036:2 (Kiernan). 21 T2036:3-T2036:4 (Kiernan). 22 T2035:22-T2035:28 (Kiernan). 23 T2035:22-T2036:2 (Kiernan). 24 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0036, [123]. 25 T3820:16 (Elkington). 26 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0017, [65], 0027-0028, [101].

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(ACMA) and National Emergency Communications Working Group (NECWG);27

(b) Telstra replaced the Telstra Front End RVA28 with the Telstra Extreme Event RVA,29 which encourages non-emergency callers to hang up, thereby reducing the queue of callers.30

(c) Telstra’s Short Delay RVA played every 30 seconds to callers in the queue, alerting them to the high demand on the service and asking them to stay on the line for the next available operator.31

(d) Telstra called in additional agents to work at the Windsor Call Centre, called staff in to commence their shifts early, extended the shifts of Telstra agents so that they worked through scheduled breaks and reclaimed three of the six Windsor terminals set aside as a redundancy for the national pool in case the Sydney Call Centre failed.32 Given the short notice Telstra had of the extreme fire risk, and actual outbreak of bushfires on 7 February 2009, it took all steps available to it to increase its level of staffing on that day.33

While these steps had some positive effect on the large queue of calls at the Telstra answering point, the constraining factor was ESTA’s lack of capacity to handle the unprecedented level of calls made that day, a factor over which Telstra had no control.34

9. Having additional Telstra operators at the Windsor or Sydney call centres on 7 February would have had no positive outcome on the number of calls able to be transferred to the requested emergency service.35 It would simply have meant that a small number of further Triple Zero callers would have got through to those additional Telstra operators, and would have been on hold with them awaiting answer by an ESTA operator.36

27 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001at 0017, [65]; T2040:9-T2040:13 (Kiernan). NECWG comprises representatives of State and Territory ESOs, ACE, ACMA and some carriers (including Telstra as ECP): see Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0017, [65]. 28 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0011-0012, [42]-[44], 0014, [51]-[52] describe the nature and purpose of the Telstra Front End RVA. 29 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0013, [49]-[50] describe the nature and purpose of the Telstra Extreme Event RVA. 30 Telstra did not activate the ESTA Bushfire RVA (which is a bushfire-specific RVA which was used during the Victorian bushfires in 2006), because it did not receive a request by, or authorisation from, ESTA to activate that RVA. Telstra may only use the ESTA Bushfire RVA with ESTA’s permission: see Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0014-0015, [55]-[56] and T2042:1-T2042:5 (Kiernan). Telstra took steps on 6 and 7 February 2009 to facilitate ESTA requesting the activation of the ESTA Bushfire RVA, but despite those steps, ESTA did not request its activation (see Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0026, [97], 0027, [100], 0028, [105] and T2042:6-T2042:7 (Kiernan)). Mr Kiernan explained his reasons for not requesting Telstra to activate the ESTA Bushfire RVA at T2018:21-T2018:31, T2041:20-T2041:31. 31 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0012, [45]-[47]. 32 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0027, [98], 0029-0030, [109], [110]; T3831:5-T3831:6, T3832:13-T3832:15, T3832:23-T3832:30. 33 T3871:1-T3871:12 (Elkington). 34 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0004, [7], 0030, [114]. 35 T3835:6-T3835:11 (Elkington). 36 See further paragraph 22(c) below.

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Requirement for Telstra operator to remain on a Triple Zero call until the call is answered by the ESO

10. The current procedure for the transfer of a Triple Zero call to an ESO requires the Telstra operator to remain on the line with the caller until a three-way conversation with the ESO and the caller has been established. The Telstra operator is unable to answer other incoming calls while in the process of transferring a call to an ESO.37

11. Telstra has in the past considered whether this requirement should be continued.

12. At a meeting of NECWG on 27 and 28 May 2004, Telstra made and outlined a proposal that, in the event of a major incident generating queries from a large number of calls in one location, the Telstra operator dissociate from each call once a “ring tone” has been established with the requested ESO. This procedure would mean that Telstra operators would be able to answer a greater volume of calls instead of waiting on the line with each caller until his or her call was answered by an ESO. At the meeting, several ESOs indicated that such a proposal would result in calls being “lost”, because those ESOs did not have facilities (Automatic Call Distribution Networks or ACDs) which enabled calls to be queued locally at their answering point. The meeting resolved that the ESOs and Telstra would further examine Telstra’s proposal to see if there was an affordable “national” solution to those events.38

13. After that meeting, further investigations by Telstra confirmed that many ESOs could not queue calls or move calls to alternative choices on the ECLIPS database, which assists in load sharing calls. Telstra as Emergency Call Person (ECP) agreed to investigate other opportunities, and the ESOs agreed to investigate options by which they could assist Telstra as ECP to connect calls more effectively.39

14. Telstra subsequently withdrew the proposal that it had put at the meeting on 27 and 28 May 2004 due to the adverse impacts referred to above, with the intention that the parties would go away and work on possible solutions.40

15. At a meeting of NECWG on 29 and 30 May 2008, Telstra as ECP (in consultation with the carriers) stated that, other than those options previously identified by it after the May 2004 NECWG meeting, it had not been able to identify any additional solutions to the situation where Telstra Triple Zero operators are waiting on the line with callers for long periods during major incidents. The Chair of the meeting then requested that the ESOs research options to assist at the ESO answering points and that they present their findings at the November 2008 meeting.41

16. At the following meeting of NECWG on 13 and 14 November 2008, the ESOs had not completed the requested action, so it was requested again by Telstra as ECP (in

37 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0019, [70]. 38 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0019, [70]. 39 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0019, [70]. 40 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0019, [70]. 41 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0019, [70].

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consultation with the carriers). There was an acknowledgment by the participants at that meeting of the effect that unplanned high volume calling events can have on the overall flow of emergency call traffic across the system. The meeting resolved to form an ESO working group to identify possible opportunities and actions that might be taken in relation to this issue. The working group, which was to be chaired by a representative of ESTA and comprise representatives of the ESOs, was to present its report to the next NECWG meeting.42 This ESO working group report has not yet been presented to NECWG.43

17. Given the criticality of effective inter-operation between Telstra (as the ECP for Triple Zero) and the ESOs, it is Telstra’s strong preference to continue working closely with NECWG and the ESOs on issues regarding improvements to call handling, and not to change unilaterally how Triple Zero calls are received and handled.44 Having said that, unplanned high volume calling events will continue to create bottlenecks at the ESO answer points until change is effected.45

Telstra’s response to Counsel Assisting’s proposed “key findings”

18. Telstra is in general agreement with many of the proposed “key findings” set out in Section 13 of the Submissions of Counsel Assisting. However, some aspects of those proposed key findings are either wrong or require qualification. In particular:

(a) The statement in paragraph 13(q) that “there was a bottleneck at the Telstra end” is incorrect. The evidence on this issue is clear; the bottleneck was at the ESTA answering point (as was conceded by Mr Kiernan of ESTA46).

(b) The statement in paragraph 13(s) that “there were occasions where the operator did not appear to have knowledge of particular fires or the threat they posed” is subject to the following important qualifications:

(i) First, the “operator” referred to must be the ESO operator, not the Telstra operator, as the Telstra operator merely performs a switching function and does not provide (and is not in any position to provide nor allowed to provide) any information or advice to the caller in respect of his or her emergency.47

(ii) Secondly, the ESOs provide their contact telephone numbers to Telstra,48 and Telstra simply switches calls to those designated numbers. Accordingly, if an operator at a designated ESO answering

42 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0020, [74]. 43 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0020, [75]. 44 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0020, [76]. 45 T3853:4 (Elkington). 46 T2036:3 (Kiernan). 47 T3818:21-T3818:23 (Elkington). 48 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0007, [22].

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point lacked requisite knowledge, that is a matter for that ESO to address, not Telstra.

(iii) Thirdly, in so far as paragraph (s) relies on the evidence of Mr Brown, it is not supportable. Mr Brown gave hearsay evidence which was demonstrated by Telstra to be incorrect, and this was conceded by Counsel Assisting.49 The operator with whom Mr Brown’s son (Jack) spoke (who had no knowledge of Strathewen or the bushfire there) was not a Telstra Triple Zero operator or an ESTA operator, but rather was the “3” directory assistance operator, who Jack Brown called immediately after terminating his last 112 call.50

(c) The very high number of abandoned calls on 7 February 2009 referred to in paragraphs 13(n) and (o) was the direct and unavoidable consequence of the bottleneck of calls at the ESTA answering point and the requirement that the Telstra operators remain on the line with the caller until the call is answered by an ESTA operator. As Ms Elkington stated, the high number of abandoned calls arose from “the fact that our operators were on calls waiting to be connected as part of our procedure; we simply couldn’t get off those calls to answer the incoming calls”.51 The very high incidence of abandoned calls would not have been meaningfully reduced had Telstra had extra operators to answer calls. As Ms Elkington said, "by [Telstra] having [an] additional five staff in the Telstra Windsor call centre, it simply would have meant that five more callers and call takers were on hold. There would have been no benefit or improved response from the emergency service organisations".52 There was nothing Telstra could have done to overcome the core problem, which was the bottleneck of calls waiting to be answered by an ESTA operator at the ESTA answering point. The evidence shows that Telstra and ESTA had a similar number of operators available to answer calls, but Telstra’s switching role can be fulfilled in a much shorter period of time than the substantive response to the emergency call which ESTA operators perform. In these circumstances, and given the volume of calls made, a bottleneck at the ESTA answer point was inevitable, and reflects Telstra’s previous experiences of high calling volume events.53 This repeated phenomenon has proven very frustrating for Telstra in attempting to perform its answer point switching function efficiently during such emergencies, and is likely to be repeated in

49 T3967:25-T3967:28. 50 Jennings supplementary statement, Ex 119 WIT.5004.002.0001. 51 T3872:21-3872:27. See too T3847:26-T3847:30, T3826:11-T3826:15. 52 T3868:26-T3868:30. See too Elkington at T3835:6-3835:11. 53 T3845:18-T3845:31 (Elkington).

