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Photo: MINUSTAH: Haitian National Police on Refresher Training Course (2011)
Final report: 20th of August 2012
Nathalie van Schagen
STUDY
Strengthening local capacities
In post-disaster Haiti
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CONTENTS
CONTENTS .................................................................................................................................................................. 2
ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................................................................... 4
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 1.2 RESEARCH METHODS AND PLANNING .......................................................................................................................... 5 1.3 SET-UP OF THE REPORT ............................................................................................................................................ 6
2. HAITI'S CONTEXT .................................................................................................................................................... 7
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO HAITI'S CONTEXT ........................................................................................................................... 7 2.2 HAITI’S CONFLICT-POVERTY TRAP ............................................................................................................................... 9 2.3 HAITI’S DEBT FOR INDEPENDENCE ............................................................................................................................. 12 2.4 HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE .................................................................................................................................. 16
2.4.1 Access to justice and cycle of impunity ............................................................................................................ 16 2.4.2 Response from Human Rights Organisations .................................................................................................. 19 2.4.3 Violence against women .................................................................................................................................. 21 2.4.4 Response from women’s organisations ........................................................................................................... 23
3. MAPPING OF NETWORKS AND LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS ..............................................................26
3.1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................................... 26 3.2 OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORKS ................................................................................................................. 26
3.2.1 La Plateforme des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits Humains (POHDH) .................................................... 26 3.2.2 Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development (PAPDA) ................................................................... 27 3.2.3 Cadre de Liaison Inter- ONG Haïti (CLIO) ......................................................................................................... 28
3.3 OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS .......................................................................................................... 30 3.3.1 Komisyon Episcopal Nasyonal Jistis ak Lapè (JILAP) ........................................................................................ 30 3.3.2 Centre de Réflexion et d'Action pour le Développement (CRAD) ..................................................................... 31 3.3.3 Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH) ............................................................................. 32 3.2.4 Observatoire National contre la violence criminalité ONAVC ......................................................................... 33
3.4 OVERVIEW OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS ....................................................................................................... 34 3.4.1 Fondation Toya ................................................................................................................................................ 34 3.4.2 Femmes et Democratie .................................................................................................................................... 35 3.4.3 Solidarité Femmes Haïtien (SOFA) ................................................................................................................... 35 3.4.4 Lig Pouvwa Fanm ............................................................................................................................................. 36
3.5 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 37 3.5.1 Obstacles in the work of human rights organisations and networks ............................................................... 37 3.5.2 Strengths and weaknesses of human rights organisations and networks ....................................................... 40
4. OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATION .................................................................................................................42
4.1 CORDAID’S HISTORY IN HAITI ................................................................................................................................... 42 4.2 POTENTIAL FOR STRATEGIC COLLABORATIONS ............................................................................................................. 44
4.2.1 Justice and Peace Netherlands......................................................................................................................... 44 4.2.2 Glencree/ Concern Peacebuilding initiatives Port-au-Prince............................................................................ 49 4.2.3 Potential partnerships ...................................................................................................................................... 52
5. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................................................54
5.1 CONTEXT ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................................................................... 54 5.2 MAPPING OF NETWORKS AND LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS & WOMEN’S ORGANISATIONS .................................................................. 55 5.3 OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATION .............................................................................................................................. 55 5.4 OBJECTIVES AS FORMULATED IN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS LINKED TO THESE........................................ 56 5.5 OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 58
ANNEX I TERMS OF REFERENCE .................................................................................................................................59
ANNEX II ITINERARY AND OVERVIEW OF CONTACTS .................................................................................................60
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ANNEX III: OVERVIEW OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................................62
ANNEX IV: HAITI’S RATIFICATION OF CORE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS ...................................65
ANNEX V: IDENTIFIED NETWORKS IN HAITI ...............................................................................................................66
ANNEX VI: MAPPING OF HUMAN RIGHTS- AND WOMEN’S ORGANISATIONS ............................................................67
ANNEX VII: OBSERVATIONS OF A PEACE DIALOGUE MULTI-STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP ............................................68
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ABBREVIATIONS
3PSM Partenariat pour la Paix et la Prospérité a Saint Martin (Partnership for
Peace and Prosperity in Saint Martin)
ANAPFEH Association Nationale de Protection des Femmes et Enfants Haïtiens
BAI Bureau d’Avocats Internationaux
BAZ Groups of people (groupe de base) often local leaders
CERFAS Centre de Recherche, de Réflexion, de Formation et d’Action Sociale
CICC Consortium Internationale- Country Coordination
CLIO Cadre de Liaison Inter-ONG Haïti
COE-H Coordination Europe Haiti
CPH Comité Protos Haiti
CPFO Centre Promotion des Femmes Ouvrières
CRAD Centre de Recherche et d’Action pour le Développement
CSO Civil Society Organisations
CSPJ
DAP
GAJ
(Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire) Supreme Court
(Direction administrative penintentaire) National Prison Commission
Groupe Assistance Judiciaire
GRET Professionnels du Développement Solidaire
GRIDAP Groupe de Recherche d’Initiatives pour un Développement Alternatif
et Participatif
HAP Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HDI Human Development Index
HoM Head of Mission
JILAP Komisyon Episkopal Nasyonal Jistis ak Lapè (Commission Episcopale
Nationale Justice et Paix)
JetP Justitia et Pax Netherlands
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilisation Mission Haiti (since 2006)
MMF March Mondial des Femmes (World March of Women)
MOUFHED Mouvement des Femmes Haïtiennes pour l’Education et le
Développement
ONAVC Observatoire National de la Violence et de la Criminalité
PAJ
PBC
Programme pour une Alternative de Justice
Peace Building Committees
PICCOH Partners of ICCO Haiti
PNH Police National Haiti
POHDH Plateforme des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits Humains
REFRAKA Réseau des Femmes des Radios Communautaires
RNDDH Réseau National de Défense de Droits Humains
RVC Programme de la Réduction de la Violence Communautaire,
département au sein de MINUSTAH
SAKS Society for Social Mobilization and Communication
SOFA Solidarité Fanm Ayisyen
SSR Security Sector Reform
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
For more than thirty years Cordaid has been supporting non-governmental organisations in
Haiti. These local partners were implementing programmes in the domains of food security,
health (focusing on the HIV-epidemic), women’s rights, emergency relief and reconstruction.
Then in January 2010 an earthquake hit Haiti and erupted most of the work Cordaid’s partners
were doing. The epicentre of the earthquake was Léogane, a rural area two hours south-west
of the capital Port-au-Prince. The devastation was enormous in the epicentre as well as in the
capital where one third of the population of Haiti is concentrated. Cordaid opened two offices, a
central one in the capital and a field office in Léogane. An extensive programme was launched
focusing on providing shelter, water and sanitation, (mental) health care and psychosocial
care. Cordaid plans to shut their doors by mid 2012.
This context, of Cordaid finishing its’ emergency programme, combined with the reality that
Cordaid needs to review its’ global development programmes and decide on a renewed focus
for Cordaid for the next decade, gave lead to this research.
The research request came from the department for Conflict Transformation (CT). In Cordaid
this department had inherited different partners, from different sectors (food security, health,
livelihoods etc) sometimes in Cordaid’s portfolio for over 15 years. Now could be a time, when
Cordaid’s global programmes are being concluded and its’ emergency programme in Haiti is
coming to an end, to collect recent data on civil society organisations in Haiti, and to gain
closer insight of what assets and networks the Cordaid emergency programme has generated
and how these contacts might be utilised for a new programme.
The objectives of this research were therefore twofold. On one hand to provide a mapping of
human rights organisations and women’s rights organisations that have activities related to
democracy building and access to justice in their programmes, including the identification of
one or two potential partners for Cordaid. And on the other hand to identify potential
opportunities for a new programme in Haiti, that complements the activities and networks the
emergency programme has achieved in the past two years. Ideally it would also contribute to a
more coherent and complementary programme of all Cordaid sectors that intervene in Haiti.
Haiti is one of the few countries for Cordaid where all sectors are represented, which highlight
both the need and the challenge to make Cordaid’s programmes more coherent.
1.2 Research methods and planning
Before the actual travel to Haiti in January, literature on Haiti’s context and Cordaid’s
programme history and policy was collected. From mid January to mid March field work was
conducted in Haiti. This consisted of a wide variety of interviews with members of civil society
organisations, partners and non-partners of Cordaid, representatives of networks, field office
staff of Cordaid and identified resource persons.
Following fieldwork the research was complemented with a literature study to complement the
context of Haiti which will be provided in the next chapter. Adding to the literature study
several resource persons and human rights organisations were interviewed during a round
table in Brussels, and in Antwerp and Leuven. Several in-depth interviews were held to double-
check the main underlying causes for poverty in Haiti.
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The first two weeks of June a research assistant was sent to Haiti to interview two well-known
human rights networks, local human rights and women’s organisations. Furthermore she was
involved in establishing a link between contacts of the Cordaid emergency programme in a
suburb of Nan Cocteau and with a potential partner, the Glencree Institute, to further explore
possibilities of a new programme in which Cordaid may play a substantial role.
It is important to note that the different interviews and more informal conversations with
Haitians have been leading in this report, not only in the mappings but first and foremost with
establishment of Haiti’s context. Their perspectives and opinions have been integrated in
determining the primary factors and underlying causes of poverty in Haiti. Also their views
have been integrated in a human rights perspective, and what the main obstacles to the full
enjoyment of human rights are from their points of view.
In the process of the research it became clear that an analysis of the context, one that is
accepted by Haitians themselves was of great importance to understanding the situation as it
is today, and what issues lie ahead, that Cordaid for example could take into account. The
researcher together with Cordaid’s programme officer agreed that more specific attention
would be put on the context, in addition to the initial Terms of Reference.
1.3 Set-up of the report
Following this introduction, a context analysis is provided. This context is based on a literature
study and complemented with insights based on interviews conducted in Haiti and in Belgium.
After having provided a context in general, this will be situated in a human rights perspective.
Focus will be put on the human rights situation of access to justice and the actual situation of
women’s rights (violations) in Haiti. This analysis is also an integrated effort of both literature
and interviews and reports from human rights organisations’ representatives that have been
interviewed in Haiti.
In chapter three a mapping will be provided of the main human rights networks in Haiti and
their activities and human rights’ and women’s rights organisations. Their objectives and
activities will be summarised as well as with whom they collaborate. Also some of their
weaknesses and strengths are shared.
In chapter four answers will be found to the second objective of this research which is to
identify potentials for collaboration of Cordaid. Firstly the added value of Cordaid important to
the programme of Haiti is outlined, and in the following paragraphs, potentials for partnership
with both international and local organisations will be proposed.
In chapter five the objectives of the Terms of Reference will be discussed and general
conclusions of this report are summarised then. It contains a broad overview of the main
needs and challenges of local NGOs in strengthening their organisations to tackle the prior
problems of Haiti, and what potential roles there might be for Cordaid to contribute. Both in
terms of building upon their track record and history of partnerships suggestions will be made,
as well as identifying opportunities that strive at coherence between the different departments
and focus points of Cordaid’s mandate as a relief/development organisation.
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Demography of Haiti
Population: 9.8 million
Ethnicity: 95% black, 5%
mulatto and white
Religion: Roman Catholic
80%, Protestant 16%
Languages: Creole and
French are both national
languages
Urban population: 52%
(urbanisation rate is 3.9%)
Population in capital Port au
Prince : 2.1 million
Source : CIA World Factbook 2012
2. HAITI'S CONTEXT
If the purpose of development is improving the chances for a people and
following generations to lead happy lives, development needs most of all the basic human freedoms from violence, from disease from hunger and
the freedom of belief and expression
Joris Voorhoeve, at a The Hague Conference on Security & Development, 2006
2.1 Introduction to Haiti's context
Haiti holds a unique place in modern world history for being the first independent black
republic that freed itself from colonial rule in 1804. Geographically, Haiti has a strategic place
in the region, being in a triangle from South America and the United States. Politically Haiti is
known for years of unrest, violence and poor governance, which is visible in its weak
institutions. These are struggling to provide the basic services. Politics are dominated by elite
that has never prioritised investments that benefit the population.
Haiti does not fit into a specific box easily. For example it cannot be framed simply as a “fragile
state”. Though it does fulfil many of the indicators attributed to fragile states, it is different
from fragile contexts such as Afghanistan and South Sudan that suffered violent conflicts for
many years. History plays an important role, as will be demonstrated in the following
paragraphs.
Haiti seems an island of extremes. It has the highest regional score in terms of violence and
criminality. Together with Jamaica, Haiti has the highest homicide rates of the Caribbean1. It is
said that, were Haiti and Jamaica to reduce their rates of
homicide to the level of Costa Rica, both countries would
see an enormous rise in economic development2. Haiti is
also known for being the poorest country in the western
hemisphere, one of the most corrupt countries in the world
sharing its position with Iraq. In terms of Human
Development3, it is comparable with the least developed
countries in the world (see text box for details Haiti).
Haiti’s Gini-coefficient is rated amongst the top ten
worldwide which signifies that the income inequality is
extreme.
At the same time Haiti has a vibrant and lively society that
has shown unimaginable resilience to the many shocks it
has endured over time. The country has a history in which
the destruction of civil society and of social capital have
been a conscious strategy of foreign nations but also from
the Haitian elite in power. The revolution that led to
independence in 1804 from France is widely perceived as
both unique as well as a struggle in which Haiti is still caught today. Later interference by
foreign powers and the highly unfavourable trade position of the nation also undermined the
1 Crime, Violence and Development: Trends, Costs and policy options in the Caribbean (World Bank: 2007) 2 (ibid) 3 Education levels, income and life expectancy
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development of social fabrics and civil society. The occupation by the United States paused
some of the progress the country had seen in the latter part of the 20th century. Nature has
also had an influence on the setback but also of the resilience of Haitians: The Island is struck
by hurricanes and flooding frequently. The earthquake of 2010 was another shock, in a long
line of many.
According to the famous development economist Paul Collier, Haiti is in a unique position for
economic development, despite the set-back of the earthquake and the political fragility of the
state and its society. He states that besides the strategic geographic position, Haiti is not part
of a troubled region, like the Great Lakes or Central Asia. The fact that labour in Haiti is not
only cheap but also of good quality, makes Haiti very attractive for the garment industry, as it
can compete with China. Also in terms of time-to market Haiti is favourable. Finally uniquely in
the world, Haiti has duty-free, quota access to the American market guaranteed for the next
nine years, which makes Haiti the world’s safest production location for garments4.
Haiti has been challenged demographically, economically, politically and environmentally over
a long period of time. This has contributed to the fact that Haiti is known as one of the
countries caught in a conflict-poverty trap. According to the World Bank, Haiti cannot escape
this trap without taking serious action to fight widespread poverty, income inequality and
urban violence and to invest in the state’s capacity to provide basic services to its population.
Providing security and rule of law are seen as crucial public goods, not only to provide justice
and safety but also as preconditions to create an environment in which development,
investments and economic growth can take place5.
Since the earthquake of Haiti in 2010, the international community has been omnipresent with
extensive reconstruction programmes. It has brought along large sums of money. This
presence, however, has further exacerbated aid-dependency. Today Haiti is almost entirely
dependent on foreign aid. This year (2012), many large international donor organisations,
including Cordaid, are withdrawing their emergency assistance from the country. For many
organisations this means that they will leave Haiti for the full 100%.
Generally speaking, it is precarious to draw a line in deciding when an emergency phase is
over, and when a country is ready to continue reconstruction and development in a longer
term perspective. There is consensus, though, that the hard-core emergency phase of
supplying first aid relief (tents, water and medical support) should be as short as possible as to
minimize the outside, top-down, general support. It is important to start as soon as possible,
or to link it to wherever feasible, to a community-driven, demand-driven and participatory
approach that respects local structures.
Cordaid has been present in Haiti since the ’80s, with different developmental and longer-term
programmes. When the earthquake hit Haiti in 2010, the decision was made that Cordaid
would start and coordinate an emergency programme with field presence. As the programme
comes to an end, one challenge is to phase out the emergency programme while linking the
expertise gained to existing programmes. Another challenge is to link opportunities to use the
assets gained (knowledge, networks, organisational experience, reputation) for new
programmes.
4 Collier, “Haiti: from natural disaster to economic security”: a report for the UN-secretary of the United Nations, January 2009 5 Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti: a World Bank Country Study (2007)
9
Haiti stands 158 out of 187 countries on
the Human Development Index (2011).
Maternal mortality rate: 523/100.000
deliveries which is nearly 10 times higher
than average in Latin America.
Infant mortality 80/1000 live births, four
times the regional average.
Life expectancy was 62.1 years.
There is a severe uneven distribution of
wealth (10% highest income quintile has
more than 54 times the income than the
poorest 10%; the Gini-coefficient of
Haiti is 60, which is among the 10%
highest in the world.
Literacy rates are estimated to be 48,
7%
Access to drinking facility services
46%
(UNDP: 2011)
The next paragraphs give an analysis of the context of Haiti. The World Bank’s aforementioned
analysis helps provide insights into the causes of Haiti’s conflict-poverty trap. Its historic
political fragility, as well as socio-economic factors, will be discussed. This will then be
complemented by a short overview of history in which three factors are mentioned as
important to the situation Haiti finds itself in today.
2.2 Haiti’s conflict-poverty trap
According to the World Bank, fragile states are characterised by a conflict poverty-trap. They
feature poverty, inequality, economic decline, unemployment, institutional weakness, poor
governance, violence, lawlessness and persistent conflict. Resulting from extensive research,
the World Bank has identified three determining components that constitute a poverty-conflict
trap. These are: (1), demographic and socio-economic factors, (2), the capacity of core state
institutions to provide basic services including security and rule of law, and (3), the agenda’s
and strategies of political actors. A closer look into those components is essential in order to
reveal some of the underlying causes that prevent Haiti from changing into a prosperous
country.
Demographic and socio-economic factors
Haiti has a fast growing population which increases pressure on the scarce resources. Since
the late nineteen eighties the urbanisation rate of Haiti has increased rapidly. Youth and
children account for 50 percent of the population. And youth unemployment, at 50 per cent, is
the highest level in Latin America. It is also
nearly three times greater than the
unemployment rate of the older generation
(35-44 years). Half of households in Haiti
live in extreme poverty, with wide
differences among and within regions.
Haiti is the world’s most remittance-
dependent country. Social protection in
Haiti is highly dependent on remittances
from Diaspora. These remittances are
accountable for 30% of household income6.
The other side of the coin is that it comes
mostly from highly qualified people who
have left Haiti and thus not supporting
Haitian’s economy directly.
The rural-urban divide in terms of access to
services is extremely unequal. Whereas 28
percent of the population has access to safe
drinking water, this is not even 8 percent in
the rural areas. The same goes for
electricity, health care and education. In
several interviews with resource persons, it
6 These transfers total about $800 million annually and account for about 30 percent of household income. Page xv: in Social Resilience and State fragility in Haiti. World Bank Country Study (2007)
10
“The Haitian National Police Force is
insufficiently trained, equipped and
staffed. The ratio is 1 police officer for
every 1000 citizens”. In the Netherlands
this ratio is 3 to 4 to a 1000 citizens.
Pierre Espérance- RNDDH
was mentioned that in some provinces there is very little, if any, police representation7.
Another difference between the rural and the metropolitan areas is the tradition of social
cohesion. In rural areas less than one quarter of the population notes that he or she feels
unsafe. In urban areas this is much higher as more than one half of the urban population say
they feel unsafe most of the time. Trust and fear have been measured as indicators of social
cohesion. Crime and violence are on the increase, especially in the urban areas8. The social
cohesion, traditionally part of rural society gets undermined by the migration of people to
urban areas, where cohesion is less visible and less effective, but even more wanted. This puts
more pressure on state institutions that are struggling already. It is presumed that better
access to basic services in rural areas will reduce the wish of people to move to urban areas.
Governance and institutions
Institutions are important for social and economic development and are crucial for state
building. They have the potential to mitigate risk factors of violence and conflict. Weak as they
are in Haiti, they might also contribute to ignite violence and crime, for example by not being
able to provide justice. Impunity is omnipresent in Haiti, and will remain so as long as the
justice system will not prosecute perpetrators of violence.
Haiti’s revenue system has been in decline since the 1980's. In 2005 it was only 9 percent of
the GDP, compared to 18 percent in other low-income countries. The volatility of international
external assistance, combined with a weak domestic revenue base and poor expenditure
targeting have left spending on education, health and infrastructure below the average of other
low-income countries.
Public education in Haiti is in a deplorable state. More than 80 percent of the children are
enrolled in non-state schools. The same goes for health services. More than 70 per cent of
health services in rural areas are provided by non-governmental organisations.
