(2011) Case Studies in Defence Procurement & Logistics: Case Study - Operation Granby 1991

Case Studies in

Defence Procurement & Logistics

Volume I: From World War II to thePost Cold-War World

Edited by David Moore

Case Studies in


Ca

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Defen

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& Lo

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This book provides nineteen cases focusing on defence acquisition and

logistics issues that will give excellent learning opportunities to a range

of readers. These include defence manufacturing, procurement, inventory

and change management, as well as operational logistic scenarios.

This collection of cases should appeal to a wide-ranging audience

including military personnel, those on defence education and training

programmes, those in the defence industry, defence agencies and those

engaged in defence-related research (an example being under- and

post-graduate students on international politics and strategic studies

courses).

However, such is the nature of these cases that they will also be

relevant to and interesting for under- and post-graduate programmes in

purchasing and logistics. They are suitable for use on MBA, PgDip and

PgCert management courses.

As well as featuring nineteen cases, there is a foreword, notes on

contributors, full acknowledgements, preface, notes on courses and

subject areas to which the book has relevance. There is also a chapter on

the nature of defence acquisition, logistics and supply chain management.

Ed

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by Dav

id M

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Contents

Foreword..............................................................................................................................i Contributors.......................................................................................................................iiiAcknowledgements..............................................................................................................vi Preface...............................................................................................................................vii Book Overview..................................................................................................................viii

Introduction

The Changing and Developing Nature of Procurement, Logistics and ISupply Chain Management in the Contemporary Defence Environment

Part 1. Defence Logistics & Supply Chain Strategy.......1

Case 1.1 From Helen to Helmand..............................................3 A Short History of Military Logistics

Case 1.2 Amphibious Operations............................................23 Sea Lion vs. Overlord: A Comparative Analysis Case 1.3 Burma.......................................................................41 Logistics Strategy in South-East Asia

Case 1.4 Operation Overlord...................................................55 Supply Chain Innovation during World War II Case 1.5 Operation Corporate.................................................69 Amphibious Logistics Support in the Falklands Case 1.6 Operation Granby.....................................................87 Logistics Support during the Gulf War

Part 2. Defence Procurement.......................................107

Case 2.1 EM-2.......................................................................109 A Rifle Ahead of its Time: The EM-2 (Rifle No. 9, Mk. 1)

Case 2.2 TSR-2.....................................................................127 The Plane That Barely Flew – A Case Study in Single Service Procurement Case 2.3 Rapier.....................................................................145 The Procurement of an Air Defence Missile System for the British Army Case 2.4 Horizon....................................................................155 European Collaborative Procurement: The Horizon Common New Generation Frigate Case 2.5 JSF..........................................................................177 Multi-National Collaborative Procurement: The Joint Strike Fighter Programme Case 2.6 JSF Alternatives.....................................................253 Multi-Service Procurement: Revenge of the Fighter Mafia – Alternatives Beyond the JSF Programme to Meet UK Carrier-Bourne Aviation Requirements

Part 3. Defence Procurement & Logistics Challenges...267

Case 3.1 Small Arms Design................................................269 The .256” British: A Lost Opportunity Case 3.2 Army Foundation College......................................277 An Exercise in Procurement and Marketing Management Case 3.3 Support Chain Management in the RAF................277 ‘An Air Bridge Too Far’: Support Chain Management in the Royal Air Force

Case 3.4 Exercise Saser Kangri............................................297 Mountaineering in the Karakoram Range Case 3.5 Strategic Mobility..................................................303 Long Range Logistics and Joint Integration

Case 3.6 Humanitarian Logistics..........................................315 Swords, Ploughshares and Supply Chains: NGO and Military Integration in Disaster Relief Operations

Case 3.7 Expeditionary Operations.......................................335 Key Issues Affecting the Provision of Logistic Support to the UK Armed Forces in Expeditionary Operations Learning and Development Notes for Selected Part 3 Cases....353

Index........................................................................................................369

Contributors

Editor

David Moore is currently Director of the Centre for DefenceAcquisition within theDepartmentofEngineeringSystemsandManagement,CranfieldUniversityattheDefenceAcademy's College of Management and Technology in Shrivenham. His varied career has includedmanagerialpositionsinboththepublicandprivatesector.HefinishedhisfinaltourintheRoyalLogisticCorps(RLC)attherankofLt.Colonel.DavidhasalsodevelopedandimplementedPurchasingandLogisticscoursesforarangeofmajorclientsaswellasMBAprogrammeswhilstattheUniversityofGlamorgan.

Authors

Peter D. Antill iscurrentlya researchassistantworkingforCranfieldUniversityat theDefenceAcademy’sCollegeofManagement andTechnology inShrivenham.Peterhaspracticalexperienceintheserviceindustryaswellasthecivilservice.AdegreeholderfromStaffordshireUniversityandtheUniversityCollegeofWales,AberystwythhealsoholdsaPGCE(PostCompulsoryEducation)fromOxfordBrooksUniversity.Apublishedauthor,he is currently conducting post-graduate research into British defence policy, historical procurementprogrammesandexpeditionaryoperationsaswellasprivatelycollaboratingwithtwocolleaguesinamilitaryhistoryproject,locatedathttp://www.historyofwar.org.

Dr. Jeffrey P. Bradford is a trans-Atlantic defence and national security consultant, formerlywithBabcockInternationalGroupPLCandpriortothat,aspecialistwithArthurD.LittleInc. incorporatestrategywithintheaerospaceanddefencesector.Inaddition,Jeffrey holds degrees from Staffordshire,Aberystwyth and Cranfield University at theRoyal College of Military Science, Shrivenham.

Jonathan P. DaviesspentayearworkingasaresearchassistantforCranfieldUniversityin theCentre forDefenceAcquisition,workingonnumerouscasestudies,conferences,reportsandbooksregardingavarietyofacquisitionrelatedtopics.PriortothisheattendedSwanseaUniversity,whereheattainedafirstclasshonoursdegreereadingWarandSociety.Currently he is spending time in South East Asia educating himself in both the language and culture of China.

Ivar Hellberg isaformerofficer in theRoyalMarineswhose thirty-sevenyearservicecareersawdeploymentsinawidevarietyofrolesincludinglogisticsandthespecialforces.DuringthistimehesawactiveserviceintheFalklandsWar(1982)andhascommanded

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theRoyalMarinesCommandoLogisticsRegimentaswellasservingasdefenceattachétoIndonesia.IvariscurrentlyaconsultantatCranfieldUniversity,DA-CMTspecialisinginSouth East Asia, Logistics, Strategic Mobility and Global Security issues.

Pete Ito hasservedasaLecturerandResearcherinDefenceAcquisitionsinceSeptember2008.HeistheAcademicLeaderontheAcquisitionEmploymentTrainingcourse,isalecturer on Through Life Capability Management, and delivers the Introductory Studies and ResearchMethodologycoursesintheDefenceAcquisitionManagementMSc.AfterearningaBachelor’sdegreeinPoliticalSciencefromtheUniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley,anda JurisDoctor (law)degree and aMasters degree in InternationalAffairs fromGeorgeWashingtonUniversityinWashington,D.C.,Peteworkedfor25yearsasaForeignServiceOfficer for theU.S.StateDepartment. Heserved inSeoul,SouthKorea;Copenhagen,Denmark;BonnandBerlin,Germany;TheHague,TheNetherlandsandWashington,D.C.Hisprimaryfocuswaspoliticalaffairs,particularlydefenceandsecuritypolicy.Heservedas the head of the Political-Military Affairs section in Berlin, as Counsellor for Political and Economic Affairs in Copenhagen and as the Deputy Permanent Representative for the U.S.DelegationtotheOrganizationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeaponslocatedinTheHague.HejoinedCranfieldUniversityinSeptember2007,workingasaresearcherinthe areas of strategic management and change management, before moving to his current position.