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future high call volume events without structural change to the end-to-end delivery of the emergency call service.54

(d) The last sentence in paragraph 13(y) is, with respect, misconceived. One of the key purposes of the VBIL is to take non-emergency call traffic away from the Triple Zero service. It was perfectly appropriate for ESTA to refer non-emergency calls requesting information about the bushfires to the VBIL. To suggest (as the last sentence in paragraph 13(y) does) that there is a burden on the emergency call service to protect the VBIL by not referring non-emergency calls through to that service is to invert the true position. The VBIL is intended to relieve call volumes on the Triple Zero service (whose function is to take and respond to emergency calls, not non-emergency calls), not the other way around. For this reason, it is very important that the VBIL is adequately staffed during bushfire events, so that it is in a position to provide a buffer for the Triple Zero service.55

Telstra’s response to Counsel Assisting’s proposed recommendations

19. Telstra supports recommendation (a) as to the staffing and capacity of ESTA. However, Telstra notes that ESTA is merely one ESO answering point. There are other ESOs nationally which also do not have adequate staff or facilities to handle high call volumes during unplanned extreme events. Proposed recommendation (a) seeks to address the issue of ESTA not having adequate staff and facilities to handle extreme calling events, but does not address the larger (national) problem which confronts Telstra as ECP. The inability of ESOs to handle high call volumes inevitably results in bottlenecks at the ESO answering points, which in turn leads to queuing at the Telstra answering point (and high numbers of abandoned calls). A national solution is required to the present problems facing the emergency call service. A fragmented or piecemeal ESTA-specific solution will not adequately address the problems confronting this national service.56 Even if ESTA is adequately staffed, lengthy call queues generated as a result of unplanned high calling events overloading other ESO answering points around Australia may impact on queues confronted by Victorian callers to Triple Zero.

20. Telstra supports recommendation (c), particularly as it might result in ESTA being more likely to request Telstra to activate the ESTA Bushfire RVA during a bushfire. In Telstra's view, the activation of the ESTA Bushfire RVA on 7 February 2009 would have been beneficial, as that RVA was tailored for a bushfire event and would have provided any non-emergency callers seeking bushfire information with the contact number for the VBIL (thereby reducing the call queue when those callers disconnected to telephone the VBIL). Telstra did everything within its power to facilitate the activation of the ESTA Bushfire RVA on 7 February 2009, but ESTA

54 T3852:7-T3852:19 (Elkington). 55 See further the section below in response to section 14 of the Submissions of Counsel Assisting. 56 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0019, [70].

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decided for its own reasons not to request the activation of that RVA.57 Telstra was unable to activate the ESTA Bushfire RVA without ESTA’s request.58

21. Telstra notes proposed recommendation (b) — "Telstra to give consideration to rostering additional staff, up to its capacity of 50 call takers nationally, on occasions of predicted high fire danger and/or on days declared Total Fire Ban days".

22. Telstra is of course open to any proposal for it to give consideration to rostering additional staff where this would result in a positive outcome for Triple Zero callers.59 However, in Telstra's submission it is important to bear in mind the following matters which bear directly on the utility and practicability (or otherwise) of this proposed recommendation:

(a) First, Telstra already allows very considerable "additional fat" in its rostering of staff. Telstra’s existing staffing set up is such that if the whole of one of its two call centres was not able to function, the staff at the other call centre would have sufficient capacity to take all national traffic. The occupancy of operators is between 45% and 50% of their time. This means that on average they spend between 45% and 50% of their working time on the operator terminal.60 This “every day” contingency allows for at least a doubling of the expected call volumes before normally rostered staff would be at capacity.

(b) Additionally, in the bushfire season (and in particular January and February), Telstra factors into its determination of the number of agents required to work the possibility of there being an extreme event (for example, a bushfire) which might increase the number of calls to be answered. Its rostering nine days in advance reflects this seasonal demand. In addition, where short term circumstances (such as extreme weather events) increase the risk above the seasonal average, further staff are made available at short notice. An example of this is that on 2 February 2009, Telstra organised for its Excelior staff on 5 and 6.5 hour shifts from Monday 2 February 2009 until Friday 6 February 2009 to extend to full shifts (that is, shifts of 8 hours and 5 minutes). A further example is that on 6 February 2009 (the day before Black Saturday), Telstra requested that Excelior staff rostered on for 7 February 2009, who were not already rostered for full shifts, extend to full shifts. This request resulted in 9 Excelior agents extending to full shifts on 7 February 2009.61 A total of 51 staff worked at the Windsor Call Centre and a total of 46 staff worked at the Sydney Call Centre during the 24 hours of 7 February 2009. The 51 staff who worked at the Windsor Call Centre during the 24 hours of 7 February equated to FTE (full-time equivalent) staff of 40 over that period.

57 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0019, [70]. 58 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0019, [70]. 59 T3851:23-T3851:25 (Elkington). 60 T3821:9-T3821:25 (Elkington). 61 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0024, [91].

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This compares with the expected requirement of 34 FTE staff for that day, based on forecast calls for that day.62

(c) Having additional Telstra operators during a major event (such as a bushfire) which results in an extreme level of calls to a particular ESO (such as a fire service) will not result in more callers being connected to that ESO unless its answering point has the capacity (in terms of staff and workstations) to handle the emergency calls quickly. If there is a bottleneck of calls at the ESO answering point (as occurred at the ESTA answering point on 7 February 2009) there is little or no utility in having additional Telstra operators.63 Ms Elkington's evidence (which was not challenged) was that Telstra is "absolutely reliant upon the emergency services picking up those calls quickly. As I mentioned, our handling times are very short. We can get a lot of calls through very quickly as long as the emergency services can take those calls from us."64

(d) Aligned with the point made in paragraph (c) above is the fact that the average call handling time for a Telstra Triple Zero operator (which is under 30 seconds65) is much shorter than the average call handling time for an ESO operator receiving an emergency call. This follows from the fact that Telstra provides purely a switching service66 whereas the ESO answering point responds substantively to the emergency call. This means that during an extreme event such as a bushfire, when the vast majority of Triple Zero callers request a fire service, the ESO answering point (which for fire services in Victoria is ESTA) will need many more staff and workstations than Telstra to avoid a bottleneck at the ESO answering point. Had ESTA had sufficient staff and workstations on 7 February 2009 to handle in a timely way the extreme volume of Triple Zero callers who requested a fire service that day, so as to avoid the bottleneck which occurred at the ESTA answering point, Telstra would have had enough staff on that day to switch all calls through to the ESTA answering point quickly and without delay, thereby avoiding any queue of callers at the Telstra answering point. Ms Elkington’s evidence was that Telstra had enough staff in its Windsor and Sydney call centres on 7 February 2009 to manage the high call demand of that day. If ESTA had been able to take Telstra's calls more quickly, there would have been no value in implementing state queueing, and Telstra would have left the national queue

62 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0026, [96]. 63 The only potential "utility" would be that a small number of additional callers would be answered by a Telstra operator, and would be on hold with the operator awaiting connection with the ESO answering point. Whether this would provide any "comfort" to those callers is problematic. See T3842:23-T3842:27, T3868:24-T3869:4, T3869:21-T3869:30 and T3835:18-T3835:22 (Elkington). 64 T3837:22-T3837:26. See too Elkington's evidence at T3841:14-T3841:27. 65 T3818:1-T3818:2 (Elkington). 66 T3812:14 (Elkington), T3818:21-T3818:23 ("We certainly don't offer any advice in terms of the emergency event itself, so there is no triaging done, it is purely switching" (Elkington)).

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in place, and "could have managed the calls and just through-connected them as quickly as possible".67 Ms Elkington’s evidence (which was not challenged) was that "the fact remains I am confident we had enough staff on if we could have passed the calls on, but the fact is we could not pass the calls on".68 This is borne out by Mr Kiernan’s evidence that based on internal modelling, ESTA would have required a total of up to 30 staffed call taker positions at its Tally Ho fire answer point to answer the volume of calls received on 7 February 2009 within the nominal benchmark period (90% of calls answered within five seconds) prescribed by the OESC and a total of up to 21 staffed call taker positions at its Ballarat fire answer point to answer 90% of calls within five seconds.69 Given the significantly longer call handling times of ESTA operators, Telstra would have had enough operators at its Windsor and Sydney call centres on 7 February 2009 to have enabled all Triple Zero calls presented that day to have been promptly passed through the national queue to ESTA, had ESTA been staffed at the requisite level to meet its nominal call answering benchmarks (90% of calls answered within five seconds).70 Clearly Telstra would not have required 50 call takers to service 51 ESTA operators, given the significant disparity between their respective call handling times,71 even accepting the need to continue to manage other national calls.

