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I Submerged Cultural Reso rces
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Toni Carrell, Editor Submerged Cultur Resources Unit National Park Se ice ON M�C Of�lM
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I Assess�ent I
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.;·�-·.: � ::��-- :,;. ,_._:�.' .� ..... • • I 1 PLEASE RETURN TO: \ · TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER �
DENVER SERVICE CENTER l NATIONAL PARK SERVICE �
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MICRONES IA
SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT OF MICRONESIA
by Toni L . Carrell , Editor
Submerged Cultural Resources Unit
Don Boyer Bureau o f Land Management
Richard Davis Guam Historic Preservation Of fice
Marj orie G . Driver Micrones ian Area Research Center
Kevin Foster Maritime I nitiative
Danie l J . Lenihan Submerged Cultural Resources Unit
David T . Lotz Guam Department o f Parks and Recreation
Fr . Thomas B . McGrath Micrones ian Area Research Center
James E . Miculka War in the Pac i fic National Historical Park
Tim Rock Marine Images
with contributions from Rose S . N . Manibusan , Dennis Blackenbaker
Will iam Cooper , Edward Wood and Suzanne Hendricks
Southwest Cultural Resources Center Pro fess ional Papers Number 3 6
Santa Fe , New Mexico 1 9 9 1
iii
Submerged Cultural Res ources Unit Southwest Cultural Resources Center
Southwest Region National Park Service
u . s . Department of the I nterior
iv
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES . . ix
LIST OF TABLES . XV
FOREWORD . . . . . xvii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . .
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
I . INTRODUCTION - Toni L . Carrell
I ntroduction . . . . Pro j ect Obj ectives . . . . . . Research Des ign . . Funding . . . . . . Study Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pro j ect Partic ipants . I s l and Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I I . ASSESSMENT AREA BACKGROUND - Toni L . Carrel l
I ntroduct ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geographic Scope . . . Geologic Sett ing . . . . . . . . . . .
SECTION I I. MARITIME HISTORI CAL OVERVIEW
xix
1 2 2 3 4 6 7
9 1 0 2 6
I I I . PREHI STORIC MARITIME WATERCRAFT AND SETTLEMENT . . 4 7 Richard Davis
IV . EUROPEAN D ISCOVERY , CONTACT AND COLONIZATION Toni L . Carrell , Marj orie G . Driver
I ntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9 Discovery and Exploration . . . . . . . . 6 0 Contact , Conquest and Colonization . . . . . . 7 0
Mariana I s lands . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 0 Contact , Commerc ialization , Christianizat ion . 9 4
Carol ine , Marshall and Gilbert I s l ands . . 9 4
v
V . COLONIAL I SM , WORLD WAR I AND THE INTERWAR YEARS Toni L . Carrell , Fr . Thomas B . McGrath
I ntroduction . . . . . American Colonial ism .
Guam . . . • . • .
German and British Colonial ism . . N . Mariana I s lands . . . . . . Carol ine and Marshal l I slands . • .
Gilbert I s lands . . . World War I . . . . . .
N . Mariana , Carol ine and Marshall I s l ands . Gilbert I s lands . . .
I nterwar Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
N . Mariana , Carol ine and Marshall I s l ands . Gilbert I s lands . . . . . . . . • . . . . .
VI . WORLD WAR I I - Don Boyer
I ntroduction . . . . . Historical Research . War with Japan Begins First Strikes in the Pac i f ic . . Second Phase of Operations in the Pac i f ic . . Central Pac i f ic Of fens ive . . . . . Assault on the Mariana I s l ands . . End o f the Line in the Central Pac ific .
V I I . POST WORLD WAR I I , THE NUCLEAR AGE TO PRESENT -- -- --- - -Toni- -L-.- Carrell _ ___ __ _
I ntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trust Territory o f the Pac ific I s lands . . Northern Mariana I s l ands . . . . . . . Carol ine I s lands . . . . . . . . . Marshal l I s l ands . . . . . . . Gilbert I s l ands . The Modern Era . .
SECTI ON I I I. SHIP LOSSES IN MICRONES IA
1 3 9 1 4 0 1 4 0 1 5 0 1 5 1 1 5 3 1 6 2 1 6 9 1 6 9 1 7 8 1 8 0 1 8 2 1 9 2
1 9 7 2 0 0 2 0 1 2 05 2 1 0 2 2 1 2 4 5 2 5 8
2 6 7 2 6 8 2 6 8 2 7 0 2 7 1 2 7 5 2 7 7
V I I I . SHIPWRECKS : THE HISTORICAL RECORD - Toni L . Carrel l
I ntroduction . . . . Ship Losses 1 5 2 0 to Ship Los ses 1 9 4 1 to Ship Los ses 1 9 4 6 to
vi
1 9 4 1 . 1 9 4 6 . 1 9 9 0.
2 7 9 2 8 0 2 9 2 324
I I I
IX . SHIPWRECKS : THE ARCHEOLOGIAL RECORD Toni L . Carrel l , Daniel J . Lenihan , David T . Lot z , James E . Miculka
Introduction . . . Mariana I s lands .
Saipan . . . Rota . . . . Guam . . . .
Carol ine I s lands . Republic of Bel au . . State o f Kosrae . . Chuuk ( Truk ) . . .
Marshall I s lands . . . Bikini and Kwa j alein . .
SECTION IV. OTHER SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES AND UNDERWATER COMPONENTS OF LAND-BASED S ITES
3 2 7 3 2 9 3 2 9 3 3 5 3 5 5 3 9 7 3 9 9 4 5 2 4 6 0 4 6 4 4 6 4
X . OTHER SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES : THE H I STORICAL RECORD - Toni L . Carrell , Don Boyer , Tim Rock
I ntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 7 Site Types , Present or Potentially Present . . 4 6 7
Prehis toric S ites . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 7 Historic Sites . . . . . . . . . 4 6 9
Known Sites Not I nvestigated . . . . 4 7 6 Mariana I s lands . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 6 Caroline I s l ands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 6
XI . OTHER SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES : THE ARCHEOLOGI CAL RECORD - Toni L . Carrell , Kevin Foster , Daniel J . Lenihan , David T . Lotz , James E . Miculka
I ntroduction . 0 0 0 . Mariana I s lands 0 0 0 . 0
Saipan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carol ine I s l ands . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Republ i� o f Belau . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0
State o f Pohnpei 0 0 0 0
SECTION IV. MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
X I I . MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS -Toni L . Carrell
I ntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . Management Recommendations . . . . . . Conclus ions . . . . . . . .
vii
0
0
0
0
0
0
4 9 7 4 9 8 4 9 8 5 1 1 5 1 4 5 2 9 5 2 9 5 4 6
5 4 9 5 4 9 5 5 2
BIBLI OGRAPHY 555
APPENDIX A : I s land Names . . . . . . . . . . 5 8 3
APPENDIX B : C hronology o f Events During World War I I . . 6 0 3
ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS . . . . . . 6 1 3
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vi ii
2 . 1 2 . 2 2 . 3 2 . 4 2 . 5 2 . 6 2 . 7 2 . 8 2 . 9 2 . 1 0 2 . 1 1 2 . 12 2 . 1 3 2 . 14 2 . 15 2 . 1 6 2 . 1 7 2 . 1 8 2 . 1 9 2 . 2 0 3 . 1 3 . 2 3 . 3 3 . 4 3 . 5 3 . 6 4 . 1 4 . 2 4 . 3 4 . 4 4 . 5 4 . 6 4 . 7 4 . 8 4 . 9 4 . 1 0 4 . 1 1 4 . 1 2 4 . 1 3 4 . 1 4 5 . 1 5 . 2 5 . 3 5 . 4
LIST OF FIGURES
Pac i f ic Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 Micrones i a base map . . . . . 1 4 Location o f Mariana I s l ands . . . . . . . 1 6 The Northern Mariana I s lands . . . . . 1 7 Location o f the Carol ine Is lands . . . . 1 9 Federated States o f Micronesia . . . . . 2 0 Location o f Belau ( Palau ) . . . . 2 2 The islands of Bel au . . . . . . 2 3 Loc ation o f the Marshall I s l ands . . . . 2 4 The Marshall I s lands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 Loc ation o f Kiribati ( Gilbert ) I s lands . . . . . 2 7 The Gilbert I s l ands in the State of Kiribati 2 8 Harbors and bays on Guam . . . . . . . . 3 2 Apra Harbor , Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 Location o f Agat and Asan Units . . . . . . 3 5 Base map o f Rota . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 Base map o f Tinian and Saipan . . . . . 4 0 Location o f American Memorial Park , S aipan . . . 4 1 Base map of Kosrae . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 Ma j or harbors and bays on Belau . . . . . . . 4 5 Jaluit sail ing c anoe . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 Techniques o f tacking and shunting . . . 5 3 Flying proa o f the Mariana I s l ands . . . . . 5 4 Distribution o f double-outrigger canoes . . . . . 5 5 Dis tribution o f double c anoes . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 Distribution of s ingle-outrigger canoes . . . . . 5 8 Voyages o f exploration 1 5 2 1 - 1 5 4 3 . . . . . 6 3 Voyages of exploration 1 5 6 6 - 1 5 9 5 . . . . 6 7 Galleon route across the Pac i f ic . . . 7 2 Champan used by the Chinese Choco . . . . . . . . 7 6 Mariana I s l ands from a 1 7 5 2 map . . . . . 7 7 Guam from a 1 6 7 1 map . . . . . . 7 9 Umatac Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 0 Carolinian proas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7 Apra Harbor ca . 1 8 1 9 . . . . . . . . 9 0 Father Paul Klein ' s map o f Palaos , 1 6 9 6 . . . . . 9 6 Naval-based sc ienti f ic expeditions , 1 8 1 7 - 1 8 2 5 . . 1 0 5 Map o f the Ralik I s lands . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 7 Naval -based sc ient i f ic expeditions , 1 8 2 8 - 1 8 4 0 . . 1 0 8 First visits by whal ing ships . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 USS GOLD STAR in 1 9 2 4 . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 9 Colonial s tatus in 1 8 9 2 . . . . . . . 1 5 2 Spanish steamer VELASCO . . . . . . . 1 5 6 Gilbertese 1 0 0 - foot baurua under construction . . 1 6 6
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5 . 5 Colonial status of the islands in 1 9 1 4 . . . 171 e 5 . 6 Colonial status of the islands in 1 9 1 9 . . 1 81 6 . 1 Japanese merchant losses from submarines . . . . 2 04 6 . 2 Tarawa and Makin . . . . . . . . . . 2 25 6 . 3 Limits o f Japanese occupation. . . . . . . . 2 29 6 . 4 Kwa j alein , Wot j e , Jaluit , Maloelap and Mili . . . 2 3 0 6 . 5 Japanese merchant ship losses to Army. . . . 2 41 6 . 6 Japanese los ses to Navy aircraft . . . . 2 4 2 6 . 7 Japanese los ses to Navy carrier planes 2 43 6 . 8 As s ault on the Mariana I s l ands . . . . . 2 4 7 6 . 9 Battle to capture Saipan . . . . . . . . 2 5 0 8 . 1 Pro f ile o f Manila gal leon , c a. 1 6 0 0 . . . 2 82 8 . 2 CS SCOTIA wrecked outs ide Apra Harbor. . . . 2 8 7 8 . 3 EDWARD CAREY o f Nantucket . . . . . . 2 8 7 8 . 4 The whaler LEXINGTON . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 9 8 . 5 A typic al British East Indiaman of 1 7 7 5 . . . 2 8 9 8 . 6 Typical New England whal ing ship , ca. 1 8 4 1 . 2 9 1 8 . 7 Deck plan of CHARLES MORGAN. . . . . . . . . 2 91 8 . 8 Damage to shipping in Palau Harbor . . . . . 321 8 . 9 Base map of shipwreck s ites in Apra Harbor . . . 3 2 6 9 . 1 S ites in American Memorial Park. . . . . . . 332 9 . 2 Base map of shipwreck s ites in Saipan Lagoon . . 3 3 3 9 . 3 Remains o f a small Japanese freighter. . . . 3 3 4 9 . 4 Upended boiler from a Japanese freighter . . 334 9 . 5 Bow o f poss ible Japanese submarine chaser. . 3 3 6 9 . 6 Remains o f a Japanese ship . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 6 � 9 . 7 Base map of documented shipwreck s ites . . . . . 3 3 8 9 . 8 Interior pro f ile of old Japanese freighter . . . 3 3 9 9 . 9 SHOUN MARU at moment o f impact . . 3 4 1
_ 9 _ . 1o ____ SHOUN __ MARU_b_urning __ and___s_i:n__ki ng . . . . 3 4 1 9 . 1 1 View athwartships at bow o f SHOUN MARU --- ---34� 9 . 1 2 View toward the stern o f SHOUN MARU. . 3 4 2 9 . 1 3 SHOUN MARU ' s bow from stem a ft to c argo hold . . 3 4 3 9 . 1 4 Port and starboard s ides blown out . . . . . 3 4 3 9 . 1 5 SHOUN MARU ' s triple-expans ion steam engine . 3 4 4 9 . 1 6 Japanese motorcyle in c argo hold . . 3 4 4 9 . 1 7 Portholes on SHOUN MARU. . • . . 3 4 6 9 . 1 8 Counter stern on SHOUN MARU. . . . . . . . 3 4 6 9 . 1 9 Auxiliary submarine chasers. . . . . 3 4 8 9 . 2 0 The engine from auxiliary sub chaser . . 3 4 8 9 . 2 1 Air cyl inders being measured by divers 3 4 9 9 . 2 2 Remains o f a radio . . . . . . . 3 4 9 9 . 2 3 Spare kedge anchor . . . . . . . . . 3 5 0 9 . 2 4 Small arms ammunition. . . . . 3 5 0 9 . 2 5 Depth charges. . . . . . . . . . 352 9 . 2 6 The diesel engine from sub chaser. . . 352 9 . 2 7 Remains o f wooden hull framing . . . 3 5 3 9 . 2 8 The antiaircraft machine gun base. . 3 5 3 9 . 2 9 Heavily encrusted binnac le . . . . . . 354 9 . 3 0 Diver examines running l ight from sub chaser . . 3 5 4 9 . 3 1 Depth charge found on sub c haser . 3 5 6 9 . 3 2 Planking partially buried in the sand . . . . . . 3 5 6 e
X
9 . 3 3 9 . 3 4 9 . 3 5 9 . 3 6 9 . 3 7 9 . 3 8 9 . 3 9 9 . 4 0 9 . 4 1 9 . 4 2 9 . 4 3 9 . 4 4 9 . 4 5 9 . 4 6 9 . 4 7 9 . 4 8 9 . 4 9 9 . 5 0 9 . 5 1 9 . 52 9 . 53 9 . 5 4 9 . 55 9 . 5 6 9 . 5 7 9 . 5 8 9 . 5 9 9 . 6 0 9 . 6 1 9 . 6 2 9 . 6 3 9 . 6 4 9 . 6 5 9 . 6 6 9 . 6 7 9 . 6 8 9 . 6 9 9 . 7 0 9 . 7 1 9 . 7 2 9 . 7 3 9 . 7 4 9 . 7 5 9 . 7 6 9 . 7 7 9 . 7 8 9 . 7 9 9 . 8 0 9 . 8 1 9 . 8 2 9 . 8 3 9 . 8 4
Diver holds up brass f ire extinguisher . . 3 5 7 A small hatch cover from sub chaser . . . 3 5 7 Location o f shipwrecks i n Apra Harbor . . . . 3 5 9 Perspective o f CORMORAN and TOKAI MARU . . . . . 3 6 0 Historic photograph o f SMS CORMORAN . . . 3 6 2 Perspective o f SMS CORMORAN . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 4 Dan Lenihan videotaping hole in CORMORAN . 3 6 5 CORMORAN and TOKAI MARU . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 5 NPS diver swimming over stack o f CORMORAN . . . . 3 6 7 Stack o f CORMORAN , 1 9 8 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 7 Dan Lenihan videotaping CORMORAN wreckage . . 3 6 8 Gravestone o f CORMORAN crew member . . . . . 3 6 8 Historic photograph o f TOKAI MARU . . . . . . . 3 7 0 Deck view o f TOKAI MARU . . . . . . . . 3 7 3 Planimetric view o f TOKAI MARU s ite . . . . . 3 7 3 Winches on deck o f TOKAI MARU . . . . . . 3 7 4 Broken forward mast o f TOKAI MARU . . . . . . . . 3 7 4 Valve handle on mas t c ap o f TOKAI MARU . . . 3 7 5 Superstructure amidships o f TOKAI MARU . . . . . 3 7 5 The transport KITSUGAWA MARU . . . . . . . 3 7 7 P lanimetric view o f K ITSUGAWA MARU . . . . . . . 3 8 0 Bow gun o f KITSUGAWA MARU . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 1 Historic photograph o f NICHIYU MARU . . . . . 3 8 5 Location o f ARATAMA MARU in Talofofo Bay . . 3 8 8 Historic photograph o f ARATAMA MARU . . 3 8 9 ARATAMA MARU resting on shallow bottom . . . 3 9 1 ARATAMA MARU after target prac tice . . . 3 9 1 Talofofo Bay after typhoon Karen in 1 9 6 2 . . . . 3 9 1 Group photo , 1 9 8 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 2 Base map o f ARATAMA MARU . . . . . . . . 3 9 4 Folding stockless anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 5 Upper portion o f a kingpost . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 5 Hold stanchions . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 8 Steering quadrant i n the stern . . 3 9 8 Japanese transport in Belau . . . . . . . 4 0 0 Barge for surface-suppl ied divers . . 4 0 0 Active duty training of Naval Reserve divers . . 4 0 1 Toni Carrell working with Navy dive team . . . . 4 0 1 Locat ions o f Japanese s hips . . . . . . . . . 4 0 3 Vince Blaiyok pos it ions s ite with sextant . . 4 0 4 David Orak v�deotapes Navy divers . . 4 0 4 His toric photograph o f AMATSU MARU . . . . . 4 0 6 AMATSU MARU burning . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 6 Base map o f AMATSU MARU . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 7 Anchor chain on AMATSU MARU . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 8 Hawsehole in forecastle deck . • . . . 4 0 8 Ladders from forec astle to main dec k . . 4 1 0 Raised expans ion tanks on forward well deck . . . 4 1 0 P iping runs from forecastle aft . . . . . . . . . 4 1 1 Longitudinal piping expans ion j o int and valve . . 4 1 1 I nterior of deckhouse on AMATSU MARU . . . . . 4 1 2 Two c atwalks aft o f the intact bridge . . . . . . 4 1 2
x i
9 . 8 5 I ntact pumphouse behind bridge . . . . . 4 1 3 � 1 9 . 8 6 Pumphouse skyl ights . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 3 9 . 8 7 T . 1 fast transports . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 5 9 . 8 8 Fifteen- inch , 2 5 -mm , antiaircraft guns 4 15 9 . 8 9 Antiaircraft machine guns on T . 1 . . . 4 1 6 9 . 9 0 Midships machinery space on T . 1 . . . . 4 1 6 9 . 9 1 T . 1 type landing ship ( transport ) . . . . . . 4 1 7 9 . 9 2 His toric photograph o f SHINSEI MARU . . . 4 1 9 9 . 9 3 Line drawing of 1C freighter sunk in Belau . 4 1 9 9 . 9 4 S ide s c an image o f RAI ZAN MARU . . 4 2 3 9 . 9 5 Historic photograph o f Shiretoko c lass oiler IRO 4 2 5 9 . 9 6 I RO burning after aerial bombing . . . . 4 2 5 9 . 9 7 High-angle gun on IRO . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 7 9 . 9 8 Catwalk runs length o f s hip . . . . . . . . . 4 2 7 9 . 9 9 Kingposts for athwartship fue ling gear . . . 4 2 8 9 . 1 0 0 Deckhouse aft on IRO . . . . . . . . . 4 2 9 9 . 1 0 1 Raised fuel tank hatches on aft wel l deck . . 4 2 9 9 . 1 0 2 Book found on 1 5 : UR : 0 1 IRO . . . . . 4 3 0 9 . 1 0 3 Page removed from book on 15:UR:0 1 . . 4 3 0 9 . 1 0 4 Historic photograph o f SATA . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 2 9 . 1 0 5 SATA s inking i n Ngeruktabel . . . . . . 4 3 2 9 . 1 0 6 Ngeruktabel Anchorage during bombing strike . . . 4 3 4 9 . 1 0 7 Loc atio n of merchant ship . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 4 9 . 1 0 8 Base map of ship in Roc k I s lands . . . . . . . . 4 3 5 9 . 1 0 9 Hatch c over beams o n unident i f ied , merchant ship 4 3 7 9 . 1 1 0 Open door into the bridge . . . . . 4 3 7 e 9.1 1 1 Small c argo winch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 9 9 . 1 1 2 Large funnel broken o f f . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 9
---- - - ---- _g_,ll3_ _ _ _ Hi_s:toric photograph of NAGI SAN MARU . . . . . . . 4 4 1 9 . 1 1 4 Heavy carpet oE coral-s-on-N:A<H-SA-N-MARU- . -·-·--· _,_44_1 _ _ _
9 . 1 15 Base map of NAGISAN MARU . . . . . . . . 4 4 3 9 . 1 1 6 Dec k winch house . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 5 9 . 1 1 7 Ladder to stern deckhouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 5 9 . 1 1 8 Historic photograph o f KAMIKAZE MARU . . . . 4 4 6 9 . 1 1 9 Location of LEONORA near Utwa on Kosrae . . . . . 4 5 1 9 . 12 0 Teddy John , HPO for Kosrae . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 3 9.1 2 1 Tank - f i l ling at Utwa vil lage , 1 9 8 1 . . . . . 4 5 3 9 . 1 2 2 Dan Lenihan records art i fact s i n Kosrae . . . . . 4 5 5 9 . 1 2 3 Several items removed by a Scripps expedition . . 4 5 5 9 . 1 2 4 Boat being readied for underwater video operation 4 5 6 9 . 1 2 5 Chief Kan I s iah reviews video footage . . . . . . 4 5 6 9 . 1 2 6 SCRU archeologists make photomosaic o f LEONORA . 4 5 7 9 . 1 2 7 Jul ian Jonah o n LEONORA s ite . . . . . 4 5 7 9 . 1 2 8 Copper sheathing o n LEONORA . . . . . . . . . 4 5 8 9 . 12 9 Copperc lad container on LEONORA . . 4 5 8 9 . 1 3 0 Toni Carrel l on FUJIKAWA MARU . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 9 9 . 1 3 1 Ready box for gun on NEW MARU. . 4 5 9 9 . 1 3 2 Mushroom cloud at Bikini . . . . . 4 6 1 9 . 1 3 3 Larry Nordby il lustrating USS SARATOGA . . 4 6 1 9 . 1 3 4 Bikinian divers work with NPS/Navy team . . . 4 6 2 9 . 1 3 5 Dan Lenihan shining light into Hel ldivers . . . . 4 6 2 � 9 . 1 3 6 A 5 - inch gun on USS ARKANSAS . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 3 ...
xii
9 . 1 3 7 1 0 . 1 10 . 2 1 0 . 3 1 0 . 4 1 0 . 5 1 0 . 6 10 . 7 1 0 . 8 1 0 . 9 1 0 . 1 0 1 0 . 1 1 1 0 . 1 2 1 0 . 1 3 1 0 . 14 1 1 . 1 1 1 . 2 1 1 . 3 1 1 . 4 1 1 . 5 1 1 . 6 1 1 . 7 1 1 . 8 1 1 . 9 1 1 . 10 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 . 1 2 1 1 . 1 3 1 1 . 1 4 1 1 . 1 5 1 1 . 1 6 1 1 . 17 1 1 . 1 8 1 1 . 1 9 1 1 . 2 0 1 1 . 2 1 1 1 . 2 2 1 1 . 2 3 1 1 . 2 4 1 1 . 2 5 1 1 . 2 6 1 1 . 2 7 1 1 . 2 8 1 1 . 2 9 1 1 . 3 0 1 1 . 3 1 1 1 . 3 2 1 1 . 3 3 1 1 . 3 4 1 1 . 3 5 1 1 . 3 6 1 1 . 3 7
PRINZ EUGEN at Kwaj alein Ato l l . . . . . . 4 6 3 Sites in American Memorial Park , Saipan . . 4 7 8 Base map o f s ites in Saipan Lagoon . . . . . . 4 8 0 Remains o f two U . S . Sherman tanks . . . . 4 8 1 Sherman tanks vis ited by snorkelers . . . . . . . 4 8 1 Other known s ites in Apra Harbor . . . . 4 85 Other known sites in Belau . . . . . . . . 4 8 7 Other known s ites in central Belau . . . . . . 4 9 1 Tony , the Kawasaki Ki- 6 1 Army aircraft . . 4 9 2 The zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 2 Aircraft coded Hap , Hamp then Zeke 3 2 . . . . 4 9 3 Fighter cal led To j o or Devil-Queller . . 4 9 3 Nakaj ima Ki- 2 7 Army f ighter . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 4 Mitsubishi F1M2 naval aircraft . . . . . . . . . 4 9 4 Army Nakaj ima Ki- 4 3 Hayabusa . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 5 Base map o f s ites in American Memorial Park . . . 4 9 9 Base map o f s ites in Saipan Lagoon . . . . . . . 5 0 0 Japanese Daihatsu landing barge . . . . . . . . . 5 0 3 Port and stern quarter o f landing barge . . . 5 0 3 Pro f ile view o f l anding barge . . . . . . . . . 5 0 4 Plan view o f Japanese Daihatsu barge . . . . . . 5 0 4 Emily four-engined , long-range bomber . . . . . . 5 0 5 Engine from Japanese f lying boat . . . 5 0 5 Tail section o f Emily f lying boat . . . . 5 0 6 Emily nose and fuselage debris . . . . . . . 5 0 6 The Japanese Aich i f loat plane Jake . . . . . 5 0 7 Remains of Jake f loat plane in Saipan Lagoon . . 5 0 7 Engine and prop f rom Jake lost in Saipan . . . 5 0 9 Unidenti fied plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 0 Square engine nacelle . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 0 Location o f phosphate mine , etc . on Rota . . 5 1 2 Cable c ars ran from mine t o f ac tory . . . . . 5 1 3 The phosphate fac tory on Rota . . . . . . . . 5 1 3 Phosphate ore trans ferred to waiting c argo s hips 5 1 5 Foundations o f a c able tower . . . . . . 5 1 5 Base map o f submerged s ites in WAPA . . . . . 5 1 7 American LVT located o f f Gaan Point . . . 5 2 0 Jim Miculka videotaping tank turret . . . 5 2 0 Tracked vehic les a t Shark Hole , Guam . . . . . . 5 2 2 Drawing o f tracked vehic les . . . . . . . . . 5 2 4 Drawing o f abandoned truck chas s is . . . . . . . 5 2 4 Aichi D3A2 dive bomber model . . . . 5 2 5 Aichi D3A1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 5 Val dive bomber i n action . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 7 Mitsubishi A6M8 and A6M5 . . . . . . . . . 5 2 7 Base map o f s ites i n Malakal Harbor . . . . . 5 2 9 Japanese communications center on Bel i l iou . . . 5 3 0 Aircraft and landing craft wreckage . . . . . . 5 3 0 Cave in which Japanese were immolated . . . . 5 3 1 Shrines to Japanes e soldiers c ave . . 5 3 1 Japanese type "A" landing craft . . 5 3 3 Japanese type "G" l anding craft . . . 5 3 3
x i i i
1 1 . 3 8 1 1 . 3 9 1 1 . 4 0 1 1 . 4 1 1 1 . 4 2 1 1 . 4 3 1 1 . 4 4 1 1 . 4 5 1 1 . 4 6 1 1 . 4 7
Japanese Navy landing craft type " A " . . . . . Japanese float Aichi E 1 3A 1 , code-named Jake . . Japanese Betty bomber . . . . . . . . Loc ations o f other s ites in Belau . Wing root and fuselage . . . . . . . Interior of G4M Betty bomber . . . . ROV being tended by Thomas Techur . . Diver 1 0 0 feet deep on Bel i l iou Wal l ROV heading down from survey boat . . " White " and " Orange " landing beaches
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xiv
. 5 35 • 539 . 5 3 9 . 540 . 541 • 541 • 543 . 543 • 54 3 • 544
LIST OF TABLES
7 . 1 Ships sunk in Bikini due to atomic tests 2 7 3 7 . 2 Ships sunk at Kwa j alein . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 4 8 . 1 Ship Los ses , 1 5 2 1 - 1 5 4 1 , Mariana I s lands . . . 2 8 3 8�2 Ship Losses , 1 8 3 6 - 1 8 8 4 , State of Pohnpei . . 2 8 6 8 . 3 Ship Los ses , 1 8 3 2 - 1 8 84 , Marshall Islands 2 8 8 8 . 4 Ship Los ses , 1 8 3 4 - 1 9 2 8 , Gilbert I s lands . . . 2 9 0 8 . 5 Japanese warships sunk within Central Pac i f ic . . 2 9 2 8 . 6 Merchant auxiliary vessels sunk Central Pac i f i c . 3 0 6 8 . 7 Key to World War I I ship losses in Belau . . . . 3 2 0 8 . 8 Japanese s hips sunk in Belau . . . . . . . . 3 2 2 8 . 9 Key to base map o f Apra Harbor shipwrecks . . 3 2 5 1 0 . 1 Japanese planes lost in Micrones ia . . . . . 4 7 3 1 0 . 2 Key to known s ites in American Memorial Park . . 4 7 7 1 0 . 3 Key to other known s ites in Apra Harbor . . . 4 8 4 1 0 . 4 Japanese aircraft s hot down over Belau . . . . . 4 9 0
XV
FOREWORD
This report on the submerged cultural resources o f Micronesia resulted more from a fortuitous set of circumstances than from long-range intent . The services of the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit have been requested by the administrations of di f ferent i s l ands s ince 1 9 8 1 for a number of totally unrelated pro j ects on submerged s ites . Over the next nine years we found that we had vis ited , and dived in , most o f the ma j or island groups while accomplishing those individual tasks .
It also became increas ingly apparent during that t ime that submerged cultural resource s were to play a maj or role in the future soc ioeconomic development of many of the newly emergent i s land states , regardless of what status or association they eventual ly keep with the United State s . A signi f icant percentage o f the tourists visiting Micrones ia are doing so for dive vacations , not surpris ing for a part of the world in which the l and area is so l imited but the lagoons and fringing ree f systems so rich in natural and cultural divers ity . Thi s rapidly increas ing use has implicat ions for the resource s themselves , in addition to the economy , which makes it more important than ever that their nature and fragi lity are wel l unders tood .
I as s i gned unit sta f f archeologist Toni Carrell to gather under one cover the results of our various pro j ects in Micronesia , to inc lude his torical context by local sub j ec t matter experts and t o present the whole i n a manner that would help enhance understanding and preservation of this unique resource base .
Although this report i s by no means intended a s a comprehens ive document , the s tudent o f Micrones ian history or archeology should find it a useful starting point and overview from which to frame out more intens ive research o f spec i f ic submerged s ites . I t should also help resource management spec ialists of i s l and governments apprec iate the nature and comparative importance of the submerged cultural resources located in their own area o f j urisdiction .
Daniel Lenihan Chie f , Submerged Cultural Resources Unit u . s . National Park Service
xvi i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
No research pro j ec t is success fully accomplished without the cooperation and support o f many individuals from initial planning to field operations to the preparat ion o f f inal camera-ready copy and graphics . This e f fort was , by nature , long and complex ; the list o f people who provided substantial as s is tance to its succes s ful completion is lengthy. Therefore , writing the acknowledgments for this report is not an easy task but one I take a great deal of pleasure i n do ing .
The pro j ect required adminis trat ive support , cooperation and coordination between the Western Region and the Southwes t Region . Western Regional Director Stan Albright and Southwest Regional Director John Cook have continual ly supported all of the endeavors of the Submerged Cultural Resource s Unit ( SCRU ) ; the work in Micronesia is the mos t recent i n a long serie s o f Western-Southwest Region cooperative e f forts . Doug Scovi l l , Chief Anthropologis t of the National Park Service (NPS) provided funding support and encouragement to undertake this extens ive pro j ect . The pro j ect also rece ived encouragement from the was hingto n History Divis ion , under the l eadership of E d Bearss and received personnel support from the Washington-bas ed Maritime I nit iat ive ' s James Delgado and Kevin Foster. The Western Region National Register Program Divis ion , under Margaret Pepin-Donat , as s is ted with some aspects o f funding and documentation . The Pac i f ic Area Office ' s Bryan Harry provided planning s upport and coordination with the Pac i f i c parks .
The Guam Department of Parks and Recreation under the direction of Anthony C . Mariano provided funding for documentation of the ARATAMA MARU . David T . Lot z , the Parks Administrator and Richard Davis , Territorial Archaeologist and Deputy SHPO at that department helped shape the pro j ec t a s an underwater archaeological f ield course that pul led representatives from many preservation programs in Micronesia .
Ralph Reyes , Superintendent o f War In the Pac i f ic National Historica l Park (WAPA) s upported site documentation both within and outs ide the parks in Guam and Saipan . WAPA also hosted most o f the activities o f the SCRU . James Miculka , WAPA Chie f Ranger , and Ranger Rose S . N . Manibusan eac h
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partic ipated in site documentation and made written e c ontributions . Their stick-to- it attitude finally res ulted in the complete mapping o f KITSUGAWA , CORMORAN and TOKAI MARU .
Overa l l administrative coordination in Belau was provided by Moses N . Sam , then Chief o f the Ministry o f Social Services . His good humor and unflagging support are apprec iated . Vicky Kanai , Chie f o f the Divis ion o f Cultural Af fairs and Belau Historic Preservation O f f icer , provided day-to-day administrative support during the three-month Belau pro j ect in 1 9 8 8 . She tackled logistic s and solved each problem with enthusiasm . Her col leagues , David Orak and Vince Blaiyok , partic ipated in all aspects o f the s ite documentation and planning for that proj ect. They s howed us the beauty of their is land home and shared the richness of their cultural heritage .
Commander David McCampbel l , USN Mobile Diving and S alvage Unit 1 , and Commander Otto Orzec h , MDSU- 1 Reserves , put together the immense Proj ect Sea Mark operation for Belau . A long with the other reserve unit c aptains and commanders and both active and reserve unit personnel , they worked extremely hard to make the Belau pro j ect succes s ful .
The Micrones ian Archaeological Survey I c overing the f ormer a Trust Territories with the exception of Guam, sponsored the ..
research in Kosrae . The personal support and on-s ite c oordination o f Historic Preservation O f f icer Teddy John was
· � invalu-ab-!-e-in-t·he-sueees·s -f.ul-�completion_o.f_thi_s__pro j �c t � _ We are indebted to Chie f Kan I s iah and the people o f the vil lage ----
o f Utwa for their warm hospital ity .
The Southwest Cultural Resources Center , f irst under D ick Sellars and then Ric k Smith , provided direct administrative s upport . Both Dick and Rick have a strong interest in the activities o f the Unit . Ronald J . Ice , Chief o f the Divis ion o f Anthropology , has continued to let us borrow members of his sta f f for both the f ield operations and the c ompletion of thi s publication .
Many volunteer sport divers helped in the documentation of the shipwrecks in Guam , Saipan and Belau and provided written c ontributions to this report . Without them , the f ield work could not have been completed . James R . Roybal c ompleted two artist ' s perspective drawings i n Guam and mapping of s hipwrecks in Belau . His skill as an artist contributed greatly to both endeavors . Mark Michael helped with video documentation and mapping o f the ships in Bel au .
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Mark Michael , along with his wife Lynne and volunteer Mark Gunderson , gathered the information needed to complete the documentation o f the s ites in Rota . Mark and Lynne ' s personal interest in preserving and understanding the s ites in Rota made inc lus ion o f those resources in this report pos s ible .
Without the help o f Dave and Suzanne Hendricks , William Cooper , Rich Fischer , Larry Walters , Jim and Bonnie Brandt , yennis Blackenbacker , and the Apra Sport Divers , the mapping of the CORMORAN , KITSUGAWA MARU and TOKAI MARU would not have been completed , nor woul d the s ites in Saipan have been photographed and artist ' s perspective drawings completed . Writer and photographer Tim Roc k has also been a regular volunteer with WAPA . Many o f his photographs are inc luded in this report , and he wrote the sections on submerged c ave resources in Chapter 1 0.
Don Boyer ' s interest in World War I I operations in the Pac i f ic brought him to our Santa Fe office several years ago . When the Belau f ield work was in the conceptual s tage , he will ingly s hared his information and expertise for the background research necessary to prepare for the f ield work . He followed that up by writing Chapter 6 and contributing to two others in this report .
I first met Marj orie Driver in 1 9 8 6 at the Micrones ian Area Research Center at the Univers ity of Guam . At the t ime , I was researching los ses o f l anding craft off the two World War I I invasion beaches and trying to get some understanding o f the s hips that have been l o s t i n and around Guam . Mar j orie , along with Fr . Thomas McGrath , was kind enough to point me i n the right direction . When I found mysel f quickly overwhelmed in the research and writing o f this report , Mar j orie and Fr . McGrath agreed to contribute c hapters. Marj orie contributed to Chapter 4 and Fr . McGrath to Chapter 5 .
Archival research i s o ften the most di f f icult aspect o f pro j ect preparation and write-up . Amalin Ferguson , the Regional Librarian , will ingly and regularly tracked down books and artic les through interlibrary loan and made them available to me . She 'also was my princ ipal intermediary with the New Mexico State Library . The researchers at the Peabody Museum ; t he New Bedford Whaling Museum ; the Nantucket Historical Assoc iation ; the Kendal l Whal ing Museum ; and the Judic ial , Fiscal and Soc ial Branch o f the National Archives all will ingly provided their as s istance .
The several hundred Japanes e s hips sunk during World War I I presented their own special research problems . Documents are di f ficult to obtain and even more di ff icult to have trans lated from the old Japanese script . By c hance I was
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fortunate enough to make contact with a researcher in Japan , 4t Dr . Sanae Yamada , who spec ializes in shipping . He grac iously provided photographs , historical background and operational histories on many of the s hips in Belau . Taka I noue , a Japanes e s tudent studying maritime archeology , obl igingly trans l ated the documents . The e f forts of Mr . Paul Lacke of Tokyo Friendship resulted in tracking down Mr . Fu j ita of Fu j ita Salvage and obtaining copies of the only surviving documents on the salvage o f the s hips in Belau .
Jerry Livingston , who has partic ipated in many SCRU pro j ects in the past , contributed his skills to the shipwreck documentation . Jerry also contributed his cons iderable ski l l s and spent the extra time necess ary to put this report into publishable form by overseei ng much o f the graphic product ion needed for print ing . Ernesto Martinez took on the j ob o f inking the maj ority of the graphics for this report . His patience and will ingnes s to accept c hanges to " finished " i l lustrat ions is s incerely appreciated . Larry Murphy , archeologist with SCRU , contributed his s igni f ic ant ski l l s at identi fying shipwreck materiel culture to many phases o f the work i n Micrones ia . Ken Vrana , Research Diving Technic ian with SCRU , energetical ly ass isted the 1 9 7 7 training and research act ivities .
A spec ial note o f thanks goes to Fran Day who has taken the .. brunt o f the secretarial and editorial duties involved in • coordinating and formatting the report to achieve final camera-ready copy . She has done a s tellar j ob once again .
In addition to the various authors and contributors , various sections of the report were reviewed by Dan Lenihan , Margaret Pepin-Donat , Rose S . N . Manibusan , Sean Cahi l l , Mar j orie Driver , Fr . Thomas McGrath , Jim and Susan Miculka , Tim Rock , Richard Davis , Pat Parker , Edwin Bears s , David Lot z , Roger Kel ly and Bryan Harry and his s t a f f at the Pac i fic Area O f f ice .
Dan a l so provided the overal l direction to the Micronesia pro j ec t . His des ire to see the ships and other s ites in the is lands mapped , photographed , videotaped and researched led directly to the many succes s fu l pro j ects there . He bel ieves in documenting , preserving and interpreting the full range of submerged cultural resources not j us t the " o l d " ones . That philosophy is also the reason that nonshipwreck s ites have been inc luded as " other " submerged c ultural resources in the work o f the Unit .
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Any inaccuracies, misrepresentations , or downright errors in this publ ication are my sole respons ibil ity . It is a l so my pl eas ant duty to thank the numerous contributors to the pro j ect and this report . Final ly , this report is a l abor o f love . It is o ffered to the people o f Micronesia in the hope that in some small way it wil l pres erve a piece of thei r rich and varied cultural heritage .
Toni L. Carre l l
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CHAPTER I . INTRODUCTION
By Toni L . Carrel l
Int roduct ion
This as ses sment report on the submerged archeological s ites o f Micronesia has been des igned within a resources management framework . The pro j ect was geared t oward generating informat ion that would be useful in submerged cultural resources s ite interpretation , protection and conservation ; in contribut ing to the historica l understanding of the islands and the maritime history of the region ; and i n answering questions o f general archeological and his torical interest .
Pro j ects in which funding and time constraints dictate a segmented approach require spec ial attention in the planning phases and the organizat ion o f work undertaken . The results of each segment should meet spec i f ic management needs and be able to s tand alone as individual management documents . Conceptua l i zed as distinct phases or s teps , the ideal c ourse o f research fol lows a logica l sequence beginning with initial reconnaissance asses sment , succeeded by inventory of all known submerged resources in an area , and followed by survey of high probabil ity areas for new s ites . Each o f these s teps is discus sed in greater detail elsewhere in this report .
Funding , priorities , and other constraints rarely permit the ideal research sequence to occur . More commonly it i s segmented and conducted i n response t o spec i f ic management needs . The Micronesia asses sment pro j ec t falls into this category , i . e . , there has never been a programmed or funded survey o f submerged cultural resources in Microne s ia . A s eries of unrelated requests for technica l a s s i stance resulted , however , in the de facto accompli s hment by the National Park Service ' s Submerged Cultural Resources Unit ( SCRU ) o f many of the requirements for a regional s ite as ses sment . Dan Lenihan , Chief o f the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit , decided to invest personnel resources in the compilation of this informat ion under one cover with the addition o f contextual and support studies . I t was felt the information would be more useful in t hat context than
1
� residing in filing cabinets as specific trip reports and s ite 4lt s tudies .
There are hundreds o f known shipwreck and nonshipwreck s ubmerged sites in the islands o f Micronesia . The sites that are reported on in detail in Chapters 9 and 1 1 are limited to only those sites that were visited by members of SCRU , the s ubmerged-research team of the War in the P acific National Historica l Park , or representatives of Guam ' s Department of P arks and Recreation ( DPR ) . These sites were evaluated or documented beginning with a brie f visit by the SCRU in 1 9 8 1 and continuing intermittent ly until 1 9 8 8 . The results o f the research provide information on a variety o f sites in the present and former Trust Territories . Recommendations for the long-term management , interpretatio n , protection , and conservation of the cultural resources investigated are o f fered.
Project Objectives
The goa l s of the field portions of this pro j ec t were fourfold : ( 1 ) to thoroughly document and describe the remains o f a number o f specific shipwrec ks in Kosrae , Guam and Belau ; ( 2 ) to evaluate and describe the present condition � o f other shipwreck sites in Saipan , Rota , Guam and Be lau ; (3) � to examine and document , when pos sible , the remains o f a variety o f other nonshipwreck sites in Saipan , Rota , Guam and Belau ; and ( 4 ) to provide baseline information on the submerged resources o f the is lands for evaluation o f site significance and suitability for nomination to the National Register of His toric P l aces and the cultural resources registers of the various islands .
Research Design
This research was designed to addres s questions that fall into five c ategories : (1 ) What is the nature of the construction and technology o f his toric ships sunk in the is lands? ( 2 ) How have shal low- and deep-water deposition af fected site deterioration or preservation and res earch potential? ( 3 ) What social , economic, and environmental conditions extant in Micronesia have a f fected the nature and potential deposition o f s hips and other site types , and how do these sites fit into the historical context? ( 4 ) What role did the ships and other sites play in the history of Mic ronesia? and (5 ) What is the range o f potential site types and what documented ship los ses occurred in Micronesia?
2
I
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The primary obj ectives of the pro j ect were s ite documentation and evaluation . For shipwreck s ites , spec ific questions were posed address ing general ship construction , that i s , hul l configuration and framing , internal o r external strengthening , hatch arrangement , machinery , engines , and armament . These are addressed primarily in Chapter 9 . For the other site types , the nature and condition of prehis toric and nonshipwreck historic remains are addres sed in Chapter 1 1 .
Chapters 9 and 1 1 addres s the impacts o f s hallow- and deep-water depos ition on phys ical s ite integrity and research potential . The relationship between the loss o f s hips and depos ition of other s ites and the soc ial , economic , and environmental mil ieu in the region are cons idered in Chapters 3 , 4 , 5, 6 and 7 . The historical or prehistorical ro le o f the s hips is also addressed i n those chapters . F inally , the range of potential s ite types and documented ship losses are reviewed in Chapters 8 and 1 0 .
I t is important to note that the historical overviews in this report were des igned to provide a context for discus s ion o f the archeological record . For this reason , certain c ategories o f information o f equal s ignific ance are given more attention than others. The most dramatic example occurs in our coverage of Japanese versus American shipping los se s during World War I I i n Chapter 8 . Much more emphas i s i s given to Japanese los ses because we are concerned mos t with vessels that have been sunk in waters acces s ible to the diving public and at depths sub j ect to archeological research without use of extraordinary technology. With the exception of Bikini Atoll and Kwa j alei n , wherein l ie many wrecks of US vessels due to atomic testing and which we have covered i n a separate report , there are very few World War I I related American vessels that meet these criteria .
Funding
SCRU operations during this period were funded by a wide variety of sources inc luding the governments of the i s lands requesting the work , the NPS archeological assis tance program and training and operational funds o f the United States ( U . S . ) Navy . Pro j ec t SeaMark , which is a cooperative working arrangement between the NPS and the Navy , is a mechanism for achieving historic preservation goals on underwater s ites . I t was the source for the a s s istance rendered by the Navy i n the pro j ects covered in t h i s report and many subsequent pro j ects in other geographical areas . Additional f inanc ial contributions came from the Ari zona Memorial Museum Assoc iat ion .
3
Study Mandate
A number of spec i f ic historic preservation l aws support study o f the resources within the former Trust Territories. Technic ally , this work partly ful f ills the comprehens ive inventory task o f the U.S. Historic Preservation Program authori z ed by the National Historic Preservation Act. Asses sments such as the one j ointly undertaken by the NPS , u . s . Navy and the various is land historic preservation programs do more than inventory s ites , however. They provide documentation o f resources that are receiving increas ing vis itation and impacts.
The national parks that are located in Saipan and Guam have their own legis lat ive mandate , above and beyond that in place on the i s l ands , that require archeological inventory within the park boundaries.
Saipan
Pub l ic Law 94- 2 4 1 , dated March 2 4 , 197 7 , made available to the Government of the Northern Mariana I s lands the 1 3 3 -acre parcel " . . . for the public use as an American Memorial Park to honor the American and Marianas people who died in the World war I I Marianas Campaign. "
On August 1 8 , 1 97 8 , the u . s . Congress enacted Public Law 95 - 3 4 8 , which established American Memorial Park on the i s l and o f Saipan. The NPS was given the responsibility to develop , maintain and administer the park " . . . for the primary purpose o f honoring the dead o f t he World War I I Mariana I s l ands Campa ign. "
The NPS was directed to develop the park as a " l iving memorial " as part of the covenant agreement between the Commonwealth o f the Northern Mariana I s lands ( CNMI ) and the U . S. One aspect of that directive was the commitment by the NPS to seek the ass i stance of appropriate his torians to interpret the historical aspects of the park .
As part o f the covenant , the CNMI can request the trans fer of t he administration and all fac i l it ies o f the park should it so des ire. As a result , the NPS does not own nor w i l l own any o f the l ands and waters on which the park i s being developed. Boundaries for the park are not firmly set. The authoriz ing legislat ion does not inc lude a boundary description or a reference to a boundary map. There are no c lear guidel ines as to who i s respons ible for the o f f shore e
4
areas o f American Memorial Park . In the general management plan , a boundary map places the offshore boundary at 1 0 0 meters from the mean high-t ide l ine .
Guam
On August 1 8 , 1 9 7 8 , the U . S . Congres s enacted Pub l ic Law 9 5-3 4 8 , which established the War in the Pac i f ic National Historical Park in the Territory of Guam .
Section 6 . ( a ) o f the act that created the park s tates :
In order to commemorate the bravery and sacrifice of those participating in the campaigns of the Paci fic theater o f World War I I and to conserve and interpret outstanding natural , scenic , and his toric values and objects on the Is land o f Guam for the benefit and enj oyment of present and future generations , the War in the Pac i f ic National Historic al Park ( hereinafter i n this s ection re ferred t o a s the " park " ) is hereby establ i s hed .
I t is very important to note that the park was established to honor all the people from all nations and that it was not established as a tribute to j u s t one particular country or group of people .
Additional subsections o f the act that are relevant to this asses sment inc lude the fol l owing :
( d ) Other points on the Is land of Guam relevant to the park may be identif ied , established , and marked by the Secretary in agreement with the Governor o f Guam .
( e ) The Secretary shall administer property acquired in accordance with the laws general ly app l icable to the management of units o f the National Park System .
( f ) The Secretary is authorized to seek the as s istance of appropriate historians to interpret the his torical aspects o f the park . To the greatest extent pos s ible , interpretive activities wil l be conducted in the fol lowing three
5
l anguages : English , Chamorro and Japanese .
Outs ide the boundaries o f the national park system , the NPS , as a part o f the Department o f the I nterior , also has a maj or respons ibil ity to provide as s istance for conservation and preservation o f resources in the former island trust territories under u . s . administration .
Project Partic ipants
In addition to the partic ipation of u . s . Navy personnel , both active and reserve , from Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 1 , the f ield asses sment and documentat ion phase involved many individuals , both in and out o f government service .
The documentation of the ship ARATAMA MARU was completed as part o f the Underwater Archeology Survey and Training Course hos ted by GovGuam . Partic ipants in the f ield documentation i nc luded David T. Lotz , Guam DPR ; Kevin Fos ter , NPS-Washington O f f ice , His tory Divis ion ; Jim J . Brandt , Guam ; Mark Michael , Rota ; John Salas , Guam DPR ; Vic April , Guam DPR ; David Orak, Belau Cultural A f fairs ; Margaret Pepin-Donat , NPS-Western Region ; Butch Iris h , Univers ity of A Guam ; Mike Fleming , CNMI; Victor H . Torres , Guam DPR ; Vince ., Blaiyok , Belau Cultural Af fairs ; and Ken Vrana , Toni Carrell , Dan Lenihan and Larry Murphy , SCRU .
James Miculka , WAPA Park Chief Ranger , and Rangers Jimmy Garrido , Kevin Carter , Randy Sablan and Rose S . N . Manibusan parti c ipated in site documentation in WAPA and on the K ITSUGAWA MARU , CORMORAN and TOKAI MARU in Guam . They also doc umented the ships and other s ites in Saipan . They were j oined at various times by Jerry L . L ivingston , NPS -Southwest Region Divis ion of Anthropology , and by volunteer divers Suzanne Hendricks , Dave Hendricks , Tim Roc k , W i l l iam Cooper , Larry Walters , Jim Brandt , Bonnie Brandt , Richard F isher , Dennis B lackenbacker and the Apra Sport Divers .
David Orak and Vince Blaiyok from the Belau Divis ion of Cultural Af fairs partic ipated in the documentation of all of the s ites reported on in Belau . Joining them were volunteer divers James R . Roybal and Mark Michael . Southwest Region NPS personnel inc luded Jerry L . Livingston and James E . Bradford , Divis ion o f Anthropo logy ; and Ton i C arrel l and Dan Lenihan , SCRU . Kevin Foster from t he NPS National Maritime Initiative also partic ipated .
Mark and Lynne Michael , owners o f D ive Rota , were ass isted by Mark Gunderson in the fol low-up documentation o f the s ites in 4lt
6
Rot a . Toni Carrell and Ken Vrana partic ipated in the initial documentation .
The Bikini pro j ect partic ipants were Jerry L . Livingston and Larry V . Nordby , Divis ion of Anthropology ; James Delgado , Maritime I nitiative ; and Daniel J . Lenihan and Larry Murphy , SCRU .
Is land Names
For more than 4 0 0 years , vessels of nations involved in exploration , colonization , and commerce cros sed the Pac i fic and discovered and claimed the is lands they encountered . I n the proces s , they gave the is lands many dif ferent names . Accurate loc at ion and ident i fication were dif f icult for the early explorers ; as a result islands were " discovered " and named several t imes over . I s lands were also purposefully renamed by l ater colonial administrators . I n addition , the native peoples have a multiplic ity of names f or their islands , often with a bewildering variety of spe l l ings . A veritable f lood of names has been bestowed upon the many islands of Micronesia . Finding the current name , or worse yet , trying to match an historic name with a particular is land can be extremely frustrating .
When this research pro j ec t began , confus ion added to frustration because of the s heer numbers o f i s lands and the variations on the ir spell ing . Wherever possible , we dec ided to adhere to the contemporary usage in those chapters that dealt with the marit ime historical overview , tempered with the modern spelling of plac e names . I n Chapter 4 , for example , the Mariana I s lands are referred to as the Ladrones and Belau as the Palaos . I f there is any question about the name , that is , i f it is not immediately apparent which i s l and is being referred to, the modern spelling follows the historic one . In Chapter 6 , dealing with World War I I , the spell ings of the islands reflec t the then current and more commonly recognized us age . In a l l other chapters , the modern spell ings are used , it being incumbent upon the res t of the world to cal l the islands by the name the citizens pre fer . Again , i f there is any ques tion about which island is being discus sed , the traditional Engl ish names follow the modern ones . Appendix A provides an alphabetica l index to the place names in Micronesia al ong with their variants. Names in all c apital letters are the s tandard modern name s , those o f f ic ially approved and recommended for current use . Names that are in lower-case letters with initial capitals are variant spell ings or names , which are fol lowed by the current pre ferred spel l ing .
7
CHAPTER I I .
ASSESSMENT AREA BACKGROUND
By Toni L . Carrell 1
Introduction
The Pac ific Basin occupies one-third of the Earth ' s surface and is , thus , the largest single feature on the planet . Within this vast expanse l ie approximately 2 5 , 0 0 0 islands , more than c an be found in all of the remainder o f the world ' s oceans . The is lands are scattered from the Arctic Circle in the north to the Antarctic in the south and exhibit great variety and extremes in physical-biotic and human environments . Combined , they total more than 1 million square miles of land area ( Thomas 1 9 6 7 : 1 ) . Yet , the most s ignificant feature of the Paci fic is its emptiness .
Despite the basin ' s limited land mass , nearly all o f the islands as well as its Asian and American continental shores were discovered and settled hundreds of years before the Vikings ventured westward or the f irst Europeans arrived . Dotted with islands whose reefs abounded with fish and bache-de-mer , whose forests contained woods both fragrant and beautiful , and whose streams provided c lear sweet water , the western and southern Pacific and its islands were discovered and inhabited by people migrating from Southeast Asia , the Philippines , Indones ia and the is lands north o f New Guinea . Movement between the island archipelagos further s pread and intermixed races and territories . The descendants o f these people , while physically distinct , share the obvious traits of seafaring and navigation . Today , they are generally referred to as Polynesians , Melanesians and Micrones ians , di fferentiated by cultural , l inguistic and phys ical differences . There is still much to learn about a l l of these voyagers , perhaps the earliest maritime explorers ; however , Micronesia i s the focus o f this study.
1with contributions from James E . Miculka and Rose S . N . Manibusan .
9
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the people and e islands o f Micronesia by discussing their physical dif ferences , location , s i ze , origin , maj or land form features , c l imatic types , vegetation and life zones .
Geographic Scope
The Pac ific Bas in
The immens ity o f and great distances within the Pac ific Bas in often make it difficult to conceptualize the bas in as a s ingle earth feature ( Figure 2 . 1 ) . The bas in i s 9 , 2 0 0 statute miles from the Bering Strait t o the Antarctic C irc le , 1 0 , 4 0 0 statute miles wide at the equator from Ecuador to I ndonesia , and 1 2 , 3 0 0 miles--almost one-half the circumference o f the earth--from Singapore to Panama ( Thomas 1 9 6 7 : 2 ) . In all , it comprises an area of more than 6 8 million square miles . The bas in i s ringed by more than 4 0 0 active volcanoes and its oceanic trenches reach c loser t o the earth ' s core than does any other place on earth; four o f the trenches are more than 6 miles deep . Tectonic activity makes this the most unstable one...:.third of the planet . The Andes and Rocky Mountains , and their near-shore coastlines , form the eastern barrier o f the basin . The Aleutian I slands arc � across the Pac i f ic on the north and extend nearly to .., Kamchatka . Along the As ian continent the Kurils , Japan , the Ryukyus , the Phi lippines , I ndonesia , New Guinea and Australia form the western boundary . Between these islands and their cont inental mainlands are marginal seas : the Bering , Okhotsk , Japan , Yellow , Philippine , South China , Java , Coral and Tasman .
The larger islands are all located within the western or southern Pac i f ic and generally form convex arcs toward the open northeast . At f irst glance it appears that they are randomly scattered; however , almost all are between latitude 3 0° north and 30° south, trending east-southeast from s outheast Asia toward Easter I s land ( refer to Figure 2 . 1 ) . Mos t are close enough together to be easily c lustered into archipelagos or groups . The notable exceptions , those is lands more than 4 0 0 statute miles from any other, are Clipperton , Easter , I s la Sala y Gome z , Johnston , Norfolk, Marcus and Parece Vela .
The People
Although it is convenient to group the people o f the wes tern and southern Pacific islands into three areas--Melanesia ( black islands ) , Polynesia ( many islands ) and Micronesia �
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( small islands ) --based on l inguistic and racial differences , in reality this division is not c lear cut . Melanes ian traces exist in parts of Polynesia , and there are Polynes ian populations in both Melanesia ( Nukumanu ) and Micronesia ( Kapingamarangi ) . Micrones ian populations have also s ettled in Melanesia .
Melanesia includes all the islands extending eastward from Indonesia , south of the equator , from New Guinea to F i j i . Linguistical ly , the Melanesians speak related but not mutually understandable l anguages . Palauan ' s are o ften included with the Melanesians , however , their languages are unrelated to the Malaya-Polynes ian family . Mel anesia is generally considered to be the f irst area settled in the Pacific , more than 2 5 , 0 0 0 years ago . The Melanes ian people , many still poorly understood culturally , are phys ically similar , being black or dark brown and , in the case o f the Papuans , having frizzly black hair .
The islands o f Polynesia form a rough triangle with apexes at the Hawaiian Islands in the north, New Zealand in the s outh, and Easter I s land in the east . The important island groups include the Marques a , Tuamotu , Society , Austral , Cook , Samoa , Tonga and Ellice is lands . These people may be the most cultural ly and l inguistical ly homogeneous of the three i s l and populations . Their language varies only dialectically from group to group and their cultures are very closely related . The first settlements in Polynesia have been traced to Tonga and Samoa , more than 3 , 0 0 0 years ago . The people have l ight brown skin and generally straight black hair .
The Mariana , Caroline , Marshall and Gilbert islands c onstitute what is traditional!� known as Micrones ia . The islands l ie between 1 9° north, 3 south latitude and between 1 3 0° and 1 8 0° west longitude . Today , many of the islands have formed republics that are seeking political recognition and independent status ( Figure 2 . 2 ) . The Caroline I s lands are now divided into the Republ ic of Belau and the Federated States of Micronesia . The latter , in turn , is divided into the states of Yap , Truk , Pohnpei and Kosrae . Guam , separated from the remainder of the Mariana Islands , is an unincorporated territory and its inhabitants are United States c itizens . Neither the Marianas nor the Marshalls are part of the Trust Territories anymore . One is the Commonwealth o f the Northern Marianas and the other is the Republic o f the Marshall I s lands . Nauru , formerly part o f the Gilbert I s lands , i s now a n independent republ ic . In s ome cases old island chain names are no longer in use ; for example , the Gilbert Islands are now part of the independent state o f Kiribati . These change s , from independence prior to the arrival of Europeans , to colonial possess ions , and recently back to independence , now again reflect the
1 3
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islanders ' view of themselves rather than an outs ider ' s arbitrary division of real estate .
Micronesia , not surprisingly , contains traces of both Melanesia and Polynesia . The people range from dark to light brown, have both straight and curly hair , and speak c losely related Malaya-Polynes ian languages . This region was first settled by voyagers from the Philippines , Indonesia and the islands north of New Guinea between 3 , 0 0 0 and 2 , 0 0 0 B . C .
The Islands
Mariana Islands
The Mariana Islands lie east of the Philippines , north o f New Guinea , southwest o f the Hawaiian I slands , and south-southeast o f Japan ( Figure 2 . 3 ) . They form a chain ext5nding from 1 3° to 2 0° 3 3 ' north latitude and fall between 144 54 ' and 14 6°54 ' east longitude . The four largest islands--Saipan , Tinian , Rota and Guam--are all at the southernmost end . The chain consists of 14 s ingle islands and 1 group of 3 smal l islands ( Maug ) .
Since the Spanish-American War in 1 8 9 8 , Guam has been administratively separated from the remainder of the Mariana chain . Today the Northern Mariana Islands are a Commonwealth while Guam is an unincorporated U . S . territory . From north to south , the Northern Mariana Islands are Farallon de Paj aros , Maug , Asuncion , Agrihan , Pagan , Alamagan , Guguan , Sarigan , Anatahan , Farallon de Medinilla , Saipan , Tinian , Agui j an and Rota ( Figure 2 . 4 ) . The total land surface o f the northern islands is approximately 2 4 7 square miles ; Saipan , Tinian and Rota occupy two-thirds of this area . Thes e three islands are also the ma jor population centers , not including Guam . Historically, the Mariana Is lands as a group were referred to as Los Ladrones .
Saipan
Saipan has been variously c alled Saepan , I le de St . Joseph , Saespara , San Jose , Saypan , Seipan , Saspan , Sepam , Sespan , Supan and Seypan . Located 1 2 5 miles northeast of Guam and 1 , 5 0 0 miles southeast of Japan ( refer to Figure 2 . 4 ) , this island was a maj or administrative and population center during the Japanese admini stration . The largest of the Northern Mariana chain , it is about 1 3 miles long , averages 4 miles in width and covers approximately 4 6 square miles .
1 5
A S I A
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Fig . 2 . 3 . Location o f Mariana I s lands .
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1 7
-
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Tinian
Historically , Tinian has been referred to as Bona Vista , Buenavista , Temean , Tenian , Tiniamou , Tanian , Tinianion and Z inian , among others . This island is located j ust over two miles southwest of Saipan and five miles northeast of Agu i j an ( refer to Figure 2 . 4 ) . Nearly 1 1 miles long and 4 - 1 /2 miles wide , the island is 32 square miles . Lower and flatter than the others , it is mostly a plateau that was used to advantage as an aircraft base during World War I I .
Rota
Rota has been known as Luta , I le de St . Anne , Santa Ana , Satpana , Suta , Z arpana , Santa Ana , Sapan , Sarpana O ' Rota and Botaha , as wel l as other names . Located 3 2 miles northeast of Guam ( refer to Figure 2 . 4 ) , from northeast to southwest it is j us t over 11 miles long and some 4 miles wide and has an area o f 2 8 square miles . In the past , the island was heavily mined for its phosphate ore .
Guam
Encompassing a land area of 2 10 square miles , Guam is the largest and s outhernmost of the 1 5 islands of the Marianas chain ( refer to Figure 2 . 2 ) . It is 3 2 miles long and 4 to 9 .. miles wide . The island has been known by many names ., including Bacim , Bahan , Bam , Goam , Hoan , Guahan , Guaj an , Guaj anao , Buayan , Omi Jima , San Juan and I guana .
Guam is a natural focus of activity within Micronesia . It is the largest and most populous island between Hawaii and the Philippines ; has an excellent , well equipped port ; is a maj or communicat ion center ; and is the maj or crossroad o f air routes . Guam is only a few hours by j et from such maj or As ian c ities as Tokyo , Seoul , Hong Kong , Shanghai , Vladivostok , Manila , Singapore and Bangkok . Also , Guam is only hours away from Sydney and Auckland . In effect , it is the metropolitan center of the western Pacific .