The population of Haiti hardly has access to justice. Security is fragile, especially in the urban
areas. Under the presidency of Martelly (May 2011- present), old commanders have organised
themselves in current barracks and governmental buildings. They are armed, and put Martelly
under pressure to invest again in a national army. This is against the precept of the
international community on which the
government heavily depends financially. A
national army in Haiti is a sensitive issue. The
armies in the past have been accountable for
several coup d’états with an impact that Haiti
still has to live with today. Security forces in
general in Haiti have mainly served as tools
of oppression, and as extensive arms of the
elite rather than serving the public. The
Dominican Republic has a strong army of
about 60.000 soldiers. Investing in an army
competitive to the Dominicans’ would not
7 ibid 8 Crime, Violence and Development: Trends, Costs and policy options in the Caribbean (World Bank: 2007)
11
"Haiti actually has three elites. There
is the intellectual elite, what I would
call the old Haitian elite of powerful
families who have money and
education, a political elite, and then
business elite. Together, they are at
the top of the 5 per cent of the
population who control, I would say,
at least 80 per cent of the wealth."
Interview with Ralph Chevy, one of Haiti’s best-known entrepreneurs in the Independent on the 23rd of January 2010
only be unaffordable for Haiti, it would also not serve the populations security. As one
interviewee9 stated clearly:
“An army is installed to protect your population from foreign threats and the police is to
protect the population from internal insecurities”.
Threats Haiti faces historically are from the ruling parties and the elites, not so much from
outside. One could argue that the MINUSTAH has become a form of occupation, an argument
that is often used when discussing the issue of a national army. But the decision for a “UN
Stabilisation Mission" was made when lack of political control in the capital of Port Au Prince
before the elections in 2004, led to structural violence.
The international community is unanimous that priority should be given to building a strong
legitimate domestic police force that will ensure public security, and contribute to the broader
process of restoring state legitimacy. Together with a civilian unit of MINUSTAH they have
invested in the structural reform of the Police. Some positive changes are visible; though trust
in the integrity and capacity of these forces remains questionable.
Haiti’s judiciary system has been weakened by corruption and frequent political interference.
This has undermined the institution’s independence and trust of the population in institutions.
The physical infrastructure is weak (it has suffered even more during the earthquake, as the
human resources, judges and judicial officers are under qualified underpaid, and the courts are
understaffed). As a result, access to justice is not only difficult; it is based on chance for many
people.
Powerful actors and strategies
Under “Baby Doc” Jean Claude Duvalier in 1986, the Constitution was adapted and includes a
clear separation of executive, judicial and legislative powers, as well as the so desired
decentralised structures of governance. This has remained theory unfortunately, although the
current government has promised to put these laws into practice.
Chronic deprivation of basic rights and lack of socio-economic opportunities, especially for the
youth, generate frustrations that can easily be
exploited by those willing to undermine the
ruling government for their personal gains.
Institutions that suffer from severe breakdown
of their physical infrastructure, poorly trained
officials who are often underpaid and prone to
corruption as well, further strengthens
opportunists to undermine state authority.
It is an enormous challenge for political leaders
to prove their leadership, especially with the
few resources available. They have to deal with
class forces that have historically been part of
the political socio economic elite and that will
fight to keep their dominant position in society.
The elite does this at the cost of others. On the
9 Rhoddy Petit, former policy officer for Haiti and the Caribbean for Broederlijk Delen and he is resource person for the context of Haiti. He has lived in Haiti for many years (in the ‘80/’90)
12
other hand the leaders need to tackle populism that seems to acknowledge the population’s
grievances but does not pay attention to the longer term socio-economic and institutional
investments which are needed for development so badly.
This analysis of the World Bank gives quite a clear insight in the socio-economic and political
context of Haiti. It explains some of the root causes that have to be tackled in order to escape
the dire situation that Haiti finds itself in. However, this is not the full picture. Haitians mention
underlying causes of the poverty trap that their country finds itself in. By giving a short outline
on the history of Haiti since it became the first country in the world free from slavery, I will
argue that Haiti is subject to (at least) three underlying causes that have kept Haiti in its
poverty trap. As they might still pose a potential obstacle to change in Haiti it appears
important to take these into account in the analysis of Haiti’s context.
2.3 Haiti’s debt for independence
After a struggle of centuries between different European nations, Haiti was confiscated from
the Spanish and turned into French hands around 1660. Léogane is the first French settlement
on the West Coast. In 1697 a Treaty is signed where the Western part of the Island is officially
handed-over from the Spanish into French hands. At that time plantations of cacao, cotton and
tobacco are in full swing. The importation of African slaves was needed to increase produce,
and profit. Later the production of sugar and coffee became important export products.
By the 1780s, Saint-Domingue became known as the “Pearl of the Antilles” producing about 40
percent of all the sugar and 60 percent of all the coffee consumed in Europe. This single
colony, roughly the size of Belgium, produced more sugar and coffee than all of Britain's West
Indian colonies combined.
The slaves working on these plantations and who were accountable for these profits reached
around 800.000 (accounting for a third of the entire Atlantic slave trade)10. Thousands of
slaves managed to escape their patrons. They raided isolated plantations, forming
communities of maroons11.
In 1791 the Haitian revolution marked the start of what would become the first slave-free
country in the world. In the north groups of slaves were well organised setting plantations in
flames and this spread out through the whole colony. The former slaves have defeated armies
from the three most powerful nations on earth (Spain, France, and England)12.
On January 1st, 1804 independence was declared by the first Head of State of Haiti: Jean-
Jacques Dessalines13. He was the military commander and successor of Toussaint L’Ouverture,
the military leader who instigated the revolution for independence.
France refused to recognise Haiti until 1825 and only recognised Haiti after it was agreed that
the nation paid14 indemnity for the loss of French property during the revolution. To pay for
this, Haiti was put into debt, which they only managed to repay in 1947.
Diplomatically Haiti was not recognised by the US until 1862, meaning that it took nearly 60
years for Haiti to gain recognition. Haiti was perceived a threat by many nations, knowing that
Haiti supported independence movements and would help to free Latin America’s slaves.
10 Wikipedia: history of Haiti 11 Maroon is derived from the Spanish word “fugitive,” or “runaway”, literally it means “top of the mountains”, and is used throughout the entire Caribbean to refer to freed slaves that moved to the mountain areas to farm. ( source Wikipedia) 12 New Internationalist, “beyond relief, beyond belief”, by Phillip Wearne, January-February 2012 13 He was emperor not president 14 150 million golden francs should be paid to the French Republic.
13
“The state does not know
how to cohabit with the
population. They are not
used to it”
Father J. Hanssen- Director of
the National Justice and
Peace Commission in Haiti
(Jilap)
After a turbulent political period in which many presidents followed each other in a short
period, the Unites States occupied Haiti, justified to their saying by the complaints from
American Banks to which Haiti was highly in debt. The occupation lasted from 1915-1934. This
period is marked as self-interested by the US and generally as a brutal period. The US retained
control of Haiti’s external finances until 1947.
Adding on this history in a nutshell, there are three main factors throughout Haiti’s history that
still have an impact on Haiti as it is today, and that were emphasized by different respondents
in formal and lesser formal meetings. These are: 1) the presence of armed forces, whether to
liberate Haiti from slavery or to oppress the population, 2) influence and interference of foreign
powers, 3) deeply rooted inequality between the elites and the majority of the population.
From armed resistance to armed oppression
Since Haiti’s revolution for independence an army had been formed. Firstly to be liberated from
France, the army consisted of commanders that were liberated slaves and later commanders
with in mind to rule Haiti to their vision. During US occupation (1915-1934) the army was
reformed, and renamed “the Garde”. What was meant to turn into an apolitical and
professional army, turned out to become an arm of the people in power. The army consisted
mainly of black Haitians, trained by a black American commander; the officers were mainly
mulattoes15 though, further strengthening the power imbalances. Under Duvalier in 1959, the
Tontons Macoutes were created: a paramilitary group that enforced his repressive regime and
was given a virtual licence to torture, extort and kill all opponents of the regime. Their official
name was the National Security Volunteers16, but soon they received the nickname of Tontons
Macoutes17. The military was discarded only after Aristide came into power in 1994. The
National Haitian Police is now fully responsible for the internal security of its population.
This recent military history has evaded all trust of the population in security forces who have
committed the worst violations. For their victims there has never been justice until today. The
executor of political power, that the security forces have been over the years, still has an
enormous impact on the population. It is crucial in the process of gaining trust of the
population that these forces have no links to the elite that committed violations, and that it
really serves the public rather than the ruling elites18.
Foreign interference & influence
The role of foreign nations over the years has kept Haiti in a
poverty trap, with debts and export barriers put on to
them. It was feared that Haiti would become an example
for other countries in the Caribbean, which would then also
fight for independence. To the United States Haiti was geo-
politically important as a counter-balance to the wind of
communism that blew over the islands. The fact that Haiti
has been forced to pay an enormous debt to France for
their independence shows that Haiti was never forgiven for
the fact they obtained their independence19. Besides
France, the United States have played an important role in
keeping Haiti fragile. The debts Haiti owed to the US were legitimising its invasion in 1915, and
15 Mulattoes were historically seen as from a higher social class than indigenous Haitians, as they were half slave descendent, half from white slave owners. This provided them with a natural status. 16 Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale (V.S.N.) 17 Conversation with Claudette Werleigh about the official name of the Macoutes. 18 Back to square one: The politics of Police Reform in Haiti, Timothy Donais ( 2005) 19 Interview with Jagoda Paukovic who lived in Haiti from 1982-1984, under the regime of baby Doc, May 2012
14
they remained in control over their foreign expenses until 1947. Several embargos were put on
Haiti, and the dumping of US-AID rice in Haiti has partly destroyed Haiti’s local rice market20.
The US kept closely involved in the politics of Haiti, not only directly from government to
government, but also the Diaspora in the United States, kept influence. In 2004 the UN
Security Council voted for a UN-Stabilisation Mission, to monitor the elections and to assist
with the restoration and maintenance of rule of law, public safety and public order.
The elite versus the masses
Elites that ruled the country have never shown a genuine interest in investing in the country.
Nor have they developed any longer-term strategy to improve the lives of ordinary Haitians.
The opposite is often true as there are numerous examples which show that the elite have
often acted against the interest of the masses. Politicians including the presidents often fear
that a well-organised peasant society may revolt against them. Rather than please these
people and thereby secure their victory in elections, they have taken actions to undermine
their potential collective strengths. As one of my respondents put it:
“Fear of organised resistance has always been in the minds of controlling power”21.
François “Papa Doc” Duvalier came to power as democratically elected president. He promised
to get rid of the ruling elite and to put native Haitians back to power. He was very much
influenced by the “negritude movement”22
which was flourishing in Africa. Papa Doc intended
to build a middle class of black people but it is too simplistic to narrow it down to a colour
issue. He became known as having ruled the country as a feared and merciless dictator. His
son Baby Doc Duvalier was courting mulatto elite again, marrying a mulatto.
One well-documented example of actions by the ruling elite to undermine the social and
economic position of the people is the eradication of domestic pigs, so called “Creole pigs”.
Under the pretext of decease, “la peste porcine africaine”, president Baby Doc ordered the
putting down of all domestic pigs. Estimates of the total number of animals that were killed
vary between 1.2 and 1.9 million animals. This plan was carried out by his personal army, the
“Tontons Macoutes”23 in a manner that horrified rural population. The entire country smelt the
burned pigs who were then piled up together in each village and poured over with gasoline and
set on fire. The screaming was to be heard throughout the night24. For the livelihoods of
ordinary Haitians this was a disaster. For them the pigs were important sources of income. A
pig used to be a saving and insurance so that poor people would always have a pig to sell and
could then send their children to school for example.
To replace the indigenous pigs the government imported white pigs from the United States.
These pigs were much more prone to disease and were less well suited to the Haitian climate.
Also, they required special food which was only available to those people with money. The
result was that keeping these pigs was not possible for most of the people and the little gains
they had made in terms of the livelihoods were undone. This increased their poverty,
20 See study of Talitha Stam, and article Phillip Wearne Jan-Feb 2012 21 Interview with Jagoda Paukovic who lived in Haiti from 1982-1984, under the regime of Baby Doc Duvalier, May 2012, also in article from Phillip Wearne this traumatic event is mentioned. And in “Haiti entre colonisation dette et domination by Sophie Perchellet (2010) this example is used as one of the strategies of creating food dependence. 22 In the 19th century there has been an open political debate about if power should go to those who know best (le pouvoir aux plus capables) or to those who represent the greatest number of citizens (le plus grand bien au plus grand nombre). The color issue is not raised by either side, but the majority in Haiti is black though, and “educated” people who supposedly knew best were mostly mulattoes that did get an opportunity under colonial rule to study in France for example. Though the two political parties no longer exist, this political quarrel is still continuing between who knows best, or who represents best the population. 23 This was a paramilitary force created by Papa Doc in 1959. 24 Interview with Jagoda Paukovic
15
“The state listens more to
the demands or advice of
the international world
and other countries than
the voices and claims of
its own population”
Interview with PAPDA
decreased their abilities to organise any type of opposition and ultimately strengthened the
position of the elite.
The putting down of indigenous pigs is a well-known example, but it certainly is not the only
example of state domination. Numerous methods have been used throughout Haiti’s history
and they have created a system where the elite protects the elite’s interests, at the expense of
the population. They were also kept poor as a pool of almost free labour. Having “pigs”
(savings) and educating children was perceived as a threat; this could mean that a large part
of the rural population could climb up towards becoming middle-class. This would mean that
they could organise themselves against the elite. The consequence on the long run is not only
that it undermines development but also that the relationship between people and the state
has changed. A consequence is that today there is little trust between the people and their
respective state institutions25. During the Duvalier regime catholic missionaries were
organising peasants into groups and cooperatives. Creole language was thought in the
countryside and there was lots of effort to make people aware about the oppression that they
were living under. Theology of liberation was in a full swing. Some of the elite was organised
either in free masons networks or in Rosicrucian networks. They quickly reacted by persecuting
those peasant movements and by undermining the catholic grass roots movement. Protestant
missionaries from all kinds were invited to settle in the country side. This represented the end
of the peasant movement. The only protection and refuge was voodoo, the indigenous Haitian
religion which survived all oppressions and changes26.
Middle class was also considered potentially dangerous if capable of importing different
ideologies which could be critical of the ruling elite. During both Duvalier regimes (1957-1986),
there was a paranoid fear of communism. Tourists or business people from communist or
socialist countries were not allowed to obtain visas. The only exception was Poland because
Polish soldiers in Napoleon’s army deserted and joined Haitian slaves in the upraising.
After four turbulent political years in the follow-up of Baby Doc’s regime (he had to flee Haiti in
1986 and resided in France), elections were held in 1990 and Jean Bertrand Aristide was
elected president of Haiti with 67% of the votes. A military coup ended his rule already 7
months later, and not before 1994 he was restored in power. In 2000 he was elected again as
president after he stepped down (in accordance with the Haitian Constitution) in 1995. By
supporters he was seen as a liberator and by detractors he was seen as another dictator. The
reason of his popularity had to do for a large part with where his roots were. Aristide was one
of the promising people within the Fanmi Lavalas Party known for its’ equity principles. This
party received a lot of popularity and trust from farmers and farmers’ organisations, in the late
’80s, with the upcoming of the Ti Legliz, the grass roots
Church.
In the years that Aristide ruled, violence was inherent to his
power. There have been several coups and coups attempts,
and in 2004 he was again overthrown and forced into exile.
Thus, the historic importance and influence of the army, the
geo-political and economic interests of foreign nations and
the devastating politics of the elites, have been three
important factors in explaining why Haiti is what it is today.
The role of the international community has been an
important factor throughout history and has made Haiti both
25 Putzel, James (2006, in: The political economy of state building in situations of fragility and conflict: from analysis to strategy. Clingendael Institute, 2012 26 Interview with Jagoda Paukovic and Herman Lauwerysen who both lived in Haiti under Baby Doc in the 1980s.
16
Many cases are known of
sexual violence being
committed by soldiers of
MINUSTAH. A hundred
soldiers have returned to Sri
Lanka, without being held
accountable for their crimes.
The Security Council is not
willing to discuss the
immunity of soldiers. They
are sent back home but Haiti
has no right to prosecute
them. Impunity contributes to
maintaining the status quo.
Local staff at Solidarité Fanm Ayisyen (SOFA)
vulnerable to and suspicious of all (aid) interventions that have been taken place.
These three factors represent three different power structures that have been, and sometimes
still are influential.
Different interviewees27 emphasized that now that Martelly (and his elite) have won the
elections, the power is (again) in the hands of the bourgeoisie. It will not be surprising that
those elite will continue to be redistributive to their elite part of the population and that they
will not represent nor be accountable to the population as a whole.
Previously the national government also had an army to command power. This army has been
dissolved. Though, as will be discussed later, the elite is represented in different public
institutions at strategic places and decides what is just. There is no real independence of
institutions, or a real democratic government.
In the next paragraphs the perspectives of representatives of civil society will be discussed and
an effort will be done to show how deeply rooted these inequalities are and what impact they
have on the daily lives of people and their communities. It is not only about a lack of social
contract between the state and its population, it is a broad and complete absence of
communication and trust of people in their government and their institutions.
2.4 Human rights perspective
2.4.1 Access to justice and cycle of impunity
The term “access to justice” has become a common term in the wider human rights and
developmental discourse, policy and programming. Especially in contexts where the
government has lacked to provide judicial services to the majority of the population, the
international community has included this aspect of human rights and developmental
programming to their arsenal of interventions. Recently it has become an integral part of
peacebuilding operations to include programmes of reforming the police (Security Sector
Reform or SSR) and to reform the justice system
(sometimes part of SSR and sometimes tackled in a
specific justice reform programme). Both justice and
security are seen as fundamental rights and
preconditions for sustainable peace and development,
essential for the legitimacy of any nation.
For the purpose of clarity the term “access to justice” is
defined here. Firstly, access (or the limited access) is
defined as: all barriers that citizens face in their
struggle to obtain justice. This includes not only the
physical distance to courts, but also the financial lack of
access, as most people in Haiti cannot afford judicial
assistance for example, or pay to file a complaint.
Furthermore knowledge or better lack thereof prevents
many people to find their way to accessing justice.
Secondly, justice is understood to mean all justice
services including the courts, but also prosecution,
27 Please see the Annex, for the round table discussion held in Brussels on the 12th of June 2012, with Anne Mc Connell and Phllip Wearne from the London- based Haiti Support Group, Greet Schoumans from Broederlijk Delen/ 11.11.11, and Claudette Werleigh, as Haiti expert, Secretary General of Pax Christi International. See also the interview with Rhoddy Petit, previously living in Haiti, and who has worked for Broederlijk Delen several years.
17
police, legal defence and alternative dispute resolution28.
Cordaid requested to dedicate specific attention to two human rights aspects in Haiti. One is
the state of access to justice and the other is women’s rights. Human rights organisations in
Haiti work on many issues related to social injustices. These issues often include specific
programmes aimed at improving access to justice and fighting (the causes of) violence against
women. Following the section of access to justice, three main obstacles were identified by
human rights organisations in Haiti. They are (i) weak capacity, (ii) legitimacy, and (iii)
language. After having identified the main obstacles, three human rights organisations working
on “access to justice” provide insight on what they do to contribute to a stronger and more
liable justice system that the population can access to find justice.
Weak capacity
The infrastructure of Haiti’s courts and prisons was weakened by the January 2010
earthquake. Though only four prisons were severely damaged, 5000 prisoners managed to
escape. This means a rough 58%, as the total amount of detainees in Haiti was 8535 just prior
to the earthquake. It needs to be said though that many more are detained in police cells for
example29. In normal times escapes are not uncommon given the inadequacies of prison
security30. The courts that were unscathed after the earthquake have remained understaffed
and under-resourced. Courts not only lack sufficient staff, but the staff that is present is
under-qualified. The earthquake and its aftermath led the destruction of many files of people
awaiting their trials. This resulted in excessively long pre-trial detentions and further pressure
on the limited space prisoners have31. The UPR report on criminal justice32 emphasizes that: “…
over 80% of the prisoners have not been convicted of a crime and are held in illegal pre-trial
detention for more than a year on average, and over three years in some prisons”.
The long pre-trial detentions, often longer than the crime the prisoners are accused. On top of
this the very poor health and sanitation circumstances
make prisons in Haiti inhumane and equal to cruel
treatment. This means in practise for example that
prisoners have to take turns sleeping on the floor, as
the space per prisoner comes down to 0.30m2 per
person. The international standard though in crisis
situations requires 2m2 as an absolute minimum33.
Another issue that is often brought up in reports that
evaluate the status of justice systems is the
contradictions in laws. The National Constitution for
example is contradictory in some instances with the Family Code. This is a phenomenon often
mentioned in countries where the justice system is weak. It is often not a first priority because
it is a symptom and not a cause of a dysfunctional justice system. There are also disparities
between National Laws and international Conventions and Treaties that have been adopted by
Haiti. Fondation Toya, a women’s grass roots organisation, emphasized the problem with this
National - International Law-gap for women’s rights.
