2013+Persons+and+Family+Relations+Case+Updates (1)

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PERSONS & F AMILY RELATIONS:

2013 C ASE UPDATES By: Atty. Melencio S. Sta. Maria1


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Acknowledgements

The cases cited in this presentation were

prepared by Blocks 1B and 1C (SY 2013-2014)

This PowerPoint Presentation was prepared by

Blocks 4B and 4D (SY 2013-2014)

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OUTLINE Absence of Essential Elements of Marriage [Art. 4

Family Code (FC)]

Void Ab Initio Marriages [Art. 35 FC]

Psychological Incapacity [Art. 36 FC]

Bigamous Marriage; Absence or Disappearance of

Spouse [Art. 41 FC]

Collusion in Annulment or Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage Cases [Art. 48 FC]

Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Dispositionof Community Property [Art. 96 FC]

Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime [Art. 99 FC]

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OUTLINE Conjugal Partnership Properties [Art. 117 FC]

Charges against the Conjugal Partnership of Gains [Art.

122 FC]

Suit between Family Members [Art. 151 FC]

Constitution of Family Home [Art. 153 FC]

Establishing Filiation of Legitimate Children [Art. 172

FC]

Rights of Legitimate Children [Art. 174 FC]

Support [Art. 194 FC]

Demand and Payment of Support [Art. 203 FC]

Designation of Parental Authority [Art. 213 FC]4


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OUTLINE Guardianship

Interlocutory Orders on Support pendente lite

Succession

Republic Act No. 7610

Republic Act No. 9262

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A BSENCE OF ESSENTIAL

ELEMENTS OF M ARRIAGE

[A RT. 4 FC]

Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 183896, Jan. 30, 2013)

Facts:

The case stems from a supposed marriage ceremony between Pakistani SyedAzhar Abbas

and Filipina Gloria Goo on January 9, 1993. The marriage contract stated that the couple was

issued a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993. The copy of marriage license

was apparently presented to the solemnizing officer during the marriage ceremony.

In July 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar to secure a copy of the

marriage license in relation to a bigamy case filed by Gloria. However, the Municipal Civil

Registrar issued a certification declaring that the office has not issued a marriage license to Syed

and Gloria. It further verified that the marriage license indicated in Syed and Gloria’s marriage

contract was issued to a different couple.

Syed filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria. He argued that

there was no actual marriage license issued to them prior to the supposed marriage in January

1993. Gloria maintained, on the other hand, that a valid marriage license existed. She presented

their marriage contract, photographs and testimonies of people present during the marriage

ceremony to negate the certification from the municipal civil registrar. She countered that a

certain ―Qualin‖ secured the marriage license for her and Syed. But she was not able to present a

copy of the actual marriage license.

RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage license issued by the Municipal Civil

Registrar of Carmona. CA ruled that there was a valid marriage license because the certification of

the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage

license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not beaccorded probative value

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Issue: WON a valid marriage license was issued to Syed and Gloria

Held:

No. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, proof does exist of a diligent

search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 wasindeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in saidlicense do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturnthe presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of therecords of her office.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, it was held that the certification ofthe Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriagelicense was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.

No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria andSyed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar ofCarmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the allegedmarriage license.

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremonywas conducted and a marriage contract was signed, does not operate tocure the absence of a valid marriage license.

Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "Theabsence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall renderthe marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Thismarriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, andthus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is voidab initio.

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A BSENCE OF ESSENTIAL

ELEMENTS OF M ARRIAGE

[A RT. 4 FC]

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario (A.M. No.MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013)

Facts:

Due to an administrative case filed on July 6, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator(OCA) formed a judicial audit team that investigated on irregularities in the solemnization ofmarriages in several MTCs and RTCs in Cebu. The head of the audit team created wentundercover with another lawyer to see if the allegations were true that there were fixers or

facilitators offering package fees to parties who would like to apply for marriage. After theirinterviews and investigation, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the following judges andcourt employees generally for gross neglect of duty due to the following circumstances:

Judge Necessario - solemnized marriages with questionable documents even where one of thecontracting parties (foreigner) submitted an affidavit instead of a certificate of legal capacity fromhis embassy; and under Art. 34 (one of the contracting parties was a minor during cohabitation)

Judge Acosta – failed to make sure that solemnization fee has been paid and also solemnized amarriage under Art. 34

Judge Rosales – failed to make sure the solemnization fee has been paid and solemnized marriagebetween foreigner who only submitted an affidavit; also solemnized a marriage without themarriage license

Judge Tormis – solemnized marriages with questionable documents; failed to make suresolemnization fee has been paid; solemnized marriage between foreigner who only submitted anaffidavit; solemnized marriage with expired marriage license.

Helen Monggaya – violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel – prohibition from soliciting any gifts and for giving false information for the purpose of perpetratingan irregular marriage

Rhona Rodriguez – violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 by participating in the collection of an agreed uponadditional fee to process the documents, and in one case, received 4,000 pesos to facilitate an

irregular marriage

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Desiderio Aranas and Rebecca Alesna – provided couples who are to be married under Art. 34 with therequired affidavit of cohabitation even if one or both of them were minors during cohabitation

Celeste Retuya, Emma Valencia, Rebecca Alesna – violated Sec. 2 (b), Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct ofCourt Personnel because they received tips in assisting parties engaged in the transactions with theJudiciary. Also, they effectively screened all documents before submitting them to the judges.

However, OCA recommended the dismissal of complaints against Judge Econg, Corazon Retuya andMarilou Cabañez for lack of merit.

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as

husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. Thecontracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person

Issue: WON the Judges and personnel of Cebu MTCC and RTC are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, grossneglect of duty, or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct

Held:

YES. Judges Necessario, Acosta, Romis and Rosales are guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect ofduty.

Neglect of duty, as defined in Rodrigo-Ebron vs. Adolfo, is the ―failure to give one’s attention to atask expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, theoffense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare‖.

This is reflected in the evidence submitted: Documents showed evidences of tampering, absence ofreceipts to show that solemnization fees were paid, documents submitted by the parties showedirregularities, testimonies were made regarding solemnization of marriages without licenses, among others.It was held that the “actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding thevalidity of the marriages they solemnized” as, for instance, absence of a marriage license wouldrender a marriage void pursuant to Art. 4 of the Family Code.

SC dismissed the argument of the respondents that it was beyond the scope of duty of thesolemnizing officer to check the validity of the marriage pursuant to People vs. Jansen.

Court finds respondents guilty, orders the dismissal of the judges and employees from service.