David Jenkinsservedfortwenty-sevenyearsintheBritishArmyonarangeofprocurement,training and education programmes including being the lead designer and implementation manager on the successful Army Foundation College PFI programme and theArmy’sprinciple training advisor to the Defence ProcurementAgency(DPA).DaijoinedtheCentreforDefenceAcquisitioninJuly2008andhashadacrucialroleinthedesign,developmentanddeliveryofarangeofacquisitiontrainingprogrammes,mostnotablythosefocusedonCapabilityManagement.He alsomanages theWelshRugbyUnion 7sTeamon theinternational rugby circuit.

Lt Cdr. Larry Parker,UnitedStatesNavy,servedasaSurfaceWarfareOfficer.Heretiredin July 2000 and began teaching Navy Junior ROTC. He currently chairs the Naval Science DepartmentatSunValleyHighSchool inMonroe,NC. Inhis free time,LCDRParkerpursuesalifelongpassionformilitaryhistorywhilehisson,Nathan,continuesthefamilytradition of service as a United States Marine. Sea Lion vs. Overlord is the result of extensive researchandpersonalexperienceasDeckOfficeronboardUSSPortland(LSD-37).

Dr. Peter TathamjoinedtheRoyal Navy in 1970 and served in a variety of appointments duringhiscareerof some35years.Highlights includeLogisticsOfficerof theAircraft

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Carrier HMS Invincible in 1994/5 during Operations in Bosnia against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia,andChiefStaffOfficerresponsibleforallhighlevelPersonnelandLogistics issues emanating from the 10,000 sailors and 30 surface ships in the Royal Navy (1999-2000).HisfinalthreeyearsintheServicewerespentintheUK’sDefenceLogisticsOrganisationwhere hewas responsible for key elements of the internal programmeofChange Management (2000-2004). During this period, he also gained an MSc in Defence Logistic Management. Following his retirement from the RN, he joined the staff ofCranfieldUniversitywherehe lectures inHumanSystemsandHumanitarianLogistics.HehasrecentlybeenawardedhisPhDforresearchintotheissuessurroundingtheroleofsharedvalueswithinmilitarysupplynetworks.

Prof. Trevor Taylor was formerly Head of the Department of Defence ManagementandSecurityAnalysisatCranfieldUniversity’sfacultyat theRoyal Military College of ScienceintheUK.HewaspreviouslyProfessorofInternationalRelationsatStaffordshireUniversityandbetween1990and1993wasHeadoftheInternationalSecurityProgrammeat the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. He is also a past Chairman of the British International Studies Association and has been Visiting Professor at the National Defence Academy in Tokyo. He was educated at the London School of Economics(B.Sc(Econ) and PhD) and Lehigh University (MA) in Pennsylvania. He has published extensivelyonEuropeansecurityanddefenceindustrialissues,andiscurrentlyworkingonthe political and defence implications of defence restructuring in Europe.

Christianne Tipping is an independent defence analyst and Research Associate of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). Until July 2008, shewasHeadoftheDefenceLeadershipandManagementProgrammeatRUSI,researchingissues relating to procurement, logistics, personnel, training, ethos, organisational developmentandleadership.ShejoinedtheInstitutein2006aftercompletinganMBA.Previously, she had spent several years as aRoyalAir Force officer, fulfilling trainingsupport roles in ground andflying trainingunits and acquiring specialist knowledge inmilitary ethos and leadershipdevelopmentwhileworking as a staff officer in the teamwhichformulatedtheRAF’sstrategiesintheseareas. ChristiannejoinedtheRAFafterspendingsometimeworkingingeneralistHRintheprivatesectorhavingcompletedaBScin Biological Science and a Postgraduate Diploma in Human Resource Management. She isaFellowoftheCharteredInstituteofPersonnelandDevelopment.

Anthony G. Williams is an independent consultant specialising in small arms and automatic cannon. He has written many magazine articles and has authored or co-authoredthefollowingbooks:Rapid Fire (2000); Flying Guns (three volumes, 2003-4); Assault Rifle (2004) and Machine Gun (2008). He is also co-editor (since 2005) of Jane’s

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Ammunition Handbook and editor (since 2004) of The Cartridge Researcher, the bulletin oftheEuropeanCartridgeResearchAssociation.Hemaintainsawebsiteonmilitarygunsandammunitionatwww.quarry.nildram.co.uk

Stuart Young joinedCranfieldUniversity in 2008 as aDeputyDirector in theCentreforDefenceAcquisitionwherehehasaparticularinterestintherelationshipbetweentheMoD and Industry across the supplychainand thedevelopmentofstrategies formajoracquisitionprogrammes.Stuart joined theRoyal Navy in 1977 as a Maritime Engineer Officer,doingapost-graduatelevelqualificationatthe Royal Naval Engineering College in Plymouth. He has served in a variety of operational posts at sea but also a number of acquisition-related appointments in the Ministry of Defence. This has includedspendingthreeyearsastheDefenceEquipmentMarineEngineerwiththeDefenceStaffat theBritishEmbassy inWashingtonDCand servingas theElectricShipProgrammeManager in the Defence ProcurementAgencywithdirectresponsibilityforamajorUK-France technology development programme. He has also been involved in the selection of innovative technologies for the Type 45 destroyer and CVF programmes and served in the DLO, the Defence Electronic Commerce Service and in the Defence Management and Leadership Centre in Shrivenham.

Acknowledgements

While a number of case studieswere specificallywritten or adapted for this book, theEditorwouldliketothankthefollowingfortheirkindpermissiontoincludethementionedmaterial:

Stuart Young, Prof. Trevor Taylor and Dr Peter Tatham for the Rapier case study, a versionofwhichfirstappearedintheIDEAA2011casestudybook.AnthonyG.Williamsforhis.256” British article.Christianne Tipping and RUSI for the Key Issues paper.LtCdr.LarryParkerforhispieceonSea Lion vs. Overlord.Dr Jeff Bradford for his JSF Alternatives paper.

TheEditorwouldalsoliketothankJonathanP.Daviesforhiscontributioninputtingthisbooktogether.However,thiswholeprojecttodesign,developandpublishthebookwouldnothavehappenedwithoutthetotalcommitmentofPeterD.AntillandtheEditorwishestorecordhisheartfeltthanksforalltheworkthatPeterhasundertaken.

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Case 1.6 // Operation Granby

Logistics Support during the Gulf War

David M. Moore and Peter D. AntillCentreforDefenceAcquisition,CranfieldUniversity,DefenceAcademyoftheUK.