28 Access to Justice: Reflections on the concept, the Theory and its Application to Latin America’s Judicial Reforms, Hammergren, L. 2004 29 Crisis Group has held interviews prior to the earthquake with senior prison administration officials, with MINUSTAH. 30 Keeping Haiti safe: Justice Reform, Crisis Group Latin America/ Caribbean Briefing N27, 27th of October 2011 31 ibid; 32 UPR Report on Criminal Justice in Haiti submitted by: Alternative Chance, Center for Constitutional Rights, Conférence des universitaires pour la défense des droits et de la liberté and LAMP for Haiti Foundation 33 UPR: Criminal Justice (2011) page 30
A basic requirement for a
functioning system of justice is
that the population has trust
in its independence. This is
absolutely absent.
Local Staff from Programme pour une Alternative de Justice (PAJ)
18
One of the major obstacles that
human rights organisations
observe when discussing with
public authorities, is that when
they highlight fundamental
human rights issues, that this is
perceived as if they are
denigrating the government, or
working against them.
This atmosphere and attitude
needs to change somehow, if
authorities and civil society are
to collaborate constructively on
structural change.
Staff of GAJ, POHDH and Claudette Werleigh share these comments
“Though the CEDAW treaty has been adopted by the national government, rape was until
recently not recognised as a crime”. This is discriminative against women, and more laws show
symptoms of a highly patriarchal society”34.
One of the results of this grass roots organisation is that they managed to generate a lot of
public attention with regard to this discriminatory law. Together with women’s groups and
authorities in the government, recently this felony has been criminalised in National Law. Now,
of course when all evidence has been gathered and proven just, perpetrators will be convicted
for between 3 and 5 years.
Since the earthquake, investments in the capacity of judges have been made. With support of
the international community 20 judges have, over a period of 16 months, been intensively
trained in listening skills, mediation and demonstrating authority and humility35.
Political & financial corruption- undermining legitimacy
The justice system in Haiti is dysfunctional and it is barely seen as a legitimate institution by
the majority of the population36. Some steps have indeed been taken to reform the justice
system and the police, but there are still many concerns, especially regarding the safety of the
population. In a recent survey of ONAVC37, different neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince have
been questioned about their perceptions with regard to the effectiveness of state institutions,
and specifically about the police and the courts. The preliminary results indicate that the
neighbourhoods’ trust in these institutes is low: in some places they hardly enjoy legitimacy at
all. To a question, for example: if you were witness to a crime, what would you do? The option
of going to file a complaint at the police was not
often mentioned as a first option (19% of the
cases)38. Reasons provided for this were, besides
lack of trust, that the police will actually do
something and the lack of proximity of the police in
their neighbourhood. In some cases the police is not
represented in a neighbourhood at all, and they have
to go to a different area that might have security
issues, or where people just don’t feel comfortable.
Also some respondents mentioned that the police
might be there physically but not available to file
complaints, also not when it regards sexual violence
or violence in general. In cases where sexual
violence is the assault, shame to report to the police
also plays a role, as well as the fear that they are not
taken serious.
Legitimacy is further undermined by corruption and
by structural impunity, mostly of well-known
criminals. There is a tendency that big criminals can
easily buy their freedom, whilst small offenders who
34 Interview with Ms Nadine Lewis from Fondation Toya, on the 6th of June 2012 35 Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, April 2011, page 11 36 Interview with ONAVC: survey held on legitimacy of governmental institutions in five different areas in Port-au-Prince 37 National Observatory against criminality and violence (a recent institute linked to the University of Port au Prince) 38 These data are from an interview with Claude Mane Das from ONAVC, the research results will be presented at a conference in Port-au-Prince September 2012
19
can’t buy their way out are held far longer than the punishment that rests on the charges filed
against them. This has resulted in a general perception that the legal system is unjust and not
intended to serve the rights of the population. Several interviewees reminded me of the fact
that people in Haiti have never seen justice: neither in the past or in the present. Recent
examples were mentioned, such as the return of Duvalier to Haiti, who is not being prosecuted
for the widespread atrocities committed during his rule from ’71 to ’86. Despite public concerns
pointed at the current government by international human rights organisations and the
Independent Expert of human rights, Duvalier’s trial will only consist of financial allegations,
and not include crimes against humanity39.
Independence of the judicial system has not yet been implemented which undermines the
legitimacy of the courts. So far the Supreme Council has not been operational because it still
has no president40. This means that judges are appointed and withdrawn by the Ministry of
Justice. The case of Duvalier is an example of governmental influence of judges. The judge
that decided not to prosecute Duvalier admitted he was under severe pressure doing so41. With
pressure also from judges threatening to go on strike, in March 2012, Martelly has nominated
different judges including a president of the Supreme Court and the Court of Cassation. They
were installed on the 3rd of July 2012. From that moment on, the President no longer has a
say on who is appointed and who is withdrawn. Despite this, the protection of all judges and
lawyers who are engaged in politically sensitive cases will remain a concern.
Language
A last obstacle to be mentioned here in gaining access to justice for the majority of the
population is the language spoken in courts. As is the case with former colonies, Haiti’s judicial
system is based upon the French judicial system, which was installed under French rule in the
1780s. In Haiti only 20-40% of the Haitians speak French, yet all legal proceedings at the trials
are conducted only in French, and not in the native language of Haiti, which is Creole42. So in
Haiti all people are all expected to know and to respect the law: “Nul n’est censé ignorer la
loi ». But until now, all laws are written in French while a great number of people cannot read
and most of the population speak only Creole43. Furthermore defendants in court cannot follow
the allegations made against them, and therefore they will not have a fair trial.
2.4.2 Response from Human Rights Organisations
Representatives of three organisations44 that are specifically dedicated to providing access to
justice were interviewed. They were asked what they see as the main obstacles accessing
justice and also how they intervene to contribute to better accessing justice. Lack of
knowledge, lack of knowing their rights and lack of access to information to obtain their rights
are mentioned as main obstacles to demand justice.
Bureau Avocats Internationaux
BAI is specialised in supporting victims and prisoners, especially the most vulnerable at the
grassroots levels, in accessing justice. By providing trainings and by giving them legal support,
victims are better equipped to demand justice. In a broader sense they also work on advocacy
39 Newspaper: Haiti Libre 1st of February, interview with Michel Forst, and HRW world report (feb. 2012) for example. 40 Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst 41 Haitian Newspaper: Defend.HT 13th of February 2012 42 UPR Report Criminal Justice 43 Interview with Claudette Werleigh: she mentioned the language as one of the biggest obstacles and injustices in accessing the justice system. 44 Bureau Avocats Internationaux (BAI), Groupe Assistance Juridique (GAJ) and Progamme for an alternative Justice (PAJ) were interviewed specifically on access to justice
20
to claim basic rights by denouncing human rights violations with well-filed cases, and also in a
broader sense, by denouncing violations and demanding accountability from the government.
They also work with the police and with some judges, which is a signal that the attitudes start
to change for the better. They are the leading organisation when it comes to providing legal
assistance to victims. They often collaborate with the Justice and Peace Commission in the
capital (Jilap). Jilap brings human rights cases to BAI and BAI in return demands advice on
certain communities where they are active, and in terms of research they are a valuable
source. Also the media play an important role according to Mario Joseph, manager of BAI and
a respected human rights lawyer in Haiti. BAI often makes use of different media to get more
public attention.
Le Programme pour une Alternative de Justice
PAJ interprets access to justice in a broader sense. For them it is about the day-to-day realities
and needs of the population. Their approach includes looking at alternative justice
mechanisms. This justice should reflect Haitian society and should thus imply questions of
social inequalities, thereby pointing at fundamentally searching for change of structures more
than demanding for reforms.
PAJ also takes into consideration the informal practise and application of justice, and how to
incorporate them into the formal rights system. PAJ was the only organisation, mentioning and
being active in the field of informal structures of justice. They have three core activities that
aim to contribute to making justice part of all people’s lives and including contributing to
changing structures (of the justice system). Firstly, they provide trainings at grass roots level
to inform people about their rights. They also provide regular trainings for paralegals, involving
local authorities wherever feasible. Secondly they work with the peasantry as a specific focus
group. They conduct research and establish justice clinics in all communes where they are
active. The demands for advice and knowledge of rights of people are reaching beyond their
capacities. Thirdly they invest in production of materials in Creole to keep the grass roots up-
to-date and they develop materials for paralegal trainers in Creole.
They are a partner of Broederlijk Delen, whose representative, during an interview, mentioned
PAJ’s excellent contacts with grass roots groups. It was also mentioned they are well-known
for their trainings to community based groups (CBOs) and paralegals.
Groupe Assistance Juridique
This organisation was the first cabinet of advocates in Haiti, being established in 1987. They
are specialised in providing legal assistance to defend human rights. The main obstacle as
perceived by GAJ is the gap between the population and its authorities. Their access point is
the population and by providing education and trainings on grass roots level, they contribute to
providing tools to defend themselves against violations, but also to demand accountability. So
the population is not sufficiently armed with information and tools to defend themselves, and
at the governmental level there is a structural problem of political will. By empowering people
they intend to change this gap between authorities and grass roots. GAJ launched a specific
programme “the defence of the right to do politiques”. Seminars and trainings on 'politicking'
/being politically active were organised, where discussions were held of what this means in
practise. For example what responsibilities come along with being engaged in politics, who is
represented, and to whom you demand accountability? Economic rights, cultural rights and
environmental rights45 were also included as part of the programme.
45 environmental rights are defined by GAJ as : the relations between nature and the population/plants and the population/animals and the population
21
The CEDAW Committee noted
in 2009 that it was concerned
about the deeply-rooted
patriarchal attitudes and
stereotypes regarding the roles
and responsibilities of women
and men. Both in the household
as well as in the working places
it constitutes an obstacle to the
achievement of men-women
equality.
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Haiti 2009.
Furthermore they have four programmes with regard to economic rights of women (together
with GAJ).
With regard to justice, they would like to extend their programme to also implement judicial
offices and clinics, that have active committees engaged discussing human rights and fight
against discrimination. The proximity of justice is one of the challenges of accessing justice.
Others that have been mentioned earlier are also the lack of capacity, political will, corruption
and how impunity has prevailed over the years.
GAJ works closely together with PAJ and with Jilap. Together with Jilap they are the two most
prominent grass roots organisations.
2.4.3 Violence against women
The issue of violence against women has been high on
the international agenda since the ’90s. International
attention further increased when stories of violence
against women in conflict situations (like Bosnia,
Rwanda, Sudan and the DRC) were broadcasted in the
international media. The 2000 Security Council
Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security was a
historic breakthrough in the sense that there was
broad recognition for the need for women participation
in peace processes, and also of their protection in
humanitarian situations (including conflicts).
The tendency has been, until recently to focus on the
consequences of violence against women, by
supporting the construction of clinics and shelters and
by providing psychological aid and small economic projects to promote the independence of
the victims. This is also aimed at helping them to gain financially and morally support to help
them to regain their dignity. Of course these are and have been relevant interventions, but
they have not contributed to the analysing of underlying cause of violence, and developing
strategies to tackle the structural causes of violence. Attention to how to change the structures
that preserve gender equality have only been widely recognised recently. The inclusion of men
in activities of education and advocacy to change attitudes seems a logical component, when
tackling gender inequality. It concerns both men and women.
ONAVC (see footnote 31) gave an insightful example of one of their surveys with regard to
“trivialising security” that they executed in three different communities of Port-au-Prince, and
sex-aggregated, to determine the differences in opinions and attitudes of both men and
women. Both sexes were asked what their response would be if a men hits a women, because
she does something that her husband doesn’t approve of. 80% in general, disapproved with
the idea that a woman should be corrected physically by her husband. 11% stated that they
would approve. And of these 11%, 80% were women.
In the next sections three causes of violence against women are outlined by different
representatives of women’s organisations. Furthermore specific literature has been consulted
in relation to human rights and human rights violations in Haiti. These causes are generally
considered the main underlying roots of gender inequality. Firstly the patriarchal system is
mentioned as a cause, this will be followed by several socio-economic causes. Finally stereo-
typing and the fact that this is preserved, contributes to the status quo of violence against
women in Haiti. The section will be finalised by giving the word to three different
22
There are many girls who decide
not to go to study as they are
convinced to find a husband that
will take care of them easily. She
realises that she will achieve an
economic status that she, under
normal circumstances, would not
get”
Interview with staff from Fondation Toya
“The last reforms have
taken place 30 years
ago. Schoolbooks
contain information that
is discriminative towards
women; it contains
stereo-types and keeps
the patriarchal
perspective alive” Mme Jacob, gender advisor from SOFA
organisations46
that have specific programmes to tackle the root causes that keep women in a
trap of not having equal chances, and thus being more vulnerable, and not gaining any
opportunities to change their situation.
History of patriarchy
Solidarité Fanm Ayisyen (SOFA) was one of the first women’s
organisations active in Haiti. It was created in ’86 as feminist
organisation that tackles the root causes of violence against
women. They were the first women’s organisation that was
asked to give insight on the context in which they work on
women’s rights by the government. Violence against women
is highly prevalent in Haitian society. In Haiti it is said that
one in three women has been a victim of sexual violence47.
One of the main causes is the patriarchal system that is
deeply rooted in Haitian’s society. Stereo-types of what a man
should be and do, and what a woman should be and do, are
kept alive in households and in schools. The cycle of impunity
further encourages the status quo.
SOFA further emphasized that society continues to hold on to the status quo. Not only schools,
but also parents contribute to what Mme Jakob called “a moral crisis” by not having control
over their children. Girls get pregnant at 13 which is catastrophic for their future but it
continues to happen from generation to generation.
According to SOFA violence is the product of the rooted inequality between men and women48.
The weak governmental institutions reinforce the cycle of violence, because impunity of these
crimes has become the norm. Laws that criminalize violence against women have been voted
but not yet implemented into their daily policies and work.
Socio-economic factors
According to JILAP violence in general has a mainly socio-economic basis. Conflicts do often
happen on a family level, but it is not there to generate violence. The social conflicts are
usually managed well before it turns violent. The government has a responsibility in providing
the services in which a conflict can be solved in a
just way. The government has a responsibility too,
in providing services to solve these conflicts in a just
manner. Lacking the capacities to fulfil its role
contributes to the cycle of impunity. Not being
punished for violations that are committed, gives the
impression of acceptance.
Fondation Toya emphasizes that the same counts for
violence against women: it is largely a socio-
economic phenomenon. With regard to the social
aspect the hierarchical structure of Haitian society is
mentioned, in which the division of roles between
men and women is very specific. Traditionally the
46 Fondation Toya, Lig Pou Vwa Fanm and the Cultural Institute of Karl Leveque. 47 Mme Jakob, gender advisor at SOFA refers to an extensive study conducted between 2003 and 2005 where 135.000 cases of sexual violence were noted. 48 Interview with Mme Jacob, gender advisor from SOFA, on the 9th of February 2012
23
husband is the head of the household and is thus considered as the one to provide for the
family in terms of food. He has the economic monopoly and considered holder of all the
families resources. The wife does not have rights as an individual and is fully dependent on the
husband. Then, when there is a problem, the dependent is submitted to violence: physically
but also and largely emotional and psychological abuse49.
Another important underlying cause of violence, the aspect of education is mentioned50. The
rates of young girls who drop out of school is high, illiteracy amongst women is significantly
higher than amongst men and the number of girls who will go and study after their secondary
education is marginal. According to Fondation Toya this has not only to do with the preference
of parents to send their sons to school, sometimes at the detriment of their daughters. This is
also an attitude that girls have.
Stereo-types
Besides the “attitudes of girls” towards their future, being comfortable depending socio-
economically on men, men also have attitudes that reinforce gender inequality. These unequal
power relations are inherent to the patriarchal structure of society.
From the perspectives of various local civil society organisations, gender inequality finds its’
roots in the patriarchal structures of Haitian society. The socio-economic situation of many
families and the weak institutions that have lacked to establish reforms in education and
judicial services, contribute to strengthening the status quo. The status quo means that human
rights are unequally enjoyed by men and by women. This has consequences on the short term
and the longer term. Laws in Haiti also constitute a barrier to equal treatment. In practise this
means that women are less likely to access formal education and professional opportunities.
Lack of opportunities makes women more vulnerable to poverty and exploitation. In public life
it is clear that women are being underrepresented in public and political processes51.This could
be seen both as a cause of their lack of opportunities, and as a consequence.
Interviews with several women’s rights organisations including some human rights- and media
organisations, gave a broad insight into the causes of violence against women. These
organisations were then also requested what their intervention strategies are to combat
inequality, and how they will contribute to change power relations that are inherent to gender
equality. Most organisations intervene with similar sets of tools, but the approaches differ
slightly.
2.4.4 Response from women’s organisations
Fondation Toya52
This is a grass roots organisation working closely with local communities, and they have a
respected relationship with the authorities. Central in their objectives is the empowerment of
women. By empowering women, they envision to change the power structures upon which
Haitian society is based. Awareness-raising and educating them particularly in questions
concerning women and also on issues that are fundamental to their vulnerability. A lot of
trainings are provided with regard to violence against women. They invite representatives of
different communities, and often women’s leaders of grass roots organisations to tackle a
49 Interview with Fondation Toya, 6th of June 2012 50 It is brought up in interviews with Jilap, Fondation Toya and in the 2009 CEDAW report in the concluding observations of the Committee on he elimination of Discrimination against Women 51 Compilation prepared by the OHCHR in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex of the human Rights Council. Working Group on the universal Periodic Review, 12th Session , Geneva, 3-14 October 2011 52 Interview Stacey Links with staff from Fondation Toya on the 6th of June 2012
24
specific problem. They also have a space where they allow grass roots organisations and
women’s groups to use their offices to sew for example and that can also be used as a space
for exchange and dialogue. They have been involved from the start in building relationships
with decision-makers. Their aim is to influence them and to remind them of their national and
international obligations. Especially the part, to bring down advocacy messages to a societal
level, is a core task of Fondation Toya. Madam Louis, the president of the organisation gives an
example of working with the Ministry of Women Affairs on the proposition of a law which
covers “le paternité comme responsable”. In Haiti, she continues, men often get into
relationships, but when a child is born they don’t take any responsibility for the child. Toya
worked on a proposal to hold men responsible and accountable (also in extra-marital
relationships with extra-marital children) for their children. They managed to get the support
from deputies in Parliament, and the law was voted, but up to now it has not been applied yet.
Just after the earthquake the situation in camps was of great concern to people living and
having to survive there. The trainings provided tools to deal with the difficult situation.
Violence was, and still is a problem in the camps. Also young boys and girls are trained so that
they change their thinking and behaviour with regard to violence and human rights. A sense of
mutual respect for both men and women cannot be taught early enough, as staff of this
Foundation emphasized. They lost a lot of their resources during the earthquake (including a
library and a micro-finance project), but they have managed to continue with inventing new
approaches with little resources, and the trainings they provide are then taught by the girls,
boys and women to others in the community.
Lig pouvwa Fanm53
This grass roots organisation exists since 1996 and they work particularly with women running
elections and also women who are running for posts of directorship and electoral. It aims to
empower women by focussing on getting women into positions of power within the
government. Educating women and sharing knowledge and expertise to strengthening women
leadership, is the second pillar of their core business. There are many challenges in Haitian
society, as there is just “not a culture of women getting involved in politics”. Even if the
opportunity is there, many external factors might complicate the decision to engage in politics.
The director of the organisation gave a personal example. She said:
“Even for me it has been difficult. I have always been interested in politics, but my husband
and my two sons told me no. My reaction was and still is that women need to be supported by
their families in their political endeavours to succeed”.
Awareness raising and trainings are their main activities. They start with very young boys and
girls, by providing trainings at schools. The foundation of the women’s movement is explained:
where it came from and what it stands for, and what they struggle for. It is not about
disparities and discrimination, according to Lig Pouvwa Fanm it is about what women do to
search for equality. The approach should be positive according to Marie Chantale Pously.
Women have to create and open spaces for themselves; to create opportunities. This is where
the focus of this grass roots organisation is based upon. They provide then the information,
and trainings on how to take certain steps forward.
53 Interview Stacey Links with staff from Lig Pouvwa Fanm on the 9th of June 2012
25
Institute Culturel de Karl Leveque (ICKL)54
This is an institute working primarily with rural organisations. They work on four axis: (i)
strengthen institutional development; (ii) democratisation of organisations; (iii) enhancing and
developing women’s leadership capacities; (iv) 'économie solidaire' where both women and
men can participate in the development of the social and economic functioning of society.