Carol ine Islands
Lying east of the Philippines , south of Japan , north o f New Guinea and southwest of Hawaii , the Caroline I s lands extend from Kosrae in the east to the Belau archipelago in the west . The islands stretch for more than 2 , 0 0 0 miles , forming a0 broad belt extending from 1 3 1° to 1 6 6° east longitude and 0 to 14° north lat itude ( Figure 2 . 5 ) . The e arly European explorers called the islands Is las Carolinas , and until recently they were often referred to as the western and eastern Carol ines , divided at approximately 1 4 8° longitude ,
1 8
ASIA
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Fig . 2 . 5 . Location of the Caro l ine I s lands .
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roughly between Pikelot in the State of Yap and Manila Ree f in the State o f Truk ( Figure 2 . 6 ) .
The western Carolines included the archipelago o f Belau , and the islands o f Yap , Ulithi , Fais , Ngulu , Soro l , Eauripik , Woleai , Faraulep , Gaferut , Olimarao , I f alik , Elato , Lamotrek , West Fayu , Satawal and Pikelot . They represent 2 3 island groups , atolls and isolated is lands . The Eastern Carolines included Manila Reef , Pulusuk , Puluwat , Pulap , Namonuito , Neoch, Truk Islands , Fayu , Nomwin , Murilo , Nama , Los ap , Namoluk , Etal and Satawan , today all part of the State o f Truk . The State o f Pohnpei contains the remainder o f the Eastern Carolines , which comprised Minto Ree f , Oro luk, Nukuore , Kapingamarangi , Ngetik , Pakin , Ant , Paking , Pohnpei , Mwokil and Pingelap . Finally, the s ingle island of Kosrae , today a separate state , formed the eastern boundary . Together these islands represent 2 5 island c lusters and isolated islands .
Bel au
Belau has been known as Palau , Arrecifos , Palaos , Paleu , Pally , Paloc , Pannog , Parao , Pelew, Pell-b and Walau . The archipe�ago is located between 8°3 0 1 and 4 3 0 1 north latitude and 1 3 1 3 0 I and 1 34°3 0 1 east longitude . The capital o f the group is Oreor ( Koror ) , which is located approximately 4 , 0 0 0 miles southwest o f Hawaii , 1 , 7 3 0 miles south o f Japan and 1 , 30 0 miles northeast of New Guinea ( Figure 2 . 7 ) .
The islands stretch 7 7 miles north-northeast and south-southwest , with a maximum width of 2 0 miles ( Figure 2 . 8 ) . Ngcheangel ( Kayangel ) is 2 miles north of the outlying reef to the north and Ngeaur ( Anguar ) is 5 - 1 / 2 miles southwest of the chain . The is lands consist of 8 l arge islands , 1 8 smaller ones , and numerous islets called Chelbacheb ( the Rock I s lands ) . From north to south the maj or features are Ngeruangel Ree f , Ngcheangel , Babeldaob , Oreor , Ngerekebesang ( Arakabesan ) , Ngerchaol , Ngemelachel ( Malakal ) , Chelbacheb , Ngemlis , Ngercheu , Ngedbus , Ngerechong , Ngebad, Beliliou ( Peleliu ) , Ngeaur ( Angaur ) , Fana , Sonsoro l , Pulo Anna , Merir, Tobi and Helen Reef .
The total land surface o f the archipelago is 1 7 1 square miles of which more than two-thirds is Babeldaob ( Department of the Navy 1 9 4 4 : 1 1 ) .
Marshall I s lands
The Marshall Islands lie between 4°38 1 and 1 4°4 5 1 north latitude and between 1 6 0°5 0 1 and 1 7 2 1 0 1 east longitude . Jaluit , the administrative center of the islands , is 2 , 09 6 statute miles southwest o f the Hawaiian Islands and 2 , 44 2
2 1
A S IA
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Fig . 2 . 7 . Loc ation of Be lau ( Pa l au ) .
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ASIA
QJ 0 Hawaii
• MARSHALL ISLANDS
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Pacific Ocean
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Fig . 2 . 9 . Location of the Marshal l I s lands .
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Fig . 2 . 1 0 . The Marshall Islands .
statute miles s outhwest of Japan ( Figure 2 . 9 ) . The Marshall ta I s lands are the eastward extens ion of the Caroline I s lands , which reach west almost to the Philippines .
The archipelago consists of 34 low-lying coral ato l l s and s ingle islands arranged roughly in two parallel rows ( Figure 2 . 1 0 ) . The Ratak chain , the easternmost in the archipelago , c ontains 1 4 atolls and 3 single islands . They are Bokaak , B ikar , Utrik , Taka , Mej it , Ailuk , Jemo , Likiep , Wotj e , Erikub , Maloelap , Aur , Arno , Mili and Knox ( Narik ) . Approximately 1 3 0 miles west lies the Ralik chain , consisting o f 1 5 atolls and 3 s ingle islands . From north to south the islands are Enewetak , Bikini , Rongelap , Rongrik , Ailinginae , U j elang , Wotho , U j ae , Lae , Kwa j elein , Lib , Namu , Jabwot , Ailinglaplap , Jaluit , Kil i , Namorik and Ebon . The average distance between islands in the same chain is 5 0 miles . In all , the archipelago occupies an area of 3 7 5 , 0 0 0 mile s , 1 - 1/2 t imes the s ize of Texas , although the actual surface area of the land is only 7 4 square miles ( Department of the Navy 1 9 4 3 : 2 ) . Historically , the islands have been referred to as Los Corrales , Marshall-Gruppe , Marschall I s lands , and Marshal l ' s Archipel , among others .
Kiribati ( Gilbert I slands )
The Gilbert I s lands straddle the Equator and l ie between 2° 38 ' north and 2°3 0 ' south latitude and between 1 6 9° ' and 1 7 8 east longitude . They are southwest of Hawaii , north of F i j i and southeast of the Marshall Islands ( Figure 2 . 1 1 ) . Today the islands are the western part of the independent republic o f Kiribati ( pronounced Kiribas ) . The Gilbert I s land chain inc ludes Makin , Butaritari , Marakei , Abaiang , Tarawa , Maiana , Abemama , Kuria , Aranuka , Nonouti , Tabiteuea , Beru , Nikunau , Onotoa , Tamana and Arorae ( Figure 2 . 12 ) . Together these is lands represent 17 island clusters and atolls . Formerly known as Tungaru in Micrones ian , and later the Kingsmill I s lands , they became known as the Gilbert I s lands in the 1 82 0s .
Geologic Setting
The islands of the Pacific range in size from the world ' s s econd largest , New Guinea , to the smallest of reef s barely vis ible above the high tide line . I n the entire Pac i f ic , between the Hawaiian I s lands and the islands from Japan to I ndonesia , there are only three islands larger than 100 square miles . All three are within Micronesia : Guam ( 2 10 square miles ) , Babeldaob in Belau ( 1 5 3 square miles ) and Pohnpei ( 1 2 7 square miles ) . The Pacific island land forms A are one of four bas ic types : continental , volcanic , low •
2 6
ASIA
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NO RTH A M ER ICA
Fig . 2 . 1 1 . Location o f Kiribati ( Gilbert ) I s lands .
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2 8
coral and raised coral islands . Each of these is represented in Micrones ia ( Thomas 1 9 6 7 : 6 -8 ) .
Is land Types and Land Forms
The continental islands are the largest in the Pacific and include New Guinea , Fij i and Japan as well as Babeldaob and Yap in the western Carolines . These is lands are distinguished by the presence of continental rock formations rather than volcanic or coral . The islands exhibit great topographical variety , such as heavy forests , grasslands and swamps , deep canyons , broadly sloping val leys and flat f lood plains . Continental islands can support a larger and more diversi fied flora and fauna and are capable of supporting large populations .
Some of the best known of the volcanic-type islands are the Hawaiian Is lands , still active today . These high islands , scattered throughout the Pacific , are o ften thousands o f feet from ocean floor to peak and contain large deep val leys with precipitous cliffs . The inactive cones form natural amphitheaters that rise from a nearly f lat f loor or form mountain-enclosed harbors . Erosion has resulted in soils capable of growing a wide variety of foodstuf f s inc luding coconut , breadfruit , plantain , taro , sweet potato and numerous fruits . Generally small to intermediate in s ize , the is lands are o ften ringed by either fringing or barrier reefs .
The volcanic islands in Micronesia were often the most frequently visited by Europeans and were the maj or population centers because , like continental islands , they could support large populations . Five islands in the Carol ine Islands are volcanic in origin : Kosrae , Pohnpei , Truk , Orear { Koror ) and Ngemelachel ( Malakal ) . The 14 Mariana Islands are also volcanic in origin . Truk and Pohnpei consist o f more than a single island and each have varying complexity in land form and reef structure .
The most numerous type o f land form in the Pac i f ic is the low coral island . Generally very small in area , they are widespread and are typif ied in Micronesia by many o f the Gilbert , Marshall and Caroline islands . General ly clas s i f ied as atolls , these islets are usually not more than 5 to 1 0 feet above high tide . Formed of organic limestone and the accumulation of limestone debris on top of an underlying volcanic mountain or c luster o f cones , they typically form a ring-like ridge or reef enclos ing a shall ow lagoon . The only s ource of fresh water is rainfall and , because the sea can eas ily inundate the land , these islands are o ften treeless and uninhabited .
2 9
The raised coral island , originally a coral atoll , is distinguished from its low-lying predeces sor by its having been raised up by a succes sion of uplifts or other geologic events . Typical of these islands is a depres sed island center, all that remains o f the ancient lagoon . Very o ften the island drops off from steep cliffs with a narrow shel f . Rare in the Pacific , some raised coral islands are rich in ore phosphate . Ngeaur ( Anguar ) and Fais in the western Carolines , Banaba in Kiribati , and Nauru are examples of raised coral islands in Micrones ia { Thomas 1 9 6 7 : 1 - 1 1 ; Department of the Navy 1 9 4 3 , 1 9 44 ) .
Climate , Prevail ing Winds and Currents
Micronesia has a tropical oceanic c limate with comparatively high , uniform temperatures . The an&ual mean temperature on Saipan in the Mariana Islands is 7 8 F . The mean on Yap and Orear ( Koror ) in the western Caro lines is 8 0°F and 8 1 °F , respectively , end on the eastern Caroline Island o f Pohnpei th5 mean is 8 1 F . The annual mean in the Marshall Islands �s 8 1 F and the southerly Gilbert Islands have a mean of 8 4 F ( Department of the Navy , 1 9 4 3 , 1 9 4 4 ; Douglas 1 9 8 9 : 2 8 8 ) . The comparatively large water area to small land area moderates year-round tem<!'eratuc5es and keeps the seasonal variation to a no more than 4 or 5 • � All the islands experience high humidity , heavy rainfall , and seasonably high winds . Rainfall varies with the trade winds and the monsoons . The rainy season is July to October or November , although rain does occur throughout the year . Tropical cyclones are regular weather events and average 1 3 0 per year ( Ward 1 9 6 6 ( 1 ) : 2 0 ) . They vary greatly from moderate to violent typhoons , normally moving westerly and north or westerly and south until they dissipate .
Prevail ing winds , a determining factor in both the discovery of the islands and later in interisland and island-mainland trade , play a controlling role in the climate . Becaus e much o f Micronesia l ies north o f the equ ator , the trade winds blow predominantly from east to west , which results in wet , c loudy windward coasts on the high islands and cloudless and dry coasts on the leeward side ( Thomas 1 9 6 7 : 1 3 ) . Unlike the dependable trade winds that cover nearly the entire Pac i f ic , the monsoons are limited to the area north o f New Guinea and Austral ia to the As ian mainland . They are characterized by seasonal reversals of winds and af fect only the westernmost islands in Micrones ia .
Near the equator , and affecting mostly the Gilbert I slands , are the doldrums . The temperature variation in this region 4lt
3 0
is only 2 ° to 3° annually and rainfall occurs throughout the year . This region is also characterized by high humidity , cons iderable c loudiness and low wind speeds , which o ften result in brief , violent squalls and waterspouts ( Thomas 1 9 6 7 : 1 3 ; Ward 1 9 6 6 ( I ) : 2 0 ) . The southeast trade winds are below the equatorial doldrums .
North and south o f the easterly trade winds , in the latitudes of 3 0° to 6 0° , are the westerlies , the winds that pushed the sail-rigged canoes and ships o f early seafarers back across the Pac i f ic to the Americas .
The ocean currents , like the prevailing winds , move from east to west through much of Micronesia . The most powerful are the north and south equatorial currents that match the easterly winds . Moving across thousands of miles o f open ocean , these strong currents are forced to turn both north and south once they hit the large land forms of Australia and mainland Asia . Part of the water flows eastward in the narrow belt called the equatorial countercurrent , which is twice as strong during the northern summer ( Ward 1 9 6 6 ( I ) : 2 2 ) . It is the combination o f east and westerly winds and currents that made migration , exploration and trade possible in the Pacific .
The Study Areas
Although this assessment has made an effort to addres s the complete range o f Micrones ia ' s submerged cultural resources , it was not pos s ible to undertake field research at each is land . Only a relative handful of islands had f ield work completed ( re fer to Chapter 1 ) . Additional geological information on a few locations where field work was completed is presented below to better orient the reader to their features .
The northern hal f of the island is a limestone plateau ringed by cliffs 5 0 0 to 6 0 0 feet high . The island ' s southern half is a range of volcanic mountains and hills paralleling the west coast , ris ing steeply to more than 1 , 0 0 0 feet above sea level and s loping gently toward the east . The coastline varies with location , from pitted , emerged coral l imestone to low , swampy lands or sandy beaches . Pillow lavas and dikes are also exposed in many places .
A number o f bays and anchorages ring the is land ( Figure 2 . 1 3 ) . Umatac Bay , on the southwest , may have been the location where Magellan made his first landfall in the Pacific . Merizo and Inaraj an on the south and Talofofo and
3 1
(/ FENA VALLEY RESERVOIR
ISLAND OF GUAM
N � 0 2 3 4 5
MILES
PATI POINT
e TOWNS AND POPULATION CENTERS )C INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT - MAJOR ROADS
Fig . 2 . 1 3 . Harbors and bays on Guam .
32
Pago on the east have been used in the past for shipping or as refuges from adverse conditions .
Guam ' s maj or port is Apra Harbor on its west coast ( Figure 2 . 14 ) . Protected on the south by Orote Peninsul a and on its north by a manmade breakwater extending from Cabras out across a natural ree f , the harbor is 1 5 0 feet deep at its maximum . Although several shoals are present , they are confined to the eastern end of the outer harbor . Apra has been modi fied as a result of the construction of U . S . military f acilities and dredging of both the outer and inner harbor to accommodate naval vessels ; fortunately , much o f the main harbor has been little impacted .
Fringing reefs less than 3 , 00 0 feet from the beach surround most o f the island . Beyond the reef , the ocean f loor drops quickly to great depths ; the Marianas Trench , 6 0 miles o f f the southern tip of Guam , is recorded a s 3 5 , 8 1 0 feet deep .
War I n the Pacific National Historical Park2
War in the Pacific National Historical Park , as now authorized , consists of seven physically separate units lying on the western side of the island . They are between the west end o f Agana and the south end of the village of Agat . Of the seven units in the park , only two are assoc iated with o f fshore areas . These are the Asan Beach Unit and the Agat Unit ( Figure 2 . 15 ) .
Asan Beach Unit : Encompass ing 4 4 5 acres offshore , this unit inc ludes all lands on the ocean side of Marine Drive between Adelup Point and Asan Point . Except for the l imestone promontories o f these two points , the land is a f l at , coastal plain with a sandy beac h , 1 5 to 3 0 feet wide , fronting the shoreline . The offshore area encompas ses extensive reef formations , up to 1 , 0 0 0 feet wide , paralleling the shorel ine . Water inside the reef varies from 1 to 4 feet deep and during low tide many areas of the reef are exposed . There is one small is let , Camel Rock , near Asan Point .
The coral c ommunity dominates the Asan Unit waters . Seagrass ( Enhalus acoroides ) is found in widely scattered patches east of Adelup Point . Corals are widely scattered to abundant in the low-tide moat along the inner reef flat . The densest corals are found immediately west of Adelup Point and seaward
2The section on War in the Pac ific National Historical Park was written by James Micul ka and Rose S . N . Manibusan .
3 3
Oroie Island
APRA OUTER HARBOR
OROTE PENINSULA
MARIANA ISLANDS APRA HARBOR ISLAND OF GUAM TERRITORY OF GUAM
Scale 1:10.000 Guam 1963 Datum
1/2
Apuntua Pt
West Channel
Commadores Cut
0 Jadl
APRA INNER HARBOR
MILES Neye lsland O
Fig . 2 . 14 . Apra Harbor , Guam .
0
- N
I I
'
AGAT U N I T/ I
G A A N PO INT '
-- - PARK BOUNDARY
W A R IN THE PACIFIC
NATIONAL H I S TORICAL PARK - Guam
Fig . 2 . 1 5 . Location of Agat and Asan Units , War in the Pacific National Historical Park , Guam .
3 5
o f the raised coral headland . Abundant areas o f soft corals 4l are found west of Asan Point .
A wide variety of invertebrates has been observed , espec ially sea cucumbers , sea urchins and sea stars . Fiddler crabs ( Ucu ) have been collected along the sandy beach at the Asan River mouth .
I t was on this shore that the 3rd Marine Divis ion came ashore on July 2 1 , 1 9 4 4 , for the initial assault and was met by troops of the Japanese 32 0th Independent I nfantry Battalion . The invas ion was in support of the recapture of Guam .
Agat Unit : This is primarily a water area covering 5 5 7 acres o f fs hore . The land is a series of small parcels between the coastal road and s horeline . Terrain is composed generally of coral outcroppings interspersed with low-lying areas . A coral reef parallels the shoreline and extends from 1 , 0 0 0 to 1 , 5 0 0 feet from the beach . Four offshore is land groups ( Pelagi I slets and Yona , Bangi and Alutom islands ) are bordered by low l imestone c l i f fs and sloping s hores . Water ins ide the reef is 1 to 4 feet deep , and during low tide some o f the reef formation is exposed .
Extending from north of Rizal Beach to the south o f Bangi Is land , the intertidal beaches at Rizal Beach , Togcha Beach A ,
and Salinas Beach to the south are composed primarily of W bioc lastic material . Some volcanic detrital debris is espec ially common near the mouths of the numerous streams that enter along the coast . Low l imestone cliffs with sea-level coral boulders border Apaca Point south of Rizal Beac h . The sewer outfall peninsula at Gaan Point is the only artific ial shorel ine in this unit . Sea walls and a s lightly altered shoreline also occur at Rizal Beach .
The reef flat widens generally towards the south from a width o f 1 7 2 feet at Rizal Point to 2 , 6 5 1 feet s outh of Gaan Point . At the north end of the Agat Unit , an intertidal reef flat with scattered depressions grades to the south into an irregular inner reef flat and low-tide moat south of Apaca Point . The inner reef flat is interrupted at Gaan Point by the manmade peninsula . The outer reef flat is cut by depressed channels at Togcha Beach and south o f Gaan Point . Alutom I s land lies on the outer reef flat margin to the south .
The reef rock of the inner reef f lat is generally veneered with patches of silt , s and , gravel , coral-algal-mol lusk rubble and scattered boulders . Scattered boulders are also found on the outer reef f lat pavement where depressions contain some sand . An accumulat ion of coral boulders into a
3 6
boulder tract partially divides the inner reef flat j ust north of the Togcha River area .
The ma jor marine community throughout the Agat Unit is the seagras s ( Enhal us acoroides ) community . Rare at the north end near Rizal Beach, seagrass becomes more abundant in the low-tide moat that begins at Apaca Point . Southward the seagrass increases , especially seaward of the Togcha River and Bangi Point . Corals , widely scattered throughout the Agat Unit , are more abundant in the low-tide moat . Only a few corals are found on outer reef flats except for those in small holes and depress ions . A wide assortment o f invertebrates and fish is known to inhabit the unit .
The reef flat at Rizal Beach is composed principally o f coral rubble . The alga Padina tenuis is prominent and sponges ( Cinachyra australiensis ) are scattered . Many gastropods are present as is the sea urchin Echinometra mathaei .
South of Pelagi I s lets , the ree f pavement becomes substrate for animals such as the sea cucumber ( Holothuria atra ) , sea urchin ( Echinometra mathaei ) , and a few crustaceans . A number of gastropod species have been observed . Farther south the shore is littered with domestic trash , and the ghost crab ( Ocypode ceratophthalmus ) is found . At the north s ide o f the peninsula at Gaan Point , the snail ( Cerithium moras ) is found in great abundance .
The Agat Unit is the s ite o f the southern invas ion beac h . I t was here that the First Provis ional Marine Brigade and the 3 05th Regimental Combat Team of the 7 7 th Army Division c ame ashore . They were met by the Japanese First Battalion , 3 8th Infantry .
A 1 , 1 6 8 - foot peak j ust northeast of Rota village is all that remains of the extinct volcano that formed this i sland ( Figure 2 . 1 6 ) . A second peak in the northwest area o f the is land rises to 1 , 6 12 feet then drops o f f dramatically to a plateau that extends to the northeast end o f the is land . Terraces are present to the west , south and east o f the mountains . An isthmus on the extreme southwest end o f the island is capped by a flat-topped plateau called Taipingot . The plateau rises 4 6 9 feet and has sheer c l i f f s and horizontal terraces . Topographically , the interior o f the island is a combination of terraces and plateaus bordered by limestone cliffs . Rock formations are basalt , tuf f i te and coral limestone ( Department o f the Navy 1 9 4 4 : 1 1 ) .
Despite the limited running water on the is land , the interior plateaus and terraces are covered with a thick growth o f
3 7
w 0)
SASANLAGO
Taipringot
Puntan Taiptngot ·
SASANHAYA BAY
Puntan Pona
Fig . 2 . 1 6 .
10 .05
Bas e map o f Rota .
r MILES
-,, Efuenaarukoso Pt.
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
MARIANA ISLANDS
ROTA From U.S, Na"p Surveys to J 965
SCALE 1:25,000
vegetation inc luding coconut palms , breadfru it trees , pandanus and some savanna grasses ( Department o f the Navy 1944 : 1 1 ) .
The coast is steep and inaccessible except for the sandy isthmus connecting Taipingot to the main body o f the is land . Nearly surrounded by rocks and coral reefs , Rota ' s maj or bays are Sasanhaya and Aratsu on the southwest and south s ides , respectively , although the most commonly used anchorages are Sasanhaya and Sasanlago on the northwest .
Saipan
The dominant topographic feature is an axial upland area extending through the northern three- fourths of the island ( Figure 2 . 1 7 ) . The northern , eastern and southern coastlines exhibit moderate to steep s lopes and c liffs . Lowlands run parallel to the shore along the western coastline .
Saipan has a combination o f barrier and fringing reef s along most of its coast . Maj or coastal habitats include beaches , rocky shores , salt ponds and lakes , mangroves , coastal strand , limestone forest , volcanic forest , o f fshore islets , and disturbed and urban areas . A barrier reef runs along nearly 9 0 percent of the 13 . 5-mile length of the western shoreline and forms Saipan Lagoon . Several areas have been identified as critical eco logical zones that deserve special consideration because of ecological uniqueness , high productivity or stress .
The island is situated within a seismically active zone that is common to the other Mariana Islands . Many earthquakes o f low magnitudes occur throughout the year . The earthquake history of Saipan s ince 1 8 0 0 indicates that two maj or tremors occurred during 184 9 and 1 9 0 2 ; their magnitudes are not known . Based upon historical earthquake data for Guam , earthquakes on the magnitude o f 5 . 0 to 6 . 0 ( Richter Scale ) could be expected .
American Memorial Park3
The park is located on Puntan Muchot on the western side o f the is land ; its 1 3 3-acre topography i s essentially flat ( Figure 2 . 18 ) . The highest elevation i s about 10 feet above mean sea leve l . Along the west , the park is bounded by 2 , 50 0 feet o f Micro Beach . Snorkeling , windsurfing , wading and
3The section on American Memorial Park was written by James E . Miculka and Rose S . N . Manibusan .
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II Naftan Rock
PHILIPPINE SEA
PUETTON TANAPAG "'
Puntan Muchot
'··
��· i; LAGUNAN GARAPAN --/-
Puntan Agingan
SAIPAN CHANNEL
BAHIA LAULAU
Puntan D;mdan
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
Carolinas Point TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
MARIANA ISLANDS
SAIPAN AND TINIAN
0 2 5 MILES
Fig . 2 . 1 7 . Base map of Tinian and Saipan .
4 0
A M E R ICAN
---------------------------------
MEMORIAL P A R K
Fig . 2 . 1 8 . Location of American Memorial
0 200 300
METERS
Park ' Saipan .
fishing are common activities in the wide , shallow lagoon e fronting the beac h .
Along the north , a boat harbor and dredged access c hannel , created during the war , provide s heltered moorage for private and commercial boats inc luding glass -bottomed tour boats now operating out of the park . These tours show visitors c oral reefs and World War I I wreckage on one-day excurs ions to Managaha I s land , a small 1 5-acre island across the lagoon . This small harbor, protected somewhat by a Y-shaped breakwater , offers the best small-boat protection from typhoons on Saipan .
The east s ide of the park is a wetland--one of the few native wetland forests on Saipan . Native trees include Bruquiera , Thesperia and Hernandia . The native fern Acrostic hum is abundant in the higher areas . The wetland is an excellent habitat for native birds . Elsewhere the park is grassland with scattered H flarne H trees , a widely planted ornamental on the island . Gras s areas are maintained by mowing to prevent the alien and aggres s ive shrub , Tangentangen , from overrunning all open areas .
Kosrae
This small , picturesque , volcanic island is the easternmost � in the Carolines ( refer to Figure 2 . 2 ) . Today a separate W s tate within the Federated States of Micronesia , it covers an area of 4 2 square miles and is 8 miles in diameter ( Figure 2 . 1 9 ) . Topographically , it cons ists of the lofty main is land , called Ualan , Lele I s land and eight low coral is lets .
Lele is dominated by a 3 5 4 - foot peak in the east and a low western portion that is artificial , that is , manmade . Ualan I s land is cros sed from east to west by a valley , which separates it into two unequal part s . The smaller northern portion is overlooked by a 1 , 9 1 1- foot peak while the larger s outhern portion culminates in Mt . Crozer , more than 2 , 0 0 0 feet in elevation . The interior o f the is land i s basalt , typified by steep , rugged topography cut by mountain streams . Densely forested , the area is almost impassable .
The narrow coastline , less than a kilometer wide , is f lat and sandy in the north and east and overgrown with mangroves on the south and west . Fields and settlements are located along the coast , on the smaller islands and in the transverse valley . In the pas t , communication was pos s ible only by small boats that circumnavigated the island in a channel that separates the fringing reef from the shore . The fringing reef almost encircles the islands at distances ranging from a few yards to a mile from shore . Passages through the reef provide access to the island ' s harbors , the best of which is 4lt
4 2
PACIFIC OCEAN
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
CAROLINE ISLANDS
KOSRAE ISLAND Ftom Japanese Surveys in 1920
MILES
Reef
KOSRAE ISLAND
PORT LOTTIN
' "
METERS
Fig . 2 . 1 9 .
COQUILLE HARBOR
PACIFIC OCEAN
PACIFIC OCEAN
KOSRAE ISLAND
,,. MILES
r
LELE HARBOR
500 500 M
Base map o f Kosrae .
Lele on the east . Others are Port Lottin in the south , Port tt Berard and Coquille Harbor , both on the west ( Department of the Navy 1 9 4 4 : 8 ) .
Kosrae was a popular stopover during the heyday o f the whal ing period in the Pacific . Its forest and streams provided the food and supplies badly needed during the whalers ' extended voyages . The island has been known by many names , inc luding Arao , Armstrong , Experiment , Hope , Quo llen, Strong, Teyoa , Ualan , Walang, Kuthiu and Kusae .
Bel au
A c omplex c luster of volcanic islands , fragmented coral atolls and low islets o f limestone , this archipelago is encircled by a combination of barrier and fringing reefs ( refer to Figure 2 . 8 ) . Ngerekebesang ( Arakabesan ) , Babeldaob , Oreor ( Koror ) and Ngemelachel ( Malakal ) are volcanic while those farther south are all coralline or l imestone ( Department of the Navy 1 9 44 : 1 1 ) . All of the islands are heavily wooded and have long narrow hil l s with steep slopes to seaward . North of Babeldaob along the archipelago ' s eastern s ide , the reef is detached . At Babeldaob , it is more characteristic of a fringing reef . South of Babeldaob it again is detached until it reaches Beliliou where it hugs the east , s outh and west s hores . A � barrier reef f lanks the entire wes t s ide of the chain and W encloses an enormous lagoon . Access through the reef is provided by a series of natural cuts and channels .
Within the large western lagoon l ie the main harbors for the island : Oreor ( Koror ) , Kobasang , Ngemelachel ( Malakal ) and Ngeruktable ( Urukthapel ) Anchorage ( Figure 2 . 2 0 ) . Depth in the sandy- and silt-bottomed harbors does not exceed 1 3 0 feet and the ocean floor is relatively f lat . During World War I I , the Japanes e made extensive use o f both Ngemelachel and Ngeruktable harbors to s helter s hips in support of their f leet train . As a result of U . S . bombing raids in March 1 9 4 4 , more than 6 0 ships were damaged or sunk in these areas .
44
KOBASANG HARBOR
KOIIEBAIL LAGOON
KOROR ROAD
Fig . 2 . 2 0 .
BABELDAOB
A 0-9..,� ARANGEL CHANNEL
+e
1.0 0.5
GORAKLBAD PASSAGE
2 MILES
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN CAROLINE ISLANDS PALAU ISLANDS
3
ARANGEL CHANNEL AND KOROR ROAD From a survey by the USS TANNER In 1969
Maj or harbors and bays on Belau .
CHAPTER I I I. PREHISTORIC MARITIME WATERCRAFT AND SETTLEMENT
by Richard Davis
In all the Micrones ian groups of islands , the design o f the outrigger canoe reached a higher level o f development than in any part of Polynes i a , as did also the knowledge of the science of navigation possessed by certain of the is landers . It is difficult to conceive of any possible great improvement upon the sailing canoe des ign of the Micrones ians , for it combines three inventions of the utmost utility in sailing :
1 . The f lattened lee side o f the hull , acting as a lee board to reduce drift to leeward and compensating to some extent for the pul l to starboard of the outrigger float on the weather side .
2 . The use of a lee platform cantilever system , enabling a quantity o f cargo to be carried .
on the greater
3 . The midships pivoting of the mast , whereby the canoe was able to sail either end forward and so to keep the outrigger on the weather s ide , whichever course it was on ( Haddon and Hornell 1 9 3 6 ) .
The canoes of the Micronesians have inspired the admiration of practically all knowledgeable sailors and social scientists who have studied them . The des igns possess a high degree of both elegance and practical seaworthiness . Early European observers frequently remarked in glowing terms on the capabilities of the craft and of their sailors ( Figure 3 . 1 ) .
In all of the island areas of the Pacific , canoes were a vital and bas ic tool . The c are , attention and prestige given to this technology j ustly ref lect its strategic importance to continued existence of the soc ieties . Espec ially in Micronesia ( the name itsel f means " tiny islands " when
4 7
Fig . 3 . 1 . Jaluit sailing canoe , showing all es sential features of the des ign used in the Marshall I s lands ( after Alexander 1 9 0 2 ; Haddon and Hornell 1 9 7 5 ) .
4 8
rendered in Engl ish ) , the dependence on canoes was great . In subsistence , communication , defense and even evacuation in the face of drought or storm devastation , the canoes s erved crucially important roles for the small is land societies .
But outrigger canoes are not unique to Micronesia or even to the Pacific . The technology has its roots in a larger cultural tradition . In a general contemplation o f these as potential submerged cultural resources in Micronesia , a brief look at the setting from a larger cultural perspective is helpful .
The native or indigenous l anguages of Micronesia all belong to one of the most widespread language famil ies on Earth . This language family is now generally called Austrones ian ( " Of the Southern Islands " if rendered in English ) . Older references o ften used "Malaya-Polynesian " to designate the same language family . Languages included in this family are spoken in Madagascar , Formosa , the Philippines , Indone s ia , parts of Melanesia , Micrones ia and Polynesia . This distribution spans both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific .
This is not to say that all o f the languages now clas s i f ied as Austrones ian are closely related or that the societies found speaking them all descend from a s ingle ancestral society . It takes a technically trained l inguist to demonstrate some of the connections . S imilarly, the average speaker o f Engl ish would not suspect that Croatian i s a related language , though linguists have no dif f iculty f inding that it is so .
The languages spoken in Micronesia in contrast to the Polynesian Islands , do not form a s ingle , closely sel f-related subunit within the Austronesian language f amily . This diversity of language may indicate that this area has had a more complex internal cultural history than Polynesia , though as of this writing the cultural history is known only in very broad outline .
Initial settlements in the area today known as Micrones ia apparently came in the second millennium B . C . , though all dates this early have been disputed for both the Marshall Islands and the Mariana I s lands . Traces of the earliest settlements on islands can be quite difficult to find and even more diff icult to piece together , because is lands can be surpris ingly changeable geological entities 1 and settlements in coastal zones can be a ffected repeatedly by storms and geological shifts .
The initial settlers also apparently came from other islands in Melanesia and/or insular southeast Asia , though again , no consensus exists as to which islands furnished the sources
4 9
for any particular initial s ettlement or ancestral population � for any specific island groups of Micronesia .
Having had a few thousand years in which to grow , c hange and interact with each other , the later cultures and societies found and described by European explorers , traders and miss ionaries can be expected to be substantially different from those of the first settlers in those is lands . And they are . In several of the larger islands , Europeans found highly organized pol itical systems , under central ized authorities , and relatively dense populations . Yet , what archeological traces remain o f the earliest settlements seem to indicate much smaller scales of village s izes and numbers and less-intens ive utilization of the resources available .
Certainly , the maj or island groups did not exist in anything approaching strict cultural isolation in the l ater prehistoric times . Voyages between islands and island groups were undertaken often enough that routes between island groups were established parts of the navigator ' s training . At least some of the people in each island group knew in more than general terms what s orts of developments were taking plac e in other neighboring is land groups and probably had indirect knowledge of goings on in even more distant places . Although we know that communications were maintained, we do not know with any certainty the average rates at which contacts were maintained .
I t is not known to what extent coordinated communications among i slands i s also true of the earlier prehis toric societies in Micronesia . It is one of the questions that archeologists wil l be tackling through c lose examination of materials for years to come . The question is of no l ittle importance , because many researchers like to use the different island societies as " independent test cases " for theories of culture . Strict " independence " for these purposes requires the assumption that such communications did take place were infrequent and inconsequential enough to have l ittle or no effect on the subsequent developments o f a particular culture or society . It is an assumption that may not be true at all .
We can hope that the picture o f Micrones ian prehistory will begin emerging with much more distinctness in the next few years . More archeological research is now underway in Guam alone than took place in three previous decades in all of Micrones ia . This s ituation is largely due to legal obl igations placed on both government-funded capital improvement proj ects and on l arge private-development proj ects . New information on a wide range of questions of prehistory is · already emerging . The rapid development is providing funds for the research but is also eras ing traces 4lt
5 0
e of the past with alarming speed . Any summary written at this time would be overtaken by new information before it got into print .
But even in all of this rush of new information for prehistory as a whole , new information on canoes from the archeological record cannot be expected in any abundance . Sadly ( from an archeologist ' s point of reference ) , the materials of prehistoric canoes are not l ikely to be preserved in the archeological record o f either land or sea . The wood and fibers would decay rapidly in most terrestrial sites ( assuming a canoe found its way into such depos its ) . And because the materials were buoyant , very few lost craft are l ikely to have sunk to the safety of deep waters for preservation before having been thoroughly broken up at the surface . Areas with mud and s ilt at the margins o f the sea and land are the places where abandoned or lost canoes could survive , but these places are rather rare in Micronesia . Still , any find of an intact canoe or portions o f a canoe in an archeological context would be extraordinarily s ignificant .
Because the archeological c ontext can be expected to provide so little direct evidence on the development o f c anoes in Micronesia , we must rely heavily on indirect methods that develop historical sequences back from what is known through the best historical documentation of the later times . The works of Haddon and Hornel l ( 1 9 7 5 ) wil l always provide the foundation for any such attempt . Their compilation o f as much documentation on canoes of Oceania as they could from primary sources and from historical sources stands unsurpassed to this day , though o f course there have been valuable supplemental studies .
The documentation provided by Haddon and Hornel l is voluminous , but so is the sub j ect . Canoes and navigational skills were of central importance to a wide variety of societies in different local c ircumstances . Attention and prestige were lavished on c anoes and the persons in charge o f them . And the variations of form and detail o f canoe s matched the variations that can be seen today i n automobiles , which may , in fact , occupy a similarly s trategic position for our own culture .
There were war canoes , canoes for cargo , canoes for use i n shallow and calm waters , and the sailing canoe for distant trips on the open ocean . Each canoe had des ign features f itting it for its intended purposes . Each island society used its own resources to best advantage in construction , and each society found a way to impress its own des ires for expression on the canoe des igns , too . Any attempt at
5 1
complete cons ideration of canoe des igns in Micronesia alone e would run to hundreds of pages .
In 1 9 8 1 , Dr . Edwin Doran , Jr . publ ished a study on the general seaworthines s of several related canoe des igns from the entire area of the Austronesian-speaking people ( Doran 1 9 8 1 ) . Doran is a geographer and presented an interpretation of the distribution of various canoe types in a geographical method that was once a maj or technique among anthropological studies as wel l .
Dr . Doran finds that the age-area method gives a fairly stable picture of relative ages and origins for several of the attributes of sailing canoes among Austronesian-speaking peoples . Brief ly stated , the age-area method is based on the assumption that cultural traits spread outward from their centers of origin and that later developments wil l tend to have spread to a smal ler extent than have older ones .
As an illustration of the method , fads that originate in California spread to other places . By the time one such fad has made its way to St . Louis from Los Angeles , an even newer fad wil l have originated and made its way to Denver but not yet to St . Louis . Mapping the areas in which the fads are practiced gives indirect , but persuas ive , indications o f both the general places of origin and the relative ages of the a fads . W' Dr . Doran examined the attributes o f hull form , sail type , and the " shunting versus tacking " technique for sailing against the wind , which is the third attribute c ited by Haddon and Hornell in the opening quote ( Figure 3 . 2 ) . His conclusions can be brief ly summarized as follows .
1 . Hul l forms were developed in the following sequence :
a . double c anoes ,
b . s ingle outriggers us ing tacking techniques ,
c . s ingle outriggers us ing s hunting techniques and
d . double outriggers .
Severa l other attributes such as the symmetry o f the two hull ends were found to relate to the s hunting technique as well ( Figure 3 . 3 ) . Dr . Doran feels that all forms except perhaps the shunting s ingle outriggers were originally from somewhere in Indonesia , particularly with double outriggers replac ing s ingle outriggers late in the sequence ( Figure 3 . 4 ) .
5 2
� A. TACK ING
'. WIND
� J} 3 '
1 5f/ /
/
' ' '
2 � / / /
W IND J}
B . SHUNTING
3a
3b
3c
3d,4
Boat and sail p rofi le v iewed from lee s ide .
Fig . 3 . 2 . Techniques o f A, tacking , and B , shunting ( After Doran 1 9 8 7 ) .
5 3
Fig . 3 . 3 . Flying proa o f the Mariana I s lands ( Anson 1 7 4 8 ) . (Courtesy o f the Huntington Library)
l11 l11
15"
45'
30° 45"
so• 75"
-- Hornell, 1946, p. xxiv • Haddon, 1 937,
pp. 1 1 7, 254
so• 75°
90" 135" 150",'
. 0 go• 105' 120° 135' 150°
165" 180° 165° 150° 135°
45°
30"
15°
o•
•, �:--·. 15"
30"
) . 45' . 165' 180' 165° 150' 1JS•
Fig . 3 . 4 . Distribution o f double-outrigger c anoes ( Doran 1 9 8 1 ) .
2 . Sail types were functionally rel ated to the hul l types , 4t and are found distributed where the corresponding hul l types are , so these do not give by themselves any additional historic ins ights .
3 . The Micrones ian area was the center o f development i f not o f the original innovation for the s hunting technique and the spec i f ic des ign features assoc iated with it . The other ma jor innovations originated in I ndone s ia and spread from there .
The age-area technique does not by itse l f give indic ations as to the earliest origins o f Microne s ian settlements . I t is more important for call ing attention to the degree of communicat ions that were maintained over long periods of t ime . After a l l , the bas ic data being compared are the canoe types in these areas at the t imes historical documentat ion becomes available . And these data suggest that Micronesia had received imported canoe forms at least twice s ince its initial settlement and was " exporting " another ma j or improvement in the basic sail ing technology at the time of discovery by Europeans .
I t is indirect evidence , to be sure , but it also leads to a tentative hypothesis that the c anoe technology o f the initial settlements was not the same as that documented by the l ater European explorers . Not the elegant " flying proas , II but e double c anoes or perhaps s ingle outriggers u s ing tacking are l ikely to have been the cra ft o f the f irst settlers ( Fi gures 3 . 5 and 3 . 6 ) . The seaworthiness of these was suf f ic ient enough that a continuous chain of contacts was maintained with at least the " nearest neighbor s , " and later techniques for c anoe des ign were acqu ired by dif fus ion through those neighbors . S ingle outriggers us ing the tacking method may have been the original craft but could have come l ater , and even the shunting single outrigger may have come from an area c loser to I ndonesia where doubl e outriggers have s ince replaced it .
Whether or not the shunting technique originated in Micronesia , the Micrones ian refinements o f the shunting s ingle outrigger des ign are not matched elsewhere .
The distributional data used in the age-area method are indirect evidence but perhaps the best that will be available , unless by some fortunate event we f ind one or more anc ient c anoes wel l preserved in datable archeological contexts from the early occupations . We may hope for this event , bec ause it wil l shed l ight on what still stands as one o f the more thrilling achievements o f the human spec ies on this planet , the discovery and settlement of the tiny i s lets o f the Pac i fic , nearly lost in the expanse o f open ocean .
5 6
15'
30'
45'
30'
so• 75' 90'
- - Hornell, 1936, p. 443
• See App. 1 for sources
45' so• 75° go•
135' 150•,/ 165' 180' 135' 45'
30'
(j · ,.....,
/� . . ·u··-�
. , . . .
(- ·� '\ \ .. \ \ \
\ \ '\ \
15'
., � . -� \ \ \ \ o· . �-:..:. -- · - ·-
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ld
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165' 180' 165' 135'
Fig . 3 . 5 . D i stribution o f double canoes ( Doran 1 9 8 1 ) .
l11 (X)
15'
30' · · · · · · Hornell, 1946, p. xxiv
• See App. 1 lor sources
--- Distribution of shunting technique 45'
30' 45' 60' 75' 90'
Fig . 3 . 6 . Distribution techniques ( Doran 1 9 8 1 ) .
105'
o f
tso•,.·'
120' 135'
s ingle-outrigger
165' 180' . 45'
30'
I N G ... ,. c t(
········ ··-····'· . .. •..••• ·· 30' I
·•••••• · ••
45'
180' 150°
c anoes and o f s hunting
CHAPTER IV . EUROPEAN DISCOVERY , CONTACT AND COLONIZATION
By Toni L . Carre l l and Marj orie G . Driver
I ntroduction
The s ixteenth century Spanish discoverers of Micronesia ventured into the region not to satis fy an inner urge for adventure , nor to pit themselves against the elements , but to fu l f i l l two bas ic mot ives : to " discover i s l ands and lands and rich spiceries and other things . . . to the bene fit o f the Kingdom " o f the Spanish and holy Roman monarch Charles V ( Cushner 1 9 7 1 : 1 2 ) and " . . . to serve God . . . to give l ight to those who were in darkness , and grow rich , as all men des ire to do " ( Bernal Diaz del Castil lo trans . 1 9 0 8 in Parry 1 9 6 3 : 1 9 ) . Magel lan discovered the I s las de Ladrones ( Mariana I s lands ) while seeking a wes tward route to the spice-rich Indies . Those Spaniards who quickly followed , expl ored Micronesia whi le aspiring to c laim a share o f the lucrative spice trade by discovering and asserting ownership o f unknown islands growing the rare spices . The quest for pepper from India , c innamon from Ceylon ( Sri Lanka ) , nutmeg and mace from the Celebes ( Sulawes i ) and the Indies , ginger from China , and cloves from the is land o f Halmahera , referred to as the Moluccas or Spice I s l ands , sent the Portuguese and the Spanish on voyages into Micronesia that taxed the men , s hips , and treasuries o f both countries .
The arrival o f Ferdinand Magel lan at the southernmost o f the Mariana I s l ands on March 6 , 1 5 2 1 , heralded the end o f isolation from European inf luence and marked the beginning o f a n era o f change and outs ide dominance i n Micronesia that would span more than four centuries be fore coming full c irc le back to s e l f -government .
The European maritime world o f the late f i fteenth and early s ixteenth century was poised on the brink of an explos ive growth in knowledge o f the seas . Passage from ocean to ocean , l inks to known countries o f es tabl ished commerc ial importance , were most practically made by ship . For a Europe that was demanding trade with the Eas t , it was taken for granted that :
5 9
a rel iable ship , competently manned , adequately stored , and equipped with means of finding the way , [ could ] in t ime reach any country in the world [ that ] has a sea coast , and can return whence it came ( Parry 1 9 7 4 : xi ) .
European sail ing vessels exploring and exploiting Micronesia re f lected the changing requirements o f discovery , conque s t , commerc ialization and colonization . Change was also re f lected in the indigenous craft o f the Micrones ians . Archipelagos are by nature maritime communities . The forms o f interis land communication they developed ref lected a conglomerate o f c ircumstances based on the need for mobility , avai lab i l ity o f resources , the forces o f nature and c ircumstances imposed by outs ide forces . The eventual disappearance of many of the indigenous craft of Micronesia was a direct result o f the impacts o f European discovery and coloniz at ion .
The e f fects o f European discovery rippled throughout Micronesia . Like waves moving away from a storm center , they arrived at the islands at quite dif ferent times and appeared in dif fering forms within the region . Conti nuous European contac t , under the inf luence and control of the Spanish, began i n 1 5 6 5 in the Mariana I s lands . However , the Caroline , � Marsha l l and Gilbert is lands were nearly forgotten after some initial discoveries and were not irrevocably swept into the Dutch , and English spheres o f inf luence until 1 6 9 6 , almost a century after the Spanish had settled in the Mariana I s lands . The obvious cultural and commercial di f ferences between the Spanish , the Dutch and the English , lead to dist inc t ly dif ferent precolonial experiences between these i s l and groups . These dramatic differences are ref lected in the discuss ions that follow .
Discovery and Exploration
During the late fifteenth century , the Portuguese steadily worked their way down the west coas t o f Africa and established a chain o f bases along the way . The Bul l o f Pope Alexander VI in 1 4 9 3 and the Treaty o f Torde s i l las in 1 4 9 4 gave the Portuguese exc lus ive rights t o coloniz e and explore a l l areas east of an imaginary l ine o f demarcation established wel l out into the Atlantic . As a result o f Vasco de Gama ' s voyage in 1 4 9 7 around the Cape of Good Hope to I ndia , the Portuguese established a monopoly over the only known sea route to the Orient .
6 0
By 1 5 1 8 the shipping route down the African coas t and acros s the Indian Ocean to India and the strategic Malaccan Straits was the exclus ive estate o f John I I I of Portugal . The Portuguese had succeeded in creating a highly profitable commerc ial empire in the East , while the Spanish could do little but stand by and watch with covetous eyes ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 8 ) .
As a consequence , the Spanish were forced to look for a westward route to the Indies .
Columbus ' voyages to the West Indies , under the auspices o f the Spanish Crown , were part of this wes tward thrust . Exploration o f the Caribbean basin by Columbus ( 14 9 2 - 1 4 9 8 ) ; the Gul f o f Mexico by P ineda , Gri j alva and Cordoba ( 1 5 1 5 - 1 5 2 0 ) ; and the east coast of South America by Hoj eda , de la Cosa , Vespuc c i , Pinz6n , Mendoz a and Solis ( 1 4 9 9 - 1 5 1 5 ) , among others , were supported by Spain in an ef fort to f ind an alternate route to the East ( Keith 1 9 8 7 : 1 4 - 2 6 ) . It was not until 1 5 1 8 , when Magellan was able to convince the Spanish Crown that rounding the tip of South America would bring him to the Spice I s l ands , that s igni ficant progre s s toward another route to the Indies was made . When TRINIDAD and its companion ships sailed into a small harbor on the southern coas t of Guam in 1 5 2 1 , Magellan ' s hopes of a westward route became a real ity . Although only 18 men and one small ship , VICTOR IA , eventually survived the rigorous expedition to the I ndies and returned to Seville , Spain had achieved succes s . Its long-sought avenue to the Spice I s lands was establi s hed and exploration of Micronesia had begun ( Figure 4 . 1 ) .
On May 6 , 1 5 2 2 , during the return voyage , the c rew on TRINIDAD , commanded by Gonz alo Gomez de E spinosa after Magellan ' s death , glimpsed t iny Sonsorol ( refer to F i gure 4 . 1 ) . This was the f irst recorded s ighting o f an island in the Caroline I s lands by Europeans ( Stanley 1 8 7 4 : 2 5 - 2 9 ) . However , it was the Portuguese , not the Spanish , who made the f irst forays into the Carolinas . Stirred into action by the Spanish discovery o f a western route to the Spice I s l ands , the captain of the Mo luccas was ordered to initiate exploration of the surrounding waters and lay claim to them , particularly those to the north--the unfamiliar Phi l ippines .
1The f ol lowing overview o f the European discovery and exploration of the Carol ine and Marshall I s l ands draws heavily from the work of Fr . Franc is X . Hezel , The First Taint of C ivilizat ion ( 1 9 8 3 ) , except where otherwise noted .
6 1
The i s l ands were reported to contain spices , gold , s ilver and tt other prec ious metals al l j ust waiting to be c la imed , pre ferably by the Portuguese , not their bitter rival s the Spani s h .
I n 1 5 2 5 , Dioga da Rocha was dispatched from the Moluccas to explore and l ay c laim to the l ands to the north ( refer to Figure 4 . 1 ) . Caught in a severe s torm in October o f that year and driven between 8 0 0 and 1 , 2 0 0 miles to the northeast , the embattled crew f inally sighted a small is land group . Rocha named the islands Is las de Sequeira , after the ship ' s p ilot . The c aptain and his c rew remained on one o f the i s lands , probably Ul ithi in the western Carol ines , for four months making repairs and waiting for favorable winds . During their stay , the Portuguese learned that there were no metals on these is lands , although gold could be obtained from high mountains to the west , pos s ibly in the southern Phil ippines . On January 2 0 , 1 5 2 6 , Rocha sailed out o f Ul ithi and the is land was forgotten .
A second expedition to the Pac ific also began during the summer of 1 5 2 5 . A f leet of seven vessels commanded by Juan Garc ia Jo fre de Loaysa set out with the sole purpose of taking pos se s s ion of the Spice I s l ands for Spain , by whatever means pos s ible . Nearly a year a fter departing Sevi lle , the f leet f inally arrived in the Pac i f ic - -with only two ships A remaining . When the f leet was forced to put in at Mexico for � repairs , only one ship , SANTA MARIA DE LA V ICTORIA , was c apable o f continuing the j ourney . Shortly after VICTORIA ' s departure , Loaysa died . Within a week the second i n command , Sebastian del Cano , was also dead . Alonso de Salazar assumed c ommand , continuing northward in a desperate search for provis ions and water . When the crew f inal ly spotted a small is land , they named it San Bartolome in honor of the s a int ' s feast day . S an Bartolome was most probably the is l and of Taongi , now cal led Bokaak , the first European discovery in the Marsha l l I s l ands ( refer to Figure 4 . 1 ) . Unfortunately , VICTORIA ' s crew was unable to f ind a suitable anchorage and were f orced to sail on , eventual ly arriving at Guam .
A fter a brief layover in Guam for reprovis ioning , Salazar , h i s less -than- full- force crew and several native Guamanian i s landers who were impres sed into service , departed for the Phil ippines . Also among the c rew was the sole survivor of three men who deserted Magel lan ' s TRINIDAD four years earlier, Gonzalo de Vigo ( Noone 1 9 8 6 : 1 0 3 ) . Fol lowing a brief s tay in the Phil ippines , Salazar c ontinued to the Moluccas where he was met by a substantial Portuguese force that was able to quickly rout the Spanish by compel l ing them to abandon their ship and take re fuge in the hills .
6 2
MAGELLAN 1 5 2 1 -VILLALOBOS 1 542-43' - - - ·
SAAVEDRA 1 528-29 ESPINOSA 1 5 2 2
ROCHA 1 5 2 5
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Fig . 4 . 1 . 1 5 2 1 - 1 5 4 3 .
S ixteenth-century voyages o f exploration and discovery ,
I n October 1 5 2 7 , Charles V sent anot her f leet from New Spain tt ( Mexico ) under the command o f Alvaro de Saavedra Ceron to provide as s i stance to the Loays a-Salazar expeditionary force . I n December , during Saavedra ' s cro s s ing o f the Pac i f ic , he s ighted the Ladrones but did not put into port ( Coel lo 1 8 8 5 : 4 2 ) . On January 1 , 15 2 8 , two smal l i s lands in the wes tern Caro l ines were discovered ; the Spaniards named the group I s las de los Reyes . The two i s lands were most l ikely Fais and Yap .
Upon reaching the Philippines a few weeks later , Saavedra f inally heard news of the Loaysa-Sala z ar survivors . Although Saavedra reali zed he could not hope to rescue Salazar and his c rew , he continued to the Moluccas where he picked up a c argo o f valuable spices be fore departing the I ndies . Hoping to f ind a return route back acro s s the Pac i f ic to New Spain , Saavedra ran along the northern c oast o f New Guinea and eventual ly turned northeast . En route he reached an is l and he cal led Barbudos because o f the beards worn by the natives . The i s l and was recorded as being at 7° north l at itude and was probably Pohnpei ( Ponape ) or one o f its outl iers . A fter s ix months o f frustration , and with the winds s t i l l against him , Saavedra was f inally f orced to turn back to the Molucc as .
I n May 1 5 2 9 I Saavedra again attempted to cro s s the Pac i f ic a ( refer to Figure 4 . 1 ) . He retraced the route o f his voyage ., the year before in FLORIDA , again s ighting islands in the vic inity o f Barbudos . Continuing northeas terly into the area o f the Marsha l l I s lands , in late September Saavedra reached what i s probably today the ato l l o f U j el ang . Impre s sed by the tattooed natives , he named the i s lands Los Pintados . On October 1 , another group o f i s l ands was discovered to the northeas t . This group , distinguished by its lush vegetation , was named Los Jardines . I t is suspected that Los Jardines are the ato l l s o f Bikini and Enewetak . A fter a brief s tay and s ome l imited reprovis ioning , Saavedra and his crew in FLORI DA continued northeastward . Within a short t ime , however , Saavedra and his succes s or were both dead , al though the s hip had reached the northern latitudes and the winds that would have eventually taken them back to New Spain had they persevered . Returning to T idore , in the Molucc as , FLORIDA ' s crew j oined the Loaysa survivors in the hills .
While Saavedra was battl ing the winds in his e f fort to cross the Pac i f ic , the representatives o f the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns were working o n a treaty . Although explorers under the auspices o f the Spanish Crown had s ucceeded in discovering a westward route to the I ndies , no s hip had been able to recros s the P ac i f ic and return to New Spain . O f 15 s hips sent out by Spain , only Magel l an ' s VICTORIA had returned ; the los s o f l i fe among the c rews e
6 4
paral leled the ship losses . Needless to say , the commerc ial success of the voyages was less than spectacular . The Treaty of Z arago z a , s igned in 15 2 9 , stipulated that in exchange for 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 ducats , Spain would give up its tenuous rights to the Spice I s lands to Portugal ( Cushner 1 9 7 1 : 2 9 ) . Under the c ircumstances , it was probably reasonable recompense for t he Spanish .
It was not until November 1 5 4 2 , 1 3 years after the Treaty o f Z arago za , that the Spanish once again attempted a n expedition into the Pac i f ic . Ruy Lopez de Villalobos , captain of a f leet o f s ix vessels , set out from Mexico with orders to s ee k out the I s las del Poniente ( I s les o f the Wes t ) , the Philippines ( re fer to Figure 4 . 1 ) . Although access to t he Moluccas was denied , there was nothing to stop Spain f rom exploring , conquering and coloniz ing the Phil ippines , reputedly rich in c innamon and gold . On December 2 5 , 1 5 4 2 , the f leet made a landfal l somewhere in the Marsha l l I s lands and Villalobos named the islands Los Corales . Shortly thereafter , they arrived at another atoll suspected of being Saavedra ' s Los Jardines . The Ladrones were also s ighted but no stop was made ( Colin 1 9 0 0 ( I ) : 1 4 9 ) . In the Caro l ines , Villalobos rediscovered Fais and Yap . There the explorers were greeted in Spanish that must have been learned from the members o f the Loaysa-Salazar expedit ion 14 years earl ier . Accompanying Villalobos was the c hronic ler Antonio de Herrera . Herrera eventua l ly published one o f the earliest and best maps o f the northern Pac i fic , which depicted a l l the is lands discovered by the Spanish ( Historia General , Madrid , 1 6 0 1 ) .
Villalobos reached the I s las del Poniente in early February 1 5 4 3 and immediately set out to conquer the local i nhabitants on the i s l and of Mindanao . Ultimately , the expedition proved unsuccess ful , and after f inding out that the Philippines had been c laimed by Portugal f ive years earl ier , Villalobos abandoned Mindanao and set out for the Moluccas . Severe food shortages and loss of l ife forced him to surrender to the Portugues e , who eventual ly provided the survivors pas s age back to Spain .
In 15 5 2 , the caravel SANTA MARGARITA , commanded by Pedro de Acuna , on a trading and exploring venture , is bel ieved to have wrecked somewhere in the Ladrones ( Potter 1 9 7 2 : 4 1 4 ) . I t may be that other ves sels vis ited the is lands during this period ; i f so , they are not general ly known .
I t was not until 1 5 6 4 that the Spanish again attempted coloni zation o f the Phil ippines . Despite evidence that the Phil ippines lay beyond the Spanish zone , as set forth in the Treaty o f Tordesil las , Phi l l ip I I dec ided that an outpost in the Philippines would be establ ished . Miguel de Legazpi was
6 5
dispatched from Mexico with orders to make for the e Phil ippines to discover which of the islands grew spices , obtain s amples o f those and the other riches available there and establish a colony . A few days out of port , one o f the ships in the f leet , SAN LUCAS , deserted the f lot i l la . Capt . Alonso de Arellano and the crew o f SAN LUCAS intended to become pirates , preying on rich merchant ves sels in the I ndie s .
P iloted by Lope Martin and purposeful ly avoiding Legazpi , SAN LUCAS s l ipped away and ran a few degrees south o f the usual track to the Ladrones . Within a month it had made its f irst l andfall at a group of low is lets that compose Likiep Atoll in the Marshal l I s lands . The following day , January 7 , 1 5 6 5 , two more islands --Dos Vec inos --were discovered ( Figure 4 . 2 ) . Dos Vec inos , two neighbors , were probably Kwa j alein . On January 8 , another i s land approximately 2 0 miles south of Kwa j alein was discovered . This was , perhaps , Lib I s l and , also cal led Nadadores by Are llano as a result o f t he hos t ile welcome received by the Spanish . On January 1 7 , several high is l ands ringed by a barrier ree f were seen--the Truk I s l ands . Once again , the well-armed natives , hos t i le and bent on capturing the ship , pursued SAN LUCAS i n their c anoe s . On January 1 8 , another small group o f is lets was discovered, the ato l l o f Pulap . Unlike the Trukese , the people o f Pulap of fered to provide water and wood to the a crew . Although apprehens ive , several men went ashore with W the i s l anders . Unfortunately , their fears were well grounded , and before it was all over two sailors were k i l led and a third barely escaped . Arellano named the i s l ands Los Martires , the martyrs . A few days l ater the natives o f Sorol Atol l , in the western Carol ines , repeated the hos tile greeting of fered by the Lib , Truk and Pulap i s l anders . This t ime the Spanish were prepared . They f ired on the armed natives and sei zed their c anoes and weapons for wood . Once beyond Sorol , the remainder of SAN LUCAS ' voyage to the Phil ippines was uneventful .
About the s ame time SAN LUCAS reached its f irst l andfal l , Legazpi in SAN PEDRO reached another is land i n the Mars hal l s . He disembarked , claimed it for the King o f Spain and named it I s la de los Barbudos on January 1 1 , 1 5 6 5 ( CDI 1 8 8 7 : 7 6 - 7 9 ) . Subsequently , Legazpi discovered four more uninhabited i s l and groups during the voyage through the Marshall I s lands ( re fer to Figure 4 . 2 ) .
The flot i l l a f inal ly reached Guam on January 2 2 , 1 5 6 5 . Forty- four years after Magellan ' s initial visit to the Ladrones , Miguel Lopez de Legazpi arrived with three s hips to o f f ic ial ly c laim the islands for the Spanish Crown . Symbolic o f the c laim , and in accord with the customs of the t imes , Mas s was s aid in a large boathouse ( Doc . Ined . 1 9 6 7 , Doc . 2 7 , �
6 6
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MARTIN 1 56 6 MENDANA 1 568
ARELLANO 1 565 LEGAZPI 1 565
QUIROS 1 595
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I
S ixteenth-century voyages o f exp loration and discovery ,
1 5 6 5 : 2 5 1 ) near the shore o f a bay o n the southwest coast of tt Guam ( Noone 1 9 8 6 : n . 5 4 3 ) . Legazpi used his sword to cut branches from the trees , pul led gras s , threw stones and had crosses c arved in coconut palms near the shore ( Doc . I ned . , Doc . 3 8 , 1 5 6 5 : 8 0 ) . Fol lowing the ceremony , the f loti l l a set about reprovis ioning . The Chamurres --the natives o f Guam-l iving up to their 5 0 -year-old reputat ion for s imply taking items that interested them , swarmed over the ships col lecting whatever they could . Tens ions mounted between the Spanish and the natives fol lowing a report that a group of sailors had been stoned while ashore seeking water . The death o f a young seaman brought matters to a head . As a resul t , an armed party from the flot i l l a torched a vil lage and a l l of the c anoes readily available . The reprisals ended with Legazpi hanging four Chamurres and departing .
Arriving in the Phil ippines in mid-February 15 6 5 , Legazpi spent the next two months exploring Samar in the eastern Philippines be fore arriving o f f the coast of Cebu in late Apri l . Although he was greeted by a l arge , wel l -armed force o f natives , they were quickly dispersed by the s hip ' s arti l lery . Legazpi took pos se s s ion o f the i s l ands in the name o f the Spanish king , Phil ip I I and formal ly initiated an era o f colonial rule that would span more than 3 0 0 years ( Cu shner 1 9 7 1 : 5 3 -5 4 ) .
I n the interim , however , Arel lano arrived in the Phil ippines before Legazpi and dec ided to wait for the f leet in the Davao Gul f . After a brief but unsucces s fu l search for the rest of the f leet in that area , Are l lano departed the Phil ippines on April 2 1 , 1 5 6 5 . Stil l piloted by Lope Mart i n , SAN LUCAS tracked northeast , then east in the hope o f f inding a sailing route back to Mexico . When SAN LUCAS reached 4 0 degrees north , the westerly winds quickly carried the s hip acros s the Pac i fic to North Americ a . Two months later Legazpi also left the Phil ippines and s ai led northeast along a c ourse s imilar to that taken by SAN LUCAS . The succe s s ful second west-east cro s s ing of the Pac i f ic by Legazpi , in SAN PEDRO , estab l ished once and for all the return route that would be followed by the Manila gal leons for more than 2 5 0 years .