Jeffrey P. BradfordDefence and National Security Consultant

Introduction

This case-study discusses the impact of logistics on military operations and seeks toexamine the relatively recent conflict in the PersianGulf between Iraq and theUnited Nationscoalition in1991.Thecasewill seek toevaluate the importanceof logistics indetermining the force structure deployed and strategy employed in the liberation of KuwaitduringFebruary1991.Thecasewillexaminetheroleoflogisticsbyapplyingwhathavebeenregardedasthefiveessentialprinciplesofsuccessfullogistics;foresight,economy,flexibility,simplicityandco-operation.1

The Invasion of Kuwait (August 1990)

Operation DesertSword,thegroundwartoliberateKuwait,wastheculminationofamulti-stagemilitaryplansetinmotionfollowingtheinvasionofKuwaitbyIraqinAugust1990.The invasion itselfwas the resultofadisputebetween the twocountries theoriginsofwhichgobackgenerationsbutwerefuelledbythedisputeovertheRumailaoilfield.Iraqclaimed that KuwaitwaspumpingmoreoilfromthefieldthanitwasentitledtoandthatitwasignoringtheOrganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production quotassetin1980andsellingmorethanitshouldontheopenmarketthusloweringtheprice of oil and Iraq’sincome.Iraqalsohadhistoricclaimstotheland,claimingitwasoncepart of the Basra Province and should have been made part of Iraqin1932.

ThingscametoaheadwhentheIraqisdemanded$16.5billionincompensation(forthe illegal pumping and loss of revenue) and cancellation of the $12 billion debt that IraqhadrunupinthewarwithIran.TheKuwaitisrefused.AsoccupyingKuwaitwouldwipeoutmuchofitsdebt,provideextrafundsandcontrolofmajoroilreserves,Iraqinvaded.

Case Studies in Defence Procurement and Logistics

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The Iraqi invasionwas preceded by amilitary build-up on its border with Kuwaitin a show of force.Thiswas detected early on in the crisis, but the intentions of Iraqwerecloakedbydiplomaticmoves,whichledotherArableaderstobelievethatoneArabcountrywouldnotfightanother.2 TheattackitselfwasspearheadedbythreedivisionsoftheeliteIraqiRepublicanGuards,thebestequipped,trainedandpoliticallyreliableoftheArmedForces.ThesedivisionswerecomparedpsychologicallybyDanis(1991)directlywithNapoleon’sOldGuard.3At02:00a.m. local time theattackerscrossed theborder,rapidlyoverwhelmingtheKuwaitiDefenceForces,inanattackwhichcapturedthecapital,KuwaitCityinundertwenty-fourhours.Whilstasuccess,thefailuretocapturetheRoyalFamilywhichescapedtoSaudiArabiawasafatalflaw,asitleftanorganisedsourceoflegitimateoppositiontotheaggression,outofreachoftheIraqileadership.

Following the invasion, regularArmy divisions entered Kuwait, andmoved to thesouthern borderwithSaudiArabiawhere they preceded to erect defensive positions, ataskatwhichtheIraqiArmyexcelledafterspendingthemajorityofitswarwithIranonthedefensive.ThisreflectedIraq’sstrategicculture,aimingtodefeatattemptsatre-takingKuwaitbypreparingtofightadefensivewarofattrition,alongthelinesoftheeightyearwarwithIran.TheRepublicanGuardswerewithdrawntotheKuwaitiborderwithIraq,wheretheyformedthecoreofthetheatrereserve,availabletoperformoperationselsewherepromptingAmericanconcernsofafurtherattackontheoilfieldsofSaudi Arabia.4

The Political Response

Theuniquenatureoftheinternationalenvironmentatthistime,facilitatedthewishesoftheUnited States and its European allies to come to the aid of Kuwait.TheendoftheColdWarenabled a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions to be passed facilitating “thegreatestmilitarydeploymentandlogisticaleffortsinceWorldWarII,followedbythemost rapid and decisive victory of its scale.”5

Desert Shield and the Logistics Effort (Aug. 1990 – Jan 1991)

These resolutions enabled the commencement of Operation Desert Shield on the 7th August 1990. ColdWarAmerican contingency planning for combating SovietmilitaryoperationsintheMiddleEasthadrecentlybeenupdatedtotakeaccountofthechangesin the international environment. The revised plan had been designated Operational Plan (draft)1002-90andhadbeentestedinacommandpostexerciseonlyafewweeksbeforethe crisis.With the Iraqi invasion, the crisisUSCENTCOMhadorganised, trainedand


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Figure 1.6.1: United States Strategic Airlift by aircraft type.

As can be clearly observed from an analysis from the table that in spite of the threat ofconflict,commercialaircraftprovidedbetweenafifthandaquarterofthetotalairlift

planned for had come, and once King Fahd of SaudiArabiahadaskedforassistance,itwasrapidly implemented. The deployment, code-named Operation Desert Shield began on the 7thAugust,andaswellastherapiddeploymentofAmericantroopstothePersianGulfitsought to build a coalition to enforce the United Nations sanctions placed upon Iraq.6

Theparatroopersofthe82ndAirborneDivisionstartedarrivingonthe8th,withelementsof the 101st Air Assault and 24th Mechanised Divisions leaving CONUS for Saudi Arabia bythe13thAugustandtheforwardelementsofthe1stMarineExpeditionaryForce(the1stMarineDivisionplusitsassociatedair-wing)arrivinginthepeninsulaonthe12thAugust.These units had completed deployment by September 20th. From the end of September until heendofJanuary,sawamassivebuild-upofmilitaryresourcesbyanumberofstates.Thisisunderlinedbyanumberofimpressivestatistics.Inthefirstforty-fivedaysofDesert Shield, moreAmericanpersonnelweredeployedthaninthefirstyearoftheVietnam commitment.

The American military airlift in the eight months of the campaign delivered nearly six timesmoresupplies thantheentire1948–1949Berlin Airlift.7Logisticalrequirementsincludedsome1.44millionmeals,34milliongallonsofwaterand1.7billionbarrelsofpetrol, oil and lubricants per day.8 The United States Armed Forces utilised not only their military airlift capability, to reinforce their units in the Persian Gulf, but also resorted to commercial carriers.Figure1.6.1belowshows thepercentagecargocarriedbyaircrafttype throughout the crisis.9

20th. From the end of September until he end of January, saw a massive build-up of

military resources by a number of states. This is underlined by a number of impressive

statistics. In the first forty-five days of Desert Shield, more American personnel were

deployed than in the first year of the Vietnam commitment.

The American military airlift in the eight months of the campaign delivered nearly six

times more supplies than the entire 1948 - 1949 Berlin Airlift. (7) Logistical

requirements included some 1.44 million meals, 34 million gallons of water and 1.7

billion barrels of petrol, oil and lubricants per day. (8) The United States Armed Forces

utilised not only their military airlift capability, to reinforce their units in the Persian

Gulf, but also resorted to commercial carriers. Table One below shows the percentage

cargo carried by aircraft type throughout the crisis. (9)

Figure 1.4.1: United States Strategic Airlift by aircraft type.