(e) Ms Elkington's evidence was that because Telstra provides a national call taking service, it frequently receives severe weather warnings, "so it is almost impossible for us to staff the centres that are 24 x 7 fully at all times throughout the year based on information that is provided to us".72 The comparison between staffing for a bushfire (an unplanned extreme event) and for New Year's Eve (a planned extreme event) is unhelpful, for the reasons set out by Ms Elkington at T3869:31-T3871:12. In short:

(i) New Year’s Eve is a planned extreme calling event day of which Telstra has 12 months’ notice to arrange its staffing, whereas a bushfire is an unplanned extreme calling event of which Telstra generally has very little notice either of the risk or the actuality of the event (and accordingly very little time to take steps to increase its level of staffing); and

67 T3869:9-T3869:20 (Elkington). 68 T3869:8-T3869:20. 69 Kiernan Ex 63 WIT.3000.001.0001 at 0024, [147], 0025, [156]. 70 During the peak calling times in the late afternoon and early evening on 7 February 2009, Telstra had on average around 25-30 operators manning terminals at its Windsor and Sydney call centres: see Annexure JLE:18 WIT.5003.001.0419. This would have been more than enough staff to service 51 ESTA operators. 71 Telstra’s operators also have to service other ESO answering points. However, on a postulated extreme event bushfire day, a very large proportion of total Triple Zero calls would be calls requesting a fire service. 72 T3837:15:T3837:20.

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(ii) New Year's Eve is characterised by a high volume of "non-genuine" calls73 which Telstra operators are able to handle very quickly, and also by a "spread" of genuine emergency calls across all ESOs nationally. The risk of any call bottleneck on New Year's Eve is accordingly at the Telstra answering point, rather than at an ESO answering point, and Telstra provisions its staffing to avoid that risk. In contrast, in the event of a bushfire in Victoria, where there is an extreme volume of calls requesting a fire service, the risk of a bottleneck is at the ESTA answering point, not at the Telstra answering point.74 For the reasons set out earlier in these submissions, increasing the number of Telstra operators will not overcome the problem of a bottleneck at the ESTA answering point.

(f) There are a high number of days of predicted high fire danger or total fire ban days every summer. Last summer in Victoria alone there were 18 total fire ban days, including 5 days in a row from 28 January 2009 to 1 February 2009, and across Australia there were would have been significantly more than 18 total fire ban days.75 If Telstra is required to have all of its 50 terminals manned on every total fire ban day each summer, there will need to be a very significant increase in its present staffing levels (with an associated very significant increase in Telstra's staffing costs, including additional wages and training76). Similar to ESTA, which requires 6.2 people to fill each call taking and dispatch position on a 24 x 7 basis,77 Telstra would require many more staff than there are workstations in order to operate its two call centres 24 hours a day on each day of total fire ban. In order to have all of its 50 terminals manned at any one time (as occurs at New Year’s Eve78), Telstra would need far more than 50 staff physically present at its call centres. This reflects the need to allow staff to take breaks and to have other staff available to take their place during those breaks.

(g) Because a total fire ban day is invariably declared shortly before the day itself, Telstra would have little time to arrange for its two centres to be fully staffed on a total fire ban day. To do so, Telstra would need to use its recall lists to call in additional staff. Not all staff on a recall list will actually be available to work when called upon at short notice to do so. For this reason, Telstra would need to have a very large number of staff on its recall lists in order to be

73 T3821:30-T3822:14 (Elkington). 74 In contrast to New Year's Eve, where there is a very high volume of non-genuine calls, there were very few non-genuine calls coming through the Victorian queue on 7 February 2009: see T3843:2-T3843:3 (Elkington). 75 The recommendation in paragraph (b) cannot sensibly be limited to Victoria (ie to days of extreme fire danger or total fire ban days in Victoria), as Triple Zero is a national service. 76 Each Telstra Triple Zero operator undergoes a week's worth of training followed by a "buddy system" period: T3814:17-T3814:21 (Elkington). 77 T1959:9-T1959:12 (Foster).

78 Elkington Ex 63 WIT.3000.001.0001 at 0023, [88]; T3822:8-3822:14.

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confident that it could have its two call centres fully staffed over a 24 hour period.

(h) To take 7 February 2009 as an example, Telstra initially rostered 93 staff to work on that day.79 Assuming that Telstra would need 200 staff to be physically present at its two call centres for all of its 50 workstations to be manned at all times over a 24 hour period,80 Telstra would have needed 107 further staff physically present at its two call centres in order for all of its 50 terminals to be staffed over the 24 hours of 7 February 2009. Because 7 February 2009 was declared a total fire ban day on the afternoon of 6 February 2009,81 Telstra would have needed to use its recall lists to call in that number of additional staff, and would have needed many more than 107 staff on that list (in addition to those already rostered to work on 7 February) to secure the required number of available staff.

(i) By way of further example, if there were 5 total fire ban days in a row (as there were between 28 January 2009 and 1 February 2009, in Victoria only), Telstra would require an even greater number of staff on its recall lists in order to be in a position to man all 50 of its terminals continuously over that 5 day period.

(j) Simply because a day is declared a total fire ban day does not of course mean that the fire risk will be realised and that there will be a high volume of calls to the Triple Zero service on that day. This presents a very real difficulty in relation to maintaining appropriately trained and skilled staff, as on most days on which Telstra’s centres would be fully staffed to meet a total fire ban declaration somewhere around Australia, the Telstra operators would not be answering calls for the majority of the time that they were at their terminals. Telstra’s Triple Zero operators are, for good reason, not permitted to do any activity (including talking or reading), other than answering and switching calls, while they are at a terminal. Further, these large numbers of staff would only be needed on days of predicted high fire danger and total fire ban days, contributing further to the likely difficulty of maintaining a trained workforce of that size.

(k) Telstra already provides a very high level of service at no cost to Government. The provision of this service is a loss making regulatory obligation imposed on Telstra.82 If it is thought desirable by Government (Victorian or otherwise) that Telstra be staffed at a level whereby it is able to have all of its 50 terminals

79 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0024-0025, [92]. 80 This number is very conservative compared with ESTA’s multiple of 6.2, which would require 310 staff to fully man 50

workstations. 81 Rees Ex 3 WIT.004.001.0001 at 0075, [306.5].

82 Telecommunications (Emergency Call Persons) Determination 1999 and Telecommunications (Emergency Call Service) Determination 2002.

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manned on every total fire ban day or other potential extreme event day (which for the reasons set out above Telstra does not believe is necessary), then the Government, not Telstra, should fund this additional staffing. This underlines the fundamental disconnect between Telstra's commercial and fiduciary obligations (which arise from it being a fully privatised company, subject to the Corporations Act) and the public interest, non-commercial, critical nature of the Triple Zero service.83 That Telstra is still the ECP is a function of its past role as a government owned monopoly public telecommunications utility. As discussed further below in the section entitled "Additional recommendations proposed by Telstra", Telstra considers that it is vitally important for the Federal Government to set the agenda for the emergency call service, by taking strategic and operational responsibility for planning the future of this critical piece of national security infrastructure.84

23. Telstra notes but does not comment on proposed recommendations (d) and (e).

Additional recommendations proposed by Telstra

24. As noted above, a national solution is required to address the recurrent problems facing the emergency call service. A fragmented or piecemeal Victorian-based solution will not adequately address the problems which confront this national service, nor ensure that Victorians have an improved service in respect of the range of possible emergencies that they face.

25. Telstra transfers calls to around 75 ESO call centres nationally. Those call centres have different systems at different stages of technological capability for accepting and managing calls.85 As the central filter, Telstra must be able to interconnect a call with every single ESO. As a consequence, Telstra’s Triple Zero capability must be matched to the least capable ESO call centre. This effectively renders the emergency call service a lowest common denominator service,86 diminishing the capacity of Telstra or any individual ESO to improve the service.

26. Telstra has highlighted the issues referred to in the preceding paragraph to government, and has made proposals to government for reform of the regulatory framework of the emergency call service, which in Telstra’s view would promote advances to the technology used by that service.87 Those proposals (and in particular Telstra’s letter to the Commonwealth Attorney-General dated 4 September 200888) have highlighted the following key facts and matters:

83 WIT.5003.001.0332 at 0333, 0339. 84 WIT.5003.001.0332 at 0333. See too the evidence of Elkington at T3851:3-T3851:7 and T3852:7-T3852:19. 85 For example, some ESO answering points do not have ACD facilities which enable calls to be queued at those answering points. 86 T3854:15-T3854:16 (Elkington). 87 Elkington Ex 117 WIT.5003.001.0001 at 0020, [77]; WIT.5003.001.0332 (letter from Telstra to the Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department dated 4 September 2008). 88 WIT.5003.001.0332.

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(a) ESO call centres are the responsibility of each State and Territory. Accordingly, it is not surprising that there are different levels of capability at each call centre. For example, some have advanced dispatching systems while others do not. Performance standards such as call response benchmarks are not uniform. Telstra ensures that it meets the strict call handling performance standards as set out in the relevant regulation but there can be delays when connecting calls to an ESO call centre because of call bottlenecks at the ESO answering points, impacting on Telstra’s grade of service.

(b) The current lack of strategic responsibility for the emergency call service means that little is being done to address the opportunities for the more effective use of new technologies.