Upon the arrival o f SAN LUCAS in Acapulco , Spanish authorities had the ship SAN JERONIMO quickly out f itted to bring additional suppl ies and reinforcements to Legazpi , s t i l l bel ieved to be in the Phil ippines . Lope Martin was again selected to pilot the ship back acro s s the Pac i f ic . Not long after departing Mexico , Martin c onvinced SAN JERONIMO ' s crew to mutiny and eventual ly took control persona l ly . Continuing in a westerly course through the Marsha l l I s lands , SAN JERONIMO s i ghted several sma l l i s lands and arrived at Ujelang on July 6 , 1 5 6 5 ( re fer to Figure 4 . 2 ) . During their brief stay on the is land , some o f the
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mutineers s l ipped back to the ship , retook it and ultimately left Martin and 2 6 others marooned .
The succes s ful establ i s hment o f an outpost in the Phil ippines by Legazpi opened the doors of the Orient to Spain . With the beginning of Spanish rule , trade between the Chinese and the Spanish community at Manila grew rapidly . Chines e entrepreneurs brought s ilks , teas , porcelain , spices and gems to the Spanish traders who , in turn , purchased these goods with s i lver mined in Peru and Mexico . The f irst of the Manila " gal leons " to traverse the Pac i f ic were SAN JUAN i n 1 5 6 7 , under the command o f Juan d e la I s la , and two unidenti f ied s hips , under the command o f Fel ipe de Salcedo . SAN JUAN sailed from the Phil ippines in July and arrived at Acapulco in November , while Salcedo departed Acapulco in April , s topped in Guam to reprovis ion , and arrived in Manila i n August . On a return voyage , SAN PABLO , also under the command of Salcedo , was lost in the Ladrones a f ter departing Manila on July 1 , 1 5 6 8 . SAN PABLO has the distinction o f being the first Manila gal leon lost in the trans -Pac i fic c ros s ing . One hundred thirty-two survivors eventual ly made it back from the Ladrones to the Philippines in a sma l l bark they constructed from a ship ' s boat ( Dalgren 1 9 1 7 : 4 8 ) .
The rich Manila galleons quickly brought Engl i s h privateers into the region . Quite naturally they concentrated their activities in the Mariana I s lands , c lose to the gal leon route . However , Drake did s top at an is land wel l o f f the Manila track in the western Carolines in 1 5 7 9 and , a fter being vis ited by s t ic ky- fingered natives , referred to it as the " Is land o f Theeves " ( He zel 1 9 8 3 : 3 2 ; Les sa 1 9 7 5 : 2 5 3 ) . The i s land Drake i s suspected o f visiting is pres ent-day Belau ( Palau ) .
The last exploratory encounter into Micrones ia in the s ixteenth century occurred when Alvaro de Mendafia led two expeditions ( 1 5 6 8 , 1 5 9 5 ) to s earch for the phantom l and o f Ophir , the source o f Solomon ' s gold ( re fer t o Figure 4 . 2 ) . On his disastrous second voyage , Mendafia died and his command was as sumed by Pedro Ferdinand de Quiros . On December 2 3 , 1 5 9 5 , while attempting to reach the Phil ippines after the small band had been dec imated by raids on their c amp , Quiros nearly ran aground on an o f f s hore reef that was most probably at Pohnpei in the eastern Caroline I s lands . Quiros is a l so c redited in 1 6 0 6 with be ing the f irst European to s ight the i s land o f Butaritari in the Gi lbert I s lands , which he named Buen Via j e . However , it was Quiros ' near disaster at Ponape that marked the end of the f irst wave of exploration into the region .
Because the i s land chains that make up the Gi lbert , Marshall and Caroline archipelagos o f Micrones ia had no riches or
6 9
prec ious metal s , and the Manila-Acapulco route ran wel l north 4lt and touched only the Marianas , there was l ittle reason for further Spanish exploration of those i s l ands . The discoveries were recorded in various j ournals and logs , and the general locations of the is lands were noted ; however , they were quickly forgotten and allowed to fade into obscurity by the Spanish . As a result of their geographic locat ion , the fate o f the islanders in the Gilberts , Marshal ls and Carolines would be dramatically di f ferent from that o f the Mariana I s landers who would feel the full impact o f Spanish domination . This led to s igni f ic ant dif ferences in the subsequent history of the Mariana I s l ands and a c ultural break with other people in the region . I n the Mariana I s lands , these differences began in the mid- 1 5 6 0 s .
Contac t , Conquest and Colonization2
Mariana I s l ands
Fol lowing initial discovery , European influence in the Mariana I s lands may be divided broadly into three t ime periods : contact ( 1 5 6 5 - 1 6 6 8 , Legazpi to Sanvitores ) , conquest ( 1 6 6 8 - 1 7 0 0 , Sanvitores to Madrazo ) and colonization ( 1 7 0 0 - 1 8 9 8 ) . The Spanish colonial period , in terms o f the A evolution o f maritime activities , may be divided into three .. general categories : early colonial period ( 1 7 0 0 - 1 7 6 5 ) , mid-colonial period ( 1 7 6 5 - 1 8 2 5 ) and l ate co lonial period ( 1 8 2 5 - 1 8 9 8 ) .
When Miguel L6pez de Legazpi ' s flagship , SAN PEDRO--captained by his 1 7 -year-old grandson , Fel ipe de Salcedo , with Father Andres de Urdaneta as navigator--dis covered the return route from the Phil ippines across the Pac i f ic to Mexico , the Chamurre people , unknowingly , entered a new age ; an age during which their customs and l ifestyle changed and dis appeared and that heralded the end o f their magnificent ocean-going f lying proas .
Contact 1 5 6 5 - 1 6 6 8 --Flying Proa s , Acapulco Gal leons and Privateers
The Age of Contact may be cons idered to be the 1 0 3 years between the arrival of Legazpi ' s expedition at Umatac and the
2 This section , Contact , Conquest Mariana Islands 1 5 6 5 - 1 8 9 8 was Driver .
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and Coloni z ation i n the written by Marj orie G .
establishment o f the Jesuit miss ion in the Marianas by Father Diego Luis de Sanvitores .
From the archipelagos o f Micrones ia have evolved some o f the world ' s most unusual sailing crafts and some o f its most ski lled mariners . Western navigators venturing into the Pac i fic Ocean in the 1 5 0 0 s came upon a chain of is lands inhabited by people known to them initially as Chamurres . The Europeans marveled at the speed and vers ati lity o f the Chamurre sailing vessel s , which they described as " f lying proas " ( Navarrete 1 9 7 1 ( 1 7 ) : 6 4 4 ) , speedy outrigger c anoes whose bow became the stern and vice versa by a s imple maneuver of the sail ( refer to Figure 3 . 3 ) . So numerous were the sma l l craft that when Ferdinand Magel lan f irst s aw them in 15 2 1 , he named the is lands I s las de las Velas Latinas , the Islands o f the Lateen Sail s . When he stopped to provis ion at one of the islands , a misunderstanding over property rights caused him to re fer to it and its inhabitants as the i s l and of the thieves ( I s la de los Ladrones ) . For centuries this plurali zed epithet remained on charts and maps to identi fy the entire is land chain to the western world ( Driver 1 9 8 3 : 1 9 8 ) .
Whenever the strange , large , European ves sels c ame in s ight of the i s lands , usually between Rota and Guam , the two southernmost in the chain , swarms o f native craf t sped out to meet them . Abuses and misunderstandings between the foreign sailors and the Chamurres soon made the islanders wary in their dea l ings with the vis itors ; nevertheles s , they eagerly traded water and provis ions for bits and pieces of highly valued iron ( hierro ) .
With the discovery o f the return route across the Pac i f ic from the Phil ippines , the so-c a l led " galleon trade " was initiated--a continual movement of men and goods between Spain ' s colonies in the New World and in the Far East . For 2 50 years great merchant vessels regularly plied the Pac i f ic and served as an indispens able link between Manila and Acapulco , thereby connecting Spain ' s colony in the Far East to her viceroyalty in New Spain and , by extens ion , to the mother country itself ( Fi gure 4 . 3 ) . In addition to the l ayover at Acapulco , the only other antic ipated s top on the year-long voyage was made on the trek to Manila when the galleons usually paused for water and provis ions at the southernmost of the Ladrones . This north-south chain o f is lands straddled the gal leons ' des ignated track , and a s soon as the vigilant natives s ighted their s ails - - for they soon must have become aware of the seasonal regularity of the ships ' arrival - -they put far out to sea in c anoes to meet
_____ theiJL,_eager to trade water and produee for highly------px±--n-------1 pieces o f iron ( Driver 1 9 8 3 : 1 9 9 ) .
7 1
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EASTERN ROUTE OF MANILA GALLEON
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Gal leon route across the Pac i f ic .
The is lands of the Chamurres became important to the gal leons for two reasons . Firs t , they served as navigational points from which the final leg of the j ourney , the run to the San Bernardino Straits , could be charted . The straits were the easternmost entrance to the Phil ippine archipelago through which the ships pas sed and threaded their way among the islands to the west coast of Luzon and Manila • s port o f Cavite . Second , after the ships had sailed 6 0 or 7 0 days out of Mexico , the isl anders could be depended upon to provide water and provisions , a c ircumstance that freed valuable c argo space at Acapulco to load additional goods and personnel .
After the Guam vis it of Miguel L6pe z de Legazpi in early 1 5 6 5 , and the discovery of the return route to Mexico several months l ater , the natives became accustomed to the yearly arrival of the gal leons as the ships passed through their islands on the leg from Acapulco to the Phil ippines . More than 1 0 0 ships pas sed through the islands during the period 1 5 6 5 - 1 6 6 8 , most in convoys of two or more ves sels , which c arried several hundred people and , although the great ma j ority were Spanish ships sail ing on the regular run f rom Acapulco to Cavite , some were English and Dutch privateers out to c apture and plunder the s ilver-l aden galleons . Among the privateers were Thomas Cavendis h , who was in the i s l ands briefly in 1 5 8 8 ( BR 1 9 0 3 ( 1 0 ) : 2 6 1 ) and Ol iver Van Noort i n 1 6 0 0 ( Burney 1 9 6 7 ( I I ) : 1 9 0 ) .
Shortly after the newly-appo inted Governor Genera l o f t he Philippines , G6mez Pere z Dasmarifias , passed through the Ladrones on the way to his new assignment , he wrote to the king to suggest that a pres idio , or garrison , be established in those islands ( Co l in 1 9 0 0 ( I ) : 1 7 8n ) . A few years later , i n 1 5 6 6 , h i s succes sor , Franc isco Tello d e Guzman , requested permiss ion to leave mis s ionaries there with soldiers for protection ( BR 1 9 0 3 ( 9 ) : 2 2 6 ) . The king did not see fit to recommend either action and it was not until many years later , in 1 6 6 8 , that the establ ishment of a small Jesuit mis s ion with a few soldiers for protect ion was authorized on Guam .
I n early January 1 5 6 6 , the gal leon SAN GERONIMO , under the command of Alvaro de Mendafia ' s widow , Is abe 1 Barreto , and piloted by Pedro Fernandez de Quiros , pas sed between Guam and Z arpana , or Rota ( Coello 1 8 8 5 : 5 4 ) . The crew were unable to anchor because they had no c able for lowering and haul ing up their boat . Mendana had sailed from Peru with an expedition that intended to establ ish a settlement at Santa Cruz in the South Pac i fic . Extreme hardship and many deaths among the settlers forced the dec is ion to abandon the settlement and sail for Manila by way of the Ladrone s .
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During the next 1 0 0 years , three s hipwrecks took place i n the 4lt Marianas that presaged the handling o f s imilar mishaps in years to come . The ships were a l l sail ing eas tward from Cavi te to Acapulco when they were overtaken by devastating typhoons .
I n 1 5 6 8 , three years after Legazpi claimed the Ladrones for Spain , one of his ships , SAN PABLO--also captained by his grandson Fel ipe Salcedo--was making the return trip from Cebu to New Spain and carrying a l arge shipment o f c innamon , as wel l as pieces o f gold , porcelains and other trade artic les ( BR 1 9 0 3 ( 2 9 ) : 34 ) . Salcedo had orders from the governor , his grandfather , to stop at Guam to determine whether or not there were c loves or pepper in the i s l ands . SAN PABLO , with 1 3 2 people aboard , reached Guam and took port on Augu s t 15 . Salcedo and most of those aboard were ashore searching for spices when a typhoon struck and drove the ship ashore . Although the ship broke up before any cargo could be salvaged , the captain managed to s ave the packet o f letters addressed to the king . The people who had remained aboard were saved thanks to the ass istance o f those who had gone ashore and commandeered a number o f proas to ef fec t a rescue .
The survivors remained on Guam three months . During that time , they built a bark by us ing t imbers and planks from the wrecked ship and mounting them on the hul l of their skiff . A In spite o f troublesome encounters with the islanders , Fel ipe .,
Salcedo ' s wisdom and good humor prevai led ; the boat was soon f inished and all the people returned safely to Cebu ( San Agus tin 1 9 7 5 : 2 9 8 ) .
SANTA MARGARITA and its consort sai led from Cavi te in July 1 6 0 0 , both heading for disaster . Heavily laden with Oriental goods , MARGARITA struggled and f loundered for eight months through a series of typhoons in the northwestern Pac i fic unt i l , with the ship dismasted and badly damaged , the crew managed to sail to the s outhern Marianas toward the known track o f the incoming Acapulco gal leons . Sail ing past Tinian , they reached the northwes t coast o f Rota , or Z arpana as the is land was then known to the Spanish . Although 2 6 0 of more than 3 0 0 persons aboard had perished , inc luding the general of the f leet , somehow the crew brought the ship in c lose to shore and attached moorings . On the s ixth day , however , the rotted lines parted and the ship ran up on the ree f ( Juan Pobre ms . 15 9 8 - 1 6 0 3 , ch . 6 9 , fol . 2 8 1 ) . Most of the few surviving Spaniards were picked up later by pas s ing Manila-bound gal leons , but several black service personnel and women refused to leave the i s l ands .
I n 1 6 3 8 , NUESTRA SENORA DE LA CONCEPC ION , reportedly the largest vessel �f the time and the r ichest that had ever been seen on the route , sailed from Cavite on August 1 0 , c aptained e
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by the Governor ' s young nephew , Juan Francisco de Corcuera . D ismasted and damaged in a typhoon , i t was driven onto the s hores of Saipan ' s Point Aguingan , where it s ank . Six survivors made their way to Guam and were taken in a native boat--surely an ocean-going c anoe , or flying proa--to the Phil ippines ; others were picked up l ater by pas s ing ships ; s t i l l others remained in the i s lands for the rest o f the ir l ives .
During this period , a substantial number o f people from the s hips are known to have remained for fairly lengthy stays among the Chamorros , the name by which the islanders eventually became known . Most were the survivors o f s hipwrecks , though the first was the Spaniard Gonzalo de Vigo , original ly with Magel lan ' s expedition and t he sole survivor o f three who deserted from Espinosa ' s TRINIDAD . He l ived in the is lands four years , from 1 5 2 2 to 1 52 6 , and was picked up between Rota and Guam by SANTA MARIA DE LA VICTORIA of the Loayis a expedition .
When the gal leons pas sed in 1 5 9 6 , one o f the Franc iscan miss ionaries aboard SAN PABLO , Fray Antonio de los Angeles , dec ided , pos s ibly on impulse , to j ump s hip in order to bring Chri s tianity to the islanders . The two soldiers who j umped a f ter him in an attempt to persuade him to return to the s hip were also carried o f f by the Chamorros . The three remained in the i s l ands and survived unharmed until they were picked up by the pas s ing galleon the fol lowing year ( Dr iver 1 9 7 7 : 1 9 ) .
Another shipwrecked survivor was a Chinese named Chaco . He had been aboard one o f the King ' s c hampans , sail ing from Manil a to Terrenate , when it was blown o f f course and wrecked at Saipan ( Figure 4 . 4 ) . At the t ime o f Father Sanvitores ' arrival at Guam in 1 6 6 8 , Choco and a f ew survivors f rom the 1 6 3 8 wreck of CONCEPCION were l iving in the islands .
Conquest 1 6 6 8 - 1 7 0 0 --Chamorro Canoes , Acapulco Gal leons and Cavite Supply Ships
By the t ime Father Diego Luis de Sanvi tores established the Jesuit mis s ion in the renamed Mariana I s lands in 1 6 6 8 , at l east 135 ships had touched at the Ladrones . These had been mostly Spanish ships travel ling between Acapulco and Mani l a , but some were English and Dutch ves sels preying on t he returning s ilver-laden galleons .
During the period 1 6 6 8 - 1 7 0 0 , the e f forts directed toward the Christ iani z at ion o f the people resulted in the conques t o f the is lands and the sub jugation of the people t o the Crown o f Spain . Traditional ly , the Chamorros had kept maritime contacts with the inhabitants o f neighboring archipelagos by
7 5
F ig . 4 . 4 . This type of ship, a champan, was used by the Chinese Choco , shipwrecked at Tinian around 164 8 . ( Courtesy of Micronesian Area Research Center Collection)
7 6
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7 7
TP7JU 4 . Z4' 8� .Fcye map . ( Courtesy
means o f their flying proas , contacts , like other li festyle eventual ly destroyed by the Christianiz ation effort that church-centered villages .
ocean-going canoes . These patterns , were weakened or
Spanish " reducc i6n , " the demanded resettlement into
Between 1 6 6 8 and 17 0 0 , at least 4 5 ships ( inc luding several English ) touched at the Marianas ( Figure 4 . 5 ) . Most left men , suppl ies and silver for the garrison ' s payro l l , but some carried diseases instrumental in the rapid dec imation o f the is lands ' populat ion .
By the beginning of the 1 7 0 0 s , the colonial development in the Marianas and on Guam required more direct contact with Mani la than could be provided by the yearly Acapulco ships . Soon supply ships from Cavite , propel led by the short- l ived southwest monsoon , put in at Umatac ( Figures 4 . 6 and 4 . 7 ) . During this period , several boats constructed in the Mari anas made their way to the Phil ippine s . Of these , one was constructed from the wreckage of the Cavite supply ship wrecked by a typhoon at Umatac in 1 6 8 3 ( AGI F 1 1 : 6 5 ) . Another was a sma l l frigate constructed from the wreckage o f NUESTRA SENORA DEL PILAR DE ZARAGOZA , wrec ked on a reef at Cocos I s land in 1 6 9 0 ( AGI F 5 6 2 v . 2 ) .
During these years of conquest and early colonizat ion , � several factors interacted to bring about the near W extermination o f the ocean-going c anoes , the so-cal led f lying proas , in the Marianas . In order to continue the work of Christianization and coloniz ation , Governor Jose Madrazo ( 1 6 9 6 - 1 7 0 0 administration ) occupied hims e l f with the removal of the Chamorros from the eight inhabited is lands north of Saipan , known collectively as Gani , an exodus accomplished with the use o f Chamorro seagoing canoes . This left only the islands o f Saipan , Rota and Guam i nhabited ( Muri l lo Vel arde 1 7 4 9 ( 4 ) : 3 7 3 ; Corte 1 8 7 5 : 3 2 ) . The forced resettlement o f the population was accomp l ished before 1 7 0 0 and , in order to prevent the i s landers from escaping and returning to the northern i s l ands , the Spaniards destroyed many o f their c anoes . The population itsel f dec reased s igni f ic antly as Chamorros died resisting the conquest and from a series of epidemics . The forced removal resulted in the death of more than 3 , 0 0 0 i s landers , many o f whom perished at sea ; others died because of the ef fects o f having to move to unfamil iar surroundings and a warmer c l imate ( AGI U5 6 1 v . 2 : 2 1 6 ) . With the decrease in population and the forced changes in l iving patterns , there also c ame a decrease in traditional shipbui lding skills .
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r===�==============-�==:::::=====:.____ ___ --D I SLE de GlTAHAN ,
o u G UAN ? elite EI SLE de S �JE.A,N .
Fig . 4 . 6 . Guam from a 1 6 7 1 map by Father Alonzo Lope z . ( Courtesy of Micronesian Area Research Center Col lection )
7 9
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Early Colonial Period 1 7 0 0 - 1 7 6 5 - -Acapulco Gal leons , Cavite Supply Ships and Pres idio Boats
The most striking thing about the Marianas during the period of early coloni z ation is the large drop in populat ion . By 1 7 0 9 , Governor General o f the Marianas , Juan Antonio Pimentel ( 1 7 0 9 - 1 7 2 0 ) , reported to the king a population o f les s than 5 , 0 0 0 for the three inhabited i s l ands of Guam , Rot a and Saipan , down sharply from the many thousands reported in the early years o f contact ( AGI F 1 2 9 Ramo 4 ) . No longer did l arge numbers o f f lying proas approach the Acapulco ships .
The early Spanish navigators , when speaking o f the swift boats o f the Chamorros , used the Malayan term 11 proa , 11 a swift Malayan vessel having a l ateen sail and an outrigger . Perhaps this was because some o f the men o f Mage l lan ' s expedition , the f irst Europeans to see the ves sels o f t he Marianas , were famil iar with the term from prior experiences in the South China Sea , Malaya and I ndones ia . E arly Spanish documents concerning the Marianas use such terms as �� navichuelos , �� ll embarcac iones , �� 11 C anoas , 11 11 barc o s , 11 11 barquitos , II 11 barquil los II and 11 bancas , II of which only the term 11 banca �� appeared pers istently into the eighteenth century . Because the term is used in the Phi lippines , it may have been introduced by Fil ipino seamen on the Mani l a gal leons and l ater re inforced by their countrymen s ent t o serve a t the garrison i n the Marianas . It i s a l s o pos s ible that it is a Chamorro word from the pre-Spanish era . Whatever its or1g1 n , documents dealing with the early colonial period use 11 banca ll when re ferring to Chamorro seagoing c anoes . The term 11 proa ll does not appear in Spanish documents as genera l ly a s does ll banc a ll or its variant 11 bangc a . I I
Whether or not the Chamorro II f lying proas II l ived on i n t he guise o f ll bancas I I remains to be determined , but during the 1 7 0 0 s , the l atter term was used in connection with ves se l s manned by Chamorros . It is di f f icult t o know , there fore , whether the f lying proas actual ly disappeared or whether that express ion , apparently used by foreigners- -espec i a l ly English-speaking foreigners - -was ever used by the peopl e o f the M�rianas , who cal led their vessels by some other unknown term .
3Regardless o f its applic abil ity to Chamorro c anoes , during the 1 8 0 0 s the term ll banca ll appears in documents o f that century to denote the ocean-going canoes of the Carol inians .
8 1
After Father Diego Luis de Sanvitores establ ished the Jesuit tt mis s ion headquarters at Agafia in 1 6 6 8 , he and his companions were forced to visit the inhabited northern i s l ands in the sma l l frail ves sels ( embarcac iones ) o f the natives . Early on , he had requested the Governor General of the Phil ippines to provide a small ves sel for travel between the several i s l ands , but none material i zed during his l i fetime , and the miss ionaries continued to depend upon native ves sels . Although the i s landers were extremely adept at s a i l ing them , the colon i z ers found them smal l , unstable and dangerous for their purposes .
During Governor Juan Antonio Pimentel ' s long administration on Guam , which began in 1 7 0 9 , there was much maritime activity in the Marianas . During the early 1 7 0 0 s , attempts were made to reach the I I I s lands to the South , I I the Carol ine I s l ands , from both the Phil ippines and Guam . This proved a di f f icult undertaking , and in 1 7 0 9 a patache was lost and at least one bilander ( balandra ) was lost in 1 7 1 0 ( Fernandez Duro 1 9 7 2 ( 6 ) : 4 8 9 ) . Several supply ships , returning to Cavite , a l s o attempted to s top at the Palaus , but attempts to estab l i s h a miss ion in the southern is lands were frustrated unt i l muc h later .
On March 2 2 , 1 7 1 0 , a few months a fter Governor Pimente l ' s arrival in the islands , four ships appeared o f f Guam ' s coast . One , BATCHELER , was the renamed NUESTRA SENORA DE LA ENCARNAC I ON Y DESENGANO , the Acapulco-bound galleon captured a few months earlier by the British privateer Woods -Rogers o f f Mexico ' s Cape San Lucas . The governor , recogniz ing the superior f iring power of Rogers ' squadron and his own mil itary l imitations , and hoping to avoid bloodshed and plunder , dec ided the best strategy was to welcome the intruders hospitably . His tactic was to provide provis ions , seek the release o f Spanish prisoners , and al low the pirates to s a i l away as soon as pos s ible with the captured galleon ' s c argo intact ( AGI F 1 2 9 : 6 4 ) .
Governor P imentel assigned administrators ( alcaldes ) to tend to government a ffairs and to control the inhabitants in Rota and Saipan . The alcalde o f Saipan forced the men to farm the 11 nica 11 root on Aguiguan and hunt c attle on Tinian . At Tinian , there were quarters for the workers who were sent from Saipan for three weeks at a t ime ( AGI F5 2 8 : 4 0 ) . The meat from Tinian , which suppl ied the Agafia garrison during the 1 7 0 0 s and 1 8 0 0 s , was o f ten transported aboard bancas , a number o f which were lost on the dangerous cross ing between the i s l ands . At Rota , Governor Pimentel ' s alcalde s aw to it that hogs , dried meat , coconut oil , lard , fish , chickens and woven s a i l s for the bancas were s hipped to the governor ' s storehous e at Umatac to be sold to the o f f icers aboard the gal leons and the Cavite s upply ships ( AGI F 5 2 8 : 3 9 ) . There
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were usually three or four Rota-Guam cross ings each year , and the number of banc as i n a f leet varied from one to four--although there were occas ional ly more .
In 1 7 1 7 Governor Pimentel 1 in a very unusual move , sent several bancas from Guam to the northern is lands o f Gani to intercept the Manila-Acapulco galleon and to deliver some letters to the gal leon ' s general . The bancas sailed July 5 , 1 7 1 7 1 and returned f ive months later , toward the end o f November . Among those who went were two men from Anigua--an outlying barrio o f Agafia--one o f whom died on the return voyage from Tinian ( AGI F 5 2 8 ( A- 2 ) : 2 0 7 ) . What prompted the governor ' s seemingly desperate attempt to contact the gal l eon on the high seas remains unknown , as no addi t iona! information has come to l i ght .
The gal leons conti nued to come and go , as did the les s dependable supply s hips from Cavite . During the early colonial years , several governors o f the Mariana I s l ands devised ways to take advantage of t he lucrative gal leon trade . These inc l uded the sale to the o f f icers of the galleons of hogs and produce , inc luding hard-to- f ind and hard-to-harvest capers from Cocos I s l and and Facpi Point . They also sold sails for the ships that had been handwoven by the women o f Guam and Rota . Additionally , the governors pro fited from the cultivation and sale of tobacco . Thi s commodity became a veritab le means o f exchange because the islanders , forced to work unrelentingly in the f ields , received in exchange for their long arduous l abor nothing but a few leaves of poor-grade tobacco . The details of such bus iness arrangements came to light i n Governor Pimentel ' s j udic ial review ( res idenc i a ) ( AGI U5 6 1 ( 5 ) : 15 2 5 ; AGI F 9 9 : 5 8 ; Driver 1 9 8 8 : 2 1 - 4 3 ) .
Meanwhile , ocean-going canoes ( bancas ) from the Carol ines arrived at Guam in 1 7 2 1 ( AGI 1 7 2 5 U5 6 1 ( 3 ) : 7 1 8 - 7 2 1 ; AHN 1 7 5 6 U5 35 2 ( IV-2 ) : 4 7 0 ; Barratt 1 9 8 8 : 8 , 2 3 ) ; the pos s ibility certainly exists that they also arrived on other unrecorded occas ions . In 1 7 2 5 , a locally constructed vessel , l ike those mentioned above , was used to carry Governor Antonio Sanche z de Tagle ( 1 7 2 0 - 1 7 2 5 ) and h i s family from Guam t o the Phil ippines , suppos edly bec ause the governor was seriously ill and needed immediate medical attent ion . I n 1 7 3 1 , a ship carrying the mis s ionaries , Fathers Cantova and Walter , reached Yap from Guam .
There was an increased dependence on the Cavite supply ships during this period because of foreign aggres s ion against the gal leons and the expense o f shipping supplies and other materials from Acapulco . After the attack on the supply s hip SAN ANDRES in Merizo Bay i n 1 7 2 1 by the British privateer John Cl ipperton , it became necess ary to seek a s afer
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anchorage , and the feas ibil ity of a change to Apra was e investigated . As a result , the f irst supply ship anchored in Apra Harbor in 1 7 3 4 . After the harbor was sounded , Fort San Luis was built in 1 7 3 7 . From then on , Apr a Harbor , rather than Merizo Bay , became the pre ferred wintering port , although ships cont inued to take on water at Umatac .
I n 1 7 3 9 war broke out between Spain and Great Britain , and ship contacts between 1 7 4 3 and 1 7 5 3 were sparse and intermittent . I n the mid- 1 7 4 0 s , Spanish ships were hounded , f irst by the Dutc h , then by the Briti s h , and there were years when no ships arrived to service the Marianas . I n 1 7 4 3 Lord George Anson spent several months at Tinian resting and re freshing his crew . From there he sailed CENTURION on to the Phil ippines , where he captured the Acapulco galleon COVADONGA . When Anson returned to England , he c arried the booty from the c aptured gal leon .
I n 1 7 4 6 the Governor o f the Marianas , Domingo Gomez de la S ierra ( 1 7 4 6 - 1 7 4 9 ) , brought material s from Cavite to build a boat for the presidio that would sail to Tinian to f etch meat . Governor G6mez , l ike many other governors , trave l led to the Marianas on the supply ship from Cavite . Meanwhile , the British threat was taking its toll and the Governor General of the Philippines ordered t he galleons not to s top at the Marianas , a dec is ion later overruled in Madrid . The English threat was such that Guam ' s coastal defenses had to be strengthened , and in response , Governor Henrique de Olavide y Michelena ( 1 7 4 9 - 1 7 5 6 , 1 7 6 8 - 17 7 1 ) built Fort San Fernando near the beach at Agana in 1 7 5 1 . He also improved and fort i f ied l ittle Fort Santo Ange l , atop a large boul der at the entrance to Umatac Bay , in 1 7 5 5 ( AGI F 9 2 0 ) .
By the mid- 1 7 0 0 s , the i s lands of Guam and Rota alone remained inhabited , and the l ifestyle o f the Chamorro people had been trans formed from a maritime to an agrarian orientation . Not only were the northern islands depopulated , which el iminated the need for transportation to s ervice them and thereby curtai led the need for substantial numbers o f ocean-going canoes , but the colony now depended almost comp letely on the Acapulco galleons and Cavite supply ships . When it became necess ary to travel to Rota or Tinian for meat and produce , smal l , locally constructed vessels belonging to the pres idio or garrison were used . For the mos t part , these were small s loops , manned by Chamorro crews and pres idio s kippers-sometimes referred to as the Governor ' s Boat . Bancas , manned by loca l mariners , also sailed between the is lands at the reques t o f the governors . These periodic trips to Tinian continued because it was the only source o f meat available for the people on Guam .
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The galleon trade suf fered a number of setbacks between 1 7 3 0 and 1 7 7 5 : two gal leons were wrecked before entering the Emboc adero , the entrance to the San Bernardino Straits and the Phil ippine archipelago ; another , as noted , was c aptured o f f the east coast of the i s lands by George Anson ; another was lost be fore it reached the Marianas from Acapulco ; and NUESTRA SENORA DE LA CONCEPCION was wrecked by a typhoon in Guam ' s Apra Harbor . Some c aptains chose not to stop at the Marianas i f they were in danger of arriving at the Embocadero late in the season , becaus e a number of ship losses had been attributed to that f actor . In addition , the supply s hips from Cavite did not always arrive on schedule and several were lost .
Mid-Colonial Period 1 7 6 5 - 1 8 15 - -Frigates , Schooners and Carol inian Bancas
I n 1 7 6 5 Spain was authori zed to sail directly from the Philippines to Spain via the Cape of Good Hope and the Indian Ocean , a route control led by the Portuguese s ince before the time o f Magellan . The use o f the new route marked the end o f the monopoly long enj oyed by the Pac i f ic gal leons . The days o f the large cargo ships were numbered , as they were s uppl anted by smaller ves sels , packet boats and frigates that could make more frequent runs . The new route , a shorter and less hazardous trip from the Phil ippines to Spain , coinc ided with the l iberal i zation of Spanish trade l aws . Although the need to support mil itary and governmental establishments in the Phil ippines and in the Marianas with men and money from the Mexican Treasury continued , smal ler vessels could be used because there was no longer the l arge volume of pas sengers and trade goods cross ing between Cavite and Acapulco . Government-owned naos , or ves sel s , continued to operate and were s upplemented by privately owned Spani s h and foreign commerc ial ships , frigates and packet boats that o ften operated on government contracts .
I n 1 7 6 6 , SAN PEDRO was lost at sea before it reached the Mariana from Acapulco--the first to be lost on that leg o f the voyage i n the trade ' s 2 0 0 -year history . I n 1 7 6 9 , the Jesuits were expel led from a l l Spanish territories , and their century- long presence in the Marianas came to an end as they were replaced by priests o f the Order o f Augustinian Recol lects .
I n late October 1 7 7 5 , His Ma j esty ' s frigate NUESTRA SENORA DE LA CONCEPCION , also cal led DESENGANO , was struck by a typhoon and wrec ked on the beach at Sumay in Apra Harbor . There were 5 3 8 people and a l arge money s hipment aboard . The s ilver was removed be fore the ship broke up , but the people were stranded at Guam for many months and , by early December , their food ran out . As had happened many times be fore , a
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small ves sel was constructed from the wreckage , the s chooner tit NUESTRA SENORA DEL CARMEN , also called LA MARIANA , and sent to Manila with word of the shipwreck . Meanwhile , the large number o f survivors faced a severe food s hortage on the s torm-devas tated is land .
During the last quarter o f the eighteenth century , the Spanis h frigates cross ing from Ac apulco to Cavite continued to c a l l at Guam , more or less on schedule , while the supply ship from Cavite seems to have arrived less frequently . An increased volume of activity on the part o f private North American commerc ial enterprises was noted , and the renowned c l ipper s hips , which made the run from Boston to Canton in record t ime , passed through the northern i s lands of the Marianas ' chain . Manila became a hub for trading act ivities , with Spanish and foreign-owned ves sels chartered to service the Mariana I s lands and other des tinations . One American commerc ial trader that came to grie f during this period was the brig BRAM I N . While it was anchored at Tinian in l ate 1 7 9 7 or early 1 7 9 8 , a monsoon blew up , the cables parted , and the s hip went to pieces on a ree f ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 7 ) : 2 7 1 ) .
A Spanish scientific expedition , led by Ale j andro Malaspina , vis ited Guam in February 1 7 9 2 . During the nearly two weeks the two ships remained at Umatac , several scientists conducted studies in natural history and cartography and made � astronomic observations ; from Umatac , the expedition sailed W' to the Phil ippines .
Several Carol inian trading canoes arrived at Guam ' s Talofofo Bay in 1 7 8 8 , but a disaster at sea s hortly thereafter brought an end to other such ventures for many years . With renewed contacts a fter 1 8 1 5 , there was an increased dependence on the Carol inian bancas in the Marianas , espec ial ly for transportation between Guam and Rota ( Fi gure 4 . 8 ) . The Carol inian settlements that were made in the early 1 8 0 0 s in Guam , Rota , Tinian and Saipan depended upon these ves s e l s for transportation , not just within these is lands but between the Marianas and the islands of the Carol ines as wel l .
I n 1 8 0 1 Governor Vicente Blanco ( 1 8 0 2 - 1 8 0 6 ) arrived at Guam aboard the American 'ves sel LYDIA, espec ial ly chartered in Manila to make the trip . It was the f irst American commerc ial vessel known to arrive at Guam . As an as ide , when it sailed for Manila , the remains o f Dofia Maria Agueda del Camino , wife of Governor Manuel Muro ( 1 7 9 4 - 1 8 0 2 ) , were shipped aboard ( Haswell 1 9 1 7 : 2 0 3 ) . Fort Santa Agueda at Apugan , overlooking Agafia , is named in her honor .
As Americ an Pac if ic , an s t at ion in
commerc ial ves sels attempt was made to
the Northern Mariana
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appeared in establish a I s lands for
the western provis ioning fur traders
Fig . 4 . 8 . Carolinian proas . The ubiquitous pope as depicted by Admiral Paris has not changed perceptibly for centuries . S�ill in use , it is lateen-sailed, twin-ended and s ingle-outriggered . These Satawal canoes are exactly l ike those of Yap, Ulithi and the rest o f the west-central Carolines . Source : Paris 1 8 4 3 : 1 1 , pl . 1 0 7 . ( Courtesy UCLA Library )
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sail ing between America and China . princ ipally of Hawaiians , was later Governor Parreno ( 1 8 0 6 - 1 8 1 2 ) .
The sma l l community, removed to Guam by
I n 1 8 0 8 the Spanish colonies in the Americas began thei r wars o f independence . The f irst among them to dec lare its freedom was Mexico , in an event that heralded the end o f the centuries-old gal leon trade ; the l ast vessel sailed from Cavite in 1 8 1 7 . I n the Marianas , the e f fect o f the interruption o f regular shipping s ervice to the Marianas forced a greater dependence on private vessels and the pres idio ' s interis land boat .
I n February 1 8 1 4 , the frigate SANTI AGO ( also c a l led I NFANTE DON CARLOS ) , o f the Royal Phil ippine Company , sailed i nto Apra Harbor from Lima ' s port o f Cal lao . Its people were anxious for news of the upris ings i n Mexico and had s topped at Guam spec i fically for that purpose . Unfortunately , it struck a ree f on the Calalang Bank at the entrance to Apra Harbor and was wrecked . The people were saved , as was most of the s ilver--o f the 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 peso s , all but 3 3 , 3 5 9 were recovered with the as s istance o f Carolinian divers who were on the island at the time ( Barratt 1 9 8 4 : 1 7 ) . The so-called Spanish Rocks ( Las Roc as de la Fragata Espanola ) in Apra Harbor commemorate the dis aster .
The last o f the Acapulco ships to arrive at Apra was MAGALLANES in 1 8 1 5 . I t seems ironic that it bore the name of the discoverer who had vis ited the i s l ands nearly 3 0 0 years earl ier and whose presence pres aged the dec line o f the greatly admired Chamorro sea-going c anoes .
Late Colonial Period 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 9 8--Frigates , Schooners , Whalers and Carol inian Bancas
In 1 8 1 3 King Fernando V I I s igned a royal dec ree o f f ic ially dec laring the end of the 2 5 0 -year-o l d gal leon trade . One of the provis ions freed the inhabitants o f the Phil ippine I s lands to engage in commerc ial activities in privately owned ves sels ( AGI F3 8 1 ) . The Mariana I s l ands , as a province of the Phil ippines , soon noted an increase in the number of s hips vis it ing its ports , notably whalers .
l
With MAGALLANES ' last trip in 1 8 1 5 , the galleon trade i n the Marianas came to an end . Uno f f ic ially, ships continued to cro s s from Mani l a to Mexico but they were dest ined for ports other than Acapulco , to places such as Tepic and Guaymas . The last of these great ships returned to the Phil ippines from Mexico in 1 8 1 9 . After that , the Manila-Mexico trade dec l ined rapidly and the Mariana I s l ands lost direct contact with Mexico , forc ing them to look , more than ever before , to the Phi l ippines for support . 4lt
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The void in shipping activities left by the demise of the gal leons was picked up by smal ler private ves sel s , although government ships continued to arrive intermittent ly . Mos t o f the contacts with Manila were o n privately owned frigates , brigs and schooners , many o f which were contracted spec i f ically for the run to the Marianas ( Driver 1 9 7 6 : 1 0 ) . They were contracted to carry the mail and to transport suppl ies and men for the pres idio--both the garrison and prison--as wel l as mil itary o f f icers , inc luding governors , other government offic ial s , their dependents , and occas ional ly , private citi zens and thei r families .
As a result o f the large number o f ships and men arriving at Apra Harbor , a substantial number of Agana res idents moved to the port area and established the vill age of Sumay to c arry on commercial activities more conveniently ( Fi gure 4 . 9 ) . Engl ish became a commonly heard language and it was reported that many i s l anders understood and spoke it wel l . Many local men shipped out as crew members . Others s l ipped out as stowaways and , although the government s ought to c urtail such act ivities , the s ituation was di f f icult to contro l . At the s ame time , a number of foreigners j umped s hip in the i s lands , a s ituation the government also wished to curtail ; nonetheles s , s ome deserters were permitted to remai n , married local women and established their homes .
I n the early part o f the nineteenth century , sma l l ves sels were attached to the governor ' s o ffice to service the Mariana I s l ands and the port of Cavite . In 1 8 2 0 , the schooner NUESTRA S ENORA DE BUEN VIAJE , also c al led LA B IENVENIDA , sailed to Tinian for meat , then on to Saipan ( LCM 1 8 : 4 8 a ) . By now , both i s l ands had small s ettl ements o f Carol inians that were overseen by an o f f ic ial from Guam who was appointed by the governor and known as the alcalde . Another schooner on the' Tinian run was SAN JOSE . Governors Medinilla ( 1 8 2 6 - 1 8 3 1 ) and Villalobos ( 1 8 3 1- 1 8 3 7 ) had small s hips built to take c are o f local governmental needs ( LCM 1 : 1 6 7 a ) .
I n 1 8 2 5 , re flecting the pol it ical disturbances brought about by the wars for independence in Spanish Americ a , three Spanish s hips arrived at Umatac from Peru on the way to the Phil ippine s , a colony still loyal to Spain . At Guam , s ome o f the crew mutinied , and the Spanish loyalists aboard were stranded and left to await later pas s age to Manila . One o f the s hips , CLARINGTON , was sunk o f f Umatac . The other three s ailed back to Mexico ( Duro 1 9 7 2 ( 9 ) : 3 2 8 ) .
Toward midcentury , convicts from the Phil ippines began to be s ent to Guam . A few arrived in 1 8 4 9 ( Saf ford 1 9 0 1 : 3 0 5 ) and as many a s 6 5 in 1 8 5 1 . Later , in the 1 8 7 0s , when there was ma j or pol itical turmoil in Spain , large numbers o f prisoners
89
Fig . 4 . 9 . Apra Harbor , c a . 1 8 1 9 , drawn by Duperrey . ( Courtesy of Micronesian Area Research Center Collection)
9 0
were exiled to the Marianas , destined for Guam , Rota and Saipan . As revolutionary activities accelerated in the Phil ippines , pol it ical prisoners from there were also sent to the Marianas . Among the first to arrive were those implic ated in the 1 8 7 2 upris ing at Cavite ( Driver 1 9 7 6 : 2 6 ) . Not surpris ingly , some exiles and prisoners tried to escape aboard ships . Some were succes s fu l , others were recaptured before the ships sailed . The mail ships and other chartered ves sels from Manila brought food and suppl ies to those conf ined to the three islands .
With the many vessels that arrived i n the i s l ands in the nineteenth century , occas ional epidemic s broke out . I n 1 8 5 6 , for example , the American schooner FROST put in with smallpox aboard and , by the time the epidemic was spent , 3 , 6 4 4 inhabitants had lost their l ives ( Driver 1 9 7 6 : 5 ) .
In addition to the foreign and domestic trading vessels that sailed between Manila and the Marianas , there were itinerant vessels that pl ied the l anes between Australia , Manila and Hong Kong . Toward the end o f the century , Yokohama was also inc luded in such itineraries .
By 1 8 5 1 there were locally based schooners o f f ic ially authorized to work in the Marianas , which were owned by traders , some o f whom were Britis h , others American . Among the traders was one Holcomb , married to a Chamorro woman , who had his headquarters at Yap . Others were J . G . Johnston , who transported numbers o f Carol inians to Tinian to work in the c attle industry and to the northern i s l ands to work the copra plantations . I n 1 8 7 6 , Johnston and several Caro linians were lost at sea whi le cros s ing from Tinian to Saipan in a smal l boat . During the 1 8 8 0 s , a Mr . Will iams established a trading bus iness and sailed his schooner between Guam , the northern Marianas , Japan , Manila and Hong Kong . Around this t ime , Japanese traders also began to ply the waters o f the Micrones ian is lands .
On the local level , there were community brigs and other small vessel s . Individual citizens , such as Jose Herrero and a Mr . Mi l l inchamp , owned smal l boats that sailed to the neighboring is lands and to the ports in southern Guam . They , too , suf fered occas ional mishaps and disasters . For example , in 1 8 5 7 CHAMORRITA was driven on a ree f , and in 1 8 6 7 a boat was lost in the Agafia channel and a launch was lost at Merizo ( Driver 1 9 7 6 : 1 8 ) .
I n 1 8 5 8 an Engl ish steam frigate sail ing from the Hawaiian I s l ands put in at Saipan in s earch of wood for fuel for the leg to Hong Kong ( Driver 1 9 8 7 : 2 3 ) . By 1 8 7 5 steamers were sai ling between Manila and the Marianas . Many were contracted mail boats ; others were mil i tary ves sel s . In 1 8 8 8
9 1
the mail run inc luded a stop at Yap , which was indicative of 4t Spain ' s interest in rea f f irming its j urisdiction over the Carol ine I s l ands in face of German encroachment there . Subsequent runs inc luded s tops at Ponape for the s ame reason .
The nineteenth century brought an increase in foreign s hipping activity to the Pac i f ic as a whole , not j us t to the Mari anas . Between 1 8 1 7 and 1 8 5 2 , the Marianas and other i s l ands in Micronesia were vis ited by several foreign s c ient i f ic expeditions , among them Rus s ian explorers in 1 8 1 7 , 1 8 1 8 , 1 8 1 9 , 1 8 2 5 and 1 8 2 8 ; French expeditions in 1 8 1 9 , 1 8 2 8 and 1 8 3 9 ; and in 1 8 5 2 , a Swedish ship vis ited the i s l ands . Several nations also sent warships to vis it and reconnoiter , inc l uding the United State s , Rus s ia , Germany and Japan .
Foreign whal ing s hips were s ighted in the is l ands as early as 1 8 0 5 and began arriving in relatively large numbers after 1 8 2 3 . French , British and Anglo-American whalers began to provis ion at Guam and other is lands in the Marianas and to use them as res t stations . As many as 3 0 ships a year came to Guam between 1 8 2 0 and 1 8 5 0 . At Guam , they usual ly put in at Umatac to take on water and , from there , went on to anchor at Apra Harbor where they l ingered long enough to reprovis ion and rest their crews ( Corey 1 9 7 1 : 8 1 ) . The whalers brought sma l l trade items , principal ly u sed c lothing and tool s to exchange for fresh provis ions . The whaling business i n the .. I Marianas began to dec l ine toward midcentury . By 1 8 6 0 the • whalers had begun to use ports in Hawaii , New Zealand and Japan , and only one or two ships put in at Guam each year .
As increased numbers of vessels pl ied the seas around the Mariana I s l ands , survivors o f disasters at sea occas ionally made their way to port in sma l l boats . Among them were two whaleboats from SARAH MOERS in 1 8 5 4 ( Sa f ford 1 9 0 1 : 3 3 7 ) and in 1 8 6 6 a barque from the Danish ship LIBELLE that wrecked at Wake I s l and . Survivors o f LEONORA , sunk at Kusaie in 1 8 7 4 , reached Guam in a rowboat . I n 1 8 8 8 survivors o f a German ship , F . H . DREWS , arrived at Saipan .
Ships were often overtaken by typhoons and damaged , lost at sea , or dashed against is land shores . Among them was a three-masted ves sel that s ank o f f Toagan Point near Pago in 1 8 6 0 ( Driver 1 9 7 6 : 1 1 ) . I n 1 8 7 2 , during its Guam s topover , the mail boat MARIA DEL ROSARIO took Governor Luis I banez y Garc ia ( 1 8 7 1 - 1 8 7 3 ) on an inspect ion trip to the Northern Marianas . At Tinian , the s hip was overtaken by a typhoon that drove it aground o f f the Sunharon roadstead . The survivors , inc luding the governor , returned sa fely to Guam in a small open boat ( Ibanez 1 9 7 6 : 2 0 6 ) . A storm in 1 8 9 1 drove the sma l l schooner YAP onto the ree f at Piti .
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With the arrival o f fairly l arge numbers o f Carolinians in the Marianas after 1 8 2 8 , their sea-going canoes became indispensable to the interisland transportation system . The governor control led at least some o f the ves sels because , in 1 8 2 3 , Governor Jose Mant illa ( 1 8 2 2 - 1 8 2 3 ) turned over s ix Carol inian bancas to incoming Governor Jose Ganga Herrero ( 1 8 2 3 - 1 8 2 6 ) . Two o f these were lost at Rota and one o f f the coast o f Guam . I n 1 8 4 8 three bancas of Carol inians from S aipan arrived at Agafia ( Saf ford 1 9 0 1 : 2 5 5 ) , and the following year three bancas from Satagual ( Satawal ) and Lamusog ( Lamotrek ) put in with occupant s who had come to settle on S ai pan . They had come because their islands had been devastated by the great earthquake of January 1 8 4 9 , which had a l s o c aused ma j or damage in Guam , espec ially at Umatac . There are reports of Carol inian banc as lost while s a i l ing among the islands of the Marianas throughout the 1 8 5 0 s , 1 8 6 0 s and 1 8 7 0 s .
The revolutionary movement in the Phil ippines conti nued unabated , and more and more pol itical detainees were sent to the Marianas . In 1 8 9 6 the steamer CHARRUCA brought 5 7 , f o l lowed by SATURNUS with 2 0 7 prisoners and VENUS with 1 2 0 .
The nineteenth century brought an end to the gal leon t rade and its large , bulky , cargo s hips . At the same t ime , t here was an increase in shipping activity in the Mariana I s l ands , though with ves se l s o f other types . In addit ion to the Spanish mil itary and government ves sels that serviced the Phil ippines , Marianas and Caro l ines , there were foreign s hips cross ing the Pac i f ic in several direct ions . These inc luded the American c l ippers that sailed from the east coast o f the United States to China and passed through the northern Marianas , British ves sels sail ing between Austral ia and the Orient , and Japanese ships venturing into Micrones ia . Some metropol itan powers sent warships to explore and reconnoiter and to conduct scientific expeditions , some o f whic h , coinc idently , served their governments ' pol itical interests as wel l . Final ly , there were trading schooners that p l ied the waters of the western Pac i f ic from Hawaii to the coasts of China , Japan and the Carol ines and centered their activities in the Marianas . The sma l l local vessels , some o f which were c apable o f reaching Manila , were used princ ipally as interi s land and coastal ves sels .
The ubiquitous ocean-going c anoes remained an act ive maritime presence unt i l the end o f the Spanish administration in 1 8 9 8 . During that last century , although there seems to be no mention o f Chamorro-constructed , sea-going canoes or proas in the l iterature available for study , their place appears to have been taken by the Caro l inians who retained their tradit ional shipbuilding and navigational skills and s a i led
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their bancas at wi l l between the Carol ine and Mariana It is lands .
Contact , Commerc iali zation and Christiani zation
Caroline , Marsha l l and Gilbert I s lands
The period from 1 5 9 5 to 16 9 6 , a century of European activity in the Pac i f ic , swept past the Carol ine and Marshal l i s lands without so much as a glance . The Spanish influence in Micrones ia , in general , and in the Marianas , spec i f ic a l ly, was directed to convers ion of the i s landers to Christianity and the Manila-Ac apulco trade . The Portuguese , involved in a war in Europe , were unable to maintain their exc lus ive hold on the Spice I s lands against the advances o f the Dutch . After the succe s s ful voyage o f Cornelis de Houtman around Africa to Java in 1 5 9 6 , the Dutch embarked on an ambitious program o f aggression and commerc ial trade that s aw them become the masters o f trade in the Malay Archipelago within 5 0 years ( Broek 1 9 6 7 : 1 5 1 ) .
The opening o f the seventeenth century s aw the institutiona l i zation o f a commerc ial rivalry in the Moluccas between the Dutch and the Portuguese and British . The � British, unable to succe s s fu l ly s ustain pirating in the � Pac i f ic , turned instead toward direct trade with the I ndies . The British-owned East India Company was formed in 1 6 0 0 with the expres s purpose o f conduct ing trade in the region . In response , the Dutch East India Company , with extens ive government support and exc lus ive rights , was formed in 1 6 0 2 t o serve a s a conduit for trade and commerc ial expans ion . In 1 6 0 9 the rival ry with the Portuguese escalated when the Dutch asserted their c laim to the Moluccas . By 1 6 2 3 the Dutch were succes s ful in forc ing both the Portugese and British from the area .
For the remainder o f the seventeenth century , Portuguese inf luence waned and was a l l but eliminated in the Moluccas , and British commerc ial enterprises were l imited to a part of I ndia . While the Dutch were commerc ially active , exploration o f the Pac i f ic during the 1 6 0 0 s was concentrated in I ndones ia , Melanesia , Polynesia , parts of Australia and New Zealand , with some l imited activity in t he North Pac i fic ( Broek 1 9 6 7 : 1 5 1 - 1 5 3 ) . The only exception was the voyage of Gheen Huyghen Sc hapenham in 1 6 2 4 - 1 6 2 5 . After rounding Cape Horn , the f loti l l a , known as the Nassau Fleet , cros sed the Pac i f ic to the Marianas and from there to the Moluccas . During the cross ing the f leet c ame upon two i s l ands at latitude 1 0° north . I t is believed that the first i s l and was either Pais or Ul ithi , and the second was Yap ( Broek 4lt
9 4
1 9 6 7 : 1 5 7 ) . These is lands had been a l l but forgotten s ince their initial discovery in 1 5 2 8 by Saavedra and again in 1 5 4 2 by Vi l lalobos .
Contact 1 6 9 6 - 1 8 0 0- -Caro l inian Bancas , Mis s ionary Ships , East I ndia Merchantmen and Convict Ships
As a resul t o f the concentration o f e f forts elsewhere , it was not unt i l nearly a century after Quiros ran aground on Pohnpei in 1 5 9 5 that a second wave of exploration and contact into the Caro l ine , Marshal l and Gilbert islands was s et in mot ion . Once again it was the Spani s h who undertook the earl iest voyages . This time , however , they were mi� s ionaries seeking new soul s , not explorers seeking new lands .
After interviewing a band o f Caro l inians blown to the eastern Phil ippines during a severe s torm , Father Paul Klein wrote a pas s ionate letter to the Superior General of the Jesuits i n Rome urging expeditions into the area for the purpose o f bringing Christianity to these people . The Caro l inians des cribed more than 80 islands that they were aware of or that made up their " nation " ( Figure 4 . 1 0 ) . Klein I s letter , along with the s ighting o f " I sla de Caro lina " by Lazcano in 1 6 8 6 and conf irmation by Rodriguez in 1 6 9 6 , the s ame year the Carol inians arrived, sparked the pries ts into action . The i s lands , referred to as the Palaos in 1 6 9 6 --and today known as the nation o f Belau ( Palau ) --were otherwise unknown to Europeans , although Drake i s suspected of having vis ited Pal au in 1 5 7 9 ( Lessa 19 7 5 : 2 5 3 ) .
Three unsuccess ful attempts to reach the Palaos - - in 1 6 9 7 , 1 7 0 8 and 1 7 0 9 - -were mounted by the Jes uits . I t was not unt i l 1 7 1 0 that Franc isco Padil l a in SANTISSIMA TRINIDAD reached Sonsoro l , a Pal aos outl ier . This sma l l is land had been only briefly gl impsed during Magel lan I s voyage of discovery more than 1 8 0 years earl ier . After a friendly welcome by t he nat ives , Padil l a allowed the two priests who were acc ompanying the expedition to go ashore . Before the priest s could complete their vis it and return t o TRINIDAD , high winds and strong currents forced the s hip away from the i s l and . Bec ause o f the severe conditions , Padil la was unabl e to return to Sonsorol . However , in the process of seeking a route bac k , he did find Panlog ( presently known as
4 The following overview of the period of contac t , commerc iali zation and Christ ianizat ion o f the Caroline and Marsha l l i s l ands draws heavily from the work o f Fr . Franc is X . Hezel , The First Taint of C ivi l i z ation ( 1 9 8 3 ) . except where otherwise noted .
9 5
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1 A A a T :n• N n u r w z. P H I LI P P Y N I C B il 'E Y L A N D :N.
Fig. 4 . 10 . Father Paul Leg 1 5 , "Cartas de descubiertas deba jo del Stocklein ( 1 7 2 6 no . 1 2 7 )
Klein ' s map o f Palaos , 16 9 6 . ( AGI , las nuevas Philippinas ( Palaos ) patrimonio de Philipe V . ) Also in and in Kramer ( 1 9 1 7 : 1 7 ) .
9 6
Babeldaob ) , the l argest Drake ' s brief vis it in from European contact . not even directly tied western Carol ines because voyages ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 4 3 ) .
i s l and in the Palaos . Other than 1 5 7 9 , the Palaos remained isolated The people of the archipelago were
into the trading network of the they did not make long , interis l and
Despite more than a century of sec lus ion , the reception Padilla received from the local people was not much di f f erent from the one given Drake . Unfortunately , the Palauans ' des ire for iron was met with res istance by the Spaniards on SANTISSIMA TRINIDAD ; the result was a brief con frontation between the two groups . When Padilla left Panlong , he took with him the impres s ion that Palaos was indeed s t i l l an " is land of theeves . "
Three ef forts were mounted in 1 7 1 1 to return to Sonsorol and rescue the two priests left the year before ; each ended in failure . None o f the ships was able to reach the i s l ands , which were then being cal led I s las Encantadas , the Enchanted I s lands . After 1 7 1 1 Guam replaced Manil a as the administrative base from which to launc h further exploratory ventures to the Palaos .
I n January 1 7 1 2 , Bernardo de Eugi departed Guam in SANTO DOMINGO in another e f fort to relocate the is land and rescue the stranded priests . An acc epted technique when trave l l ing in unfamil iar waters was , i f pos s ible , to obtain the services of a local pilot . This was done with some regularity by the Portuguese when navigating through the Indian Ocean ( Parry 1 9 7 4 : 1 7 1 , 1 7 4 - 1 7 5 ) . Because the report from the Carolinians s tranded in the Phi lippines indicated that they were wel l acquainted with navigation between their own i s l ands , Eugi reasoned that he might be s uccess ful in his mis s ion i f he could obtain a Carol inian guide .
After a week at sea , Eugi discovered a small group o f ato l l s that h e named I s las de Garbanzos , Chickpea I s l ands . These i s lets , known today as Ulithi , lay southwest o f Guam in the western Caroline archipelago . After some di f f iculty and a confrontation that left one Spaniard and several Carol inians dead , Eugi kidnapped a native to serve as a pilot . With the aid of the Ul ithian , SANTO DOMINGO was navigated to one o f the northern is lands in the Palaos . Upon arrival , Eugi again attempted to entice several natives to come aboard . This was f inally accompl ished and , with some dif f iculty , he had two more native pilots . A lthough one of the Palauans quickly escaped , the two remaining natives helped Eugi reach Sonsorol , wel l to the south of their original Palaos l andfa l l . Unfortunately , winds and strong currents again prevented a landing and SANTO DOMINGO was forced to continue to Manila .
9 7
The second miss ionary voyage into Las I s las Carol inas occurred in the 1 7 2 0 s , following the arrival o f a large group o f Caro l inians at Guam in June 1 7 2 1 . Blown o f f course and drifting for days , the natives o f Woleai were quickly taken under the wing o f Father Juan Antonio Cantova . Cantova learned the language o f his charges and , when it was t ime for them to leave and attempt to return to Woleai , Cantova departed with them . Unfortunately , the islanders were again blown o f f course and ended up in the Phil ippines .
It was not until 17 3 1 that Father Cantova attempted another miss ionary voyage into the Carolines , accompanied by Father Victor Walter . The two priests , along with a small contingent of soldiers , sailed from Guam to Ul ithi and from there to Falalap , another is let i n the group . At Fal al ap they were greeted with a good dea l o f enthusiasm by the populace who quickly adopted the teachings o f the two priests . After several months in the islands , Cantova sent Walter back to Guam to obtain needed suppl ies and pos s ibly two addit ional priests for the mis s ion . During the return voyage , the ship was blown o f f c ourse to the Philippines before eventually making its way back to Guam . Two years passed before Father Walter returned to Ul ithi in June 1 7 3 3 , only to f ind on arrival that Father Cantova and the soldiers who remained on the island had been kil led s hortly after Walter ' s attempted voyage to Guam ( Burney 1 8 1 7 : 1 8 - 2 9 ) . The death o f Father Cantova ended the miss ion o n Ul ithi and halted Spanish miss ionary interest in the Carol ines for nearly 5 0 years .
The only other Spanish activity in the Carolines occurred in 17 3 3 . The Manila-Acapulco trade was f lourishing along the more northern routes , but in that year CONSOLACION s ighted Ngetik in the Carol ines while on a trading voyage to South America ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 8 3 ) .
In other areas of the Pac i f ic , the first hal f o f the e ighteenth century saw an aggres s ive and reorganized British East I ndia Company break out o f I ndia and establish direct trade with China . This was accompanied by an increase in British-sanctioned privateering by Dampier , Woods -Rogers , Anson , C l ipperton and Shelvocke . A s a result , the Dutch were put on the defens ive , and ultimately the Dutch sphere of influence was l imited to the Mal ay Archipe lago . In the mid- 1 7 0 0 s Britain ' s o f f ic ial interest in the Pac i f ic was bas ically commerc ial rather than colonial . E xploration in the region was encouraged in order to discover produc ing areas , develop trade monopolies , and discover acces s routes to home markets . Circumnavigations undertaken were no longer privateering enterprises ; rather , they were sponsored , equipped and directed by the government as part o f a national 41t
9 8
program . To further British commerc ial aims , the expeditions were mandated to search for two geographica l features , the Northwest Pas sage , presumed to lay north of Cape Mendoc ino , and a great southern continent south and west o f Cape Horn ( Ruggles 1 9 6 7 : 2 3 8 ) .
The f irst of several government-sponsored voyages , that o f John Byron ( 1 7 6 4 - 1 7 6 5 ) , resulted in sightings o f i s l ands i n Polynesia and the Gi lbert I s lands . Byron , in HMS DOLPHIN , discovered Nikunau in 1 7 6 5 and named it Byron I s land . The voyage of Samuel Wallis and Phi l ip Carteret ( 1 7 6 7 - 1 7 6 8 ) was authori zed spec i f ically to search for the southern continent , Terra Austral is . During the pas sage through the Straits o f Magellan , the two ves sels under the commands o f Wal l i s and Carteret , respectively , became separated during a s torm . Bel ieving that Carteret ' s SWALLOW had sunk , Wall i s attempted to work his way west and south . After reaching 3 7 ° south , Wal l is fol lowed the trade winds northwes t toward the equator . He traveled through the Tuamotu and Soc iety i s l ands in French Polynes ia and eventually reached the Marsha l l I s lands , where he made several discoveries ( Ruggles 1 9 6 7 : 2 3 9 ) .
Carteret , in a leaking and deteriorating SWALLOW , managed to clear the Straits of Magellan after spending four months battl ing wind and storms and was forced to sail north to Juan Fernandez Is land be fore continuing his westward j ourney . Carteret eventual ly turned west by south and s ighted Pitcairn I s land before returning to the normal cruising latitudes ; he is credited with several discoveries in the Carol ine I s lands , not the least o f which are Pule Anna , Merir , Sonsorol , Tobi and Helen ' s Ree f . Another o f Carteret ' s important discoveries was the naming and f irst use of the s traits separating New Britain from New I reland , and New Ireland from New Hanover in the Bismarck Archipelago . Carteret ' s 1 7 6 8 exploration o f the southeas t and north s ides o f New Guinea , complement ing those o f Dampier from 1 6 7 9 - 1 6 9 1 o f t he passage o f f the northwest tip of New Guinea , would firm up the route to be followed by numerous British East I ndiamen into Melanes ia and Micronesia for the balance of t he c entury ( Ruggles 1 9 6 7 : 2 4 0 ) .