Month C-141 C-5 KC-10 Commercial

Aug-90 38% 44% 1% 17%

Sep-90 80% 12% 2% 6%

Oct-90 25% 51% 4% 20%

Nov-90 28% 49% 3% 20%

Dec-90 29% 37% 4% 30%

Jan-91 30% 39% 1% 30%

Feb-91 31% 35% 0% 34%

Mar-91 24% 38% 0% 38%

Aug-90

Sep-90

Oct-90

Nov-90

Dec-90

Jan-91

Feb-91

Mar-91

0%10%

20%30%40%50%

60%70%80%

90%100%

% C

arg

o C

arr

ied

Aug-90

Sep-90

Oct-90

Nov-90

Dec-90

Jan-91

Feb-91

Mar-91

Month

US Strategic Airlift by Aircraft Type

Commercial

KC-10

C-5

C-141

As can be clearly observed from an analysis from the table that in spite of the threat of

conflict, commercial aircraft provided between a fifth and a quarter of the total airlift

during the months of preparation and the campaign itself. The British airlift requirement

as part of Operation Granby, was supplemented by sorties from other NATO countries

as well as obtaining significant support from the United States. The latter support was

necessary for the larger helicopters which needed shipment to Saudi Arabia. (10)

It is important to note however, that airlift is expensive and certain cargoes such as main

battle tanks (which can weigh up to sixty tons) cannot be carried efficiently by this

mode of transport. Sea-lift was, as ever, a vital medium for transporting these cargoes to

the Theatre of Operations. Table 2 below, shows a month-by-month analysis of US

deliveries by sea. (11)


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Figure 1.6.2: US Sea-lift Deliveries by Cargo Type

Whenconsideringthetableabove,itisimportanttonotetherequirementforPetrol,Oiland Lubricants (POL).Thiscouldbeseenasarathersurprisingrequirement,seeingastheconflictwasinthemostoil-richregiononEarth.But,whenoneconsidersthesophisticatednatureoftheproductsinquestionandtheneedtomanufacturethematspecialistfacilitieswhicharelocatedintheoilconsumingnations,therequirementbecomesclear.

For the British ArmedForces,sea-liftwasnotsoplentiful.TheHouseofCommonsDefenceCommitteenotedthat“thesea-liftwasheavilydependantinsomecategoriesofships, from a handful of countries”.12Furthermore,itwasnotedthattherewasadistinctreluctance on the part of shipping companies to disrupt their commercial activity to assist infulfillingthetransportationrequirements.

However,itisimportanttorealisethatthislogisticalbuild-upanddeploymentofforceswas allowed to proceed uninhibited by the IraqiArmed Forces. Such a deployment to

duringthemonthsofpreparationandthecampaignitself.TheBritishairliftrequirementaspart of Operation Granby,wassupplementedbysortiesfromotherNATOcountriesaswellasobtainingsignificantsupportfromtheUnitedStates.ThelattersupportwasnecessaryforthelargerhelicopterswhichneededshipmenttoSaudi Arabia.10

Itisimportanttonotehowever,thatairliftisexpensiveandcertaincargoessuchasmainbattletanks(whichcanweighuptosixtytons)cannotbecarriedefficientlybythismodeoftransport.Sea-liftwas,asever,avitalmediumfortransportingthesecargoestotheTheatreofOperations.Figure1.6.2belowshowsamonth-by-monthanalysisofUSdeliveriesbysea.11Figure 1.4.2: US Sea-lift Deliveries by Cargo Type

US Sealift Deliveries by Cargo Type

Cargo

Ammunition

POL

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

160000

180000

Aug-90

Sep-90

Oct-90

Nov-90

Dec-90

Jan-91

Feb-91

Mar-91

M onth

To

nn

ag

e

POL

Ammunition

Cargo

When considering the table above, it is important to note the requirement for Petrol, Oil

and Lubricants (POL). This could be seen as a rather surprising requirement, seeing as

the conflict was in the most oil-rich region on Earth. But, when one considers the

sophisticated nature of the products in question and the need to manufacture them at

specialist facilities which are located in the oil consuming nations, the requirement

becomes clear.

For the British Armed Forces, sea-lift was not so plentiful. The House of Commons

Defence Committee noted that “the sea-lift was heavily dependant in some categories of

ships, from a handful of countries.” (12) Furthermore, it was noted that there was a

distinct reluctance on the part of shipping companies to disrupt their commercial activity

to assist in fulfilling the transportation requirements.

However, it is important to realise that this logistical build-up and deployment of forces

was allowed to proceed uninhibited by the Iraqi Armed Forces. Such a deployment to a

distant country’s air and sea ports while being free from interdiction and interception

should be viewed as a unique situation, which is unlikely to be repeated in the future.

Operation Desert Storm: The Air Campaign (January - February 1991)

Following the expiry of the United Nation’s deadline for Iraq to vacate it’s self-declared

‘19th Province’, the coalition moved from a defensive stance to an offensive one. On

January 17th at 02:38 a.m. (local time), the air campaign, known as Operation Desert

Storm commenced. The plan comprised four distinct phases. The first, envisaged a

strategic air campaign aimed at twelve different types of target including those

facilitating Iraq’s ability to support and communicate with it’s occupation force in the

D


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adistantcountry’sairandseaportswhilebeing free frominterdictionand interceptionshouldbeviewedasauniquesituation,whichisunlikelytoberepeatedinthefuture.

Operation Desert Storm: The Air Campaign (January – February 1991)

FollowingtheexpiryoftheUnitedNation’sdeadlineforIraqtovacateitsself-declared‘19th Province’, the coalitionmoved from a defensive stance to an offensive one. OnJanuary 17th at 02:38 a.m. (local time), the air campaign, known asOperationDesert Storm commenced. The plan comprised four distinct phases. The first, envisaged astrategicaircampaignaimedattwelvedifferenttypesoftargetincludingthosefacilitatingIraq’sabilitytosupportandcommunicatewithit’soccupationforceintheKuwaitTheatreof Operations, Iraqi infrastructure and its military/industrial complex. The first phaselastedsomesixdays.PhasetwosoughttogainairsupremacyovertheKuwaitTheatre,anenterprisewhichtookamereday.Thethirdandlongestphaseinvolvedthepreparationofthebattlefield,bydegradingIraqiformationsintheTheatre.Thefinalphasewasaimedatsupporting the eventual ground offensive.13

To impart some appreciation of the scope of this endeavour, some 2,700 aircraft of severalnationsflewsome130,000sortiesover forty threedays,expending87,679 tonsof air-to-ground munitions and consuming 1,953 million litres of aviation fuel (averaging 45.42 million litres a day).14Thiscontrastswith theaireffort toassist theAlliedforcesbreakoutoftheNormandybeachheadin1944,whichinvolvedtheuseof1500bombersdropping 3,400 tons of munitions.15 Iraqoncemoredeclinedtoresponddirectlytotheairattacks,andofferedonlytokenresistanceatbest,beforetheAlliesrapidlywhittleddowntheAirForce’sabilitytodetectandrespondtoAlliedincursions.IraqeventuallysentthemajorityofthemostmoderncomponentsofitsAirForcetoseeksanctuaryinIran,inanattempt to preserve them.

Iraq’sresponsetotheCoalitionwastoresorttousingSovietsuppliedsurface-to-surfacemissiles,whichIraqhadre-engineered,sacrificingexplosivepayloadforincreasedrange.KnownasScuds (or locallyasAl’Hussayns),overeightyof theseweaponswerefiredfromhardtolocateplatformsinthetwenty-eightthousandsquaremileareaofIraq,againstthe capitals of Israel and Saudi Arabia.16Theseweapons,itwashoped,woulddrawIsraelinto thewarwithIraq,enlarge thedispute intoapan-ArabJihad,andfracture theArabcomponentoftheCoalition.Thiseventhowever,didnothappen.TheUnitedStatesuseddiplomaticpressuretoensureIsraelirestraint,andmanyCoalitionaircraftwerereassignedtocarryoutwhateuphemisticallybecameknownas‘scud-busting’.