The SC through Navarro vs. Domagtoy, established that: ―The judiciary should be composedof persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, morethan the ordinary layman”. Employees are also held liable as established in Villaceran vs. Rosete, whichsaid ―Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice… these courtpersonnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurable affect thehonor and dignity of the Judiciary‖.

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V OID A B I NITIO M ARRIAGES

[A RT. 35 FC]

Fujiki v. Marina (G.R. No. 196049, Jun. 26,2013)

Facts: Fujiki a Japanese National married Marinay in the Philippines.Fujiki was not able to bring Marinay to Japan and they eventually lostcontact. Marinay remarried another Japanese national but claimed she

was being maltreated. She contacted Fujiki and they reestablished theirrelationship. Fujiki sought judgement from the Japanese courts for nullityof Marinay’s second marriage on the ground of bigamy which the Japancourt granted.

Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for Judicial Recognition ofForeign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). RTCdismissed petition based on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). This rule prescribes that the parties who can file a declaration ofnullity or annulment of marriage are limited to only the husband or wife.

Issues: WON rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wifecan file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage applies

WON the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding forcancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

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HELD: A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a

foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties

is a citizen of a foreign country. The court went on to cite Juliano-Llave v.

Republic wherein the court ruled that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that

only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment ofmarriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of

the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or

correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The rule is clear that any person interested in any act, event, order or decree

concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civilregister may file a verified petition for cancellation or correction of entry.

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family

Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the

ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to

Marinay.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the

status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign

country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a

fact under the Rules of Court.

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[A RT. 35 FC]

Capili v. People (G.R. No. 189805, Jul. 3, 2013)

Facts:

Respondent charged herein petitioner Capili with the crimebigamy before the Pasig RTC. Respondents claim that a

second marriage was contracted before the first marriagewas declared void. Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspendalleging that there is currently a pending civil case fordeclaration of nullity of the second marriage before theRTC of Antipolo filed by Karla Medina-Capili. Thearraignment was therefore reset. Ultimately, RTC Antipolo

declared the second marriage void. Because the secondmarriage was ultimately declared to be void, petitionerargues that there cannot be any crime of bigamy.

Issue: WON Petitioner is liable for bigamy, considering thatthe second marriage was declared to be void? 12


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Held:

YES. Petitioner is still guilty of bigamy despite declaration of second marriage as void. The

crime of bigamy exists so long as a second marriage was contracted during the

subsistence of a valid first marriage. This is true even if the second marriage was

declared to be a nullity.

According to the RPC, the elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: the offender has been legally married;

the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,

the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for

validity

In the present case, all the elements are present. At the outset, it is therefore clear that thePetitioner is liable for bigamy. Additionally, the second marriage was contracted during the

subsistence of a valid first marriage. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the

second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for

the crime of bigamy.Even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second

marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was

celebrated, there is still a crime of bigamy.

Jarillo v. People held that:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial

because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private

complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt

in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to

prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage iscontracted.

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[A RT. 35 FC]

Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan ( G.R. No. 201061, Jul. 3,

2013)

Facts:

Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) alleged that he was married to

Azucena Alegre (Azucena), where they had three children. However, Benjamin

developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally) who was a

customer in the business owned by Benjamin’s family. Sometime after Azucena

left for America, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. They

sign a purported marriage contract even though Sally knew of Benjamin’s

marital status. Sally assured him that the marriage contract would not be

registered. Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children.

When the relationship ended, Sally went to Canada bringing with her

their 2 children. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of

public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract

as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent

marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court.

Issue: WON the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was valid14


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Held:

No. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into the purported

marriage, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was still valid

and subsisting. Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena was duly established

before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage

contract.

Furthermore, the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally had no valid

marriage license because the Local Civil Registrar confirmed that the

Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally did not match the Marriage

License series issued for the month of February 1982. The Civil Registrar

also said that it did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 (the alleged

Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally) to the couple. Such certificationfrom the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a

marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification

enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law

to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without

a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license isnecessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the

marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license.

Therefore, it is clear that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was

null and void ab initio and non-existent.15


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[A RT. 35 FC]

Montanez v. Cipriano (G.R. No. 181089, Oct. 22, 2012)

Facts: On April 8, 1976, Lourdes married Socrates. On January 24, 1983, while the

first marriage has not yet been judicially dissolved, Lourdes married Silverio.

Lourdes filed a petition in 2001 to annul her marriage with Socrates for psychological

incapacity. The first marriage was declared null and void on 2003On May 14, 2004, Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, the petitioner and Silverio’s

daughter from the first marriage, filed a bigamy complaint against Lourse. Attached

to the complaint was a marked and signed affidavit of Silverio stating that Lourdes

concealed her marriage to Socrates.

On July 24, 2007, Lourdes alleged that since her marriage was declared void

ab initio in 2003, there can be no bigamy in the absence of two valid marriage, is

therefore wanting. RTC ruled that bigamy was not committed by the respondent. The

subsequent marriage was solemnized in 1983 prior to the effectivity of the Family

Code; hence, the existing law at that time did not require judicial declaration of

nullity as a condition to remarry. Due to the unsettled state of Jurisprudence, RTC

interpreted the law liberally in favor of the accused.16


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Issue: WON the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal

of the on for bigamy filed against her.

Held: No, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not justify the dismissal of

the bigamy case.In Jarillov. People, the Court ruled that when an accused contracted a

subsequent marriage without the prior marriage having been judicially

declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated. This is

so because the first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by

a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.

The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriagewould not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the

subsistence of the first marriage. As long as there is no judicial declaration of

nullity, the marriage is presumed to be existing. Therefore, he/she who

contracts a subsequent marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of

the first marriage can be prosecuted for bigamy. Yes, what makes a person

criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage

during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be

permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the

judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared

can it be held as void, and so long as there is no declaration, the presumption is that the

marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the

judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being

prosecuted for bigamy.17


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[A RT. 35 FC] People v. Odtuhan (G.R. No. 191566, Jul. 17, 2013)

Facts: Respondent contracted marriage with Jasmin in 1980. Thirteenyears thereafter, he married Eleanor. However, his first marriage wasdeclared void ab initio because it was celebrated without a marriagelicense. Meanwhile, the second spouse died. Respondent was charged withbigamy. He raises the defense that the facts in the information do not

charge an offense of bigamy since his first marriage was void ab initio;hence, there is an absence of an essential element in the crime of bigamy.

Issue: WON respondent is guilty of bigamy.

Held: Yes, what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when hecontracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of avalid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judgefor themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the

judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage isso declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no declaration,the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he whocontracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration ofnullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecutedfor bigamy.