(c) While Telstra currently strives to provide the best service it can, it is not an arm of Government. Telstra does not have responsibility for (and in many cases access to) the existing and emerging national security threats (whether man-made or environmental). Moreover, Telstra provides the service on behalf of the Commonwealth Government free of charge. As a company accountable to its shareholders this means there is a fundamental disconnect between its commercial and fiduciary obligations, and the non-commercial, critical nature of the service.

(d) Telstra is concerned that the combination of this disconnect, the lack of strategic direction and technology challenges have the potential to jeopardise the future of this important service. Telstra considers that the Commonwealth Government, as the custodian of the safety and welfare of all Australians, is best placed to take the strategic lead and coordinating role in securing the future of the emergency call service.

(e) Telstra considers that it is vitally important for the Commonwealth Government to set the agenda for the emergency call service, by taking strategic and operational responsibility for planning the future of this critical piece of national security infrastructure.

(f) Decisions as to which service improvements are required and capable of implementation and coordination with State/Territory ESOs should be the responsibility of Government policy makers taking advice from specialist agencies — ASIO, Defence, Attorney-General’s Department, ACMA and Treasury in respect of funding, as well as the relevant State/Territory ESOs and other agencies.

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27. In light of the above, Telstra submits that the Commissioners should make the following recommendations:

That the Commonwealth Government, in consultation with the State and Territory Governments, set the agenda for the emergency call service, by taking strategic and operational responsibility for planning its future processes, resourcing and infrastructure needs, in an integrated way.

That the Commonwealth and the State of Victoria report to the Commission by no later than 1 December 2009 on the steps that have been taken to improve the end-to-end Triple Zero process, resourcing and infrastructure, including in respect of seeking solutions to the bottlenecks which occur at ESO answering points.

28. Telstra of course recognises that this is a Victorian Royal Commission. However, it is clear that the subject matter of the Commission's terms of reference traverses State boundaries. Triple Zero is a case in point; community information warning systems are another. Moreover, the matters raised by Telstra in its letter to the Commonwealth Attorney-General dated 4 September 200889 have been referred to the Police Ministers Council for its meeting in November 2009, and the Commonwealth has made it clear "that it is hoped that any decisions will be informed by the recommendations of this Commission, among other things".90

29. One of the matters which Telstra submits should be addressed at a national level under the framework of a Commonwealth Government strategic and operational review of the emergency call service is the problem of bottlenecks occurring at ESO answering points in the event of a major incident generating queries from a large number of calls in one location. This is a matter in respect of which the ESOs (at a national level) need to consider options and find solutions; Telstra as ECP has exhausted all options available to it to address this problem.91 In the absence of national, structural changes, similar difficulties to those which occurred on 7 February 2009 are likely to re-occur.92

30. A significant further problem faced by the emergency call service is the very high incidence of "non-genuine" Triple Zero calls.93 Telstra answers around 12 million Triple Zero calls each year, and of those around 60% are "non-genuine" (i.e. not genuine emergency calls requiring a police, fire or ambulance service).94 Telstra submits that the Commissioners should make the following recommendation:

89 WIT.5003.001.0332. 90 T3868:3-T3868:11 (Counsel for the Commonwealth). 91 See generally the section above entitled “Requirement for Telstra operator to remain on a Triple Zero call until the call is answered by the ESO”. 92 T3853:3-T3853:5 (Elkington). 93 “Non-genuine” calls include prank calls and accidental diallings, and calls where the caller does not understand the proper (and limited) role of the Triple Zero service (i.e. emergency calls requiring police, fire or ambulance), such as calls seeking a State Emergency Service. See T3825:11-T3825:20 (Elkington). 94 T3825:27-T3825:29, T 3861:6-T3861:10 (Elkington).

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That the Victorian Government (in consultation with the Commonwealth and other State and Territory Governments) consider undertaking a public advertising campaign which emphasises the important and limited nature of the Triple Zero service, explains the nature of an "emergency" call and implores the public not to use the Triple Zero service for "non-genuine" calls.

31. Such an advertising campaign could be run, for example, in conjunction with a bushfire awareness campaign at the beginning of each bushfire season, and could advise the public, amongst other things, that persons merely seeking information about bushfires, rather than reporting an emergency requiring assistance from a fire service, should use the VBIL and not the Triple Zero service. Telstra (and, it anticipates, ESOs involved in the Triple Zero service) would welcome the opportunity to provide input into the key messages of such a campaign.

32. Additionally, there has been some evidence from those who experienced mains power outages during the bushfires that they lost their fixed line telephone functionality.95 Mr Beresford gave evidence that a landline telephone draws the power it needs from the lines that connect the phone to the network, unless the phone is of a type which also requires its own source of electricity (such as a cordless phone, or a phone with a built in answering machine). A loss of mains power at the customer access point will not impact service, unless the phone is of a type which requires mains electricity. In the latter case, no calls can be made, including calls to emergency services.96

33. In light of this evidence, Telstra submits that the Commissioners should also make the following recommendation:

The Victorian Government give consideration to embarking on a public advertising campaign highlighting the value for persons residing in areas of high bushfire risk who have a landline telephone to have a handset which does not require mains power for its operation.

THE VICTORIAN BUSHFIRE INFORMATION LINE (SECTION 14 OF COUNSEL ASSISTING’S SUBMISSIONS)

34. Paragraph 14(h) of Counsel Assisting's proposed “key findings” in relation to the VBIL refers to "the long delay times before calls were answered" by the VBIL. There was also a very high rate of abandonment of VBIL call attempts.97 This no doubt resulted in many VBIL callers, frustrated at not being answered by a VBIL operator, telephoning Triple Zero instead,98 thereby clogging up the Triple Zero service. One of the key purposes of the VBIL is to take non-emergency call traffic away from the Triple Zero service. This purpose is frustrated if VBIL does not have sufficient

95 Casey Ex 70 WIT.035.001.0001 at 0003, [11]; T2360:23-T2360:25 (Casey). 96 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0012, [45]; T3601:30-T3602:6 (Beresford). 97 Venters Ex 137 WIT.3024.002.0001 at 0018, [126]. 98 See for example Matthews T3785.

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operators to answer non-emergency callers seeking information about bushfires. The relatively small number of VBIL operators working on 7 February 2009 (as referred to in paragraph 14(j) of Counsel Assisting's proposed “key findings”) and the relatively long average handling times99 inevitably contributed to the burden imposed on Telstra's Triple Zero operators that day in answering and dealing with non-emergency callers seeking information about the bushfires.

35. Telstra respectfully agrees with all of Counsel Assisting's proposed recommendations in relation to the VBIL.

COMMUNITY INFORMATION AND WARNING SYSTEMS AND DISSEMINATION OF WARNINGS (SECTION 2.3.3 OF COUNSEL ASSISTING’S SUBMISSIONS)

Summary of key facts

Overview of the need for a comprehensive CIWS

36. Since 2003 Telstra has engaged with the Victorian Government and other governments concerning the development of a telephony-based comprehensive, all-hazards CIWS.100 The goal of this system is to provide emergency warning information to communities impacted by any emergency incident and to complement the capabilities of ESOs.101

37. Telstra’s proposed CIWS is not limited to persons who “opt-in” to the service. An opt-in service is generally recognised to be an inferior system, and is regarded as such by Victoria’s Emergency Services Commissioner, Mr Esplin, and the Director of Emergency Management Australia (EMA), Mr Tony Pearce.102

38. Telstra’s proposed CIWS is intended to enable ESOs to initiate outbound messages to individual premises/residents and itinerant mobiles within a designated geographic area.103 Telstra's proposed CIWS includes features not found in a simple opt-in community information warning system, such as:

(a) the ability to provide in-field reports to ESOs on the success or otherwise of delivery of messages to both fixed and mobile services (such as whether the call was answered or unanswered or went through to a message bank). This information might be used by the relevant ESO to better inform further actions to be taken by it in response to the emergency;

(b) the ability to deliver messages to landline and mobile telephones based on a billing address, and to itinerant mobiles operating within a designated

99 Venters Ex 137 WIT.3024.002.0001 at 0012, [82]. 100 Consolo Ex 118, WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0003, [8]. 101 Consolo Ex 118, WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0003, [8]; T215:29-T216:13 (Esplin). 102 TEN.004.003.0041 at 0041 (minutes of meeting between representatives of Prime Minister & Cabinet, EMA and the Department of Broadband Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) - see second paragraph); TEN.004.003.0099 at 0100 (Minutes of Inaugural Emergency Warning System Working Group, 30 May 2008); T308:18-T308:21 (Esplin); T1547:3-T1547:13 (Pearce) and TEN.004.003.0009 at 0009; Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0003, [9]-[10]; T3881:22-T3882:21 (Consolo). 103 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0004, [10].