The c l imax of the British age o f c ircumnavigation and government-sponsored expeditions were the voyages o f Capt . James Cook between 1 7 6 8 and 1 7 8 0 . Among his many achievements , inc luding discovery of the Hawaiian I s l ands , Cook proved that there was no great southern continent and set the stage for Vancouver to f inal ly disprove the theory o f a Northwest Passage ( Ruggles 1 9 6 7 : 2 3 8 - 2 4 4 ) . Because o f Cook ' s ability a s a marine surveyor and leader , the navigational charts and information he produced on places for reprovis ioning in the Pac i f ic were used extens ively for many
9 9
years . scurvy travel .
Cook also proved it was pos s ible to all but e l iminate and other diseases result ing from long-distance
The regular convoys of British ships after 1 7 8 0 , en route around the Cape of Good Hope and through the I ndian Ocean to canton , passed through the Dampier Strait o f f the northwest t ip of New Guinea and continued northeast in an arc that brought them c lose to the western Carol ine I s l ands o f Palau be fore turning back to the Chinese mainland . East I ndia merchantmen taking this route known as the Inner Pas s age made regular discoveries o f is lands in the Carolines , some o f which were named for company s hips such as Lord North ' s I s l and ( Tobi ) and Helen ' s Ree f ( Stevens 1 8 0 8 : 6 3 4 ) . The years after 1 7 8 0 s aw European knowledge of the geography o f the western Caroline I s l ands become s teadily re f ined and detailed .
One o f the most famous o f these discoveries , although by acc ident , was the wreck o f the British East India Company packet ANTELOPE off Palau ' s wes tern reef in 1 7 8 3 . This encounter irrevocably forced Palau from its lengthy isolation i nto direct European contact . Early British involvement in the i s land ' s internal affairs would prove to have repercus s ions that have continued to this day .
Cook I s des cription o f Australia I s New South Wales coastline e I eventua l ly led to the estab l ishment o f the f irst British settlement in the Pac i fic at Port Jackson . Capt . Arthur Phi l l ip , in command of a f leet of eleven ships referred to as the First Fleet , brought in the f irst group o f c onvicts and suppl ies to the new settlement in 1 7 8 7 . The settlement in Sydney Harbor was destined to become
. . . for the South Pac i f ic what Honolulu was to be for the North--the ma j or port-of -ca l l for s hips entering and leaving the Pac if ic , an entrepot for trade between East and west , and eventually a supply point for white settlers in the is lands beyond . It was from this base that the British whaleships and merchantmen would sail forth into the Caro l ines and Marshalls for the next four decades . . . ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 6 4 ) .
Like s o many that followed them , the ships of the First Fleet , once they had rel ieved themselves of their human cargoes , made north for Canton to pick up Oriental goods before returning to England . I n the proces s , the c aptains took their ships wel l around to the east on a course that was �
1 0 0
eventually called the Outer Pass age . This route took British shipping through portions o f the Gilbert , Marsha l l and eastern Carol ine i s l ands that had been nearly f orgotten . I n 1 7 8 7 - 1 7 8 8 Capt . Thomas G ilbert in CHARLOTTE and Wil l iam Marshall in SCARBOROGH took their ships o f the First Fleet into the is lands that now bear their names . I n the Gilbert I slands , they rediscovered Quiros ' Buen Via j e , renaming it Touching ' s I s land . Marsha l l named the other princ ipal atol l s Allen ' s , Gillespie ' s , Clarke ' s , Smith ' s and Scarborough I sland . Gilbert named Abaing Matthew ' s I s l and a fter the owner of his ship . He a l s o s ighted Tarawa and named the three northernmos t atolls Gilbert ' s , Marshal l ' s and Knox ' s is lands . Marshal l s ighted Aranuka and named the eastern and western ends Hopper ' s and Henderville ' s i s l ands , respectively . Together Gil bert and Marshal l discovered Kriua and named it Woodle ' s I s land .
Two other ships from the Firs t Fleet , ALEXANDER and FRIENDSHIP , worked their way through the Solomon and Rus sell is lands en route to Canton when , in need of food and water , they made a l andfall in the Palaus . During their brief stay , Captain Shortland noted that the natives had i ron adzes o f " European manu facture " and occas ionally used Spanish words ( Phil l ip 1 7 8 9 : 2 0 8 - 2 1 2 ) . Jus t f ive months before the arrival o f ALEXANDER and FRIENDSHIP in September 1 7 8 8 , another British ship had brief ly stopped in Palau . IPHIGENIA , u nder the command o f Capt . Wi lliam Douglas , vis ited Tobi and Palau in 1 7 8 8 , while en route to the Pac i f ic Northwes t coast on a fur-trading expedition . The value o f furs from the Northwest to the merchants in the Orient was another of Captain Cook ' s discoveries .
Other discoveries in the eastern Carol ines and Mars ha l l s by British merchantmen taking the Outer Pass age inc luded those of Capt . Henry Bond on ROYAL ADMIRAL ; he sighted the ato l l s o f Namorick and Namu in the Marshalls in 1 7 9 2 . British ships were regularly reporting s i ght ing is lands in the vic inity o f Yap and Sorel i n the wes tern Carolines between 1 7 8 7 - 1 7 9 3 . The ship WARREN HASTINGS made a landfall at Ngulu Atol l south of Yap in 1 7 8 7 . In 1 7 9 3 Captain Musgrave in SUGAR CANE and Capt . Will iam Raven in BRITANNIA named Musgrave I s land ( Pingelap ) and Raven I s l and ( Ngetik ) in the eastern Carolines . The is lands that comprise E newetok Atol l in the Marshal l s were s ighted by the crew on WALPOLE in 1 7 9 4 and again by the crew on HUNTER in 1 7 9 8 . In 1 7 9 5 Captain Mortlock , in YOUNG WILLIAM , gave his name to the i s l ands in the Carolines that today are c a l led Nomoi . He is also the discoverer of Puluwat I s l and west o f Truk . In 1 7 9 7 Captain Dennett also reported several new islands in the Marsha l l s . The Gilberts were further explored and reported on in 1 7 9 8 by Captain Fearn and i n 1 7 9 9 by Capt . Charles Bishop . Bishop , in the brig NAUTILUS , s ighted Abemama and named it Roger
1 0 1
S impson ' s I s land after an as soc iate who was on board . 4l Although fewer in number , Spanish s hips were occas ional ly in the region as wel l . A Spanish c aptain , Ibargoitia , s ighted the atol l s o f Puluwat , Pulusuk , and Pulap in 1 7 9 9 and again in 1 8 0 1 , while on a trading voyage ( Ruggles 1 9 6 7 : 2 4 7 ; Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 8 2 - 8 3 ) .
While the Mari ana Islands were e f fectively cut o f f from the rest o f Micrones ia , the influence o f European c ivil i z at ion was spread through the Carol ines and to a lesser degree the Marsha l l s by the Carol inians thems e lves . The intermittent c anoe voyages that did occur were primarily by acc ident , and when the i s landers f inal ly returned to their homes , stories o f the cruelty o f the Spaniards only served to frighten the populat ions . Only two purposeful trading voyages from the Carol ines to Guam , in 1 7 8 7 and 1 7 8 8 , are recorded . Several c anoes from Lamotrek , led by an i s lander named Luito , travelled to Guam in order to trade for iron and metal tools . Although the islanders were cordially received by the Spaniards and encouraged to return , their failure to return to Lamotrek from the s econd voyage again halted interisl and travel ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 1 0 3 ) .
Commerc ialization and Chris tiani zation 1 8 0 0 - 1 8 8 0 -Carol inian Bancas , East India Merchantmen . Trading Schooners , Naval Cruisers . Whaling Ships , Mis s ionary Ships and Blackbirders
It was not until after the turn of the century that Carol inian bancas once again began to appear on the s hores of Guam . The fears of the Caro l inians were allayed by the voyage of Don Luis Torres in 1 8 0 4 . Senor Torres sailed to many o f the islands in the western Carolines . He invited the is landers to resume their trading voyages and reas sured them that they would be wel l received by the Spanish . As a result o f Torres ' ef forts , voyages to Guam resumed and continued through most o f the century ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 1 0 4 ) .
European discoveries in the Pac if ic as wel l as in the Carol ine , Marshall and Gilbert i s l ands continued into the 1 8 0 0 s ; however , exploration in this century provided no great new continents , is lands or pas s ages . Activity in the region during the f irst quarter o f the n ineteenth century can be characterized as predominantly trading , sea-hunting, missionary work , some marine surveying during naval cruises , s c ienti f ic analys is o f the ocean bas in , and exploration of the South Pac ific and Austral ia ' s coastline ( Ruggles 1 9 6 7 : 2 5 0 ) .
•
By 1 8 0 0 , the s tage had been set for the next wave of European influence and commercial activity- -the traders , naval -based SC ienti fiC explorers 1 WhalerS I miSS iOnarieS and e
1 0 2
blackbirders . At the turn o f the century , Micronesia was crisscros sed by three distinct trade routes .
British merchantmen , and occas ionally the American ships that cal led at Port Jackson . . . made their way north through the islands on their passage to China . American ships , sometimes after spending time on the Northwest coast to pick up a cargo o f furs , c rossed the Pac i f ic in the low northern latitudes to take advantage of the trade winds on their way to China . Finally , Spanish ves sels from the Phil ippines put out to the i s lands to the east in search o f produce that might be sold to Chinese merchant s . . . . the Micrones ian islands just happened to be on the trading l anes , and so were acc identally discovered . . . ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 84 ) .
I ndependent Traders and Naval Expeditions
Discovery and contact became , as never before , a true by-product of trade . Banaba in the Gilberts was first reported on by Capt . Jered Gardner o f the American s hip DIANA , who s ighted the is l and on January 3 , 1 8 0 1 , and named it Rodman I s l and . In 1 8 0 2 the crew of COROMANDEL s ighted several islands in the Carol ines in the vic inity of Truk , inc luding Nama and Los ap , southeast o f Truk , and Murilo and Nomwin in the Hal l I s l ands north o f Truk . Between 1 8 0 3 and 1 8 1 1 , several islands in the Marshal l s were s ighted . The c rew on ROLLA s ighted Jaluit in 1 8 0 3 , and Capt . John Patterson on ELIZABETH s ighted it again in 1 8 0 9 . Patterson is also c redited with the first s i ghting o f Mariana and Arorae in the Gilberts , which he named Hall ' s I s land and Hope ' s I s land , respectively . In 1 8 0 4 Capt . John Mertho on OCEAN discovered Uj ae and Kwa j alein in the Mars ha l l I s l ands and rediscovered Banaba in the Gilberts and named it a fter his ship . The crew on PROVI DENCE located Uj elang in the Marshal l s in 1 8 1 1 and named it Providence I s land . Captain MacAskill on LADY BARLOW named Macaskill I s land ( Pingelap ) in 1 8 0 9 , and Captain Betham on MARQUI S OF WELLI NGTON named Wellington I s land ( Mwoki l ) in 1 8 15 , both near Pohnpei . I n 1 8 0 6 the Spaniard Monteverde o n PALA discovered Nukuoro , a Pohnpei outl ier , while Dublon on SAN ANTONIO named an i s l and a fter hims e l f in Truk in 1 8 1 4 ( Ruggles 1 9 6 7 : 2 4 7 ; Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 8 2 - 8 3 ) .
The interest o f the United States in the Pac i f ic began with the China trade and the need to f ind marketable goods to exchange for teas and s ilks . American discoveries in the
1 0 3
region began in 1 7 9 9 when Ebon in the Marshall I s lands was 41 s ighted by crewmen on the merchant ship ANN AND HOPE . The trading ships HOPE , in 1 8 0 1 , and NANCY , in 1 8 0 4 , each s ighted Strong ' s I s land ( Kusaie ) in the Caro l ines . I n 1 8 0 9 TONQUIN made the f irst recorded s ighting o f Kapingamarangi in the eastern Carol ines ( Hezel 1 9 8 4 : 8 4 ) .
Fur-seal ing along the Pac i f ic Northwes t coast , exploited f irst by the British in 1 7 8 5 , quick ly dominated the China trade . However , because o f the restrictive monopol ies o f the British East India Company and the South Seas Company , along with Britain ' s involvement in the Napoleonic Wars , their trading on the coast was l imited . The trade in sea otter s kins from the northwest coast and seal skins from sub-Arctic and Arctic islands was rapidly monopol i zed by Americans after the turn o f the century . After f i l l ing their ho lds , the ships would sail south down the coast and , us ing the s ame trade winds that propel led the Spanish galleons from Ac apu lco to Manil a , sailed to Canton to obtain teas and s ilks . The fur trade was short-lived , however , rapidly dec l ining after 1 8 1 0 and no longer dominating the trans-Pac i f ic trade a fter 1 8 1 5 . By 1 8 3 0 the seals were nearly extinct and the trade ended ( Bertand 1 9 6 7 : 2 5 6 -2 6 0 ) .
While the fur-trade was dec l ining , entrepreneurial c aptains ventured into Microne s ia to seek other c argoes that could be � sold in China . The private traders , many o f them American , .. quickly moved to exploit the wealth o f the i s l ands .
Sandalwood , hec he-de-mer , mother-of pearl , turtle s he l l , and edible birds ' nests were the most commonly sought artic les , and the search for islands that might serve as abundant sources of supply occupied traders throughout much of the nineteenth century . Ships sailing from Liverpool or Boston would make for the Pac i f ic Is lands with a c argo o f cheap ironware , c a l ico and gingham , bric - a-brac , mus kets and powder , or whatever else they thought would interest the i s landers . They would cruise the area until they had picked up a ful l c argo which was then carried t o a Chinese port and traded for oriental commodities ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 8 5 ) .
These trading voyages introduced a variety of manu factured goods to the i s landers and increased their des ire for iron .
Shortly after the turn of the century , government-sponsored naval expeditions , with a mandate to conduct sc ient i f ic 4lt
1 0 4
� 0 U1
K OTZEBUE (LATE 1 8 1 7 & 1 825) DUPERREY 1 824
KOTZEBUE (EARLY 1 8 1 7 & 1 824) FREYCINET 1 8 1 9
...... ... --- �� � - � .oE.� �� -� � �
- -- -- ----,-- - - - --
• YAP ULITHI 0
SAIPAN /
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0 NGULU 0SOROL
WOLEI • ,
TOBi • -_ . .,£-- ·
KAPINGAMARANGI 0
Fig . 4 . 1 1 . Naval -based sc ient i f ic expeditions , 1 8 1 7 - 1 8 2 5 .
exploration , hydrographic s tudies , and accurate c harting of tt i s l ands and ree f s began in earnest ( Figure 4 . 1 1 ) . While in the Gilbert I s lands , Duperry was the f irst European to s ight Marake i . The maj ority o f these voyages occurred between 1 8 15 and 1 8 4 2 and had a s ignif icant impact on the Caroline and Mars ha l l i s l ands .
Rus s ian interest in the Pac i f ic was p iqued when the Rus s ians became serious competitors in the fur trade and des irous of a l arger share o f the China market . Two voyages commanded by Lt . Otto Ye . Kotzebue resulted in many important discoveries in the Marsha l l I s l ands . On his f irst voyage , from 1 8 1 5- 1 8 1 8 , Kot zebue was mandated to search for the i l lus ive Northwest Passage and to undertake geographical research in the Pac i f ic Ocean . Although Kotzebue ' s search for a passage was unsucces s fu l , it did result in an increase i n detai led information on many o f the is lands o f f the northwes t coast of Americ a along with the discovery of Kotzebue Sound .
During the unfavorable winter months of 1 8 1 6 - 1 8 1 7 , Kot zebue took his brig RIURIK into the Marshall I s lands and the Tuamotu Archipelago . The true pos ition o f the Marshall I s l ands was f inal ly del ineated during that stay . Kot zebue also discovered that the Marshal l I s l ands cons ist o f two parallel series o f island chains , the eastern Ratak Chain and the wes tern Ral ik Chain . The Ral ik Chain was only traversed; .. however , Kot zebue c are fully mapped and studied the Ratak W Chain ( Figure 4 . 12 ) .
Kotzebue ' s second voyage , from 1 8 2 3 - 1 8 2 6 on the s loop PREDPRIATIE , involved a return to the Marsha l l and Tuamotu i s l ands . He made numerous astronomical observations , studied the temperature and spec i f ic weight o f ocean water , and again c arefully described the coral atol l s vis ited . As a result of Kotzebue ' s two voyages , 1 1 is lands in the Marsha l l s were mapped , along with 4 in the Tuamotu Archipelago and 1 in the Soc iety I s l ands ( Lebedev and Grekov 1 9 6 7 : 1 9 1 - 1 9 3 ) .
Another Rus s ian explorer , Capt . Fedor P . Lutke , was c ommanded to conduct sc ienti f ic observations in the Pac i f ic during a c ircumnavigation lasting from 1 8 2 6 - 1 8 2 9 ( Figure 4 . 1 3 ) . On board the s loop SENYAVIN were two natural ists , Karl H . Martens and Aleksandr F . Postels , and a n ornithologist , Freidrich H . de Kitlitz . From November 1 8 2 7 to the end of 1 8 2 8 , Lutke s ailed throughout the Carol i ne I s lands , systemat ica l ly investigating and des cribing them . One group , named after his ship SENYAVIN , was virtual ly unknown to Europeans . Lutke ' s surveying expedition in the Carol ines vis ited nearly every inhabited ato l l short of Yap and Palau . His accomplishments inc luded the rediscovery o f Ponape ( Pohnpe i ) , forgotten by Europeans s ince Quiros ' visit in 1 5 9 5 , and extens ive geodetic work and description o f natural tt
1 0 6
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Naval -based sc ient i f ic expedit ions , 1 8 2 8 - 1 8 4 0 .
conditions and the population o f the islands ( Lebedev and Grekov 1 9 6 7 : 1 9 3 - 1 9 4 ; Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 9 0 ) .
Other Rus s ian cruises to the Pac i f ic inc l uded the two voyages of V . S . Khromchenko in the s hip ELNA from 1 8 2 8 - 1 8 3 0 and in the transport AMERICA in 1 8 3 1- 1 8 3 3 . Khromchenko collected information on and des cribed several o f the Marshall I s lands . The transport AMERICA was again in the Marshall I s lands from 1 8 3 4 - 1 8 3 6 under the command o f I . I . Schantz . Schantz discovered 1 3 uninhabited is lands in the Ral ik Chain , whic h he named the Schantz I s l ands and which are today known as Wotho Atol l ( Lebedev and Grekov 1 9 6 7 : 1 9 8 ) .
When Kot zebue arrived in the Marshal l I s lands in 1 8 1 6 , he discovered that for a l l o f the activity in the region , these is landers had been left nearly untouched by European in fluences . They had only tools of wood and s hel l , s imple woven garments and baskets . He also found they were s t i l l making voyages i n their gracefu l , double-ended c anoes , equipped with a s ingle outrigger for bal ance . Kot zebue distributed knives and hatchets to the islanders and left goats and pigs on Wot j e . He even had one o f his o f ficers plant a garden and left seeds with the i s landers to supplement their food c rops . Eight years later when Kotz ebue returned to the islands , he found that the foodstuf fs he had left were in common use and that the pigs and goats were being raised on the island of Aur . In general , Kotz ebue described a picture o f Marshallese l ife that was not much different from that described by Cantova nearly a century earlier in the central Caro l ines ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 9 2 - 9 4 ) .
I n dec ided contrast to the Marshal l s , the Mort lock I s l ands were wel l acquainted with western culture . When Lutke arrived in 1 8 2 8 , he noted that axes of s hell were no l onger in use , having been replac ed by iron ( Lutke 1 8 3 5 ( 2 ) : 1 0 9 1 ) . The Mortlocks , in addition to being part o f a trading network that included canoe trips to Guam for iron and other goods , were also receiving vis its from the few whal ing s hips that were beginning to enter the region . As a result , the Mortlockese were more sophisticated than the Kosraeans Lutke had vis ited and were no longer interested in glass beads or other trade items . The presence of dogs , cats and fowl on the islands also spoke of wes tern influence . At each ato l l vis ited , there was heavy Mortlockese trading o f c hickens for knives , scis sors and axes . Lutke characterized the i s l anders as " . . . a people that understands trade and knows how to use it to [ their ] own interests " ( 1 8 3 5 ( 2 ) : 6 3 ) .
The Frenc h , who had a reputation for sc ientific exploration and inquiry , were not s itting idly by while the Pac i f ic was being explored by other nations . Voyages undertaken by the eighteenth-century French explorers De Bougainville
1 0 9
( 1 7 6 6 - 1 7 6 9 ) , De Surville ( 17 6 9 - 1 7 7 0 ) , De Fres nes and Crozet ( 1 7 7 1 - 1 7 7 3 ) , Le Perouse ( 1 7 8 5 - 1 7 8 8 ) , Marchand ( 1 7 9 0 - 1 7 9 2 ) and D ' Entrecasteaux ( 1 7 9 1 - 1 7 9 3 ) concentrated in the South Pac i f ic Ocean , New Zealand , Austral i a , Indonesia , South China Sea , Alaska and the Kuri l I s l ands . The f irst nineteenthcentury voyage into the Pac i f ic was captained by Nicholas Baudin ( 1 8 0 0 - 1 8 0 3 ) . Baudin sailed LE GEOGRAPHE and LE NATURALISTE along more than 3 , 0 0 0 nautical miles of Austral ian coast l ine , as we l l as a portion of Tasmania and New Guinea , whi le making a detailed survey and collecting information on animals , plants and the native populations ( Garry 1 9 6 7 : 2 0 4 - 2 0 5 , 2 0 9 ) .
The Frenc h began exploration of Microne s ia with the voyage of Louis de Freyc inet during 1 8 1 7 - 1 8 1 9 . Freyc inet had been a cartographer on the Baudin expedit ion and was mandated to " . . . engage in various scienti f ic observations on the phys ics of the globe " ( Garry 1 9 6 7 : 2 1 4 ) . The frigate URAMIE left Toulon in September 1 8 1 7 and steered for Mauritius and Austral ia . Freyc inet spent a short time o f f three atolls near Truk and eventually arrived at Guam , where he spent more than two months reprovis ioning ( refer to Figure 4 . 1 1 ) . During his stay at Guam , Freyc inet gathered the information upon which he based his description of the Carol ines inc luded in the expedition document s .
Following in Freyc inet ' s footsteps , a former l ieutenant under Freyc inet , Louis I s idore Duperry , captained the corvette COQUILLE through Polynesia , parts of Melane s ia and around Australia from 1 8 2 2 - 1 8 2 5 . During May and June 1 8 2 4 , COQUILLE traversed the Gilbert and Carol ine islands while col lecting information in the natural sc iences and reporting on their geography ( refer to Figure 4 . 1 1 ) . While in the Gilbert I s l ands , Duperry discovered Marake i . Duperry also surveyed part o f Truk lagoon and described Kosrae ( Garry 1 9 6 7 : 2 15 ; Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 9 0 -9 1 ) .
The expeditions of Jules S . C . Dumont d ' Urvil le made major contributions to knowledge o f the western Pac i fic . His f irst voyage , in Duperry ' s rel iable COQUILLE ref itted and renamed L ' ASTROLABE , was charged with continuing his former c aptain ' s work and with exploration of the Carol ines and Pal a us and approaches to New Guinea ( Figure 4 . 1 3 ) . After surveying the south o f Australia , Tasman Bay and a portion o f the New Guinea c oastline ; discovering a pass between New Zealand ' s northern shore and an is l and in Cook Strait ; undertaking a geographica l s tudy o f the Fij i I s lands ; searching for the remains o f the La Perouse expedition lost in the Santa Cruz Is lands ; and completing the survey of Truk in April 1 8 2 8 , L ' ASTROLABE made for Guam to reprovis ion . Plans to c arry out extens ive s urveys o f the Carol ines and Palaus were aborted
1 10
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Dates of f irst vis its by whal ing ships to Micrones ian I s l ands .
because o f the i l l health of his c rew ( Garry 1 9 6 7 : 2 1 5 - 2 1 8 ; e Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 9 1 ) .
I n 1 8 3 7 d ' Urville began his second voyage into the Pac i f ic . He was instructed to examine the potential for whal ing in the South Polar regions and to extend his explorations in Oceania ( re fer to Figure 4 . 1 3 ) . Under his command , the corvettes L ' ASTROLABE and LA Z ELEE skirted the Antarct ic continent and vis ited the Marquesas , Tahiti , Samo a , Fij i , Loyalty i s l ands and the Louisiade Archipelago ( Garry 1 9 6 7 : 2 1 9 -2 2 0 ) . During December 1 8 3 8 and January 1 8 3 9 , d ' Urville stopped at Palau and Yap ; however , the maj ority o f his work in the Caro l ines focused on Truk . The study o f t he natural l ife and the descriptions o f the people o f Truk were the f irst by Europeans who actual ly set foot on the is land ( He zel 1 9 8 3 : 9 1 ) .
The conc lus ion o f d ' Urville ' s second voyage in 1 8 4 0 brought to an end the French era o f exploration in t he Pac i fi c as wel l as the end o f European discovery in Micronesia . By 1 8 4 0 mos t , i f not al l , o f the is lands had been charted and the detailed descriptions o f the people and islands by European and American explorers f i l led hundreds of volumes .
The i s l and o f Kosrae to the east o f the wel l - acculturated Mort locks was still unaf fected when vis ited by the French Captain Duperrey in 1 8 2 4 . The i s landers fol lowed the Frenchmen and were amazed at their white skin and c lothing . The Kosraeans were unacquainted with iron and had to be s hown how to use iron hatchets ( Lesson 1 8 3 9 : 4 5 9 -5 1 4 ) . Three years later , however , Lutke found that iron hatchets were in c ommon use on the i s l and ( No z ikov 1 9 4 6 : 1 3 0 ) . Surpris ingly , the people o f Truk , the nearest neighbors to the Mortlocks , were s t i l l unaffected by outs ide inf luences a full 1 0 years after Lutke ' s vis it . When the trading bark PERU lay o f f an i s land in the l agoon in 1 8 3 2 , Captain E agleston noted that the i s l anders " . . . have had l ittle or no intercourse with other nations " ( Eagleston in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 2 ) : 4 9 6 -4 9 8 ) . I n 1 8 3 8 , Dumont d ' Urville found the people o f Truk suspic ious o f the French although des irous o f iron as wel l as other trade items ( Dumot d ' Urville 1 8 4 3 : 12 0 - 1 6 7 , 3 0 9 - 3 2 8 ) .
Overa l l , the cultures in the eastern Carol ines that were being described by the Rus s ian and French explorers were tradit ional and l ittle af fected by outs ide inf luences . However , the vis its o f Europeans were increas ing and changes were occurring rapidly . Certainly , the inf luence of Western contac t was more pronounced the farther wes t one moved through the i s l ands and the c loser one got to Guam . Lutke noted that the Carol inians he met o n Guam were very dif ferent from those in the outer islands .
1 1 2
They wear red shirts and straw hats ; they s ay " adios " and " s i senor . " But with this " c ivilization , " they are to their free countrymen as a caged parrot is to the magni f icent f locks that enchant the traveler in the forest . They are los ing their culture comp letely . There is not even the shadow of that uninhibited cheerfulness that they had before . There i s a certain trace of sadness in their forced smile . . . ( Lutke 1 8 3 5 ( 2 ) : 12 3 - 1 2 4 ) .
On Woleai , an i s l and that experienced heavy tra f fic with Marianas , Lutke observed that the hospital ity o f is landers was much less than he had received elsewhere that the fts were more frequent . He conc luded that " . . . more contact natives have with c ivilized men , the corrupt they become " ( Lutke 1 8 3 5 ( 2 ) : 3 0 1 ) .
the the and the
more
The influence of Western culture , brought more and more frequently to the is lands by independent traders , continued to grow throughout the f irst hal f of the nineteenth century . I n November 1 8 3 3 the brig SPY , on a beche-de -mer voyage , arrived at the island o f Ponape to trade and reprovis ion . Like many o f his contemporaries , Captain Knight found the is land to have good harbors and an " . . . unl imited quantity o f f irewood and most excel lent water " ( Wil son 1 8 4 1 ) . A variety of foodstu f fs could be eas ily obtained , and the i s l anders were friendly . Ponape was considered " an i s l and very wel l worth the attention of whalers " ( James 1 8 3 5 ) .
I n the f ive short years s ince Lutke had rediscovered the is land , Ponape had already made something of a reputation for itsel f . British whaleships out o f Sydney and merchant ves sels o n their run from Austral ia to China were beginning to make the island a regular port of call . With them came the convicts from the penal colonies in Aus tralia , either as stowaways or as seamen . . . . the captains were usually only too happy to be rid o f these men by the t ime they reached the f irst s topover . . . . These runaway convicts
became the f irst white men to l ive for any length o f t ime on the isl and ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 1 1 0 ) .
Ships trading for beche-de-mer and tortoise throughout the Caroline and Marshall is lands . Ponape , was al_so a popular layover . By 1 8 3 5 had gone from near isolation i n 1 8 2 4 to having
1 1 3
she l l roamed Kos rae , l ike
the Kosraeans " . . . not l e s s
than thirty runaways on the is land . . . many o f them convicts " e ( Sydney Gazette August 2 , 1 8 3 6 ) . Tens ions between Western inf luences and demands upon the is l anders and the Kosraean traditional ways came to a head in 1 8 3 5 when the brig WAVERLY arrived at the island .
Sailors from the brig either coerced or kidnapped women on the i s l and and took them on board WAVERLY . The inc ident that fol lowed was described in a newspaper story and was based upon the eyewitness account o f the high chief .
White man want to get gal go aboard s hip . King no l ike . In night white man take plenty gal go aboard ship . I n morning , kanaka go board ship ; big i s l and , small is land , all go and k i l l every man board ship . White man k i l l some kanakas . Then kanakas take chests , sma l l things ashore , then set f ire to s hip ; burn sails , rigging , spars , casks , everything belong to ship . Every white man kil led ( The Friend , November 1 8 5 4 : 8 2 ) .
The attack on WAVERLY was repeated a few months l ater when the trading schooner HONDURAS vis ited the i s l and . With the � exception o f the mate and steward , the crew was kil led . In � this instance , the two survivors escaped with the s hip , obtained crewmen from Ponape and eventually made their way to Hawai i ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 3 ) : 5 4 1 - 5 4 6 ) .
As the number o f ships moving through the region increased so did the opportunity for conf l ict . Attacks on t rading ships , although not frequent , did occur , more often than not as a result o f some real or imagined breach o f behavior on the part o f the sailors or as a result of some longstanding enmity between the islanders and foreigners . Like the inc ident with WAVERLY , these attacks often resulted in the loss o f the ship as well . The trading schooner DASH ran aground on the western Caroline I s land of Ngulu in March 1 8 3 4 . While the crew was attempting to free the ship , the i s l anders attacked , killing three men and wounding the captai n . Captain Keating organi zed an escape o f the remainder o f the crew on the ship ' s boats , eventually making it to Manila ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 5 ) : 1 52 ) .
In 1 8 4 6 the brig WILLIAM NE ILSON , o n a trading miss ion in the region , was attacked while at Ebon in the southern Marshall I s l ands . The crew were ki l led and the ship destroyed by the i s landers . The year before , it was reported that Captain Cheyne , on the ship NAI D , also had trouble with the natives of Ebon who killed one man ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 4 ) : 3 2 4 - 3 2 6 , 3 3 3 - 3 3 4 ) . tt
1 1 4
In 1 8 5 2 , the schooner GLENCOE was also attacked and burned at Ebon ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 2 ) : 2 55 , ( 4 ) : 3 2 7 ) . That same year , SEA NYMPH , on a trading voyage out o f San Franc isco , was attacked and burned at Jalu it ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 4 ) : 3 2 7 ) .
The Gilbert I s l ands were no more safe for the independent trader . In 1 8 5 1 , the brig RODOLPH was attacked and the s hip destroyed by the inhabitants of Tabiteuea ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 6 ) : 5 4 1 ) . Two years l ater the trader ROSA was attacked at Tarawa .
the brig Rosa , while on a trading voyage among the South Pac i f ic I s l ands , was attacked at Tauroa [ s ic ] by savages , and the Captain and several o f the crew murdered . The natives , o f who a l arge number had been admitted on board the ves sel , commenced a s imultaneous attack upon the crew of the brig , killing or overpowering s ix o f their number and forc ing the survivors to seek refuge in the c abin . They there procured arms and ammunition and after a sharp conf l ict , succeeded in overpowering the natives--driving most o f them overboard .
Mr . Maiden , the second rna te , upon whom the command devolved , bore the vessel up for Sydney , where she arrived in sa fety ( Daily Evening Traveler , Boston , November 2 3 , 1 8 5 3 in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 7 ) : 2 2 3 ) .
Increased trading in the region also increased the number o f vessel losses from navigational errors , natural disasters , or on-board confl icts . In 1 8 1 0 the British trading ship MARTHA was sunk after running aground on Palau ' s s outhernmos t atol l , Helen ' s Ree f ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 3 ) 1 9 7 ) . The London-based I SABELLA , while on a pas sage from Sydney to Manila , wrecked in 1 8 1 1 at Oroluk Atoll near Ponape . The British-owned East I ndia Company ship CANTON ran aground on Taongi in the Marsha l l I s lands i n 1 8 3 2 ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 7 ) : 2 2 2 ) , and in 1 8 4 4 the schooner SHAW wrecked on a ree f at Ponape ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 6 ) : 1 4 5 ) . The survivors o f these wrecks , while under a good deal o f s tres s , were not necessarily mistreated by the natives . The American bark SARAH MOOERS , en route from Sydney to S an Franc isco , wrecked on the ree f at Ngatik in the eastern Carol ine I s l ands on December 2 , 1 8 5 3 . Contemporary newspapers provide the fol lowing account of the disaster .
The British ship Sea King arrived at Hong Kong on the 2nd May , bringing from the Raven I s l ands in the Pac if ic ,
1 1 5
eighteen pas sengers and the c arpenter o f the wrecked Sarah Moore , o f San Franc isco .
The Sarah Moore sailed from Sydney for San Francisco on the 4 th of September last , having on board , bes ides the crew eight cabin and twenty-two steerage pas sengers . . . . The vessel s ailed for two or three weeks in the direction of the Friendly I s l ands , where the Captain proposed trading . . . .
On the 4 th December , the s hip hove to o f f Nottick [ s ic ] , one o f the Raven I s lands whence the boat was sent ashore for hogs and the master gave charge of the deck to a European from the I s land , who profes sed to be a pilot . Suspic ions were aroused by the conduct of this man , who permitted the ves sel to dri ft on the rocks at high water . The value o f the c argo was $ 2 0 0 0 . There were but f ive or s ix natives on the is land who treated the pas sengers wel l .
On the 1 7th o f March , the American whalers Delta and Thomas hove in s ight , and sent boats ashore , taking o f f the c aptain , c abin ladies , and crew . Be fore this , two o f the crew , three pas sengers and a native s tarted in a ship ' s boat for the i s l and of Ascens ion [ Ponape ] , but never after heard of and are supposed to have perished . Among those left on Nottic k , were Mr . and Mrs . Power , and two children , who endured great privation unti l the 2 0th April , when they , with the others rema1n1ng , were rescued by the Sea King ( The Friend , September 1 8 5 4 in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 5 ) : 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 ) .
Final ly , the British-owned East I ndia Company bark LADY RAGLAN , while on a trading voyage from London to China , wrec ked on Helen ' s Ree f in 1 8 5 4 ( Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 8 - 9 ) .
Whalers
Although the Spanish had a profound e f fect on the people of the Mariana I s lands , and the early independent traders made their presence known throughout Micronesia , it may be s afely
1 1 6
s aid that the American whalers presented the greatest impact on the precolonial Caroline , Marsha l l and Gilbert i s lands .
Whal ing expanded from the Atlantic into the Pac i f ic j ust before the turn o f the nineteenth century . From 1 7 9 3 to 1 8 2 0 , British whalers were among the f irst to scout the mid-Pac i f ic in search o f whales . The first American whaleship entered the Pac i f ic Ocean while looking for whales off New Z ealand in 1 8 0 4 . Until 1 8 15 , Pac i f ic whal ing was concentrated along the wes t coast o f South Americ a , re ferred to as the " onshore grounds . " After 1 8 1 8 , the " o f fshore grounds , " 1 , 0 0 0 miles o f f the coast of Peru , became the favored hunting area . By then , however , the whaleships were ranging as far north as San Franc isco Bay , and by 1 8 2 3 American whalers had vis ited Honolulu and more than 6 0 were cruJ.s J.ng o f f the " Japan grounds , " that l arge open area between Hawaii and Japan ( Bertrand 1 9 6 7 : 2 6 1 -2 6 2 ) .
Once initiated , whal ing increased rapidly in the Pac i f ic ; 1 1 9 American whaleships were reported hunting there in 1 8 1 9 , and by 1 8 4 0 that number had increased to more than 5 0 0 ( Bertrand 1 9 6 7 : 2 6 2 ) . The ship captains quickly learned to fol low the migrations of the whales ; in the spring they would hunt o f f Japan , the summer would be spent i n the Arctic , and during the winter they cruised the equatorial grounds . It was during these winter cruises that the whalers vis ited the islands of eastern Micrones ia .
Among the first is l ands to be vis ited on a regular bas i s were the Gilberts . Nonouti was vis ited by the British whaleship ANN AND HOPE in 1 7 9 9 ; however , it was Tamana , first vis ited in 1 8 0 4 , and Nikunau and Arorae , each f irst vis ited in 1 8 2 5 , that received the vast ma j ority of whalers in that i s l and group . Captains o f whal ing ships also made some discoveries in the is land group . Capt . J . Clerk , on the whaler JOHN PALMER , was the f irst to s i ght Beru , which he named Maria ' s I s land ; Onotoa , which he named Eliza I s land ; and Tamana , which he named Rotcher I s land in 1 8 2 6 .
The f irst vis its by whalers throughout eastern Micronesia followed a general pattern o f east to west and south to north ( refer to Figure 4 . 1 4 ) . The Gilbert I s lands received the maj ority o f their f irst vis its between 1 8 0 4 and 1 8 2 7 , and the southernmost Marshal l I s lands of Namorik and Ebon were f irst vis ited in 1 8 3 5 and 1 8 3 7 , respectively . The far eastern Carol ine I s lands of Ponape , Ngetik , Mwokil and Kosrae were f irst vis ited between 1 8 3 3 and 1 8 4 2 , whi le the southernmost o f the eastern Carolines , Kapingamarangi , was f irst vis ited in 1 8 2 8 ( Langdon 1 9 7 9 : 3 1- 3 8 , 5 2 - 6 1 , 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 ) .
Without a doubt , however , the 1 8 4 0s and 1 8 5 0s were the period of heavie st vis itation by whalers throughout Mic rone s ia .
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Wilkes ( 1 8 4 5 ( 5 ) : 4 8 4 ) described the American whaling industry tt a s " whiten ( ing ] the Pac i f ic Ocean with its c anvas . "
Ponape , at which about f i fty ships had called during the whole decade between 1 8 3 0 and 1 8 4 0 , received thirty or forty ships each year during the early 1 8 5 0 s and more than fi fty i n i t s peak seasons of 1 8 5 5 and 1 8 5 6 . Kosrae , which never became quite as popular as Ponape , was vis ited by twenty or thirty ships a season during the early 1 8 5 0 s . . . " ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 1 3 2 ) .
The whaleships were des igned and equipped to not only hunt and take whales but also to process them . Because the whale oil and bone or baleen could be stored without spoilage and later o f f - loaded in Honolulu for shipment to the East , whal ing voyages o ften lasted four to f ive years . I t was necessary , therefore , for the whalers to be able to obtain wood , water and food from the Pac i f ic I s lands they vis ited . I s l ands that could provide a liberal supply o f these much-needed items were vis ited by a steadily increas ing number of ships . By the early 1 84 0 s , it was reported that " the people general ly , except the aged members o f the community , have obtained a very extens ive knowledge o f the A Engl ish language , enough to make themselves pretty well � understood " ( Baker in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 3 ) : 5 7 5 ) .
The whalers brought with them small items for trade , inc luding prized red calico shirts , gingham blouses , t ight-waisted dresses , palm- leaved bonnets , and printed handkerchiefs . More importantly , however , the whalers brought to the i s landers western culture and a knowledge of other places and things . Not infrequent ly the sailors would desert ship to l ive , for a while , among the i s l anders . Former deserters , or those stranded on the i s l and for one reason or another , o ften worked for is land chie f s and acted as trade intermediaries .
Unfortunately , whalers also brought western diseases . Smal lpox was brought to the island o f Ponape in 1 8 5 4 by the whales hip DELTA . The dead sailor was buried on the i s l and and two additional crewmen , also infected , were left behind . Before the disease ran its cours e , more than 2 0 0 0 Ponapeans - -over a third o f the population at that t ime--were dead . In 1 8 5 5 , inf luenza swept through Kos rae and kil led several hundred . Between 1 8 3 0 and the end o f the whal ing period in the 1 8 6 0 s , the populat ion on Kosrae went from over 2 , 0 0 0 to less than 7 0 0 ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 ) . Venereal disease inc luding syphilis was rampant on Ponape and Kosrae and , as
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one might expect , this s ituation was l ittle dif ferent on the other islands habitually visited by the whalers .
Despite generally good relations between the whalers and is landers , there were a number of inc idents o f violence between the two groups . In the early whal ing era , the British ship NIMROD was attacked in November 1 8 3 3 at Macaskill Is land ( Pingelap ) by natives ; the captain and one crewman were kil led . The American whaler MENTOR ran aground on a northerly ree f of the Palau I s lands in 1 8 3 2 .
The ship ran on the rocks o f the Pellew I s lands , on the night o f the 2 1st o f May 1 8 3 2 and the crew were saved by taking to the boat s . . . . At dayl ight , discovering part o f the ree f dry , they directed their course to it , where they pas sed that day and the fol lowing night . The next morning they were vis ited by a number o f c anoes full o f natives o f a neighboring is land , for the purpose o f plunder . The c rew were f inal ly robbed o f their clothing and left almost naked . ( Boston Daily At las August 1 0 , 1 8 3 3 in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 5 ) : 4 1 0 ) .
Within a few days the c rewmen reached Babelthuap , the l argest o f the Palau islands , where they were treated fairly by the natives . After spending s ome months on the i s l and , several o f the stranded crewmen left in a whaleboat and a c anoe in an e f fort to reach the Celebes . Blown o f f course and s hort o f water , the eight men and three natives who accompanied them landed on the island o f Tob i . While on Tobi , the crewmen and natives were treated as s laves and nearly hal f the group died or were brutally kil led there . Horace Holden , a s urvivor , wrote a widely circulated account o f the loss o f MENTOR and the subsequent rescue of the remainder of the c rew ( Holden 1 8 3 6 ) .
In November 1 8 3 4 , the Engl ish whaleship CORSAIR left Oahu and headed for the Kingsmil l I s l ands ( Gi lberts ) in search o f whales . After spending three weeks and obtaining 3 9 0 barrel s o f sperm o i l , they headed toward Drummond I s l and ( Tabiteuea ) . A contemporary newspaper provided the following account of subsequent event s :
On the 1 3th of January 1 3 [ 1 8 3 5 ] , being in the leeward of Drummond ' s I s land , at 9 p . m . Capt . Venables thought he saw l ights ashore , or ordered the ship ' s helm to be put down ; the man at the helm put it hard up , and the ship immediately struck an
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unseen ree f . Everything was done to get the ship o f f , but in vain . The s ame n ight a boat containing Mr . Smith , the surgeon , and f ive men , was lost . The other four boats were loaded through the c abin windows with the most valuable artic les . At dayl ight saw the land about 8 miles to the northward . [ The c aptain ] sent two coats to reconnoitre , which came back at noon , s aying there was a s and bank in the bay , on which a vessel might be built , that the natives appeared friendly , and that they thought no danger was to be apprehended from them . . . . I n the morning two boats went t o procure goods from the ship ; one boat ' s crew guarding those on shore .
The Captain ' s boat had touched at another point on the I s land . About 2 5 0 natives c ame from the main is land and s tated that the c aptain and s ix men with him were s lain by the natives . They then attacked the guard , three o f who were wounded , k i l l ing in return three natives . Both parties then f led , the natives bearing o f f goods . About two hours after the arrival of the men at the [ s tranded ] ship a great number o f c anoes were on their way to the ships , and it was dec ided to set the ship on f ire , which was done , a fter obtaining bread , water and c lothing . The three [ ship ' s ] boats , with e ighteen men , then started for Guam . After much suf fering they arrived at the is land o f Rota , Feb . 1 1 , having been 2 7 days in the boats ( Es sex Register , March 3 , 1 8 3 6 in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 6 ) 5 3 6 - 7 ) .
I n 1 8 3 6 the British whaleship FALCON was forced to spend nearly three months at Kos rae because o f adverse winds . Fina l ly , in April , Capt . C . Hings ton weighed anchor and depart for Ponape . After they arrived at Ponape , once again strong winds prevented their departure . This ship was still stranded in July , when it f inal ly went onto the reef . While the ship was disabled , natives on the is land attacked , k i l l ing the c aptain , mate and four o f the crew ( He zel 1 9 7 9 : 4 1 , 9 0 ) . That same year the American whaler AWASHONKS was attacked in 1 8 3 6 at Namorik in the Marshal l I s lands . In this inc ident only the c aptain and f irst and second o f f icers were kil led and the crew returned to Hawai i s a fely ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 5 ) : 5 ) . e
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I n the eastern Carol ine I s lands , Kosrae was not only the scene of attacks on trading ships but on whalers as wel l . I n September 1 8 4 2 , the crew o f the British whaleship HARRIET were attacked . After kil l ing the c rew , the Kosraeans burned and s cuttled the ship in an act of revenge for wrongdoing to is land women ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 , Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 3 ) 5 6 4 - 5 6 6 ) .
Many whal ing ships were lost in the region simply as a result o f running aground and not as the result o f any violence from the natives . In 1 8 4 4 the whaler COLUMBIA , under the command o f Captain Kel ly , wrecked on Sydenham I s l and ( Nanouti ) in the Gilberts ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 4 ) : 4 1 9 ) . E ight years later , another whaler was lost in the Gilberts ; the whaleship ONTARI O ran aground on a ree f at Pitts I s land ( Butaritari ) in 1 8 5 2 . The s hip struck at 4 a . m . on January 2 4 and within a few hours was a wreck . The captain , c rew and a portion o f the c argo were rescued by the schooner SUPPLY ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 2 ) : 4 5 ) . That s ame year , GENI I was abandoned at Kosrae in the eastern Carol ine I s lands . The chief o f the is land , known as King George , would not al low the crew to remain on the i s l and and forced them to depart in c anoes or boats for Ascens ion I s land ( Ponape ) ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 4 ) : 3 6 2 ) .
The whaler PARAGON was being towed out of the harbor at Strong I s land ( Kosrae ) on March 2 0 , 1 8 5 3 , when it dri fted on to the south ree f and wrecked ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 3 ) : 5 8 9 ) . S ix years later the whaler LEXINGTON had similar troubles . Captain Fisher o f the stric ken ship wrote o f the loss .
We put into Strong ' s I s land on the 5th o f March [ 1 8 5 3 ] , for recruits , before going North . A few days a fter we anchored there , the wind c ame in to the eastward , blowing straight into the pas s age , and we did not get a c hance to get out until the morning o f the first o f April when we got under weigh , with a fair wind from the westward . Took the pi lot on board , and had two o f the King ' s boats and four o f the ship ' s boat s , towing the ship . When we got about the middle of the pass age , a strong breeze from the eastward , with a heavy sel l , sprang up and took everything aback , two anchors were let go and a l l sail clewed up as quickly a s pos s ible , but by the time the anchors brought up , her stern struck t he ree f . The swell and breakers cont inued to increase , as the t ide rose , and it was impossible to get a longs ide with the boats ; two of them got broken to pieces . . . . By the exertions o f
1 2 1
the mis sionary , Mr . Snow , one o f the natives was persuaded to swim through the surf with a l ine to the ship , by which [ the captain ] and the crew that remained ( on board ] were hauled on s hore . In a short t ime she s truc k , a great part of her keel c ame out , and everything that was in the cabin and the run was washed o f f ( Fisher in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 3 ) : 6 0 3 - 6 0 4 ) .
The Rev . S . C . Damon wrote to the Honolulu-based newspaper , The Friend , with an account o f the loss o f the whaleship MIANTONOMI at Ponape in November 1 8 5 4 .
The first whaler in was the Miantonomi , Capt . Clement , in the last part of September . The small pox , which had been raging here and taken o f f about hal f the natives , broke out among her crew after she sailed . She in consequence returned , and on the 2 0th o f November was wrecked on the outer ree f , between the Bonatik and Paniau harbors . . . ( The Friend , Nov . 14 , 1 8 5 5 in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 6 ) : 1 7 9 ) .
The whal ing era dec lined rapidly a f ter the l ate 1 8 5 0 s and by 1 8 6 9 only three ships landed at Kosrae during the season , Ponape had only a few more , and the mos t popular stopovers in the Gilberts , Tamana and Nikunau , reported only one ship each ( Langdon 1 9 7 9 : 3 2 , 3 6 , 5 7 , 6 0 ) . However , the event that foreshadowed the end of whal ing in Micronesia was not an attack by natives or the loss o f a s hip on a remote ree f ; it was the attack by a Confederate cru iser on Yankee whalers in the Pac i f ic .
The cruiser SHENANDOAH , c aptained by James Waddell , was mandated to devastate the Union ' s whal ing fleet in the Pac i f ic ; toward this end Waddel l boarded a Hawaiian schooner on March 3 0 , 1 8 6 5 , to " inquire o f the captain the location o f [ the Yankee ] whal ing f leet , and . . . immediately steered a course in that direction " ( Boston Evening Courier Aug 2 6 , 1 8 6 5 in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 6 ) : 1 9 3 ) . SHENANDOAH then s urprised the whalers HECTOR , EDWARD CAREY , HARVEST and PEARL in Ponatik Harbor at Ponape . Waddel l demanded the surrender of the ships that were trapped in the harbor and claimed them as pri zes o f war . The ships were stripped o f useful gear and whale oil and were burned at anchor . The crews , with the exception o f those who j oined Wadde l l , were left at Ponape . The Bos ton Evening Courier chronic led the events that followed :
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The Shenandoah then set sail for Ochotsk Sea , where on the 2 7 th of May s he captured the whal ing ship Abigail , Capt . Nye , with 3 0 bbl s . of sperm oil . After remaining alongs ide the Abigail one day , and taking from her such c lothing , sma l l arms and l iquors a s were wanted , she was committed to f l ames , and with the Abigail ' s crew on board , the pirates s et s ail for the Arctic Ocean . Soon a fter the crew o f the Abigail went on board Shenandoah , T . S . Manning , who had been [ Abigail ' s ] second o f f icer , John A . Dowden , boatsteere , and thirteen men , mostly Sandwich I s landers , j oined the pirates [ Manning ] j oined the Shenandoah as pilot , and steered the pirate towards our whal ing fleet , and gave the rebel commander the information as to where it lay . The Shenandoah arrived o f f Cape Thaddeus at the entrance to the Arctic Ocean , on the 2 O th of June . Here she encountered the Euphrates , Capt . Hathaway , with two whales , which was burnt on the 2 1 s t June . The next day , she fell i n with , and burnt the Wm . Thompson , Capt Tucker , and the Jireh Swift , Capt . Williams , having four whales each ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 6 ) : 1 9 3 - 1 9 4 ) .
Before Waddel l was finished , he had used SHENANDOAH to c apture and burn 3 4 whal ing ships and c apture and bond 4 more ( Starbuck 1 8 7 8 : 1 0 3 ) . This proved to have a serious impact on the already depleted whal ing f leet . At the beginning of the C ivil War , the United States government had purchased and scuttled more than 4 0 old whaleships at the mouths of the Charleston and Savannah harbors in an e f fort to block those ports ( Starbuck 1 8 7 8 : 1 0 1 ) .
A final blow occurred in the fal l of 1 8 7 1 , when the Arctic whaling f leet , cons isting o f 3 4 ships , was destroyed by ice off Point Belcher . The ships , having worked their way wel l into the Arctic , were trapped when a southwest wind drove pac k ice inshore , immediately c atching several ships and quickly packing small ice around the remainder .
The heavy floe-ice grounded i n shoal -water and between i t and shore l ay the ships , with scarce ly room to swing at their anchors . . . . Nothing but ice was visible o f fshore . . . the only clear water
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being where they lay , and that narrowed to a s trip from 2 0 0 yards to hal f a mile in width , and extending from Point Belcher to two or three miles south o f Wainwright inlet . . . . every day the ice packed more and more c losely around the doomed ves sels .
. . . The next day the bark Awashonks [ was c rushed ] . . . . The peri l was now apparent to a l l the l ittle c lear water that remained was rapidly f i l l ing with ice and c los ing around them ( Starbuck 1 8 7 8 : 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 ) .
On September 1 4 , 1 8 7 1 , the f leet was abandoned . The loss of the Arctic f leet , when coupled with the devastation wreaked by SHENANDOAH in the Pac i f ic in 1 8 6 5 and the introduct ion of kerosene in the early 1 8 6 0 s , brought the whal ing era quickly to a c lose .
Mis s ionaries
When whal ing was at its peak in the late 1 8 4 0 s and 1 8 5 0 s , two other act ivities were making their influences felt in the region : the miss ionaries and the copra traders . � American miss ionary act ivity in the Pac i f ic began i n the Hawai ian I s l ands in the 1 8 2 0 s when the Boston-based American Board o f Commis s ioners for Foreign Mis s ions established its first miss ion . As a result of its succes s in Hawaii , by the 1 8 5 0 s the board was ready to begin establishing mis s ions in Micronesia . The first mis s ion established was at Kosrae . Three American couples and two Hawaiian deacons with their wives arrived on the i s land in August 1 8 5 2 and requested permiss ion to stay . The high chief o f the is land , known as King George , gave Benj amin Snow and one o f the Hawaiian couples permiss ion to set up a mis s ion . The remainder o f the group travel led to Ponape in hopes o f establishing a mis s ion there .
On Ponape the miss ionaries were given permis sion to set up a station in the area o f Kiti Harbor . The nahnken o f Kit i , a young inf luential leader on the island , welcomed the mis s ionaries and provided them with a piece o f land for their use . Albert Sturges , Luther Gul ick , and the Hawaiian deacon Ka ' aikaula , quickly settled in at Rohnki t i . A s hort t ime later , Gul ic k obtained permis s ion to set up a second mis s ion on Ponape in Madolenihmw , overlooking the main harbor .
Despite the smal lpox epidemic that swept through Ponape in 1 8 5 4 , the intertribal warfare between chiefs vying for the �
1 2 4
support o f followers , and the tremendous dec l ine in the population that both of these events brought about , the miss ions continued . During the worst of the epidemic and shortly thereafter , Sturges and Gu l ick even cons idered abandoning the Ponape mis s ion and moving to either the Gilberts or Marshalls . However , the miss ionaries pers isted and miss ion schools were set up and church services were given to ever- increas ing numbers of is landers . Although the missionaries felt that it was j us t a matter of time before the population of Ponape and its outliers died out , they did not hes itate to hold s ervices whenever they found an audience , and in fact found that the i s landers on Pingel ap , Ngatik and Moki l were eager to have mis s ions establ ished .
Surpris ingly , the teachings o f the miss ionaries on Ponape were not openly opposed , and their attack on prostitution , alcohol , the " heathen " custom o f feast ing and the bel ie f in spirits did not exc ite much res istance . The islanders bel ie f in spirits , the bas is o f their traditional rel igion , was already decl ining as a result of the many outs ide influenc es converging on the small i s land . It was the miss ionaries oppos ition to kava and al l of the ritual s associated with its use that eventually separated the converted Christian from the heathen and posed the most dif ficult problems .
To hold a feast o f any sort without the ritual kava drinking was unthinkable . Any Ponapean man worthy o f the name was expected to grow the plant , indeed the cultivation of kava was an important avenue for achieving prestige in the soc iety .
When the miss ionaries s ingled out kava drinking as a spec ial obj ec t o f reproach , they did so not s imply because o f the drug ' s as soc iation with the evils o f alcohol , but because it , more than anything else , symbol i zed an adherence to the old heathen ways ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 1 53 ) .
The miss ionaries ' inf luence on Ponape was apparent and growing by the late 1 8 5 0 s . With the availabil ity of iron tool s , clothing , muskets and other western items , women were beginning to wear dres ses and men wanted cash payments for their work instead of tobacco or trade items ; in short , the islands ' inhabitants were becoming more sophisticated . The rel igious hymns taught to the i s landers were being sung even by those who did not attend church services , and miss ionary teachings were being pas sed by word of mouth ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 1 5 5 ) . Although there was a resurgence o f the traditional rel igion and some confrontations occurred between
1 2 5
the Christians and " heathens II in t he early 1 8 6 0 s , in 1 8 6 6 e Chris t ians numbered more than 3 , 0 0 0 on the is land , and by the end o f 1 8 6 7 , the miss ionaries stated they II
• • • have reached what may be called the second stage of our work , the great mas s o f the people have abandoned heathenism 11 ( Sturges in Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 1 5 8 ) .
The mis s ion on Kosrae , although supported by K ing George and general ly success ful , met with much more res istance among the population . After the King ' s death in 1 8 5 4 , the attendance at services dropped dramatica l ly and there were those who wanted the miss ionary , Benj amin S now , expel led from the i s l and . Kanka , George ' s succes sor , neither ful ly supported nor openly hindered the miss ionary ' s work . I t was not until Snow began preaching on Ualang , the main is land , that Kanka was opposed . The traditional rel igion was strong there , and the is land priests warned the peopl e that they would be in deep danger i f they listened to the miss ionary . A fishing acc ident to one of Snow ' s disc iples was of fered as proof of the danger of l istening to the miss ionary ; as a result , attendance at services dropped to nearly nothing . Snow was forced to l imit his preaching to the small is land of Lelu ( He zel 1 9 8 3 : 1 5 8 - 1 6 4 ) .
I n 1 8 5 5 and 1 8 5 6 , inf luenz a ripped through the i s l and and took hundreds of lives . I n an ef fort to restore the old order , the chiefs reinstituted the traditional rel igious teachings , much to the dismay of Snow , and in 1 8 5 7 all foreigners , with the except ion of the missionary and his family , were expel led from the i s l and . It was not unti l 1 8 5 8 that any real progres s was made toward Christianization of the i s landers . That year a Kosraean convert went back to Ualang to preach ; his surpris ing success renewed Snow ' s hope for the establishment o f a permanent miss ion . By 1 8 6 2 when Snow left to establ ish a miss ion on Ebon in the Marshall I s lands , the church had a fol lowing of nearly 2 0 0 and the demise o f the chie f ly c lass was imminent ( He zel 1 9 8 3 : 1 6 4 - 1 6 7 ) .
Despite the reputation that the Mars ha l lese had for violence against foreigners , miss ion act ivities were initiated in the i s l ands in 1 8 5 7 with the arrival o f Edward and Sarah Doane . Their way was paved in 1 8 5 5 by another miss ionary , Dr . George Pierson , newly ass igned to Kosrae . While en route to his a s s ignment , Pierson traveled on board a whaler that s topped in the Marshal l I s lands . By coinc idence , the ship vis ited Ail inglapalap where the most influential and mos t feared chief in the Marshalls was col lecting tribute and vis iting . For s ome reason Kaibuke , the chie f , was receptive to the miss ionary and sent Pierson to Ebon as a pre l iminary step to the es tablishment of the mis s ion . Two years l ater , when the Doanes and Pierson returned to Ebon on the mis s ionary packet
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MORNING STAR , they brought with them Hiram Bingham and a Hawaiian teacher , Kanoa , who would travel on to establish a mis s ion on Abaiang in the Gi lberts .
Because o f the patronage of Kaibuke , the miss ion on Ebon f lourished . From the very beginning , over 1 0 0 i s landers attended church services , and when chiefs from neighboring islands vis ited with their retinues , they too attended m1 masse . Fortunately for the miss ionaries , the is land ' s population was not a stable one . As a result o f the cons tant interisland travel , the Marshal lese spread the mis s ion ' s teachings throughout the archipelago . " Word o f the sermons goes out from the miss ionaries to their immediate neighbors , and via them to others o f the north " ( Pierson in Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 2 0 3 ) .
The miss ionaries did not have kava or alcohol problems to contend with when they arrived and tobacco was not widely used . There was " no rowdyism , no fighting , and no oppos it ion from whites biased against the miss ionaries . . . . " ( American Board o f Commis s ioners for Foreign Mis s ions ( ABCFM ) Dn-A 2 3 Mar 1 8 5 9 ) and the Marshal lese feasts were not represented by " . . . gluttonous eating , drinking to intoxication and wild revel ry . . . . " ( Doane , ABCFM DN-A 23 Mar 1 8 5 9 ) that occurred on other islands . As a result of the miss ionaries proscription against tattoo ing , it was no longer openly practiced on Ebon , and by 1 8 6 0 the ma j ority of the islanders would not work on the Sabbath . Miss ion success in the Marshal l s was l inked to the success in the school s . Within a few years several schools were opened on other islands , and by 1 8 6 9 Marshallese , educ ated at the miss ion s chool , were themselves teac hing and spreading the Gospel ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 2 0 2 - 2 0 9 ) .
I t is not surpris ing that as the mis s ionaries ' influence increased among the i s landers , the Marshallese chiefs became less enthusiastic about their presence and their teachings .
Although the chie f s outwardly maintained their pol ite and deferential posture toward the mis sionaries for a while , the chill deepend year by year . With the death o f Kaibuke . . . who had acted as a check on les ser chie f s to keep oppos ition within bounds , their hostility became more open . The c hiefs soon dropped any pretense o f attending religious services
and began terrori z ing the Christian neophytes among their subj ects ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 2 0 8 ) .
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I n spite o f the open animos ity of the chiefs , the mis s ion A grew quickly during the 1 8 6 0 s . By 1 8 6 5 Hawaiian teachers W were on Namorik and Jaluit in the Ral ik chain , and in 1 8 6 9 Mil i and Ma j uro i n the Ratak chain had miss ions estab l i s hed . Shortly therea f ter , miss ions were established on Arno and Maloel ap , and by 1 8 7 5 seven is lands had mis s ions ( He zel 1 9 8 3 : 2 0 9 ) 0
The packet MORNI NG STAR I was purchas ed by the American Board o f Commiss ioners for Foreign Mis s ions in 1 8 5 6 . The ship was used to support the various mis s ions and transport pas sengers and c argo throughout the region . Not only did the packet bring miss ionaries , it also brought those who would j ust observe and report . In 1 8 6 1 , the editor of the Honolulu-based newspaper , The Friend , travel led on MORNING STAR to provide " . . . our readers with a series o f descriptive sketches . . . . " about the is lands and its people , among them the still relatively l ittle-known Gilbert I s lands ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 4 ) : 3 9 7 ) .
The m i s s ion on Abaiang was f lourishing in 1 8 6 1 , and it was reported that the miss ionaries had made a good beginning in the region . Portions o f the New Testament , hymns , and textbooks had been printed in the native language and a school established . The chief o f the Abaiang regularly attended the church services and partic ipated in prayer � meetings ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 4 ) : 4 0 9 - 4 1 1 ) . On Tarawa , s imilar W successes were achieved ; the chief took the miss ionary families under his protection and encouraged attendance at sermons . A schoo l was establ ished o n Tarawa that could boast its " . . . pupils could answer questions equal to the advanced c lasses in the very best Sabbath Schools o f Christian l ands " ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 4 ) : 4 1 0 ) .
At the beginning of the 1 8 6 0 s , the total population o f the Gilbert I s lands was estimated to be 5 0 , 5 0 0 . Trade was l imited to coconut oil in exchange for tobacco and arms . With the arriva l of the miss ionaries , the i s l anders began requesting c loth , knives , hatchets and other artic les . The chief o f Abaiang even purchased lumber for the construction o f a sma l l house ( Ward 1 9 6 7 Z ( 4 ) : 4 1 7 - 4 1 8 ) . Thi s was a dramatic di f ference in the Gilbertese acculturation as or . Gul ic k described the i s landers as l ittle changed from t heir traditional way o f l ife when the miss ionaries first arrived in 1 8 5 7 .