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Held:

NO. The findings of the expert were one-sided, given that

Dominic himself was not subjected to such, and that the findings

and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert weresolely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and

characterizations of him rendered by the petitioner and her

witnesses (those whom the petitioner herself referred)

CA’s reliance in Dagdag, Hernandez, and Pesca were not

misplaced. Based on the doctrines established in these 3 cases, it

was not the absence of the medical expert’s testimony alone thatwas crucial but rather the petitioner’s failure to satisfactorily

discharge the burden the showing the existence of psychological

incapacity at the inception of the marriage.

The totality of evidence of proving such incapacity at

and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucialconsideration. To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration

of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the

evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's

psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing

prior to the time of the marriage.20


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PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

[A RT. 36 FC]

Republic v. C.A. and Quintos (G.R. No. 159594,Nov. 12, 2012)

Facts:

Eduardo and Catalina were married in civil rites. However, they were not blessed

with a child because Catalina had a hysterectomy following her second marriage. Eduardo

filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing psychological incapacity as a

ground. He alleged that Catalina always left the house without his consent; that she

engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual

needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of caring for their

adopted daughter; that she gambled away all his remittances as an overseas worker; and

that she abandoned the conjugal home with her paramour.

As support to his claim of psychological incapacity, he also presented the results of

a neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes stating that Catalina

exhibited traits of a borderline personality disorder that was no longer treatable. Catalinadid not appear during trial but admitted her psychological incapacity. She denied flirting

with different men and abandoning the conjugal home.

Issue: WON Catalina was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital duties.

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Held:No. Marriage remains valid. Psychological incapacity is an

incapacity/inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic maritalobligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal or neglect in theperformance of marital obligations.

In Republic v CA(Molina), SC has established guidelines involving thenullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity. Thesewere not met in the instant case since the gravity, root cause andincurability of Catalina's purported psychological incapacity were notsufficiently established.

Catalina's behavior of frequent gossiping, leaving the house withoutEduardo's consent, refusal to do household chores, and take care of theiradopted daughter were not established. Eduardo presented no other witness to

corroborate these allegations. Also, the RTC and CA heavily relied on Dr.Reyes' evaluation despite any factual foundation to support this claim. Thereport was vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of theincapacity.Even the testimony of Dr. Reyes stated a general description ofborderline personality disorder which did not explain the root cause as to whyCatalina was diagnosed as such. They did not specify the acts or omissions orthe gravity which constituted the disorder.

What was established was that Catalina was childish and immature.

Furthermore, Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina. This lacks thedepth and objectivity of an expert assessment. From the scant evidencepresented, it can be adduced that Catalina's immaturity and apparent refusalto perform her marital obligations do not constitute psychological incapacityalone. It must be shown that such immature acts were manifestations of adisordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to dischargethe essential obligations of marriage. 22


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PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

[A RT. 36 FC]

Republic v. Encelan (G.R. No. 170022, Jan. 9, 2013)

Facts:

In 1979, Cesar Encelan married Lolita, and they bore twochildren. In 1984, Cesar left for Saudi for work and 2 years later,he found out that Lolita was having an illicit affair with Alvin. In1991, Lolita left the conjugal home with the children and livedwith Alvin. In 1995, Cesar filed a petition for declaration ofnullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.

Lolita denies all allegations of infidelity and psychologicalincapacity.

Lolita’s psychological evaluation report stated that she:

Was not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness Had not been able to provide the expectations expected of her for a

good land lasting marital relationship, as she refused to go abroadwith Cesar

Was transferring from one job to the other, which depicts someinterpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience inattaining her ambitions 23


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Issue: WON psychological incapacity exists

Held:

NO.Psychological incapacity contemplatesdownright incapacity or inability to take cognizance ofand to assume basic marital obligations, not merely therefusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on thepart of the errant spouse.

For sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugaldwelling to constitute psychological incapacity, it must beshown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are

manifestations of a disordered personality that completelyprevented the erring spouse from discharging the essentialmarital obligations. Otherwise, the alleged sexual infidelityand abandonment are merely grounds for legal separation.

Interpersonal problems with co-workers does notconclude that Lolita, at the time of the marriage, waspsychologically incapacitated. Aside from the time element

involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spousecannot simply be equated with her professional/workrelationship. Their relatedness and relevance to one anothershould be fully established for them to be compared or to serveas measures of comparison with one another.

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B GA O S MA AG A S C O


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BIGAMOUS M ARRIAGE; A BSENCE OR

DISAPPEARANCE OF SPOUSE

[A RT. 41 FC]

Republic v. Narceda (G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013)

Facts:

Robert P. Narceda and Marina Narceda got married on July 22,1987. In 1994, Marina went to Singapore and never returned orcommunicated with respondent. The last the respondent has heard abouther is that she’s been living with a Singaporean husband.

For purposes of remarriage, on May 16, 2002 Robert filed a Petitionfor a judicial declaration of presumptive death and/or absence of Marina.The RTC granted the petition and declared the Presumptive death ofMarina. Petitioner appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals on theguround that respondent failed to conduct a diligent search of his wife andthere was no well-founded belief that Marina was dead. The CA dismissedthe appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and ruling that thehearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is asummary proceeding under the Family Code, being such the judgmentsherein shall be immediately final and executory.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion forReconsideration but was also denied hence, this petition.

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Issue: WON the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of

Robert Narcedo.

Held:

Art. 41(2) states: For the purpose of contracting the subsequent

marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must

institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the

declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to

the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a

summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an

absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. The OSG availed

the wrong remedy when it filed its notice of appeal. The wrong filing

did not toll the running of the period for filing the Petition for

Certiorari, which has lapsed. As a result, petitioner's contention that

respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his

absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court.

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COLLUSION IN ANNULMENT OR


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COLLUSION IN A NNULMENT OR

DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF M ARRIAGE C ASES

[A RT. 48 FC]

Chan v. Chan (G.R. No. 179786, Jul. 24, 2013)

Facts:

Petitioner Wife filed against Respondent Husband a petition for thedeclaration of nullity of marriage, with the dissolution of their conjugal partnershipof gains, and the award of custody of their children to her, claiming that RespondentHusband failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed

him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibiteddrugs.

Respondent Husband claims that it was the Wife who failed in her duties. And that he initially agreed to marriage counseling to save their marriage, but uponarriving at the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gavehim an injection. He attached a Philhealth Claim Form to his answer as proof thathe was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. However, that sameform carried a physician’s handwritten note that the Husband suffered from―methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.‖

Based on the physician’s handwritten statement, Petitioner Wife requestedfor the issuance of a subpoena ducestecumaddressed to Medical City, for theproduction of the Husband’s medical records. The Husband opposed, arguing that themedical records were covered by physician-patient privilege.