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During this period however, more crucial developments took place. The maincomponentsofCoalitionmilitarystrengthweremovedwestwardsingreatsecrecy,toanareaoppositewhichthedefensivepositionsoftheIraqiArmywerelighter,andwheretheCoalition could exploit its decisive advantage in technology and manoeuvrability. Iraq’sdecisiontolightlydefendthewesternareawasderivedfromahistoricalreputationoftheareainswallowingarmies,duetofeaturelessnatureoftheterrain.FortheCoalitionforceswithadvancedsatellitenavigationequipment,knownasGPS(GlobalPositioningSystem),they could use this error of perception to their best advantage.17

BythetimetheAllieswerereadytocommenceOperationDesertSwordinmid-February,they had cut off theKuwaiti army of occupation, severing its lines of communicationand logistics. The Coalition had also utilised deception techniques tomove two corpsformations(VIIandXVIII)402and204kilometreswest,respectively.18

Themulti-national forceswerearrayed infiveorganisationalareas fromwest toeast;XVIII Corps (comprising American and French mobile forces), VII Corps (comprising the heavy armoured formations of the USA and UK), Joint Force Command - North (JFC - North) whichcomprisedArabcoalitionmemberswhichwere toattack Iraqiunits insideKuwaititself,avoidingthechargeofdirectlyattackinganotherArabstate,MarineForcesCentralCommand(MARCENT)whichbynowconsistedofthe1stand2ndMarineDivisions,andJointForceCommand-East(JFC-East)comprisingKuwaiti,SaudiandQatariforces.

Themissions assigned to the five formationswere as follows.TheXVIIIAirborneCorpsinthefarwestwastoflydeepintoIraqandseizecontrolofthestrategicHighway8. Capture of this road would cut communications between Baghdad and Kuwait,preventing the dispatch of reinforcements to the beleaguered 19th Province. The VIIth Corpswasdetailed tomarchnorth and then east along theWadi-al-Batin, and to seek,engage and destroy any elements of the Republican Guard Force Command (RGFC) that were encountered. Given the similarities of language, both culturally through Englishand professionally through NATO,commonlogisticrequirementsandtradition,thismostdemandingtaskwasassignedtotheUSandBritishforce.

JFC-North,EastandMARCENTwereorganisedtoattacktheIraqiforcesentrenchedin Kuwaitbyfrontalassault.Thismovewouldaidinthedeceptionplanning(themovementoftwocorpswestwards)andwouldpreventIraqinusingitsforcestocutthecoalitionlinesof supply.19

Itmustbenotedhowever,theroleoflogisticsindeterminingtheoperationalpossibilitiestotheCommander-in-ChiefofCentralCommand.Initialplanningfortheliberationwascentred upon a full-scale frontal assault across the defensive barriers constructed by the IraqisontheborderofSaudi Arabia and Kuwait.Thisisagoodexampleofthelogistics


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beinginsufficienttoallowflexibilityinplanningamoderncampaign.Followingpoliticaldisquiet as to the risks involved, themilitarymade their case for amuch larger forcestructureintheMiddleEastinordertoengageinamoremobileactivity.Theywereableto get permission to engage in a logistical build-up sufficient tomount amoremobileoffensive into IraqtodestroykeyunitsandrestoreKuwaitisovereignty.20

Operation Desert Sword: The Ground Offensive G Day: Sunday 24th February 1991

The analysis of Operation DesertSwordwillbestructuredasfollows.Foreachdayoftheconflict,thecase-studywillfirstlyprovideabriefsummaryofevents.FacingtheCoalitionontheeveofthewar,wereatotaloffortytwoIraqidivisions,comprisingofaround570,000personnel.Intermsofmajorequipmentholdings,estimatessuggestthataftertheintensiveair bombardment, Iraqpossessedsome2,865tanks,1,955armouredpersonnelcarriersand1,772 artillery pieces.21Thefiguresusedinthisdatasetarehigherinthesecategoriesduetoadecisiontotreatconservativelyanyclaimsregardingtheeffectivenessofcoalitionairpower.

TheCoalitionfieldedlesspersonnelonthebattlefield thanIraq.Althoughpublishedfigurestodatearevague,theauthorshaveestablishedaworkingfigureofapproximately315,000forthethirteendivisions,elevenbrigades,threeregiments(twoartillery)andonecommando group.

In theXVIIIAirborneCorps area, thewar started at 07:00with theFrenchDaguetDivisionstrikingouttowardsAs-Salmanairfield,ninetykilometresinsideIraq.Thiswasfollowedbythe101stAirAssaultDivision’sfirststeptowardscapturingHighway8– an airassaulttoaforwardoperatingbase120kilometresinsideIraqiterritory.Thebasewascaptured by midday.

In the centre, VII Corps schedule was drastically revised following successeselsewhere,theCorpsattackstartedat15:00hours.Bytheendofthefirstday,VIICorpsunits had advancedup to eighty kilometres,whilst the 1stCavalryDivision conductedseveralfeigningattackstoconvincetheIraqicommandersthattheallieswerecommittingthemselves to a frontal war of attrition, rather than awar ofmanoeuvre. Theweatherconditionsinthetheatre,onthe24thFebruaryareworthyofmention,asthedescriptionbyKindsvatter (1992) dispels stereotypical notions of the desert:

“Cold, misty, cloudy, with rain showers in the morning. Rain stopped in the afternoon, but the winds picked up from the south-east, and blowing sand reduced visibility to 1,000 metres or less. In the evening, winds subsided, but overcast skies made for a dark night.”22


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G + 1: Monday 25th February 1991

InXVIIICorpsarea,afourhourairassaultplacedCoalitionforcesontoHighway8,225kilometresinsideIraq.The24thMechanisedDivisionsecureditssupplyroutes.TheVIICorpsmeanwhile,continueditsmarchnorthtomeettheRepublicanGuards.The1st(UK)ArmouredDivisionattackedareservebrigadearoundObjectiveBRONZE.Intheeast,theMarinescontinuedtheirdrivetowardsKuwait,becomingengagedinabattleattheMagwaOilField.BothArabcommandscontinuedtheiradvancetowardsKuwait.

The meteorological conditions were still very poor. Kindsvatter (1992) describesconditionsintheVIICorpsareaofoperationsas“overcast,cold,frequentshowers,attimesheavy”.23 Eldridge (1991) also describes the atrocious combat conditions of MARCENT where,“rainandfogreducedvisibilityto200–500metres”.24 For the XVIII Corps, the weatherforecastwastodeterminethetimingoftheassaultonHighway8,asthatevening“rain,sandstormsandveryhighwindshadgroundedallhelicopterswiththeexceptionofthe AH-64 Apache.”25

In summary, the effects of the weather appeared to hamper air transportation and scoutingsuggestingthateitherpilotslackedtrainingfordesertflyinginadverseconditions,orthatthenightvisionequipmentwasnotaseffectiveashadbeenhoped.

G + 2: Tuesday 26th February 1991

XVIIICorpsoperationswereseverelyhamperedbypoorweatherconditions,resultinginanumberofattacksandoperationsbeingcancelled.24MechanisedDivisionattackedanairfield,supplybaseandnumerousotherrearechelontargets.

TheVIICorpsdestroyedamajor supplybase (Al-Busayyah),beforefinally turningeast.Thateveningakeyengagementtookplacebetweenelementsofthe2ndArmouredCavalry Regiment and the Tawalkana Republican Guard Division, which has becomeknown as ‘TheBattle of 73 Easting’. 1st (UK)ArmouredDivision attackedObjectiveBRASSandtheIraqi52ndArmouredDivision.