Although general ly the miss ionaries had l ittle to fear from the natives , and no attacks on their ships are reported , the mis s ionary service was not without its mishaps . After the f inal voyage o f MORNING STAR I to Micronesia in 1 8 6 1 ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 4 ) : 3 9 7 ) , the packet was repl aced by a second s hip , MORNING STAR I I . The second MORNING STAR continued the
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e support o f the mis s ions in Micronesia unti l October 1 8 6 9 when i t wrecked on an o f f s hore reef at Kosrae . Captain Tengstrorn reported the following regarding the disaster .
The brig Morning Star left the south harbor of Strong ' s I s l and [ Kosrae ] , for Honolulu , at 3 : 3 0 on the 1 8th of October , with a light wind o f fshore . Were towed out with two o f the brig ' s boats and the pilot boat . At 5 P . M . , the pilot and a l l shore hands l e f t the ves sel , and one o f the brig ' s boats was sent t o get some l ines which had been left on the ree f . At 6 : 1 5 the boat returned and was taken on board the brig , which was at this time ful ly three miles from shore , with wind very light , N . by W . During the evening , which was c loudy and dark , it was found that the brig had drifted in shore with a strong current , the boats at once manned and sent ahead to tow her o f f ; but s t i l l the vessel kept dri fting in . Finding that nothing could be done to keep her o f f shore , the port anchor was let go at 8 : 3 2 P . M . in twenty- f ive fathoms o f water . A t 1 0 P . M . , a squal l carne u p . . . the eastward which appeared very threatening , but gave us hope that by s l ipping the anchor , we might get out to sea be fore the force of the s quall s truck the ves sel . Everything was made ready for this emergency , as the squa l l s truc k us , the fore and aft s a i l s were hoisted , the chain s l ipped and for a moment the ves sel went ahead ; but the heavy rol lers which c arne in c hecked her headway , and be fore she could gather again , she struck a l ittle aft o f the mainmast , the next sea l i fting her broads ide on to the rocks . . . . At 1 1 P . M . the pas sengers were sent ashore_ in one o f the boats , at great peril . At 1 1 : 3 0 the foremast was cut away . A heavy wave which had broken over the vessel made a complete wreck o f everything o n deck and i n the cabin- staterooms , doors and furniture being completely smashed by its force , and al l the c lothing , stores , etc . , scattered and destroyed . At 1 : 3 0 the boat returned from the harbor , three miles distant . At every sea washing entirely over the ves sel , nothing could
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be done further to s ave her or the ef fects ; and at 2 A . M . , the off icers and crew went on shore . They returned at dayl ight , but found everything so completely destroyed by the breakers , that nothing could be s aved ( Tengstrom quoted in The Pac i f ic Commerc ial Advertiser , Feb . 5 , 1 8 7 0 in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 3 ) : 6 1 3 - 6 1 5 ) .
MORNING STAR I I was replaced by MORNING STAR I I I , which served the mis s ionaries without serious mishap until 1 8 8 4 , when it too wrec ked at Kosrae . Capt . George Garland arrived at the i s l and initial ly on November 1 3 to take o f f the o f ficers and c rew of STAGHOUND , which had wrecked in August . The ship then vis ited Ponape and Truk and on its return to Kosrae in February 1 8 8 4 went aground as it was entering the harbor ( ABCFM 1 8 5 2 - 1 9 0 9 : IX ; Garland to Prudential Committee , 2 0 Mar 1 8 8 4 ; Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 1 1 0 ) .
Copra and Labor Traders
During the f irst hal f of the 1 8 0 0 s , general trade continued throughout the region . However , not long a fter the arrival of the f irst mis s ionaries on Ebon in 1 8 5 7 , a di f ferent type o f trade began and a di f ferent type of trader entered the A islands . These were the copra agents and traders who � established permanent stations on the islands and settled in the region . Eight trading ships vis i ted Ebon in 1 8 6 0 , and in 1 8 6 1 the first coconut oil factory was established . With the copra traders c ame both prostitution and disease . Influenza swept through the island in February 1 8 5 9 , and measles and influenza struck in 1 8 6 1 . In 1 8 6 3 , a virulent form of typhoid further reduced the population . Venereal disease inc luding syphil i s spread rapidly t hrough the Marshalls and Gilberts as the trading ships began more extens ive vis its throughout those archipelagos .
The first copra station in the region was on Ebon . The trading schooner PFEIL , owned by the German firm of Ho f f schlaeger and Stapenhorst , landed the first two traders in early 1 85 9 . PFEIL traveled throughout the islands in support of the copra trade and i n 1 8 6 1 brought a l l the materials to set up a small coconut oil extraction p lant , the first in the region . Al though the coconut had been used extens ively throughout the Pac if i c by the is landers for cooking and as an ointment , it was not unti l 1 8 4 0 that Westerners first recognized its commerc ial potential in the manufacture of c andles and soaps .
One o f the largest o f the trading f irms , and one that quickly spread throughout the Pac i f ic , was J . C . Godef froy & Sohn . e
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The German-owned company set up an agency in Samoa in 1 8 5 7 and established its commerc ial predominance in central Polynes ia within a few years . Gode f froy ' s influence expanded even more rapidly after it perfected a more e f f i c ient method of collecting the oil than pre s s ing and shipping it in c asks ; the coconuts were spl it , dried and transported in sacks . The dried coconut meat produced a purer oil and the " chaf f " c ould be used for cattle feed ( Firth 1 9 7 7 : 5 ) . Not only was it more e f fic ient , it was also cheaper to transport . In 1 8 6 9 Godef froy ' s agents were sprinkled throughout the Gilbert I s lands , and by 1 8 7 3 there were f ive s tations in the Marshall s . After 1 8 7 6 Gode f froy stations were located from Tahiti to the Marianas , inc luding the Carolines . A fleet o f eight l arge trading ships supported the company ' s s tations , vis iting once or twice a year to col lect the copra , turtle shel l , and heche-de-mer and leaving supplies ( Firth 1 9 7 7 : 5 ) .
Gode ffroy & Sohn was j oined by other German f irms . Fred Hennings and Ruge , Hedemann & Company both set up bus ines s in Fi j i in 1 8 6 3 . Adolph Capelle & Company set up a s tation on Ebon in 1 8 5 9 and eventua l ly became Godef froy ' s agents . In 1 8 7 4 , Eduard and Franz Hernsheim establ ished s tations on Malakal in Palau and in 1 8 7 6 in the Marshall I s l ands . By 1 8 7 9 the Hernsheim trading interests were f irmly estab l i s hed throughout the Marshal l and Gilbert is lands and their bus ines s headquarters were on Jaluit ( Firth 1 9 7 7 : 5 - 6 ) . The Germans were j oined in Micronesia by Crawford & Company o f Honolulu and Henderson and & McFarlane o f Auckland ( Hezel 1 8 7 3 : 2 1 2 ) .
Competition was brisk between the trading firms and , as a result o f several f inanc ial setbacks , by December 1 8 7 9 , Gode f froy & Sohn was on the verge o f bankruptcy . Unable to maintain its hold on the market , the company sold its interests to the l arge German f irm of Deutsche Handel s und Plantagen-Gese l lschaft der Sudesse Inselen zu Hamburg ( DHPG ) . Along with Hernsheim & Company the DHPG dominated the copra trade until the German annexation of the Marsha l l s i n 1 8 8 5 .
By the end o f the 1 8 7 0 s the Marshalles e , Gilbertese , and Carol ine I s landers had become accustomed to ship ' s biscuit , beer and Schnaps , as wel l as the usual cotton and iron goods . Some Marsha l lese chie f s dres sed their wives i n s ilk , mostly bought on c redit from the trader , and suppl ied them with sewing machines , while at Yap in the Caro l ines , a chief paid M4 , 0 0 0 for an o ld machine-gun of the Bavarian army ( Firth 1 9 7 7 : 6 ) .
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The copra trading houses not only changed the traditional e process ing o f copra , they also changed the manner in which it was produced . Al l things being favorable , c oconut plantations were more prof itable than independent col lectors . Plantations were established throughout the region after 1 8 7 6 , which provided the European grower with f inal s ay about the production and price o f the processed coconuts . This also ensured a greater prof it for the trader . Despite price fluctuations and changes in trading firms , copra continues to this day to be an important agricultural product in the Carol ine , Marshal l and G ilbert is lands .
Not surpris ingly , the inc reased general trade and copra product ion within the i s l ands res ulted in a number of shipping los ses and acc idents related to that act ivity . The schooner FLYI NG FOX wrecked at Sydenham I s l and ( Nonouti ) in the Gilberts in 1 8 4 8 ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 4 ) : 4 1 9 ) . I n 1 8 6 5 o r 1 8 6 6 E BBA BRAHE , " a full-rigged ship bound for China , " wrec ked on a ree f at Ngulu in the western Carol ine I s l ands ( Tetens 1 9 5 8 : 6 4 ) . In 1 8 5 9 the Belgian ship CONSTANCE wrec ked on " . . . an unknown ree f in the Carol ine I s l ands on the 9 th of July " ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 2 ) : 9 3 ) . That s ame year the Hof f schlaeger & Stapenhorst-owned schooner PFE IL ran aground in the l agoon at Ebon .
I n entering the pas sage leading to the l agoon , and the wind suddenly shifting , the schooner s truck midway on the rocks , where she remained one and a hal f hours , s triking heavily several times . With great exertion of the crew and with the help o f the natives from ashore , the schooner was got o f f and anchored to the leeward of the is land . . . . [ a fter arriving at Guam ] a survey having been held . . . the schooner was condemned and sold ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 2 ) : 2 4 4 ) .
I n 1 8 6 1 , the trading ship NORNA wrecked on Oroluk in the eastern Carolines . When the captain and crew reached Guam , he also reported that two other ves sels were wrecked in the s ame vic inity ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 5 ) : 3 4 3 ) . After trading and col lecting copra throughout the region , the German s chooner MARIA , owned by Hoffschlaeger and S tapenhorst , wrecked on a reef at Ebon on February 4 , 1 8 6 3 ( Blodgett i n Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 4 ) : 3 3 8 ; Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 1 2 4 ) . E l s ewhere in the Marshall I s lands , the German trading schooner FRANZ out of Hamburg was attacked and destroyed at Rongrik . The natives murdered the shore party , took the vessel , kil led the rest o f the c rew and burned the ship . Finally , in 1 8 6 3 the trader CLARA D .
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ROBBI NS wrecked on Ma j uro ; on board was the wel l -known copra agent Adolph Capelle ( Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 1 2 5 ) .
The Briti sh-owned bark SYRINGA , bound to China , lost its fore and main topmasts during a squall when just north o f the Gilberts . SYR INGA eventual ly arrived at Jaluit where
the carpenter commenced cutting out and f itting new topmasts ; but be fore this had been accomplished the wind had veered to the westward , and the vessel swinging to , touched with the s tern on the rocks and was wrecked . Capt . Pease , o f the Water Lilly , brought ( s ic ] the wreck for $ 5 0 0 taking away with him seventeen sail s , two boats complete , and a l arge quantity o f other gear ( Pac i f ic Commerc ial Advertiser , Feb . 12 , 1 8 7 0 in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 3 ) : 35 5 ) .
In the western Caroline I s l ands , the English trading bark RENOWN , under the command of Capt . G . E . Adams , wrecked at Palau on February 9 , 1 8 7 0 . The crew remained under the c are of the chief of Koror for nearly two months before they were rescued by the British warship HMS RINALDO . It was reported that the " crew was treated with the greates t pos s ible kindness and hospitality " ( Robinson 1 8 7 0 in Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 1 1 ) . A few months later , a fter trading throughout the Marsha l l s , the schooner MALOLO arrived in Ponape on May 3 0 . Capt . E . A . Pitman reprovis ioned and , after taking several Chinese laborers on board to return to Shanghai , departed on July 1 7 , 1 8 7 0 . As he was attempting to leave the harbor , the ship went aground on a reef ( Bridges 1 8 7 0 ) .
The Amer ic an ship BELVEDERE , out o f Savannah on a pearl-diving c ruise , wrecked on a ree f near Yap in 1 8 7 1 ( Klingman 1 9 5 0 : 1 6 - 1 7 ) . I n the Marshalls , the British bark CORYPHAEUS wrecked on a ree f at Ailuk Atoll on August 2 3 , 1 8 7 1 . The captain and c rew were wel l treated and on September 3 the maj ority o f the crew departed in two of the ship ' s boats . In April 1 8 7 2 , the remaining c rewmen were rescued by the HMS BARROSA ( Moore 1 8 7 2 ; Shadwel l 1 8 7 3 ) .
I n 1 8 7 3 the Honolulu-based bark KAMEHAMEHA V was reported wrecked at Ponape ( Sturges to Pogue , Aug 2 and July 2 5 , 1 8 7 3 in Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 8 7 9 ) . The next year the blac kbirder Bully Hayes in LEONORA , later wrecked in Kosrae , vis ited the abandoned KAMEHAMEHA V and salvaged what he could from the s ite ( Goodenough 1 8 7 5 : 1 6 7 5 ) . I ronically , KAMEHAMEHA V was the same ship that rescued the crews of the stranded whalers destroyed by the Confederate raider SHENANDOAH in 1 8 6 5 . Wel l known throughout the region , the trading s hip was
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commis s ioned by the Hawaiian Government and the owners , D . A Foster & Company , were to be paid $5 , 0 0 0 per head for the W return o f Hawai ian seaman from Ascens ion ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 6 ) : 1 9 8 ) .
I n September 1 8 7 4 , the brig ALFRED , owned by Gode f froy & Company and under the command o f Captain Ganter , arrived at Jaluit to trade and take on copra . After completing its bus ine s s , the s hip wrecked on the reef while trying to leave ( Wawn 1 8 7 4 : 1 5 1 - 5 ; Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 1 3 2 ) . The next year , 1 8 7 5 , the Rus s ian-built bark JULI E RE ITZ , owned by Capelle Company , was driven ashore and wrecked during a typhoon whi le anchored at Jaluit . Two other schooners belonging to Cape l le were wrecked at the s ame time ( Colcord 1 8 7 5 ; Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 1 3 2 ) . Final ly , in 1 8 8 0 the schooner LILLA , owned by the trader O ' Keefe , wrecked at Melekeok in Palau ( McGuiness 1 8 8 2 ; Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 2 4 ) .
As commerc ialism in the form o f p lantations grew throughout the Central and South Pac i f ic , so did the demand for l abor . When Godef froy sold its holdings in 1 8 7 9 , the company ' s copra and cotton plantations covered an area of 4 , 3 3 7 acres and employed 1 , 2 1 0 l aborers , mostly Gilbertese and New Hebrideans ( Firth 1 9 7 7 : 7 ) . A wide variety of crops was tried in the i s l ands , but only copra , sugar , cof fee , cocoa , vanil la , fruit , cotton and rubber were o f any commerc ial success . These c rops required the presence o f cheap labor . I t wasn ' t long be fore the plantation owners were looking to Micronesia e for workers .
Bec ause many o f the i s l and peoples were unwil ling to work as wage l abor , the problems o f obtaining sufficient numbers of workers arose . The demand for labor in the mines of Peru , the c o f fee plantations of Central America , the sugar c ane f ields o f Hawaii , and the cotton and sugar c ane f ields of Queens l and produced the independent l abor " recruiter " to fill the gap . The recruiter would visit the less frequented i s lands and induce or coerce i s landers to s ign contracts committing them to work at an i s l and or mainland plantation . I n return for their labor , the is landers were to be fed , paid , and when the contract was c ompleted , returned home . The plantation owners paid the recruiters , or blac kbirders as they were more c ommonly known , so much per worker del ivered . The f irst indentured islanders were taken into Australia in 1 8 4 7 by Benj amin Boyd ( Oliver 1 9 5 1 : 1 2 8 ) ; however , the labor trade did not take on mass ive proport ions unti l the 1 8 6 0 s .
As early as 1 8 7 2 , Honolulu and Sydney pub l is hing artic les about the " man- stealers ( The Friend , May 1 8 7 2 ) . As competition for increased , the blackbirders became even s l avers .
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newspapers were o f the Pac i f ic " i s l and laborers more e f f ic ient
They c aptured s avage chiefs and their famil ies and held them hos tage until enough able-bodied fol lowers had signed on . In a few cases they even del ivered the hostages to the sharks and scattered shot at the vil lage to make the place unhealthy for rival recruiters ( Ol iver 1 9 5 1 : 1 2 7 ) .
The blackbirders also provided muskets and ammunition to the is landers , which created a demand for arms that could be f i lled only by s igning on as a laborer ( Ol iver 1 9 5 1 : 1 2 8 ) .
The western i s lands o f Micronesia were the most heavily hit by blackbirders ; however , the central and eas tern i s l ands were also vis ited . The Auckland-based schooner MIDGE , on an unsucces s ful search for laborers in the Marshalls , kidnapped four or f ive Kosraeans , and the ship EUGENE took several Marshallese from Ail inglaplap in 1 8 7 2 . Numerous labor s hips went to the northern Marshall I sl ands during this period to obtain women to be sold as mistresses for plantation overseers . Reportedly among the most beauti ful in the Pac i fic , they " fetch [ ed ] at the Fi j i I s lands twenty pounds a head , and are muc h more prof itable to the s l avers than the men " ( Moore 1 8 7 2 in Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 2 3 7 ) .
The brig CARL , o f Melbourne , regularly raided the eastern Carolines , Marsha l l s and Gi lberts . In January 1 8 7 2 , the ship took 15 men from Mil i , 2 5 f rom the Gilberts , and 4 7 from the Mortlocks , the smal l group o f islands south of Truk . The next year SUZANNE took another 8 0 Mortlockese to work on the plantations in S amoa ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 2 3 8 ) . Shiploads o f Micrones ians and Polynes ians were taken to Peru and sold to the planters and guano-depos it owners . The mortality rate among the island l aborers was very high , and few of the Micronesians who were taken ever returned to their homes .
As reports o f the kidnappings and atroc ities spread , British and American wars hips were dispatched to the area in an e f fort to control the abuses and bring to j ustice the o f fenders . The Kidnapping Act o f 1 8 7 2 was enacted to control l abor practices , and the British and American navies were respons ible for enforc ing the legis l ation . The British Admiralty was the stronges t opponent o f blackbirding ; however , it was stymied by some o f its own colonial and foreign service o f f icers who contended that the i s l anders had s igned contracts ; therefore , it was not s lavery . I n 1 8 7 0 one o f the peak years of blackbirding , nearly 2 , 3 0 0 i s l anders entering F i j i were " certi f ied " as having undertaken their l abor contracts voluntarily ( Ol iver 1 9 5 1 : 1 2 9 ) .
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The presence o f the American and British naval s quadrons did 4l much to l imit the most f lagrant abuses , but they were not able to stop the labor trade . The British were l imited by the Fi j ian home government that could not , and the Queens l and government that would not , prohibit the indenture system of l abor recruiting . By 1 8 7 3 the worst of the blackbirding was over in the Carol ines and Marshalls . However , Jaluit continued to be used as a depot for l aborers rec ru ited in the Gilberts to work on the Hawaiian p lantations . I n the l ate 1 8 7 0 s Marshall and Gilbert islanders were still being shipped to Hawaii . Until 1 8 8 2 , the Gilbert islanders were the vast maj ority of l aborers sent to Hawaii . Large-scale immigration o f Japanese laborers to Hawaii after 1 8 8 2 f inal ly ended the importation o f laborers from the Gilberts ( He zel 1 9 8 3 : 2 3 9 - 2 4 0 ) .
The wreck o f the schooner LEONORA at Kosrae in 1 8 7 4 would appear to have been poetic justice . The s hip was owned by Bul ly Hayes , a freewheel ing trader and b l ac kb irder known throughout Micronesia , who was o ften sought by both British and American naval cruisers for his unscrupulous act ivities ( Russell 1 9 8 2 ) . Bul ly Hayes and LEONORA were reportedly i nvolved in some rather unscrupulous dealings on the i s l and o f Pingel ap in March o f 1 8 7 4 . Hayes allegedly kidnapped the chief of the is land and held him for ransom until the i s l anders brought 5 , 0 0 0 coconuts and one girl on board � ( Goodenough 1 8 7 5 : 1 6 7 5 ) . Another blac kbirder , the schooner W' MANA out o f Honolulu , arrived at Jaluit in December 1 8 7 9 . Before MANA could return to Hawaii with its load of indentured s l aves , it wrecked on an o f fshore ree f ( Bennett 1 9 7 6 : 2 6 ) .
By 1 8 8 0 , the inf luence of the mis s ionaries was widespread throughout the region . Miss ions were sprinkled from the Carol ines through the Gilberts , and the tradit ional way of is l and l ife was dramatical ly changed . The i s l anders had developed a high level of sophistication regarding themselves and the outs ide world , and their taste for Wes tern-made goods was insatiable . The introduct ion of rifles , l iquor and disease , and the upheaval caused by the marauding blac kbirders , irrevocably a ltered the l ives o f the i s landers . Traditions and the native crafts disappeared w ith alarming speed , and a German ethnographer noted that only the people of the northern Marsha l l I s l ands still remained free o f the inf luence of the merchant and mis s ionary ( Hager 1 8 8 6 : 1 1 0 ) .
A lthough Wes tern contac t had adversely af fected the people of the Carol ine , Marshall and Gilbert i s l ands , the British and American navies attempted to c ontrol the worst abuses . I n 1 8 8 0 British influence was beginning to grow in the Gilberts I while German commerc ial interests were e
1 3 6
well-established and felt throughout the Marsha l l s and Carol ines . German colonial interest in the region was growing along with their trading companies . As early as November 1 8 7 8 , a detachment of German marines raised their national flag over Jaluit a fter conc luding a treaty with the chiefs of the Ralik I s l ands ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 2 9 8 - 2 9 9 ) . I f the winds o f change were not to be de f lected , then
. . . the remedy for the ills that Western c ivil i z ation had a lready brought to the islands lay not i n a return to an imaginary culture , pristine and pure , but in an advance toward full European rule . . . . the Wes t had inf l icted evil s on the islanders [ and ] only the West could o f fer release from them ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 2 9 8 ) .
The changes in the Caroline , Marsha l l and Gilbert i s l ands from 1 8 0 0 to 1 8 8 0 were so pronounced that an i s lander born in 1 8 0 0 , and somehow protected from Western inf luence and diseases , would l ikely not have recognized either his homeland or his neighbors by 1 8 8 0 .
The first 8 0 years o f the nineteenth century s aw s uccess ive waves o f Europeans sweep through the i s lands , beginning with the British East I ndia Company merchantmen , followed by the British whalers and traders just after the turn o f the century , the various naval and sc ient i f ic expeditions , the American whalers and missionaries , the organi zed German and the independent copra trader s , and f inally the infamous blackbirders . The presence o f these diverse groups not only left traces on the islands and on the cultures they encountered , but also left traces on the reefs , l agoons and sea f loor that today compose a portion of the archeological record that represents this dramatic era o f change .
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CHAPTER V. COLONIALISM , WORLD WAR I AND THE INTERWAR YEARS
By Toni L . Carrel l and Fr . Thomas B . McGrath , S . J .
I ntroduction
Tremendous changes occurred in the i s l ands of Micronesia during the 6 1 years from 1 8 8 0 to 1 9 4 1 . By 1 8 8 0 , Guam and the Northern Mariana I s l ands had already gone through their colonial era . The Caroline I s lands , although c laimed by Spain , were never under sovereign control and , along with the Gilbert and Marshal l I s l ands , were effectively s t i l l autonomous . However , from the 1 8 8 0s through the early 1 9 0 0 s colonial rule was implemented i n the Caroline , Marsha l l and Gilbert islands under two very di f ferent masters : the Germans and the British . Just prior to the beginning o f the twentieth century , the influences over and fate of the Northern Mariana I s l ands began to diverge from those o f Guam and become more c losely al l ied with that of the Caro l ines and Marshal ls under German colonial adminis tration .
During World War I , although still nominal ly owned by Germany , the Northern Mariana , Carol ine and Marsha l l i s l ands were under the direct control of the Japanese . After the war the islands , with the exc eption of Guam and the Gilberts , were o f f ic ia l ly shu f fled between European and Eastern powers and their fates were , more than ever , l inked .
The Gilbert I s l ands , pol itically separated from the Carol ine and Marshal l I s lands j ust be fore the turn of the century , continued on their own path under British rule unt i l the inception of World War I I . On Guam , a period of relative stabi lity under American colonial administration that i s referred t o as the American Naval Period began in 1 8 9 9 and continued unt il the outbreak of World War I I .
The pol it ical maneuvering resulting from the Spanish-American War in 1 8 9 8 and the events o f World War I , which took place hal f a world away , irrevocably impacted and altered the future course of the Caroline , Marshall , Northern Mariana and Gilbert i s lands and their inhabitants . The events of this period also began to reveal Micrones ia ' s true strategic importance in the Pac i f ic .
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. c 1 . 1 " 1 Arner1can o on1a 1srn
Guam
The beginning o f the Spanish-American war in 1 8 9 8 brought the Spanish colonial period to a c lose on Guam and ushered in a new colonial master , the United States Navy . Along with an end to Spanish rule in the nineteenth century , there carne an end to the centuries -old gal leon trade and ties with the Phil ippines and Mexico . Unl ike the other is lands of Micronesia , Guam was ef fectively shielded by American colonial rule from the upheaval s as soc iated with World War I and the postwar era , so these upheavals are not addressed separately here . American naval colonial ism essentially extended from 1 8 9 8 to the outbreak o f World War I I .
The change in colonial administration from Spain to the United States also resulted in a change in the types o f s hips that frequented Apra Harbor .
American Naval Period , 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 4 1 --Mil itary Transports and Station Ships , Trading Pas senger Steamers and Mail Ships
Cruisers , Schooners ,
On February 2 5 , 1 8 9 8 , Ass istant Secretary o f the Navy Theodore R . Roosevelt cabled Adrn . George Dewey in Nagasaki and ordered the As iatic squadron to Hong Kong . Dewey was ordered to keep the ships fully bunkered with coal and " . . . in the event o f dec laration o f war on Spain , your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the As iatic coast and then begin o f fens ive operations in the Phil ippine s . . . . " ( Roosevelt in Hoyt 1 9 8 1 : 4 3 ) . By mid-April , Dewey had pos itioned his ves sels o f f Hong Kong whi le waiting for word from Washington . War was dec lared on April 2 1 , and on May 1 Dewey engaged Admiral Montoj o in Manila Bay . The Spanish-American war had come to the Phil ippines .
This mil itary venture into the waters o f the Phil ippine Sea created a need for supply l ines across the Pac i f ic . The f irst vessels to meet that need were troop transports . The supporting transports , cross ing the Pac i fic with men and materiel , inc luded a stop at Guam . Mil itary transports would
1This section on American colonialism in Guam 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 4 1 , and the Northern Marianas was written by Father Thomas McGrath , S . J . An earl ier vers ion o f this paper was given at the C . A . S . Research Conference , Univers ity of Guam , in April ! 9 8 941t
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prove to be the mainstay o f transportation and commerce for Guam during nearly the next hal f-century .
The first transports ordered to Manila were C ITY OF PEKING , AUSTRALIA , and CITY OF SYDNEY . Their first stop was Honolulu , where they j oined the cruiser USS CHARLESTON . Lt . Randolph H . Miner , U . S . Navy , wrote to the Chief o f the Bureau of Navigation about the transporting o f troops on the Pac ific . Miner noted :
[ the ] first expedition to Mani l a , cons isting o f the CITY OF PEKING 1 the AUSTRALIA , and the CITY OF SYDNEY, which s ailed from San Franc isco on May 2 5 , 1 8 9 8 , was partly under naval control , the CITY OF PEKING being chartered by the Navy Department and having a naval o f ficer in command , while the other two ships had naval o f f icers on board in an advisory c apac ity . Few complaints have been heard from this expedition . Being j oined by the U . S . S . CHARLESTON at Honolulu , they thus became almost entirely under naval management ( Department of the Navy 1 8 9 8b : 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 ) .
When the transports reached Honolulu , Navy Capt . Henry Glass , commander o f the USS CHARLESTON , rec eived the fol lowing orders from Secretary of the Navy John D . Long :
Navy Department , Washington, May 1 0 , 1 8 9 8
Commanding Of ficer USS CHARLESTON
S ir : Upon the receipt o f this order , which is forwarded by the steamship CITY OF PEKING to you at Honolulu , you wil l proceed , with the CHARLESTON and CITY OF PEKING in company , to Manila , Philippine I s l ands .
On your way , you are hereby directed to stop at the Spanish I s l and of Guam . You will use such forces as may be neces sary to capture the port of Guam , making prisoners o f the governor and other officials and any armed force that may be there . you w i l l also destroy any fort i f ications on said island and any Spanish Naval ves s e l s that may be there , or in the immediate vic inity . These operations at the I s land o f Guam should
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be very brief , and should not occupy more than one or two days . Should you f ind any coal at the I s l and o f Guam , you will make s uch use o f it as you cons ider des irable . It is left to your discretion whether or not you destroy it .
From the I s land o f Guam , proceed to Manila and report to Rear Admiral Dewey , U . S . N . , for duty in the squadron under his command ( Department o f the Navy 1 9 8 1a : 1 5 1 ) .
The small f lotilla sailed into Apra Harbor on June 2 0 , 1 8 9 8 , and , to the consternation of the Spanish governor , Captain Glas s quickly occupied Guam and received the surrender of the i s l and at 2 : 4 5 p . m . ( Department o f the Navy 1 8 9 8c : 2 ) . There was l ittle or no res istance mounted by the small Spanish garrison who were not even aware war had been dec lared . The o f f icers and men of the American ships partic ipated in a f lag-rais ing ceremony and a 2 1 -gun salute from CHARLESTON on June 2 1 , at Fort Santa Cruz ( Department o f the Navy 1 8 9 8c : 2 ) . Later , the Spanish governor and some of his o f f icers were taken aboard CHARLESTON as prisoners of war ( Harman 1 8 9 8 ) . Army Brig . Gen . Thomas A . Anderson later wrote about the capture o f the Spanish governor and his a o f f icers : •
General H . C . Corbin , W . D . , Washington , D . C .
My dear General ,
Cavete , Manila Bay July 1st , 1 8 9 8
I arrived here last evening after 3 6 days voyage from San Franc isco . We were del ayed seven days by orders from the Navy Department to stop en route and c apture the I s land o f Guam . This was a sealed order to the senior naval off icer at Honolulu : I knew nothing o f it . The naval people made the c apture , but they cal led on us for help , and also to ration and hold s ix Spanish o f f icers and 54 men . . . ( Ad j utant General ' s Of f ice 1 8 9 0 - 1 9 1 7 , no . 14 4 6 8 7 ) .
The day fol lowing the f lag-rais ing ceremony , is landers came out to the ships to barter some produce and wares . Charles E . Longden, a �ember o f the 1st Cali fornia Volunteer Regiment a attached to the hospital corps , commented on the scene in his ,_,
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diary and wrote that the " . . . cent piece general ly had more purchas ing power than a dime " ( 1 8 9 8 ) . The confu s ion lay in the appearance of the unfamil iar United States coins .
There is little gold and no paper money on the i s l ands . The money [ is ] princ ipal ly Mexican , cons iderable Chilean , and a f ew Spanish pesos . The pesos and Mexican are worth fifty cents a piece , and the Chilean thirty- seven and one-hal f cents in U . S . coin ( Department o f the Navy 1 8 9 8c : 2 3 ) .
After the f leet departed Guam and was again en route to Manila , Longden continued his observat ions on the j ourney " . . . nothing to see but water . Report has it that we l and at another i s l and only a few hundred miles away , pos s ibly tonight or tomorrow " ( June 2 3 , 1 8 9 8 ) . Longden went on to mention a lecture on Manila by Ma j or Tilden . Ma j or Tilden , an of ficer with the troops on board C ITY OF PEKING , stated that " Guam is still Spanish Territory because we didn ' t leave any troops there to hold it " ( Longden 1 8 9 8 ) . The net e f fect o f CHARLESTON ' s act ivity on Guam , however , was to establish the island as a coal ing station for American ships engaged in s upporting the Phil ippine war .
A short two weeks after the departure of CHARLESTON , the chartered transport USS COLON sailed into the Marianas . On board were members of the Utah Volunteer Light Art i l lery . George A . Fischer , one o f the volunteers , observed :
[ that ] the Ladrones islands are some of the most beautiful bodies of land I ever saw . Mountains covered with trees and a sea coast grown up with beautiful groves . This is the s ight which met our eyes today . The i s lands stretched out l ike a chain . We did not stop here as we expect to meet some Spanish Forts tomorrow morning . Cartridges for our pistols were is s ued today ( Fischer July 9 , 1 8 9 8 ) .
An important opportunity was missed by the two groups o f transports i n the summer o f 1 8 9 8 to seize control o f a t least Saipan and extend American inf luence in the Marianas . The failure to take this action led to the severing o f pol itical t ies between Guam and the remainder o f the Mariana I s lands through the Treaty of Paris . This separation , pers isting to this day , pro foundly influenced the history o f shipping in the Marianas .
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At the c lose of the Spanish-American War , the United States 4t took control of the Phil ippines and formal ly annexed Guam as a naval and coal ing station . The American Naval Adminis tration on Guam began in August 1 8 9 9 with the arrival of Captain Leary aboard USS YOSEMI TE , the station ship . In 1 9 0 0 General Wheeler completed a report on the f irst year of the is land ' s administration and noted that t here were four large ships in Apra Harbor . These were the transports USS WARREN and USS SOLACE , the coll ier USS BRUTUS , and YOSEMITE . " To these were added a small trading schooner , which gave the place quite a business appearance " ( Wheeler 1 9 0 0 : 2 9 ) . This scene would change l ittle through the years . The transports , the station ship , and the trading schooner woul d remain ; the coll ier in time would be replaced by an oiler ; and , for a while , the steamers of the Dol l ar Line would be present in the harbor .
I n early 1 9 0 3 Governor Sewe l l noted the arrival o f the station ship USS SUPPLY with the c omment that " . . . her roomy quarters and large storerooms make her wel l sui ted for the duty " ( Annual Report o f the Governor - ARG 1 9 0 3 : 2 ) . Sewell went on to expres s his gratitude to the Army t ransports that " stop here on their outward voyage , bringing mai l and stores , inc luding fresh provis ions , bes ides c arrying pas sengers " ( ARG 1 9 0 3 : 2 ) . On the ques tion o f the storage of coal for reprovisioning , Sewel l found it more practical to A leave it s tored directly on the coll ier rather than ., o f f loading to shore and so requested that a ship be permanently stationed on the i s l and .
The fol lowing year , 1 9 0 4 , Governor Stone spoke about coal being put on flat boats and poled to the ree f for trans fer . This process slowed down the trans fer operation cons iderably ( ARG 1 9 0 4 ) . Despite this , coal was provided to the supply and repair ship IRI S , the refrigerator ship CELTIC , the cruiser ALBANY , the auxil iary c ru iser BUFFALO , the wooden steamer MOHICAN , the battleship and c ruiser s quadrons o f the As iatic Fleet , and the German gunboat CONDOR ( ARG 1 9 0 4 ) . Stone mentioned that the Army transports c a l led regularly each month , on a f ixed date , but that the Navy transport SOLACE was the only west-bound connection , and he hoped it would stop three times a year in the future ( ARG 1 9 0 4 ) .
The question o f tariffs arose during the administration of Governor Dyer in 1 9 0 5 . He described the s ituation in these words :
the absence o f a freight carrying craft between San Franc i sco , Guam , and Manila throws all the trade with this I s l and into the hands o f the Japanese . They have establ ished stores , regular
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l ines o f schooners , practically monopolize trade and f ix prices . Under these conditions l iving expenses for the natives are cruel ly high . Under the present organi zat ion the customs duties are necessary for is land revenues but they should be abol ished on all articles coming from the United States and Manila ( ARG 1 9 0 5 ) .
Activity in the harbor that year focused on the coal ing o f the cruiser USS NEW ORLEANS , the station ship USS SUPPLY , the survey ship USS RANGER , and the Navy transport USS LAWTON . This activity was punctuated by the arrival o f the American merchant ship KENNILWORTH and the pas sage of 2 0 Japanese sailing ves sels ( ARG 1 9 0 5 ) . The Army transports continued to be the regular transportat ion and commerce l ink with the United States . In an ef fort to encourage additional trading activity , Governor Dyer stated that he would l ike to see LAWTON , accompanied by SOLACE , make regular calls at Guam . I n 1 9 0 6 SUPPLY made a trip to the coast o f China and Manila for needed suppl ies for the naval station and another to Yap seeking information on the telegraphic c able .
Two years l ater in 1 9 0 8 , Governor Dorn echoed his predeces sors on the matter of trade :
No ves sels f lying the American flag touch here except the Army transports and an occas ional war vessel . The transports are not permitted , by War Department regulations , to c arry freight for commerc ial purposes . As a consequence , practically all the trade of Guam is in the hands of the Japanese , who are gradually acquiring the commerc ial mastery and buying up all the choice lands o f the I s land . They introduce their small schooners , a risk few merchants would c are to take , ( and bring i n ] large quantities of cheap and inferior goods o f antiquated patterns which are sold at irregular and exorbitant prices ( ARG 1 9 0 8 : 2 2 ) .
He went on to request that a sma l l steamer l ine be sub s idi zed to make monthly trips between Guam and Manila to c arry mai l , passengers , and freight ( ARG 1 9 0 8 : 2 3 - 2 4 ) .
I n his report for 1 9 0 9 , Governor Dorn wrote of negotiations by a local merchant for a smal l steamer to make the Guam-Mani la-Hong Kong run four times a year ( ARG 1 9 0 8 : 5 ) .
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Thi s , the governor felt , would increase trade opportunities tt and would result in an increase in cult ivated acreage . The fol low ing year the s ame governor obs erved :
reports from the outlying districts show an increase in the crops of rice , mai ze , camotes , and sugar cane , the crops being the l argest in the past ten years . . . . The export of copra , the only artic le of export , amounted to 5 3 4 tons valued at $ 3 3 , 6 1 0 , a l l s hipped to Japan ( ARG 1 9 1 0 : 1 ) .
The bus ine s s community received a lift when permiss ion was granted to carry some United States commerc ial freight on Army transports duty- free . Governor Dorn made this comment on the new s ituation :
A notable result is that several of the Japanese f irms have l ately been plac ing orders , through a local American f irm , for cons ignment s o f goods heretofore imported from Japan ( ARG 1 9 1 0 : 2 ) .
Over the next three years copra continued to be the mainstay o f the is land . In 1 9 1 1 there were f ive schooners trading A between Yokohama and Guam . These c arried a l l the copra from .. the i s l and at a price set by the Japanese merchants ( ARG 1 9 1 1 : 2 ) .
The outbreak o f World War I had little direct impact on Guam . I n 1 9 1 4 Governor Coontz conf ined trade under foreign f lags to two Japanese schooners , which made 1 6 trips between Yokohama and Guam during the year ( ARG 1 9 1 4 : 1 8 ) . Also under Governor Coont z , the right to trade exc lus ively between S aipan and Guam was denied to the Japanese and trade between Manila and Guam steadily increased . The trade between Guam and S an Franc isco , bec ause o f the monthly arrival o f Army transports , grew to s igni f ic ant proportions ( ARG 1 9 1 4 : 1 8 ) .
I n November 1 9 14 , SMS CORMORAN entered Apra Harbor and , fail ing to depart in 2 4 hours , was interned for the remainder o f Germany ' s war ( ARG 1 9 1 5 : 3 ) . The ship languished in the harbor for almost three years , unt i l the ves sel was scutt led by the c rew and became a permanent res ident on the sea f loor .
SUPPLY made one commerc ial trip in 19 15 , during July and August , landing at Yokohama , Shanghai , Hong Kong and Manila . During that s ame summer a boat reached Guam from Rota with news o f starvation due to a food shortage . A number o f small boats went tQ the rel ief of Rota , and other supplies were delivered to the Japanese governor in Saipan via one o f the It
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trading schooners , MARIANA MARU ( ARG 1 9 1 6 : 2 6 ) . The following year , in June , SUPPLY made another commerc ial trip to Nagasaki , Shanghai and Mani l a ( ARG 1 9 1 6 : 2 ) .
The withdrawal o f the Pac i f ic Mail Steamship Company in 1 9 1 6 c reated some problems for the Army because the company would no longer be available to c arry additional military freight . As a result o f the increased pressure on space available on Army transports , the quartermaster ' s department in San Franc isco began re fus ing a l l shipments o f freight for Guam except perishable naval s tores . In response , Atkins Kro l l began running a commerc ial l ine o f schooners between San Franc isco , Guam and Manil a to f i l l in the void . Japanese schooners , under the control o f the firm o f J . K . Shimizu , also made frequent trips between Guam and Yokohama that year ( ARG 1 9 1 6 : 2 7 ) .
During 1 9 1 7 SUPPLY cont inued to make regular runs for commerc ial purposes , but by year ' s end these were discontinued until USS GOLDSTAR c ame in 1 9 2 4 to serve as the station ship for Guam . From 1 9 1 6 through 1 9 1 9 , the Army transports made their monthly stopovers in Guam in addition to vis its by the Naval ves sels AJAX ( auxil iary ) , CAESAR ( collier ) , CINC I NNATI ( protected cruiser ) , MONTEREY ( monitor ) , ABENDARA ( co l lier ) and SATURN ( co l l ier ) . The American auxiliary schooners AVARUA , BERTHA DOLBEER , BERTIE MINER , ETHEL ZANE , KEAU HOU , MARIAN , HOEAU , SEAFARER and TAGUA stopped at Guam over the s ame period . The Japanese schooners DAICHI 1 TORA MARU 1 KOEI MARU 1 MARIANA MARU and NANYO MARU also came into the harbor at Guam during these years .
Governor Gilmer reported that USS NAPA ( the s tation ship ) , USS BITTERN ( a minesweeper ) , and USS ROBERT L . BARNES ( the station floating oil depot ship ) arrived in the harbor in April 1 9 2 0 ( ARG 1 9 2 0 : 1 1 ) . BARNES became the oiler , replac ing the coll ier BRUTUS , and in later years became the vessel for training mes s attendants on Guam for the Navy . Although BARNES survived World War I , it was eventually sold for scrap . In addition to the Army transports THOMAS , LOGAN and SHERIDAN , which made monthly trips , the Navy transports PENSACOLA and NEWPORT NEWS made the three round trips each in 1 9 2 0 on the San Franc isco-Manil a run ( ARG 1 9 2 0 : 1 2 ) .
I n 1 9 2 2 another Army transport , MADAWACKS , j oined the three already in service . The Navy transports continued their monthly schedule and were j oined by SS BORBYLINE , WEST HIXTON and INTAN . The Japanese schooners MARIANA MARU and NANYO MARU also continued to sail between Guam and Yokohama and brought trade goods and suppl ies ( ARG 1 9 2 1 : 1 3 ) . Over the next three years , the American schooners SS GLYMONT , RADNER and RESOLUTE vis ited Guam ; the two Japanese schooners
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remained ; the mil itary transports continued their runs ; and a several Navy vessels stopped for fuel on the j ourney to
'W Cavite from Mare Is land ( San Franc i sco ) . Late in 1 9 2 4 , USS GOLDSTAR ( Figure 5 . 1 ) arrived to become the station s hip under the command of w . w . Bradley who would eventual ly become a naval governor o f Guam ( ARG 1 9 2 5 : 5 1 ) .
Governor Price wrote that the f irst commerc ial steamer in s everal years , SS STUART DOLLAR , arrived in January 1 9 2 5 , and in February , SS PACIFIC j oined the commerc ial service ( ARG 1 9 2 5 : 5 1 ) . I n 1 9 2 6 both s hips were replaced by SS STANLEY DOLLAR and GRACE DOLLAR ( ARG 1 9 2 6 : 2 2 - 2 3 ) . These ships maintained commercial service to Guam unt i l 1 9 2 9 when D IANA DOLLAR replaced GRACE DOLLAR . The Army transports were cut back to two ves sels a month during this period while MARIANA MARU continued to sail regularly between Guam and Yokohama . By 1 9 3 2 a second Japanese auxil iary schooner , SAIPAN MARU , was in the Guam-Yokohama service ( ARG 1 9 3 2 : 7 6 ) .
Governor George Alexander noted increased tra f fic i n Apra Harbor in 1 9 3 3 when YAMASHIRO MARU ( for one year only ) and CHOME I MARU j oined the small f leet o f Japanese schooners . Other American steamers that entered the harbor were SS DEFENDER , DEL MONTE , SUNKIST and RESTORER ( ARG 1 9 3 3 : 8 5 - 8 7 ) .
During the American Naval period , mil itary transports a continued to pas s through the waters o f Guam , the Pan 'W American Airl ines " Cl ipper " arrived in 1 9 3 5 with greater frequency , more Naval vessels brought material to improve the base , and MARIANA MARU continued its trading .
Guam ' s bus iest port , Apra Harbor , had three reported ship los ses from 1 8 9 8 to 1 9 4 1 . The f irst occurred on November 1 3 , 1 9 0 0 , when the steam l aunc h YOSEMITE sank during a typhoon . According to the Guam Recorder ( November 1 9 0 0 , Vol . 2 ) , the boat lost its f irst anchor , ran aground on the shoals at Calalan Ree f , was blown o f f and lost a second anchor at Spanish Rocks , and was last seen at 8 o ' c lock in the morning .
The converted c able ship CS SCOTIA ran aground on Spanish Rocks in broad daylight on March 1 1 , 1 9 0 4 . In the annual Report o f the Governor for 1 9 0 4 , he stated :
early in the morning of March 1 1th , the Cable Ship Scotia , in making into the harbor , struck Calalan Bank near Spanish Rock , became a total wreck , and after many days was abandoned and sold . The i l l fated Scotia had been ordered to this port for the purpose o f moving the Midway leg of the Commerc ial Pac i f ic Cable .
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Fig . 5 . 1 . USS GOLD STAR in 1 9 2 4 . ( Photo by Department of the Navy )
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At the outbreak o f Germany ' s war with Japan , the c rew o f the German raider , SMS CORMORAN , entered Apra Harbor in the hope o f obtaining enough coal and provis ions to reach German East Afric a . Captain Maxwell , the recently arrived naval administrator on Guam , met with the German c aptain , zuchswerdt , but refused his request . Under international rules at the t ime , Z uchswerdt had a choice o f e ither departing the harbor or having his ship interned for the remainder of the war . Unable to leave because of insuf f ic ient fuel and suppl ies , the German ship and crew were interned on November 15 , 1 9 14 . Three years pas sed before American-German relations were broken and the German c aptain was ordered to s urrender his ship . Rather than do so , he order the ship scuttled . On April 7 , 1 9 1 7 , CORMORAN was sunk in Apra Harbor .
German and British Colonial ism
By 1 8 8 0 , although both the German and British governments were reluctant to acquire colonial possess ions in Microne s ia , pressure from the large commerc ial trading houses , miss ionaries and plantation owners o f both countries eventua l ly resulted in an about- f ace on the pos it io n of A nonintervention . German commerc ial influence in the � Caro l inas , Marshalls and Gilberts , and British commerc ial interes t in the Gilberts , Solomons , Fi j i and New Hebrides were evident from the late 1 8 7 0 s . From 1 87 8 , when Germany conc luded its first treaty with the chiefs on Jaluit i n the Marshal ls , German commerc ial and colonial interests grew . By the end o f 1 8 7 8 , the German Imperial Government had s igned a series o f treaties ensuring t rading privileges and e s tablishment o f coaling stations in the E l l ice , Gilbert , Marshall and Duke of York is lands as wel l as the northern coast of New Britain .
The British , ever mindful o f the rise in German influence and concerned that the United States might also choose to interfere , annexed Fi j i in 1 8 7 4 and establ ished a High Commis s ioner for the Western Pac i f ic who was mandated to extend his authority over all Britis h sub j ects in the region through the Royal Navy . I n 1 8 8 5 Germany laid c laim to the Marshall I s lands under protectorate status , and in 1 8 92 Britain c laimed the Gi lbert I s lands . The i s l ands were partitioned between Spain , Germany and Britain prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War . The is lands o f the Marianas and Carol inas continued to be claimed by Spain , the Gilbert I s lands were under the protection o f the British , and the Marshal ls were under Germany ( Figure 5 . 2 ) . I t was not until after the Spanish-American War that Germany o f f ic ially e
150
c laimed t he Caroli ne , Marshall and Northern Mariana i s l ands and e stab l ished administrative headquarters on Palau , Yap , Ponape , Truk , Jaluit and Saipan .
Northern Mariana I s lands
German Colonialism , Japanese Control , 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 1 4 - -Trading Schooners , Mai l Ships and Mil itary Cruisers
Despite nominal control by Spain , neither the Germans , the British nor the Spanish were able to extend their commerc ial inf luence to the Northern Mariana I s l ands , where the Japanese held sway . I n 1 8 9 0 , the South Sea I s l and Company was formed by Taguch i Ukichi , who sent TENYU MARU to the Bonins , Guam and Yap ( Peatt ie 1 9 8 8 : 1 6 ) . This was not a highly succes s ful venture , but it opened the door for future commerce . Two years l ater , in 1 8 9 3 , the Hiki South Seas Trading Company , Ltd . , engaged in agricultural enterprises in the Marianas and set up smal l commerc ial stores ( Peattie 1 9 8 8 : 2 2 ) .
I n 1 8 9 9 , a fter the United States obtained Guam and the Phil ippines , Germany bought the rest o f the Marianas from Spain , which extended Germany ' s colonial influence in the region . However , the Japanese merchants had established an important pos ition in the trade for copra by this t ime . Georg Fritz , a German government district o f fic ial or magistrate in the Mariana Is lands , commented on the s ituation :
Merchants have no prospects s ince no transportation exists . The three companies [ that ] export copra on their own ships to Japan have the importation of goods in their own hands and have retail stores . Bes ides the sailboats o f these companies , which sail between Yokohama and Guam , a postal s teamer from the Reich on its way to Hong Kong stops in Saipan s ix times a year ( Fritz 1 9 0 6 ) .
H . von Seidel , a German researcher , observed that letters f rom Europe went to and from Yokohama eight or ten times a year on a Japanese commerc ial schooner ( Seidel 1 9 0 3 ) . Herman H . L . W . Costenoble , who eventually became the Director o f Agriculture o n Guam , said that " the s ettler is discouraged from s hipping German products by private c argo because he has to pay more [ for ] freight than what is bought " ( 1 9 05 ) .
During I s l ands
the German were the
administration , the least productive
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Northern of any
Mariana in the
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PALAU (SPAIN)
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·.� Farra lion d e Pajaroa
<•Aauncton leland NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS (SPAIN)
=:> Wake
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P a g a n �)Guguan 0 "\J Farallon de
Salpan • M a d lnllla
Agul)an ·' Tlnlan
MARSHALL ISLANDS
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. R ota <?Guam
:) .s. Gafarut
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POHNPEl ISLANDS
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• . . 1Pulap __ Truk Ia ::; :�· !.��r, -� o ,·o,uk
.0 Satawan �) Mortloc k
leland a Nukuoro 0
CA�OLINE ISLANDS (SPAIN)
E n a watak
STATE OF
KOSRAE
(GERMANY) ':: S o k a a k
�::: Ebon
Ka"lngamarangl GILBERT ISLANDS
NORTHWESTERN ISLANDS
:: USTRALI[\ LOUISIADE A R C H_
(BRITAIN) �
Nauru
Yanlkolo •
T O R R E S I S L A N D S ,,, VANUATU
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.::.tl Butarltarl
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Taman a !:· •) Arora•
TUVALU
Rotuma �-'
FIJI
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Fig . 5 . 2 . Colonial s tatus o f the Micrones ian I s lands in 1 8 9 2 .
protectorate . This may have been based in part on the popul ation mix in those is lands . In 1 9 0 2 there were only 1 , 1 0 0 Chamorros and 8 5 0 Carol inians l iving in the German-held i s l ands , with the populations concentrated on Saipan , Tinian and Rota . Saipan and the northern is lands were devoted to coconuts ; however , even with o f f ic ial encouragement only a few hundred tons o f copra were produced annual ly , and that by the Carol inian l aborers . Unlike the Carol inians , the Chamorros were l andowners and les s inc l ined to work for s omeone else . On Tinian the activity continued to be mostly c attle-rais ing ( Ol iver 1 9 6 1 : 3 5 4 - 3 5 5 ) .
Overa l l , the Northern Mariana I s lands were a f inanc ial burden to the Germans . Initially Saipan was the administrative headquarters for the group ; however , the is land l apsed into unimportance and the headquarters were eventually moved to Yap in the Carolines .
Although the German flag continued to fly at the customs house and German warships made occas ional vis its , the trade and economic life of the Northern Mariana I s lands was f irmly in the hands of the Japanese . By 1 9 0 8 the Japanese-owned South Seas Trading Company ( NBK ) was formed to c arry on commerce in Micronesia , inc luding the Marianas . Saipan was at the outer fringe of the German Pac i f ic empire , which now reached to New Guinea ; however , that would soon change .
Carol ine and Marshal l I s lands
German inf luence in the i s l ands was focused on three kinds o f commerc ial activity : as traders among the islands and general merchants in port towns ; as planters growing princ ipal ly copra and cotton ; and a s mine owners . The economic bas is for German involvement was a key factor in the s h i ft in emphas is from nonintervention to colonial expans ion in the South Pac i f ic . German commerce peaked in 1 8 8 0 , and a fter 1 8 8 2 the European price o f copra dec l ined and did not recover until 1 9 0 1 . Coupled with foreign competition for c opra and laborers , the German trading empire was s lowly contracting in the mid- 1 8 8 0 s . The inf luential Deutsche Handel s und Plantagen-Gesellschaft der Sudesse Inselen zu Hamburg ( DHPG ) , the large German trading company , was forced out of Rotuma in the early 1 8 8 0s by the Britis h , and sources of cheap labor and trading contracts were disrupted . When pre s sure mounted in 1 8 8 5 to protect commerc ial interests and halt the decline , Germany annexed the Marshall I s lands . This was Germany ' s second colony in the Pac i f ic and was its most valuable acquis ition because of the f lourishing copra trade . Annexation of the Marshal l I s l ands opened the door to German colonial ism in Micrones ia .
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German Co lonial ism , German and Japanese Con trolL. e 1 8 8 0 - 1 9 1 4 --Trading and Labor Schooners , Mis s ionary Packets , Steam Freight and Pas senger Ships , Mail ShipsL. Mil itary Cruisers and Frigates
In 1 8 8 0 the Pac i f ic was cons idered the front ier zone of the German empire , but by 1 8 8 6 - 1 8 8 7 , is sues regarding the i s lands were discus s ed at the highest levels o f the Briti s h and German governments . Initially , none o f the partic ipants wanted outright annexation ; however , none could af ford to withdraw from the region . There was the mutual des ire , at governmental levels , for strong , native governments that would be able to maintain peace and provide the necess ary s ecurity to foreign traders ( Knight 1 9 7 7 : 6 2 ) . But des ires notwithstanding , what was in place was a strong commerc ial monopoly that had a great deal of influence among the i s land peoples .
Although nominally under the adminis tration o f the Reich , after formal annexation and establishment o f the German Protectorate in the Marshall I s lands in 1 8 8 5 , control was ultimately in the hands of the Jaluit-Gesellschaft , a trading company formed in 1 8 8 7 . Thi s company was formed from the merger o f the two largest f irms in the South Pac i fic , Robertson & Hernsheim and the DHPG . With 6 0 trading stations from Palau to the Gilberts , the Jaluit-Gesell schaft received � exc lus ive rights to take posses s io n o f unoccupied land , to � fish for pearl-shell , and to exploit phosphate deposits . In exchange , the company paid the salaries o f the government administrators , provided hous ing and o f f ice fac i l ities , transported o f f ic ials on company ships and agreed to make up any deficit that might occur in the Protectorate ' s budget . Further , the company was as sured that the Imperial Commiss ioner would follow the advice of the company on pol icy dec i s ions and that no decrees would be issued unt i l the company had an opportunity to review them ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 4 0 ) .
I n addition to strong pressure from Germans in the is lands , the Austral ians cons istently pres sed the British for wholesale annexation of the is lands both as an economic and mil itary buf fer ( Knight 1 9 7 7 : 6 4 ) . Another concern o f both the German and British governments was the distribution of coal ing stations at strategic outposts from the Panama Canal acro s s the Pac i f ic . The annexation of the Marshall I s lands , when coupled with other German-held islands , was the genes is for an unbroken chain o f outposts across the Pac i f ic . The acquisition o f the Caroline I s lands by Germany completed the chain .
Spain c laimed the Carol ines for more than three centuries ; however , Spain never e f fect ively occupied or administered the is l ands . With the spread of British , German and Japanese e
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traders in the mid- 1 8 8 0 s and Germany looking with covetous eyes toward the Carolines , Spain sought to reassert its rights to the i s l ands . The Anglo-German agreement o f 1 8 7 6 s t ipulated that both the Carol ine and Marshal l I s l ands should be cons idered within the German sphere o f inf luence ( Brown 1 9 7 7 : 1 3 8 ) . With that long-standing agreement in hand and a fter annexing the Marshall I s l ands , the Germans moved to formal ly acquire the Carol ines by direct occupation o f selected is lands .
Spain , although recogniz ing that it c ould not prove direct his toric adminis trative control of the Caro l ines , was loathe to permit German incurs ion . In 1 8 8 2 a Spanish c ruiser travel led through the Western Carol ines in order to estab l i s h treaties with several o f the is land chiefs , and i n 1 8 8 3 the s teamer CASTELLANO carried materials for the construction o f a fac tory on Yap ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 3 0 9 ) . I n a further e f fort to stave off any c laim by the Germans , Spain sent the cruiser VELASCO from Mani la to Yap to col lect information in preparation for the establishment o f Spanish administrative headquarters ( Figure 5 . 3 ) .
Despite the activit ies of the Spanis h , Prince Bismarck c hose to announce the German intention to annex the Carol ines . I n res ponse , the Spanish government sent the ships SAN QUENTIN and MANILA to take pos sess ion o f the i s l ands in l ate August 1 8 8 5 . I n the meantime , the Germans had dispatched the frigate ILTIS to Yap with instruct ions to c laim any i s l ands not already c laimed by Spain . The ships reached Yap within a few days o f one another , and although the Spanish flot i l l a arrived f irst , the Germans claimed the is land . For their part , the Spanish were appalled and demanded s atisfaction for the Germans ' presumptuous behavior . The Germans , mindful o f world opinion and looking at the larger picture , agreed to have the dispute settled by the Pope . As a res ul t , s overeignty o f the Carol ines was awarded to Spain , but Germany was given extens ive trading privileges . More importantly , the papal dec ision establ ished Germany ' s c la im to the is l ands in the event Spain ever rel inquished control ( Brown 1 9 7 7 : 14 0 ; Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 3 0 9 - 3 1 2 ) .
I t was not until the c lose o f the Spanish-American War that Germany again had an opportunity to pursue its colonial interests in the Carol ine I s lands . In the spring o f 1 8 9 8 , a b i l l had been passed that supported German naval expans ion . That s ame year another law was passed that was des igned to encourage German merchant ship construction ( Brown 1 9 7 7 : 1 4 1 ) . By l ate 1 8 9 8 , a large navy and merchant f leet was being developed , and the c ircumstances for acquis ition o f additional territory in the Pac i f ic were ripe for colonial expans ion .
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Fig . 5 . 3 . Spanish steamer VELASCO visited many o f the islands . ( Courtesy of Micronesia Research Center Collection)
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As early as July 1 8 9 8 , the United States was approached by the German ambas sadors to London and Washington regarding the Caroline I s l ands . They sugge sted that Germany would support American occupation of the Phil ippines in exchange for cons ideration of Germany ' s claim to the Caroline s . When the American peace conditions were accepted in August , Germany immediately began independent negotiations with Spain for any c e s s ions that might be ant ic ipated . A fter s everal rounds o f negotiations between the United States and Spain , it was determined that the Philippines , Puerto Rico and Guam would be purchased from Spain for 20 mil l ion dol l ars . In the meantime , the German Foreign O f f ice continued to pre s s Spain for the acquis ition of the Caroline and Mariana I s l ands , including Palau . I t was not until February 1 8 9 9 that any settlement was reached . Germany purchased the is lands for 2 5 m i l lion pesetas and agreed to extend generous trading privileges to Spain ( Brown 1 9 7 7 : 1 4 1 - 1 5 0 ) .
Although first Spanish and then German administrators had pol itical authority over the islands , neither had a long-lasting impact on the people they were rul ing . Unlike the people o f the Mariana I s lands who had undergone a long period of sub j ugat ion , the Carol ine i s landers were largely independent , l iving under traditional c hief ly rule . When the Spanis h garrison arrived on Ponape in 1 8 8 7 , it was faced with a wel l -developed pol itical system that had long famil iarity with wes tern and European c ivil ization . The contact did provide acculturat ing inf luences , but despite that , the tribal chiefs dominated both their subj ects and the success o f commerce in the is lands .
The attempt by Spain to actualize its c laim in the Carol ine I sl ands in 1 8 8 7 and enforce colonial rule was a disaster . Unf amiliar with Ponapean social and pol itical l i fe and ind i f ferent to traditional independence , the Spaniards arriving in their roles as colonial masters were met with a good deal o f res istance by tribal chie f s . With the Spanish also c ame Roman Cathol ic priests , which added another element for potential conf l ict with the wel l -entrenched Protestant mis s ionaries . A fter nearly a decade o f mil itary , tribal and rel igious confrontations , the Spanish had lost all c redibi l i ty with the Ponapeans as colonial rulers ( Hempenstall 1 9 7 7 : 2 0 9 -2 1 3 ) .
When Germany acquired the Carol ine I s lands in 1 8 9 9 , the Ponapeans were unmastered and remained the rulers of their own country . The experiences o f the Ponapeans under Spanish colonial ism only reinforced their independence . The intertribal warring on the i s l and and rel igious confrontations continued . The incoming colonial deputy governor , although faced with a s ituation that was uncontrol lable and without a mil itary apparatus to c hange
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things , approached colonial rule from a less confrontational 4t avenue than had his predeces sors . Albert Hahl s aw the Ponapeans as a people exposed to the worst elements o f Western and European civi l i z ation . Hahl focused on earning the trust of the people and supporting local chie f ly rule . He was eventually able to mediate some intertribal conf licts and to negotiate certain j urisdictional rights from the chie fs . Hahl ' s overriding mandate was to take no action that would result in or require military intervention . " Ponape was not worth a war and Berlin was prepared to s acri f ice economic development for the sake of communal peace " ( Hempenstall 1 9 7 7 : 2 14 ) . As a result , no direct administrative control was exercised on the is l and , and no c olonial demands were made on the population .
L imited control was maintained through the chie f s and miss ionaries until 1 9 0 8 when Ponape received its third administrator . Georg Fritz brought with him a program o f land re form and soc ial and economic development that was , in itse l f , general ly acceptable to the existing chiefly structure . What Fritz did not understand was the depth of the traditional tribal fac tional ism on the is land , which was presented under the guise o f rel igious rivalry . Fritz ' s succes sor , Boeder , brought events to a fever pitch by forc ing reforms and adherence to colonia l rule and eventually sparking a rebel l ion by the Sokehs tribe in October 1 9 1 0 A ( Hempenstal l 1 9 7 7 : 2 2 0 - 2 2 2 ) . � When word f inally reached the German outpost in China , four cruisers were sent to settle the matter . By January 1 0 , 1 9 1 1 , EMDEN , LE IPZ IG , NURNBERG and CORMORAN were at Ponape with 3 0 0 marines on board . Despite a blockade and a four-hour battle , the Sokehs were undaunted unti l they were denied access to available foodstuffs and small groups of marines , s tationed at various loc ations around the is land , were dispatched to search for and harass the c l an members . I n February 1 9 1 1 , the Sokehs tribe f inal ly surrendered and Ponape became a true German colony . The princ ipal result was that the Ponapeans were forced to give up their long-held control o f relations with outs iders and accept a bas ic change in the sys tem o f land tenure and tribute ( Hempenstal l 1 9 7 7 : 2 2 6 - 2 2 9 ) .