The request of Petitioner Wife was denied and her subsequent Motion forReconsideration on the matter was also denied. She then filed a Petitioner forCertiorari with the Court of Appeals but this was also dismissed. Her subsequentMotion for Reconsideration with the CA was also denied.

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Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of asubpoena ducestecumcovering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these arecovered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication

Held:

Issuance of a subpoena ducestecum is premature. Petitioner Wife made therequest before trial started. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making arequest for the issuance of a subpoena ducestecumcovering her husband’s hospitalrecords. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that thehusband may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so totheir disclosure.

Petitioner Wife’s motion for the issuance of the subpoena ducestecum alsocannot be treated as a motion for production of documents as a mode of discoverybecause Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is only limited to disclosure ofdocuments which are NOT PRIVILEGED.

Petitioner Wife claims that the documents are not privileged because it is theTESTIMONY of the physician that is supposed to be privileged. This contention iswrong. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician ―cannot in a civil case,without the consent of the patient, be examined‖ regarding their (physician-patient)professional conversation. To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of thehospital records (including the results of tests that the physician ordered, thediagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment given) would, in effect,be tantamount to allowing access to evidence that is inadmissible without thepatient’s consent. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling thephysician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient,without the latter’s prior consent.

Lastly, Petitioner Wife argues that her Husband already admitted in hisanswer that he had been confined in a hospital. However, as already mentionedabove, trial in the case had not yet begun. Since trial had not yet begun, it cannot besaid the Husband had already presented said Philhealth claim form as evidence. TheHusband was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer.

Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.28

OWNERSHIP ADMINISTRATION ENJOYMENT


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O WNERSHIP, A DMINISTRATION, ENJOYMENT

AND DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY

[A RT. 96 FC]

Republic v. Domingo (G.R. No. 197315, Oct. 10, 2012)

Facts: A parcel of land titled under the names of Spouses Ramoso was inherited by Angel Tinio from her sister Trinidad Tinio-Ramoso. This was sold to the respondents.However, they were only given the duplicate OCT. The Registry of Deeds declaredthe original OCT destroyed. Hence, the respondents filed a petition for thereconstitution of the original OCT. A notice of hearing was sent out to the SpousesRamoso, the Domingos, Angel Tinio and the concerned agencies. Republic of thePhilippines contends that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Heirs ofSpouses Ramoso and a certain Gabaldon were not notified of the proceedings. Theirnames do not appear in the duplicate OCT.

Issue: WON the heirs of the Spouses Ramoso and Gabaldon were required to be notifiedof the said proceedings.

Held: No, the source of the reconstitution falls under Section 2(a) of RA 26 —the owner’sduplicate certificate of title. Hence, the procedure to be followed falls under Sec. 10 inrelation to Sec. 9 of RA 26 and not Sec. 12 and 13 thereof. Sec. 10 states that thenotice shall be published in the manner stated in Sec. 9, which prescribes that thenotice shall specify among others: the names of the interested parties appearing inthe reconstituted certificate of title. Since the names of the heirs and Gabaldon didnot appear in the certificate of title, they were not required to be notified.

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DISSOLUTION OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY


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DISSOLUTION OF A BSOLUTE COMMUNITY

REGIME

[A RT. 99 FC]

Heirs of Dr. Intac v. CA (G.R. No. 173211, Oct. 11, 2012)Facts:

Ireneo Mendoza was married to SalvacionFermin and had two children: respondents Josefina and Martina(Salvacion is their stepmother). He was the owner of a property with TCT 001 situated at Quezon City.

In 1977, Ireneo, with the consent of Salvacion, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of Angelina and her husband, Mario (Spouses Intac). TCT 002 was issued in favor of spouses Intac. Despite the sale,Ireneo and his family continued staying in the premises and paying its realty taxes.

After Ireneo died intestate in 1982, his widow and respondents remained in the premises. After Salvaciondied, respondents still remained there. They are in the premises up to present time, paying real estate taxes thereon,

leasing out portions of the property, and collecting the rentals.Meanwhile, however, in 1994, respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Cancellation of TCT against

spouses Intac. It prayed not only for the cancellation of the title, but also for its reconveyanceon the ground that thesale is simulated, therefore, void. Pending litigation, Mario died and was substituted by his wife and their children(petitioners).

Respondents alleged that when spouses Intac borrowed the title of the property from Ireneo, it was to beused as collateral for a loan from a financing institution. Respondents objected to the request but Ireneo tried toappease them, telling them not to worry because Angelina would not abuse the situation as he took care of her for avery long time. Lastly, respondents were paying the real estate taxes over said property.

Spouses Intac countered, among others, that the subject property had been transferred based on a validdeed and for a valuable consideration and that the action to annul the deed had already prescribed.

On April 30, 2002, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents and against Spouses Intac, ordering that the Deedof Absolute Sale is an equitable mortgage; and that the RD was to cancel TCT 002 and, in lieu thereof, issue a new TCTin the name of Ireneo.

On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the RTC erred in first declaring thedeed of absolute sale as null and void and then interpreting it to be an equitable mortgage. The CA believed thatIreneo agreed to have the title transferred in the name of spouses Intac to enable them to facilitate the processing ofthe mortgage and to obtain a loan. This was the exact reason why the deed of absolute sale was executed.

The nephew of Ireneo testified that the latter never intended to sell the subject property to the SpousesIntac and that the deed of sale was executed to enable them to borrow from a bank.

The CA further observed that the conduct of spouses Intac belied their claim of ownership because when thedeed of absolute sale was executed, spouses Intac never asserted ownership, either by collecting rents, by informing

respondents of their ownership or by demanding possession.

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CONJUGAL P ARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES

[A RT. 117 FC]

Beumer v. Amores (G.R. No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012)

Facts:

Beumer, a Dutch National, and Amores, a Filipina, wasmarried on March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of NegrosOriental declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the

former’s psychological incapacity. Consequently, petitioner filed aPetition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and prayed for thedistribution of several properties claimed to have been acquiredduring the subsistence of their marriage.

Amores averred that, with the exception of their 2 residentialhouses, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal propertiesduring their marriage, and that she was able to acquire 4 other lots

out of her personal funds and 2 others by way of inheritance.On theother hand, Beumer testified that while the 4 other lots wereregistered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquiredwith the money he received from the Dutch government as hisdisability benefit.