FollowingtheRadioBaghdadannouncementmanyunitswerepreparingtowithdraw.Oneoftheunitswhichfailedtoactuponthebroadcastbecomeengagedinamajorbattlearound the KuwaitInternationalAirportwiththeUSMarines.TheJointForceCommandscontinuedtheiradvance.Theweatheronceagainwasuniversallybad.Kindsvatter(1992)describedraininVIICorps’area,whichbytheafternoonhadbecomeasandstorm.26 In thewest,Dempseynotesthatthebadweathercontinuedtohinderoperationsuntiltheearlyhours of the 27th February.27


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G + 3 Wednesday 27th February 1991

With the improvement inmeteorological conditions,XVIIICorps continuedoperationswith a new found vigour.A new forward operating base (VIPER) was established tointerdict Iraqi forces in and around the city of Basra. The 24th Mechanised DivisionattackedtheJelibahairfield.

VII Corps continued its drive eastwards, becoming deployed to cover the Iraqiwithdrawal,includingelementsoftheAdnanandMedinaRepublicanGuardDivisions.In the east, KuwaitCitywasliberatedbyunitsoftheJointForceCommands,NorthandEast.

VisibilityintheVIICorpsareawasdescribedinEldridge(1991)asamixtureoffogandsmokefromtheburningoilwells,whichcreateda“nearimpenetrablehaze”.28

G + 4: Thursday 28th February 1991

Following the announcement of an 08:00 cease-fire, Coalition operations in VII andXVIIICorpsareasaltered,accordingtoKindsvatter(1992)andwere“aimedtodestroyorcaptureasmuchIraqiequipmentaspossible.”29Followingthecease-fire,theBritishandAmericanswereabletotakestock.Havingexecutedamissionwhichwouldresultintheuseofsuperlativesintermsoftime,distanceandactivityundertaken,whatstatewerethoseforcesin?

TheBritishArmyhadasevereproblemintermsofimprovingthereliabilityofitstankfleetintheGulf.Itwasnotedthat:

“At the outset of Granby, what had long been known within the confines of the Army became public knowledge: that many of the Challenger I tanks were not battle-worthy. Challenger availability in 1990 in BAOR was just 23 per cent.”30

When the tanks reached theGulf, therewas evenmore cause for concern.OfficialpredictionsregardingChallengerenginefailuresreckonedthatabreakdownwouldoccurevery1,235kilometres.Theactualfigureinpractisewasnearer723kilometres.Asoneobservernoted,“forthegivenfleetsize,every5kmoneChallengerwouldrequireapowerpackchange”.31Figure1.6.3overleaf shows themeandistancebetweenengine failuresduring theperiodNovember1990–February1991 forChallenger Ipowerpack (P/P),engines(ENG),gearboxes(G/BOX)andAuxiliaryPowerUnits(APU):32


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Figure 1.6.3: Mean Distance Between Failure (MDBF) Challenger I Tank Fleet.

Theabovefigure illustrates theclassicconundrum inpeacetime.Equipment isusedinfrequentlyinordertominimisewearandtear,yetthisleadstoloweravailabilityrates.TheChallengersdeployedtotheGulfwereusedconstantlybythe4thand7thArmouredBrigades in training and soon began to improve. Further, the deployment of a support team from Vickerstoassistinproblemsolving,enabledrapidandeffectivecommunicationofproblems along the supply chain.

Conclusions for the Logistician: The Gulf War as a Case of ‘Best Practice’?

Having considered the impact of logistics issues in the Gulf campaign of 1991, whatlessonscanwedrawbaseduponthefiveprinciplesofeffectivelogisticsplanning?Intermsofforesight,thelogisticsplanningavailableforsupportinglargearmouredformationswasbased upon NATO practise for deterring a WarsawPactthreat.

When it came to the transplantationof this establishment into the desert, a numberof problems emerged. These problems revolved around the differences in environment. ThedesertwasclearlylargerthanCentralEurope,unfamiliartomanyofthetroopsandessentially featureless.Without access to satellite navigation technology, the enterprisewouldhavebeenmuchmoredifficulttoco-ordinate.

“At the outset of Granby, what had long been known within the confines of the Army

became public knowledge: that many of the Challenger I tanks were not battle-worthy.

Challenger availability in 1990 in BAOR was just 23 per cent.” (30)

When the tanks reached the Gulf, there was even more cause for concern. Official

predictions regarding Challenger engine failures reckoned that a breakdown would

occur every 1,235 kilometres. The actual figure in practise was nearer 723 kilometres.

As one observer noted, “for the given fleet size, every 5 km one Challenger would

require a power pack change”. (31) Table 3 below shows the mean distance between

engine failures during the period November 1990 – February 1991 for Challenger I

power pack (P/P), engines (ENG), gear boxes (G/BOX) and Auxiliary Power Units

(APU): (32)

Figure 1.4.3: Mean Distance Between Failure (MDBF) Challenger I Tank Fleet.

Mean Distance Between Failure (Challanger I Tank Fleet)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

14/11/90

21/11/90

28/11/90

05/12/90

12/12/90

19/12/90

26/12/90

02/01/91

09/01/91

16/01/91

30/01/91

16/02/91

Tim e

MD

BF

(in

Km

s)

P/P

ENG

APU

G/BOX

The above table illustrates the classic conundrum in peacetime. Equipment is used

infrequently in order to minimise wear and tear, yet this leads to lower availability rates.

The Challengers deployed to the Gulf were used constantly by the 4th and 7th Armoured

Brigades in training and soon began to improve. Further, the deployment of a support

team from Vickers to assist in problem solving, enabled rapid and effective

communication of problems along the supply chain.

Conclusions for the Logistician: The Gulf War as a Case of ‘Best Practise’ ?

Having considered the impact of logistics issues in the Gulf campaign of 1991, what

lessons can we draw based upon the five principles of effective logistics planning ? In

terms of foresight, the logistics planning available for supporting large armoured

formations was based upon NATO practise for deterring a Warsaw pact threat.

,,,, __ ,

----- ----- ---;;:_--- ------~


97

In terms of training, having NATO forces in static defensive positions for several decades, led to logisticsbecomingaqualitativelyplannedexercise,whichwasrepeatedfor some period of time. This, it could be suggested, has led to a certain degree of atrophy, in terms of remembering the notion of logistics as an art, rather than a science. For the movementofformations,onelessonwasre-learned.

The development of mobile forces has been constrained for decades on the limitations of airtransport.Whileitisfast,itisrestrictedintheamountofheavyequipmentitcancarryquiteseverely.Also,formationsthattendtohaveverygoodstrategicmobility,tendtobelimitedwhenitcomestotacticalmobility.Thus,heavyequipmentwillstillhaveto,byand large, be moved by sea, in the 21st century. Rapid deployment, it could be suggested, isonlyrapidintermsofmakingapoliticalcommitmentinaparticularsituation.

Regardingthesecondcharacteristicofeconomy,howdidtheexperienceinthedesertmeasureup?Economyof logisticscanbeseenbytheuseofprecisiontokeepthelandforces momentum up during Operation DesertSword.However, it isclearthat thehightempoofoperationscouldnotbemaintainedmuchlongerthanthe100hoursofconflictduetothefactthattheforcesweremassivelyover-extendedandforcesustainmentneededto catch up.

Manoeuvre warfare tends to use fuel rather than ammunition when compared toattritionalwarfaretechniques.33Desertoperationsrequiredmanyfueltankers,especiallyfor the fuelhungrytanksdeployedbytheUSArmy.34Despitethesedifficulties,itcouldbesuggestedthat,logistics,asemployedduringtheconflict,wereofaneconomicalnature.The supplychainwasbuiltupfromthecontinentalUSAthroughtothedesertformissioncritical items and spares.