Ponape was the exception rather t han the rule , however . The agreement with the Jaluit Trading Company for administration of the islands was terminated in 1 9 0 6 and , with S amoa and Ponape the notable exceptions , the Germans had l ittle problem establ ishing colonial rule . They worked within the existing traditional power structures and permitted local i s land chie fs to exerc ise some authority over the natives . Kosrae was governed by a local elected chieftain who was under the j urisdiction o f the German government o f f ice in Ponape . The tt
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is lands o f Truk were divided into s ix adminis trative districts , col lectively under the supervis ion of a great chieftain , whose pos ition was hereditary ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 5 4 ) . On Palau the i s l anders were governed by two great chieftains and s ix lower chie ftains who were selected by the people , subj ect to German approval . I n the remainder o f the Carolines , the Germans s imply empowered all o f the chieftains who were in control during the Spanish period ( Purcel l 1 9 6 7 : 5 5 ) .
Under German administration , traders could not legally sell l iquor or guns to the natives or extend them credit . Traditional property rights were respected , but land not spec i f ically c laimed was cons idered the property o f the government and was redis tributed to landles s i s l anders . Foreigners were not permitted to purchase land and could only lease it for 25 years . Government and miss ionary schoo l s were established and rel igious freedom permitted , although Spanish mis s ionaries were required to leave when the Germans formal ly acquired the islands . American miss ionary activity continued throughout the German Colonial period ; however , by 1 9 0 6 , these mis s ionaries were supplanted by the German Leiberzel ler group who continued to work throughout the Marshall and Carol ine I s l ands . By 1 9 0 8 the Spanish miss ionaries were replaced by German Capuchins o f the Rhenish-Westphal in Order and by the Al s atian s isters of the Franc iscan Order . There was also the Japanese Catholic group Seishinsha Dendodan . Hospitals and medical services were establ ished on Ponape and Yap , and some agricultural research was conducted on Ponape ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 5 6 - 6 6 ) .
While the fate o f the Carol ines was being dec ided hal f a world away at the highest levels of government on both s ides o f the Atlantic , the islanders were bus ily attending to their l ives . Trade continued to flourish and there was a s i z eable market for the merchandise that the companies furnished .
The people of the southern Marshalls ( and presumably the Carolines ] were . . . buying large quantities o f imported rice that they cooked in iron pots purchased from the traders . Ship b iscuits were another delicacy P ipes and tobacco were always in great demand , even in places where Protestant influence was strong , ( because ] virtually everyone above the age of s ix , except for the most scrupu lous converts , smoked incess antly day and n ight . Clothing , iron tools , and firearms were the old staples of island trade . . . [ but by 1 8 8 6 ] merchants were
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c atering to the people ' s new tastes ( Hezel 1 9 8 3 : 3 1 7 ) .
These new tastes inc luded " hair oil , rings . . . bread , salted meat , conserves , and beer " ( Hager 1 8 8 6 : 1 0 9 ) .
Because o f the Jaluit Trading Company ' s strong influence over the Protectorate ' s administration , i t was able to el iminate foreign competit ion in the Marsha l l s through high bus iness taxes on non-German companies . Hawaiian and American firms were bought out in the 1 8 9 0 s , and the British-owned Pac i f ic I s lands Company sold its Marshal l trading stations in 1 9 0 1 in exchange for the rights to mine phosphate on Nauru , part of the German Marshal ls . The German Imperial Government extended the Jaluit-Gesellschaft ' s exc lu s ive rights for trade to inc lude the Eastern Carol ine I s lands in July 1 9 0 0 ( Firth 1 9 7 7 : 1 7 - 1 8 ) .
I n addition to their trading enterprises , the Jaluit-Gese l lschaft established a mail l ine between Jaluit , the other German-held is lands and Sydney in 1 9 0 0 . I n 1 9 0 1 , the pas senger and freight ship GERMANIA , subs idized by the Jaluit Company , began making three trips per year between the German possess ions , Hong Kong and Sydney ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 4 7 - 4 8 ; Henderson 1 9 6 2 : 2 7 ) .
I n spite o f the pol itical upheaval s in the region , copra e manufacture continued unabated . The exports of the German companies continued to grow , and in 1 9 0 0 copra comprised nearly 7 3 percent o f the exports c arried by company ships from the Marshall , Mariana and Carol ine is lands ; by 1 9 0 2 , this figure had increased to 9 6 percent ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 4 4 ) . Under German administrat ion between 1 9 0 4 and 1 9 1 2 , the production of copra exports in the Marsha l l s , Nauru and Eastern Carol inas increased from 8 , 6 6 1 , 8 4 0 pounds to 1 0 , 6 1 3 , 9 0 0 pounds . I n the Western Carol inas , Palau and Northern Mariana is lands , product io n increased from 1 , 3 1 9 , 34 0 pounds to 2 , 4 2 6 , 8 2 0 pounds ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 4 6 ) . These increases may have been as a result of increased cultivation . Forced planting o f coconut trees began on Ponape in 1 9 0 0 ; each adult male was required by the German colonial government to plant and cultivate 1 0 coconut trees per month . Similar requirements were forced on Yap and Truk ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 4 5 ) .
The Wes tern Carol inas did not produce the quantity or quality o f copra that were obtainable from the Central Carol ines and Marsha l l s . I n 1 8 9 2 - 1 8 9 3 , copra exports reached 1 , 0 0 0 tons , but dec l ined after that because o f an insect infestation . The s ituation was such that during the f irst two years o f the German administration , all copra exports were halted in order to give the groves an opportunity to recover and to conserve tt
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the dwindl ing food supply . A second copra embargo was enacted between 1 9 0 6 and 1 9 0 8 due to a drought ( Department o f the Navy 1 9 4 4 : 2 8 - 2 9 ) .
The wes tern Caroline I s l ands also presented some other di f ficulties for the Germans . Unlike the trade in the Marsha l l I s lands and Central Caroline I s lands where the Jaluit trading company was a near monopoly , in the Wes tern Carol ine I s lands the Germans faced stif f competition from the Japanese .
As early as the Spanish period Japanese business had become strongly entrenched in Palau . When the Germans arrived they found the Japanese in control of nearly all the trade of this is land group . . . . I n 1 9 12 , 7 3 o f the 1 2 2 foreigners l iving in the Marianas and Western Carol ines were Japanese , and approximately one-third of the foreign trade in this area was with Japan . German mercanti l e interests were i n second place , despite o f f ic ial support and encouragement ( Department of the Navy 1 9 4 4 : 2 9 ) .
Japanese expans ion into the Caro line I s l ands began in 1 8 9 1 when Enomoto Takeaki , along with some bus iness partners , founded the Koshinsha and establ i shed a store on Ponape . Although later trans ferred to Palau , the Kos hinsha remained in bus iness throughout the German colonial period . Another firm , the Nanyo Boeki Hioki Goshi Kaisha , had a thriving bus ines s on Truk unt il disputes with German o f f icials and British and American merchants forced its departure in 1 9 0 1 . When the company left Truk , the owners arranged to have another Japanese-owned company become its agent in the i s l ands , serving Truk , Yap , Ul ithi and E lato . The Japanese f irm , Nanyo Boeki Murayama Gomei Kaisha , attempted to establish a store on Ponape in 1 9 0 1 but was denied permis s ion by the Germans . The company ship , TAKEZO MARU , c arrying the owner , Murayama , sailed to Ponape and he eventually arranged to have a Spanis h mer�hant act as his agent . A second voyage resulted in permiss ion to trade with Faraulep and Lamotrek , and a few years later the company obtained permis s ion to trade direct ly on Ponape and Truk ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 2 0 - 2 2 ) .
The Nanyo Boeki Murayama Gomei Kaisha merged with the Nanyo Boeki Hoiki Kaisha in 1 9 0 8 to form the South Seas Trading Company , and by December 1 9 0 8 , the company had completed 1 0 voyages . This company traded in the South Seas ( Nanyo ) for more than 5 0 years and extended its influence throughout the region . The £outh Seas Company along with the Nanyo Kohatsu Kai s ha eventually control led all o f the trade in the
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German-held islands after they were turned over to Japan as It mandated territories ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 2 2 - 2 3 ) . From its inception , the South Seas Company ships were engaged in transporting freight , c arrying mail and pas sengers , maintaining a chain of retail outlets that sold goods to the i s l anders and Japanese res iding in the islands , and of course , trading in copra ( Purcel l 1 9 6 7 : 2 2 ) .
The discovery o f phosphate on Ocean I s land ( now c a l led Banaba ) in the British Gi lberts and on Nauru in the German Marshalls in 1 9 0 0 added to the pro f its o f the Jaluit-Gesel lscha ft and served to i ncrease its monopol istic hold ; the company quickly obtained exclus ive rights on all mining on Nauru . The Pac i f ic Phosphate Company , formed in London but inc luding the Jaluit-Gesellschaft , provided enough return on investment that the trading company was able to greatly expand its bus ines s . After the Australian-owned Burns , Phi lip & Company complained that Germany was breaching the free-trade provis ions o f 1 8 8 6 , the Jaluit-Gesellschaft lost its exc lus ive trading privileges but was granted a 9 4 -year lease on the phosphate concess ion as compensation ( Firth 1 9 7 7 : 1 8 ) .
Although the Japanese were not owners in rn1n1ng operations until after the outbreak o f World War I , they were employed by the Pac i f ic Phosphate Company on Ocean I s l and as early as � 1 9 0 5 . They worked as carpenters , shipwrights , f iremen , � blacksmiths , woodworkers and cooks on three-year contracts ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 1 1 ) .
Phosphate was also mined on Angaur in Palau . I n 1 9 0 3 , while searching for coal , German i nvestigators discovered phosphorous . I n order to mine the depos its , the Deutsche Sudsee Phosphat Aktiengesel lschaft was established in 1 9 0 8 . The government-owned company began mining on Angaur in 1 9 0 9 and by the end o f the year had mined 8 , 6 4 1 tons o f ore ; by 1 9 1 3 that figure had risen to 9 0 , 0 0 0 tons ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 4 9 ) . I n 1 9 1 3 the company also obtained rights to mine on Fais . Native laborers from Yap and Palau were forced to work the mines for a certain number o f days each year ; they were supplemented by Chinese workers and a few German administrators . The increase in shipping devoted to mining increased proportionately along with the tonnages o f ore recovered .
Gilbert I s lands
The British first attempted to exert formal control over the i s l and group in late 1 8 7 7 with the appointment of the Governor of Fi j i as the High Commiss ioner for the Wes tern Pac i f ic with authority over all British sub j ects . Exces s ive tl·
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labor-recruiting in the Gilberts and elsewhere and heated public outcry forced the British to intervene , and British naval commanders were mandated to control the worst exces ses . It was through this process , in the late 1 8 7 0 s and 1 8 8 0 s , and as a result of pressure from foreign competition that Britain renounced its princ iple of lais sez-faire toward the region and began developing a framework for the establ ishment of a colony in the southwest Pac i f ic .
British commerc ial influence in the Gilbert I s lands was focused on three activities : col lection of copra , l imited trade and extraction of phosphate . This dif fers greatly from the other British-held pos sess ions during this period where extens ive plantation agriculture , trade and merchandis ing were present .
Brit ish Protectorate , British and German ControL 1 8 8 0 - 1 9 1 4 --Gilbertese Baurua , Trading and Labor Schooners , Mis s ionary Ships , Colonial Government Ships , Steam Freight and Pas senger Ships , Mail Ships , Mil itary Cruisers and Frigates
In 1 8 9 2 , the HMS ROYALI ST was sent to Abemama , and on May 2 7 Capt . E . H . M . Davis proc laimed the islands a British protectorate . Under an order- in-counc il in 1 8 9 3 , the High Commiss ioner ' s authority was expanded to inc lude Tonga , Samoa and the Union , Phoenix , E l l ice and Gilbert i s l ands . The Marshal l , Caroline , Solomon and Santa Cruz i s l ands ; Rotuma ; New Guinea ( east of 1 4 3° ) ; New Britain ; New I reland ; and the Louisiade Archipelago were also brought under the commis s ioner ' s control " provided they were not already within the j urisdiction of any c ivilized power " ( Graham 1 9 7 0 : 14 7 ) . Other i s l ands in the southwestern Pac i f ic outs ide the l imits of Fij i , Queens land or New South Wales were also inc luded i f they were not already control led by another nation . Fol lowing a f lag-rais ing ceremony in the E llice I s lands , headquarters for the protectorate were f irst established in the Gilberts at Butaritari and in 1 8 9 6 at Tarawa ( Douglas 1 9 8 9 : 3 0 0 ) 0
The Protectorate administration o f the islands was based upon a s imple code of laws des igned to continue , as far as pos s ible , the traditional native forms of government , albeit modi f ied by miss ion and other fore ign inf luences . The British Res ident Commiss ioner , at first the only adminis trator in the is lands , was later j oined by district magistrates and counc i l s o f is l and elders . Be fore the establ ishment o f the Protectorate , the i s l ands were control led either by traders , beachcombers , native chiefs or strong-wil led miss ionaries . After the Protectorate , the most blatant manipulations by the mis s ionaries were stopped as were the interis land and intertribal wars aimed at acquiring
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more land ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 1 5 5 - 1 5 8 ) . Along with these changes tl c ame the requirement of community work and some taxation .
I n 1 8 9 5 Tel fer Campbel l , the f irst Res ident Commis s ioner , c ame to Botio on Tarawa . I t was really Campbel l who instituted the new regime . Up t i l l then we had not noticed any rea l c hanges .
He put a j udge-magistrate on each i s l and with an as s istant , c ounc ilors and policemen . People had to obey the law under penalty of a f ine or prison ; they had to pay tax ; make roads ; build prisons , hospital s and houses for government o f f ic ials . We began to f ind this a hard system ; the police were feared and we longed for the old times . The government did do some good , however , the men who had f led to Abaiang were brought back and had their l and returned to them ( Unident i f ied informant in Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 2 3 2 ) .
The government prohibited the sale o f l and to nonnatives and limited leases to no more than f ive acres .
By the l ate 1 8 8 0 s , there were estimated to be fewer than 50 traders in the Gilbert I s lands , mos t of whom were small independent bus inesses tra f fic king in bas ic neces s it ies such as c loth , tobacco , iron pots , knives , axes , rice and other tinned goods in exchange for copra ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 1 4 7 - 14 8 ) . Copra was the principal marketable resource and was produced on a l l of the islands by independent family groups . The only other way the i s l anders could obtain money to buy trade items was by marketing their labor . Gilbertese regularly s igned on to work in the phosphate mine on Ocean I s land or the plantations on Washington and Fanning i s l ands to the east . After the British c laimed the islands under the status of a Protectorate , they instituted regulations that l imited the amount o f t ime an islander could be hired to one or two years . They also encouraged the move o f the f amily group to les s en the impact of dis ruption .
I n 1 8 8 8 , 1 1 traders were scattered through various vil lages on Butaritari , and by 1 8 8 9 it was the bus iest island i n the group . Two American-owned companies , Crawford and Wightman , had sma l l bus ines ses , and the Germans in the Mars ha l l s , l ike the British and Americans , used small sail ing s hips to maintai n their trade . Although Butaritari was heavily vis ited by labor recru iters , the population did not dec l ine
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dramatica l ly because of the abundance o f copra ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 2 0 3 ) .
Mis s ionary act ivity was widespread and , prior to 1 8 8 8 , solely in the hands o f Protestants . The London Miss ionary Soc iety was f irmly established on Arorae , Tamana , Onotoa and Beru by the l ate 1 8 8 0 s . The American Board of Commiss ioners establ ished themselves in the 1 8 5 0 s and were dominant in the northern is lands and Ocean I s l and . Catholic priests began work in the group in 1 8 8 8 , us ing Nonouti as their base , and by 1 9 14 had churches established on nearly all the is lands ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 ) . The priests regularly travel led between the i s l ands and between vil l ages on the atol l s by local c anoe . The Gilbertese baurua were deep-water craft regularly used for interisland traf f ic and commerce ( Figure 5 . 4 ) . Sabatier recounts several ins tances where islanders and priests had near-disasters while trave l l ing between the islands ; however , it was not until the loss o f Brother Bernard Lemmens along with three c anoes filled with i s landers in 1 8 9 8 that the Protectorate government prohibited travel between Tabi teuea and Nonouti in bauruas ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 2 7 0 - 2 7 1 ) .
The inf luence o f the mis s ionaries and priests and the protection of the government helped to improve the overal l health o f the i s landers . However , despite improved hygiene and occas ional visits by doctors , two epidemics swept through the is lands . The f irst was in 1 8 9 0 when a virulent form o f meas les appeared o n Nonouti . The population o f the is land was dec imated with more than 1 3 0 deaths . The second was an epidemic o f dengue fever in 1 9 1 2 that was widespread ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 1 9 6 , 3 0 7 ) .
After 1 9 0 0 phosphate mining became the ma j or commerc ial activity in the is l ands when it was discovered on Ocean I s l and . In the l ate 1 8 9 0 s , the London-owned Pac i f ic I s l ands Company , working out of Howland and Baker is lands , was collected guano . In an e f fort to expand its market , the company sent ships to other i s l ands in search o f mother-o f-pearl and copra . In the process , a company representative vis ited Nauru and brought back what he thought was a piece o f petri f ied wood . The wood s at around for three years before it was analyzed at the urging of Albert E l l i s . When it was discovered that the wood was real ly a form o f high-qual ity phosphate , the company sent E l l i s to investigate .
Although Nauru was then c laimed by Germany , nearby Ocean I s l and was not , and it too proved to have extens ive phosphate depo s its . In May 1 8 9 0 , E l l is negotiated an agreement with the natives on Ocean I s land that gave the Pac i f ic I s lands Company exc lu9 ive rights to mine phosphate for 9 9 9 years for an annual payment of 50 pounds sterl ing . At the same time ,
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Fi g . 5 . 4 . r.ilbertese 100- foot bauru� under con�truct i on at Tabiteuea in 1 9 3 9 . ( Photo by H . E . M�ude)
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the Pac i f ic I s lands Company also sought to obtain a l icense from the Brit ish Colonial Office that ensured the company sole rights to occupy the is land from January 1 , 1 9 0 1 , and to display the Brit ish flag . The license also s tated that Ocean I s land was a British pos sess ion .
The West Pac i fic British High Commiss ioner , although instructed to is sue a proc lamation to make Ocean I s l and part of the Gi lbert and E l l ice I s lands Protectorate , determined that the is land had already been annexed through the l icense given to the Pac i f ic I s l ands Company , because that l icense referred to the is land as a pos ses s ion of Her Ma j esty ( Douglas 1 9 8 9 : 3 0 4 ) . In September 1 9 0 1 , the ship HMS PYLADES vis ited the i s l and and raised the British f lag in an o f f ic ial ceremony .
The Pac i f ic I s l ands Company , newly reorganized as the Pac i f ic Phosphate Company , quickly began exploitation o f the phosphate depos its . By 1 9 0 7 phosphate production had become so important that the Protectorate ' s headquarters were trans ferred to the island . I n 1 9 0 9 , the company had already exported nearly 2 mill ion tons of ore . The company bought land from the Ocean I s landers for only 2 0 pounds an acre and paid them a minor compensation for the destruction of fruit trees . These terms eventually resulted in the refusal of the Ocean I s l and natives to sell the company any more land . The s ituation was not resolved until the company agreed to pay the islanders a royalty of 6 pence per ton on a l l phosphate mined ( Douglas 1 9 8 9 : 3 0 4 ) .
The phosphate depo s its were estimated to be 2 0 m i l l ion tons in 1 9 0 7 ( S abatier 1 9 7 7 : 2 9 3 ; Oliver 1 9 5 1 : 3 1 2 ) . Mining was accomplished by recruiting laborers from the Gilbert and E l lice is lands and was supplemented by a comparatively small number of Japanese and , l ater , Chinese .
There were no dramatic changes in the is lands from the establishment of the Protectorate through 1 9 1 4 . A sma l l ship , TOKELAU , was purchased by the colonial government i n 1 9 0 8 t o faci l itate interis land communic ation and inc rease its e f fectiveness ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 1 5 ) . Trade became concentrated in the hands o f larger companies , phosphate m�n�ng on Ocean I s land increased and miss ionary activity continued unabated . Freighters made regular cal l s at Ocean I s land to leave supplies and collect phosphate ; however , trading/pas senger ships arrived and departed irregularly elsewhere in the island group . Other than the l arge Gilbertese canoes , these infrequent interis l and s hips provided the only means of communication .
Unl ike earlier in the century , ship losses from 1 8 8 0 through 1 9 1 4 in the Carol ine , Marshall and Gilbert i s l ands werH
1 6 7
primarily caused by human or navigat ional error rather than 4t attack by islanders . In April 1 8 8 2 , the Spanish steamer ROMEO vis ited Yap and picked up 12 people stranded from the wreck o f the mail ship AGUSTIN ( Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 2 4 ) . The German trading schooner , CAROLINE , captained by Felix Becker , vis ited several is lands in the Marsha l l s and Eastern Carolines while col lecting copra in 1 8 8 2 . In August of that year after departing Yap , the ship wrecked near Woleai . In September or October , the c rew managed to reach Ponape in one o f the ship ' s boats ( He zel 1 9 7 9 : 2 4 , 8 6 ) . The schooner , STAGHOUND , wrecked at Ko srae in August 1 8 8 3 . The crew remained on the is land unt i l November when they were rescued by the American miss ionary ship , MORNI NG STAR I I I .
In January 1 8 8 4 , the Hawai ian labor-recruiting ship , JULIA , wrecked on a ree f at Nikunau in the Gilberts . Capt . A . N . Tripp and the crew remained on the i s l and for nearly 3 months before being picked up by the ship KALUNA and returned to Honolulu ( Maude in Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 3 6 5 ) . That s ame month in the Marsha l l I s lands , the schooner RAINIER , under the command o f Captain Morrison , wrecked on Uj ae . The trading schooner was on its maiden voyage from Philadelphia when it wrecked on the ree f . Some o f the crew used a small boat to leave and were picked up by a British ship near Kosrae . Others remained on the is land , constructed a small schooner out of the remains of RAINIER , and reached Jaluit in Marc h . The A remainder o f the crew were picked up by the American ship , W USS ESSEX , in April ( Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 1 4 0 ) .
While the men from RAINIER were building a schooner , the miss ionary packet , MORNING STAR I I I , captained by George Garland , was visiting the islands of Ponape and Truk . After rescuing the crew of STAGHOUND in November , Garland returned to Kosrae for a 3 -week layover in December be fore heading to Truk and Palau . He returned to Kosrae in late February 1 8 8 4 . As the ves sel was preparing to put i n , it went aground and was a total loss . Captain Garland along with some of the miss ionaries left the is land in early April on a small boat bound for Ponape ( Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 1 1 0 ) .
The British steamer , BOTHWELL CASTLE , was rated A- 1 by Lloyds at the time o f its loss at Ngetik southwest o f Ponape in the eastern Caroline Is lands . The iron-hu lled merchant ship was captained by H . D . Boyer out of Newcastle , New South Wales , when it wrecked on the reef on Christmas Eve , 1 8 8 4 . The captain and three crewmen left the is land in a ship ' s boat while hoping to reach Guam . I nstead , they arrived in Palau sometime in January 1 8 8 5 where they remained for nearly two months before they were picked up . The remainder o f the crew were f inal ly rescued from Ngetik sometime before October ( Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 1 3 - 1 4 , 8 8 ; Lloyds Registry of British and Foreign A Shipping 1 8 8 3- 8 4 ) . The German ship , KATHERINE , wrecked off ..
1 6 8
Faraulep in the western Carol ine I s lands in 1 8 8 5 . Captain Becker and his c rew remained on the island for nearly 1 8 months before they were rescued ( Hezel 1 9 7 9 : 2 6 ) .
In 1 8 8 8 the trading schooner , GEORGE NOBLE , ran aground on Nonouti . The ship belonged to a Chinese company , On Chong , that traded in the islands . Because the crew were fearful o f carrying a priest from Sydney to the Gilberts , the ship s l ipped away only to run aground . Father Leray , on Nonouti at the time , constructed a l arge cros s from the ship ' s mast at the village o f Taripo , a c ross that was still vis ible in 1 9 3 8 ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 1 7 0 ) .
The freight steamer , ELBA , wrecked at Ocean I s l and in the German-held Gilberts in 1 9 0 4 . Because of the di f f iculty o f anchoring , transport and loading of phosphate could only be accomplished during calm weather with an offshore bree z e . A sudden shift in the wind drove ELBA onto the rocks where its compos ite wooden and iron hul l began to break up before s inking ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 2 9 4 ) .
Final ly, the small schooner , HIRAM BINGHAM , owned and captained by the Protestant miss ionary Mr . Walkup , wrecked 2 0 miles o f f Butaritari in 1 9 0 9 . The ship was loaded with suppl ies and carrying a c rew of four along with four pas sengers , three of whom were children ; they made their escape in a ship ' s boat , f inally reaching Ebon in the Marshall I s lands a fter 2 1 days adri ft ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 2 2 4 - 2 5 ) .
The vessel losses from 1 8 8 0 to 1 9 1 4 ref lect the commerc ial and rel igious act ivities that were being conducted in the region by Americans , Germans and the British . Not represented are the activities o f Japanese traders . Shipping losses by the Japanese certainly must have occurred ; however , they are not documented in the non-Japanese language s ources that were consulted . Japanese archives or contemporary histories may provide the necessary information on these ships .
World War I
Northern Mariana , Caro line and Marshall I s lands
I n 1 9 1 4 the is lands of Micronesia were held by Britain , Germany and the United States . Britain control led the Gilbert and Solomon islands ; Germany held the Caro l ine , Marshall , Northern Mariana and Palau i s lands as wel l as a portion o f New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago ; and the United States control led Guam ( Figure 5 . 5 ) . Although there were repeated attempts at the establishment of an extens ive
1 6 9
commerc ial network in the South Pac i f ic , on the eve o f World It War I the
. . . Japanese government and private interests could only look back over nearly 2 0 years of misfortune . . . . Undeterred by these setbacks and spurred only by the conviction that the Marshall , Mariana , and Carol ine I s lands were of commerc ial and strategic value , the Japanese government , from the outbreak of World War I , engaged in a diplomat ic and mil itary o f f ens ive to gain a territorial foothold in the South Pac i f ic ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : xxii-xxiii ) .
Shortly a fter Japan dec lared war on Germany , two German cruisers rendezvoused at Pagan be fore beginning the long j ourney horne and ef fectively abandoning the area . Japan quickly extended its inf luence by seiz ing several i s l ands . For the next three decades both the economic and pol itical destinies o f Japan and the Northern Mariana , Carol ine and Marshal l is lands were linked .
German C laim , Japanese Control , 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 1 8 - - Steam Freight and Passenger Ships , Mail Ships , Mil itary Battleships , Destroyers and Cruisers
Japanese had However , it territorial opportunity
At the beginning of World War I in Europe , the no idea how long the hostil ities would continue . i s c lear from their act ions that they had both and economic aspirations , and the war provided an to act . Winston Churchill stated :
The attitude of Japan toward Germany suddenly became one of f ierce menace . No c lause in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty [ of 1 9 1 1 ] entitled us to invoke the a s s istance of Japan . But it became evident be fore the war had lasted a week that the Japanese nat ion showed themselves reso lved to extirpate a l l German authority and interests i n the Far East ( Churchill 1 9 2 4 : 3 1 4 - 3 1 5 ) .
By entering the war and us ing the Anglo-Japanese agreement as a pretext , Japan could in no way be accused o f territorial expans ionism . Therefore , in early August 1 9 1 4 when the British suggested to Japan that it might be helpful if Japanes e naval vessels were sent to the China Sea to " search out and destroy German armed commerc ial ves sels which were already harass ing British commerc ial shipping " ( Purcell e
1 7 0
N
I
PALAU
Farrallon d e Pajaroa
·-'A aunc•on I s land NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS : Wake (US)
• Pagan -� Guguan J � ' ,:;. Faralion da
Medin lila Salpan • AguiJan • Tlnian # R ota
<?Guam (US)
(GERMANY)
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MARSHALL ISLANDS (GERMANY)
'." B o k a a k Rongelap
Bikini I Rongrlk I Blkar --:_,
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-:i' (GERMANY) Yap Islands._ Ulllhl Namonuito POHNPEI
ISLANDS
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Ngulu
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ci,._ •. ,_,. Pohnpei
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Satawan -.::; M ortlock - Iaiande
·�:; lnge\ap j CAROLINE ISLANDS
NukucHQ .�
(GERMANY)
Kaplngamarangi NORTHWESTERN I S L A N D S
STATE OF
KOSRAE GILBERT ISLANDS
(BRITAIN)
(-' tjutaritariGILB ERT •,o ISLANDS S> Taraw11 :Y
�i:,Abemama
_, c::, ADMIRAL TV ISLANDS --� ·.:: /:1• -::; �:;
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Ta ltauea�-;;:. 19 0 -�, .,- <>"'·�; PAPUA GUINEA B I S M A R C K
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N:EW GUINEA GROUP N E W BRITAIN "\..:)., � •
(GERMANY)
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� 0 Q� :..::'\
Tamana '":· •.) Aroraa
TUVALU
:
-
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�OLOMON SEA ISLAN D S ·�,.Q�o � _ SOLOMON ISLANDS
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Rotuma �·
FIJI
Fig . 5 . 5 . Colonial s tatus o f the is lands in 1 9 1 4 .
1 9 6 7 : 7 5 - 7 6 ) , the Japanese were extremely recept ive . The tl Japanes e ; however , did not want to limit partic ipation on such narrow grounds nor did they want to have to restrict m i l itary activity .
Japanes e Foreign Minister Kato Takai i indicated to the Briti s h that military intervention in their beha l f would requ ire the use of all necessary means , and it would be impo s s ible to stop at only search ing out and destroying German ships . Further , according to the treaty , there would have to be a dec laration of war . I n response , the British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey wire d the Japanese and asked them to postpone any mil itary activity . The Japanese intention to dec lare war was made c lear to Grey . The Japanese were committed to the protection of commerce on the high s eas , which would " . . . necessarily involve the mopping up o f German bases . . . " in the Pac i f ic but " . . . in no way would threaten China or be inj urious to British commerce " ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 7 8 ) .
This placed the British in a d i f ficult s ituation . The international implications of Japan ' s involvement in the war , the neces s ity of maintaining the neutral ity o f China , and Japan ' s " itchy trigger f inger " a l l had to be cons idered .
I n the early days the Japanese a l liance was a matter of some embarras sment and even anxiety . Japan was ready to t ake her part in the war as our Ally ; the Far East and the whole of the Pac i f ic lay open to her and were her natural sphere o f operations . But the prospect o f unl imited Japanese act ion was repugnant to Australia and New Zealand . They already regarded Germany , her pos ition , and transact ions in the Pac i f ic with some mis giving ; they would have reviewed the substitution of Japan for Germany with pos itive alarm . Equally important , the e f fect of Japanese act ion on publ ic opinion in the United States would be disastrous ; it might even make American opinion antagonistic to us . We had , there fore , to explain to Japan that her help would be welcome , but that her act ion mus t be l imited and her prospective acquis itio n o f German territory must not extend beyond certain bounds ( Grey 1 9 2 5 : 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 ) .
Despite the e ffort of the forestall the involvement
1 7 2
Briti s h Foreign Secretary to o f the Japanese , military
preparations were initiated and Japan was unwil l ing to moderate its position . Grey argued that if Japanese interests were being threatened by Germany , they s hould dec lare war based upon the Anglo-Japanese Treaty , but he wanted to make it c lear that action against Germany s hould not extend beyond the China Sea . This was c learly unacceptable to Japan , which wanted a dec laration of war that would leave it free to take whatever action it chose . A fter much negotiation , the British government rea l ized that Japan had no intent ion of restricting its sphere of action , and further discuss ions were futi le . A broad statement i ssued by the British only alluded to Japanese involvement beyond the China Sea .
The Governments o f Great Britain and Japan . . . are o f the opinion that it is necessary for each to take action to protect the general interest in the Far East contemplated by the Anglo-Japanes e All iance , keeping espec ially i n view the independence and integrity o f China . . . . It i s unders tood that the action of Japan will not extend to the Pac ific Ocean beyond the China Seas except inso far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping l anes in the Pac i f ic , nor beyond As iatic waters westward o f the China Seas , nor to any foreign territory in German occupat ion on the continent o f Eastern Asia ( MacMurray 1 9 2 1 ( 1 1 ) : 1 1 6 7 ) .
Japan countered with the dec laration that it made no promises to restrict its military act ivities and entered the war on that understanding in September 1 9 14 ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 8 1- 8 7 ) . I t is c lear that the Japanes e " pers istently pursued a very del iberate course leading to a pos ition from which Japanese c laims to the former German i s lands were . . . stronger than those of any other All ied power at the end o f the war " ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 8 8 ) .
Well before Japan formal ly entered the war , the German l ight c ruiser , EMDE N , departed Ts ingtao , China , and headed south . On August 6 , 1 9 1 4 , a f leet o f German c ruisers commanded by Adm . Gra f von Spee , then at Ponape , also departed for Pagan in the northern Mariana I s l ands . After Pagan , the c ruisers s ailed for Maj uro , took on coal and suppl ies , and sailed east on August 3 0 . This left the China Sea and the Pac i f ic unde fended by a German naval force .
I n the meantime , on August 9 , 1 9 14 , a small f leet o f three British cruisers left for Yap in search of the Germans . When they arrived , the wireless stat ion was bombarded and the
1 7 3
c able was cut . The Japanese also quickly s e i z ed the tt opportunity to dispatch a f leet to Ts ingtao and put together three battleships and a destroyer to serve as a Pac i f ic task force . On September 2 0 , the task force arrived at Jaluit and took pos sess ion o f that is land without encountering any opposition . Three more battleships were sent to Palau on October 1 . The two groups , re ferred to as the First and Second Squadrons , quickly occupied the German i s lands . Kosrae , Ponape , Truk , Palau and Angaur were rapidly taken between October 3 and 9 , and on October 1 4 Saipan was seized . A fter October 1 4 , all ships " entering or leaving the is lands were under the j urisdiction o f the Japanese Minister of the Navy . . . . Nothing could be done without the permis s ion o f the Japanese mil itary forces " ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 8 9 - 9 0 ) and the islands were firmly under Japanese mil itary control .
This quick act ion by Japan was unantic ipated by Britain . Although the British made an ef fort to restrict further naval action by Japan , the s ituation was already beyond their immediate control . The British wanted the Anglo-Japanese occupation o f the Pac i f ic to be temporary . A lthough the Japanese agreed in princ ipal , they made it c lear that they had already made a " . . . cons iderable contribution to the war e f fort . . . [ and ] were counting on British support . . . [ in ] acquiring the islands " ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 9 3 ) . Japanese Foreign A Minister Kato Takaaki further indic ated that bec ause of � Japan ' s extens ive contributions , when the war f inally ended , it would be impos s ible for Japan to withdraw f rom the occupied i s lands .
I n December 1 9 14 , it was obvious that the statements and s ubsequent act ions by Japan were i n direct contradict ion to its previous dec larations and assurances . Earl ier , in August , the Japanese had indicated to the British that they had no territorial ambitions . However , by December , after occupying several is lands , Japan agreed to have the ultimate dispos ition of the Pac i f ic is lands settled by the All ies , but made it clear it wanted permanent pos sess ion as a reward for partic ipating in the war . British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey reiterated the British pos ition in December 1 9 14 that " al l occupation of German territory either by British or Japanese forces [ would ] be without pre j udice to the f inal arrangements which have to be made after the conc lus ion of the war " ( Grey in Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 9 4 ) .
Although the dispos ition o f the is lands would have to wait , Japan ' s Foreign Minister Kato Takaaki moved to negotiate a separate peace with Germany . Secret negot iations c onti nued until May 1 9 1 6 , when the British were f inal ly informed . Foreign Secretary Grey eventually responded to the news with the comment that Germany should make a peace o f fer to a l l the 4lt
1 7 4
ma j or combatants rather than negotiating with Japan alone . Grey ' s statements on the matter notwithstanding , the Japanese government continued to pre s s the issue with Britain ' s a l l ie s and by July had convinced the Rus s ians t o s ign a secret agreement support ing Japan ' s cl aim . This was the first in a series o f agreements signed in 1 9 1 6 and 1 9 1 7 that ensured European s upport for Japan and its c l aim on the German islands ( Ikle 1 9 6 5 : 6 3 ) . Eventual ly , all of the maj or powers agreed to s upport Japan and after the c lose o f the war , the Empire was given the islands under a Class C Mandate .
After November 1 9 1 4 , there were no hosti lities taking plac e i n the Pac i fic , and World War I was taking place only i n Europe , Afric a and the Near East . This interlude , whi l e European and American concerns were elsewhere , provided Japan nearly 6 years within which to establ ish its e l f as the administering force over the islands before any s erious outs ide discuss ions or monitoring were instituted . During the remaining years o f World War I , Japanese administration directly impacted the l ives of the islanders .
On December 2 8 , 1 9 1 4 , the South Sea I s l ands Temporary De fense Garrison was created . Immediately , the Japanese set about developing an administrative structure that would control the islands . The military headquarters were set up on Summer I s land ( Natsu Shima ) and Saipan , Palau , Truk , Ponape and Jaluit were des ignated as c ivil government districts , each with a defense garrison and a government advisor . Garrisons were also established at Yap , Jaluit and Angaur , and each was under the control of a Japanes e naval o f f icer who had ultimate authority . Although there was some real ignment o f government districts and adm inistrators , the f inal result was to place the adminis tration o f the is lands f irmly in the hands o f the Navy by the end o f 1 9 1 7 ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 1 4 6 - 1 4 8 ) .
I nformation on the adminis tration o f the islands from 1 9 1 4 to 1 9 1 8 is sketchy . It appears that the Japanese generally maintained the German system , insofar as taxe s , local government , and agricultural policies were concerned . However , with the occupation came martial law, which remained in e f fect until December 1 9 1 5 , when mi l itary personnel were trans ferred to c ivil government dis tricts and as signed police duties . By 1 9 1 7 a s eparate force was establi shed for pol ic e dutie s ; however , there was l ittle di f ference between the mil itary occupational forc e and the new pol ice force because both served as soldiers . Generally , the laws under which the is landers l ived were little changed f rom those that had been in force during the German period .
A maj or change during World War I , however , was in the area of educatiorr. German miss ionaries , who had been almos t exclus ively responsible for education , were expel l ed a fter
1 7 5
the Japanese arrived . I n their plac e , o f f ic ials o f the Navy e and representatives o f the South Seas Trading Company ( Nanyo Boeki Kaisha ) a s sumed teaching respons ibilities . Those native children fortunate enough to be in the s ame area as one of the few " teachers " received instruct ion in the Japanese l anguage , s inging and mathematic s . This s ituation continued until late 19 1 5 , when 6 elementary school s were establ ished , one each on Truk , Saipan , Yap , Palau , Ponape and Jalui t . Native children between the ages o f 8 and 1 2 were permitted to enrol l and were given 4 years of education . As before , instruction inc luded the J apanese l anguage , along with ethic s and a skil l or handicra f t .
I n 1 9 1 8 the term o f school ing was reduced to 3 years , a lthough a spec ial supplementary c ourse was o f fered that could last as long as 2 years . At the s ame time , the government establ ished fac il ities for education away from the main school buildings , which were c a l led detached schoo l s , in seven di f ferent areas ( Purcel l 1 9 6 7 : 2 2 9 -2 3 0 ) .
Before Japan entered the war , a number of private commerc ial interests in Japan were concerned about their future pos ition in the islands . Representatives o f one company , the Nanyo Kogyo Goshi Kaisha , submitted a petition to the Japanese government in August 1 9 1 4 , requeste d permiss ion to continue trading in the region , and e xpressed the hope of A partic ipating in the development o f the area . A few months � l ater , a group o f scientists was dispatched to the Pac i f ic is l ands to investigate education , agriculture , forestry , medic ine , geography, ecology and botany , among other topics ( Purc e l l 1 9 6 7 : 1 5 2 - 1 5 5 ) . In an e f fort to continue economic development in t he region , the Japanese kept open for trade the harbors o f Saipan , Yap , Palau , Truk , Ponape and Jaluit from the t ime the Japanese Navy occupied the is l ands ; however , Kosrae was not opened unt i l after January 1 , 1 9 1 9 . E lsewhere , customs regulations and duties were established and trade c ontinued unabated ( Purcel l 1 9 6 7 : 1 4 9 - 1 5 1 ) .
The Japanese intention to increase c ontrol over the is lands was evidenced early in the war when they seized the German-owned phosphate mines on Angaur . The German South Seas Phosphorous Company , represented by the Engl i s h f i rm of Samuels and Samuels , protes ted the t akeover :
During the present war the Imperial Government have occupied the island o f Angaur and . . . have seized and exploited the phosphate mines which were private property . Several cargoes o f the mineral have been shipped to Japan and it is understood will continue to arrive there
1 7 6
( Samuels and 1 9 6 7 : 1 5 6 ) .
Samuels in Purcell
Despite the protest , by August 1 9 1 5 all the Germans on Angaur had been expel led under the pretext that the company was not private but was subs idized by the German government . The Germans were , therefore , forced to leave for mil itary reasons . A similar incident occurred in 1 9 1 6 when 3 0 Germans were expel led from the occupied is lands . Most were doctors and miss ionaries who had not been evacuated at t he outbreak o f the war ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 1 5 5 - 1 5 6 ) . Having control over the mines and other commerc ial interests , as wel l as inserting themselves directly into the administration o f t he is lands , the Japanese had consol idated their control . I t is clear that the Japanese proceeded on the assumption that the is lands were their territory after the announcement that Japan was entering the war . Japanese interest was not based upon the assumption that they would only hold the i s lands until the end of the war . These activities were c learly part of an overall plan to implement long-term Japanese rule .
During the period o f Japanese naval rule , copra and phosphorous continued to be important exports ; to these were eventual ly added sugar and alcoho l . By 1 9 1 7 the government had set up a shipping l ine to handle its expanding empire in the Pac i f ic .
The Japan Mail Steamship Company ( NYK ) received the shipping contract between Japan and Micrones ia , while the South Seas Trading Company ( NBK ) had the service from t he regional centers to the outer islands . Within a few years the NYK Western Line had four ves sels in service , making 5 5 -day trips , that stopped at Saipan and Tinian . The NYK Eastern Line , with three vessels in service , made 5 0 -day trips with stops at Saipan . The NYK also had a Saipan Line that made 4 8 trips a year to Saipan and Tinian . The NBK had the interis land service within the Marianas . It ran 1 7 t imes a year from Saipan via Rota to Guam and 5 times to the northern is lands o f Anatahan , Sarigan , Alamagan , Pagan and Agrihan ( USN 1 9 4 4 : 1 3 0 ) . The NBK enj oyed a favored trade pos it ion because of the exc lu s ive government s hipping contrac t s . I t built warehouses for copra and extended payment in Japanese goods , i . e . , foodstu f f s , sundries and tool s , to the i s l anders ( Peattie 1 9 8 8 : 1 2 1 ) . The NYK control led external trade , with three l ines , and NBK controlled internal shipping service within the Marianas . The frequent visits of the NYK and NBK l ines brought some prosperity to the isl ands and supported Japanese expans ion .
1 7 7
Gilbert I s l ands
The outbreak of World War I in Europe and the activities o f the Japanese in the islands t o the west and in China had l ittle direct impact on the Gilbert I s l anders . The Protectorate was nearly forgotten by the Home O f f ice because it was s ecure and isolated . With the pos sess ion of mining lands , the Paci fic Phosphate Company pros pered despite reduced exports . There were minor staff and shipping shortages , but general ly these proved to be mere inconveniences .
British Control , 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 1 8 --Steam Trade , Pas senger and Freight Ships , Colonial Government Ships and Gi lbertese Baurua
Britain moved to annex the Gilbert and E l l ice i s l ands a fter the i s l ands were named a colony on November 1 0 , 1 9 15 . Britain guaranteed to continue existing laws and i s land governments and to protect l and rights . After obtaining approval from the native governments , the Order-in-Counc il went into e f fect on January 1 2 , 1 9 1 6 , and the Gilbert and E l l ice islands formal ly became a British colony . Ocean I s l and , along with Fanning I s l and ( now Tabuaeran in the Line I s l ands ) and Washington I s l and ( now Jarvis administered by the United States ) to the east were incorporated into the A colony l ater in 1 9 1 6 , as were the Union I s l ands ( now Tokel au ) • to the southeast .
The colonial administrative organizat ion changed l ittle from that under the Protectorate . The British res ident commis s ioner was supplemented by a treasurer , accountant , chief o f pol ice , three education o f f ic ials and two telegraphists in addition to the district o f f icers ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 1 5 3 ) . However , the laws under which the i s l anders l ived were evolving . I n the 1 8 9 0s , under the mis s ionary influence , the l i s t of crimes included adultery and fornic ation , as wel l as the ft , fighting , danc ing , tattooing , p ierc ing ears , tell ing l ies and failure to observe the Sabbath . By the early part o f the twentieth century , the high chie f s still held the traditional respons ibil ity for the " good order and cleanl ines s " of their is lands ; however , they were given no spec i f ic formal powers and were no longer cons idered as part of the native governments . Instead , native magistrates and counc ilors were appointed by the British res ident commiss ioner and district o f f icers , who now he ld wide -ranging powers including review o f all native court dec is ions . Punishable o f fenses no longer inc luded fai lure to observe the Sabbath or fornication , and compensat ion for other crimes was discontinued . Rather , the princ iple of compensation for o f fenses began to be replaced by the Western concept of
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e punishment by a central i z ed colonial government ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 12 6 , 4 7 ) .
The main sources o f revenue continued to be customs dues , l icenses , head tax , export taxes ( on phosphate and copra ) and land taxes . Copra and phosphate also continued to dominate the trade of the i s l ands during the war .
Phosphate mining on Ocean I s land continued to be pro f itable for the Paci fic Phosphate Company partly because of thei r monopolistic practices and the reluctance of the colonial government to step in and assume more control . Under a hard- fought and heavily disputed agreement arrived at in 1 9 1 3 , the company was permitted to lease additional l ands on the island . The Ocean I s landers , although not happy with the s ituation , were forced to accept the terms o f fered , which included the abi l ity to retain the use of the l and until needed for mining , and once the land had been mined , to rec laim and replant it to bring it back to its original s tate . Opposition to the company ' s use of the new l ands arose over the terms of compens ation for food-bearing trees . Although these trees were not spec i fically addressed in the new leas e , the i s landers wanted c ompensation f or a l l food-bearing trees , not j u s t the coconut palms .
More serious , however , was the issue of replanting the worked-out lands . Although a few trees were planted , the e f fort was hal f-hearted and had l ittle s ucces s . Des pite the f act that the c ompany ' s ships arrived in ballas t , that is , empty , there was no cons ideration given to bringing in soil , even though there was a s uggestion that the i s l anders be required to move soil from their unworked lands to the mined areas . There was even talk of requiring the i s l anders to do so through a public works regulation ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 0 1- 10 3 ) . The potential s uccess o f the rec lamation was further hampered by a 2 -year drought , and by July 1 9 1 7 , Edward Carlyon El iot , the res ident commiss ioner , reported that the replanting was " as dead as the trees which have been planted in the worked out areas from t ime to t ime " ( El iot 1 9 1 7 in Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 0 3 ) .
Because o f the l imited resources o f the other islands in the group and the l imited abil ity of the Gilbertese to obtain money for trade goods , they continued the practice of s e l ling their labor . The Pac i f ic Phosphate Company employed more than 1 , 0 0 0 laborers , the ma j ority of whom were Gilbertese . Employment outs ide their home is lands , for a year or two under contract , was established as a pattern in Gilbertese l i fe by the c lose of the nineteenth century . The monies earned al lowed them to purchase goods that would not have otherwise been obtainable and that had become the necess ities of life . Trade general ly remained in the hands o f a few
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companies and , outs ide o f contract labor I the Gilbertese e continued their traditional subs istence economy based upon copra , fishing and limited agriculture .
Unl ike many o f their Micrones ian neighbors , the Gilbertese did not lose their canoe-building skills during the onslaught o f westernizat ion . They continued to build c anoes for f ishing and interisland travel within the Gilbert archipel ago , which facil itated contact and exchange o f goods and the movement of islanders . However , commerc ial s hipping during World War I was both sporadic and l imited into and out o f the Gilbert I s lands . General t rade and pas senger travel did continue but at reduced level s when compared to the prewar years . The most regular shipping activity was that a s sociated with the phosphate mine on Ocean I s land . This contrasts sharply with the activity of the Japanese in the Marsha l l , Carol ine and Northern Mariana is lands . Regular s hipping tra f f ic continued and , in fact , increased with the expans ion o f the Japanese Empire . General trade , copra and phosphate mining were the princ ipal commerc ial activities .
No spec i f ic European or American shipping losses were identi f ied for the Carol ine , Marshall and Gi lbert i s lands during the background research for World War I . However , Sabatier reported that between 1 9 0 4 and 1 9 2 8 , two fre ighters wrecked at Ocean I s land ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 2 9 4 - 2 9 5 ) . No other A information has come to light regarding these ships . W' ' Documentation o f Japanese shipping losses is d i f f icult to locate . Given the increase in Japanese shipping during World War I , both between the islands and from the i s lands to Japan , there is certainly the potential that los ses occurred . I n formation regarding these ships may be available in Japanes e records .
I nterwar Years
By 1 9 1 9 , the face of Micronesia , with the exception of Guam and the Gilbert Is lands , had changed dramatically ( Figure 5 . 6 ) . Japan had consol idated its power and , coupl ed with that country ' s expans ionist vis ions , the is lands were treated as pos sess ions rather than territories , e f fectively sealed o f f and integrated into the Japanese Empire .
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...... (X) ......
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PALAU (JAPAN)
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Sonaorol Islands
···-:;: Marlr Tcbl
·:·: '.':: Helen Reef
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• Pagan ;) Guguan 0 ..:\.;, Farallon de
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CAROLINE ISLANDS (JAPAN)
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS (JAPAN)
MARSHALL ISLANDS (JAPAN)
0
POHNPEI ISLANDS
Pohnpal
S a taw an ::;:; Mortlock Ialande
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E n a w a t a k B i k i n i
Koaraa
STATE OF
KOSRAE
. KapiRgamarangl
·; B o k a a k R o n g a l a p
I R o n g r l k I B l k a r , , ' •
, .. , E b o n
GILBERT ISLANDS
(BRITAIN)
t' a utarua rlGIL B ERT '<•" ISLANDS �Tarawa �
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Mauru ·-·aanaba � � f) Tabltauaat. ·i) 6 Tamana !:' <.:)
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T O R R E S I S L A N D S
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Fig . 5 . 6 . Colonial s tatus o f the is lands in 1 9 1 9 .
Northern Mariana , Carol ine and Marsha l l I s lands
Japanese Mandate , Japanese Control , 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 4 1 - -Steam Freight and Passenger Ships , Mai l Ships , Military Battleships , Destroyers , Cruisers and Aircra ft
The Japanese o f f ic ially began to adminis ter the Mariana I s l ands ( except Guam ) after World War I when the i s lands were ass igned to Japan as mandated territory by the League o f Nations . I n March 1 9 2 2 , shortly after the treaty w ith the United States was signed , the Japanese government placed the i s l ands under the control of the South Seas Bureau and appointed an administrative director . Legi s lative power over the mandated territory was exerc ised by the Imperial Japanese Government in cooperation with the Parl iament . The d irector of the South Seas Bureau , who reported to the Premier , was respons ible for implementing the general l aws of the Japanese Empire as wel l as laws spec ially formulated for the i s lands . Further , the director had discretionary authority to is sue fines and imprison an individual for up to 1 year without a trial . He could also order mil itary forces in the i s l ands to perform tasks that were to the " bene fit o f public peace and order " ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 15 8 ) .
I n July 1 9 2 0 , an independent pol ice divis ion was established in the i s l ands . In addition to their duties related to law .. enforcement , they also had respon s ibil ity for taking the � census and in matters of publ ic health . With the creation of the South Seas Bureau , a permanent police force was establ ished , and by 1 9 3 3 , there were 1 5 9 members . The vast maj ority of pol ice were on Saipan , but there were also o f f ices on Rota , Tinian , Yap , Palau , Peleliu , Angaur, Babeldaob , Truk , Ponape , Jaluit , Kwa j alein and Wot j e ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 2 1 6 ) . The pol ice superintendent and the pol ice inspectors were Japanese , while the number of Japanese and native patrolmen were about equal . Native patrolmen handled only those cases that involved natives until 1 9 2 9 , when procedure was changed to al low them to be as s igned to any case , regardless of national ity .
The laws under which the i s landers l ived changed with the arrival o f the Japanese . Along with Japanese c ivil and criminal o f fenses , the pol ice also enforced a third type , the pol ice o f fense developed to accommodate the spec ial s ituations found in the i s l ands . These inc luded failure to prevent insect damage to coconut trees ; neglecting to report births , deaths or changes in res idence ; conceal ing a person in one ' s house or boat ; loitering ; holding immoral banquets ; danc ing ; lewd behavior toward women ; adultery when the viol ated woman lodged a formal complaint ; destruct ion or remova l of government property ; pol luting water ; castrating :_:,ne E e i ( or a.nother person ; tattooing ; and fail ing to keep the e
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vil lage streets c lean ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 2 1 9 ) . Although the pol ice of fense code applied to native and nonnative a l ike , i t appears that it was written with the intention o f contro l l ing traditional patterns of nat ive behavior .
Like the Germans and mi ss ionaries before them , the nat ives were prohibited from buying , making or accepting as a gi f t any beverage that had a n alcohol content over 3 percent . The use and posses s ion of firearms was also prohibited ( Purc e l l 1 9 6 7 : 2 2 3 - 2 2 4 ) .
Until 1 9 2 2 , the Japanese did l ittle to change the exi s ting structure o f government at the local level . The South Seas Bureau employed natives , who had held leadership pos itions during the German administration , as local government o f f ic ials in the role of chieftain and great chieftain . I n October 1 9 2 2 , the South Seas Bureau changed the system t o one in which there were four native of f icials , based upon ethnic dif ferences . The vil lages o f the Chamorros were headed by a general village c hieftain , kucho , who had control over a wide geographic area , and a vil l age chieftain , j oyaku , who control led only one village . The villages of the Caro l inians and Marshallese , referred to as kanakas by the Japanese , had roughly equivalent leaders cal led sos oncho and soncho , a general village chie ftain and village chie ftain . The b igge s t dif ference between the Chamorros and the kanakas was that the Chamorro chieftains were members of the community who had tradit ionally held power , while the kanaka chieftains may or may not have held power under traditional tribal patterns . Because the Japanese sys tem did not always support or complement the traditional systems o f the vil l ages , a distinction between the traditional vil lage chieftain and government o f f ic e chieftains quickly developed . Further , the Japanese would make changes without hes itation , thus undermining the respect due and authority of the appointed government chieftains ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 1 6 0 - 1 6 4 ) .
By 1 9 1 9 there were suffic ient Japanese children on s ome o f the i s lands to warrant the establishment o f s eparate schools . The s tandards for these schools , very d i f ferent than for those o f the natives , were des igned to conform to those in Japan . At the t ime the South Seas Bureau was established in 1 9 2 2 , the detached c las s room fac i l ities that were previou s ly establ ished became s c hoo ls in the ir own right .
Pol l taxes , initiated during the German period , cont inued without much change unti l 1 9 2 2 . After that date , depending upon the wealth o f a person , the tax could be as much as double the 10 yen normally due , and after 1 9 2 7 the maximum was raised to 4 0 yen . Payment in copra � instead o f cash , continued throughout the period . I n the Marshal l I s lands ,
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the pol l tax was not levied individually , rather the tax , in copra , was f ixed for each village and was based upon the extant market price ( Clyde 1 9 3 5 : 9 3 ) . The appointment of local o f f ic ials and the thoroughnes s with which the poll t axes were collected were an immediate manifestation of Japanese domination . Because the t axes were paid in copra , this directly af fected the l ivel ihood o f the i s landers . Coconuts were a food staple as wel l as a form o f currency and any increases or changes in the system had wide-ranging e f fects .
In the area o f land ownership , the Japanese made s igni ficant c hanges . Only those lands to which the German government held formal title were trans ferred to the Japanese by the mandate . However , " the Japanese government started from the princ iple that the land which was trans ferred to Japan in its c apac ity of mandatory was land which ipso facto belongs to the s tate by virtue of the princ iple that a l l real property without owner belongs to a state " ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 1 7 2 ) . The Japanese immediately encountered dif f iculties in implementing this philosophy bec ause native land ownership was not c learly def ined . Records were either incomplete or mis s ing , land was owned on both an individual and communal bas is , and ownership was based upon oral history or tribal custom . Under the Japanese system , all lands were divided into s tate or private domain , although private persons or corporations could obtain permis s ion to exploit state l ands . Because l and ownership was an area in which cons iderable trouble between the natives and Japanese could occur , i f not handled c arefu l ly , the Japanese moved slowly , but del iberately .
In 1 9 1 6 a l l land transactions were frozen and only government o f f ic ials were permitted to concl ude any agreements with natives . From 1 9 2 3 through 1 9 3 2 , a thorough survey of government-held lands was conducted in the i s lands . Fol lowing that , a survey of all privately held lands was c omp leted . By March 1 9 3 2 , the is lands of Saipan , Rota , Koror , Mal akal , Arakabesan , Babel thuap , Ponape and Yap had been surveyed , a total o f 2 2 0 , 0 5 2 acres . Native land ownership amounted to only 6 0 , 0 7 0 acres on those is lands whil e Japan determined that it held title to 1 5 6 , 1 2 8 acres , the remainder being in nonnative private hands . The area surveyed represented approximately 4 1 percent o f the total surface area of the mandated is lands . The government also c laimed ownership of nearly all of Jaluit , Peleliu and Fais , which it had purchased from the Germans for their phosphate mines . The discrepancy between Japanes e-owned and native-owned lands was explained by a contemporary Japanese researcher who stated that
. . . probably the l and that is entered as government land c an be understood to
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inc lude the ma j ority o f land which traditional ly was owned on a cooperative basis by the whole vil lage ( Yanihara 1 9 3 5 : 2 6 7 in Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 1 7 4 ) .
Once land ownership had been determined , the South Seas Bureau pursued an aggre s s ive policy of leas ing l and to private interests with the understanding that the land would be used in keeping with the overall economic pol ic ies o f the Japanese government . Most of the land was leased to only two companies , the Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha , the South Sea I s l and Company , and the Nanyo Boeki Kaisha , the South Sea Trading Company . According to Yanihara , the land leased to these two companies amounted to j ust under one-third of the arable l and in the islands ( in Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 1 7 5 ) .
When Matsue Haru j i c ame to Sa ipan in 1 9 2 0 , he was interes ted in sugar cane . After making an extens ive survey o f the island , he made the dec i s io n to attempt cultivation . He received permiss ion to cultivate all government land rent-free . With this grant in hand , he formed the South Sea I s land Company and proceeded to hire workers from Okinawa . Within a short t ime , Haru j i developed sugar c ane f ields , sugar mil l s , railways , and distil leries on Saipan , Tinian and Rota . Through his e f forts a " . . . s ingle success ful industry in the Marianas [ bec ame ] the bas i s for the economic development of the Japanes e Mandated Terri tory as a whole " ( Peattie 1 9 8 8 : 1 3 0 ) .
By 1 9 3 2 , 1 8 percent o f the arable l and was being used for cultivation of foodstuf f s and sugar , whi le 4 1 percent of the arable land was in coconut trees . Although sugar cane grew to be a maj or crop in the Northern Mariana I s lands , very few natives were involved in the sugar industry as either tenant farmers or l aborers ; the f ac il ities were , for the most part , staf fed by Japanese immigrant workers ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 1 8 2 ) .
The South Sea I s land Company was also involved in the production o f alcohol and molasses on Saipan , Tinian and Rota ; s tarch on Palau and Ponape ; and bonito process ing on Saipan , Palau and Ponape ( Purcell 1 9 6 7 : 1 8 7 ) .
Phosphate was discovered on Rota in 1 9 3 0 . An elevated conveyor was built on the s abana to haul the phosphate down the hill to the proces s ing plant where it was loaded into ships moored in Sas anhaya Bay for del ivery to Japan . The operation on Rota j oined other success ful Japanese-owned plants on Angaur and Pelel iu , in Palau , and on Fais in the Western Carol ine I s lands .
Unlike the sugar ref ining and other commercial pursuits o f the Japanese , the mining and handl ing o f phosphate ore did
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not require a skil led labor force . As a result , a large e number of native laborers were employed . The natives were brought from Yap and Palau until 1 9 2 3 , when the populations of those islands began to dec line ; the Japanese then turned to Truk and the Mortlock I s lands . The workers were s upposed to be recruited on a "vo lunteer " bas is , although when the number of volunteers was insuffic ient , natives convicted of crimes could be sent to work o f f their penalties . The Chamorros were treated better than were their Caro l inian counterparts , but all were conscripts , and working in the mines was compulsory . Nat ives from Yap were required to work from 4 months to 1 year , while Trukese and Mortl ockese had to remain 4 to 6 months . In all cases , Japanese workers at the mines were employed in supervisory or machine-operating pos itions , while the Chamorros and Carol inians were unskil led laborers ( Purcell 19 6 7 : 1 9 2 , 1 9 5 ) .
Other commerc ial enterprises were also present in the i s l ands during this period . The South Sea Trading Company ' s ships ran scheduled trips between the i s l ands and Japan , and by 1 9 3 3 the company had a network o f 3 2 retail stores in the i s l ands and a monopoly on the transport o f freight . Unl ike the South Sea I s land Company that rel ied on nonnative l abor , with the exception o f phosphorous m�n�ng , the South Sea Trading Company depended heavily upon the native population for its work force . Natives were employed on the docks to A handle baggage and c argo s and as l aborers on the copra � plantations held by the c ompany . Gradually , however , they were replaced by Japanes e workers who were a readily avai lable source of dependable , cheap l abor .
I n addition to South Sea Trading Company and the South Sea I s l and Company , there were a number o f smal ler reta i l trade companies working in the region . According to the South Seas Bureau , by the end of December 1 9 3 2 there were 3 1 other f irms handl ing retail trade and c opra ( Purcel l 1 9 6 7 : 1 9 9 ) .
Fishing was the largest industry in the Western C aroline I s l ands . Despite the natives ' acknowledged pro ficiency , fishing was almo s t entirely in Japanese hands . Koror was the main fishing center , but there were also smal ler locales in Saipan , Truk , Ponape and the Marshal l I s lands . I n the 1 9 30s Japanese ships f ished as far away as the Dutch East I ndies , and the f leet numbered more than 3 5 0 . Commercial fishing in the mandated territories resulted in annual c atches o f from 1 5 , 0 0 0 to 3 8 , 0 0 0 tons o f bonito , plus quantities o f tuna , trepang and trochus . Natives were permitted to col lect trepang and shel l , but a l l deep-sea fishing was done by the Japanese ( Ol iver 1 9 5 1 : 3 5 7 ) .
Throughout the Japanese period there was a comprehens ive program to devel op agriculture , industry and commerce in the tt
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i s l ands through a system o f government subs idies . Both natives and Japanese were el igible for agricultural a s s istance if they would agree to devote their e f forts to the cultivation and production of foodstuf fs . Toward these ends , the government actively encouraged immigration from Japan and guaranteed the immigrant arable land . Between October 1 9 2 4 and June 1 9 2 7 , three s ites on Babelthuap tota l l ing 2 , 5 9 3 acres were set aside for Japanese immigrant farmers . I n 1 9 2 7 a site of 1 , 9 6 3 acres on Ponape was selected . The government also provided seeds and equipment to farmers scattered throughout the is lands ( Purc e l l 1 9 6 7 : 2 0 2 ) . Although natives were , on the surfac e , able to receive government subs idies and even vocational training in agriculture , the number of individual s who received either was no more than a few hundred in any one year from 1 9 2 2 to 1 9 3 1 ( Purcel l 1 9 6 7 : 2 3 3 ) .