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geographic area based on network data (rather than only to fixed or mobile telephones of persons who "opt in" to the system); and

(c) the ability to provide service and capacity management. In times of an emergency, the load on Telstra's networks (including its mobile networks) may become very heavy, potentially leading to network congestion. The delivery of mass outbound calling through a CIWS in times of emergency may potentially exacerbate network load and cause network congestion. An important aspect of an effective mass outbound calling CIWS is the ability to monitor and manage load on Telstra’s networks, which Telstra offers through its proposed CIWS.104

2005 CIWS trial

39. The Victorian Government and Telstra conducted a successful trial of a CIWS in 2005.105 This trial — which arose from a 2003 Telstra briefing to the Victorian Government on new and developing spatial and telecommunications technologies and capabilities106 — was conducted between June and September 2005 in the Shires of Yarra Ranges and Northern Grampians.107 The trial was conducted on fixed line services on an “opt-in” basis, because at that time Telstra was not authorised to access the IPND for a CIWS.108

2006 Proposals to State Governments

40. On 22 June 2006, Telstra presented a detailed CIWS proposal to the Victorian Government (June 2006 Proposal).109 The Executive Summary to the June 2006 Proposal explained, amongst other things, that:

(a) warnings could be communicated both to fixed line and mobile services of all carriers, based on billing address, using a geo-coded version of the IPND database;

(b) warnings could also be communicated to itinerant Telstra mobile services, and those mobile services operating with Telstra global roaming, by use of network data which would locate their service by reference to a base station in the targeted area; and

(c) in-field reports could be generated for ESOs including lists (by street address) of answered numbers, un-answered calls (including where a message was left on an answering machine) and properties where no land-line telephone exists.

104 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0004, [10]. 105 Esplin Ex 11 WIT.005.001.0001 at 0042, [217]; WIT.005.001.0833; T295:13-T300:21 (Esplin); T3884:18-T3886:5 (Consolo); T1518:24-T1520:6 (Pearce) and TEN.004.003.0009 at 0009. 106 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0005, [13]. 107 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0010, [26]. 108 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0010, [26]; T1537:27-T1537:30 (Pearce). 109 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0017, [40]; Annexure MDC:14 – Confidential.

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41. At around the same time, similar proposals were also submitted by Telstra to other State Governments.110 Each proposal provided pricing for the State on a “go it alone” basis or as a participant in a national CIWS (with the pricing proportionate to the State’s relative population). Target deployment date for the verified CIWS was October 2007 for the 2007/2008 fire season.111

42. Telstra did not receive any formal response from the Victorian Government to the June 2006 Proposal or from any other State Government to any of its CIWS proposals.112

Access to the IPND

43. In order to be able to deliver messages to all land lines and mobile telephones based on billing addresses within a particular geographic area, it is necessary to have access to the IPND.113 The IPND is a database which contains telecommunications customer information arranged by number for customers of all telecommunications carriers and carriage service providers.114

44. The process of creating a geo-coded database utilising the numbers and corresponding billing addresses on the IPND is neither technically challenging nor time consuming115 (indeed, Telstra geo-coded a simulated version of the IPND for the 2005 CIWS Trial116), but until after the 2009 Victorian bushfires there were regulatory and legislative barriers to accessing the IPND for the purposes of a CIWS.117

45. Telstra has actively petitioned the Commonwealth to facilitate expeditious access to the IPND for purpose of a CIWS since 2003.118 In one such letter in 2003, Telstra noted that “the approaching summer marks the beginning of bush fire season. In situations where lives are threatened, Telstra believes it is imperative to assist quickly in preventing or lessening that threat.”119

46. From 2003 Telstra canvassed, and actively promoted to the Commonwealth Government, numerous options to obtain expeditious access to the IPND, including

110 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0021, [41]. 111 Annexure MDC:14 - Confidential; TLS.001.021.0021 at 0037. 112 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0021, [43]. 113 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0005, [11]. 114 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0005, [11]. 115 T3909:28-T3910:3 and T3910:20-T3910:24 (Consolo). 116 WIT.005.001.0833 at 0855. 117 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0005, [11]. 118 See, for example: TLS.010.001.0033 (letter to ACA dated 28 October 2003); TLS.010.003.0008 (letter to ACA dated 20 November 2003); TLS.110.001.2119 (letter to DCITA dated 1 March 2004); TLS.110.001.0411 (letter to ACMA dated 3 August 2005); TLS.110.001.0267 (letter to DCITA dated 7 November 2005); TLS.110.001.1454 (letter to DCITA dated 17 February 2006); TLS.110.001.1051 (letter to Senator Helen Coonan, Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts dated 21 April 2006); TLS.010.001.0030 (letter to DCITA dated 19 June 2006); TLS.110.001.1451 (letter to EMA dated 21 December 2006); TLS.001.018.0012 (letter to Mr Philip Ruddock, Attorney-General, dated 3 July 2007); TLS.110.001.0588 (letter to Senator Helen Coonan, Minister for Communications, Information Technology & the Arts dated 23 July 2007). 119 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0007, [19]; TLS.010.003.0008 at 0010.

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legislative and regulatory amendments.120 Certainly Telstra had no objection to these steps if that was what was required.121

47. Access to the IPND was a pre-requisite for the implementation of a comprehensive (as distinct from an opt-in) location based CIWS.122

Messages to mobile phones based upon location rather than billing address

48. Sending messages to mobile phones based on billing address is a useful feature of Telstra’s CIWS, but has a very important limitation, namely, the very mobility of the service. A person’s billing address is usually either the address of his or her home or workplace, but people may spend much of their time away from either or both of those locations. A very important feature of Telstra's proposed CIWS is its capacity to track and send SMS messages to itinerant Telstra mobiles and mobiles roaming on Telstra’s mobile networks within a targeted geographic area. This uses Telstra’s network data rather than billing information from the IPND. (It should be feasible to also locate itinerant mobiles on the mobile networks of other carriers, but this will require the cooperation of other carriers.)

COAG announcement and tender for a national CIWS

49. On 30 April 2009 COAG issued a Communiqué advising, amongst other things, that:

COAG also agreed [at its meeting held on 30 April 2009] to take immediate steps to enhance Australia's natural disaster arrangements through the development of a telephone-based emergency warning system that will enable the States and Territories (the States) to deliver warnings to landline and mobile telephones based on the billing address of the subscriber to be operational by October 2009 and to undertake further research into a capability to deliver warnings based on the location of a mobile telephone.123

50. Victoria is to take the lead role in the tender process.124 Telstra has not yet been advised of the time-frames for the tender process, but stands ready and willing to submit a tender.125

51. No time-frame was proposed for the “further research into a capability to deliver warnings based on the location of a mobile telephone”.126

120 See for example Telstra's letter to the Minister for Communications, Information, Technology and the Arts dated 23 July 2007 (TLS.110.001.0588 at 0590-0592), which attached suggested necessary amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1997, the Carrier Licence Conditions (Telstra Corporation Limited) Declaration 1997 and the IPND Industry Code. 121 T3890:4-T3890:20 and T3891:29-T3892:9 (Consolo). 122 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0005, [11]. 123 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0034, [80]; TLS.001.019.0134 at 0135. 124 Pearce Ex 45 WIT.032.001.0001 at 0021, [102]; T310:8-T310:14 (Esplin). 125 T3903:12-T3903:18 (Consolo). 126 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0034, [80]; TLS.001.019.0134 at 0135.

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Mobile location capability

52. Also on 30 April 2009 COAG issued a media release stating that the Commonwealth will invest up to $15 million to assist the States and Territories to establish a national telephone emergency warning system.127 That media release stated that "technological gaps currently limit the system to sending alerts to mobile phones based on the billing address, rather than where the handset is at the time of the emergency". That statement is at best conservative and (based on the evidence adduced by Telstra to this Royal Commission) probably inaccurate. The capability to deliver warnings to mobile phones based on the “location area” (that is, a bundle of cells) already exists, although a development period is required in order to implement more targeted individual “cell based” location as part of a CIWS). Development of mobile phone location, including by individual base station, has formed part of a number of CIWS proposals by Telstra since 2006. Further, this technology (referred to as “cell broadcasting”) is already in use in other countries, in accordance with agreed international standards.128

Ability to manage network congestion

53. A key element of any telephony based early warning system is the ability to manage potential network congestion. This was recognised by both Mr Esplin129 and Professor Handmer, who accepted that the operator of the networks is best placed to monitor and manage the load on those networks as mass outbound calls or SMS messages are sent using a CIWS. 130

Performance of Telstra’s networks on 7 February 2009 demonstrates that they would have had capacity to carry an effective telephony based early warning

54. Telstra has provided comprehensive evidence detailing the performance of its fixed and mobile networks during the bushfires.131 That evidence demonstrates that Telstra's networks proved resilient to the fire front. There was direct fire damage to infrastructure on only 4 mobile base stations.132 There was some loss of functionality of other network elements. This occurred in one of two ways:

(a) First, loss of power to 23 network elements (RSS exchanges, Remote Access Units (RAUs) and mobile base stations), following interruption to mains power and the expiration of battery power before mains power was restored or the batteries could be recharged.133

127 TLS.001.027.0001 at 0002. 128 TEN.004.003.0099 at 0101 (Minutes of Inaugural Emergency Warning System Working Group, 30 May 2008). 129 T527:25-T528:17 (Esplin). 130 T3174:25-T3175:4 (Handmer). 131 See Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 and Jennings Ex 119 WIT.5004.001.0001. 132 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0017, [68]. 133 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0017, [68].

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(b) Secondly, direct fire damage to optical fibres located within pits. Significant fuel in the vicinity of the pits resulted in them being exposed to intense heat over an extended period.134 This eventually led to the optical fibres failing, causing a loss of transmission to some network elements.