ICKL focuses primarily on socio-economic rights, as they feel that socio-political rights are
largely covered by others. They raise awareness and provide trainings to communities of these
rights and what they entail and what they mean in the daily life of communities. They have a
focus on rural farmers, where they spread themselves what their responsibilities are. Local –
and central authorities are involved in distributing the message. The relationship with local
authorities is of crucial importance to their work. They cannot develop any kind of activities
without first discussing this and without also collaborating with local authorities. They have to
be and are always involved in the process. What makes it workable for ICKL is that in each of
the groups they work with, one member of the authorities is represented and they make the
dialogue with authorities and create a link between the work which they do and involving the
authorities.
54 Interview Stacey Links with staff from ICKL on the 1st of June 2012
26
3. MAPPING OF NETWORKS AND LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS
3.1 Introduction
There are many networks in Haiti: some strong and alive, some fighting for their survival and
some are only existent on paper. Two national networks were quickly identified on the basis of
interviews with different human rights and women’s rights organisations. These two networks
seem to be well-known in the entire field of human rights. A third network was added, an
international network, on Cordaid’s request. Other networks seemed less relevant, or were not
visited due to time constraints. The networks mentioned by different organisations are
available in Annex V.
In the next paragraphs the objectives and activities of these networks are shared. This will be
followed by a short outline of some principal human rights organisations that were interviewed,
and who often relate to one of these networks with at least some of their activities.
The same mapping was requested by Cordaid for women’s networks and women’s
organisations. For women networks it appeared to be different though. There are several
networks active in Haiti defending women’s rights but they are mostly internationally
orientated or internationally based. For this reason no women networks have been
interviewed, but some will be mentioned when discussing the activities of local women’s
organisations, and they will be summarised in Annex V.
The Chapter will then be concluded with some of the obstacles these networks face in their
daily work. Then some strengths and weaknesses that appear not only in networks but also in
human rights and women’s rights organisations will be outlined.
3.2 Overview of human rights networks
In the next sections three well-known human rights networks with their head office in Port-au-
Prince will be discussed. The first two networks are national networks and have been active in
Haiti for quite some time. The last network to be discussed is an international network, mainly
existing of French and Canadian donors. This network was interviewed by specific request of
Cordaid, to gain insight in what opportunities are available in better cooperating with
international as well as with national and local organisations.
3.2.1 La Plateforme des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits Humains (POHDH)55
This is a well-known platform, and probably considered as one of the if not thé one platform of
human rights organisations. It is a platform for the training, observation, research and
reflection on human rights (violations) in Haiti. They have eight permanent members, who are
all human rights organisations, but quite complementary to another. There are two judiciary
NGOs (PAJ and GAJ), two organisations with a religious base and constituency (Jilap and
CORAL56), one cultural institute (ICKL), one specifically focussed at students in socio-economic
rights (CRESFED), one specifically focussed on the rights of refugees and repatriates (San Kal
Levèk) and RNDDH, the human rights organisation that targets the wide spectrum of all
human rights violations and aspects.
55 interview Stacey Links with Alermy Piervilus and three colleagues at POHDH on the 9th of June 2012 56 Commission de Réflexion et d”assistance Légale de la Conférence Haïtienne des Religieux
27
Their objective is to empower the population by informing, educating and training citizens so
that they themselves are able to participate in this power of holding government and various
actors accountable and responsible for their actions. They file human rights violations, and are
a strong platform in advocacy: both on a local as well as on a national and international level.
One of the results they mentioned is the criminalisation of rape to be recognised in public
institutions, and that this can be punishable by law. This took a whole lot of effort of human
rights organisations in Haiti, but it shows that advocating can be successful.
The Human Rights Organisations that were
interviewed spoke quite highly of POHDH. It is
widely perceived as a platform that is active and
well aware of the latest updates and reports.
They are often quoted in the UPR-report
summary of stakeholders, more often than
Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International
which shows they have a solid reputation and
knowledge of a wide variety of human rights
issues.
Its weakness probably is, - as is observed as a
common denominator of Haitian NGOs- that the
organisations stand or fall with the engagement of the director of this Platform. The
knowledge, experience, and the way the organisation is represented to the outside world is not
shared amongst its’ staff and remains solely with the director. This is an observation not only
seen by the interviewer, but also by other international organisations which are financing
POHDH, and is considered a serious risk.
After the earthquake of January 2010, numerous NGOs lost their funding when the director
passed away, or was no longer capable of running an NGO. This was mentioned for example by
the director of ANAPFEH, a women’s organisation, who could not immediately get back to work
after the earthquake and lost their funding. They did pick up though afterwards, and are now
back to business.
3.2.2 Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development (PAPDA)
PAPDA57 is a network of a wide array of Haitian organisations: women's organisations,
organisations of the peasantry; socio-professional organisations and those that work on
questions concerning the environment. The network was established as a result of a process
of analysis and evaluation of the social movement in Haiti. Politics in Haiti were evaluated,
particularly when President Aristide returned after the coup d'état of ‘90/’91. In 1994 when the
president returned (from the United States) with an amplified programme of neo-liberal
politics, network members perceived a disengagement from the state. This was a momentum
to draw an inclusive alternative vision and plan regarding the socio-economic future of Haitian
society.
The fundamental objective of this network is to link the peasantry and the bourgeoisie to
decrease inequality in Haiti. Strengthening the voices and power of the population and to
mobilise people, is central to PAPDA’s strategy to bring about change. Systemizing experiences
from the grassroots and integrating them in the political discourse which allows for their
further strengthening and structural support, is one of the core strategies of their work.
57 Interview of Stacey Links with staff from PAPDA at the 4th of June 2012
The objective is to change the status
quo. The status quo now is that the
state and the population are
completely disintegrated and are in a
situation of non-communication, non-
interest, and distrust.
Interview with local staff from PAPDA
28
Advocating is therefore crucial, which is done in close collaboration with grassroots before
taking up messages to the local, national and often international level too.
Supporting local initiatives and accompanying them in getting the necessary tools to organize
themselves is an important element of their work. Secondly reflecting on their (members)
work and see how this information can be incorporated into a more scientific analysis, is
important for their broader analysis and advocacy. Conclusions and recommendations can be
withdrawn from this, and will then be used to try and influence and change policies that serve
the peasants for example. After fine-tuning the outcomes with the grass roots members, a
report might be published to ground the advocacy messages which could then be used by
member organisations themselves to complement and strengthen broader advocacy
objectives.
PAPDA’s work targets the most vulnerable in society and provide them with the necessary tools
to allow them to escape from their poverty situation. Poor people are perceived by PAPDA not
only as people who lack money and food or opportunities, but who do not have adequate
capacity to change their situation and are thus condemned to poverty. Activities include
research and documentation of economic problems, consultation and strategizing, public
education and communications, lobbying and advocating authorities and officials, and
international networking.
This network which is contributing to the discourse of seeking alternatives for socio-economic
change is unique in Haiti. It is well-known by Haitian and international organisations, inside as
well as outside Haiti. The national government invites them when expertise is needed on socio-
economic change, and when representatives of grassroots organisations are needed to come to
an inclusive analysis. Also on an international level their reports are known, and their methods
are recognised.
At the same time though, criticism is spilt over this network, on one hand probably because of
their success. They are on the radar nationally and internationally, making it visible and
transparent for all and that brings along criticism as well as positive stories.
But secondly, and I can’t determine yet if this is a Haitian phenomenon of competition
amongst organisations themselves, or if this criticism is really well-founded, there seems to be
a leadership challenge amongst successful networks and organisations.
3.2.3 Cadre de Liaison Inter- ONG Haïti (CLIO)
The impressions of the CLIO Platform were gained through participation in one of their General
Assemblies, and by having two interviews: one with the only local organisation represented in
this platform, and two with the platform’s chair. The general Assembly is organised once a
year and all members of the network are expected to be present. This Assembly takes half a
day. The representatives of the organisations present at the Assembly were mainly Canadian
and French and the organisations that were represented were all international, except for one.
This General Assembly was organized to agree on the Statutes of the Platform which is
fundamental to their legitimate status. Without legal status the impact of their advocacy will be
questionable, is the argument. Beside the discussion point of agreeing on the Statutes other
topics were on the agenda, for example with regard to the status of advocacy activities and
planning. The discussion about their legal status took the whole morning though at the
detriment of all other topics on the agenda58.
58 Cordaid’s field director was participating in the previous General Assembly and he observed the same tendency: discussions about form overshadowed the core business of the platform: collaborate advocacy.
29
Observations
There is an unbalance in the representation of local and international organisations. This is an
issue they would like to solve, but it proofs difficult to attract local organisations. One of the
reasons is that a condition to become a member is to have a legal status. This is difficult for
most local organisations as it has proven difficult for international platforms like this one.
In the debates there seemed to be some power play amongst some of the members about who
to include or exclude in this platform. Once a platform is active and has success in its
(advocacy) activities the active members are easily distinguished for the lesser active ones.
Therefore the discussion seemed to serve only the status of some of the members. This is
quite a common characteristic of networks and platforms, but it indicates their lack of
efficiency. The Platform offered their services to support (local) organisations in getting their
legal status, to act as a representative, but not before they have their own legal status.
People might be reticent in welcoming other organisations (mainly local), when things have not
been sorted for themselves. But this also means that the discussions about the rules and
regulations paralyse discussions on which common actions could follow. Some of the present
organisations showed fatigue with the same discussions without concrete output. They are
present to work on common letters, to discuss what issues to take up and some members
have expressed that they feel they are wasting their time. The question is whether once the
platform is formalised, the discussions will change to effective collaboration on common
advocacy issues. On the other hand, all members were present at the Assembly, and wanted
to bring the discussion forward.
I spoke to Enpak which is one of the few local organisations represented in the Platform. Enpak
was there as observer (no legal status yet), and also to form a bridge between the
international and the local organisations. Andrinette Policard Cadet is programme manager at
Enpak. She told me that before Enpak she worked for an international NGO, and she was a
member then. Now she has been asked to join also and to attract other local organisations too.
This is quite a challenge, not only for procedural reasons, but also because the objectives of
the platform are not very clear. One objective for example is to be a service provider, but this
might not be the first priority of a local organisation.
On Friday the 17th of February I had a private meeting with Martine Bernier, who has been the
chair of this Platform since October 2011. She explained some of the challenges of the network
and also that the legal status is important for their advocacy impact. They do have three
commissions that come together in groups. One on local development, one on health, with
good relations with the Ministry of Health, and one in agriculture.
In February 2010 they had a meeting on how to proceed with the Platform. Was there still a
need to proceed or not? They were one of the first platforms, with a history of relations with
government and authorities. Other platforms like CCO came into being, for example to
coordinate international humanitarian aid. After a while that slowed down. Clio decided in
February 2010 to revitalise and to rearrange the platform. One of the challenges was to hire a
full time person to keep the network up and running. This should be some one that could
prepare the agenda and to send documents around and arrange the meetings to ensure
continuity. Before there were volunteers, but it demands a lot from one person, often next to
his full-time job. This decision is important to the continuity of the network, according to
Martine though many challenges still remain. Funding is still an issue, as is the recognition by
government of their legal status. Mrs Bernier is optimistic about the future of the network as it
fulfils a niche not covered by other networks: bridging the gap between international and local
organisations using their reputation and contacts with local authorities, needed for successful
advocacy.
30
3.3 Overview of human rights organisations
In the next section an overview will be given of four human rights organisations that were
interviewed. First of all The Justice and Peace Commission Haiti, CRAD a former partner of
Cordaid, in the Cebemo époque, the national human rights organisation RNDDH, with whom
Cordaid was already in contact with and quite a new organisation the national observatory
against crime and violence. Each of these four organisations has a link with the work of
Cordaid and each has potential to become partners with Cordaid, or to have an affiliation with.
Not all organisations that were interviewed are summarized here. Please view annex VI for a
full overview of all organisations that were interviewed. For some of the organisations outlined
below, action was taken immediately by the Cordaid programme officer, for other
organisations follow-up might come in a next field visit. Recommendations with regard to the
potentials of these organisations follow in the final section of conclusions and
recommendations.
3.3.1 Komisyon Episcopal Nasyonal Jistis ak Lapè (JILAP)59
The Justice and Peace Commission has been in Haiti for a long time and is represented in
every province of Haiti. Its National Commission is based in Port-au-Prince, and strengthens
the work of its’ parishes in the provinces. Jilap is one of the organisations well-known and
widely respected both by civil society and by the government. They have a strong reputation
when it comes to analysis of the context, research, developing training manuals in Creole and
providing training to a diverse group of grass roots representatives.
Activities
They work on five pillars: (i) observations, (ii)
analyses, (iii) publications, (iv) declarations and (v)
documentation. All aspects of human rights in general
and of violations in particular are taken into account.
They have 3 national pillars:
1. Observation of elections; this includes technical
training on how to execute observation, what to
report and how;
2. Civic education; sensitizing communities about the
roles and responsibilities of elected representatives
both on a local level and in the Senate. Training of
police, judges and magistrates on their roles and
responsibilities are also included;
3. Reform of the justice system; by providing
trainings, campaigning and advocacy. Strengthening
the capacities of the state is essential. They have an
advocacy programme that focuses on justice reform and which targets local authorities and
members of civil society. They took the Caritas manual as a basis and translated that into
Creole.
The target groups are parishes, the Church and the Church Society and all kinds of (human
rights) local NGOs. An average of 24 sessions a year with about 30 people are held in which
they aim at 30% female representatives. In the period between 2002/2008 they have provided
59 Episcopal National Commission of Justice and Peace (CEJP)
Human security is a basic
human right in which the
government should seriously
invest. A professional and
strong police force that is well-
trained and staffed is therefore
of crucial importance as well as
a functioning justice system.
Interview with Fr Hanssen, director
of Jilap
31
300 trainings of 4 days, where they specifically targeted vulnerable groups, for example in Cité
Soleil. They have reached more than 15.000 people.
Human Security
Both investing in a strong professional police force as well as in the justice system are
important elements of building a democratic and safe society. It is therefore that Jilap focuses
on strengthening of governmental institutions by training their often under-educated staff and
to make fighting against impunity one of their core activities. It is there that reforms should
take place.
Advocacy campaigns are organised complementary to different training sessions which may
contribute to changes in behaviour and attitudes. Both government and society are not used to
communicate. The government has no history of listening to the needs and priorities of the
population. This needs to change, and civil society needs to gain trust in the institutions that
should provide services for their well-being.
Jilap continues by saying that Haiti is not a violent country but that changes in society are
needed. One important development was the coming of Digicel which made a huge difference
in people being able to communicate, but also spending the little money they have on units60.
The outbreak of cholera also brought change in society. When it became known that
MINUSTAH was the source and that in a short period of time 7000 people had died, outrage
was the response.
It is planned that the programme on access to justice will be implemented as one of the
priorities for the next years. They get financial support from Caritas Switzerland and Miserior.
Cordaid has supported Jilap in the past, but due to a change in focus (it changed from
education to health), the partnership ended.
3.3.2 Centre de Réflexion et d'Action pour le Développement (CRAD)
From 1997- 2004 Cordaid supported this centre with alphabetisation classes but due to a shift
in their policy towards economic development, it was said, the partnership with Cordaid ended.
Trocaire advised me to join one of their meetings. The link between Cordaid and CRAD is not
only one that has been in the past, there are also potentials for
future collaboration. CRAD has four of its projects in the
vulnerable area of Martissant, which is where Glencree Institute
together with Concern has initiated a project to reduce
violence. Cordaid would like to explore the potentials of
duplicating such an initiative in an area where the Cordaid
shelter programme is represented. Getting more information on
the realities of people living (mostly in the camps) of Martissant
could be insightful.
It was a meeting with around 20 people: older women, who
had been in the alphabetisation classes earlier and who were
now teaching other people to read and write. People from the
refugee camps, of which there are four in Martissant,
representatives of local organisations and some volunteers to
the project. The camps will all be evacuated this coming summer, according to the current
government. Also two representatives from SOFA were present, as they were part of the
training programme of women from the camps.
60 This is how credits for calling via mobile phones are called.
Have you seen the
wall around the camp?
It’s a joke! Some of
our stuff, like cooking
pots and pans, and
clothes are stolen, and
nobody does anything.
Female Camp Member in Martissant
32
One young man who lives in one of the four camps (Nakan) explains about the situation in his
camp. They are submitted to structural violence in the camps. The police does not enter the
camp. MINUSTAH does but they do not interfere when there are fights going on. The
MINUSTAH protection unit is visited by camp members, but they don’t see any changes.
Another woman, also living in the camp, said violence got worse. It is an open camp and gives
people from outside easily opportunity to enter. Sexual violence is also widespread. It happens
publicly but mostly within families. That is why SOFA is also represented. They have a shelter
in Martissant for victims of violence (see interview SOFA for the statistics on violence against
women in 21 of their centres, including Martissant).
Children are also often victims of violence, and two volunteers explain about the challenges
they have with the restaveks in the camps.
There are classes provided here, and volunteers give alphabetisation and management classes
and trainings on how to run your business?
3.3.3 Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH)
The name “National Human Rights Defense Network” might be somewhat misleading. They
adopted this name in 2005. In practise though, they are an international NGO, member of the
International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), and they participate in the leading Haitian
National Human Rights Network (POHDH).
They were created in 1982 in New York under the original name of National Coalition for
Refugees (NCHR). They were initially focussed on ending the deportation of Haitian refugees
under Duvalier’s regime. Training and advocacy were their core activities. During the 1991
coup, the coalition monitored the human rights violations committed by the military regime.
This led to opening a field office in 1992 in Haiti where they expanded their activities and to
what it has now become: a national human rights organisation. The fact that “network” is in its
name might be misleading. They are not a network: the name network was given to the
organisation to imply that they have a broad influence as well in Haiti as outside of Haiti.
RNDDH has two principal activities that contribute to social change. Firstly human rights
education: trainings are provided that focus at citizens’ awareness of their rights but also
towards the police, the judiciary system and prison staff. Secondly they are monitoring key
institutions in respect to their obligations to protect human rights and uphold justice.
Secondly they monitor human rights violations. This also includes monitoring of the National
Haitian Police (PNH) and prisons in Haiti. They visit police stations and prisons to observe the
functioning, the working conditions of staff, conditions of individuals held in custody and they
document human rights violations. They follow-up on these violations, and get in touch with
high-officials (often informally) to ensure continued follow up at the Police level. They keep
track of all documents in a data-base which is then also used for reporting and advocacy
purposes.
Another objective is to strengthen and establish departmental human rights networks. There is
no RNDDH established network yet at the Island of la Gonave for example but this is planned
to be in place end of 2012.
Police Trainings
Three seminars a year for fifty police officers are organized. 10% of these officers are women.
In these three days PNH will integrate practical and theoretical aspects of how they can ensure
human rights protection (Also using the Universal Declaration and internal PNH rules).
33
With regard to women’s rights, they collaborate with SOFA, with the
Mouvement des Femmes Haïtiennes pour l’Education et le Développement (MOUFHED) and
Kay Fanm. They also work together with Jilap and several organisations that are linked to the
refugee camps and rights, and to health issues (APROSIFA) and ngo’s with contact in prisons
so RNDDH can get access.
3.2.4 Observatoire National contre la violence criminalité ONAVC61
The observatory was established in 2009, just before the earthquake. It is an independent
organisation but they work in close collaboration with the University of Port-au Prince.
Activities
They conduct surveys in different areas of Port-au-Prince. They train the interviewers, often
students from the University, in how to conduct the survey and how to work with GPS. They
use this to be able to provide cartography as well. So from area to area it can be viewed in a
map, how many people for example perceive police and justice not as legitimate institutions,
or how secure they feel in their neighborhoods. They also use data from the Institut Haïtien de
Statistique (which gave their most recent estimation of the population in 2009). So they can
take a sample of 10 to 15% of the population in that specific area.
Organisation
The office of ONAVC is located quite central in Port-au-Prince. They have 4 paid full-time staff,
and three assistants and interns who work voluntarily. For each of the surveys they recruit
people in newspapers and on their website. Training and transport costs are paid for. They
have a board (conseil d’orientation) that consists of wise people who give their opinion and
who take the lead for directions and perspectives that ONAVC should take in consideration.
They are part of a platform d’échange, with Concern, Jilap, representatives of the police and
prison), that come together every two months. There is also a scientific committee, an
advisory board. They are also a member of POHDH.
Collaboration
They are aware that there is no consistent longitudinal data on the prevalence of violence
against women. The same counts for violence in a broader perspective. The manager of
ONAVC Claude Mane Das says what is most important is to analyse what is the real face
behind violence? It should be deconstructed from all opinions and the role of the media, to
take a close look at the causes and consequences. URAMEL, one of Cordaid’s partners
published a report on violence in Haiti that includes some of the good practices of NGOs.
They get financial support from UNDP and from Croix Rouge Canada.
They know SOFA well, and when an example of complementarity amongst NGOs and ONAVC
was provided to Claude, he immediately added that this was the reason for ONAVC to start
their surveys. So they could provide hard data and collaborate with NGOs, being fed by NGOs
so as they could reinforce their advocacy, and respond with activities, to needs like indicated
by ONAVC.