The South Sea I s land Company , the South Sea Trading Company , and the Japan Mail Steamship Company , served the mandated islands throughout the Japanese administration . The Japan Mail Steamship Company ' s Western Line increased its number o f voyages from 2 9 i n 1 9 3 7 to 3 6 i n 1 9 3 8 . By 1 9 4 1 , the Nanyo ( south sea ) was a tourist des tination for Japanese vis itors travelling in ves sels such as PALAU MARU .
The Japanese made an e f fort , at least until 1 9 3 2 , to administer the i s lands in accordance with the League o f Nations mandate ; however , i t was done at minimal expense and for the maximum bene f it of the Empire .
Japanese Mil itary Act ivity2
There is no question that the mandated islands were being developed by the Japanese as advanced naval fac i l ities , fighter and bomber long-range patrol bases , and as submarine bases during the interwar years . However , despite extens ive e f forts from 1 9 3 1- 1 9 4 1 to establish interlocking air bases and to provide suitable naval harbors and intermediate repair fac il ities , these areas were never fully developed into f irst-class fac i l it ies that were wel l-protected from s ea and air assault .
Edwin Layton , then I ntelligence Chie f for Adm . Husband E . Kimmel , said in May 1 9 4 1 that he had prepared
2The fol lowing discuss ion on Japanese mi litary shipping and aircraft activity during the interwar years was prepared by Don Boyer .
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. . . detailed charts o f the larger mid-Pac ific atolls where [ he ] bel ieved that Japan had il legal ly established mil itary installations . The evidence had been provided from monitoring radio traf fic , careful submarine surve i l lance , and occasional help from Pan American Airways . . . ( Layton 1 9 8 0 : 1 1 2 ) .
The evidence Layton gathered indicated seaplane and submarine bases at Kwa j alein and Jaluit , l arge radio transmitting towers on Ponape , airstrips capable o f handling long-range bombers on Saipan , and development o f a deep-water anchorage at Truk , among other items . The existence o f military development in the mandated islands was cons idered in United S tates Pac i f ic naval strategy up to the outbreak o f the war , particularly because several is lands could obvious ly be used as staging areas for a Japanese attack on Hawaii . As it turned out , only submarines ass igned to the Pearl Harbor operation sortied from the i s lands ; the c arrier s trike on Hawai i c ame from the Kuviles .
As Layton ' s report reveals , the U . S . Navy was conducting l ong-range submarine intel l igence miss ions throughout the Mariana , Marshall and Carol ine i s l ands . The patrol reports for these miss ions , to date unpublished , might prove to be important source documents on mil itary development in the area . Originally , the reports must have been highly c las s i f ied because they were evidence o f United States penetration into a restricted area , but they should now be avai l able in the submarine historic al archives .
The Imperial Japanese Navy , unl ike its American counterpart , conducted very real istic training exerc ises in a l l weather conditions in all Pac i f ic areas . This pol icy risked and damaged ships and aircraft , and kil led men , but paid o f f with a high degree of readines s and skil l in wartime maneuvers , a fac t that would be impressed upon the U . S . Navy with great e f fect . The mandated islands s aw continual movement of Imperial Navy ships on training exerc ises and other maneuvers in the interwar years' . Admiral Layton ' s book reveals that a cons iderable amount o f this nava l ac tivity was at least partially monitored through u . s . decryption of Japan ' s naval codes and other radio intell igence techniques . For example , in l ate May 1 9 4 1 , it was known that two Japanese aircraft c arriers had attempted to strike and invade the Marshall I s lands . Kwa j alein ' s submarines and l and-based aircraft played the de fens ive role . Upon conc lus ion o f the exercises , the c arriers vis ited Wot j e , Kwa j alein and Jaluit , home bases of the defending forces , before returning to Japanese waters .
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e l
Permanently assembled naval organi zations , such as the South Seas Force , were s tationed in the is lands as war became more and more l ikely . The South Seas Force , the operational t itle o f the Japanes e 4 th Fleet , was respons ible for patro l l ing the Marshall is l ands . Air defense for the region c ame from the 2 4th Air Flot i l la , which was also based at Truk and l ater Rabaul . Their operations were described at the beginning o f the war :
. . . Flying boats and some land attack planes conducted daily long-range searches around maj or is land bases to o f fer early warning of approaching American warships . The Japanese planned to stage in squadrons o f land attack planes from widely scattered bases in order to concentrate them at the point o f danger , a procedure that would prove ine f fective in meeting swift American c arrier raids ( Lundstrom 1 9 8 4 : 7 6 ) .
Fl ight training exerc ises o f this type were undoubtedly conducted in the Central Pac i f ic as the island bases were developed . I nformation on operational losses is l ac king in the historical records avai l able to date , and it is pos s ible that aircra ft los ses predating the war could be found in the region . The historical record indicates some smal ler s hips were lost in the Central Pac i fic , primarily by grounding or foundering .
Japanese destroyers and anti submarine forces were also a continual presence in the area . Destroyers were wel l - suited to the role of " naval presence " because of their relative economy o f operation . Des troyer and submarine squadrons operated from a l l the maj or bases , and Imperial Navy l i ght cruisers o ften served as f lags hips o f these squadrons . Larger warships , such as battleships and cruisers , woul d have operated on their own training and gunnery exercises ; however , l ittle information i s readily avail able regarding the special operations of these big , fast warships . It is unl ikely any l arge warships were permanently stationed in the Mariana , Marsha l l and Caro l ine islands during the interwar years , their presence being reserved for spec i f ic operations only . As the war in China heated up from 1 9 3 1 on , the ma j or warships , particularly aircraft carriers , supported this e f fort .
In most areas o f the Pac i f ic theater , informat ion on the operat ion of the Japanes e merchant marine is almost nonexistent . American sources indicate that U . S . rapid tra ffic analys is provided a partial picture of the movement o f naval and merchant tra f f ic during a portion o f the
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interwar years . However , the decryptions o f Japanese rapid tl tra f f ic have in genera l been researched only for other purposes , such as analyz ing the Pearl Harbor attack or submarine his tories rather than reconstruct ing an operational history of the Japanese merchant marine . I f such information exists in Japanese sources , it has not yet emerged . An operational history o f the merchant marine o f Japan i s long overdue , cons idering the enormous losses o f s hips and men during the war , but any such task would require thorough research of American intell igence records and Japanese assistance .
A good deal o f information on the ships o f the Imperial merchant marine was gathered by U . S . Naval inte l l igence ; most of these ship data--size , speed , shape , etc . - -are use ful in wartime but are not particularly revealing about the operation o f the merchant marine and how it was control led , espec ially during the interwar years .
I nte l l igence data on the Japanese merchant marine are found in the wel l -known Office of Naval I ntelligence publ ic ation ONI - 2 0 8-J and inc lude photographs o f many ships that were operational in the interwar years . Clearly , there was a cons iderable ef fort made to collect these photos , which indicates that the u . s . Navy was wel l aware of the potential of Japan ' s merchant marine to serve in war . I f intel l igence � 1 e f forts were made to construct an " operational guidebook " on W these merchant vessels , re ference to it has not shown up in the general war histories or those directed to the Pac i fic submarine c ampaign , the mos t logica l area for this historical information to surface .
Despite lack o f information on interwar and later , wartime , merchant ves sel movements , much c an be surmised from the fact that the islands required regu lar resupply from the homeland . Many of the c ivil steamship l ines had s tandard routes through the mandated is lands to c arry people and supplies to the major commerce centers ; these were primarily pas senger-cargo ships , although there were some cargo ves sels . Passenger l iners carrying foreign tra f f ic were not routed through this area nor , as far as is known , were foreign freighters working under c ontract for the Japanese . I n 1 9 3 7 , for example , 4 6 percent o f Japanese goods " . . . had been transported by ves sels under foreign f l ags , princ ipally British, American , German , and Norwegian " ( Roscoe 1 9 4 9 : 3 0 8 ; Lundstrom 1 9 8 4 : 7 6 ) .
The Japanese air bases and naval harbor fac i l ities required regular merchant tra f f ic for supplies and placed heavy demands on naval auxi liaries for f leet repair and maintenance . Naval and merchant tankers were required to provide fuel for ships , aircraft , and vehic les . Tenders were 4lt,
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required to maintain submarines , destroyers , and patrol c raft . Several large naval auxil iary tenders were always deployed with the 6 th ( submarine ) Fleet when the units o f the 4 th ( South Seas ) Fleet deployed throughout the i s l ands . Their maj or anchorages were usually Saipan , Palau , Kwa j alein and Truk . Seaplane c arriers also operated in the area , both augmenting existing long-range patrol s and engaging i n training exerc ises .
Harbor fac il ities required cons iderable ship-borne support , and each o f the developed harbors would have supported antisubmarine patrol craft , gunboats , guard ships , harbor vesse l s , small s upply and landing craft , tugboats , barges ( for fuel , food and was te ) , s eaplanes and net and buoy tenders . The shore-based s upport fac i l ities were needed to maintain such a fleet of harbor ves sels . Minelayers and mine sweepers , a l l naval vesse l s , would also have been c losely associated with maj or naval fac i l ities throughout the interwar years . Losses o f any o f the smal ler craft in the area are not s pec i f ically documented , but cons idering the nature o f the sea and the nature o f men , losses mus t be presumed .
Traf fic in the islands or between Japan and the i s l ands was of a more s inister nature than naval ships on prec i s e training maneuvers . The long-range reconnaissance patrols o f U . S . submarines were touched o n briefly ; these were exceptionally realistic " maneuvers " because c aution would have been required to avoid detection . Had any of these submarines been detected by the Japanese , it could have c aused an international inc ident .
It is wel l documented that , as the war approached , many Japanese merchant vessels carried Japanes e o f f ic ers in mufti , doing a l ittle spying on American fac i l ities . Although not spec i f ical ly documented in historic record , some of the interwar photographs o f Japanese merchant and naval ves s e l s hint that the United States was not above taking a photograph through a porthole , just as the British did of their German counterparts . Spying is an accepted part of inte l l igenc e , and s everal spec i fic Japanese intel l igence operations originated in the is lands . In 1 9 2 6 , for example , the l ight cruiser , YUBARI , and the naval tanker , SATA , l ater sunk i n Palau , shadowed the annual U . S . Naval maneuvers in the Paci fic and gathered electronic intelligence ; the tanker , ERIMO , did the s ame thing in 1 9 3 2 .
The peacetime operations o f the Imperial Navy , its air arm , and the merchant marine , are not wel l documented in the historical record but can still be inferred to be the dominant economic and social influence in the mandated is lands between the wars . As World War I I drew c loser , more
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and more land- and sea-based military material and personnel tt began to enter the area in preparation for the expected expans ion acros s the Pac i f ic . By December 1 9 4 1 , these i s l ands were fully prepared for their role in the opening of the Pac i f ic war .
Gilbert I s lands
British Rule , 19 1 8 - 1 9 4 1 --Steam Trade , Pas senger and Fre ight Ships , Colonial Government Ships and Gilbertese B aurua
Following the end of World War I , the future of Ocean I s land and its relationship with the rest o f the Gilbert is lands and Nauru became the sub j ec t of heated debate . Nauru , even richer in phosphate than Ocean I s land , was seized by Austral ian troops at the outbreak o f the war in 1 9 1 4 . Although Australia was unwilling to rel inquish the island , and the United Kingdom and New Zealand could not come to agreement about administrative control , all agreed that the industry and its pro f its should come under government management . Accordingly , the Pac i f ic Phosphate Company was bought out , and under a tripartite agreement e f fect ive June 1 9 2 0 , the United Kingdom , Australia and New Zea land assumed direct ion through the British Phosphate Commiss ioners ( BPC ) .
Under the new organization , the BPC was able to increase e f f ic iency through mechaniz at ion and to reduce the price of phosphate > by reduc ing the pro fit margin . The increas ing ava i l abil ity o f phosphate directly benef itted the agriculturalists in Austral ia and New Zealand . I n the second year o f the BPC ' s operation o f the mines , they " . . . further reduced its price to farmers , covered all costs , establ ished reserve funds against every pos s ible contingency , s howed a s urplus in excess o f two hundred thous and pounds and still complained ( the BPC ] was over- taxed " ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 1 6 ) . The BPC felt that they s hould only be required to bear the costs assoc iated with the administration of Ocean I s land and not the rest o f the Gi lberts and E l l ices . The government pos ition , adopted in 1 9 2 0 , maintained that " Ocean I s land was but one portion o f a fairly extens ive l ittle Colony and could legitimately be taxed for the bene f it o f the whole " ( Fell in Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 1 7 ) .
Despite apparently suffic ient revenues , the administrative s ta f f o f the islands was cut during 1 9 2 3 - 1 9 2 4 and the colony ' s ship , TOKELAU , was sold . In addition to l imiting communicat ion between Ocean I s land and the rest o f the colony , district off icers could only vis it the more remote i s l ands by obtaining pas sage on s hips belonging to the few
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trading c ompanies in the region or on one o f the BPC freighters .
The BPC was extremely influential with the colonial government and did not hes itate to use its power to seek tax rel ie f in 1 9 3 2 in exchange for an agreement to meet any short fal l between government revenues and expenditures . As a result o f this agreement , the BPC repl aced the Gilbertese laborers with Chinese , further reducing the cash income o f the is landers , which was already depres sed by low c opra prices ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 ) .
By 1 9 3 7 , the s ituation was such that the new High Commis s ioner , S ir Arthur Richards , expressed deep concern regarding the extent to which the government had l o s t control of the finances of the colony .
I may s ay at the outset that , so far as I can s ee , the agreement has not worked out
and I cannot avoid the conc lus ion that far too much deference has been accorded to the views of the Commis sioners in the matter o f Government expenditure . . . . the Commiss ioners assumed a right to critic ize every item o f expenditure , and , no doubt encouraged by the conc i l iatory attitude of the Administration , took ful l advantage o f the pos ition , extended their c ritic ism to all Government activities and instituted a c ampa ign of Government economy ( Richards in Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 12 2 ) .
Until the l ate 1 9 3 0 s , the colonial pol icy toward the islanders themselves was one o f paternal ism . The assumption was that the i s l ands would remain impoveri s hed , that development should be l imited , and education shoul d " have no greater purpose than to make its graduates better c it izens in a limited atol l environment " ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 2 5 ) .
Secure in their isolat ion and supported by the att itude o f the colonial government , the i s l and magistrates became even more authoritarian and attempted to regulate a l l aspects o f the dai ly l ives o f the i s landers . In the 1 9 2 0 s , prosecutions and convic.tions were widespread , and in any given year the equivalent of three-quarters of the adult popul ation were found gui l ty of some infringement , the vast ma j ority of which were minor and related to the c leanl iness , or l ac k thereof , o f houses and vil l ages ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 ) .
In 1 9 2 6 Arthur Grimble was appointed res ident commis s ioner . A protectionist and a f irm supporter o f colonia l pol icy ,
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Grimble wanted to prevent outs ide inf luences from corrupting tt the islands . The paternalistic attitude of the colonial government culminated with Grimbel developing a uni form law-code that was applied to all o f the Gilbert and E l l ice islands . Published in 1 9 3 0 , the Regulations for the Good Order and Cleanliness of the Gilbert and E l l ice I s lands inc luded such admonitions as the e l imination o f soliciting goods and services , the control of adoptions and parents ' duties towards their children . The c are o f the aged or adoptive parents , dogs , pigs and fowl were regulated . Celebratory feasts for marriages , births , betrothal s and puberty required permis s ion , and competitive feasts or publ ic feasts for vis itors were forbidden . Pub l ic danc ing was permitted only on certain days during spec i f ied hours . "All males attending dances were to c arry lamps ; children could not attend , shameful gestures and movements o f the body, magic ritual s , and unc lean games were prohibited " ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 2 7 ) .
Law-codes such as these were common in nineteenth-century Micronesia but had all but disappeared under colonial rule in the twentieth century . Even by contemporary standards , the regulations were cons idered to be " Spartan in character and draconic in their severity " but the high commiss ioner and his s ta f f o ffered l ittle more than token resi stance to Grimble ' s recommendations ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 2 8 ) . In spite o f their A obvious paternal ism and attempt at sweeping control o f the w is landers , the native governments were selective in their enforcement o f these laws .
They supervised communal works , inspected houses , and enforced the c urfew but where the l aw came into conf l ict with customary modes of behaviour still held in respect , no action would be taken . Despite the l aw , l i fe crises were s t i l l marked by feasting goods and services sol ic ited , and its doubt ful whether the inc idence of abortion was s ignif ic antly reduced . . . . o f fenders who had committed acts regarded as distinct ly antisocial - -for example , theft , i ncest or rape- were often punished by family or community action without reference to courts ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 12 9 ) .
Although there was a concerted e f fort on the part o f the colonial government to el iminate traditional authority , it was no more success ful than it had been with the legis lation . On Makin , Butaritari , Abaiang , Abemama , Kuria and Aranuka the high chie f s and the ir famil ies continued to wield cons iderable power , us ing their influence to undermine �
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e the native governments where pos s ible . "Even where chief s had long s ince abdicated in favor o f pastors , o r the old men had apparently surrendered their power there was a general adherence to a deeply-rooted body of custom upon which al ien l aws and re l igious beliefs had made only a s uperficial impact " ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 2 9 ) .
A fter 1 9 3 2 there was a move to dismantle the paternal istic legislation and administ rative control epitomi zed by Grimble . The change was lead by H . E . Maude , along with a new generation of district o f fi c ers , who worked toward developing more even-handed legislat ion that recognized traditional leaders and customary laws . As a result o f their e f forts , a new code was drawn up that recogni zed the d ivers ity o f customary law , although a l l the native governments were still bound to a general code t hat dealt with publ ic health and sa fety , communal works and freedom o f worship ( Macdonald 1 9 82 : 1 3 8 ) . These changes were supported in 1 9 3 7 by the newly arrived High Commiss ioner Sir Arthur Richards and l ater by his succes sor . They attempted to make changes in the overall administration of the colony , incl uding moving the headquarters from Ocean I s l and to the Gilberts , and improvement o f education and health services . Unfortunately , substantive changes would not take place until a f ter World War I I .
Miss ionary activity continued on all of the i s l ands . Butaritari and Abaiang , mos tly Protestant in the 1 8 9 0 s , were mostly Catholic by the 1 9 3 0 s . The shifting o f rel igious af filiations in the is lands occurred gradually and without fanfare . Further south t he denominations were general ly evenly balanced , the dec is ion to choose one over another based as much on res idence , kin rel ationship and pol itical loyalty a s the presence or absence of one miss ion or another . There was haras sment and bickering between groups and the " . . . adherents of each adopted their chosen cause with a fervour and intolerance that could be matched only by a minority o f the European mis s ionaries " ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 2 9 ) . However , overal l the inc idents were minor and mos tly o f a petty nature .
The miss ions continued to c arry the maj or respons ibil ity for education , and by the 1 9 2 0 s , both the Gilbertese and E l l ic e I s l anders were l iterate in e ither their own l anguage o r Samoan . Education was compul sory , although the s c hool s were only minimal ly supported by the colonial government unti l the early 1 9 2 0 s . In 1 9 2 2 , a government-built school was opened on Tarawa ; its aim was to improve the education o f the islanders and train them in Engl ish so that they could f i l l bas ic government pos itions .
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I n addition to legislative and educat ional changes , the 1 9 30s � s aw a move to help the islanders obtain greater returns from their l ands through the development o f cooperative trading soc ieties . The f irst cooperative s oc iety was established in the E l l ice I s lands in 1 9 2 6 ; as a result of its succe s s , the concept was immediately introduced in the Gilbert I s l ands . From the 1 8 7 0s , l ocal isl and leaders had been attempting to exert some control over the cost o f trade goods in exchange for their copra . The rapid dominance o f the l arge trading f irms quickly el iminated the independent trader and negated local e f forts to e f fect an equitable exchange rate . W ith the establishment o f the cooperative societies , the i s landers became direct ly involved in the import and export o f goods and copra . By the mid- 1 9 3 0 s , t here were 3 4 soc iet ies operating in the Gilberts . Mos t had fewer than 2 0 0 members each but , despite their l imited numbers and f l edgling bus ines s skil l s , the soc ieties were succes sful ( Macdonald 1 9 8 2 : 1 4 1 - 1 4 2 ) .
Only one documented , commerc ial s hip loss was discovered during the background research for the period 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 4 1 . It i s the British-owned fre ighter , OCEAN TRANSPORT . While waiting to be loaded with phosphate at Ocean I s l and , the ship was driven onto the ree f and wrecked on January 3 0 , 1 9 2 8 ( Sabatier 1 9 7 7 : 2 9 5 ; Hocking 1 9 6 9 : 5 2 0 ) . However , given the extens ive f ishing and interi s l and trade that occurred , there .. I mus t have been some losses o f Japanese or native boats . W Unfortunately , these losses c an only be surmised based upon the general act ivities t aking place during the interwar years ; no documentation has been located to date to identi fy any spec i f ic losses .
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CHAPTER VI . WORLD WAR I I
By Don Boyer
I ntroduction
The events o f World War I I in the Paci f ic had a profound impact on the people of Microne s ia . While under the control of the Japanese , the mandated islands experienced some economic growth . However , for many of the i s l anders Japanese mil itary rule o f ten resulted in harsh and cruel treatment ; the advent o f hostil ities did not make their l ives any eas ier . The islanders on occupied Guam felt the full brunt of Japanese domination because o f their close ties to and support o f the U . S . All the isl anders in Micronesia suf fered from s hortages of food and other necess it ies as the U . s . was increas ingly able to cut o f f resupply by merchant ships . U . S . bombing during aerial raids , preinvas ion salvos from ships and planes that were aimed at reduc ing Japanese defens ive s trength , and f inal ly the as saults by troops resulted in the wholesale destruction of support fac i l ities , villages and the i s l anders ' economic base . Family members were often separated or kil led , and their way of l ife was in chaos .
The war in the Pac i f ic i s now part of the history of Micronesia . The phys ical remains o f the war , the ships , planes , men and materiel are also now a part o f the archeology o f the is lands . I n order to fully understand the value of these remains , both in terms of past human suf fering and present historic s igni f ic ance , a discus s ion of the critical position occupied by Micronesia , both a s Japanese possess ions and American bases during World War I I , is neces s ary .
Particular attention is given to Japanese naval and merchant ship operations because Japanese ships operated in the Central Pac i f ic over a longer period of time than did American s hips , and these form the ma j ority of the wrecks still found in the area . During the course of the war , a few Americ an s hips were lost in the Central Pac i fic ; however , these losses are wel l documented . Many amphibious assault craft were also lost and most areas have remains o f these sma ll ves sels .
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For this overview , the Central Pac i fic area inc ludes those i s l ands now re ferred to as Micrones i a , more spec i f ic ally the Gi lbert , Marshall , Caroline and Mariana island groups .
By 1 9 1 8 the Japanese were already an i ndustrialist nation and had well -defined imperialistic tendenc ies . The acquisit ion o f island territories in the Pac i f ic was far from haphaz ard , rather it was part of an overal l plan to gain ascendancy , or at least avoid domination , in the F ar East . The advantages inherent in obtaining a string of is land bases , forming a neat wedge between U . S . Territories i n the Pac i f ic , was not lost on Imperial Japanese mil itary planners even i f the development o f aircraft had not yet progressed to the point where long-range air power was a s erious cons ideration in mil itary planning . The Japanese demonstrated that it was the geographic location of these i s l ands in the Pac i f ic that was o f paramount importance to any mil itary planning or pol it ical maneuvering by either s ide . The i s l ands were never important to the Japanese for their resources , economy or abi l ity to absorb a burgeoning populat ion . Because of this , the Japanese mil itary , particularly the Navy , usually had far more influence in this area than did the c ivil Japanese government in the period between Worl d Wars I and I I .
Between the wars , Japan strictly exc luded foreigners and A foreign merchant tra f f ic from its i s l and areas . Historical � information on interwar development o f air and naval mi l itary bases , aircraft f l ight operations , Imperial Japanese Navy exerc ises , merchant traf fic , and harbor development i s a lmost nonexistent in publ ished U . S . sources . Knowledge of merchant ship operations o f this era is particularly l acking . What is known is that military development certainly did occur, forming interl inked air bases as wel l as forward naval operating bases for both s ubmarine and surface forces . Any war planning on the part o f U . S . Naval forces in the 1 9 30s had to inc lude cons ideration of the air and naval c apabil ities o f such places as Tru k , Kwa j alein and Palau, despite publ ic Japanese assurances t hat these areas were not being made mi l itary-capable .
1For the purposes o f discuss ing the events in this chapter , the island and regional use during that era are used ; these names most commonly used in historic al records .
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o f World War I I names i n common
are also the
Data on Japan ' s wartime construction o f merchant vessels are minimal . When the war started , photography of Japanes e merchantmen ceased , and photo comparison of war-built ships was seldom , if ever , pos s ible . Many hundreds of these standard merchant s hips were , of course , lost during the war in the Central Pac i fic . These are only partially covered in the Joint-Army-Navy Asses sment Committee ( JANAC ) Report , completed in 1 9 4 7 , listing Japanese warship and merchant losses to all causes in World War I I . The ships in JANAC are not a l l inc luded in the tables f ound in Chapter VI I I because o f the dif f iculty o f tracking down hundreds o f latitudes and longitudes that were not further identi f ied a s " near Truk " or " 1 0 0 miles SW o f Ponape " i n the source documents .
When World War I I began , the Central Pac i fic is lands served as staging areas f or the early expans ion of the Japanes e Empire t o the south and as ma j or forward naval operating bases , roles they would per form again l ater during the long , costly struggle for New Guinea and the Solomons . Submarine operations and long-range air patrol s were a continual feature of mil itary operations in the mandated territory . Army troops , naval landing forces and their fort i f ic ations increased steadily a s the war progressed and occupied most o f the i s lands . Yet , when these i s l ands came under direct military assault the Central Pac i f ic was lost in one year , from November 1 9 4 3 when Tarawa was invaded to November 1 9 4 4 when organized res is tance o n Peleliu ended .
From the Japanese s tandpoint , the commitment o f cons iderable resources and military forces to the " China I nc ident " f rom 1 9 3 1 - 1 9 4 5 , a course of action forced by the Imperial Japanes e Army and its political s upporters , led to some military neglect of other parts o f the Empire , particularly the Central Pac i fic i s l ands . These i s l ands were never prepared for mil itary operations to the degree suspected or predicted by U . S . intelligence sources . The i s l ands certainly never received the mil itary attention they s hould have , had the Imperial Navy expected any serious as sault . The Japanes e government ' s focus o n China led t o many overs ights when the pos s ibil ity of a Pac i fic war with one or more of the A l l ied powers , particu larly the United State s , became more o f a reality . These overs ights , which contributed much to the rapid loss of the Central Pac if ic i s l and bases , compounded the inherent di f f iculty of maintaining l arge dispersed forces in areas o f very l ittle land .
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Far more influential than Japanese preparednes s for war was 4t the evolution in the American Navy o f an e f fective s ubmarine force and a Fast Carrier Task Forc e . No Japanese , or for that matter American , naval planner o f that era could have pos s ibily predicted that the United States could deploy a 1 2 -carrier , B -battleship task force support ing an amphibious group capable of landing over 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 troops against a s ingle target in June 1 9 4 4 , while at the same time supporting an even l arger invas ion hal f a world away at Normandy . The American materiel superiority in weapons and numbers is ref lected in the high percentage o f Japanese ships found throughout the area . The enormous l y e f fective submarine war ( once torpedo defects were corrected ) contributed to the
maj ority o f Japanese merchant ship los ses in a l l areas ; this is also reflected in the known shipping losses in the Central Pac i f ic when deep waters outside island groups are c ons idered .
Neither the number o f s hipwrecks nor their home country are indicative o f the full valor and sacri fice experienced on both s ides in defending or assau l ting the is lands o f the Central Pac i fic . No Japanese-held is land directly assaulted in the Pac i f ic war ever s urrendered , no white flag was ever raised from the one remaining Japanese command bunker , no ceremonial sword pass ed to the victor ' s hand . On the other s ide , no U . S . amphibious as s ault on a Pac i f ic I s land was ever � unsucces s fu l , no as sault waves thrown back into the sea . W These are the facts that s hould be remembered , and these are the facts to which the Pac i f ic shipwrecks o f World war I I bear mute tes timony .
Historical Research
While conducting the historical research neces sary for this c hapter , it became apparent that the published records used to document the losses o f Japanese shipping and aircraft do not agree . Not only do various Japanese and American accounts di f fer , but American records also exhibit discrepanc ies . This problem is wel l -known to historical researchers ; however ,· this is les s known to the general public and consequently requires extreme caution when conduct ing research on Japanese shipwrecks , particularly merchant vessels . Comprehens ive research would require acces s to both Japanese and American source documents and c ros s -comparison of all published records and on-s ite i nvestigations .
No attempt is made in this chapter to reconc ile the discrepancie� found , for example , between the Joint Army-Navy Asses sment Committee ( JANAC ) Report of 1 9 4 7 , Warships o f the e
2 0 0
Imperial Japanese Nayy 1 8 6 9 - 1 9 4 5 , or the recently published U . S . Submarine Attacks During World War I I . That type of detailed research is outs ide the scope and purpose o f this chapter , which lists only the most wel l-documented Japanese and American losses of shipping , or provides representative examples of the types o f engagements and s inkings that occurred during a part icular Central Pac i f ic wartime operation . This is also true for Japanese aircraft losses ; cons iderable additional research would be necessary to identi fy any particular a ircraft , its s quadron , pilot , and base o f operations .
The discrepanc ies , and the consequent need for detailed research in both Japanese and American historical s ources to resolve them , have s igni f icant consequences for those who must manage the resource base . World war I I remains in the Central Pac i f ic are a dwindl ing resource , gradual ly decompos ing as a result o f the e f fects of the sea , and increas ingly vulnerable to exploitation by technically sophistic ated diving explorations and by careles s sport divers seeking souvenirs . Protection , preservation and interpretation of the art ifacts o f World War I I assume greater importance when a dwindl ing resource base is cons idered in conj unction with the many gaps in the historical record that can only be c losed through more comprehens ive archeological and historical analys is .
War With Japan Begins
The simultaneous attack by Japanese Naval and Army forces in the Dutch East Indies ( now I ndones ia ) , Southeast · Asia and Pearl Harbor left the Imperial Navy quickly dominant in the Pacific ( re fer to Figure 2 . 1 ) . Although the attack on Pearl Harbor was designed as a kill ing blow against the Pac i f ic Fleet , it failed to des troy Pearl Harbor a s a f leet fac ility , ultimately a dis as trous overs ight . It further failed to c atch the American aircraft c arriers in the harbo r , although the carrier ENTERPRISE was les s than eight hours steaming distance f rom Pearl and some of its a ircraft returning to Ford I s l and the morning o f December 7 were shot down .
The Japanese ons laught in As ia was rapid , ruthless and e f fective , de feating al l engaged forces in a l l areas . This success engendered an att itude of defeatism , fear and helples s ness in the Allied forces II at the front , II who had l ittle with which to de fend themselves . The Briti s h , American and Dutch forces were quickly routed a s the Japanese overran the oil and resource-rich lands . These resources were needed by Japan in order to function as a nation in the
2 0 1
face o f the u . s . -imposed embargoes on strategic materials , a 4t u . s . reaction to Japan ' s continued involvement in the war with China . Whi le bitter battles o f retreat and frustration were played out far to the west by the u . s . As iatic Fleet and
' their overwhelmingly superior Japanese opponents , the Central Pac i f ic remained a relative backwater wel l into 1 9 4 2 .
Japanese submarines scheduled to participate in the Pearl Harbor operation staged through S aipan and Kwa j alein and Japanese forces ( inc luding one l ight carrier ) assembled at Palau for the landing at Davao and the Southern Phi l ippines . Additiona l ly , most of the naval forces for the Wake I s l and assault twice sortied from Kwa j alein , the Marines at Wake having stood them off the first time . Other war operations in the Central Pac ific are not wel l documented in the English language histories o f this period o f the war . It is known that many naval forces staged through the area en route to other areas to the south and west and represented an increase in warship tra f f ic over the prewar average . Steadily increas ing merchant tra f f ic in the area l ikely continued in the prewar pattern with the exception o f mil itary convoys en route to other destinations . Many merchant ships still proceeded independently and unarmed despite the threat of submarine attac k .
Japanese forces quickly moved into the Gilbert I s lands once A the war began and established bases at Makin and Tarawa . W' Seapl ane tenders and small naval forces also operated continuous ly in the area ; they supported various naval miss ions and established control over outlying islands . Long-range patrols by seaplanes and land-based attac k planes were a continual feature of Japanese operations , as were submarine patrols .
Because the Japanese had complete control over the Central Pac i f ic , with the exception o f u . s . submarine penetration , it is probable that Japanese air and ship operations can only be genera l ly summari zed . Although U . S . intelligence from radio traf fic in the area is incomplete and fragmentary , the decrypts and tra f f ic analys is might shed cons iderable l ight on the s ub j ect . This is particularly true for merchant ves s e l s whose radio security was far eas ier to deal with than most naval traf fic . The degree of u . s . penetration of the Japanese JN- 2 5 naval code at this t ime is not wel l documented in any source , but this decrypted i nformation would be useful in developing a picture o f naval operations . Unfortunately , although there is an enormous c o l lection of intel l igence decryptions , usually re ferred to as " Ultra " intell igence in U . S . records , research to date in this col lection has been directed at other aspects of the P ac i f ic War . As far as is known , no e f fort has been made in wartime historical research to detail the operations o f the Japanese merchant f leet 4lt
2 0 2
before and during the war , nor to depict naval or merchant operations in the Central Pac if ic early in the war .
While the Japanese consol idated their gains in the southern areas and continued the long struggle for the Phil ippines , the Central Pac i f ic is lands served primari ly as stag ing bases for operations elsewhere . Japanese operations in the Philippines did not go as planned ; the tenac ious defense o f the i s lands delayed the Japanese far longer than antic ipated . As a result , Palau became increas ingly important as a staging base for the conquest o f the southern Philippines , rece1v1ng planes , ships , men and equipment from Saipan and the home is lands until the fall o f Corregidor .
During the first months o f the war , the only U . S . naval forces capable of operat ing in the Central Pac i f ic were submarines ; however , their initial impact in the area was minimal . The operations in the Phil ippines , o f f Japan , in Southeast As ia , and the Dutch East I ndies occupied the few submarines available . The s ubmarine bases in Australia and Pearl Harbor were a long way from the Central Pac i fic , which l imited their range and time on station . Coupled with insuf fic ient numbers was the more serious is sue a ffecting early U . S . submarine performance in all areas o f the Pac if ic War--a horribly defective torpedo . De fects in the torpedo resulted in many mis ses and premature firings . To make matters worse , submarine commanders who reported such problems were not heeded . The Navy ' s obdurate Bureau o f Ordnance even refused to test the torpedoes at first . I n desperation , the Commander o f Submarines i n the Pac i f ic Fleet f inally conducted his own tests in 1 9 4 3 and initiated f ield correct ions . He even went so far as to use c arefully s aniti zed Ultra intel l igence information to convince doubters in the bureaucracy . The torpedo problems were not fully solved until some 2 1 months a fter the war started . Success ful submarine attacks increased steadily from this point on, as c an be seen by re ference to Figure 6 . 1 .
Submarines were not always e f fectively employed in the early s tages of the war because they did not have the advantages o f modern e lectronic s , espec i a l ly radar . They also suffered from too many overly cautious commanders , an outgrowth o f a cautious and unreal istic peacetime training program that contrasted sharply with the training conducted by the Imperial Japanese Navy . Because of these factors , the submarine war in the Central Pac i f ic was initial ly l imited in e f fect , sinking few ships , and the submarine f leet was sometimes poorly used and directed by the commanding admirals . This s ituation would gradual ly change and the ma j ority of Japanese ship losses in the Central Pac i f ic would eventually be credited to s ubmarines . Fortunately for the United States , the employment of Japanese fleet s ubmarines
2 0 3
(TONS X 1 000) 2 0 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 20 1 40
YEAR MONTH
1 9 4 1 DECEMBER 31 ,893 1 94 2 JANUARY , .•.j 28,351
FEBRUARY ...
15,975 I t-:M,:A:;R;,.C;.:,H__;.;. ___ .,_-'-11-'-"' . . T-".-',.• 26,183 t-
Mi;A';:yifR;.;IL;_ ___ --f.,.c.'-f__;.;.'f'--''.Lj'j 26::.,,88"i6r-cfi"T> +"T'f'-c:-has,tto JUNE <.-:::· 20,021 I JULY ['G l'· ':': >> 39•356
MARCH APRIL : . MAY JUNE . ,.. 1 '.'. ' ' > :
.. . .
. ..... ...
JULY I ··"'· . '···· . ..... . . 82,784 AUGUST . . . ':' ''·. 80,799 SEPTEMBER
, . · . .. . · , ,,, ... ..
109,447 105,346
I 1 22['9 10 1 ,581
J 1 1 9,823 I
, :. 1 2 1 ,531
1 60 1 8 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 2 4 0 2 60
·. · 167,002
JULY • · ' , I •. . . . ·
I >· · >" 2 1 8,907 �A�U�G�U�S�T�:;;:::=:::t=+·
·
· '··=t=t·1·.'d · •. h>=f:ittt= .• ttt:::1=•d' hi ·�:::4 :. · 1== •·• · ttf:;j::t+Jb=::t=t+l�··�· 'L···t··�··• :f1q�jf:z$;Ljp 245,384 SEPTEMBER . £ · ;> �> ,, ; · I · . ·,
'; . ,;: >c. 18 1,363
OCTOBER > · l·'c � '• · : ' .. : ,, .. ,, ' •: ·, .: NOVEMBER ·,i r·,•;,o; . ·:p . ·• ·,,: :· .. :·:- : .... :,. 220,478 DECEMBER ' ' '' ·, /.; . •· ... ,. 103,836
1 94
s ..._,:�::;�:;:�:;,�:;::�:.:.:_RY
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70,727 l I •• ,. 796
APRIL ·.:,-� ::i 60,876 MAY 32,394
UNREVISED FIGURES FROM USSBSIJANAC, 1 947
6 . 1 . 1 9 4 5
Fig . Augus t
Japanese merchant losses from a l l ied submarines .
( 5 0 0 tons only )
2 8 0 300 320 3 4 0 360 3 8 0
( 1 , 1 5 2 1 / 2 VESSELS FOR 4 , 8 5 9 , 6 3 4 TONS)
December 1 9 4 1 through
was unimaginat ive and poorly directed , almost removing Japan ' s f leet submarines from any decis ive role in the war .
As the war raged to the south and west and s alvage work continued to the east at Pearl Harbor , the Central Pac i f ic remained relatively unmolested by the operations o f the two powerful bel l igerents . The Central Pac i f ic would remain terra incognita for U . S . f orces despite continu ing submarine reconnais sance ; a Japanese merchantman , unarmed and unescorted , could still s a i l at 1 0 knots from Truk to Kwa j alein to Saipan without a care in the world . This relative quiet would las t until February 1 9 4 2 , when two American airc raft carriers would pay a visit to the Central Paci fic .
First Strikes in the Pac i f ic
Gilbert and Marshall I s lands Raids , February 1 9 4 2
Adm . Chester Nimitz , Commander- in-Chief , Pac if ic F leet ( C INCPAC ) , intended to use U . S . c arrier strength to hit enemy i s land bases because he saw thi s strategy as the best c hance of blunting the Japanese expans ion into the South Pac i f ic and the best use of availabl e forces . The fast raids would provide a sorely needed morale boost for the American public and the Navy . They would a l s o provide combat experience for the as -yet unbloodied airmen , which did not risk too much , and would , hopefully , protect American supply l ines to Australia through Samoa .
The carriers ENTERPRISE , under Adm . Will iam F . Hal sey ( Task Force 8 ) , and YORKTOWN , under Adm . Frank J. Fletcher ( Task Force 1 7 ) , escorted a troop convoy to Samoa and then departed January 2 5 , 1 9 4 2 , to hit bases in the Gilberts and Marsha l l s . The attacks scheduled for February 1 were targeted on Kwa j alein , Maloelap and Wot j e in the Marshall s , ENTERPR I SE ' s targets , and Makin and other bases in the Gilberts , YORKTOWN ' s targets . E scorti ng the c arriers were the heavy cruisers LOUISVILLE , CHESTE R , NORTHAMPTON and SALT LAKE C ITY with the l ight cruiser ST . LOUI S . All the cru isers were scheduled to bombard the i s l ands .
Japanese air de fense for the region was reported as " . . . a portion of Rear Admiral Toto E i j i ' s 2 4 th Air Flot i l l a [ koku sentai ] . . . " ( Lundstrom 1 9 8 4 : 7 6 ) . This cons isted o f 3 3 c arrier f ighters , 9 land attack planes and 9 f lying boats from the CHITOSE and YOKOHAMA air groups . American reports indicated seeing more aircraft than this , particularly at Tarawa . I n any case , these naval air forces were the only attack forces in the area other than submarines ; no heavy naval units were
2 0 5
in the vic inity . Apparent ly , the Marshall and Gilbert i s lands were low on the Japanese aircraft priority l ist bec ause most of the aircraft were not f irst-l ine types . They cons isted of mostly G3M2 type 96 l and attack planes , code named Nel l by u . s . forces , A5M4 carrier fighters , code named C laude , and Kawanishi H6K4 type 9 7 f lying boats , code named Mavis . Cons idering that this eastern extremity of the Pac ific territory held by the Japanese was in direct confrontation with the U . S . Pac ific Fleet , the relatively weak de fens ive forces us ing " second string " aircra ft are indicative of the overal l lack o f realistic planning and preparation for war on the part o f the senior mil itary command . Expans ion into Southeast As ia , China and the Dutch East Indies absorbed tremendous air and surface forces as wel l as merchant tra f fic . This undoubtedly contributed to the l imited naval of fens ive materiel in the Marshall and Gilbert is l ands . The two attac king c arriers approaching for the f irst o f fens ive Pac i f ic Fleet action in late January 1 9 4 2 were themselves testimony to the slim resources o f the United States at the same time , a lthough two heavy c arriers were certainly more util itarian o f fens ive weapons than the outlying Japanese i s l ands in the Central Pac i f ic , as would be c learly demonstrated .
Admiral Hal sey , in overal l command , pos itioned ENTERPRI S E in the midst o f the targets in the Marshalls and l aunched the f irst s trike in the predawn hours o f February 1 , 1 9 4 2 . All of ENTERPRISE ' s dive and torpedo bombers ( SBD Dauntless and TBD Devastators ) were fully occupied with Kwa j alein , so f ighters ( F4F Wildc ats ) were used for the initial strikes on Wotj e and Tarawa . Thi s deployment strategy would quickly change because Tarawa had a first-class a irfield and was , in fact , one o f the ma j or bases in the Central Pac i f ic . Wot j e was also bombarded by two cruisers and a destroyer under Adm . Raymond Spruance , while Tarawa was bombarded by the cru iser CHESTER and two destroyers .
ENTERPRI SE ' s initial launch cons isted o f 3 7 SBD Dauntless dive bombers , 9 TBD Devastator torpedo planes and 6 F4F Wildcat fighters . With the initial attack on Roi , Comdr . Hallsted Hopping , Squadron Leader o f VS- 6 , dropped the f irst bomb of World War I I to land on Japanese soil . Shortly thereafter , Hopping ' s SBD crashed i n the ocean , a victim of heavy antiaircraft f ire . This began the Central Pac i fic island ' s long as soc iation with an aircraft c arrier named ENTERPRISE . Strikes were carried out until one o ' c lock in the afternoon , concentrating on Tarawa with its heavily developed airfie ld . Torpedo and bombing attacks were carried out against the merchantmen , patrol vessels and auxiliaries found around the islands , but no c lear accounting of exactly the number o f s hips sunk or damaged emerges from published Engl ish sources . It is certain ships were sunk , but it is
2 0 6
not known i f any were salvaged , either by the Japanese be fore the islands were invaded or later by American forces . Cons iderable damage was done by air and surface bombardment to al l the bases attacked and many aircraft were destroyed . American reports c laimed one light cruiser and one submarine damaged along with at least seven merchantmen and auxil iaries .
I ncomplete or inaccurate information about Japanese shipping or aircraft losses was not an uncommon problem , particularly in early war actions and in war accounts publ ished s hortly after the fact for two reasons - - l ittle was known of Japanese ships in general , and the nature o f aerial combat in enemy territory does not lend itsel f to long meditative appraisals o f ships , particularly ships shooting back with heavy-cal iber weapons . Known Japanese los ses during the raid against the Gilberts and Marshalls include the auxiliary netlayer KASHIMA MARU , transport BORDEAUX MARU , auxiliary submarine chaser SHONAN MARU NO . 1 0 , and gunboat TOYOTSU MARU , all victims o f ENTERPRISE airc raft .
As ENTERPRISE and its escorts withdrew , f ive Nel l s attacked the force . Fi fteen bombs in all were dropped , the c losest 3 0 feet o f f the port quarter o f ENTERPRI SE , c aus ing minor damage and killing one man . ENTERPRI SE was also near-mis sed by a fatal ly damaged Nel l attempting to crash onboard--a tactic that would later become all too famil iar to the Pac i f ic Fleet . Several other Japanese aircraft were reported shot down in these engagements , mostly ASM C laudes and H6K Mavis seaplanes .
Simultaneous ly to the south , YORKTOWN launched attacks against Makin , Jaluit and Mil i , which cons isted init ially o f 1 7 SBDs and 1 1 bomb-armed TBD Devastator torpedo planes a long with covering F4F Wildcat fighters . Mili was barren o f worthwhile targets , but f ac i l ities and small auxi l iary ves sels at Jaluit and Makin were attacked . Poor weather serious ly hampered e f fective coordinated attacks and resulted in additional U . S . aircraft losses . Worsening weather prevented further attacks , and YORKTOWN withdrew to j oin ENTERPRISE for the return to Pearl Harbor .
By February 6 , 1 9 4 2 , both c arriers were back in Pearl , having success ful ly conducted the f irst o f fens ive strike o f the Pac i f ic Fleet with minimal losses of F4F Wildc ats , SBD Dauntlesses and TBD Devastators . Although damage to the Japanese-held is lands and shipping was less than c laimed at the time and much was s alvaged or repaired , the e f fectivenes s o f the Japanese air arm i n the Marshalls and Gilberts was severely reduced until replacement men and materiel could be sent in . The U . S . Navy also learned valuable lessons in operating its carriers and air groups at minimum ris k , which
2 0 7
would pay o f f in future operations . Finally I the Japanese e were served not ice that they were no longer alone in the Central Pac i f ic ; there would soon be further hit-and-run raids .
Wake and Marcus Raids , February-March 1 9 4 2
On February 1 4 , 1 9 4 2 , the carrier ENTERPRI SE left Pearl Harbor with the cruisers NORTHAMPTON and SALT LAKE CITY and seven des troyers bound for strikes on Wake . Wake had been c aptured by the Japanese on December 2 3 , 19 4 1 , after their initial attack had been repu lsed by defending Marines . The carrier LEXINGTON was occupied in an abortive attack on Rabaul , and YORKTOWN was being held in reserve , so this hit-and-run raid would pit a s ingle carrier against two widely separated targets , both pos sess ing heavy land-based aircraft de fenses . Admiral Halsey was again in command .
The strategy used during the air attack for Wake was s imilar to that on the Marshal l s and Gilberts . First , the heavy cruisers bombarded Wake , approaching from the northwest . Then ENTERPRISE ' s 5 2 -plane group , c ons isting o f 3 7 SBD dive bombers , 9 TBD torpedo bombers and 6 F4F fighters were launched 1 0 0 miles north o f Wake . The attack c ommenced about 7 : 5 0 a . m . , February 2 4 ; there was no airborne aircraft � oppos ition and the i s l and was heavily bombed with much damage ,., to fac i l ities , fuel storage and a ircraft . Several small Japanese auxiliary craf t were reported sunk in the vic inity .
Again , precise i nformation on ves sels and aircraft down in the area is s canty , ENTERPRISE c l a iming one sma l l patrol craft and three four-engine Mavis f lying boats destroyed ( two on the ground ) in addit ion to damage to the is land ' s s tructures and runways . Two smal l auxil iary patrol boats were also claimed as destroyed by aircraft and destroyers MAURY and BALCH .
On February 2 5 , as ENTERPRISE was steaming to a fueling rendezvous , C INCPAC ordered Halsey to attack Marcus I s land some 6 5 0 miles west o f Wake and only 1 , 0 0 0 miles from Tokyo . ENTERPRI S E , accompanied by only two cruiser escort s , launched a 3 8 -p lane attac k group in the predawn l i ght o f March 4 , 1 9 4 2 . ENTERPRI SE ' s radar o f f icer was able to track the attack inbound and provided course c orrections for the s trike leader , the f irst instance o f radar a s s istance in a c arrier-based attack .
Commenc ing their attack about 6 : 3 0 a . m . and c atching the defenders by surpris e , the 3 2 dive bombers worked over Marcus with its three triangular runways . There was no shipping reported damaged or sunk in this engagement , but shore-based e
2 0 8
f acilities and aircraft on the ground were severely damaged . Completing this s ingle attack before noon , ENTERPRISE turned for Pearl Harbor , performing the c las s ic naval maneuver known as " hauling out with Hal s ey . " Published sources are not c lear on the types of aircraft surprised on the ground by this attack and destroyed . Presumably these inc luded the usual first-line naval fighter and bomber aircraft o f the period and reconnai s s ance types as wel l .
ENTERPRISE returned to Pearl Harbor on March 1 0 , 1 9 4 2 . ENTERPRISE ' s lone raid deep into enemy territory , while accompanied by only two cruisers , demonstrated the e f f ic acy of the bas ic tactic being advocated by air-minded admirals i n the Pac i f ic Fleet against a still -conservative surface-minded Navy--the long-range , hit-and-run strategy . Some obvious defic ienc ies existed , in particular c lose escort for the c arriers and more f ighter a ircraft to escort attac king planes and de fend the carriers . But , overa l l , the concept was proven in the raids on the Marshal ls , Gilberts , Wake and Marcus . Aircraft and men were lost operational ly and in combat , but the c arriers emerged intact .
On the Japanese side , base c apabil ities were reduced , airpower was curtai led and it was obvious that a l l o f these is land areas were vulnerable to attack unless s u f f ic ient naval and air forces were alloc ated . Naturally , bases were rebuilt and reinforced where pos s ible , but there was l ittle available to commit to the Central Pac i f ic . The needs o f the Japanese military in the South Paci fic , Southeast As ia and China limited what could be accomplished elsewhere , espec ially as cons iderable f orces were still committed to the struggle for the Phil ippines .
The existing timetable for Japanese expansion further into the Paci fic , New Guinea and the Solomons was disrupted by these carrier raids . This delay would pay o f f in May 1 9 4 2 when aircraft carriers would square o f f against each other for the first time , initiating the naval campaign for the Solomons and New Guinea .
A period o f relative quiet ensued in the Central Pac i f i c after the February carrier raids , while is sues elsewhere occupied the Naval forces o f Japan and the United States and Douglas MacArthur ' s embryonic campaign in New Guinea . The Japanese would soon meet the u . s . Marine Corps , and aircraft c arriers would settle once and for all the ques tion of the dominant naval force in the Pac i f ic ; when the ENTERPRI SE returned to the Central Pac i f ic in 1 9 4 3 , it would not be a lone .
2 0 9
Second Phase o f Operations in the Pac i f ic
The early operations o f the Japanese military j uggernaut succeeded beyond even the expectations o f the most optimistic Japanese mil itary commanders , with the exception o f the Phil ippines where it was apparent that a long , bitter and bloody battle was going to occur be fore the Americans could be ous ted . The battle in the Phil ippines would eventual ly upset the Japanese t imetable o f future operations and would occupy mil itary forces and equipment needed in other areas . Whatever else might be said about the American sacri f ices in Manila , Cavite , Bataan and Corregidor , they were a key element in eventual victory despite the bitterness o f defeat .
Bol stered by continual succes s and the inabil ity o f Al lied forces to strike any ef fective counterblows , Japanes e naval and army forces began the second stage of Japan ' s expans ion into the Pac i fic by occupying Kavieng on New Ireland and Rabaul on New Britain in January-February 1 9 4 2 ( refer to Figure 2 . 1 ) . Occupation and development of these two bases was s upported by naval and merchant forces routed from Japan through Saipan and then Palau or Truk .
Palau , Saipan and espec ially Truk became maj or forward operat ing bases for units o f the Japanese Combined Fleet , A with the smal ler Caroline and Marshal l bases primarily � occupied with air reconnais s ance and submarine operations and serving as routing bases for aircraft and the ever-increas ing merchant and naval auxil iary traf f ic . Because o f the Japanese control of air and sea around the Central Pac i f ic i s l ands and these islands ' relative isolation from the areas Japan selected for the " front l ines , " the bases were nearly immune to any form of dec is ive attack , cons idering that the U . S . did not have the resources available to make such an attac k . Isolated carrier raids , primarily morale and experience builders , and submarine attack were the only practical o f fens ive operations that the U . S . could and did mount in this area .
Submarines would continue to c ause shipping losses in the Central Pac i f ic throughout the war or until these areas were secured by U . S . forces . However , it should be pointed out that despite the di f f icult ies faced by the " s i lent service "
2 10
during the f irst years o f the war , around 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons o� shipping were eventual ly credited to submarines by JANAC for the period December 1 9 4 1 -December 1 9 4 2 ( re fer to Figure 6 . 1 ) . This tonnage figure does not inc lude ships damaged and
.laid up for repairs , also a service drain on Japan ' s thin merchant resources . Losses to submarines in the early part of the war would have cons iderable e f fect on the abi l ity o f Japan ' s military to move men and equipment farther into the Pac i f ic , particularly as these operations were not the main focus of Japanese e f forts .
Occupation of Kavieng on New I reland and Rabaul on New Britain provided wel l -harbored forward bases for further Japanese plans in the South Pac i fic--occupation of New Guinea and the Solomon I s l ands . The occupation o f these areas was a prelude to operat ions a imed at c utt ing the F i j i-Samoa l i fel ine between the u . s . and Australia . A plan for inva s ion of Aus tralia was dropped , primarily because the Japanese Army recogni zed that such a move was beyond the capabil ity o f Japanese resources . Rabaul and Kavieng were both heavily developed o f fens ively and de fens ively by the Japanese Army and Navy . Rabaul became one o f Japan ' s most heavily-defended bases , s urrounded by air bases , antiaircraft and s hip defenses , and would remain a thorn in Admiral Nimit z ' and General MacArthur ' s s ides unt i l 1 9 4 4 . Even then it was s t i l l strong enough to be bypas sed by All ied invas ion forces i n favor o f l e s s well -defended areas that could be used t o keep Rabaul neutrali zed .
Japanese forces , deploying from the Rabaul -Kavieng area , landed troops on March 9 , 1 9 4 2 , at Lae and Salamau on New Guinea ' s north coast . Thi s was the first step in the planned occupation of New Guinea that was aimed at the A l l ied base at Port Moresby on New Guinea ' s south coast . For the f irst time , the Japanese landing met with stiff res istance from U . S . forces , although the landings and occupation were not stopped . On the morning of March 1 0 , 19 4 2 , the carrier LEXINGTON , under Rear Adm . Wilson Brown , and the c arrier YORKTOWN , under Admiral Fletcher , launched fighters , torpedo bombers and dive bombers north over the impos ing Owen Stanley Mountains o f New Guinea . These aircraft caught Japanese forces in both Lae and Salamau by surprise . Postwar accounts credit aircraft from LEXI NGTON and YORKTOWN with s inking
2 JANAC , though obvious ly inaccurate , is the only s et o f documented statistics currently available some 4 0 years after the fact , although new information s uch as that found in U . S . Submarine Attacks during World War I I starting to emerge .
2 1 1
is now
three transports , KONGO MARU , TENYO MARU and YOKOHAMA MARU e ( later s alvaged ) , with varying degrees o f damage to KOKAI MARU , seaplane tender K IYOKAWA MARU , light cruiser YUBARI , minelayer TSUGARU and destroyers ASANAGI and
. YUNAGI 1 and Japanese c asualties o f 1 3 0 kil led and 2 4 5 wounded ( Lundstrom 1 9 8 4 : 1 5 0 - 1 6 8 ) . This attack " infl icted on the Imperial Navy by far its heaviest losses s ince the outbreak of the war . . . . " ( Lundstrom 1 9 8 4 : 1 6 3 ) . Further , the damage to Japanese forces clearly indicated to Japanese commanders the need for adequate air s upport for further operations in New Guinea that could initial ly only be provided by aircraft c arriers . These carriers were not immediately available bec ause Japan ' s six big carriers of the " Kido Butai " { s triking force ) were occupied sweeping the I ndian Ocean, netting over 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons of merchant and naval shipping and pushing the British Far Eastern Fleet back to Madagascar .
E s s ential ly , l ack of air support forced Vice Admiral I nouye , in overal l command o f operations in New Guinea and the Solomons , to postpone for a month the scheduled c apture of Port Moresby and Tul agi , a small is l and direct ly acro s s the sound from Guadalc anal in the Solomons . Upon completion of the I ndian Ocean raid , the Kido Butai returned to Japan for much needed rest and repairs . The c arriers SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU ( Carrier Divis ion 5 ) were detached and sent to Truk with s upporting forces i n response to Admiral I nouye ' s � request for carrier s upport . ..,
For the first time in the war , Truk saw a portion o f the Japanese Combined Fleet ' s elite s triking force anchored within its enormous lagoon . The presence of SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU s igni f ied a change in the Pac i f ic strategies . Large naval striking forces would now be deployed by both s ides whenever the Japanese attempted further expans ion in the Pac i f ic . This s ituation arose when further expans ion by the Japanese south and east in the Pac i f ic severely strained the c apability o f land-based airpower to e f fectively cover these moves . Up to this point , the Japanese advances had been well covered by land- and s ea-based airpower within their e f fective operational ranges . Seaborne merchant tra f f ic was also a bene f ic iary of this air cover . Beginning with the New Guinea c ampaign , however , there were insuf fic ient highly trained , l and-based air forces avai lable to concentrate at the point of attack . This contributed to the disruption of Japanese plans and set the stage for the f irst c arrier vs . carrier battle o f the war . Later , the Japanese occupation of Tulagi and nearby Guadalcanal would prove fatal because their distance from Rabaul ' s l and-based air power was suf f ic ient to c ause an unacceptably high c ombat attrition rate--exact ly the type o f war s ituation the Japanese c ould not af ford .
2 12
By April 1 9 4 2 , forces o f both s ides were poi sed but not yet committed to dec is ive action . u . s . naval forces , though s l im in comparison to Japanese naval presence in the South Paci fic , were far more e f fectively deployed and uti l iz ed than their Japanese counterparts because of the absolutely priceless advantage of Ultra decryptions . u . s . penetrat ion of the Japanese JN- 2 5 naval code was still only part ial , but good use was made of this information by the commanders in charge , particularly Admiral Nimit z . He was a s s isted by his intel l igence chief , Edwin T . Layton , and probably the mos t e f fective u . s . code-breaking team ever assembled--Fleet Radio Unit , Pac i fic . But before the forces gathered around Tru k , Rabau l , Pearl Harbor and New Caledonia could e ngage , two American aircraft c arriers on a lonely north Pac i f ic traj ectory would further derange Japanese plans for conquest .
Early in 1 9 4 2 the sound o f American submarine torpedo explo s ions continued in gradually increas ing numbers in the Central Pac i f ic . Already shipping losses in the Pac i fic area were rais ing eyebrows among those monitoring the pul s e o f Japan ' s wartime economy . Unfortunately for Japan ' s war e f fort , the mil itary high command had its eyes focused on conquests in China , Southeast Asia and the Pac i f ic . They were not interested in the stat istics o f economists whose graphs were beginning to reveal the constant interplay o f merchant tonnage constructed versus combat losses and o f o i l and bulk commodities imported versus c argoes lost . The picture was already not good , " . . . the balance o f shipping available to Japan began to dec l ine as early as Apr i l 1 9 4 2 . . . . " ( The War Against Japanese Transportation , u . s . Strategic Bombing Survey , 1 9 4 7 ) .
The Dool ittle Raid , April 1 9 4 2
The raid on Tokyo and other targets by Col . James Dool ittle ' s B-25 medium bombers , launched from carrier HORNET some 6 0 0 miles from Tokyo on April 1 8 , 1 9 4 2 , was an unqual i f ied success in terms of embarra s s ing the higher echelons of the Japanese military hierarchy , although material damage c aused by the Tokyo raiders was minimal . HORNET , covered by its s ister ship ENTERPRISE , both under the command of Admiral Halsey , had been detected inbound by Japanese picket s hips . The Japanese , expecting an attack by carrier aircra f t o f c onventional range rather than longer-ranged medium bombers , miscalculated their response exactly as U . S . planners had hoped , and Doolittle ' s attac king forces escaped to China and the USSR , where the ir rea l troubles began . HORNET and ENTERPRISE also escaped untouched , returning to Pearl Harbor . They were almost immediately redeployed to the South Pac i f ic in the hope they could support forces engaged in the Coral Sea but arrived 2 4 hours late for the battle . Coral
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Sea would be the only ma j or carrier engagement ENTERPRISE: would miss during the entire war .
Dool ittle ' s raid was an enormous morale boost for the hard-pres sed American forces in the Pac i f ic and on the home front . Its greatest immediate bene f its were a thorough shake-up of Japanese compl acency about the war ef fort , with subsequent hurried and i l l -conceived plans and priorities by the mil itary , coupled with an Ultra intell igence windfal l for u . s . intel ligence groups . The tremendous increas e in Japanese naval messages , all obvious ly concerning the Dool ittle raid , brought additional decryption and tra f f ic analys is gains for the Pac i f ic Fleet ' s intelligence units , information and decryptions that contributed cons iderably to U . S . knowledge o f future Japanese operations and , most importantly , a t imetable for those operations . The c lose cooperation developing between intell igence units and the U . S . submarine service would also result in an ever- increas ing number o f s inkings in all ocean areas , all attributable in one way or another to Ultra . A s inking off Palau , a transport down near Truk , damage to a destroyer near Jaluit , a wrecked tanker under tow to Saipan- -all these types o f inc idents contributed to the increasing di f f iculty of s upplying and maintaining the Japanese advance into the Pac i f ic . Although no statist ical analys is has been pub l ished to date , several historica l sources indicate at least 55 percent of a l l submarine s inkings benef itted from information provided by Ultra .
Battl e o f the Coral Sea , May 1 9 4 2
Further bene f its accrued to the the u . s . from the Dool ittle Raid because Japanese naval planners f inal ly solidif ied their plans . Adm . I soroku Yamamoto ' s proposal for an attack on Midway , ostens ibly to secure the l ast gap in Japan ' s front l ines and hopefully to draw the remainder o f the u . s . fleet ( particularly the carriers ) into decis ive de feat , was accepted by the naval staf f . There were good reasons not to engage in the Midway Operation , many o f them brought up by informed Japanese naval staff o f f icers in conferences during April -May 1 9 4 2 . However , the serious loss of face incurred from the Dool ittle raid effectively s ilenced opposition . There was also a strong feel ing among the Japanese naval s ta f f against interfering with the plans o f Admiral Yamamoto who , as Commander-in-Chief o f the Combined Fleet , had been bri l l antly succes s ful in every naval operation so far . This rel iance on Admiral Yamamoto was , in part , a mani festation of the " victory disease " with which the Japanese were infected at this period . ( The term was coined by the Japanese themselves in their postwar analyses . )
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Reflecting revised Japanese plans , the carrier task forces and other Combined Fleet units repaired , trained and prepared for the upcoming Midway Operation . Meanwhile , Admiral I nouye was ordered to commence further operations directed at occupying Milne Bay and Port Moesby in New Guinea in early May . Carriers SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU , as wel l as the smal l converted carrier SHOHO , would directly support this amphibious assault planned for Port Moresby and also protec t the Japanese flank a t Tul agi i n the Solomon I s l and chain southeast o f New Guinea .