55. Importantly, Telstra’s investigations have not revealed a single significant network element which ceased functioning in advance of the fire front, and most of the impact caused by interruption to mains power and damage to optical fibres under pits occurred many hours after the fire front had passed.135 For example:

(a) the Marysville and Taggerty RSS exchanges and RAUs at Narbethong and Buxton continued to function until the early hours of 8 February 2009,136 several hours after the evidence indicates the fire front passed through those towns;137

(b) it is estimated that the fire impacted Kinglake between 18:30 and 20:30.138 The exchange at Kinglake and the exchange at Kinglake West both lost mains power at 17:47 on 7 February but the sites continued to operate until the batteries expired over 11 hours later at 05:15 and 05:26 respectively on 8 February, long after the impact of the fire. Telstra’s mobile base station in Kinglake also continued to function without mains power until around 05:22 on 8 February;139

(c) similarly the Toolangi RSS exchange lost mains power at 17:18 on 7 February but the site continued to operate until the battery expired over 10 hours later at 04:10 on 8 February;140

(d) it is estimated fire crossed the Hume Highway at around 14:00141 on 7 February threatening the Wandong area. The first Telstra mobile base station to lose functionality on 7 February was located in Wandong North, and functionality was lost due to fire damage to optical fibre transmission cable at 14:51. Telstra’s mobile base station providing service in Wandong Central lost mains power at 17:14 on 7 February. However, the site continued to operate until battery power expired over 12 hours later at 06:25 on 8 February. The only fixed line services to be impacted in Wandong due to loss of functionality

134 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0016, [68]. 135 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0017, [70]. See too T3597:12-T3597:17, T3601:3-T3601:29, T3610:12-3610:21,

T3614:25-T3614:30, T3616:28-T3617:3, T3617:17-T3617:23 (Beresford). 136 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0017, [70]. 137 T130:3-T130:12 (Waller); Scott Ex 91 WIT.045.001.0001 at 0004-0005, [22]-[26]; Waller Ex 6 WIT.002.002.0001 at 0096,

[340]; Walter Ex 77 WIT.041.001.0001 at 0004-0005, [21-[26]; TEN.037.001.0018 at 0034; T4303:26-T4303:28 (Paterson); T935:10 (Ferguson); Ferguson Ex 29 WIT.022.001.0001 at 0003, [24]-[25]; Newman Ex 9 WIT.009.001.0001 at 0003, [14]; T134:19 (Waller).

138 T89:2-T89:3 (Rees) (18:30-20:30 - Kinglake impacted). 139 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0021, [92]. 140 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0021, [91]. 141 Rees Ex 4 WIT.004.002.0001 at 0004, [17] (13:58 - Fire crossed the Hume Highway); T2670:27 (Rees) (fire estimated to

cross the Hume at 14:00).

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of a powered network element (in this case a RAU) were at 06:17 on 8 February, after the expiration of the battery power to the RAU;142

(e) it is estimated the fire impacted Taggerty around 17:00143 on 7 February. However fixed line functionality continued in Taggerty until 00:49 on 8 February when the optical fibre under a pit which had been exposed to heat over an extended period ultimately failed;144

(f) it is estimated that spot fires were first seen in Healesville at 18:00145 on 7 February. However fixed line functionality continued in Healesville until 06:57 on 8 February when the optical fibre under a pit which had been exposed to heat over an extended period ultimately failed.146 Due to redundancy built in to the network servicing Healesville, not all of the fixed line services in Healesville were affected by this loss of functionality;

(g) it was reported that Labertouche came under ember attack at around 14:00 on 7 February.147 The Labertouche exchange lost mains power at 17:44 but the site continued to operate until the battery expired over 11 hours later at 05:22 on 8 February;148 and

(h) Horsham was first threatened by fire some time after 14:00149 on 7 February. Two RAUs that service part of Horsham lost mains power at 13:34150 and 14:40151 on 7 February.152 The sites continued to operate until battery power was exhausted over 13 hours later at 04:00 and 05:33 respectively on 8 February.

56. The fact that the loss of functionality to Telstra's network elements in particular areas generally occurred well after the fire front had passed through those areas is of particular significance in the context of an effective CIWS. It is self-evident that for an early warning to be effective, it must be delivered to persons in a particular geographic area before the fire front passes through that area. The evidence before the Commission demonstrates that Telstra’s fixed and mobile networks would have been capable of delivering such a warning to persons in areas impacted by the Black Saturday bushfires at all times prior to the fire front passing through those areas.

142 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0019-0022, [82]-[95]. 143 Waller Ex 6 WIT.002.002.0001 at 0097, [339] (18:30 North-eastern flank of the fire became an extensive front that impacted

the community of Buxton and went as far as Taggerty); Walter Ex 77 WIT.041.001.0001 at 0004-0005, [21]-[26] (Fire reached 121 Knafl Road, Taggerty).

144 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0023, [102]. 145Rees Ex 4 WIT.004.002.0001 at 0004, [21] (new fires at Healesville). 146 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0022, [96]. 147 Ex 7 SUMM.001.002.0001 at 0025. 148 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0024, [109]. 149 Ex 7 SUMM.001.002.0001 at 0226; Rees Ex 4 WIT.004.002.0001 at 0007, [47]. 150 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0019, [80]. 151 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0019, [79]. 152 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0019, [79].

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57. Professor Handmer initially suggested that exchange failure after mains power failure is a potential problem for a CIWS.153 However, this suggestion did not bear close scrutiny, and Professor Handmer accepted that in the context of a telephony warning system, exchange failure after mains power failure is not likely to be a problem because exchanges will continue to operate for some hours after a fire front has caused loss of power (because exchanges are powered by batteries).154 This was demonstrated by Mr Beresford's evidence.

58. Another potential issue for an effective CIWS is network congestion. Mr Beresford’s evidence was that there was virtually no congestion in Telstra’s fixed line network at any time on 7 or 8 February 2009.155 Similarly, in respect of mobile phones, Mr Jennings’ evidence156 was that:

(a) only a small number of base stations on Telstra’s Next G network experienced significant congestion;157

(b) whilst there was some congestion on the 2G network, both Telstra’s networks continued to carry calls at all times, except when a base station lost functionality as a consequence of fire damage; and

(c) because of the way Telstra configures its Next G base stations, they have a lot of inherent capacity, which enables them to carry significant levels of extra traffic.158

59. If warning messages had been dispatched to mobile phones by SMS by early afternoon on 7 February those messages would have preceded the heavy traffic levels.159 Further, as Telstra’s mobile base stations were continuing to carry calls during the peak periods, SMS messages would still have been successfully delivered with minimal impact on congestion, even at peak times, as a consequence of:

(a) SMS using a relatively small amount of network capacity;160

(b) SMS being a store and forward system which will send and resend a message until it is successfully delivered;161 and

(c) Telstra’s ability to monitor and manage network load.162

153 Handmer Ex 96 WIT.044.001.0002_R at .0023_R, [96] and 0027_R, [118]. 154 T3172:24-T3172:31 (Handmer). 155 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0013, [51]; T3602:26-T3606:30 (Beresford). 156 Jennings Ex 119 WIT.5004.001.0001 at 0018, [58]; T3954:23-T3956:11 (Jennings). 157 T3955:29-T3956:1 (Jennings: "On the Next G network there was little or no congestion in all of the base stations, excepting for a very small number which exhibited some congestion peaks during 7 and 8 February.")

158 T3958:25-T3958:29; T 3955:2-T3955:9 (Jennings).

159 WIT.5004.001.0155 and WIT.5004.001.0197. 160 T3170:10-T3170:12 (Handmer). 161 T3170:13-T3170:15 (Handmer). 162 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001at 0004, [10].

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60. The performance of Victoria's telephone network on 7 and 8 February 2009 was commented on by Professor Handmer, who stated that at this stage, based upon his team’s interviews of numerous persons affected by the bushfires, “there is no evidence that the phone system as a whole had any problems, except when towers were destroyed, which is beyond the control of anyone.”163

EYEfi SPARC

61. EYEfi SPARC is a remote video and telemetry system. It uses wireless or fixed line communications and is solar powered, enabling the rapid deployment of custom-built field equipment, cameras and weather stations into metropolitan, rural and regional areas.164 Video images from EYEfi mobile camera sites in remote areas (where there is no access to power or fixed-line telephony services) can be transmitted through Telstra's Next G wireless network to Telstra's Internet Data Centre facility in Melbourne, where connected agencies and authorities can access and view the information through a secure Internet connection.165

62. Among other features, EYEfi SPARC enables a user logged into the system to identify a fire’s location (latitudinal/longitudinal/altitudinal) within seconds.166 EYEfi SPARC also has the ability to identify and communicate other location information, such as micro-climate weather conditions and lightning detection, which are critical in the early detection of fire starts and events; and a “Geo Fence” function which allows users to collate information for that area such as key infrastructure or residents located in that area prior to issuing warnings.167

63. A 12 month Fire Tower pilot trial commenced in March 2008 under a formal trial agreement between EYEfi, the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner (OESC), DSE, Telstra and Melbourne Water.168 The Fire Tower pilot deployed the standard EYEfi system (camera, solar equipment and communications equipment) into the field at four sites in Victoria.169 That pilot trial has since been extended.170

64. Images of the recent Victorian bushfires were transmitted from the four trial sites during the bushfires and utilised by DSE and Melbourne Water. The footage transmitted included elements of the fire that could not otherwise have been witnessed by fire crews.171

163 T3177:12-T3177:15 (Handmer). 164 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0035, [85]. 165 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001 at 0036, [90]. 166 Langdon Ex 31 WIT.016.001.0001 at 0003, [19]-[20]. 167 Langdon Ex 31 WIT.016.001.0001 at 0003, [24]. 168 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.001 at 0037, [92]. 169 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.001 at 0037, [92]. 170 Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.001 at 0037, [94]. 171 Langdon Ex 31 WIT.016.001.0001 at 0004-0005, [35]-[38].