Materialswereonthewhole,effectivelycataloguedintoandoutof the theatreafterthe conflict. Increasing the precision of this activity will gradually become of greaterimportanceasstocksofsuppliesshrinkandtheforcesdeployincreasinglysophisticatedequipment.

Theflexibilityofthelogisticsoperationinthedesertwasamplydemonstrated.TheseniorAmericanlogisticiannotedthatthekeylessonforhimwasthecreationofaflexibleorganisationtoget the taskscompletedto thesatisfactionof the theatrecommander.35

The transformation of the logistics establishment from its static European form to a desertsustainmentforceisatributetotheskillsofthelogisticsplannersandpersonnelinvolved.

TheGulfoperationwasbothlargeandcomplex.However,itcouldbearguedthatatitsheart,thelogisticsoperationwassimple.Theforcesinthedesertweredependantonlogisticssupporttosurviveinwhatwasahostileenvironment.HostNationSupportwas


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mobilisedinordertoprovidebasicsupplieswiththehomecountrytakingresponsibilityformoving the forces necessary to the Gulf.

The co-operative aspect of the Gulf operation mirrored the success of the political coalition. The coalition forces in the Gulf received assistance through commercial air and sea-liftandasdetailedearlier,helpedoneanothermoveparticularitemsofequipmenttothetheatre.FortheWesternforces,co-operationwasessentialtoaccessthemostbasicitems such as bottled water. In designing the ground campaign, clearly co-operativelogisticswereamajorfactor in theBritishandAmericanforcesofVIICorpsworkingtogether.

Thecasealongwiththosepreviouslyhavesoughttodemonstratethatmodernoperationsareindeedconstrained,ifnotdefined,bythelogisticsinfrastructureavailable,aswellastestingwhatareregardedastheessentialpractisesofgoodlogistics.

The five factors themselves appear to remain a relevant framework for consideringmilitarylogistics.Futureresearchinthisfieldcouldbetargetedtowardsaclearerdefinitionof the philosophical underpinning of military operational planning with a view toestablishingthelinkbetweenlogisticsissuesandoperations.Suchaparadigmwouldrelatethehusbandingoflogisticswiththeexpenditureofmilitaryresources.

Notes

1. Foxton P. D. Powering War: Modern Land Force Logistics.London:Brassey’s,1994.Chapter 1. Page 3.2.HeikalM.Illusions of Triumph. London: HarperCollins, 1993. Part II. Chapter 2. Page 227.3. See Danis A. “Iraqi Army Operations and Doctrine” in Military Intelligence, April-June 1991, Page 6.4. Ibid.5. Rottman G. and Volstad R. Armies of the Gulf War. London: Osprey Elite Series No. 45, 1993 Page 3.6. Department of Defence. Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War.Washington:GPO,April1992,Chapter3.Pages32-33,andCraft,D.W.An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War.CarlisleBarracks:StrategicStudiesInstitute,USArmyWarCollege,1992,Pages16-17.7.Commander-in-Chief,U.SCentralCommand,unclassifiedDesert Shield/Storm Facts, Figures,QuotesandAnecdotes7Aug1990-11Apr91Page13.8. Ibid. Page 19.


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9.MenarchikD.Powerlift – Getting to Desert Storm: Strategic Transportation and Strategy in the New World Order.WestportCT:PraegerPublishers,1993Chapter2.Page56.10. House of Commons. HC287/I Defence Committee 10th Report: Preliminary Lessons of Operation. GranbyLondon:HerMajesty’sStationeryOffice17/07/91.Written Evidence. Pages 80 - 81. Especially paragraphs 79, 80 and 92 - 95.11.OpCit.Menarchik.Page116.Figure2.30.12. Op Cit. House of Commons HC287/I. Page 21. Paragraph 37.13. Op Cit. Department of Defence. Chapter 6. Pages 95 - 101.14. Op Cit. Commander-in-Chief, US Central Command. Page 18.15. SheffieldG.D.“Blitzkrieg and Attrition” in McInnes and Sheffield:Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice.London:UnwinHyman1988.Page74.16.OpCit.Commander-in-Chief,USCentralCommand.Page6.Forty-oneScudswerefiredatRiyadhSaudi Arabia and forty at Tel Aviv Israel.17. Rip M. R. and Lusch D. P. “The Precision Revolution: The Navstar Global Positioning System in the Second Gulf War” in Intelligence and National Security, 1994. Page 177.18. Ibid. Page 175.19. Englehardt J. P. SSI Special Report: Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Chronology and Troop Lists for the 1990 - 1991 Persian Gulf Crisis.CarlisleBarracks:StrategicStudiesInstitute,USArmyWarCollege,1991.Page5.20.AtkinsonR. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Gulf War. London: HarperCollins, 1994. Chapter 4. Pages 105 - 139.21. Op Cit. Commander-in-Chief, US Central Command. Page 2.22. Kindsvatter P. S. “VII Corps in the Gulf War: Ground Offensive” in Military Review, February 1992. Page 24.23.Ibid.Pages25–26.24. Eldridge B. “Desert Storm: Mother of All Battles” in Command,Nov–Dec1991.Number 13. Page 27.25. Dempsey, T A. “On the Wings of the Storm: Heliborne Manoeuvre during the Gulf War” in Defence Analysis, 1994. Volume 10 Number 2. Page 172.26. Op Cit. Kindsvatter. Page 29.27. Op Cit. Dempsey. Page 173.28. Op Cit. Eldridge. Page 36.29. Op Cit. Kindsvatter. Page 37.30. House of Commons. HC43 Defence Committee Fifth Report: Implementation of Lessons Learned from Operation Granby.London:HerMajesty’sStationaryOffice25/05/94.Page14. Paragraph 39.


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31. Campbell A M. “Equipment Support”inWhiteM.S.(ed.)Gulf Logistics: Blackadder’s War.London:Brassey’s,1995.Chapter7.Page143.32. Ibid. Page 144. Figure 7.1.33. Thornton S F. “Supply”inWhiteM.S.ed.Gulf Logistics: Blackadder’s War. London: Brassey’s,1995.Chapter6.Pages124-125.34. The United States M1 Abrams MBT uses a rotary gas turbine engine that ran on petrol ratherthandiesel,whichiswhattheEuropeanMBTsranon.35.PagonisW.G.Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War. Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992. Page 223.

Further Reading

Armees, ‘Soutien d’avant garde’ in Armees d’Aujourd’hui, 161 (Jun. - Jul. 1991). pp. 76 - 79.Army Logistician. Burnishing the Desert Shield, (Jan. - Feb. 1991). pp. 20 - 22.————. AMC’s Role in Operation Desert Shield. (Mar. - Apr. 1991). pp. 2 - 5.Augustus,Ejr.‘Logistics Automation Support’ in Army Logistician. (Jul. - Aug. 1993). pp. 36 - 37.Bacon, P. H. ‘Repair Parts to the Rescue’ in Army Logistician (Jan. - Feb. 1993). pp. 11 - 13.Ballantyne, R A. ‘The Aerospace Industry 2: Supporting the Military - Operations Granby and Desert Storm’ in RUSI Journal 137 (4) (Aug. 1992). pp. 50 - 52.Beaton, D J. ‘Operation Granby 23 Engineer Regiment’ in The Royal Engineers Journal 105 (3) (Dec. 1991). pp. 268 - 271.Bernard,DC.‘Support to Strike - Tactical Supply Wing Support During Operation Granby’ in Air Clues 45 (11) (Nov. 1991). pp. 410 - 412.Blackwell,J.‘An Initial Impression of the Logistics of Operation ‘Desert Shield’’ in Military Technology 14 (12) (Dec. 1990). pp. 57 - 61.Bosco, L. ‘Making things happen in the Persian Gulf’ in All Hands 891 (Jun. 1991). pp. 32 - 35.Bottoms, A. M. ‘Desert Shield and the Acquisition Manager’ in Program Manager 20 (1) (Jan. - Feb. 1991). pp. 8 - 13.Brame,W.L.‘From garrison to desert offensive in 97 days’ in Army 42 (2) (Feb. 1992). pp. 28 - 35.————. ‘Planning Desert Storm Logistics’ in Army Logistician (May - Jun. 1992). pp. 16 - 21.