61 9th February 2012
34
3.4 Overview of women’s rights organisations
The mapping of women’s rights organisations proved more challenging than mapping human
rights organisations. There seemed to be a strong core of women’s organisations that do know
each other and collaborate on certain aspects of women’s rights. Outside of this core it
appeared more difficult to get in touch with women’s rights organisations and their
representatives. Then unexpectedly at a conference dealing with land ownership organised by
CIDSE, two women’s organisations presented themselves. The first impression was that they
didn’t seem linked to the bigger women’s associations, and vice versa. Interviews with grass
roots organisations like Lig Pouvwa Fanm and Fondation Toya confirmed this first impression
that women’s organisations are differently organised than human rights organisations. The
latter seem more connected to networks and information on a national level. It is too early to
draw any conclusions, but a first observation is that women’s organisations are less (widely)
represented on a national level. It is at least remarkable that when looking at the UPR
submissions with regard to Haiti’s women’s rights and gender based violence, two big national
women’s rights organisations have taken the lead, and the organisations that have endorsed
the report, are national and international human rights organisations, but none grass root
women organisation. This might have something to do with the weak capacities of local
organisations as Cordaid is familiar with in the Democratic Republic of Congo for example. But
it doesn’t explain why a strong advocacy organisation like SOFA has not endorsed the report.
Four women’s organisations have been interviewed as a first identification of what kinds of
women’s organisations are active in Haiti and what their activities are. They are quite well
connected with other grass roots organisations and they are represented in different networks.
The links with national and international organisations has not always been clear.
3.4.1 Fondation Toya
Please see section 2.4.4 for information with regard to their strategy and activities. Here some
specific information will be provided with regard to their institutional challenges and
collaboration with other women’s organisations and networks.
They are part of a grass roots network “rezo pouvwa fanm yo”, and they collaborate with
organisations like Kay Fanm who are specialised in legal assistance for example, and
complement the work of this Foundation. They have received institutional support from the
Global Fund of Women, which is an advantage and gives space to develop different initiatives,
and not being bound to one particular project. They have programmes, besides in Port-au-
Prince, in Léogane and in Nipes.
The organisation
Fondation Toya has a multidisciplinary team and part of this team works specifically on the
'technicalities' of financial support requests. So for example, we help other women's
organisations to write their proposals for projects. So we work with a lot of other women's
organisations and many of the initiatives are in partnership with other organisations.
The biggest organisational obstacle is resources. Toya has human resources, knowledge and
the availability of people who are also prepared to work on a voluntary basis. Toya uses
personal resources (cars etc) to realise their projects. That hasn’t stopped them from
continuing their work which has been appreciated by their partners.
35
They also have some professionals available for assistance and advice whenever needed. The
availability of interns (3 months) is a luxury. Five of our staff is permanent staff. And finally we
have the advisory board (9 members) that invest their time in the projects and who have a
genuine interest in the results of the projects.
3.4.2 Femmes et Democratie62
This women’s organisation has existed since 2000 and is working on the empowerment of
women. They have three specific areas they focus on: (i) political participation of women and
women leadership, (ii) women entrepreneurship and (iii) socio-economic and civil rights.
The target population has been “women in their 40s”, but now it has become more and more
important to involve youth. Advocacy is an important part of their work, and they have good
relationships as well with the Business Community as well as with governmental officials.
The organisation
FED is a small organisation. They have six founding members that advise the administration.
They have partners in other countries, about 15, which are generally large organisations,
'federations of association,’ but then they have about 300 organisations that participate in the
work of FED. It is thus a network of organisations but not in a formal sense, and they also do
not want it to become formal. It is their strategy that these organisations be independent.
They created this big 'network' of largely grassroots organisations, and united with their
partners (12 years that they have worked together). They are invited every two years to come
up with a strategic plan – to constantly reorient themselves in the new realities and
developments of the context within which they work.
They have a good working relation and are recognised by the Haitian state and its’ authorities.
The government invites them regularly to give advice, to participate in events (such as the
constitutional review commission/constitutional amendment) and to come for specific meetings
with regard to gender equality. This relationship has been built over the years and is perceived
as quite unique by staff of FED. Many women’s organisations perceive the authorities as a
threat, and do not even try to communicate with them. This is considered a problem as
without the local authorities nothing structural will change.
FED documents and publishes reports with regard to violence. They do this in the areas of
Delmas, Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Léogane, Chressier, Kessove and Pétionville. These areas are
prone to violence, which is why they have been targeted by FED. They ay the government has
played a role there since the earthquake by taking land of people without consulting them.
They provide trainings in human rights (socio-economic cultural and civil political).
3.4.3 Solidarité Femmes Haïtien (SOFA)
SOFA was created in ’86 as feminist organisation that tackles the root causes of violence
against women. In ’87 under Duvalier there was space for women to organize themselves and
to participate in debates related to violence against women. But the root causes, the
domination of men, was not addressed. It became a movement with an international
dimension. In the ’60 Soeur Mirabelle was assassinated for her political (feminist) ideas on
equality between men and women. She became a symbol of the combat on violence against
women, fighting against the tolerance that existed regarding violence.
62 Interview Stacey Links with F staff from Femmes et Democratie 28th of May 2012
36
There have been some changes since then. Violence against women is less accepted than it
was years ago. When Aristide came to power by initiating a coup, the military was in power.
This was a difficult period, and a lot of women and young girls were raped, no matter what
age.
Activities
In ’94 a Truth Commission was installed but there was no follow-up to the impunity of all these
crimes. SOFA wanted to consolidate these efforts because of this lack of public service. Women
are alone when it comes to facing violence. SOFA wanted to support them in their struggle for
justice. They started to provide trainings to their members, to assist them when seeking
justice, and to seek examples of other countries in the region with the same challenges.
That’s how they started with the first eight centres. Years of trainings and women awareness
that violence should not be accepted has led to some changes. Their members do now often
file complaints, and it is seen as less acceptable as it was earlier.
They provide advocacy trainings and involve members to advocate towards local and national
authorities. They are in close contact with the communities and know where to point their
recommendations at. They intermediate with decision-makers and have good relationships
(build from the past 20 years). Advocating is also organized in different platforms that they
participate in, and where each has a role. SOFA is often the mobiliser in a systematic way to
involve as many members as possible.
3.4.4 Lig Pouvwa Fanm
Diaspora has always been important to the existence and continuity of Lig Pouvwa Fanm. They
have supported the organisation from the beginning. It was emphasized that the relationship
between the Diaspora and the local population is one without difficulties. They learn from the
Diaspora and they aid and help the organisation and share information. Even within the
organisation there are members who are part of the Diaspora. The organisation is financed
through small projects and not on a long-term, broad basis which is considered as one of its
challenges. As there with many local organisations, also Lig Pouvwa Fanm has some financial
hurdles and difficulties. The fact that they are not in a position to look further forward, due to
projects finances, is considered an obstacle.
Lig Pouvwa Fanm does not involve in partnerships with other organisations as such, however
they have worked with other women's organisations on particular projects in the past.
ENFOFANM is one of them.
Their working method is that they develop a concrete plan/budget/strategic plan, before
approaching organisations with a specific and guided idea. They will ask expertise from a
particular organisation. After the earthquake though things have been difficult in terms of
organisation resources but they are getting back on track. (They have also lost the president of
the organisation and her husband who both died during the earthquake).
It might be worthwhile to visit this grass roots organisation to further explore upon their
activities and links with other grass roots organisations. The information gathered during this
first exploring interview is too narrow to draw any recommendations from.
37
Many government officials
don’t know what their
mandate entails when
representing the population.
They should be accountable
for promises made and be
transparent. Civil society
organisations have a role to
play too. Not only to
denounce but also to educate,
and to come with alternatives.
Investing in this relationship
is key to changing structures
in Haiti.
Claudette Werleigh, ex-prime minister under Aristide in ‘92/’93 and former Secretary General of f Pax Christi International
3.5 Concluding Observations
Only two national networks have been interviewed. These are two of the most well-known and
respected human rights networks. The sample is nevertheless too small to draw any general
conclusions with regard to the state of well-being and potentials of networks in Haiti. Besides
the interviews with the two networks, other human rights and women’s organisations often
expressed (mostly) their appreciation of these networks, or were very outspoken on why they
are a member of one of these networks. This gave lead to providing an overview of what
obstacles human rights networks face when searching a constructive dialogue with
representatives of government, whether on a local or on a national level. Therefore, instead of
drawing general conclusions on networks strengths and weaknesses in Haiti, some of the
commonly shared obstacles will be mentioned, both of networks and of human rights and
women’s organisations. Furthermore some of strengths and weaknesses will be discussed, as
observed, but it is too early to draw any conclusions in a broader sense.
3.5.1 Obstacles in the work of human rights organisations and networks
Relationship civil society versus government
This sensitivity in the dialogue of civil society organisations with local or national authorities is
an obstacle shared by many organisations, especially the ones with advocacy programmes. For
a network, as such, the challenge is even more complicated because all organisations need to
agree on taking a risk of being condemned as enemy. A representative from PAPDA states:
When human rights organisations bring up human rights issues, or violations that have been
monitored, it is often perceived as “us” human rights network, against “them” the government.
Which is not the case, but because the fundamental struggles of power are highlighted, this is
the general judgement. This is an obstacle in our work, and we have to be very diplomatic
when raising issues.
Another obstacle which is caused by the government not
fulfilling its duties to educate its’ population, is an
overall lack of awareness. Citizens are not aware of the
responsibilities of the government and what the
government is required to provide for, towards its’
population.
Strengthening of capacities of citizens should be
therefore one of the main priorities. This is, or should
be, a fundamental part of each organisation, as one of
the interviewees put it. Strengthening local capacities
starts with raising the awareness of citizens about their
rights and how to claim these rights from governmental
authorities. Grass roots organisations often mention the
low level of education, of literacy and general awareness
among the population. One needs a structural approach
and a lot of patience to make sure that changes are
really taking place.
SOFA gave an example, that after many years of
training and raising awareness campaigns of women’s
rights, an increase of filing complaints at the police was visible. Women were not only aware of
38
their rights, but they felt empowered to defend themselves. PAPDA also mentioned when
discussing “successes” that the fact that there are many human rights organisations active in
Haiti, this has led to positive changes. Organisations are more and more able to exert their
influence through advocacy. The criminalisation of rape, now endorsed in law, had never been
possible without the never halting advocacy efforts of these organisations.
The gap between civil society and local government authorities seems quite detrimental in
developing a constructive dialogue. Though many people perceive governmental authorities as
an enemy to the population, it is crucial to develop this dialogue in order to change structures
in society. The gap between civil society and authorities is a two way gap though. It is not only
civil society that often perceives the authorities as their enemy, but also authorities are often
offended by the way they are approached, and by their negative way of broadcasting
messages.
Claudette Werleigh, who was engaged both on the governmental side (as prime minister under
Aristide) and as a driver of different national and international NGOs, emphasized the
importance of constructing dialogues between both parties.
She emphasized that advocating towards governmental structures is lacking. People know very
well to express their criticism towards government and to denounce their actions, but rarely
something constructive is followed by the denouncements. And even more rarely, concrete and
constructive recommendations are formulated.
She continued in giving some examples of authorities who don’t know their mandate and have
no clue of what their own roles and responsibilities are, but also of people who know their
mandates but are just in a position to ignore them and who don’t care.
According to Ms Werleigh, central to escaping the negative spiral of civil society and authorities
standing opposite each other, is to focus and invest in advocacy strategies that are
constructive and that focus on opportunities instead of only on what goes wrong. Civil society
could take the lead here educating authorities through concrete advocacy messages to benefit
the well-being of the majority of the population.
Alfred Kamara, Cordaid’s logistics manager, gave a striking example when discussing the gap
between civil society and governmental authorities, when he had a meeting with the Ministry
of Planning and Economic Development:
“The Ministry had just resent a container from the Netherlands, because it had been in the
harbour for 6 months, and nothing had been done with it. Officially the regulations were not
followed strictly. But in fact this representative really didn’t care if there were needy Haitians
waiting for iron sheets to cover their homes”.
Changing attitudes of both authorities and civil society appears to be one of the key issues
when contributing to changing social structures. Interviewees were asked about what the
most important contribution of civil society could be, regardless whether it is a local, national
or international organisation. Three different organisations responded quite similarly. Key to
any initiative involving empowering civil society should include the strengthening of local
authorities and governmental institutions. Including authorities and contributing to
strengthening local authorities and its institutions is key to stabilising the country.
39
Relationship civil society and international organisations
There are many obstacles that were present before the earthquake that were only accentuated
after the earthquake. There is however one major obstacle that arrived after the earthquake,
according to PAPDA. This is the major influx of humanitarian NGOs which have decapitalised
the work that has been done at grass roots level. The director of PAPDA’s advocacy
programme explains:
“It is so frustrating when we see that work of probably 10 to 15 years is jeopardised when a
humanitarian NGO enters, and places its work and vision above that of local organisations…
Humanitarian organisations don’t care about any of the work outside their temporary scope,
and this creates a dependence of the population that has just been the change objective of
PAPDA: empowering them and providing tools and knowledge so they demand accountability
from government themselves”.
Some of the humanitarian organisations even pay local communities to participate in their
projects. This is in fact exactly the opposite of what needs to happen, according to Jean Pierre
Ricot. This method disrupts the existing community structures and confuses local citizens. He
also emphasized that it paralyses local initiatives and solidarity amongst each other. Projects
of these organisations are most of the time too short-term to really have an impact. So when
the organisations then leave again, there’s actually nothing valuable that remains for the
population, except a building may be.
It was also emphasized by more organisations that international NGOs, like Oxfam for example
that have been in the country for a long period of time, have changed their approach since the
earthquake. This has had an impact on the partnerships they had, and some organisations
have decided that their partnership did no longer serve both ends. PAPDA explains:
“Oxfam for example had a good understanding of the local context and its needs and they
were supportive in terms of strengthening local capacities and supporting joint advocacy on
terms and conditions of local grass roots organisations. After the earthquake their approach
and strategy changed completely”. They started to advocate on their own without consulting
local organisations on their needs and priorities. This was for us a reason to end the
partnership”.
This example of Oxfam is one of many and unfortunately not an exception of how grass roots
organisations have perceived the work of international organisations after the earthquake. The
fact that money was given to participants of projects also created tensions according to some.
Witnessing a quarrel between local employees of one of Concern’s projects this became clear.
One of the members of one of the Peace Building Committees (PBC) set-up by Concern in
Martissant shared his frustrations:
“We heard that some of the members from another Peace Building Committee do get
compensation for their contributions in organising an event for the community. This creates
tensions. Why would they get money for the same services as we do, and why would we do it
voluntarily then? But more importantly we don’t want money; we pushed so many times for
vocational training. It could be anything: plumbing, construction, carpenting. We need some
training, so we can continue and build our futures, also after you have left”63.
63 Guiraud Jean Wesner, one of the most vocal representatives that shared his frustrations about the peace building project with a consultant of Concern, who did research on local ownership. Concern permitted me to join this roundtable meeting with members of the PBC in St Martin, January 30th.
40
A discussion in one of the working groups64 about the lessons learnt of collaboration between
international and grass roots NGOs confirmed this observation. The discussion dealt with
frustrations of the PBC in relation to Concern. It was said that the PBC was appointed to
represent the community. This means they invest a lot of free time and energy but they do not
profit from anything, while the people they represent do. Though this is positive for the
beneficiaries it does create tensions within the Committees. These spokespersons work hard to
get people together, to organise meetings, to get the right advice and they do not benefit
themselves. Also, Concern was not consistent in using PBCs as local advisors: sometimes they
felt surpassed and excluded, when activities took place. This was perceived by PBCs as a lack
of respect and recognition, and created frustration and tensions.
The working group recommended that Concern should actively involve the committee
members in their activities, and that the parties should find a way to communicate on a
regular basis to exchange information, instead of communicating only when things had gone
wrong already. This way both parties could benefit from the available information in the
programme and in the field. PBC explicitly asked Concern to use their knowledge and access to
networks and contacts, and not to leave them ignorant.
Organisational obstacles
Just to sum it up, all of the organisations that were interviewed both mentioned they have
financial constraints, as well as human resource challenges. It is difficult for especially small
NGOs to access financial resources for a longer period of time. The risk is that they can only
survive on living from project to project, at the cost of a more integrated approach that
assures continuity for a period of five to ten years for example.
Recruiting qualified and well-educated people with experience is a challenge of human
resources that has often been mentioned as an obstacle. In this period where a lot of
international organisations are pulling out their expat staff, competition for well qualified local
staff is mounting. Unfortunately local organisations always seem to lose the competition, as
they cannot provide the same terms and conditions as international organisations can offer.
Networks also have resource challenges, but they tend to focus more on long-term
commitment from donors to support their network, and to attract donors that are willing to
invest in a secretariat for example (like Clio). Another issue that seems to worry networks
more than individual NGOs is the issue of getting an official status as NGO by the government.
Networks lose their weight as a network when they cannot officially speak on behalf of all their
members, but instead can only mention the members that have a status. The difficulty in the
case of the Clio network is is that it further complicates their wish to attract local organisations
to become members. It is an exercise of having a long breath and a lot of time and energy and
bureaucracy to get this status. For smaller and grass roots organisations this is hardly doable,
but for a network like Clio it is a prerequisite for membership.
3.5.2 Strengths and weaknesses of human rights organisations and networks
Leadership
There appears to be one leading organisation among the human rights organisations in the
region, namely Réseau National des Droits Humains. They have excellent connections with the
international forums, which gives them a certain status. On the one hand they are appreciated
64 From 10-12 February a workshop was organised by Glencree Institute with all different stakeholders of the peace programme of Concern. The participants included members of the PBC, the private sector, ex-baz members, police and representatives of local authorities. The researcher was invited to participate in this two and half day workshop.
41
highly by fellow human rights organisations in Haiti because of the quality of their extensive
research and thorough analysis. However, there's a possibility that this happens at the cost of
advocacy at local level. Some local organisations find it hard to connect to the advocacy work
of RNDDH.
Also leadership can be perceived as threatening and it could even be an obstacle to other
organisations in terms of collaboration, or also within the own organisation. Some directors of
organisations hold the management and their knowledge and experience so close to
themselves, that as soon as this leader is not available, the organisation is not the same. The
interviewer experienced this with the POHDH network: the director was not available due to
travel abroad, and the team that she interviewed was not well updated of the latest
developments. When an organisation is identified by the director of that organisation, it does
bring challenges of continuity and of collaboration along.
Cooperation amongst the different organisations seems generally weak. An indicator is that
people are not adequately informed about each others' activities.
Cooperation within the networks also seems limited, but it is too early to draw any strong
conclusions. For the international network it proved difficult to attract local organisations to
participate in their network and its’ activities. Interests (agenda’s) don’t seem similar nor
coordinated.
POHDH and PAPDA, both networks with an international reputation and funding, are prone to
criticism regarding leadership and lack of innovation.
For PAPDA it was said several times, that since their establishment, they have not innovated
themselves. The message for an alternative economy has remained the same, their advocacy
message and recommendations have not changed and the problems they claim to be solved
have not changed either. It appears that their success permitted them to be less innovative
and result oriented. The formula of the network is still unique and needed, but the results do
disappoint. Some donors have withdrawn their support because of this and others are reluctant
to contribute to these networks.
42
4. OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATION
4.1 Cordaid’s history in Haiti
An insight into several of Cordaid’s (at the time Cebemo) documents gave reason to include a
section of Cordaid’s history of programmes. Though not at all representative for the activities
of Cordaid over the years, it does provide some of the highlights both in the dynamic history of
Haiti as of Cordaid’s (policy) response in their programmes. The role of the Church throughout
this period has been taken into account as this is where Cordaid’s roots are founded and where
their programmes are built upon: upon the structures and the networks of the Catholic Church.
The very first link to Cebemo’s presence in Haiti followed from a visit in 1969 of Father Muth to
Haiti. The record stated that: “the poverty situation on one hand and the lack of development
organisations that were present on the other hand motivated him to explore possibilities for a
structural relationship in the Netherlands with Haiti”. The director of Cebemo (at that time
Central Mission Commissariat) played an active role in setting-up a central desk in Haiti as well
as a Board in the Netherlands. This is how Cohan was born65. COHAN was established as a
local or national organisation that could provide the field support Cordaid would need for their
programmes. It started with emergency relief (primarily food aid) and later developed into an
intermediate agency with many fields of expertise.
Analysis of Cebemo/ COHAN development approach in Haiti 1985
The objective of the Co-financial programme (Medefinancieringsprogramma) is: the material
and non-material emancipation of specific poor population groups66.
The bulk of Cohan’s projects is focussed on economic independence via a process of social
organisation of target groups. Most of the programmes are run in the rural areas and they
have the objective to realise a structural change in the existing system of inequality. There is
one project in an urban context that aims at structural change. The evaluators observed that
the imbalance between rural-urban programmes has to do with Cohan’s opinion that
opportunities to realise organisation of groups (organisatievorming) is rare in the urban
context. Arguments are that social alliances are weak in recent formed bidonvilles and large
mobility of inhabitants forms a threat to social organisation.