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Issue:WON Beumer has the right to claim reimbursement from the purchase ofthe real properties subject to the dissolution proceedings?

Held:

NO. In the case of Muller v. Muller, the Court held that one cannot seekreimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly andknowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreignownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987Philippine Constitution.

Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of theabove-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because ofsuch prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in thelatter’s name.

The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity,and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated,he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may bedenied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has beeninequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.

The Court cannot grant reimbursement to petitioner given that heacquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of itsunconstitutional purchase. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution

and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations andproduces no legal effect at all.

This case provides the exception to Art. 117, which provides that, ―the followingare conjugal partnership properties:

1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense ofthe common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or foronly one of the spouses; XXX‖

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CHARGES AGAINST THE CONJUGAL


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P ARTNERSHIP OF G AINS

[A RT. 122 FC]

Pana v Heirs of Juanito, Sr. (G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10,2012)

Facts:The prosecution accused petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others

of murder before RTC Surigao. The RTC rendered a consolidated decision acquitting Efrenof the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty ascharged and sentenced them to the penalty of death.The RTC ordered those found guilty topay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of both accused but modifiedthe penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court alsoaffirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual

damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place, however, the Court made an award ofP15,000.00 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the Court awarded P50,000.00exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them.

The decision became final and executory on October 1, 2001.

Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTCordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in thenames of Efren and Melecia.

Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued to which

petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash, claiming that the leviedproperties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.

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Issue:WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for

the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.

Held: Yes, the conjugal properties may be levied and executed in light of the disputed fact that

MeleciaPana has no exclusive properties.

Further, however, the Supreme Court ordered that before the conjugal properties may be

levied and executed the RTC Surigao shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution

on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and MeleciaPana for the satisfaction of the

indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in the criminal cases, the

responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

Article 122 of the FC:‖… However, the payment of personal debts contracted by

either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as

well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced againstthe partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article

have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if

it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall

be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.‖ (Emphasis supplied)

Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of

her own, the above applies. Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of

the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even beforethese are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities ―may be enforced against the

partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been

covered.‖

No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article

122 states that ―at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be

charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.‖

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SUIT BETWEEN F AMILY MEMBERS

[A RT. 151 FC]

People v. Venturina [G.R. No. 183097, Sept. 12, 2012]

Facts:

The accused, Venturina assails the decision of the CA in finding him guilty for two

counts of rape committed against his daughter, AAA.

The names of the victim and the relatives mentioned in the case are not identified

pursuant to RA No. 7610, An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence And Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination, And For Other Purposes which states

that the identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her

identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members shall be withheld.

All the arguments raised by the appellant challenges the credibility of AAA. At the

center of appellant’s defense of denial is his assertion that the accusation against him was a

mere concoction. According to him, ―AAA‖ filed the case because she resented being

disciplined by him.

Issue: WON the Venturina is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of rape against his

daughter AAA

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Held: YES. The SC believes that believe that it was appellant instead who concocted

his defense. Not even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would push her

own father to the wall as the fall guy in any crime unless the accusation against him

is true.

As has been repeatedly ruled, ―[n]o young girl x x x would concoct a sordid

tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo medical

examination, then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial,

if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice.‖

Thus, taking into consideration that the parties are close blood relatives, ―AAA’s‖

testimony pointing to her father as the person who raped her must stand.

The trial court was thus correct in imposing the penalty of death on

appellant. However, since the death penalty for heinous crimes has been abolished

by Republic Act No. 934619 the appellate court correctly modified the trial court’s

imposition of the death penalty by reducing it to reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility

for parole.

To justify the imposition of death penalty, however, it is required that the special

qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to theappellant be properly alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial. All

these requirements were duly established in these cases. With respect to her

relationship to appellant, it was likewise specifically alleged in the Informations that

appellant is ―AAA’s‖ father. During trial, appellant categorically admitted that

―AAA‖ is his daughter37



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P ARTNERSHIP OF G AINS

[A RT. 122 FC]

Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan (G.R. No. 178288 Aug. 15, 2012)

Facts: The court issued a judgment against Sps. Fortaleza

which resulted to the execution of their conjugal house.

Issue: WON he family home can be executed.

Held: A f amily home is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, provided such claim for exemption

should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the

property at public auction. Failure to do so estopps the party from

later claiming the exemption

In this case, reasonable time for purposes of the law onexemption does not mean a time after the expiration of the

one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the

property.38


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ESTABLISHING FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

[A RT. 172 FC]

Makati Shangri-La Hotel v. Harper (G.R. No. 189998, Aug. 29, 2012)

Facts: The alleged widow and the son of the Christian Harpersdeath in Shangrilla premises wants to prove in court filiationwith the deceased for standing in court. Documents presented

were Birth Certificates of father and son and MarriageCertificate.

Issue: W/N the Plaintiffs-Appellees were able to prove withcompetent evidence the affirmative allegations in thecomplain that they are the widow and son of Mr. ChristianHarper?

Held: In this case, the respondents were able to present thementioned documents, all of which were presumably regardedas public documents under the laws of Norway. Suchdocumentary evidence sufficed to competently establish therelationship and filiation under the standards of our Rules ofCourt.

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[A RT. 172 FC]

De Belen v Tabu (G.R. No. 188417, September 24, 2012)Facts:

o The property subject of the controversy is a 9,000 square meter lot situated inMariwalo, Tarlac, which was a portion of a property registered in the name of the lateFaustina Maslum.

o Faustina died without any children and left a holographic will, which was notprobated, assigning and distributing her property to her nephews and nieces.

o One of the heirs was the father of Domingo Laxamana who allegedly executed a Deedof Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land disposing of his 9,000 square meter share of theland to LaureanoCabalu.

o Meanwhile, a Deed of Extra-judicial Succession with Partition was executed by thelegitimate heirs of Faustina. The said deed imparted 9,000 sqm. of land to Domingowhere he sold 4,500 sqm to his nephew EleazarTabamo and the rest of it wasregistered under his name.

o Domingo purportedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent RenatoTabu wherein the latter subdivided it into two.

o Laxamanatogether with the heirs of Domingo filed an unlawful detainer actionagainst Cabalu et. al. against all persons claiming rights under them. The heirsclaimed that the defendants were merely allowed to occupy the subject lot by theirlate father, Domingo, but, when asked to vacate the property, they refused to do so.