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65. EYEfi SPARC could be used in combination with Telstra’s CIWS, including to deliver targeted messages to mobiles and fixed lines within areas identified as threatened by the EYEfi SPARC system.172

Telstra’s response to Counsel Assisting’s proposed “key findings”

66. Telstra is in general agreement with many of the proposed key findings set out in Section 2.3.3 of Counsel Assisting’s Submissions. However, some aspects of those proposed “key findings” require qualification or correction. In particular:

(a) Paragraph 2.3.3(h) states:

The delay was also due in part to the fact that until after the 2009 fires, the States and Commonwealth had not agreed on the appropriate model for a national system.

The evidence establishes that this delay was in no way attributable to Telstra, and indeed arose despite Telstra’s best efforts. At all times after 2003 Telstra sought an expeditious implementation of a CIWS, and (subject to access to the IPND) stood ready, willing and able to deliver such a CIWS.173

(b) Paragraph 2.3.3(k) is inaccurate in several respects. Firstly, the SMS message sent by Telstra to its customers on 2 March 2009 was not sent to customers with a billing address in Victoria, but rather was sent to all mobile telephones of Telstra customers recorded as having been switched on in Victoria or in Tasmania in a timeframe agreed between Telstra and Victoria Police. 174 Secondly, the statement attributed to Mr Esplin is incomplete. Mr Esplin in fact stated that prior to 7 February he “would have no confidence that we would have got the agreement of the carriers to do it in the time it was done” (our emphasis). Also, this statement comprises speculation regarding a hypothetical situation, and therefore should not constitute a “key finding”.

(c) With respect to paragraph 2.3.3(l), Telstra agrees that this reflects COAG’s announcement, but emphasises that the capability to target SMS messages based on the location of handsets already exists.

Telstra’s response to Counsel Assisting’s proposed recommendations

67. Telstra generally agrees with the recommendations proposed by Counsel Assisting in relation to CIWS, but submits that recommendation (a) is inadequate and should be supplemented. That recommendation as presently framed is that:

The Commonwealth and COAG should ensure that implementation of stage one of the new national emergency warning system prior to bushfire season 2009-2010.

172 T3906:20-T3907:14 (Consolo). 173 See generally Consolo Ex 118 WIT.5000.001.0001; T3881:9-T3903:18 (Consolo); T1534:23-1535:22 (Pearce). 174 TLS.010.001.0029.

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68. In Telstra's submission, the recommendation should extend to implementing stage two of the proposed new national emergency warning system - the delivery of warning messages to mobile phones based on the handset's physical location. As set out above, the capability to deliver warnings to mobile phones based on location area already exists (although a development period is required in order to implement more targeted individual “cell based” location as part of a CIWS). This capability will increase the effectiveness of an emergency warning system and should be deployed as quickly as possible, preferably prior to the commencement of the next bushfire season. Telstra submits that proposed recommendation (a) should be supplemented by a recommendation that:

The Commonwealth, COAG and the State of Victoria determine immediately whether it is possible to deliver a cell-based mobile phone early warning solution by the 2009-2010 bushfire season, and, if so, ensure that such a solution is either available, or is progressed as far as possible, by the commencement of that bushfire season.

69. Additionally, the Commission has the benefit of significant evidence as to key elements of an effective CIWS. In Telstra's submission, the essential features of the proposed new national emergency warning system to be implemented prior to the 2009-2010 bushfire season, as referred to in proposed recommendation 2.3.3(a), should be specified in that recommendation. Those features should include:

(a) the capability to send voice recordings to all fixed line phones within a specified geographic area;

(b) the capability to send SMS messages to all mobile phones within a specified geographic area, with that capability based on both (i) billing addresses and (ii) identification of mobile phones by actual location, including to individual cell-level to the extent it is technical feasible to do so by or during the 2009 - 2010 bushfire season;

(c) the capability to manage both fixed line and mobile telecommunications traffic to impacted areas and to manage network load; and

(d) the capability to provide in field reporting, including lists by street addresses of all answered numbers, lists by street addresses of all un-answered calls and properties where no land-line telephone exists.

Additional recommendation proposed by Telstra

70. The effectiveness of the EYEfi SPARC system was demonstrated on 7 February 2009. Telstra submits that the Commission should recommend that:

The State of Victoria determine whether it is feasible to implement an EYEfi SPARC (or equivalent) system with live sites distributed throughout Victoria’s Bushfire Risk Zones by bushfire season 2009-2010, and if so to proceed with such implementation. To the extent possible, such system should be integrated with the recommended new national emergency warning system.

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“COMMUNICATIONS” ISSUES ON 7 FEBRUARY 2009 BETWEEN THE KANGAROO GROUND AND KILMORE ICCs (SECTIONS 8.1(o), 9.3 AND 9.4 OF COUNSEL ASSISTING’S SUBMISSIONS)

Telstra’s response to proposed “key findings” of Counsel Assisting

71. Counsel Assisting propose a number of key findings in relation to "communications" issues between the Kangaroo Ground and Kilmore ICCs on 7 February 2009. Telstra submits that the Commissioners should take care before adopting a number of these proposed findings, which are (with respect) loosely framed. It is correct that there were "communications" issues between the two ICCs on the day. However, it is very important to identify precisely the nature of those issues. They were not telephone network performance issues. They were not telephone network congestion issues. Any inability on the part of the Kangaroo Ground ICC to contact the Kilmore ICC on 7 February 2009 by telephone was simply because the Kilmore ICC phones were either engaged or were not being answered, or because the Kilmore ICC was not adequately equipped to perform its functions.

72. In particular, the Commissioners should exercise care before adopting the proposed findings set out in paragraphs 8.1(o), 9.3(e) and 9.4(b), which are to the effect that the Kangaroo Ground ICC "could not contact” the Kilmore ICC at times (or at least at critical times) on 7 February 2009. The evidence (as summarised below) does not support those proposed findings, at least as expressed in such broad and unqualified terms. Any findings on the inability of those at the Kangaroo Ground ICC to contact the Kilmore ICC at times or critical times on 7 February 2009 must be qualified by a further finding that any such inability did not stem from any telephone network failure, network congestion or other network issue, but rather was the product of lack of resources, in particular lack of sufficient landline phones, or lack of personnel to answer landline phones, at the Kilmore ICC.

73. There has been some evidence from CFA personnel about communication problems between the Kangaroo Ground and Kilmore ICCs on 7 February 2009. These communication problems were not explained by the relevant witnesses other than at a very general, non-specific and imprecise level. Suffice to say that the evidence establishes the following:

(a) there were numerous communications between the Kangaroo Ground and Kilmore ICCs throughout the day on 7 February 2009. The suggestion by Mr Jason Lawrence in his witness statement175 on several occasions that he was "unable to make contact" with the Kilmore ICC is not borne out by the evidence and is indeed inconsistent with some of it. Mr Lawrence’s witness statement is replete with references to communications made by him to other CFA personnel at the Kilmore ICC on 7 February 2009. For example:

175 Lawrence Ex 50 WIT.3004.001.0197.

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(i) at 3:50 p.m. Mr Lawrence spoke with Greg Murphy (who at that time was the Incident Controller at the Kilmore ICC);176

(ii) at 4:30 p.m. Mr Lawrence spoke with Stewart Kreltszhelm (who by then had taken over from Mr Murphy as Incident Controller at the Kilmore ICC);177

(iii) at 4:50 p.m. Mr Lawrence spoke with Peter Hayes, the Operational Officer at the Kilmore ICC;178

(iv) Mr Lawrence "continued to discuss jurisdiction during the course of the afternoon [of 7 February] with Kilmore ICC and Graeme Armstrong. Kilmore ICC confirmed they were still responsible for the fire";179

(v) at 11:45 p.m. Mr Lawrence spoke to Graham Healy, the Incident Controller at the Kilmore ICC;180

(vi) at 1:08 a.m. on 8 February 2009, Mr Lawrence spoke to John Bingham, the Operations Officer at the Kilmore ICC;181and

(vii) at 2:50 a.m. on 8 February 2009, Mr Lawrence again spoke to John Bingham at the Kilmore ICC.182

(b) Additionally, there was evidence from Leonie Hunter, who worked as the Information Officer at Kilmore ICC on 7 February 2009, that at approximately 5:18 p.m., Peter Stoddart of the Planning Section at the Kangaroo Ground ICC telephoned Kim Welsh at the Kilmore ICC, and that "Kim Welsh phoned Peter Stoddart on a couple of occasions to follow up on his request".183

(c) The explanation for any inability to make contact with the Kilmore ICC on 7 February 2009 is that the phones at the Kilmore ICC were either busy or were ringing out (i.e. were not being answered). Thus Mr Lawrence said in paragraph 20 of his statement that he "tried to contact Kilmore ICC on numerous occasions but was not able to make contact either by mobile phone or land lines both of which either rang out, were engaged or went to message bank".184 Mr Cowan confirmed that the nature of the "communications" problem between the Kangaroo Ground and Kilmore ICCs on 7 February 2009 was that the phones at the Kilmore ICC were either engaged or were

176 Lawrence Ex 50 WIT.3004.001.0197 at 0202, [23]. 177 Lawrence Ex 50 WIT.3004.001.0197 at 0203, [26]. 178 Lawrence Ex 50 WIT.3004.001.0197 at 0203, [27]. 179 Lawrence Ex 50 WIT.3004.001.0197 at 0203, [28]. 180 Lawrence Ex 50 WIT.3004.001.0197 at 0204, [34]. 181 Lawrence Ex 50 WIT.3004.001.0197 at 0204, [34]. 182 Lawrence Ex 50 WIT.3004.001.0197 at 0204, [35]. 183 Hunter Ex 55 WIT.3004.001.0129 at 0133, [22]. 184 Lawrence Ex 50 WIT.3004.001.0197 at 0202, [20].