Position of women
In Cohan’s programmes there is full attention for the position of women. Women are perceived
as the most important target group. Also in the evaluation specific attention was put on the
role of women in Cebemo’s and Cohan’s projects because it was emphasized that: emergency
aid often passes through women before it reaches the target groups, while structural aid is
almost automatically focussed on men. Special attention is given to commercialisation of food
produce.
One of the conclusions is that in Cohan’s policies there is no specific attention to women’s
(socio-economic) position, but that it is taken into account in the integrated approach. There
are no women represented in the overarching Board of Cohan, but they do participate in some
of the programme departments of Cohan, especially those focussed on emergency aid. Cohan
concluded that it is especially difficult to recruit higher educated and qualified women for those
65 More information could be provided if this proves valuable for Cordaid 66 The term “target group” is often mentioned in the evaluation, but never defined more concretely than: individuals, families and groups.
43
positions. Another conclusion is that in none of the programmes there is given explicit
attention to the socio-economic position of independency of women.
Role of Caritas
In Haiti a structure of diocesan Caritas-organisations is functioning under the umbrella of the
Bishops Conference. Caritas policy has three main components: Social assistance,
development and human promotion. There are differences though between the national Caritas
policy and that of the diocesan activities. This is most obvious with regard to food aid. There
are some tensions with regard to the wide diversity of development projects, but Cohan
prefers (for political reasons) to work within the Caritas structure.
In his travel report of 1991, Herman Lauwerysen (Cebemo) described the situation in Haiti
both as fragile as well as hopeful. It is concluded that Haiti is on a junction: the Duvalier period
has ended and Aristide raises hope for many Haitians to change society for the majority of the
population. The threat of the Macoutes is still present but the situation seems to bow to real
changes in society.
One of the main identified problems is that there is a lack of flexibility in the changing of
structures: especially those structures that could be influenced by civil society, like political
structures such as the Parliament, and the Ministries. Before these structures didn’t exist or
were there just to reinforce the status quo. So on the level of NGOs there is a lot of urgent and
creative work to do to support civil society in its mutual advocacy and communication toward
authorities.
One of the recommendations of the travel report in ’91 is whether Cordaid (Cebemo) (together
with its counterpart Cohan) should collaborate with the government, and if so, how and how
intensively. This seems an interesting recommendation as it remains an issue of discussion
over the years.
Another recommendation is that Cebemo should reflect on its support to farmers’ movements,
together with its’ counterparts. The MPP (Mouvement Pausan de Papaye) for example, was
strong politically tied to the Lavalas-party of Aristide. Its director has been requested many
times to become the Minister of Agriculture on his presidency.
The Church has proven not to be strong enough to influence Aristides’ behaviour. Aristide is
blamed for having abused his religious power in favour of his political career. The fact that one
of the Bishops was chairing the inauguration of Aristide proved that the official Church
accepted the situation with Aristide as it was.
Crisis Situation in 2005, change of policy
In 2005 Herman Lauwerysen was requested to spend several months in Haiti. The objective
was to get a better grasp of the developments that followed each other quickly and Cordaid
wanted to invest more in strengthening of capacities of local organisations. It was also clear
for Cordaid that Haiti seemed to be one of the countries in permanent crisis, and therefore
Cordaid wanted to invest in risk-management. Due to the violent circumstances in the
neighbourhoods where Mr Lauwerysen stayed at the time, his mission was hampered and he
returned earlier than expected.
In July 2005, Mr Lauwerysen gave an outline of the volatile context at the time, and what
policy changes should be or could be made to respond adequately to the situation.
It was decided that a so-called temporary change of policy would take place for 2005 and
2006. The choice was made to enhance one overall theme: Conflict and Peace (physical
security and minimal economic security). Partner Cohan-BRD had an explicit request to
Cordaid to include this into their policy to be better equipped to tackle the crisis situation.
44
Organisational capacity building should continue but activities in this area should be considered
into this perspective67.
Looking back upon the policy changes within Cordaid this temporary change appeared not to
be so temporary. On the contrary, this change in policy to decide for an overall conflict-peace
theme was one of the first movements towards a more inclusive approach. This approach took
into account the complex economic and political context of Haiti and Cordaid responded with
this change to an explicit need to continue their programmes in Haiti. Many other organisations
at the time had completely stopped their activities, besides emergency relief.
From then on conflict transformation became the umbrella of the overall Haiti programme. The
next annual plan (2013) should build upon the experiences and programmes of the past, and
wherever feasible be as closely integrated with all different programmes, active in Haiti.
4.2 Potential for strategic collaborations
In the next paragraphs potential collaborations with international as well as with local (partner)
organisations will be discussed. In some cases these potential collaborations might seem
already out of date. This is because the researcher (J&P) and the programme officer (Cordaid)
have been in a continuous dialogue about the whole process of research and interviews with
different organisations and thus also about different potentials. The programme officer had
visited Haiti in the beginning of March and in some cases the meetings and interviews
conducted by the researcher were then directly followed up by an exploring meeting from the
programme officer. For example the National Justice and Peace Commission, based in Port-au-
Prince, Jilap was immediately visited after having discussed the mutual potential advantages of
a potential partnership. Also the National Observatory against Crime and Violence (ONAVC)
was immediately visited, as the programme officer saw multiple opportunities for collaboration
in the short and in the longer run. The Glencree Peace Building Institute and their collaboration
in two suburb areas in Port au Prince together with Concern were immediately followed by a
visit to Concern Haiti, and also extensive mail conversations followed with Glencree, Trocaire
and Concern. The following paragraphs are a reflection of the meetings and interviews of the
researcher and in some cases of the researcher and the programme officer. Further follow-up
done by the programme officer is not included.
4.2.1 Justice and Peace Netherlands
Justice and Peace Netherlands has a track record in Haiti since the 1980s. It has had and still
has a longstanding relationship with Cordaid, in Haiti as well as in other countries and regions.
Justice and Peace Netherlands has been engaged with the political and human rights situation
in Haiti, in close collaboration with the National Justice and Peace Commission in Port au Prince
(Jilap). The Commission stayed in regular contact with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
Development Cooperation, with officials of the Ministry and with politicians, to advocate for
human rights and development in Haiti.
It has been active in the Dutch Haiti Platform together with thirteen68 other NGOs, amongst
them Cordaid (then Cebemo). This platform came into existence after the coup of September
67 Field Mission, report Herman Lauwerysen, January-May 2005. 68 BBO, Cebemo, CNV, Council of Churches of the Netherlands, Crowing Rooster Films, ICCO, Jehanne van Woerkom, Pax Christi, Solidaridad, Ultimatum, Vastenaktie and Working Group Dominican Republic. Later Cohan, Vastenaktie and Working Group Human Rights of the Council of Churches joined.
45
1991. Efforts were done jointly to keep the Dutch government, and the European Community,
as it was called then, engaged in the situation of Haiti, politically as well as financially.
The Dutch Commission participated in a delegation of European Justice and Peace
Commissions on a travel to Haiti in May/June 1993. The objective of this mission was to
strengthen the process of democratisation.
In September 1993 Aristide was invited to the Netherlands and because of efforts of this
Platform the Dutch government was widely represented during his visit.
Human rights violations
After the fall of Duvalier in February 1986, a small part of his supporters, mostly part of former
Tontons Macoutes active within the departments of the army and the police have continued
with committing crimes against the population, without any repercussions69. Justice and Peace
Netherlands raised the violations in national and international fora, sometimes with Amnesty,
sometimes with a coalition of the Church and sometimes on its own behalf. In 1988 there was
fear of extrajudicial killings in the north of Haiti, of small farmers that belonged to a catholic
organisation. The residing Minister of Defense at the time, as well as the Dutch Embassy and
different authorities were alarmed to take action. One remarkable arrest received a lot of
international attention and that was the arrest of Manno Charlemagne in October 1991, a
Haitian folk singer and human rights activist. In 1993 he would sing at the welcome meeting of
Jean-Claude Aristide in The Hague. Manno was supporter of Aristide and intimately involved
with the Lavalas Movement through which Aristide came to power. After interference of
celebrities like Eddy Murphy and Jane Fonda and reverend
Jesse Jackson, Manno was given permission to leave the
country in December 1991.
Human rights advocacy was also initiated with the Justice
and Peace Commission in Port-au-Prince, who was the only
national organisation that continued to publish reports on
human rights violations. CHADEL70
(the Haitian Center for
Human Rights) was also involved in publishing urgent
actions with regard to violations and arbitrary arrests.
Changing roles of the Church?
As mentioned earlier the raison d’être of
Cebemo/Vastenaktie/ Cordaid is its Catholic roots.
Throughout the history of its activities and programmes in
Haiti, the relationships with the Catholic Church have been
dynamic. Cordaid and Justice and Peace have kept their
relationship with the Church, though this has been
challenging at times.
Before the Haitian Revolution, Roman Catholicism in particular and the church in general
played minor roles in colonial life. Roman Catholicism gained official status in several post
independence Haitian constitutions, but there was no official Roman Catholic presence in the
country until the signing of a Concordat with the Vatican in 1860. The Concordat provided for
69 “se pa pour l’argen, se volonté », (1990) Verslag van de reis naar Haiti, als waarnemer bij de verkiezingen, T.L.E. Strop-von Meijenfeldt, chair of the Dutch Working group of human rights of the Council of Churches 70 CHADEL: Centre Haitien des Droits et Libertés Publiques. There is no recent information to be found with regard to this National Human Rights organisation. A delicate detail though that was found in an Amnesty International 1991 document was that when Aristide was turned over by a coup in 1991, Raoul Cedras took over power and the director of CHADEL, Jean Jacques Honorat, was ratified by the Chamber of Deputies as provisional Prime Minister of Haiti on 14 October 1991.
The division in the Church
comes from a division in
society [..] a form of
apartheid whereby less
than 10% of the population
is excluding 90% and
condemns the population
to live in the margin of the
political, economical and
cultural life.
Interview with Victor Scheffers, director Justice and
Peace Netherlands, in “de Bazuin” in 1993
46
the appointment of an archbishop in Port-au-Prince, designated dioceses, and established an
annual government subsidy for the church. An amendment to the Concordat in 1862 assigned
the Roman Catholic Church an important role in secular education.
The small number of priests and members of religious orders initially ministered mainly to the
urban elite. Until the midtwentieth century, the majority of priests were francophone
Europeans, who were culturally distant from their rural parishioners. Nationalists and others
came to resent the Roman Catholic Church because of its European orientation and its alliance
with the mulatto elite. François Duvalier opposed the church more than any other Haitian
president. He expelled the archbishop of Port au -Prince, the Jesuit order, and numerous
priests between 1959 and 1961. In response to these moves, the Vatican excommunicated
Duvalier. When relations with the church were restored in 1966, Duvalier prevailed. A Haitian
archbishop was named for the first time, and the president gained the right to nominate
bishops.
The mid-1980s marked a profound change in the church's stance on issues related to peasants
and the urban poor. The Church developed into a unique institute that offered space for
democratic development, and against the then ruling dictatorship71. Reflecting this change
was the statement by Pope John Paul II, during a visit to Haiti in 1983, that "Things must
change here". Galvanized by the Vatican's concern, Roman Catholic clergy and lay workers
called for improved human rights. Lay workers helped develop a peasant-community
movement. The Bishops Conference then condemned poverty and inequality in Haiti publicly,
many times. They supported the priests and their initiatives which provided them with the
opportunity to work on awareness raising and organisation of basis groups, especially in the
rural areas72. On local level priests worked together with faith-based organisations and non
faith-based organisations. They setup development and alphabetisation programmes for grass
roots groups in great solidarity with the majority of the population. The Roman Catholic radio
station, Radio Soleil, played a key role in disseminating news about government actions during
the 1985-86 crisis and encouraging opponents of the Duvalier government. The grass roots
movement of the Church was getting more and more popularity, called “Ti Legliz” (small
Church). This Church enjoyed a lot of respect from the population and became widely known.
Salesian father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was its most visible symbol and charismatic leader. The
bishops actively denounced Duvalierist repression and human-rights violations.
In the aftermath of Jean-Claude Duvalier's departure, the church took a less active role in
Haiti's politics. The alliance with the lower classes left the Catholic Church with its relationship
to the more radical elements of the political movement that it had supported.
The positive image of the Church changed after 1986: The Constitution permitted the
possibility of association and of political parties, which empowered the up-to-then underground
organisations. This was a surprise for the ruling elite as they had not expected the resistance
to be so large. Their positions in power seemed to be threatened by this sudden upcoming of
movements that claimed their (land)rights. With support of the army and the Macoutes many
farmer organisations were attacked, church organisations were dissolved and the Bishops
besides trying to control the situation, did not condemn the hunt for (catholic) farmer’s
organisations.
Archbishop Francois-Wolff Ligonde of Port-au-Prince, who had strong ties to the Duvalier
dictatorship, clashed constantly with Father Aristide, whose election victory he condemned
from the pulpit. Father Aristide's own superiors in the Salesian order expelled him for, among
71 Article The Bazuin, based upon an interview with Victor Scheffers (see footnote 75). 72 Haiti Landendocument: De katholieke kerk voor en na 1986 (page 7)
47
other things, "inciting hatred and violence and exalting class struggle”. Of Haiti's 11 bishops,
only Willy Romelus of Jeremie, president of the Justice and Peace commission has consistently
supported the work of the Little Church.
Before Father Aristide was overthrown in September 1991, and even before he was elected to
office, members of base communities were deeply involved in grass-roots social programs to
bring literacy and health services to the poor, as well as religious outreach efforts. The grass-
roots movement has remained one of the few viable centers of resistance to the military-
dominated Government that overthrew Father Aristide as President. Now they became the
target both of the Catholic hierarchy and the political groups that made the coup.
Different farmers organisations often set-up with full support and protection of the Church,
following the social teachings of the Church, were now threatened and attacked, but the
Church wasn’t there to protect them, nor to condemn the violence. In some cases it was even
denied by the Church that they knew of their existence.
The attitude of the Church was disappointing, and was reflected in several reports and articles
collected by Justice and Peace Netherlands in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In one of the articles it was stated:
One of the few church bodies that remained on the side of the victims is the Episcopal
Commission of Justice and Peace in Port-au-Prince. The chair, Bishop Romélus, continues to
protest against injustice and to make human rights violations public and to support the “sans-
voix”. He has become isolated in the Bishops Conference, has hardly access to the media and
in the past one and a half year he has been threatened, attacked and abused regularly73.
In the travel report of Herman Lauwerysen of his trip in May 1992, the disappointment of the
role of the Church was ventilated:
The silence of the Church in this crisis situation is symbolic for a disagreement between the
Bishops. A new Nuncio has been appointed, one that supports the military. The Conference of
religious people however, continues to support the opposition, as does Justice and Peace.
It was also emphasized more than once that people in Haiti have been very disappointed with
this change of course from the Bishops Conference. After Aristide’s departure, and with the
inauguration of a new president, that was contested by the wide international community, it
was the Vatican as only state that recognised the new President. Declarations of the
aggravated situation and of the suffering of the people failed to appear.
Collaboration
Justice and Peace Netherlands collaborated with the National Justice and Peace in Port-au-
Prince to request attention for the structural violence against (Catholic) farmer organisations,
and specific leaders in the North-West of Haiti (Jean Rabel). In 1987 200 to 300 peasants from
this area were killed in the context of a land dispute. The threat against peasant groups
continued, especially the group “tet ansam” was targeted: a catholic peasant organisation that
advocates land reform. In fact it had become a conflict between well-organised small farmers
73 Article in the Bazuin by Victor Scheffers, director of Justice and Peace Netherlands: “ En hun stem wordt niet meer gehoord… In Haiti zucht het volk onder armoede en terreur, maar de bisschoppen zwijgen (jaartal onbekend, maar vermoedelijk in 1993)
48
One may expect from the
Vatican and from the Catholic
hierarchy that they condemn
violence and human rights
violations. A dialogue should
be established between the
Bishops and the priests as a
first step to overcome the
internal division within the
Church.
Victor Scheffers director of Justice and Peace Netherlands, (1993)
and large landowners. With support of the Macoutes landowners regained their power by
killing, threatening and putting houses on fire. Also the Equipe Missionnaire was accused of
incitement and of communism and had to leave the area for security reasons.
Caritas and Oxfam and some other international organisations then submitted a proposal to
support the community of Jean Rabel, both with food aid, and agricultural support as well as
judicial defence of small farmers in courts.
Potential for future cooperation
Though Justice and Peace Netherlands has not been active in Haiti for the past ten years, it
was interesting to observe that many of the working
methods and themes that were used by Justice and
Peace Haiti were quite similar to the Dutch
Commission’s methods. The principles of “see, judge,
act” were leading in the activities of Justice and Peace
Haiti, as they are for Justice and Peace Netherlands.
Also the method of developing materials through a
participative approach was quite similar in both offices.
Justice and Peace Netherlands had just developed a
manual on accessing (social) justice in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, whilst J&P Haiti had just begun with
translating some part of the Caritas manual on justice,
from English into Creole. Here opportunities for
collaboration were explored, and the Commission in
Port au Prince showed interest in the different methods
and in an exchange of materials and methods. For the
coming years access to justice is a priority on its
programme agenda. Including local authorities to
overcoming the gap between civil society on one hand and authorities and government on the
other is starting point.
Justice and Peace Netherlands does have experience in including a broad stakeholder
approach, whether it is about sensitive issues like sexual violence, or issues like truth and
reconciliation, workshops are always represented by people of civil society and of the local
police, courts, and sometimes the mayor.
One of Cordaid’s objectives is to explore collaborations with local organisations on
strengthening capacities with regard to empowerment of women, democratisation and access
to justice. Another Catholic organisation, Trocaire, has also mentioned “access to justice” as
one of its focus points, but its programme ideas were not final at the time.
Another entry point could be “advocacy” as both organisations have a long track record with
strengthening local capacities to advocate (frame, claim and execute) human rights, including
access to justice.
The links with the Catholic Church and its networks could be a valuable entry point which links
to the last observation of this section: what is the recent status of the relationship with the
Bishops’ Conference and the priests with whom Cordaid has collaborated for many years? Are
there any entry points that could make further dialogue possible and could the National
Commissions of Justice and Peace Haiti and the Netherlands possibly play a role in facilitating a
dialogue, in order to (re)strengthen relations, and to reinforce advocacy on higher levels?
49
4.2.2 Glencree/ Concern Peacebuilding initiatives Port-au-Prince
Since 2006 the Glencree Institute has been engaged in a programme of reducing violence with
stakeholders in the areas of St Martin and a year later in Martissant. St Martin is a small
disadvantaged community with barely access to electricity of approximately 80.000
inhabitants. Martissant is a community of approximately 200.000 people. Glencree’s methods
of inclusive dialogues have been widely recognised. It all started with the establishment of
creating “improbable relationships” amongst enemies after years of conflict in Ireland. Though
the weapons have been put down, the relationships between Catholics and Protestants are
distant and at times volatile. In relation to Haiti Glencree was asked by Concern to set-up a
programme that could reduce violence in communities where Concern’s development
programmes were running, but that were interrupted or even stopped because of the
structural violent eruptions in the area.
Working methods
Glencree started with a mapping of the different stakeholders that could play a role in peace
building as well as playing a role of spoiler of peace. Peace Building Committees (PBC) were
then formed and different people in the communities were brought together. Police, the private
sector, also armed bandits, local leaders, local NGO’s and local authorities.
In 2011 12 people of this group (from each sector) were invited to Ireland to talk to the
different stakeholders there. They experienced how different stakeholders were collaborating
and in dialogue to reduce violence in Belfast. The invitees came back and shared their
knowledge and experiences with their teams, in the two areas of St. Martin and Martissant.
From 2001 to 2006 the security in both areas was very poor. From 2006 to 2010 the violence
reduced, due to different factors and it seemed that the collaboration with police and
MINUSTAH, the private sector and the bandits had contributed to that. But then in 2010, the
situation aggravated, and there were many incidents in a period of three weeks (October-
November 2010).
The initial 3 years work together was based on an approach of inclusive dialogue and training
and aimed at overcoming the marginalisation experienced by the baz74 and the polarisation
experiences by many groups in St. Martin. In 2007 the work saw an intensification of efforts in
St Martin and an expansion into Martissant where the intergroup violence experienced by the
community had considerably different dimensions than in St. Martin. The model employed in St
Martin was adjusted to the context of the neighbouring area of Martissant. One of the main
drivers of violence was related to the territorial nature of the baz. The core of the approach
remained training and dialogue resulting in practical action some of which is undertaken by
locally formed committees.