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Issue: WON the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Landcovering the 9,000 sqm property executed by Domingo infavor of Laureano Cabalu is valid

Held: No.

o The sale cannot be deemed valid because, at it was made,Domingo was not yet the owner of the property.

o Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered intoupon future inheritance as void.

o In this case, the original owner was Faustina, who during herlifetime, had executed a will. In the said will, the name ofBenjamin, father of Domingo, appeared as one of the heirs.

o However, when the deed was executed, Faustina’s will was notyet probated and the property still formed part of the inheritanceof Domingo’s father from Faustina’s estate.

o Therefore, Domingo’s status as an heir of Faustina by right ofrepresentation being undisputed, the said property served as thefuture inheritance of Domingo from Faustina.

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[A RT. 172 FC]

Perla v Baring (G.R. No. 172471, Nov. 12, 2012)

Facts:

o Mirasol Baring and her minor son, Randy, filed before the RTC aComplaint for support against Antonio Perla.

o Petitioners allege that Mirasol and Antonio lived together ascommon-law spouses for 2 years and as a result, Randy was born.

Antonio subsequently abandoned them to become a seaman.

o However, Antonio, who had a family of his own, denied havingfathered Randy.

o During the trial, Mirasol presented Randy’s Certificate of Live Birthand Baptismal Certificate and claimed that Antonio supplied theinformation in the said certificates. Randy, on his part, claimed thathe knew Antonio to be his father, calling Antonio ―Papa‖ during theirfirst meeting. Also, it was alleged that Randy lived with Aunt Lelita(Antonio’s relative) for one week who treated Randy as a relative.

o On the other hand, Antonio admitted to having sexual intercoursewith Mirasol, but denied having supplied the information in thecertificates.

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Issue: WON Randy is entitled to support from Antonio.

Held: No.

o The lower courts failed to establish the illegitimate filiationbetween Randy and Antonio since they based their decisionson the certificates of Live Birth and Baptism, despite theabsence of Antonio’s signature on the said documents.

o In Cabatania v. CA, it was held that a certificate of live birth

purportedly identifying the putative father is not competentevidence of paternity when there is no showing that theputative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.

o Randy’s testimony of having met his father for the first timeand his living with Aunt Lelita cannot be considered asindications of open and continuous possession of the status of an

illegitimate child under Article 172 and 174 of the Family Code.o Lastly, nothing from Mirasol’s testimonies sufficiently prove

that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to the usualperiod of pregnancy or 9 months before the birth of Randy.

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RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

(A RT. 174 FC)

Abrigo v. Flores (G.R. No. 160786, Jun. 17,2013)

Facts: A parcel of land was inherited by siblings Francisco and Gaudenciafrom their deceased parents. A partition of the land was agreed upon,whereby the western portion shall pertain to Francisco and his heirs,while the eastern part shall pertain to Gaudencia. However, no actualpartition occurred and heirs of both parties enjoyed and possessed theproperty as co-owners. During this time, the heirs of Gaudencia madeimprovements on the property, which encroached upon the westernportion of the lot.

Eventually, the heirs of Francisco decided to partition the property. The

Court ruled for the partition in accordance with the original agreementand ordered the removal/ demolition of the improvements encroachingupon the western part of the property.

Heirs of Gaudencia prayed to set aside the order of demolition on thebasis of a supervening event. They alleged that one of the heirs ofFranciso- Jimmy Flores, sold his ¼ share of the western portion of the

lot, thereby making them co-owners thereof.

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Issue: WON the sale by a legitimate heir of his share in the estate

qualifies as a supervening event that will justify setting aside

the order of demolition or execution of the partition.

Held: NO.

A supervening event in order to qualify as exception to

the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable

judgment rule must directly affect matters litigated upon and

substantially alter the rights and relationships of the parties torender the execution unjust. In this case, even on the

assumption that the sale of Jimmy Flores’ share is true, the

same does not alter or modify the judgment on the property at

issue. In addition, the appellate court found the whole sale

transaction suspicious and not supported by evidence. Theexecution has dragged on for 17 years now since order

of implementation was given, it is high for the Court to

put a stop to further delays to finally enable the heirs

and successors-in-interest of Francisco to exercise their

rights as legitimate heirs and as winning parties to afinal judgment.

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SUPPORT (A RT. 194 FC)

Lim Lua v. Lua (G.R. No. 175279-80, Jun. 5, 2013) Facts: Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage

with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, and for support pendent lite amounting to P500,000.

Respondent on the other hand, refused and manifested that he is only willing to give as muchas 75,000 as support.

RTC ruled that the amount of 250,000 support per month is sufficient, notwithstanding theseparate medical support for susan when the need arises. However this amount was eventually

reduced by the CA, citing the fact that there was no evidence adduced to show the allegedmillions of income of respondent, and that based on the evidence presented the proper amountto paid should be 115,000. This was not assailed by any party does it became final andexecutory.

Issues once again arised, when respondent in complying with its obligation paid only theamount of P162,651.90 to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision,he deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) orderedby the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005),totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and petitioner in the sumof P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings). On the other hand petitionercontends that respondent shouldn’t be allowed the deductions he made arguing that under

Article 194, support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of thefamily, that in this case the cars and credit card charges are not part of support.

Once again RTC, ruled in favor of petitioner granting a writ of execution, however upon appealsuch was decision was reversed and the CA allowed the deductions made by respondent. Hencethe case at bar.

46

Issue: WON the deductions made by respondent including the two


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Issue: WON the deductions made by respondent including the two

automobile and credit card charges are valid deductions and considered as

advances.

Held:

The Supreme Court reversed the CA, and stated that CA

should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be

credited against the accrued support pendente lite.

The amount of support which those related by

marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each

other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver

and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises

everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,

medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with

the financial capacity of the family.

Here, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial

court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries

of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions.

Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his

children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and

Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry

goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to

the judgment awarding support pendente lite. Any amount respondent

seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for

sustenance and household expenses

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DEMAND AND PAYMENT OF SUPPORT


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DEMAND AND P AYMENT OF SUPPORT

(A RT. 203 FC)Gotardo v. Buling (G.R. No. 165166, Aug. 15, 2012)

Facts: Gotardo and Buling were lovers. During their relationship, they had severalintimate sexual encounters resulting to her pregnancy. When told of thepregnancy, he made plans to marry her but subsequently backed out. Eventually,she gave birth to a son. When he did not show up and failed to provide support forthe child, she sent a demand letter demanding recognition and support for thechild. This was ignored. Hence, she filed for compulsory recognition and supportpendente lite. He denies the imputed paternity. However during trial, it wasestablished that she only had one boyfriend to whom she had sexual relations. The

allegation that she had previous relationships with other men remainunsubstantiated.

Issue: WON the court may order Gotardo to recognize and provide legal support tohis minor son.