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ringing out (i.e. not being answered).185 Alexander Caughey, a CFA officer who worked out of the Seymour RECC on 7 February 2009, identified a similar experience at the Seymour RECC. Mr Caughey’s evidence included that “during the day [7 February] my communication was a combination of mobile phone and hard line [land line] but the hard line was sometimes very hard to use simply because of the number of lines available and the plethora of calls that were coming in for the afternoon. I will say this much: the call rate that was coming in that afternoon at Seymour was way beyond what could possibly be coped with in terms of keeping [phone] logs."186

(d) Ms Hunter, who was the Information Officer at the Kilmore ICC on 7 February 2009, gave evidence that she was not aware of any communications problems between the Kangaroo Ground and Kilmore ICCs, and that "when we were phoning them [Kangaroo Ground ICC] we didn't have a problem at all" and that her colleague at the Kilmore ICC, Kim Welsh, did not have "any issues with contacting them".187 This is consistent with Mr Beresford’s evidence that there was no fixed line network congestion in either the Kangaroo Ground or the Kilmore area on 7 February 2009.188 Mr Cowan gave evidence that the Kangaroo Ground’s communications systems worked very well on 7 February 2009.189

(e) In paragraph 44 of his statement, Mr Lawrence refers to "a handwritten note that states that Kilmore ICC's communications are down".190 However, Ms Serafina Munns, who was working in the Information Unit at the Kangaroo Ground ICC from approximately 8 a.m. on 7 February 2009 until approximately 8 a.m. on 8 February 2009, gave evidence which clarified that the reference to “communications being down” at the Kilmore ICC was a reference to the fax machine and computer system not operating at the Kilmore ICC for a period of time, rather than telephone communications being down.191 Moreover, Ms Hunter gave evidence which put this issue in its proper perspective. She said there was an "initial problem we had at four o'clock" with regard to fax communications at the Kilmore ICC, "but we sent our faxes and emails at a later date for the threat warning 7 and they were - went where they were supposed to; so I’m not aware that there was any communication problems as such".192 The reason why the fax machine and computer system went down for a short period of time at around 4.00 p.m. at the Kilmore ICC is

185 T3750:17-T3750:24 (Cowan). 186 T1706:14-T1706:24 (Caughey). 187 T1728:31-T1729:7 (Hunter). 188 T3606:20-T3606:30 and T3627:29-T3628:4 (Beresford). 189 T3750:14-T3750:16 (Cowan). 190 Lawrence Ex 50 WIT.3004.001.0197 at 0207, [44].

191 Munns Ex 44 WIT.3004.001.0065 at 0073, [40]; T1367:6-T1367:15 (Munns). 192 T1726:22-T1726:29 (Hunter).

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not clear. Ms Hunter’s evidence was that "we weren't quite sure what the problem with the fax machine was".193 This illustrates the danger in relying on general and imprecise allegations of "communications" being "down" such as that given by Mr Lawrence.

COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE (SECTION 19 OF COUNSEL ASSISTING’S SUBMISSIONS)

74. Counsel Assisting's proposed "key findings" in paragraph 19.2(a) and (b) include:

(a) …Members of the public need to be able to contact emergency services in an emergency. Communications within and between emergency service agencies are vital to any effective and coordinated emergency response. A reliable and robust communications infrastructure is therefore essential.

(b) The Commission has heard evidence that indicates Victoria's communications infrastructure was placed under great stress on 7 February, and that there were difficulties in communicating with and within emergency services, and generally.

75. These proposed findings may be taken to imply that the communications infrastructure in Victoria proved deficient on 7 February. At least in so far as Telstra’s infrastructure is concerned, such an implication ought to be squarely addressed by positive findings consistent with the matters set out below, which have been clearly established on the evidence.

76. Telstra has adduced comprehensive evidence in relation to its communications infrastructure, including its fixed and mobile telephone networks and its managed radio network services provided to the DSE, the CFA, Victoria Police and Rural Ambulance Victoria. None of that evidence has been challenged. It clearly establishes the following:

(a) Telstra’s fixed and mobile telephone infrastructure proved to be resilient to the fire front, and while put under tremendous pressure, performed very well on 7 and 8 February in the face of the most severe bushfire in Victoria's history and the heavy traffic load placed on those networks.194

(b) The scale and severity of the fires meant that Telstra’s infrastructure was exposed to fire damage. This had an inevitable but relatively limited impact on the telecommunications services delivered.195

(c) Loss of functionality of network elements generally occurred many hours after the fire front had passed through the affected areas,196 and accordingly had

193 T1721:13-T1721:15 (Hunter). 194 See paragraphs 54-58 above. 195 Beresford Ex 112 WIT.5002.001.0001 at 0016, [66]-[67]. 196 See paragraphs 54-58 above.

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little impact on fixed or mobile telephone communications on 7 February, which was the critical day of the emergency.

(d) There was virtually no congestion on the fixed line network on 7 February.197

(e) Telstra’s Next G mobile network experienced significant congestion in only a small number of base stations.198

(f) Some congestion occurred at the cell level (i.e. at the base station part of the mobile network) as a consequence of the exceptionally high localised call volumes. The volume of traffic to most mobile cells in the bushfire affected areas was approximately three to five times the peak volume of traffic on the preceding days.199

(g) At the height of the fires, most mobile cells were heavily loaded but were still carrying calls (except where functionality was lost because of fire damage).200

(h) Telstra’s managed radio network services also performed exceptionally well.201 This is demonstrated by Mr Cowan’s evidence of Telstra having met its contracted grade of service for its various managed radio networks,202 and also by the letter dated 31 March 2009 from the Radio Communications Manager of DSE to Telstra which stated:

Would you also pass on to all Telstra staff involved in providing the service and especially those responding to emergencies during the fires, often at great personal effort, to provide the highest level of radio communications essential to the safety of personnel on the fire line and for efficient fire-fighting effort.

(i) Two of Telstra’s state managed radio network base stations were destroyed by the bushfires (Kinglake and Mt Stanley). However, the destruction of these base stations did not have any significant impact on any of the ESOs or their radio communications.203

(j) There was evidence from various CFA officers about problems with CFA radio coverage and performance on 7 February 2009. However, without exception, each of these CFA radio issues concerned CFA’s local radio networks (which are owned, operated and controlled by the CFA, not Telstra), and not the

197 See paragraphs 54-58 above. 198 Jennings Ex 119 WIT.5004.001.0001 at 0018, [58]. 199 Jennings Ex 119 WIT.5004.001.0001 at 0018, [58]. 200 Jennings Ex 119 WIT.5004.001.0001 at 0018, [58]. 201 See generally Cowan Ex 113 WIT.5001.001.001. 202 Cowan Ex 113 WIT.5001.001.001 at 0027-0029, [107]-[112]; T 3661:4-T3662:3 (Cowan). 203 Cowan Ex 113 WIT.5001.001.001 at 0021-0025 and 0027, [78]-[87], [88]-[95], [106]; T3656:3-T3656:12 (Cowan); T3658:18-T3659:3 (Cowan); T3660:9-T3660:23 (Cowan); T3670:1-T3670:2 (Cowan); T3670:3-T3670:18 (Cowan).

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Telstra CFA Radio Network, the coverage of which is confined to only four CFA regions in Victoria.204

(k) There was also some (hearsay) evidence given by Deputy Commissioner Walshe concerning the performance of the Telstra Victoria Police Network in the Marysville area.205 That evidence was responded to by Mr Cowan in paragraphs 114-127 of his statement, and Mr Cowan’s evidence was not subsequently challenged. Mr Cowan’s evidence clearly establishes that the problems adverted to by Deputy Commissioner Walshe were not network performance issues, and this was accepted by Deputy Commissioner Walshe in his oral evidence.206 The Telstra Victoria Police Network was performing on 7 February 2009 at Marysville precisely as specified. It was for the Victoria Police dispatch operator to prioritise communications on the network and take necessary steps to avoid "congestion".207

77. Counsel Assisting does not presently propose any recommendation in relation to Victoria's communications infrastructure, which it says will be a subject of evidence in future hearings. Telstra agrees that no recommendations are warranted on the existing evidence, which is largely confined to Telstra’s telecommunications infrastructure and its robust performance during the bushfires.

Dated: 30 June 2009

Michael Garner

Freehills Solicitors for Telstra

204 T3670:26-T3673:10 (Cowan). 205 Walshe Ex 19 WIT.003.002.0001 at 0029-0030, [115]-[121]. 206 T1199:10-T1199:23 (Walshe); T3664:6-T3664:13 (Cowan). 207 Cowan Ex 113 WIT.5001.001.001 at 0032, [122].

SUBM.100.010.0035