Moving Forward
The programme came to an end in June 2012 and this gave lead to take stock of priorities
beyond this period both for Concern and for Glencree. In March 2011 an external evaluation of
the programme of Glencree/Concern took place. The main recommendations were that the
programme efforts should continue and that renewed support should be given to both St
Martin and Martissant, and also a deepening of the current processes was recommended.
Strengthening of capacities was one of the main priorities: both in terms of recruiting local
staff as well as identifying external capacities to delivering “peace dividends”.
74 Baz, literally means groups of people from the base (community). They are often local leaders, sometimes armed, but not always, and they prefer not to be called “gangs”, which is why groups of people with power in the community are consequently called Baz in this paper.
50
Recently Concern decided to not continue its’ programme in Haiti with regard to peace building
dialogues in the areas of St Martin and Martissant. Glencree does intend to continue its’
efforts, also in collaboration with the Irish government.
Opportunities for collaboration
Cordaid already had a relationship with the Glencree Institute about the possibility to invest in
a Peace Building Institute in Haiti. Glencree, Concern and some other NGOs in Haiti were
preparing a concept note, on what an institute like this should look like in the context of Haiti.
Possibilities of a Summer Institute were also explored with different representatives of NGOs in
Port-au-Prince. These meetings or gatherings were facilitated by Concern. Firstly the
researcher was requested to participate in one of their meetings and to comment on the
concept note and also to see how the Cordaid’s experience with a similar Peace Building
Institute could be incorporated in this concept note. Secondly Cordaid was invited to one of
Glencree’s peace building workshops, to have a personal experience with the Glencree multi-
stakeholder method to reduce violence in two areas of Port-au-Prince. For a summary of this
two-and-a-half day- workshop, please see Annex VI.
Following the workshop and the meetings, it was decided that both opportunities should be
further explored. The programme officer for Haiti in Cordaid further explored collaboration
opportunities with regard to the Peace Building Institute, with Trocaire, who was also
interested, with Concern, Glencree and with the director of the former Peace Building Institute,
Kettly Lezancourt.
Opportunities were explored for Cordaid to initiate a programme in an area adjacent to St
Martin and Martissant75, in which Cordaid already has an extensive network. After an
introductory conversation with different representatives of Cordaid’s Shelter Programme, the
area of Nan Cocteau was discussed as possible area for a pilot project with regard to reducing
violence, and strengthening capacities of local stakeholders.
Nan Cocteau is a suburb area where baz is known to be active. Poverty is extreme and the
“Lamentin Camp” a former base camp is perceived as a potential threat to security. There are
rumours that members of former forces continue training there. Lately there have been some
problems with partners involved in the shelter programme which are signals of a deteriorating
security situation. One of the main obstacles observed at the moment is that social relations
and exchanges are weak, as is trust amongst one another. A mapping of the actual situation
obstacles and main stakeholders need to be made in order to provide a broader picture of the
area.
It was a joint effort of Cordaid’s programme officer for Haiti, the researcher and the director of
the Glencree Institute to take one and a half day at the Glencree Institute in Ireland to explore
the possibilities of both initiatives, and to see what both parties had to offer and what results
should be expected. This would be followed by a visit from the Glencree’s director to the
Cordaid office, just before his travel to Haiti.
Trip to Ireland76
In this one-and-half day plans were made how to move forward both on the idea to launch a
locally-owned and led Peace Building Institute and how to move ideas forward with regard to a
possible pilot of building have peace dialogues in a multi-stakeholder setting. It was agreed
that Ian White would take the lead in doing a mapping with regard to the main problems and
stakeholders represented in Nan Cocteau. He would get the support of two people of the
75 A map of the city and its suburbs will be included 76 This trip took place on the 16th and 17th of May 2012
51
Shelter Programme to bring him in contact with some of the core stakeholders in Cordaid’s
network, and also to help to make the analysis, as a lot of work needed to be done in a short
time frame.
Outcome of the visit to Ireland was then to continue both tracks, to initiate a stakeholder
mapping (analysis) in Nan Cocteau, as a basis for a potential pilot project. Cordaid could
facilitate two Haitians of the Shelter Programme for participation in the analysis, and helping
with contacts. Ian White would visit the Netherlands, to participate in a session with different
programme officers working on Haiti and to see where possible links could be established
between the different sectors or business units. Co-writers of the “community security” unit
were invited, as well as the representative of Disaster Risk Reduction and the resource person
that has long worked on the initiative on the peace building Institute in the Philippines, to
share his knowledge and lessons learnt.
Visit to the Netherlands77
John Paul Lederach was requested to facilitate a meeting with some concrete questions, which
were formulated both by the Cordaid programme officer and by the Glencree director. Two
main challenges were tackled in this session:
1. What can organisations like Glencree and Cordaid contribute to support the spin-off of a
locally owned and directed Peace Building Institute?
2. In what think-frame and concepts should the programmes of Glencree be incorporated?
Besides the multi-stakeholders dialogues, advice with regard to early warning systems
was requested.
After Ian White gave an outline of the history of the Institute, the dialogues that were initiated
in Ireland, and then in other contexts in the world, Lederach drew a frame after which a
discussion took place. It was clarifying to have different activities and ideas that have come up
being put together in concepts and in a frame in which both Cordaid and Glencree could
further work upon.
The key-word of the discussion was leadership. In the programmes of Glencree: whether
facilitating dialogues in disadvantaged suburbs or supporting a peace building Institute,
strengthening capacities and strengthening leadership is the rationale. Or one could say the
theory of change. Lederach provided an example of a Sifon:
“It is like trying to move a small proportion against gravity and this small portion will then pull
the rest’.
It is about creating space for people, not only literally in the form of an institute, but also in a
broader sense: creating a space in which people meet and talk to each other who would
otherwise never do. According to Lederach it is important to define a “magnet”, something that
attracts people to come to a meeting. This is a collaborative activity that should be practical
and concrete and that could bring people together that normally wouldn’t. It could for example
be the availability of electricity, which is hardly accessible in St Martin. Ian White together with
two local staff in Port au Prince will do a mapping on the situation in Nan Cocteau. It could be
interesting to have a closer look at the perceptions of what needs to change according to
different stakeholders that will be interviewed.
77 Ian White’s visit was on the 7th and 8th of June 2012. The Session facilitated by J.P Lederach took place at the 8th of June 2012
52
The same could be valuable for a Peace Building Institute. First one looks at the envisioned
personal change, then at relationship change and then at the level of structural change. It
begins with collaboration (magnet) and then a shared vision and constructing a
transformational understanding of leadership. According to Lederach it is important to
emphasize that an Institute with these objectives shouldn’t at all be academic, as one excludes
important stakeholders that should be part of the whole process. It could be a laboratory of
peace learning: it could include participatory action research, for example.
Then some management challenges with regard to the set-up of the Institute were discussed.
The resource person on the set-up of the Mindanao Institute had already given some
reflections on the set-up. One of the lessons learnt of the Philippines Institute is that it is of
crucial importance that the Institute is “owned” from the beginning by Haitians. This means
that even in a transitional phase outsiders should try and stay at the side-line, and for example
not take place in the Board. Lederach remarked that in this set-up process form should follow
function. It is about the activities and the relationships to be built that make this Institute a
laboratory for leadership. Only after that has been agreed it could be discussed what shape it
should have. It facilitates then more easily, as everyone is clear on the process, what needs to
be formalised to facilitate the activities.
Follow-up
The programme officer of Haiti has been engaged in the follow-up of this potential partnership.
Recently, the sector of Conflict Transformation is in dialogue with both Glencree and 3PSM to
see how initiatives and expertise could be combined and strengthened. A mapping exercise has
been executed in an urban area of Port-au-Prince where Cordaid has been active with its
emergency programme (Nan Cocteau). Further planning and programming will be done by the
programme officer of this sector and wherever opportune in close collaboration with other
sectors.
4.2.3 Potential partnerships
After the visit and interviews with the National Observatory against Crime and Violence
(ONAVC) in February, relations were immediately sought by Cordaid. The programme officer
had a meeting with the manager (Claude Mane Das), about possible links between their
programmes and the surveys being done by ONAVC.
One output that resulted from this visit was that Cordaid will get support from ONAVC when
they send different students both local and from the University of Port-au-Prince, to support
these students in their methods.
A meeting with Jilap was also arranged on the field trip of Cordaid’s programme officer in
March, after an interview with the researcher. The first contacts have been established, and
the intention to collaborate has been shared. This needs follow-up though, either by Cordaid,
or by both Cordaid and Justice and Peace Netherlands.
Another option for collaboration could be a partnership with CRAD. They have been a partner
of Trocaire for many years (to both satisfaction), and also in the past they have been a partner
of Cebemo. Even today women that received literacy classes financed by Cebemo, were part of
the current programme and passed on their reading and writing skills.
If Cordaid decides to extend their activities with a specific focus on strengthening capacities of
local organisations by strengthening advocacy skills, Fondation Toya might be a potential
53
partner organisation: they focus on trainings, they have a track record with regard to advocacy
both on local and national level and they have a good relationship both with grass roots
organisations and with (local) authorities.
Both Trocaire and Broederlijk Delen are part of the CIDSE family, and regular contacts and
exchange on vision, mission and strategies have been part of the field trips of the programme
officer. Especially Trocaire has been an important source for the researcher for getting an
overview of contacts and potential partners and to get a first grip of the context of Haiti. The
interview with Broederlijk Delen both by the programme officer as by the researcher has given
insight on the working methods and priorities for both organisations in Haiti. Broederlijk Delen
invests in strengthening of local capacities, and has supported national human rights networks
for a long time. On the basis of the first positive exchanges and opportunities identified for
collaboration (in terms of partners and human rights/ women’s rights issues), there will be a
follow-up on a next field trip of the programme officer.
Concern is also a Catholic Organisation that has been active in Haiti for a long time. This Irish
NGO has committed itself to a programme of Peace building in two urban areas of Port au
Prince (St Martin and Martissant). The Irish Glencree Institute delivers the expertise for
dialogue amongst a multi-stakeholder group and representatives of the communities of
different sectors. Unfortunately Concern has decided to stop this programme at the end of the
year. Glencree and Cordaid are of the opinion that many opportunities are present. Not only to
continue this programme, but also to extend it with a pilot for example to an adjacent suburb.
Further exploration of this opportunity seems quite unique, as different programmes of Cordaid
might come together into one single area. The programme of Urban Matters has been active in
this adjacent area, the Emergency Programme has been present there, and also for Disaster
Risk Reduction opportunities may arise to become involved. The same counts for small scale
economic activities, as they might function as a magnet or a teaser like Mr Lederach explained
in the brainstorm session.
54
5. CONCLUSIONS
In the next section a short overview will be given of the main outcomes of each chapter. This
will be followed by an outline of the three objectives as formulated in the Terms of Reference.
The main challenges and needs with regard to strengthening capacities of human rights and
women’s organisations in Haiti will be leading in these conclusions. The section will be closed
with a few recommendations for follow-up.
5.1 Context analysis
From the context analysis three paramount factors that still have an influence of why Haiti is,
as it is today, were outlined in the first chapter. This served to obtain a basic understanding of
the environment in which local and national organisations operate. These three factors are
identified as: i) a history of oppression, ii) foreign interference and influence iii) and the role of
the elite versus the majority of the population.
One of the outcomes of the context analysis is thus that the deeply rooted inequality, being
preserved by the ruling elite, has until this day blocked any development benefiting the
majority of the population. This decisive factor of inequality, at the detriment of the
population, is a factor that should be taken into account when formulating new programmes
and partnerships. At least being aware of the existing power structures could prevent
organisations to strengthen the unbalances that exist amongst the population. Not taking
these structures into account risks not only to strengthen the unbalances but also to contribute
to internal conflict, and to jeopardise initial objectives of a given intervention.
Another risk, though latent at this moment, is the power of the military. The fact that there is
no national army at this moment is no guarantee that previous commanders will reorganise
themselves to become a strong armed force again. This risk could become real, with or without
the president’s consent. This is even more of a risk in a context where government structures
have been weak and are still weak today. The government does not have the monopoly over
violence, which also means that it is not capable of protecting its citizens against threats, in
the first place, from inside. The police is more often perceived to be a threat rather than a
protector of civil rights.
Besides the three contextual factors presented above, a fourth one was identified later in the
report. This is the role of the Catholic Church. The Church has been important in creating and
supporting farmers and farmers’ organisations in the rural areas, with the upcoming of the Ti
Legliz. At the same time they have also played a dubious role when the elite started to be
concerned of the strength and influence of the Ti Legliz and when the ruling elite decided to
end this freedom of association for example. Then, the Church hierarchy, probably afraid of
losing their own influential position between the elite, turned its back to the grass roots
Church, and even denied the existence of the peasant movements in some cases, with
devastating consequences for the rural peasant movements, and for the relationship of the
Church with the poor majority of the population.
55
5.2 Mapping of networks and local human rights & women’s organisations
A mapping of human rights and women’s organisation and networks was conducted (see
chapter 3). This included identifying obstacles and challenges in their work. Three challenges
emerged as being common for the different respondents.
Relationship between civil society and the government
Relationship between civil society and international organisations
Organisational (internal) obstacles
Especially the first challenge can be an important factor for Cordaid. Cordaid is often
considered to be a broker or intermediate between (local) authorities and the interests of civil
society organisations. Through a multi-stakeholder approach it is envisioned that the distance
between the state and civil society will be decreased. Dialogue and tailor-made trainings are
often part of this approach. One of the observations made during the identification of the main
obstacles of human rights organisations, was that NGOs are often dependent for their success
and funding on the personalities of their directors. These people are the driving forces of a
NGO, but this structure of an organisation also entails the risk that most of the information and
skills and knowledge remains with this one personality. This often leads to a situation where
other staff members hardly have a chance to strengthen their skills, and to make a valuable
contribution to the organisation. This practise might also jeopardise the continuity of an
organisation, because when this one personality is absent, a lot of the activities of the
organisation are put on a hold.
5.3 Opportunities for collaboration
In this report Cordaid’s programme history in Haiti is shortly described, including its
partnerships with local organisations throughout the years. The overall picture that emerged is
that most of the partnerships were with farmers and farmer’s organisations and with women’s
groups and with the Church. Cordaid engaged with women’s organisations from an early period
on, when women’s rights were not yet on the international development agenda. Also its
relationship with the Church that has had an impact on the work of Cordaid both in a positive
and in a negative way was described. The main dilemma then: how to breakthrough or
contribute to a breakthrough in the deeply rooted system of inequality in Haiti, is still an
important issue today.
Three initial organisations were found to be potentially interesting for Cordaid to connect with
and to further explore. These are: The Glencree Institute, the Justice and Peace Commission
Haiti (Jilap) and the Observatory against Crime and Violence (ONAVC). In the next paragraph
it will be explained why these organisations might be interesting for Cordaid to partner with.
56
5.4 Objectives as formulated in the Terms of Reference and recommendations linked to these
I. To have an understanding of Cordaid’s potential role in strengthening women’s movements
and human rights organisations
On the basis of the mapping and the identification of the challenges that human rights
organisations experience in their daily work (also see paragraph 3.5.1) , some conclusions can
be drawn in terms of Cordaid’s potential role in strengthening local organisations.
One of the most important obstacles in the work of human rights and women organisations
was identified as their sensitive relationship with local authorities. Both civil society and
authorities have a negative image of each another, and this jeopardises the opportunities to
change. As mentioned in the section on challenges and obstacles (3.5) this is not only a matter
of unwillingness and distrust, but also of not having the right tools to approach authorities for
example in a constructive and positive way.
Cordaid’s track record in Haiti consists of a wide array of local organisations and a broad
network. Its track record with multi-stakeholder approaches has proven results. Cordaid also
has in-house expertise with regard to materials and tools on advocacy and strengthening
advocacy skills of local organisations and other relevant stakeholders.
Depending on what strategy Cordaid priorities, different human rights organisations the arena
of women’s movements could benefit from Cordaid’s support. The following decisions are
recommended to be made:
1. To support an organisation that has strong relationships with grass roots organisations but
to a lesser extent with international and other local networks and organisations. A good
example is Fondation Toya. This organisation is well connected to both the grass roots and
local authorities. A challenge is that it seems to lack influential weight to have a continuance
pressure on authorities;
2. To support organisations that are already well connected to (international) networks and
organisations and who has a respected position with regard to authorities. A good example is
Femmes et Democratie. They could have the potential to enhance their efforts to mobilise their
constituency, with support (expertise and resources) from Cordaid, to bring advocacy to a next
level;
3. To support organisations with specific expertise in research and human rights. Both of these
are important for any new programme implemented by Cordaid’s conflict transformation
department. Two strong potential partners were identified: Justice and Peace Haiti and the
Observatory against Crime and Violence have been visited to explore concrete opportunities for
partnership and longer term collaboration. Cordaid should decide which forms these
partnerships should entail;
4. To explore a potential collaboration with the Glencree Institute. This process is already
underway following earlier draft of this report. To date a preliminary mapping together with
local Cordaid staff in the field has been conducted (please see for more details 4.2.1).
Decisions should be made if Glencree is the primary partner in the pilot of peace dialogues in
Nan Cocteau, or if Cordaid also wants to continue with the Peace Building Institute, that should
provide spaces for local players to learn, exchange and take actions with regard to peace
building initiatives (see paragraph 4.2.2).
57
II To contribute to a coherent programme in which the different sectors/ business units are
interlinked and benefit from each other
This objective is an objective that links to the internal discussion of Cordaid. A lot of changes
have been made, and many still are going on, that have an effect on the work of each of the
departments within Cordaid. This will have consequences for the activities and programmes of
Cordaid in Haiti. The context of Haiti might also be a bit more complicated than some other
contexts, as Haiti is both a focus area, that is busy with an exit-strategy for their emergency
programme, and at the same time, new programmes have started that should complement
the emergency programme. This objective has been taken into account in the process of the
research, but not as a specific focus that was related to specific requested outputs. Two
specific actions have been taken to contribute to a coherent programme.
An informal session was held to get an overview of each of the objectives of the different
sectors, and to get a first impression of where possible overlap areas might exist, that could be
strengthened. This was done in Haiti with the DDR section, Emergency Aid, Conflict
Transformation, urban Matters and Livelihoods/ economic activities. Throughout the research,
and also in formulating the year plan 2012, these objectives were taken into account. One
concrete output could be the European Commission proposal where the different Business
Units, as mentioned above each have their specific role to play in one specific area of Port-au-
Prince, striving to come to one coherent programme, where each of the individual programmes
of the different sectors enhance each other.
The programme officer of Conflict Transformation has taken into account the network and
activities of the Emergency Programme in Nan Cocteau, one of the areas where Cordaid had
set-up its Shelter Programme.
In the development phase of different Business Units proposals, the researcher has been asked
to provide input from the perspective of Conflict Transformation. Having just returned from the
field at that time, it was possible to provide information regarding overlaps of the different
departments.
III Explore the possibilities of a partnership between Justice and Peace Netherlands and
Cordaid on a programme in Haiti
A first potential for future cooperation has been identified in section 4.2.1. Justice and Peace
Netherlands has a track record in Haiti since the 1980s. It has had and still has a longstanding
relationship with Cordaid, in Haiti as well as in other countries and regions. Justice and Peace
Netherlands has been engaged with the political and human rights situation in Haiti, in close
collaboration with the National Justice and Peace Commission in Port au Prince (Jilap). Jilap
showed interest in the different methods developed and used by the Dutch Commission and in
an exchange of materials and methods.
58
5.5 Overall Recommendations
Supporting networks
It is recommended that, if Cordaid’s still interested in strengthening local and national
networks, it continues the mapping of networks, and derive new networks, other than the ones
based in Port-au-Prince. Two national networks were interviewed and they seemed well
connected to their member organisations and both with a considerate reputation. A general
impression was that in the rural areas, agricultural networks might well be functioning without
strong links to organisations in the capital, which was the first focus of the researcher.
It is recommended that Cordaid is clear in what kind of networks it is most interested to
strengthen: either in weak networks that could use organisational strengthening, in terms of
leadership or broader representation of needs of for example farmers’ associations. Or, in
networks that are already strong in their advocating, but could use some specific advocacy
skills, or skills that complement their activities as a network. For the three networks that were
identified in Port-au-Prince these seemed to be the main challenges.
Both national networks POHDH and PAPDA received criticism in terms of the lack of
representation of their members and members’ agenda’s. It is recommended before investing
in a network to speak to some of its members. Iteca for example was enthusiast, but this is
not a complete representation of how local/ grass roots organisations feel they are represented
at the different policy levels.
Relationship with the Church
Relationships with the Church and its networks: though only touched upon slightly through
literature study of the archives of Justice and Peace and Cordaid’s track record, it might be
valuable to further make up a balance of the current relationships with the Church and its
networks and to explore further potential for collaboration.