Held: Yes. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matterof obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimateor illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keepingwith the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variableand, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as theamount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and thenecessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionatelyaccording to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the

resources or means of the person obliged to support.

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DESIGNATION OF P ARENTAL

A UTHORITY (A RT. 213 FC)

Beckett v. Sarmiento A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, Jan. 30,2013

Facts:

Geoffrey, an Australian citizen, was previously married to Elseta, a Filipinocitizen. Said marriage bore a child Geoffrey, Jr. The couple were subsequentlydivorced and by virtue of a compromise agreement, custody over Geoffrey, Jr. was

granted to Geoffrey who took his son with him to Australia, subject to yearlyChristmas visits here. In one of the Christmas visits, Geoffrey consented to haveGeoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the holidays, provided she return the child on January9, 2011. However, on the said date, Eltesa did not return Geoffrey Jr., hence, this promptedGeoffrey to file a petition for violation of RA 7610 and prayer for the issuance of a writ ofHabeas Corpus.

Geoffrey relates that, during the conference on the application for habeas corpus,Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed inside the courtroom hysterical conduct,

shouting and crying, not wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the father, was atotal stranger. Despite Geoffrey Jr.’s outburst, Judge Sarmiento issued an Order, directingEltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to Geoffrey. For some reason, the turnover of Geoffrey, Jr. toGeoffrey did not materialize.

Hence Geoffrey sought the immediate implementation of the Order. But instead ofenforcing said order, Judge Sarmiento, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional custodyover Geoffrey, Jr. Geoffrey’s main contention is that Judge Sarmiento can no longer grantprovisional custody to Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on compromise agreement.

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Issue: WON Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law


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Issue: WON Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the lawwhen it granted provisional custody over the minor child to themother despite a previously approved compromise agreement andorder granting custody to the father.

Held: NO.Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody, did

not disregard the res judicata rule. The matter of custody, to borrowfrom Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,―is not permanent and unalterable[and] can always be re-examined and adjusted.‖ And as aptlyobserved in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custodyagreement can never be regarded as ―permanent and unbending,‖the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even ofthe child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangementwould no longer be to the latter’s best interest.

Under, the Family Code, case of separation ofthe parents, parental authority shall be exercised by theparent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into

account all relevant considerations, especially the choice ofthe child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen isunfit. Geoffrey Jr., at the time when he persistently refusedto be turned over to his father, was already over 7 years ofage. As such, he was very much capable of deciding, based onhis past experiences, with whom he wanted to stay. 50

GUARDIANSHIP


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GUARDIANSHIP

Abad v. Biason (G.R.No. 191993, Dec. 5, 2012)

Facts: Abad filed for guardianship over the person and properties of

Maura, his aunt. Biason opposed the appointment of Abad prayed to

be appointed guardian instead since he was previously granted

power of attorney to manage Maura’s properties. RTC appointed

Biason as guardian. Abad filed a motion and pointed out that Maura

chose him to be her guardian. The RTC denied the motion. Maura’s choice was not given decisive weight because her advanced age. Abad

appealed to the CA. Eduardo then appealed to the SC. During

pendency of the case Biason passed away. Petitioners filed a motion

to dismiss the petition and terminate the guardianship of Biason.

Issue: WON Guardianship is terminated upon death.Held: YES. The case has become moot and academic as there is no

longer a justiciable controversy. It is a well established rule that the

relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by

death. There is no longer any juridical tie between Maura Abad and

Leonardo Biason, rendering it pointless to delve into the propriety of

Biason’s appointment.

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SUCCESSION


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SUCCESSION

Neri v. Uy (G.R. No. 194366, Oct. 10, 2012)

Facts:

Anunciacion had 7 children, 2 from her first marriage with

Gonzalo and 5 from her second marriage with Enrique. Anunciacion and

Enrique acquired several homestead properties. Anunciacion died

intestate. Enrique, in his capacity and guardian of their minor children,

executed an extra-judicial settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale

adjudicating to themselves the properties. Thereafter, it was sold to the

spouses Hadji and Julpha Uy for P80,000. The children of Enrique filed

an annulment of sale on the ground that it was sold within the

prohibited period. RTC ordered the annulment of said deed. RTC said

that even though the sale was beyond the 5-year prohibitory period,

Anunciacion’s children from her first marriage were deprived of their

hereditary rights and Enrique had no authority to sell the shares of

their minor children. CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and declared the

extrajudicial settlement and subsequent sale as valid and binding. The

minors were deemed to have ratified the sale when they did not

question the same sale upon reaching the age of majority.

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Issues:

WON CA erred in upholding the validity of extra-judicial settlement of

the estate with absolute deed of sale as far as the shares of the 2

children from the first marriage of Anunciacion were concerned.

WON CA erred in not nullifying or annulling the extra-judicial

settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale with respect to the

shares of the minor children, depriving them of their inheritance.

Held: In the execution of the extra-judicial settlement of the estate withabsolute sale, all the heirs of the Anunciacion should have participated.

Since the children from the first marriage were admittedly excluded, the

settlement is invalid and not binding upon them and consequently, a

total nullity. Although the settlement of the estate was invalid, the sale

of the subject properties made by Enrique and his children (excluding

the minor ones), in favor of the respondents are valid but only up to theextent of their respective proportionate shares. As guardians of the

minor children, Enrique had no power of alienation with respect to their

shares to the estate of their mother, Anunciacion. He only had powers of

administration. Administration includes all acts of preservation of the

property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the

thing.

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Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay (G.R. No. 183053, Oct. 10,

2012)

Facts:

Upon the death of Cristina Suntay, two of her grandchildren

(Isabel, a legitimate grandchild, and Emilio III, an illegitimategrandchild) both sought for the issuance of Letters of Administration in

their favor with respect to the settlement of the estate of Cristina. The

trial court granted the same in favor of Emilio III. The appellate court

reversed the trial court and appointed Isabel as the administratrix of

the estate. On appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, Isabel and

Emilio III were both appointed to the position, the two of them being co-administrators. Isabel filed a Motion for reconsideration of this decision.

Issue: WON the Letters of Administration should be issued to both of

them, or to only one of them.

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Held:

Isabel should be appointed as the sole administratrix of

the estate. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal

consideration reckoned with is the interest in the estate of the

one to be appointed as administrator. Thus, Section 6, Rule 78 ofthe Rules of Court provides for an order of preference to be

followed with respect to whom letters of administration shall be

granted. This notwithstanding, the court in certain

circumstances has upheld the appointment of co-administrators.

In the case at bar, the appointment of both Isabel and

Emilio III as co-administrators will not redound to the benefit of

the estate, for the two have a deep aversion for each other.