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Bryant, B. ‘City in the Sand’ in The Military Engineer 83 (546) (Nov. - Dec. 1991). pp. 10 - 14.Byther, D. ‘Desert Shield Contingency Contracting’ in Army Logistician (Mar. - Apr. 1991). pp. 22 - 25.Cain, F. M. III. ‘Building Desert Storm Force Structure’ in Military Review 73 (3) (Jul. 1993). pp. 21 - 30.Carbonneaux. ‘Daguet: Logistics in broad daylight’ in Military Technology 15 (8) (Aug. 1991). pp. 33 - 35.Collar, L. L. ‘Desert Storm and Its Effect on U.S. Maritime Policy’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (3) (Jun. 1991). pp. 67 - 68.Defense Transportation Journal. ‘Desert Shield/Desert Storm: USTRANSCOM’s First Great Challenge’ 47 (3) (Jun. 1991). pp. 14 - 19.————. ‘The Railroaders’ Finest Hour: Desert Shield/Storm’ 47 (3) (Jun. 1991). pp. 27 - 30.————. ‘U.S. Ports Rise to the Challenge of Desert Shield/Desert Storm’ 47 (3) (Jun. 1991). pp. 36 - 41.Donohue, T. J. ‘Trucking Industry Played Key Role in Desert Shield/Storm’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (3) (Jun. 1991). p. 26.Donovan, F. R. ‘Test of Sealift Planning for MSC’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (3) (Jun. 1991). pp. 60 - 62.Donovan, F. R. (et. al.). ‘Sealift - The Steel Bridge’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (6) (Dec. 1991). pp. 30 - 32.Driscoll, E. J. ‘They Also Serve’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (3) (Jun. 1991). pp. 58 - 59.Eanes, J. T. ‘USCENTCOM As Focal Point of Mobility Effort’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (3) (Jun. 1991). pp. 72 - 73.Edgar, E. ‘249th Engineers Storm the Desert’ in The Military Engineer 83 (546) (Nov. - Dec. 1991). pp. 4 - 9.Elder, J. P. ‘Survey Operations’ in The Royal Engineers Journal 106 (2) (Aug. 1991). pp. 125 - 131.Evans, J. D. ‘Air Force Buys Support’ in The Military Engineer 83 (546) (Nov. - Dec. 1991). pp. 28 - 29.Fellows,R.‘Computers Aid in Medical Supply’ in Army Logistician (Sept. - Oct. 1992). pp. 12 - 13.Felton,M.W.‘Managing ODS Supply : The Untold Story’ in Army Logisitician (Jul. - Aug. 1993). pp. 13 - 15.


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Fortner, J. A.,Doux, J.T.&Peterson,M.A. ‘Bring on the HETs ! Operational and tactical relocation of heavy manoeuvre forces’ in Military Review LXXII (1) (Jan. 1992). pp. 36 - 39.Fuchs,W.F.‘Sealift ships play major role in Desert Storm’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (2) (Apr. 1991). pp. 10 - 14.Galway,L.A.Management Adaptations in Jet Engine Repair at a Naval Aviation Depot in Support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm (CA: RAND 1992). N-3436-A/USN.Gourley, S. R. ‘US trucks in Desert Storm’ in International Defence Review 25 (1) (Jan. 1992). pp. 34 - 38.Ham, J. ‘Desert Air Terminal Operations’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (3) (Jun. 1991). p. 74.Hammick,M.‘Lost in the pipeline speed stretched logistics to the limit’ in International Defence Review 24 (9) (Sept. 1991). pp. 998 - 1001.Hayashi, G. ‘Intermodalism Pays Off in the Gulf War’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (3) (Jun. 1991). pp. 63 - 66.Hayr, K. ‘Logistics in the Gulf war’ in RUSI Journal 136 (3) (Autumn 1991). pp. 14 - 18.Heron, J. M. ‘Sanitation in the sand and other tales’ in The Royal Engineers Journal 105 (1) (Apr. 1991). pp. 12 - 18.Hill, R. D. ‘Depot operations supporting Desert Shield’ in Military Review LXXI (4) (Apr. 1991). pp. 17 - 28.Hoover,WW.‘The Desert Shield Airlift: A Great Success That Holds Some Valuable Lessons for the Future’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (3) (Jun. 1991). pp. 54 - 55.James, G. K. ‘Aviation logistics mobility: lessons learned’ in U.S. Army Aviation Digest 1-92-2 (Mar. - Apr. 1992). pp. 32 - 36.Jane’s Defence Weekly. ‘Achilles heel of an army’, 18 (13) (Sept. 1992). pp. 19 - 23.————. ‘Success behind the ‘Storm’ front’ 15 (19) (11/05/91). pp. 783 - 787.Johnson,L.M.&Rozman,T.R.‘The armour force and heavy equipment transporters: A force multiplier?’ in Armor C (4) (Jul. - Aug. 1991). pp. 13 - 16.Kirsch,R.S.&MagnessI.V.,‘Iron Sappers’ in The Military Engineer 83 (546) (Nov. - Dec. 1991). pp. 25 - 27.Kondra, V. (et. al.). ‘Airlift - First on the Scene’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (6) (Dec. 1991). pp. 26 - 29.Langenus, P. C. ‘Moving an army: Movement control for Desert Storm’ in Military Review LXXI (9) (Sept. 1991). pp. 40 - 51.Laposata, J. S. & Hatley, C. D. ‘Conventional Forces Europe Combat Equipment Retrograde: A Dress Rehearsal For Desert Storm’ in Defense Transportation Journal 47 (4) (Aug. 1991). pp. 10 - 11.


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Case Studies in


Volume I: From World War II to thePost Cold-War World

Edited by David Moore

Case Studies in


Ca

se Stu

dies in

Defen

ce P

ro

cu

rem

ent

& Lo

gist

ics

This book provides nineteen cases focusing on defence acquisition and

logistics issues that will give excellent learning opportunities to a range

of readers. These include defence manufacturing, procurement, inventory

and change management, as well as operational logistic scenarios.

This collection of cases should appeal to a wide-ranging audience

including military personnel, those on defence education and training

programmes, those in the defence industry, defence agencies and those

engaged in defence-related research (an example being under- and

post-graduate students on international politics and strategic studies

courses).

However, such is the nature of these cases that they will also be

relevant to and interesting for under- and post-graduate programmes in

purchasing and logistics. They are suitable for use on MBA, PgDip and

PgCert management courses.

As well as featuring nineteen cases, there is a foreword, notes on

contributors, full acknowledgements, preface, notes on courses and

subject areas to which the book has relevance. There is also a chapter on

the nature of defence acquisition, logistics and supply chain management.

Ed

ited

by Dav

id M

oo

re

Documents

(2011) Case Studies in Defence Procurement & Logistics: Case Study - Operation Granby 1991