Cordaid’s roots lie within the Catholic Church; its constituency as well as its networks have put
the organisation in a unique position to work with local grass roots organisations, often
inaccessible for other organisations. The relationship with the Catholic hierarchy has been
ambivalent though over the years. Further exploration of how both the Church and Cordaid
could mutually benefit from a (renewed) dialogue could be worthwhile.
At a time when Cordaid links its emergency programme to a longer term presence in the
country, more focus should be dedicated to including projects that envision changing
underlying power relations, existent in the structures of the government, of the Church as well
as in society.
59
ANNEX I TERMS OF REFERENCE
Objectives
I. To have an understanding of Cordaid’s potential role in strengthening women’s
movements and human rights organisations;
II. To contribute to a coherent programme in which the different sectors/ business units
are interlinked and benefit from each other;
III. To have a better understanding of how the set-up of sustainable programmes can
benefit from the achievements of emergency interventions;
IV. Explore the possibilities of a partnership between JetP and Cordaid on a programme in
Haiti
Output
The following output of the research will be provided:
1. Mapping of organisations and networks who are working on women’s rights, women’s
violence against women’s and women’s political participation;
2. Mapping of organisations and networks with regard to human rights, democratisation
processes and improving access to justice and the justice system;
3. Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these networks (recommendations for
Cordaid whether to support a network(s) or not;
4. Making note of what issues are cross-cutting in all business units;
Methodology
Preparations included a study of recent literature and documents provided by Cordaid (see
Annex II for reference list). Data about the context was obtained through meetings with the
Head of Mission (HoM) and local staff; local staff also helped find the first linkages and made
the first appointments. A field visit helped gain some of the first impressions. (Vila Rosa and
Canapé Vert). Part of the method was also participation in conferences and workshops in order
to get a broad view of the active organisations in the field and their mutual relationship. Thus a
network of local organisations as well as international ones was quickly established.
Planning
The assignment is scheduled in the period of January 22 to May 20 2012 (4 months). It is
agreed that both the director of Justice and Peace Netherlands, Victor Scheffers and the
Cordaid coordinator for conflict transformation with regard to Haiti, Astrid Frey supervise and
comment on the mission in each phase of the process. One visit to the headquarters will take
place (25th of March- 1st of April) and one visit from Astrid Frey to the Region will take place
(26th of February- 8th of March), to further elaborate on the focus points in the research
process.
Reporting
It has been agreed that a monthly follow-up report will be sent to both supervisors, and that
the researcher will be provided with feedback. Agreements will be made for timing for the final
report, as well as on the follow-up of this research.
i. A possibility could be to visit different donors, in Europe and possibly also in the US;
ii. To co-write a proposal containing elements that obviously link the different units in
one overall project;
iii. To provide a presentation of the findings to Cordaid Haiti staff at headquarters, and
possibly also for stakeholders in Brussels or elsewhere. (It depends on the
outcomes).
60
ANNEX II ITINERARY AND OVERVIEW OF CONTACTS
Organisation Name
11.11.11. Greet Schaumans
ANAPFEH78 Kettly Alysee Gestionnaire
BAI79 human rights lawyer Mario Joseph
Broederlijk Delen (Haiti) Bénédicte Willemart
Broederlijk Delen Rhoddy Petit
CERFAS Abbé François Kawas
CERFAS80 Esther Schneider
CLIO Martine Bernier
Concern Amy Knorr
Coordinator 3PSM Jackson Nozil
Cordaid field office Koen Wagenaar
Cordaid field office Gibert
Cordaid field office Alfred Bobby Kamara
CPFO Djénane Ledan
CPH81 Philippe Becoulet
CRAD82 William Thelusmond
ENPAK Andrinette Policard Cadet
Ex prime minister/Pax Claudette Werleigh
Femmes en Démocratie (FED) Marie Carmel Michaud Nadège Beauvil Danielle Saint Lot
Fondation Toya Nadine Louis
GAJ83 Méhu Garçon
Glencree Institute Ian White
Haitian Support Group Phillip Wearne
Haitian Support Group Anne Mc Connell
ICG84 Bernice Roberton-Cote
ICKL85 Marc-Arthur Fils-Aime
Independent consultant Herman Lauwerijssen
78 Association Nationale de protection des femmes et enfants Haïtiens 79 Bureau Avocats Internationaux (BAI) 80 CERFAS: Centre de Recherche, de Réflexion, de Formation et d’Action Sociale 81 Comité Protos Haiti 82 Centre de recherche et d’action pour le développement 83 Groupe Assistance Juridique 84 International Crisis Group 85 Institut Cultural de Karl Leveque
61
Institut Haitien de la Paix Ketty Luguneourt
Iteca86 Georges E. Werleigh
Jilap Jocelyne Colas
Lig pou vwa Fanm Marie Chantale Pously
ONAVC87 Claude Mane Das
PAJ88 Joseph Maxime Rony Jean Freud
PAPDA Ricot Jean Pierre
POHDH Alermy Piervilus
RNDDH89 Pierre Espérance
SAKS Sony Esteus
SOFA Mme B. Jacob
Trocaire Gigi Dupuy
Wildfried Laurier University Timothy Donais
86 L’Institut de Technologie et d’Animation; an NGO that supports agricultural grassroots NGOs in rural development 87 ONAVC: Observatoire National de la Violence et de la Criminalité 88 Le Programme pour une Alternative Justice 89 RNDDH : Réseau National de Défense de Droits Humains
62
ANNEX III: OVERVIEW OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
Anten, L., I. Briscoe & M. Mezzera, 2012, The political Economy of State-building in situations
of fragility and conflict: from analysis to strategy. A synthesis paper based on studies of
Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala, Kosovo and Pakistan. Conflict
Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, January
Asfaw, S., G. Kerber & P. Weiderud, 2005, The Responsibility to Protect: ethical and theological
reflections (2005), World Council of Churches, Geneva
Basok, T., Ilcan, S & Noonan J., 2006, Citizenship, Human Rights and Social Justice, University
of Windsor, Ontario, Canada
Call, C.T., 2000, Sustainable Development in Central America; The challenges of violence,
injustice and insecurity, Hamburg Institut für iberoamerika- Kunde
Caple James, E., 2010, Democratic insecurities: Violence, Trauma and Intervention in Haiti
CECI / SOFA. 2011. L’ état General de la violence faite aux femmes et aux filles en Haïti, Pour
une intervention cohérente
CEDAW, 2009, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of discrimination
against women (CEDAW), Haiti, 10th February 2009
CIA The World Factbook: retrieved information from “people and society” at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
Collier, P., January 2009 “Haiti: from natural disaster to economic security”: a report for the
UN-secretary of the United Nations
Derks, M., 2012, Improving security and justice through local/non-state actors: The challenges
of donor support to local/ non-state security and justice providers. Netherlands Institute of in
International Relations “Clingendael”. April
Donais, T., 2005: Back to square one: The politics of Police Reform in Haiti
Dziedzic, M. & Perito, R.M., 2008, Haiti, Confronting the gangs of port-au-Prince, United states
Institute of Peace, Special Report, September
Galeano, E. 2012, Occupied Again – will Haiti ever be free of unwanted invaders?, In: New
Internationalist, January / February 2012, pp. 26 – 27
Global Justice Clinic / Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2012, Yon Je Louvri:
Reducing Vulnerability to Sexual Violence in Haiti’s IDP Camps, New York: NYU School of Law
Grant, U., 2010, Spatial inequality and urban poverty traps – ODI working Paper 326, Chronic
Poverty Research Centre, December
Harvey, N. 2012, Were did all the money go?, In: New Internationalist, January / February
2012, pp. 28 - 30
Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2011, World Report 2011
International Crisis Group (ICG), 2011, Keeping Haiti safe: justice Reform, Update Briefing, 27
October
63
International Crisis Group (ICG), Keeping Haiti safe: police Reform, Update Briefing, 8th
September 2011
JILAP, 2010, Enquête sur les armes à feu en Haïti, entre 1986 et 2010, July
Lemanski, C., 2012, Every day human (in)security: Rescaling for the Southern city, Security
Dialogue, 43(1), 62-79
Molenaar, M., 2012, Opportunities and obstacles concerning local partnership in Cordaid’s
post-earthquake aid mission in Haiti, Wageningen University, January
OHCHR, 2009, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social
and cultural rights, including the right to development: report of the Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences (submitted by G.
Shaninian)
OHCHR, 2011, Haiti: Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review, 12th session
on the working group of the Universal Periodic Review, 3-13 October 2011 (submitted by A.
Ouvrye)
OHCHR, 2011, Report Human Rights Council 17th session 4 April 2011, Report of the
Independent Expert on the situation of human rights (submitted by M. Frost)
OHCHR, 2011, Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti, 4th
April (Submitted by M. Frost)
PAHO / WHO, Statistics on Haiti (last official update of demographic data is 2001), Accessed at
www.paho.org/english/sha/prflhai.htm, June 2012
Perchellet, S., 2010, Haïti : entre colonisation, dette et domination. Deux siècles de lutte pour
la liberté, CADTM-PAPDA, www.cadtm.org
Platform des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits Humains (POHDH), 2012, La Minustah et les
violations des droits de l'homme en Haiti, Public Report, 22nd February
Putzel, J.,2006 in: The political economy of state building in situations of fragility and conflict:
from analysis to strategy. Clingendael Institute, 2012
Reich, H. 2006, In conflict transformation projects, partnership, participation or patronage?
Berghoff Occasional Papers no 27, September
Savi, G., 2011, Stakeholders analysis in Haiti, Mission from June 18 to July 08
Solidarité Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA), 2011, Rapport - Bilan XI. Des cas de violence accueillis et
accompagnés dans les centres d’accueil de la SOFA. Année 2010-2011, December
Stam, T. Planting strategies in Rural Haiti: An Ethnographic Context, Draft report May 12st
2012
UNDP, 2011, Human Development Report (HDR) 2011: Sustainability and equity: a better
future, New York
World Bank, 2007, Crime, Violence and Development: Trends, Costs and policy options in the
Caribbean
World Bank, 2007 Country Study: Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti
64
Cordaid documents that were consulted for this research
Een analyse van de CEBEMO/ COHAN ontwikkelingsaanpak in Haïti, Programma-evaluatie nr.
23, augustus 1985
Haïti Landendocument, Cebemo 1980-1988, waarschijnlijk geschreven door Herman
Lauwerysen, maar geen auteur genoemd
Verslag Reis Haïti van 11 t/m 20 maart 1991 van Herman Lauwerysen, CEBEMO, afdeling
Latijns-Amerika.
A quick scan on fragility, K&E, January 2012
Cordaid Annual Plan, Haiti 2012
Building Flourishing communities: Cordaid’s mission in the world of today and tomorrow
(2012)
Risk Mapping Haiti; sector Disaster Risk Reduction & Emergency Aid, January 2012, Evelien
Thieme & Carolien Jacobs
Herziening beleid vanuit de crisissituatie, (concept) Juli 2005, Herman Lauwerysen
Haïti missie van Herman Lauwerysen van 17 januari tot 14 mei 2005, juni 2005
65
ANNEX IV: HAITI’S RATIFICATION OF CORE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
Haiti has ratified the next Core Human Rights Instruments:
The International Covenant on Civil Political Rights (ICCPR) (1991, accession)
The Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1995), it has signed the Optional Protocol for
the CRC, but it has not been ratified yet.
The Convention against all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1981)
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (1972)
The Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (2009 a)
Haiti has not ratified:
The core international Treaty on economic, social and cultural rights (ICESCR)90
It has signed the San Salvador additional Protocol, but it has taken no steps towards
ratification
The Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CaT)
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families (not signed, not adopted)
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (signed
in 2007, but not adopted)
90
During a recent follow-up visit of the Inderpendent Expert on human rights, mr Michel Forst, Martelly promised to ratify the ICESCR
as soon as possible. This was confirmed in the public statement of Michel Forst, on the 8th of February 2012, on 20
th February the
Treaty has been signed!
66
ANNEX V: IDENTIFIED NETWORKS IN HAITI
CIDSE: network of Catholic organisations active in Haiti; providing learning events for their
partners four times a year, on specific topics. A recent topic was “land tenure” which was
received enthusiastically, by local and by international participants, and which is likely to get a
follow-up.
CCO- International Consortium- Country Coordination Office – instigated by ECHO
CLIO : Cadre de Liaison Inter-ONG Haïti
COFAD: Collectif Femmes pour le Développement
CONAP91
Haiti’s National Coordination for Advocacy on Women’s Rights
COMPA: a liason of social movements and forums. (Social transformation)
FIDH: Féderation International des Droits de l’Homme (members are RNDDH)
MMF: March Mondial des Femmes (members are SOFA)
PAPDA: Haitian Platform to Advocate Alternative Development
POHDH : Plateforme des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits Humains
REFRAKA: Réseau des Femmes des Communautés de Port-au-Prince. SOFA is a member, but
not actively involved. It is the so-called baby of SAKS
Rezo pouvwa fanm yo – network for women- and human rights organsations. Fondation Toya
works with them
91
CPFO collaborates with them. The director of ENFOFANM is the same as the director of CONAP (Danielle Magloire).
67
ANNEX VI: MAPPING OF HUMAN RIGHTS- AND WOMEN’S ORGANISATIONS
Women’s rights organisations
1. Solidarité Femmes Haïtien (SOFA)
2. Femmes et Democratie (FED)
3. Fondation Toya
4. Lig pouvwa Fanm
5. ENFOFANM
6. ENPAK
7. Association Nationale de Protection des Femmes et Enfants Haïtiens (ANAPFEH)
8. Centre Promotion des Femmes Ouvrières (CPFO)
Human rights organisations
1. Bureau Advocates Internationaux (BAI)
2. Centre de Recherche, de Réflexion, de Formation et d’Action Sociale (CERFAS)
3. Centre de Réflexion et d'Action pour le Développement (CRAD)
4. Groupe Assistance Juridique (GAJ)
5. Institute Culturel de Karl Levêque (ICKL)
6. Programme Assistance Juridique (PAJ)
7. Society for Social Mobilization and Communication (SAKS)
8. Komisyon Episcopal Nasyonal Jistis ak Lapè (JILAP)
9. Observatoire National contre la violence criminalité (ONAVC)
10. Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH)
International Organisations
1. Trocaire
2. Broederlijk Delen
3. Concern
4. Glencree Institute
5. International Crisis Group
Resource Persons
1. Claudette Werleigh (Former Secretary General of Pax Christi International)
2. Georges Werleigh (ITECA)
3. Philippe Becoulet (CPH)
4. Gubert Saint Fleury (Cordaid)
5. Alfred Kamara (Cordaid)
6. Piet Spaarman (Cordaid)
7. Koen Wagenbuur (Cordaid)
8. Greet Schoumans (11.11.11)
9. Rhoddy Petit (Broederlijk Delen/ independent consultant)
10. Herman Lauwerijsen (lived in Haiti, and used to work for Cordaid in the 90s and up to
2005. He also did a phd in Haiti on voudou)
11. Jagoda Paukovic (Justitia et Pax, used to live and work in Haiti, in the 80s)
12. Philip Wearne- UK Haiti Support Group
13. Anne Mc Connell – UK Haiti Support Group
68
ANNEX VII: OBSERVATIONS OF A PEACE DIALOGUE MULTI-STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP
Weekend peace dialogue: facilitated by two local facilitators and by Ian White (Glencree Peace
Institute Ireland) and by Amy Knorr working for Concern
10-12 February, Moulin-sur-Mer
There were 20 participants, mostly from the area of St Martin, where violence is part of their
daily life, and some were from Martissant, another area where Concern has been involved
since 2006, to reduce violence via a multi-stakeholder approach. Among the participants in
this 2,5 day workshop were representatives of the peacebuilding committees (PBC), of the
private sector, of the police, and several ex-bandits who have turned in their weapons.
The objective of the workshop was to create insight into the different perspectives and lives of
the different stakeholders and to humanize relations between them as a first step into
commonly looking for strategies on how to reduce violence in St. Martin. All the exercises
were participatory, and exercises of trust were built up, until the climax which was on Saturday
afternoon and evening: storytelling. Every participant took 7 minutes to tell his or her life
story; from their birth, to their adolescence to where they are now. It was not mandatory, but
after some hesitations everyone participated.
It was striking to hear that violence was such a fundamental part in all of these stories. It
often started in the womb. Domestic violence was one of the main characteristics in each and
every story; from the time they were children, so from their parents, until the time that they
became parents themselves. Besides domestic violence there were also, dominantly in the
male stories, examples of (guns) street violence, kidnappings and violence at schools. For the
three ex-gang leaders the violence meant in particular that there was availability of guns and
bullets in and around the house from a very young age. It was easy for a 7 or 8 year old to
grab a gun and take it to school. It was also a natural course of life to join a gang at a young
age, to protect your family, and to gain respect (through fear).
For the mothers that shared their story, violence was also common from the time they were
children to their marriage. Almost all participants came from broken families. In the stories of
the women it was often the father or the husband who could not protect his wife (n)or be
faithful. Some of these women, as young girls, shared how they tried to escape the poverty
trap and in some cases they succeeded by starting to sew or by being so incredibly eager to go
to school that they succeeded to finish it. It was mentioned by several participants how they
did not want to be like their father or mother and how they would break this trap of violence;
by being faithful, by fighting for education, by starting something for themselves.
On Sunday, after an evaluation of the previous day, the participants were divided into working
groups to discuss the different challenges they were faced with in St Martin:
- Group I: How can local and international organisations better collaborate? (Also in
respect to the tensions in the Peacebuilding committee of St Martin);
- Group II: Propose concrete actions to reduce violence in St Martin;
- Group III: What are the root causes of violence in St Martin?;
- Group IV: Propose concrete actions to improve economic development in St. Martin.
Working group III on root causes of violence had made an analysis of violence over the past
ten years. They identified four different types of violence over the past 10 years:
a) Political violence (2001) following the contested presidential elections that Aristide
claimed to have won. Political violence between Aristide and the opposition, and also
from his own constituency, created insecurity, tensions and violence
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b) Social conflict (2005) in combination with political instability due to transitional
government, unrest of Aristides departure, and upcoming elections
c) Lack of taking into account the (disarmed) “baz” groups in the DDR and CDDR
programme (2005- 2008);
d) Economic conflict (2009-2011)
In regard of political violence: a large part of the population was excluded from participating in
public life. Power was shared amongst a small elite group (clans, families) and the impact of
badly organised elections created intense emotions of unfairness. Authorities abused their
positions in power at the cost of the population; an obvious conflict of interests.
With regard to social violence: lack of access to justice and impunity (especially for the people
in powerful positions), marginalisation and stigmatisation of people in the communities who
were not anywhere close to the sight of decision makers. Abuse of position of authorities and
bad practices of the Haitian police and the ministries were mentioned as main factors. On a
lower level there was a fight for leadership, one group wanted to have control over a specific
zone in Port-au-Prince. Distribution of social services is badly arranged and distributed. A
structural lack of possibilities for university or professional education was then mentioned as
one of the obstacle to escape social violence on the longer term.
Concerning the identification of opportunities for economic development, the next proposals
were made:
1. Investing in a vocational school, for example in plumbing, carpenting, tailoring, mechanic
Setting up a professional training center;
2. Developing cultural activities and sports;
3. Organising concrete actions to clean the surroundings at St Martin (propose a day to
clean per month);
4. Organising women groups at 3PSM;
5. Promoting the creation of small business and reinforcing the ones that already exist;
6. Creating a peace center to promote economic development in the area;
7. Organising a competition for small business plans, and financing the best one.
The workshop closed with a presentation of the outcome in the working groups, and a circle of
what people had experienced and learned in these days. The results were quite positive.
People who were practically neighbors did not know each other, or had not talked to each
other, and here they did get to know one another, and they said that they would keep in
contact.
For some the Power-game was very useful, giving insights on how power is often used against
you when you are already in the periphery, not having many opportunities. Knowing this,
being conscious of the power-game makes one less impressionable/ susceptive to it. One
person of the private sector was often targeted by the police without obvious reason. When
Ian explained that the rules of the game were decided by him in all obscurity, also to show
that this is often what happens in the slums. The police is tired of the violence so they just
target anyone who is in their way, treating people as third class citizens while people in power,
and often in the private sector, enjoy impunity for the crimes they commit. Therefore, a
person who would sell out a neighbour to the police gets rewarded in this setting. This in turn
creates tensions in the relationships between authorities and citizens, because people feel
treated unfairly and they are not able to discover the rationale of some actions.
It was shared by all participants that the workshop was a positive experience, and that this
positive attitude should be followed up once everyone returned to the community. Using our
networks and contacts to find out which changes are within reach, and to develop commonly.
Unfortunately there were no concrete agreements made at that moment. But a local
organisations based at the heart of this area, and working with the different sectors (3PSM) did
some of these issues will come back at the PBC meetings, held at the office of 3PSM. Also in a
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more informal way, many phone numbers amongst us were exchanged, to keep in touch with
others.
Glencree foresees to give a follow-up workshop in September, when some of the plans
discussed here in the working groups might have developed a bit further.