Although the two of them have an interest in the estate, being

grandchildren of Cristina, the mere demonstration of such an

interest does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-

administration thereof. The seeming impossibility of Isabel andEmilio III working harmoniously as co-administrators may

result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying

the settlement thereof. Moreover, it was shown that Emilio III

was remiss in his duties as administrator. He failed to faithfully

discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s estate with the

end in view of distribution to the heirs.

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De Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla (G.R. No. 151334, Feb. 13, 2013)

Facts: Leandro Figuracion died intestate, leaving behind two parcels of land.

Petitioner sought an extrajudicial settlement of Leandro’s estate before prior

settlement had been made.

Issue: WON there should be a prior settlement of Leandro’s intestate estatebefore partition?

Held: YES. Partition is inappropriate in a situation where there remains an

issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate.

SUCCESSION

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Casilang v. Casilang-Dizon (G.R. No. 180269, Feb. 20, 2013)

Facts: Libonio Casilang died intestate. He has 8 children. Thechildren made a verbal partition on his estates. Rosario (daughter of

his son Ireneo) sued Jose (son of Liborio) for unlawful detainer on the

lot, where Jose is residing, claiming that her father owns the lot based

on a tax declarations.

Issue: WON the oral partition was valid.Held: Yes, Jose is the rightful owner. Regardless of whether a parol

partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law,

equity will be considered in proper cases, where it has been

consummated by taking possession and in exercise of ownership by

the parties with respect to their portions. The equity will confirm suchpartition and decree title in accordance with the possession in

severalty.

Jose’s possession of Lot No. 4618 is well borne out by the records. It is

also consistent with the claimed verbal partition with his siblings.

Actual possession and exercise of dominion are considered strong proof

of an oral partition which the Court will not hesitate to uphold.

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Galvez v. CA and Montano (G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013)

Facts:

Sps. Eustacio and Segundina are owners of land in Leyte. When

they separated, Eustacio sold the property to their daughter Jovita

without the knowledge or consent of Segundina. Jovita mortgagd

property to PNB. PNB foreclosed property and sold property to Sps.

Montaño. They tried to get actual possession thereof but Segundina

refused to vacate which led Montaños to sue for recovery of ownershipand possession and damages in the MTC. A petition for review was also

filed but the court dismissed on the ground that no copies of pleadings

and other material portions of the record as would support the

allegations were attached as annexes in violation of Sec. 2, Rule 42 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue: W/N failure to attach the pleadings and other material portions of

the record as would support the allegations of the petition is a ground

for outright dismissal of a petition for review

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Held: No.

Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the necessity of

attaching the pleadings and portions of the records to the petition:

First, only pleadings and parts of case records which are relevant and

pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the

document in question will support the material allegations in thepetition.

Second, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents

thereof can also found in another document already attached to the

petition even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the caserecord may still be given due course) upon showing that petitioner

later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the

higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.60


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The Court considers the attachments (i.e. certified true copies of the

MTC and RTC Decisions and Order) already sufficient to enable

the CA to pass upon her assigned errors even without the pleadings

and other portions of the records. To still deny due course despite

the MTC decision having substantially summarized their contents

was to ignore the spirit of the rule to give sufficient information to

the CA.

Since her petition focused only on questions of law (effects of the lack

of her consent, ant of consideration, and the conduct of the

foreclosure sale), it was plain that she was not assailing the

propriety of the findings of fact but only the conclusions reached

after their appreciation of the facts. In dealing with the questions

of law, the CA could simply refer to the attached decisions of theMTC and the RTC.

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Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian (G.R. No. 201815, April 8, 2013)

Facts:The Heirs of Fian refused to acknowledge the sale of 2 parcels of land

made by Spouses Fian to Spouses Mesina and are claiming

ownership over the same. Petitioners filed an action for quieting of

title entitled: Heirs of Sps. Mesina, represented by Norman Mesina v.

Heirs of Fian, represented by Theresa Fian Yray.

The representative of the Heirs of Fian allege that the complaint has

no cause of action because it violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of

the Rules of Court. She contends that the ―Heirs of Mesina‖ and the

―Heirs of Fian‖ could not be considered as juridical persons or

entities authorized by law to file a civil action. She maintains that

all the heirs should be individually named in the complaint andsince this was not complied with, she prays for the dismissal of the

action.

Issue: WON the failure to implead the other heirs in the complaint

warrants the dismissal of the action.

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Held: No, the issue is about a non-joinder of an

indispensable party, not a failure of the complaint to

state a cause of action. The non-joinder of indispensableparties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At

any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times

as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a

party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If

the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable partydespite the order of the court, that court may dismiss

the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with

the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party

claimed to be indispensable.

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Catedrilla v. Lauron (G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013)Facts:

Petitioner Rey is a co-owner, along with other heirs, of a parcel ofland. He acquired the land via succession from his mother. Rey, as aco-owner, filed with the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment againstherein respondents Lauron alleging that through the tolerance ofRey’s co-owners, they constructed a building in a portion of the landand occupied the same. Demands from the heirs to vacate the

premises were unavailing. One of the defenses raised by the Lauronsis that the complaint should be dismissed because it did not include,as indispensable parties, Rey’s co-heirs who are co-owners of the landin dispute. The MTC and RTC ruled in favor of Rey, while the CA,reasoning that the co-owners (co-heirs) are indispensable parties,reversed the RTC’s Decision and dismissed the complaint forejectment.

Issue: WON co-owners (co-heirs) should be included as indispensableparties in a complaint for ejectment

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Held: No

A co-owner (co-heir) can file an action for ejectmentwithout impleading his co-owners as long as he does not claim

exclusive ownership of the subject lot. This is because based on

Article 487 of the Civil Code, any co-owner may bring such an

action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as

co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the

benefit of all.

Here, Rey filed the complaint for the purpose of

recovering possession of the land, which would redound to the

benefit of the co-owners. He did not file the action to claim

possession of the land for himself. He was acting on behalf of his

co-owners, who were also his co-heirs when his mother died.Hence, there was no need to implead his co-owners as

indispensable parties for the action to prosper.

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Garcia v. De Caparas (G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013)

Facts:Heirs of Makapugay along with heirs of Eugenio filed a complaintwith the PARAD of Bulacan for the nullification of the leaseholdand restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Dominga(wife of one of the deceased heirs of Eugenio named Pedro) They arepraying that the 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract betweenPedro and Amanda be nullified and that they be recognized as co-

lessees, be allowed to cultivate the land as agreed upon.Dominga then claimed that petitioners never assisted in thefarming of the land and tha