By the end of April 1 9 4 2 , all the Japanese forces s taging from the home islands through Saipan , Palau and Truk to Rabaul and Kavieng were assembled . For Port Moresby , the invas ion force ( in three parts ) was commanded by Rear Adm . Aritomo Goto and cons isted o f a main force o f four heavy cruisers , a destroyer and the l ight carrier SHOHO ; an invas ion force of transports and auxiliaries and a s upport group of a seaplane carrier and light c ruisers . A further small group of transports and destroyers was as s igned to capture Tulagi for eventual use as a seaplane base . Admiral Takagi ' s striking force of SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU , supported by cruisers and destroyers , were deployed to cover and s upport these invas ion forces . Thi s splitting of forces on the part of the Japanese Navy was c haracteristic of ma j or operations by them throughout the war , o ften with disastrous results .
Paci fic Fleet Headquarters was wel l enough informed o f Japanese intentions through radio traf f ic analys i s and decryptions to deploy the c arriers YORKTOWN and LEXINGTON to the Coral Sea ( re fer to Figure 2 . 1 ) . Act ion commenced on May 3 , 1 9 4 2 , when aircraft from YORKTOWN struck the sma l l Tulagi invas ion force and sunk an old destroyer , two small patrol c raft , and a transport and damaged other s hips . The two big Japanese carriers were out o f position , delayed due to refueling , and could not support the Tulagi force , the remnants of which returned to Rabaul . On May 7 , acting on poor reconnais sance information , c arriers SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU did succeed in s i nking the u . s . f leet oiler NEOSHO and destroyer S IMS , while Admiral Fletcher , victimi zed by equally poor reconnaissance data , got lucky and found carrier SHOHO the s ame day . SHOHO was promptly s unk by planes from LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN , the f irst Japanese carrier los s o f the war .
Following the sparring on May 7 , 1 9 4 2 , both c arrier forces found each other on May 8 . Planes from the Americ an c arriers succeeded in putting several 1 , 0 0 0-pound bombs on SHOKAKU , knocking it out but not s inking it . Z UIKAKU was not damaged , but its air groups were dec imated and it too was rendered ine f fective . YORKTOWN was seriou s ly damaged by a bomb , and LEXINGTON took two torpedoes and a bomb , resulting in its
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eventual loss when ruptured fuel tanks ignited , c aus ing 4lt uncontrol lable f ires . LEX INGTON was abandoned and scuttled l ate i n the afternoon of May 8 . LEXINGTON was America ' s first a ircraft carrier loss o f the war .
Tactically , the victory went to the Japanese at the Coral Sea in terms of tonnage sunk . Strategica l ly , the Japanese Port Moresby invas ion was stopped cold and the invas ion transports forced to turn around and return to Rabaul during the c arrier battle . This was the first t ime a Japanese amphibious a s s au l t was stopped . Coming hard on the heels o f the surrender o f Corregidor , the Coral Sea battle was a c learcut American victory and a great morale booster for the American pub l ic . I n addition to gaining time for hard-pres s ed U . S . forces in the Pac ific , further intel l igence gains from the Coral Sea would pay huge dividends in the next naval battle .
U . S . forces withdrew from the Coral Sea to Pear 1 Harbor following the battle . The Japanese were in no pos it ion to take advantage o f the U . S . absence , however , because o f lack o f c arrier air cover and the demands of the upcoming Midway operation . While Japanese naval and army operations in the New Guinea-Bismarck-Solomons area regrouped from the stinging de feat , the Combined Fleet , minus two sorely needed c arriers , began its deployment for Midway . Prevented f rom further gains in New Guinea , stalled in Tulagi and about to start an � airfield on Guadalcanal , the Japanese would await the outcome � o f the Midway operation be fore continuing their conquest of the South Pac i f ic .
Battle o f Midway , June 1 9 4 2
The battle o f Midway , l ike that o f the Coral Sea , did not have a direct impact on the Marsha l l , Caroline , Gilbert and Mariana is lands . However , the outcome of these battles did a f fect the abi l ity of the U . S . to pursue a strategy of attrition warfare and make s teady progres s acro s s the Pac i f ic . The significance o f both the battle o f the Coral Sea and Midway ( the latter cons idered a maj or turning point o f the war ) to the eventual outcome o f the Pac i f ic War c annot be overstated . Midway was to serve as another mid-ocean base for Japanese expansion and as a j ump-off point for attacks against Johnston I s land and Hawaii ( re fer to Figure 2 . 1 ) .
The Japanese attack on Midway occupied almost the entire s trength of the Combined Fleet , again scattered acro s s the Pac i fic in several task groups . As a divers ion , two l ight c arriers and occupation forces were dispatched to the Aleutians to occupy Attu and Kiska and to attack Dutch Harbor as wel l . This force was essentially ignored by the U . S . Navy and played no s igni f icant part in the conflict at Midway . e
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Deployed against Midway were the " Kido Butai " with four carriers , AKAGI , KAGA , HIRYU and SORYU , and their supporting forces . These fast carriers approached from the northwes t and were followed at a distance by the Combined Fleet ' s battleships , inc luding Admiral Yamamoto on the f leet f lagship YAMATO . The invas ion transports for Midway , accompanied by support bombardment forces , c ame from Central Pac i f ic bases to the southwest .
Against these forces , Admiral Nimitz deployed only the three sister carriers ENTERPRISE , a veteran ; HORNET , a new c arrier with an untried air group ; and YORKTOWN , also a veteran but only partially repaired from its Coral Sea damage . With their supporting cruisers and destroyers , this sma l l group represented America ' s 11 f irs t team 11 in the Pac i f ic --the men and materiel available and on the front l ines when the war began before u . s . production capability made any di f ference in the war e f fort . Under command of Admirals Spruance ( replacing the i l l Halsey ) and Fletcher , the three c arriers appeared inadequate for the task of holding o f f the most powerful invas ion armada deployed so far in the Pac i f ic War .
Fortunately for U . S . forces , Admiral Nimitz not only had superb inte l l igence on Japanese intentions , inc luding mos t o f their battle plan , but he acted immediately and dec is ively on these intel l igence decrypt ions in the face of con f l ic ting information from other inte l l igence sources . Dec is ively deployed and brillantly employed , ENTERPRISE , YORKTOWN and HORNET destroyed the Japanese c arrier force on June 4 , 1 9 4 2 , mortal ly damaging AKAG I , KAGA and SORYU within f ive minutes and scoring on HIRYU l ater in the day . The loss of these s hips was followed by the s inking o f one heavy c ruiser ( MIKUMA ) and damage to another the next day . On the U . S . s ide , the carrier YORKTOWN was lost to aerial bombs and submarine torpedoes and the destroyer HAMMANN was sunk by a torpedo .
Following the c arrier battle o f June 4 , 1 9 4 2 , the remaining Japanese forces retreated in dis array , with the exception o f those forces that succeeded i n " capturing " undefended Attu and Kiska , where they immediately became more of a l iabi l ity to the Japanese than a forward bas tion . For the U . S . , el imination o f four o f the s ix carriers o f Japan ' s only true c arrier task force took enormous pres sure o f f the only American carriers available in the Pac i fic , ENTERPRI S E , HORNET and SARATOGA .
The strategic e f fect o f the Americ an victory was immediate and enormous , although the Japanese re fused to recognize the Battle of Midway as a strategic defeat at the time . Without an ef fective fast c arrier force , all Japanese front l ine areas were now far more vulnerable to attack by American
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naval and amphibious units unless additional air power could It be provided in great numbers . One o f the legs supporting Japanese plans for expans ion across the Pac i f ic had been the abil ity to deploy large numbers o f carrier a ircraft to any threatened point . With four carriers sunk and no l arge c arrier construct ion program in the works , further Japanese operat ions were now in serious j eopardy whether the Japanese recognized it or not . SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU , s t i l l in Japan under repair from the Coral Sea battle , plus the few c arriers under cons truction , would not be s u f f ic ient to s upport either o f fense or defense for any length o f time . The men of SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU would take a tremendous beating over the next two years proving j ust that point .
Stripped o f the potential support o f the fast carriers , the Central Pac i fic is lands were now vulnerable to the s ame type o f c arrier attack original ly cons idered a bulwark o f their defens e . Fortunately for Japanese f orces , the U . S . was in no pos ition to immediately exploit this advantage , although pol itical and mil itary events would conspire to make the South Pac i f ic once again the focus o f the main war e f fort by both combatants .
New Guinea and Guadalcanal , July-August 1 9 4 2
The pol itical and mi l itary s ituation faced by the U . S . and its Al l ies f ighting a war on two fronts was still grim in mid- 1 9 4 2 . Despite the agreement by the maj or All ied powers on a war philosophy o f " Germany firs t " and the pleas o f the USSR for a second front in Europe , it was obvious to American war planners that of fens ive action in the Pac i f ic would be required to ensure at least the containing o f the Japanese and preventing the loss of the vital l i felines to Aus tral ia . This c reated competit ion for war resources among the mi litary commands involved in Europe and the Pac if ic . Bec ause of American commitments to North African operations and related actions in the Mediterranean , MacArthur ' s campaign in New Guinea and the Naval and Marine Corps operations in the Solomons under Vice Adm . Robert Ghormley , and later Admiral Hal s ey , would suffer from shortages of personnel and equipment . This would o ften put the war e f fort in extreme peril in the Pac i f ic and would extract an enormous tol l from Americ an and All ied forces .
For the Japanese , who by July 1 9 4 2 were once again ready to commit troops to the New Guinea front , the Central Pac ific islands would now receive their most intense period of mil itary and merchant traf f ic . All Japanese Army and Navy mil itary forces to be used in New Guinea had to stage through Saipan , the Phil ippines , Palau , Truk , Kwaj alein and other is lands en route to Rabaul and eventual deployment either in
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northern New Guinea or , l ater , in the Solomons ( re fer to Figure 2 . 1 ) . The staging of troops again emphasized to the Japanese the importance o f the geographic locations o f these island bases . Depredations by American submarines were a constant factor throughout this phase o f the war . Beginning with the Guadalcanal campaign , submarine operations in the Central Pac i f ic intens i f ied with better results . On the Japanese s ide , more merchant ships were armed , the beginnings of a convoy sys tem were establ ished , and Japanese antisubmarine resources ( never adequate during the war ) were increased throughout the Central Pac i fic is lands and the Northern Marianas . Enormous numbers o f ships and aircraft would pas s through the Central Pac i f ic en route to combat areas and many would not return . Repair facilities in these areas began to do a land o f f ice bus ines s . Truk was heavily involved in ship repair work in 1 9 4 2 - 1 9 4 3 as damaged s hips from Guadalcanal , Rabaul and New Guinea arrived from the south .
The Japanese invas ion o f New Guinea began again on July 2 1 , 1 9 4 2 , when Lt . Gen . Tomitaro Horii ' s 1 6 , 0 0 0 -man el ite South Seas detachment landed at Buna . Instead of an amphibious assault on Port Moresby , this t ime the Japanese intended to march over the 1 3 , 0 0 0 - foot Owen Stanley Mountains and capture Port Moresby from the north . Apparently the c l imatic and environmental conditions in these j ungle-covered mountains were not a factor in Japanese plans , but the j ungle and diseases would be more relentless enemies than those who had guns and bombs . As it was for the Japanese , so it was for the all ied Australian , New Zealand , British and American forces who would bear the brunt of the New Guinea fighting under General MacArthur ' s c ommand .
Austral ian troops fought a bitter retreating engagement over the Owen Stanleys along the Kokoda Trail against advanc ing Japanese troops . The Japanese were barely contained , f inal ly accepting defeat only when about 3 0 miles from Port Moresby . During the same time , a second amphibious assault was attempted by the Japanese at Milne Bay , at the eas tern end o f New Guinea . This attempt was repul sed by Austral ian troops and American combat engineers . The attempt to c apture New Guinea in one dec is ive action had again failed ; the Japanese were then committed to an attrition battle for New Guinea , pouring men and resources into the north coast o f the i s l and by barge , destroyer and freighter . Although the Imperial Army would continue to seek the conquest o f New Guinea , another land battle would soon occupy almost all the men and material s original ly planned for the Papau front . Despite this , Allied forces would pursue the Japanese in the j ungles of New Guinea wel l into 1 9 4 5 .
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Before the end o f June 1 9 4 2 I the Japanese I consolidating e their s l im hold on the Solomon I s lands at Tulagi , brought in labor troops , engineers and con struction equipment to Guadalc anal in order to begin t he construct ion o f an airfield . When the 1 3 -ship convoy c ompleted its del iveries at Guadalcanal and steamed out o f the sound, Japan had occupied the last piece o f territory in the Pac i fic it would hold . Bec ause o f its distance from ma j or l and-based air power at Rabaul and because Americ an response to the air-base construct ion was relatively quic k , Guadalc anal immediately became a l iabil ity to the Japane s e , particularly a s the Japanese Army had not prepared intermediate airfields in the Solomons chain before starting on Guadalcanal .
On August 7 , 1 9 4 2 , 1 1 , 0 0 0 Marine s o f the 1 s t D ivis ion reinforced l anded on Guadalcanal and Tulagi , occupied the airf ield and el iminated stubborn Japanese res is tance by Tulagi by the end of the next day . This began the next longest sustained battle in American history , the s ix-month struggle for Guadalcanal . Although it is far too complex to cover in a general overview of this type , Admiral Morison ' s pre face to Volume f ive o f his History o f U . S . Naval Operations in World War I I succ inctly summarizes the campaign :
. . . . . the United States Navy fought s ix maj or engagements in waters adj acent to Guadalcanal , more bitter and bloody than any naval battle in American history s ince 1 8 1 4 . Four of them were night gunf ire actions o f a kind that we may never see again ; two were c arrier-air battles of the pattern set at Coral Sea ; a l l are highly interesting and s igni f icant in the his tory o f war . I n addition , there were a s core o f naval act ions invo lving des troyers and motor torpedo boats which never attained the dignity o f names ; f ights almost daily between the Imperial Japanese Air Force and American f liers ; some thirty occas ions when land-based airplanes attacked ships ; a fair number o f submarine battles ; and a lmost continual ground fighting by United States Marines and Army against Japanese troops , inc luding the Battles of the Tenaru River , the Matanikau River , the Bloody Ridge , Henderson Field , Point Cruz , the Gifu and the Gal loping Horse , which are worthy to figure in any m i l itary history . The Guadalcanal campaign is unique for
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variety and multiplic ity o f weapons employed and for coordination between sea power , ground power and air power . And certainly no campaign in modern history is more fraught with feroc ity and misery ; none has blazed more brightly with heroism and s e l f-sacrifice [ Morison 1 9 5 1 ( V ) : npn ] .
Despite the bes t e fforts o f Imperial Army and Navy units to recapture Guadalcanal , they were never able to do so , los ing thousands o f men and hundreds o f ships and aircra ft in the attempt . Faced with inc reas ing problems in New Guinea from General MacArthur ' s ever more succes s ful All ied armies , defeat in Guadalcanal , and an increas ingly success ful submarine c ampaign , the Imperial Army e f fort collapsed ; its ambitious plans for conquest turning more and more to plans for retreat and defense after January of 1 9 4 3 .
With Guadalcana l secure and victories in New Guinea , American forces were poised to advance up the Solomons and recapture all of Northern New Guinea , eventually planning to recapture Rabaul . This two-pronged o f fense under MacArthur in the Southwest Pac i f ic and Admiral Halsey in the South Pac i f ic would occupy most of 1 9 4 3 . With a steady increase in ships , men and materiel available , and guided by intel l igence information , the U . s . was able to by-pas s strongpoints and occupy less wel l -de fended areas . American forces were eventually able to break the Bismarcks Barrier , leap over Rabaul and occupy the Admiralty I s lands as wel l as recapture most o f New Guinea by 1 9 4 4 , which poised American forces in the South Pac i f ic on the route back to the Philippines .
These long, desperate , naval and l and actions stretching from Guadalcanal to Manus and northwes tern New Guinea were not the only actions pres sed against the Japanese . In mid- 1 9 4 3 , the operations that would retake the Central Pacific commenced . Japan had been unable to defend itsel f from the two-pronged attack through New Guinea and the Solomons ; in 1 9 4 3 there would be a third prong .
Central Pac i f ic O f fens ive
The American dec i s ion to begin an o f fens ive in the Central Pac i f ic had , l ike all Pac i f ic battles , a pol it ical and a military rationale . On the mil itary s ide , the campai gn in New Guinea was now obvious ly control lable and winnable , and it was also obvious from inte l l igence sources that the Japanese Army and Navy were in dire straits as a result o f the enormous attrition o f men and resources . Addit ional ly ,
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the new ' fast c arriers were beginning to show up in the e Pac i f ic - -both ESSEX-c lass fleet carriers and the less c apable but equal ly fast INDEPENDENCE-class l ight carriers . These ships and their supporting warships were powerful but untried . The c arrier admirals waged a voc i ferous c ampaign to get these new weapons into act ion .
Pol itica l ly , the invas ion of the Central Pac i f ic was critical to the Navy . I f the Navy did not maintain o f fens ive action somewhere , it risked having its forces subordinated to MacArthur ' s campaign in the southwest Pac i f ic , something the Navy was unwil l ing to do . The Navy did not view tying its aircraft c arriers to a long-term land campaign in c lose proximity to enemy air bases in a good l ight , nor did it trust General MacArthur whose enormous ego was always getting in the way o f bril l iant leadership . The Central Pac i f ic c ampaign had so many advantages from the strategic view that it was not di f f icult for Adm . Ernest King , Chie f o f Naval Operations , to get it approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staf f . Navy-contro lled operations in the Central Pac i f ic also neatly s idestepped the is sue of overal l command of American forces in the Paci fic . Much more importantly , it provided a means of maintaining a three-pronged attack on the Japanese to which they could not adequately respond with the mil itary resources available .
During the long campaign for the South Pac i f ic , the Japanese-control led islands o f the Central Pac i fic continued in their role o f forward air and naval bases and as staging points for the merchant , naval and air tra f f ic being sent south from the homeland to support the New Guinea-Solomons battles . The advantages accru ing to the Japanese from pos ses s ion o f the is land bases in the Central Pac i f ic were c lear ; internal l ines of naval communication and availab i l ity of airfields for shuttling airpower around . During the early period o f the Pacific c ampaign ( 1 9 4 2 -early 1 9 4 3 ) , the U . S . did not have the aircraft c arrier resources to seriously threaten these is land bases , only the increas ingly e f fec t ive submarine c ampaign af fected Japanese operations in the Central Pac i fic . Much o f the de fensive c apabil ity o f these is l ands was serious ly hampered by the submarine war . Merchant ships c arrying men and materiel to reinforce these bases were not arriving , to the overal l detriment of the de fens ive structure in the region . Many island bases were not as strongly defended or heavily fort i f ied as they s hould have been when American assault forces descended upon them . Les s than adequate defenses plus the inabil ity o f the Japanese f leet units to e f fectively operate in the Marshalls and Gilberts , because o f diminished carrier airpower , had a direct bearing on the success o f the Central Pac i f ic of fens ive .
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However , it was also obvious to the U . S . that any as s ault on the is land bases would require a maj or commitment of force that must be able to e f fectively cut o f f an atol l in the face of available Japanese naval and air power . Despite reduced support , the determination of the Japanese to hold these bases was undiminished . The tenac ity o f the de fenders and their defens ive strength was tes ted on Makin more than a year before Operation Galvanic , the code name for the Gilbert invas ion , was put into ef fect .
The Makin Raid , August 1 9 4 2
On August 9 , 1 9 4 2 , the day Marine forces secured Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomon I s lands , two U . S . submarines departed Pearl Harbor with Lt . Col . Evans F . Carlson ' s 2nd Raider Battal ion on board . NAUTILUS and ARGONAUT , both big prewar " V-boats " c arrying two 6 - inch guns eac h , were assigned to deliver Carlson ' s Raiders to Makin I s land ( actually Butaritari I s land , known by the Gilbertese as Makin Meang ) in the Gilberts for a hit-and-run raid . Ordered by Admiral Nimit z , the attack was primarily intended " . . . to sec ure intelligence about the Japanese installations , strength and inc lination to fight for the atolls of the Central Pac i f ic " ( Hoyt 1 9 7 8 : 1 ) . The raid would also test the e ffectiveness o f the newly formed Marine raider battalions a s wel l , although their true test would come on Guadalcanal . Inte l li gence data indicated the Gilberts were relatively lightly de fended , having been occupied by Japan after the war started , thus their selection as a target .
By August 1 6 , the two submarines were off Makin and the raider forces were l anded in the early morning in rubber boats with small outboard motors . The accidental discharge o f a Marine rifle a lerted the de fenders ( about 2 0 0 in number ) and a fire fight erupted . By late afternoon , Carlson ' s Raiders still had not secured the is land , despite f ire support f rom the submarines ; the raiders had also taken about 3 0 casualties , 1 1 dead . The Japanese incl ination to fight was certainly not in doubt- -the Marines had to kil l them all and were not able to capture any prisoners , nor quickly disengage . Forced to stay on the beach overnight , the Raiders withdrew the next day , but not eas i ly . Boats swamped , motors died and many had to swim for it . Withdrawal was completed that day , despite some aerial haras sment from Japanese aircraft from other is lands . Total American casualties amounted to 18 dead and 12 miss ing ; 9 of the mis sing were men unintentional ly left behind , c aptured and executed .
The Marine raiders killed the de fenders , burned suppl ies and install ations , reportedly s ank a small transport , c aptured
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intel ligence data I and then withdrew . The cold l ight of e postwar analys is suggested the raid to have been more nearly a disaster , but the individual Marines had , as they would so many times , turned a bad s ituation into a victory . Postwar records show the Japanese did not l ose any aircraft in this operation and the small transport was not credited .
Properly hailed as a victory in the wartime c ivil ian press s t i l l beset by the early de featist attitudes toward the war , the Makin raid was , in some respects , detrimental to the war e f fort . I t t ipped the Navy ' s hand to the Japanese and pointed out the glaring vulnerabi l ity o f these outpost i s l ands to the Japanese high command , who immediately began to correct this oversight . One is land area in particular was immediately reinforced--Tarawa . The Japanese also scoured a l l the i s l ands , rounding up coastwatchers and others , all of whom were subsequently tortured and killed .
Gilberts I nvas ion , November 1 9 4 3
More than a year after the Makin raid , Operation Galvanic was original ly to have inc luded both Tarawa and Nauru is lands , but Makin was substituted for Nauru l ate in the p lanning stages ( Figure 6 . 2 ) . American forces for the attack included the 2 nd Marine Divis ion under Maj . Gen . Jul ian c . Smith and the U . S . Army ' s 2 7th Divis ion under Ma j . Gen . Ralph Smith . Overall command o f the as s ault forc es went to another Smith, Marine Lt . Gen . H . M . Smith , nicknamed " Howlin ' Mad . " Command o f the amphibious as s ault force , which now inc luded eight escort c arriers and seven o ld battleships , went to Rear Adm . Richmond Kel ly Turner . Nearly 1 0 0 Army bombers and about 300 Marine and Navy land-based aircraft were used to support the as s ault , but the real punch behind the invas ion was Admiral Spruance ' s 5th Fleet , inc luding 6 big c arriers , 5 l ight carriers , 8 escort carriers , 6 new battleships , 1 5 heavy and l ight c ruisers , and 6 5 destroyers . E ighteen attack transports were accompanied by tankers , minesweepers , tenders and amphibious c raft o f the as sault force .
The as s ault on Tarawa marked the return o f the veteran carrier ENTERPRI S E to the Central Pac i f ic . Its last vis it to the Central Pac i f ic had been the raid on Wake and Marcu s in February 1 9 4 2 . This t ime it woul d not be one lone carrier and two heavy cruisers . For this invas ion , the c arrier task forces would stick c lose in s upport of the l andings rather than engaging in long-range , hit-and-run strikes against widely separated targets . This was a conservative approach to carrier warfare dictated as much by the fact that amphibious assault techniques were new and full of risk as by any conservatism on the part o f the commanders .
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Fig . 6 . 2 . Both Tarawa and Makin were heavily defended , and the battles there were the f irst in which the Marines faced the Japanese . The rec apture o f the Gilberts was a turning point in the Paci f ic War .
2 2 5
The c arriers did partic ipate in sof tening up the i s l ands in 4t September 1 9 4 3 , when three c arriers struck Butari t ari in Makin Atoll and Betic in Tarawa Ato l l . The is lands were attacked s everal times on September 1 8 , which caused cons iderable damage to fac i l ities and des troyed aircraft and shipping , mostly small vessel s . The Japanese defenders were now assured of continued attention as they prepared for the inevitable as sault . In October , the carriers attacked Wake , doing more damage and destroying air power in the area . Like the e arly raids in the Central Pac i f ic , c arriers and aircraft were given a f inal honing and training before the main as s ault , but unl ike previous raids , knocking out the supporting air power that could interfere with the assault was a primary obj ective . The stage was set , and c arrier- and land-based air pounded the Gi lbert I s lands continuous ly prior to the invas ion .
Oppos ing the landings on Tarawa and Makin were the 7 th Sasebo Spec ial Landing Force and supporting units inc luding labor battal ions , commanded during the as s ault by Rear Adm . Kei j i Shibas aki . Admiral Shibasaki ' s men had constructed impres s ive defenses on Tarawa where Japanese forces were concentrated . Makin had fewer men and less e laborate de fenses , but overall the area had been converted into a virtual fortress .
On the morning 0 f November 2 0 I 1 9 4 3 I the Marine and Army e assault forces landed on Tarawa and Makin in the face of intense oppos it ion and were hampered by the miscalculat ion of tides that stranded many l anding craft hundreds of yards off the beach . The preassault bombardment by ships and aircraft had been insuf f ic ient , leaving many areas undamaged . Tarawa became a three-day blood bath in which the outcome was in doubt for the Marines before they f inally gained the upper hand on the second day of the invas ion . Makin was eas ier , but the u . s . Army ' s 2 7 th Divis ion , less experienced than the Marines and unfortunately saddled with some ine f fective commanders , had a tough time o f it . While the Marines and Army suf fered thousands kil led and wounded while a s s aulting the formidable defenses o f Makin and Tarawa , the Navy provided air cover for the assaul t . Because the c arriers were tied to the vic inity of the amphibious as s ault , they were vulnerable to attack . The escort c arrier LI SCOMBE BAY paid for that vulnerability and was torpedoed and sunk by I - 1 7 5 on November 2 1 , 1 9 4 3 , with the loss of over 6 4 0 men . Nearly 1 , 0 0 0 men died assaulting Tarawa and over 2 , 0 0 0 were wounded . The Japanese garrison was kil led almost to a man ; a few Japanes e were captured but mos t o f the survivors were Korean laborers . The de fenders and the de fenses gave a c lear indic ation o f how it would be in the Central Pac i f ic as each i s l and base was c aptured .
2 2 6
After the battle , it was apparent that s erious American mistakes were made at Tarawa . The need for e f fective , self-propelled , landing craft c apable o f negotiating reef s was high o n the l i s t a long with much more naval and aerial bombardment . To the c redit of the senior American commanders , these deficienc ies were rapidly corrected , although it was c lear that no amount o f bombardment was going to be completely e f fective against the types of defenses the Japanese were insta l l ing throughout the Central Pac i f ic .
For one part o f the Central Pac i f ic , Japanese naval and merchant tra f f ic c eased and American development began . Capture o f the Gilberts resulted in an immediate inf lux o f men and material to construct and activate u . s . air bases and facil ities to be used in pounding the Marshal l I s l and bases in preparation for the next amphibious invas ion . Airfields constructed on the Gilbert I s l ands were heavily used for land-based bombing , reconnaissance , transport and supply e f forts directed at the Marshal l s and , later , Truk . The advance across the Central Pac i f ic was so rapid that many o f the Gi lbert I s l and bases were greatly reduced i n personnel and c apability within a year , some s erving primarily as transport centers . I nvas ion o f the Marshalls was made cons iderably eas ier by the presence of a large photoreconnaissance team based in the Gilberts . American forces were thus able to obtain up-to -date intel l igence on Japanese naval and base fac il ities in the Marsha l l s , unl ike the situation prior to the invas ion in the Gilberts when reconnais s ance ef forts were more l imited and far les s e f fective .
Neither Makin nor Tarawa was l arge enough to develop into a ma j or fleet base--a fact o ften used to critic ize the Tarawa invasion and its cos t . However , the u . s . Navy had to begin somewhere , and the Gilberts were the easiest piece of the Central Paci f ic to cut o f f . Despite the cost and despite their l imited long-range u s efulnes s , the Gilberts were the correct place to start . Capture o f the Gilberts opened the entire Central Pac i f ic to invas ion .
u . s . submarine patrols continued to focus their e f forts on constant attrition . With ever-increas ing succes s , they prevented many tons o f suppl ies and personnel from getting to the Japanes e " front l ines . " For example , one submarine s ank a transport and prevented s ome 1 , 2 0 0 troops from arriving at Tarawa prior to the American invas ion . The troops that survived sat out the war in Jaluit . A lthough the s ubmarine service had been p lagued with torpedo trouble up to l ate 1 9 43, the problems were fixed and the increase in s inkings was immediate and serious . Increas ingly , submarine ef fectiveness contributed s igni ficantly to the e f fort directed at conquering the remainder of the Japanese-held
2 2 7
Central Pac i f ic islands . Newly-published ( 1 9 8 9 ) documents � also show that a cons iderable number o f damaged ships at various i s l and bases burdened the Japanese supply problem even more than had been thought ( for more on this , see the section on the Truk Raid ) .
The capture o f the Gilberts , provided the " break " in the Japanese outer defens ive perimeter vital for eventual victory . This battle also marked the end of the Japanese advance across the Pac i f ic ( Figure 6 . 3 ) . I t also al lowed the Navy and Army to increase the pres sure on the next targets and keep areas that were to be by-pas sed pounded down and ine f fective for the remainder o f the war .
By-passed is land bases were not ignored , rather , they c ame under day and night bombing raids , bombardment by surface ships and general harassment . Most remaining Japanes e is land bases turned from defense to vegetable gardening and f i shing as the war continued and no surface or air transport could get through with suppl ies . The Japanese Navy , under pres sure from the Army , continued to attempt to supply these bases by submarine with l imited succes s . I t was now f ar more dangerous for Japanese submarines anywhere in the Pac ific than for their American counterparts ; the U . S . Navy , learning from its Atlantic experiences with U-boats , had a far more e f fective antisubmarine program than did Japan .
Kwa j alein I nvas ion , January-February 1 9 4 4
P lanning for the invation o f the Marsha l l s by U . S . forces was concurrent with that for the Gilberts because o f t he proximity o f the two island groups and the neces s ity o f a tight schedule to f it in with other planned Pac ific operations in the Solomons and New Guinea .
Pressure on the Marshalls to the northwes t increased a fter the succes s ful attack on the Gi lbert bases . Admiral Nimitz , in response to the naval problems as soc iated with the Gilbert c ampaign , spec i f ic al ly the loss o f L ISCOME BAY and damage to INDEPENDENCE and LEXINGTON , determined that fast c arrier raids should be more aggre s s ively used to e l iminate air power in the vic inity o f the next targets . Further , he hoped to l imit damage by not tying carrier forces too c lose to an amphibious invas ion for too long .
On December 4 , 1 9 4 3 , two o f the c arrier task groups o f Task Force 5 0 ( soon to become TF- 5 8 ) raided Kwa j alein itself ( Figure 6 . 4 ) . Four heavy and two light carriers attac king from the unexpected northern direction des troyed many aircraft , s ank at least four transports and damaged the light cruis ers I SUZU and NAKA in attacks on Roi-Namur and Kwa j alein �
2 2 8
THE PACIFIC THEATER DF WAR �®�� c �@��
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Fig . 6 . 3 . the Pac i f ic ,
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Japanese
2 2 9
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occupation o f i s l ands in
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Fig . 6 . 4 . The i s l ands of Kwa j alein , Wot j e , a l l heavi ly reinforced by the Japanese prior in January-February 1 9 4 4 .
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Jaluit , Maloelap and M i l i were to the attac k on the Marsha l l s
as wel l as Wot j e . Aircraft , airfields , de fenses and base facil ities were also hit hard . The Japanese responded with night air attacks on the withdrawing carrier group , damaging the carrier LEX INGTON with one torpedo hit .
Kwa j alein , central ato l l o f the Marshal l group , was always cons idered a prime target in Pac i f ic war planning . I t was f inal ly selected as the focal point for the next American assault because o f the almost-completed air f ield there and because solid inte l l igence data indicated to Admiral Nimitz ' planners that it would be an eas ier target than Wot j e , Maloelap , Jaluit or Mi l i , a l l o f which the Japanes e were reinforcing to the best o f their ability after the fall o f the Gilberts . Selection o f Kwa j alein met with res i stance from Nimit z ' subordinate commanders , who felt the eastern group of i s l ands , the Ratak Chain , would be more appropriate . Nimitz prevailed , primarily because he felt his air admira l s , chaf ing under the command o f more conservat ive surface-oriented o f f icers , were correct in their assumption that the fast c arrier task forc e , properly employed , could hit widely separated i s l ands and keep them ine f fective while Kwaj alein was assaulted . There were enough c arriers for the j ob now , inc luding escort c arrier groups that could absorb much of the " routine " assau l t work on the beaches as wel l as antisubmarine patrol and f ree the big carriers f or operations distant from the primary target .
The Kwa j alein as s ault gave the U . S . Navy an opportunity to utilize the big c arriers without being too conservative . This time the carriers would be more mobile and would avoid the mistakes o f the Gilberts . The Kwa j alein invas ion would add its weight to the theories o f the air-minded Navy , and set the stage for the devas tating carrier air attack at Truk l ater in the war .
The organization for " Operation Flintlock " was s imilar to " Galvanic " in the Gilberts and utilized many of the s ame naval task groups and amphibious forces . Admiral Spruance , Commander 5th F leet , was in overal l command , while Rear Adm . Turner was again in command o f the assault forces ( Task Force 5 1 ) . Ma j . Gen . C . H . Corlett , USA , commanded the 7 th Infantry Divis ion assigned to as sault Kwa j alein . The northern l anding force on Roi-Namur was under the command of Maj . Gen . Harry Schmidt , U . S . Marine Corps , with units of the 4 th Marine Divis ion . The reserve force under Capt . D . W . Loomis , u . s . Navy , was used as a f loat ing back-up in case things got tough on the beaches ; as it turned out , this group became Task Group 5 1 . 1 1 , as s i gned to take Eniwetok ( Operation " Catchpole " ) . There were approximately 5 4 , 0 0 0 as s au l t troops in these three groups in comparison to about 2 7 , 8 0 0 troops in the Gilberts operation .
2 3 1
The j oint expeditionary force for the assault cons isted of almost 3 0 0 ships plus the fast c arrier task force and submarines as signed to war patrols and reconnai s s ance in the area . This as s au l t force was a cons iderable improvement over that used for the Gi lberts operation , whose harsh and bloody les sons had been quickly learned . Amphibious as sault forces were greatly improved by better amphibious tractors and supported by mod i f ied amphibious vehic les des i gned for c lose inshore f ire support of landing troops . Communications between commander s and forces ashore were greatly improved by spec ially des igned communications and command ships , such as Admiral Turner ' s flagship ROCKY MOUNT . Improved air support and attack techniques were devel oped for the as s ault , inc luding better air communic ations and practice against fort i f ic at ions such as those found at Tarawa , which were constructed on Kahoolawe in the Hawai ian I s lands for Navy and Marine practice .
Overall , the preparation for the Kwa j alein assault was a vast improvement over that for the Gi lberts , part icularly direct support for the assault troops duri ng the landings and the air assaults prior to the landings . The fast carrier task force , aided by l and-based air from the Gilbert bases , gained control o f the air and eliminated Japanese air power before the assault . The strategy used for Kwa j alein set the pattern for al l subsequent Paci f ic island operations .
The Japanese responses to American preparations for attac king Kwa j alein were conspic ious by their absence . Admiral Koga , commander o f the Combined Fleet following the death of Admiral Yamamoto in April 1 9 4 3 , in his flagship MUSASHI at Truk , had l ittle with which to respond . Koga ' s carrier- and land-based aircraft had been exhaus ted in the continuing struggle to hol d the Bismarcks and Solomons against the combined MacArthur-Halsey as s aults in the south and southwest Pac i f ic . Some Imperial Japanese Navy submarines were deployed from Truk on o f fens ive patro l ; however , these were the only representatives o f the Navy on hand when Kwa j alein was invaded . Their impact on events can be gauged by the fact that the historical record mentions that four submarines were lost and little else .
The Imperial Navy , still crippled by the loss o f four aircraft c arriers at Midway., could not de fend the Central Pac i fic , and the Imperial Army was fully occupied elsewhere . Without fast c arriers and the ir aircraft and with insuf ficient long-range bombers operating in the Central Pac i fic , the s t i l l -powerful Japanese Combined Fleet ' s s ur face warships could not succes s fu l ly intervene when faced with a U . S . force o f 1 0 to 1 2 heavy and l ight carriers plus a battle group o f 8 fast new battleships and their escorts . The dec is ion o f the high command was obviou s - -the Central Pac i f ic tt
2 32
perimeter would not be heavily reinforced ; those solders and sailors already there would stand and die , extracting as heavy a tol l as pos s ible in the process , while the de fens ive perimeter was redrawn on the Tokyo s ituation maps . Many s imilar dec is ions would have to be made in the near future , and each new line would be drawn c loser to Japan itsel f .
On January 3 1 , 1 9 4 4 , a smal l assault force under Rear Admiral Hil l took Ma j uro Atol l in the eastern Marshalls in the f irst s tage o f the Kwa j a lein as s aul t . Three Japanese soldiers were c aptured and no one was k i lled on either side . Maj uro was c aptured by 9 : 5 5 a . m . , and the American f lag was " . . . raised on the f irst Japanese territory--Japanese be fore the war--to fall into American hands " ( Morison 1 9 5 1 VI I : 2 2 7 ) . The f irst break had been made eas ily , but much bloodshed would fol low on Kwaj alein and Roi-Namur .
Naval bombardment o f Kwa j alein from the old battleships and support cruisers and des troyers commenced early on January 3 1 , 1 9 4 4 , while the assault forces disembarked from transports and headed for Roi -Namur . Assault troops hit Red and Green beaches on Roi and Namur , respectively , about noon on January 3 1 , and the fight turned into the s ame f ight that would develop on every Pac i fic is land invaded--tough , bloody and relentless , against an intel l igent , resourceful and exceptionally tenac ious enemy . The extent to which lessons from Tarawa were taken to heart was obvious in this as s au l t , because the Roi -Namur complex was captured in three days o f hard fighting , although the i s land was better prepared and de fended than Tarawa . Naval air and surface bombardment was far heavier than in previous attacks , and the assault forces were better prepared , trained and equipped for the j ob . Almost three times the tonnage o f bombs and shel ls landed on Roi -Namur than were spent at Tarawa , and the o ld battleships were operating less than a mile o f f shore , with l i ghter s hips operating even c loser . Additionally , artillery battalions landing on small islets near Roi-Namur added their explos ives to the devastat ion , along with general and call-strike air support throughout the as s ault .
Sma l l is lets adj acent to Kwa j alein were captured on January 3 0 , 1 9 4 4 , with about 1 2 5 Japanese kil led compared to 3 Americans . One o f the bene fits o f this preliminary a s s ault was the capture o f some 7 5 secret Japanese naval c harts o f cons iderable value for operations i n the Central Pac i f ic , particularly information on mine f ields . On January 3 1 , Ennylabegan and Enubu j , sma l l is lets that form a portion o f Kwa j alein Atoll ' s protect ive ree f , were captured for u s e a s artil lery bases and the main assault o n Kwa j alein its e l f commenced o n February 1 .
2 3 3
Japanese de fenders res isted the Americans with the s ame � ferocity regardless o f odds or equipment ; most had to be found , dug out , and then burned , s hot , or buried in their de fenses ; very few surrendered . The Japanese pol icy o f " no surrender " was one of the factors that prevented air and ship bombardment from being all that the ground soldier , who had to step onto the beac h , might wish . This was particularly true in areas where the Japanese coul d really dig in , such as Pelileu and Iwo Jima . The prelanding bombardment as sau l t on the Kwa j alein I s l ands was probably a s success ful as any ; for example , o f the Roi defenders only about 3 0 0 men survived the bombardment . Roi and Namur were overrun by 2 : 1 5 p . m . on February 2 , 1 9 4 4 , with the last Japanese kil led or captured . The 4 th Marine Divis ion was quickly rel ieved by garrison and construct ion units , and the islands were in use as an air base complex within two weeks . The battle on Kwa j alein was s imilar to that at Roi , but elements of the u . s . Army ' s 7th I n fantry Divis ion , which had captured Attu , faced the Japanese on that island .
As an example o f pre landing surface and air bombardment , Kwa j alein had few , i f any , equals when one cons iders the acreage under attack . For this i s l and alone , the U . S . Navy deployed 4 old battleships , 3 new battleships ( borrowed from the supporting fast carrier tas k group ) , 3 heavy cruisers , 1 l i ght cruiser and 1 1 destroyers . Air support was provided by ._. two heavy , one l ight and three escort carriers , although air � support was somewhat l imited by bad weather . In varying degrees , this weaponry was deployed against Kwaj alein from the morning of the as s ault unt i l the island was secured . This type o f close-in continual support earned the nickname " Spruance Haircut . "
Assault troops landed on the Kwa j alein lagoon beaches on February 1 , 1 9 4 4 , at 9 : 3 0 a . m . -- 1 , 0 0 0 troops were ashore within 1 0 minutes . Pitted against about 4 , 0 0 0 defenders , they advanced inland and by 1 1 : 3 0 a . m . were facing determined res istance from wel l-prepared pos itions . Although the pressure on both s ides was continual , by nightfall over 1 0 , 0 0 0 American troops were ashore . At night the assault troops faced the usual Japanese night attacks , infiltration and harassment . The night attacks s taged on Kwa j alein were repulsed , with heavy los ses for the Japanese . Continual f ire support was provided by the Navy for the American troops ashore , a luxury the Japanese did not have . Progress against the ingenious Japanese style of c oncrete and coconut-log blockhouses , bunkers and trenches was s low , but by February 5 the fighting was over , leaving only the prec autionary c leaning up o f the smal ler is lands o f the atoll . On February 6 , 1 9 4 4 , the garrison forces took over . American casualties for the battle were around 3 7 2 kil led and 1 , 5 8 2 wounded with
2 3 4
about 7 , 8 7 0 Japanese kil led and 2 6 5 taken prisoner ( Morison 1 9 5 1 VI I : 2 7 8 ) .
While Kwa j alein ( and Eniwetok in part icular ) became advanced naval bases and airfields , the problem of Truk and the Marianas with their unknown quantities of air power was addres sed by the fast carrier task force . Fol lowing support of the Kwaj alein invas ion , the fast carriers took the next step in their wartime deve lopment as a powerful , ful ly e ffective , strategic weapons system . The Imperial Japanese Navy , on the other hand , wou ld become incapable o f winning any battle , in a strategic sense , anywhere in the Pac ific .
Capture o f Eniwetok by Brig . Gen . T . E . Watson ' s 8 , 0 0 0 troops , Operation " Catchpole , " quickly fol lowed Kwa j alein . The reserve force troops , augmented by units that had partic ipated in the c apture of Kwaj a lein as s aulted and c aptured Engebi I s l and on February 1 7 - 1 8 , 1 9 4 4 , and E niwetok itsel f on February 1 9 -2 3 . Japanese res istance was very l ight in comparison with other i s l and as s au lts , primarily becau se there was very l ittle with which to res ist . E ngebi was a smal l airfield used for s huttl ing aircraft elsewhere and Eniwetok had not even been reinforced by the Japanese until the Gilberts fel l .
Enewetok ' s large l agoon became a forward u . s . naval base o f cons iderable importance in the advance across the Pac i f ic 1 and Americ an construction and build-up on the atol l ' s three maj or i s l ands almost obl iterated evidence o f Japanese occupation on l and .
Truk Raids , February-April 1 9 4 4
With the entire eas tern hal f o f the Central Pac i f ic in Americ an hands , the strategic s ituation for the Japanese , particularly in regard to Truk , changed dramatically . Truk was now vulnerable to attac k , particularly from the fast carriers who did not have to worry about land-based a ircraft at their back if they penetrated too far into the Central Pacific . Admiral Koga was quick to pull the Combined Fleet west to Palau and to leave behind in Truk only those s hips that could not leave because o f damage or , for one reason or another , had to stay . Soon these ships would be gone .
The Truk garrison was , however , in a pos ition to f l ank any further U . S . movements in t he Paci fic beyond Eniwetok . The Marianas bases were also a threat to further westward movement , as they also had l ong-range bomber units avai l able .
For the Central
fast-carrier task Pac i fic in early
forces , the raids made in the 1 9 4 4 were the next important
2 3 5
development in c arrier warfare . Strikes directed at Truk , e Yap , Ponape , Pal au and the Marianas were independent of any immediate amphibious fol low-up ; so t he fast c arriers ranged f ar and wide at their own pace and s c hedule . These powerful , sustained strikes at enemy outposts were c losely coordinated with the capture of Eniwetok and the remainder o f the Marshall I s land bases . The s ame c arriers provided s upport during the Hol l andia landings in New Guinea .
At the t ime " Ha i l stone " was scheduled , American planners were not yet s ure i f Truk , the f irst target , would eventua l ly have to be invaded . More information on Truk ' s strength and c apabilit ies was needed before such a determination could be made ; l ittle was really known o f Truk ' s defenses at the time other than that it was the main forward base for units o f the Japanese Combined Fleet . Regardles s o f its potent ial or actual c apabilit ies , it was obvious to American planners that Truk would have to be neutralized . With the ma j ority of amphibious forces committed to Kwa j alein and operat ions in the South Pac i fic , the fast-carrier task force was the ideal tool for the j ob because of its mas s ed hit-and-run c apabil ity .
The f irst photographic reconnai s sance o f Truk was made February 4 , 1 9 4 4 , by a B- 2 4 Liberator from Bougainville . Appearance o f reconnaissance aircraft tipped the Japanese A I that something was in the wind . Al l those ships o f the W' Combined Fleet that could , left Truk immediately . Only two l ight cruisers , NAKA and KATORI , and about eight destroyers remained from t he f leet units . The damaged l ight cru iser AGANO , the l argest l i ght cruiser to be sunk by a u . s . s ubmarine in World War I I , left Truk on February 1 6 but never made it home , as it ran into a s pread o f torpedoes from submarine SKATE instead . With the heavy Combined Fleet units gone , Truk was even more vulnerable to attack because it had never been heavily built up de fens ively , although Truk did have impres s ive antiaircraft defenses .
Before dawn on February 1 7 , 1 9 4 4 , the carrier task groups , undetected by the Japanese , moved to within 9 0 miles of Dublon . Spread across an ocean area larger than the targets they were attack ing , the aircraft c arrier task groups were compos ed of 5 heavy carriers , ENTERPRISE , YORKTOWN , ESSEX, INTREPID and BUNKER HILL ; 4 l ight carriers , BELLEAU WOOD , CABOT 1 MONTEREY and COWPENS ; 6 new fast battleships 1 IOWA , NEW JERSEY , SOUTH DAKOTA 1 ALABAMA , MASSACHUSETTS and NORTH CAROLINA ; 5 heavy cruisers , SAN FRANCI SCO , BALTIMORE , WICHITA , MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS ; 5 light cruisers , SANTA FE , SAN D IEGO , MOBILE , OAKLAND and B ILOX I ; and 2 6 destroyers . The f irst strike on Truk was a f i ghter sweep des igned to knock down enemy air power ; the 5 big c arriers launched 7 2 F6F Hel lcats whi le the l ight c arriers provided combat air e
2 3 6
patrol over the f leet . The f irst strike was succes s ful ; although 9 0 Japanese aircraft attempted to intercept , 3 0 were shot down and 4 0 were des troyed on the ground . Only four American f ighters were lost in this strike . The second strike inc luded 1 8 Avenger torpedo bombers , loaded with fragmentation bombs , destined for the airfields of Eten , Moen and Param . As Morison wrote , " . . . of 3 6 5 aircraft at Truk when the raid began , fewer than 1 0 0 remained unscathed . . . " ( Morison 1 9 5 1 V I I : 3 2 0 ) .
With the fighters and bombers beaten down , the shipping in Truk Lagoon was next . The light carriers began l aunching deckloads o f fighters , dive bombers and torpedo bombers in staggered lots for continuous coverage . " The power o f this bombing attac k may be gauged roughly by the fac t that there were thirty strikes in all , each s tronger than either of the two Japanese strikes that had done all the damage at Pearl Harbor " ( Morison 1 9 5 1 VI I : 3 2 1 ) . Destruction to the f leet train and auxil iaries was enormous , with over 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons o f shipping , both naval and merchant , sent to the bottom or irreparably wrecked . Thi s includes s hipping sunk on the night of February 17 , 19 4 4 , by 1 0 radar-equipped Avengers from ENTERPRISE in the f irst night-time carrier strike o f the war . About one-third of the total damage to shipping at Truk was credited to this night attac k .
The task force did not get o f f unscathed , however , as the Japanese had radar-equipped planes as wel l . S ix or seven BSN " Kate " torpedo bombers made a run on the force l ate in the evening o f February 1 7 , 1 9 4 4 . Evading night fighters , one Kate was able to get a torpedo into INTREPI D about 1 1 : 0 0 p . m . Eleven men were kil led and seventeen wounded , and INTREP I D had t o b e detached along with the l ight carrier CABOT , two cruisers and four destroyer s for protect ion . Despite this , the attack on Truk was not s topped or even apprec iably slowed down .
Operations resumed on February 1 8 , 1 9 4 4 , with c arriers ENTERPRISE , ESSEX , YORKTOWN and BUNKER HILL " on the 1 ine " l aunching strikes agains t the rema1n1ng ships and concentrating on airfields , ammunition supplies , hangers and f ield fac i l ities . By the t ime the carriers withdrew around noon , 1 , 2 5 0 combat sorties from the c arriers had dropped almost 5 0 0 tons o f bombs and torpedoes on the ships and fac il ities at Truk .
The Truk raid was enormous ly effective . The comb ination o f air power , which did the ma j ority o f damage , surface ships and submarines , operating in the area in late February , s ank over 30 ships . In addition to the light cruisers KATORI , s unk by surface forces , AGANO , sunk by a sub and NAKA , s unk by aircraft ; the Japanese f leet also lost the modern
2 3 7
destroyer MAIKAZ E , sunk with KATORI , the old destroyers 4lt TACHIKAZE 1 OITE and FUMIZUKI ; motor torpedo boat GYORAITEI NO . 1 0 ; and s ubchasers CH-2 4 a nd 2 9 . Merchant ship destruction , inc luding naval auxiliaries was even more seriou s - -transports AKAGI MARU 1 KIYOZUMI MARU 1 AIKOKU MARU , all ex-armed merchant cruisers ; YAMIGIRI MARU 1 TAIHO MARU , MATSUTANI MARU , KENSHO MARU , AMAGI SAN MARU , HANAKAWA MARU , UNKAI MARU NO . 6 1 YAMAKISAN MARU , SAN FRANC ISO MARU 1 RE IYO MARU , HOKUYO MARU , Z UKAI MARU 1 GOSE I MARU 1 JOSAN MARU and SEIKO MARU a l l went down along with aircraft transport FUJIKAWA MARU 1 ammunition ship NICHIRO MARU 1 water c arrier NIPPO MARU ; and auxil iary f leet tankers FUJISAN MARU 1 HOYO MARU , SHINKOKU MARU and TONAN MARU NO . 3 . TONAN MARU NO . 3 was the second l argest merchant ves sel in Japanese service , exceeded only in s i ze by its s ister TONAN MARU NO . 2 . TONAN MARU NO . 3 was s alvaged by the Japanese after the war . Both ships were originally whal ing factory ships .
U . S . submarines operating in the several other losses , but these patrol and were not spec i f ically during the Truk raid .
general area also c aused s ubs were on normal war a s s igned supporting roles
The Navy ' s later asses sment showed t hat , overall , the p lanes could have done better , particularly against the ships , but the damage was still enormous , espe cially among tankers and other ships o f the Japanese Combined Fleet ' s supply train . The loss o f auxil iary and f leet tankers , with their at- sea re fuel ing rigs , was the most serious , depriving the Combined Fleet o f its ability to sustain l ong-range , long-duration operations in the Pac i f ic , at least until more tankers c ould be deployed . In this sense , the new American fast carrier task force , without actually s ighting or directly attacking a s ingle l arge unit o f the Combined Fleet , managed to force that f leet thous ands of miles wes tward , f irst to Palau and then to Borneo and Lingga Roads . Without suffic ient air power , Japan ' s surface Navy was unable to engage U . S . f orces on equal terms ; retreat was the only alternative . The Truk strike was the f irst dent in the remaining Japanese defense perimeter , and Truk was rendered useless as a forward f l eet base . Truk had been so reduced by this strike , and others to fol low , that u . s . planners struck i t from the list o f as sault targets and cons igned Truk to the realm of the by-passed is lands to be haras sed by bomber assaults throughout the remainder o f the war . Fina l ly , on September 2 , 1 9 4 5 , Vice Adm . Chuichi Hara surrendered Truk to American forces on the heavy cruiser PORTLAND ; Vice Adm . George D . Murray , once commanding o f f icer of the ENTERPRI S E , accepted the surrender for the u . s . Navy .
Following the Truk strikes , the fast carrier forces headed for their next targets - -Palau and the Marianas , a c lear
2 3 8
indicat ion that the u . s . Navy was now dominant in the Pacif ic .
Mariana and Palau Raids , March-April 1 9 4 4
The hit-and-run raid by Vice Adm . Marc Mitscher ' s fast carrier task force on February 1 7 - 1 8 , 1 9 4 4 , brought a new phase of warfare to the Central Pac i f ic . The expansion o f the u . s . Pac i f ic f leet t hat began i n mid- 1 9 4 3 f inal ly provided suffic ient l arge c arriers to attack any target , even those that had large l and-based air forces .
The des truction of aircraft , shipping and base fac il ities at Truk had shown that the c arrier task force was , and woul d remain , the dominant o f fens ive force a t sea . I n s u f f ic ient numbers and properly employed , the American fast c arriers would be used not only to cover American amphibious operations during the always -dangerous as sault phases , but also in far-ranging s trikes against enemy targets c lo s e enough to provide air support to bes ieged Japanese de fenders . Once American amphibious forces hit the beachhead , the de fenders would be cut o f f f rom resupply and rearmament from other island bases or the home is lands .
The capabil ity o f the U . S . Navy to strike and seal o f f an area by us ing the fast carriers would wrest the remainder o f the Japanese Central Pac i f ic empire away i n les s than a year . This strategy would also open the door to the Phi l ippines and Japan itsel f with tactics undreamed of at the beginning o f the war . U . S . Naval air power gained skill and improved tactics and equipment as each target was attacked . The carrier forces that attacked the Mariana I s l ands were much more e f fective than t he force s that had assaulted the Gilbert and Marshall is lands , although many of the s hips were the s ame .
The power o f the fast c arriers and t heir e f fect on the Japanese mil itary machine can be gauged by the des peration o f the eventual Japanese response--the kamikaze . I n e f fect , the kamikaze was a cruise mis s i le , at least from the point o f view o f those being attacked . One c an speak vol umes about the use of a human guidance system as opposed to c omputers , but the fac t remains that t he kamikaze was very e f fective against aircraf t carriers , particularly later in the war . The seeds o f the kamikaze e f fort would be planted in the results of the upcoming as s ault on the Marianas that was scheduled to begin in June 1 9 4 4 . But before t he f irst as sault wave hit the beach on Saipan , there was much work for the fast carriers in the Central Pac i f ic . And as a lways , veteran carrier ENTERPRI S E would set the pace for t he Fast Carrier Task Force , TFS 8 .
2 3 9
The strike at Truk c aused Admiral Koga , now commander- in-chief o f the Combined Fleet , to withdraw all forward units to Palau , 1 , 0 5 5 miles west of Truk . Although this removed the Japanese f leet f rom immediate danger , it also further exposed the entire Central Pac i f ic to U . S . f leet- and land-based attac k . By-passed is land bases were sub j ect to constant haras sment and interdict ion raids by s urface forces , submarines , c arriers and l and- and s ea-based air power for the remainder o f the war without inter ference from Japanese naval units . From the u . s . viewpoint , keeping by-pas sed i s l and bases in the Central Pac i fic pounded down night and day prevented any surprises from behind the l ines a s the war moved westward and ensured no reinforcements were moved to forward points . As a bonu s , these sc attered attacks provided minimum-risk practice for u ntried air groups and the l ike be fore they went on to more serious action at " the front . " The general ef fectivene s s o f these attacks is re flected in the los s of merchant s hips to attacks f rom U . S . Navy and Army aircraft ( Figure 6 . 5 , 6 . 6 and 6 . 7 ) .
Admiral Koga ' s retreat from Truk was not who l ly defens ive as the presence o f maj or Combined Fleet units at Palau s till posed a threat to MacArthur ' s planned advance on Hol landia on the northern New Guinea coast . As a result , a c arrier raid on Palau was ordered by Admiral Nimitz to fol low the already-planned f irst strike on the Marianas . With an enormous f leet train o f tankers and support ships capable of keeping the fast c arriers at sea for months , by choice rather than necess ity , inserting another raid in the schedule at such a late date was not really a s erious strain on the u . s . Pac i f ic f leet , and plans moved forward accordingly .
The f irst air attac k on the Marianas commenced on February 2 3 , 1 9 4 4 , with the c arriers launching from wes t o f Guam to take advantage o f the prevail ing w inds . American airc raft destroyed wel l over 1 6 0 Japanese aircraft in the air and on the ground during these attacks as wel l as fac i l ities , small patrol craft and some small merchantmen or auxil iaries . Submarines stationed around the Marianas intercepted escaping ships , and merchant t9nnage losses from all sources amounted to nearly 5 0 , 0 0 0 tons . Most importantly , American aircraft photographed a l l the is lands and , a s Morison indic ates in hi s history , " . . . the photographic intel l igence obtained was even more important than the destruction wrought " ( Mar is on 1 9 5 1 VI I I : l 5 5 ) .
Fol lowing the f irst Marianas s trike , the fast c arriers returned to Ma j uro for rest and replenishment whi le the various land-based air commands continued to pound by-pas sed Japanese bases in the Central Pac i f ic . TF- 5 8 sortied from Maj uro on March 2 2 , 1 9 4 4 , for Palau where strikes were e
2 4 0
YEAR
1 9 4 1
1 9 4 2
1 94 3
1 9 4 4
1 94 5
(TONS X 1 000) 20 40 6 0 80 1 00 1 2 0 1 40
MONTH
DECEMBER 18,Gi01 JANUARY
I . "("-I_ FEBRUARY MARCH 4,109 APRIL ___ _ - 9,798 MAY . ·:· 1 1 0,000 JUNE -l]12,358 JULY .l 20,776 AUGUST 420 I SEPTEMBER . . · 7 , 190 OCTOBER 5,863 NOVEMBER : .':j24,5 10 DECEMBER D,aso I JANUARY L l 41 ,269 FEBRUARY 1 : - 19,478 I MARCH [, > - T 37,739 APRIL -- -- -· 24,521 MAY 2,060 JUNE ••• 1 JULY 4,425 AUGUST 4,488 SEPTEMBER ' -115,429 OCTOBER > :· 115,253 NOVEMBER 1- .---- - I 70,458 DECEMBER _,,_ ._ 'I ' 36,226 JANUARY , _ __ .. . . 22,823
40,J83 FEBRUARY I I MARCH · j13,224 J APRIL ._: .. _ . :·tJ2 1 ,942 MAY 9,828 JUNE 7,763 1 JULY 7,865 AUGUST I 13,6 10 SEPTEMBER 3,258 OCTOBER 1 '-: > 23,827 NOVEMBER I .. 37,350 DECEMBER .. , ___ I - ---- 54,996 JANUARY 1'' . .:-. 23,450 I FEBRUARY 19,198 MARCH · ·< T 52,4 13 APRIL I . 18,174 MAY 4 , 1 18 JUNE .. 35,309 JULY - -- 35,5 1 1 AUGUST - - -- l t ·:.- 73'i41
FROM UNREVISED JANAC/USSBS SOURCES, 1 94 7
Fig . 1 9 4 1
6 . 5 . Japanese merchant through August 1 9 4 5 .
1 60 1 80 2 0 0 2 2 0 2 4 0 2 6 0 2 8 0 300 320 340 3 6 0 380
(300 VESSELS FOR 909,572 TONS)
ship losses to u . s . Army aircraft December
( T O N S X 1 000) 20 40 60 80 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 0 1 6 0
Y E A R M O N T H
1 9 4 1 D E EMBER
1 94 2 JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST [: .:',/; 9,30� SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER C)T;l-;']25,546 NOVEMBER [}'/ l>.:o:;t· ;;:. · r :• :.;.o l:··o ' o /) 77,807 DECEMBER
1 9 4 3 JANUARY 10,568 FEBRUARY
. ..J
MARCH APRIL
MAY
J U N E JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER 5,824 DECEMBER -. 1:::.1 14,397
1 944 ' JANUARY 1' ... /.:' .:1::. :,. 55, 184 FEBRUARY t . =i·>Ja,zo7 MARCH 2,655 A'PR1L 2,2.30 MAY
•••
JUNE I JULY
AUGUST I:O:Je,oiso SEPTEMBER ::-:_:: 8,095 OCTOBER .:;1:)12,258 NOVEMBER :-:.�;:- ,
8�= 2-1 DECEMBER
1 945 JANUARY 549 I I F EBRUARY 1 ,677 MARCH _,.'-���-:�� 14t 7 3 APRIL
MAY L:·.:\lo:'·;, I)T >.< ' ' '. : 1;·._,:·:-.Ja7,49 J U N E ·.:.:-;:-.. :JJ 2 1 ,027 JULY
l••· :i
AUGUST :t F: .. :·J ... •• I
UNREVISED FIOURES FROM USSBS/JANAC SOURCES, 1947
Fig . 6 . 6 December
Japanese merchant ship 1 9 4 1 through August 1 9 4 5 .
1 80 2 0 0 2 2 0 2 4 0 2 6 0 2 8 0 300 320 340 3 6 0 3 8 0
( 1 44 1 /2 V E S S E L S FOR 383, 1 6 8 T O N S . T H I S I N C U D E S V E S S E L S DAMAG!=D FOR DURATION.)
losses to Navy l and-based aircraft
( T O N S X 1 000) 20 40 6 0 80 1 00 1 2 0 1 40 1 60 1 80 200 2 2 0 2 4 0
YEAR MONTH
1 9 4 1 DECEMBER
1 9 4 2 JANUARY FEBRUARY
MARCH 2 1,610 APRIL
MAY
J U N E
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
1 94 3 JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH APRIL
MAY
J U N E JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER 26,0 1 7 1 9 4 4 JANUARY 6,738
FEBRUARY :. ·, . .. : k.:':.,, :< I · · . 186,725 MARCH · . . ,. , .. ··.::as,at APRIL 1,775 MAY 992 JUNE ' :..::_ 85,146 JULY ' ·. 9,486 AUGUST ·J 22,9 1 8 SEPTEMBER · f: ::.· : ; ' · 1 213,250 OCTOBER .,, .. . f , , 1 : ·' . · · .. . · .. ·· 13 1,308 NOVEMBER . .. .. ,: . · . L . I 120,373 DECEMBER 8,2 1 7
1 94 5 JANUARY . .::': , .. . ·· FEBRUARY 1,384 MARCH ·. · 50,437 APRIL MAY
JUNE JULY 'i.' li .. ,
. . . 1 77,3j'
AUGUST f .. i FROM UNREVISED JANAC/USSBS SOURCES, 1 9 4 7
+ FOR PURPOSES OF THIS GRAPH, SHIPS LISTED AS DAMAGED AND OUT OF ACTION ARE INCLUDED WITH SINKINGS
Fig . 1 9 4 1
6 . 7 . Japanese through August
merchant 1 9 4 5 .
ship losses to Navy
2 6 0 2 8 0 300 3 2 0 3 4 0 3 6 0 3 8 0
: : 308,4 1 9 ,.
(393 1 / 2 VESSELS FOR 1 ,4 5 3 , 1 3 3 TONS)
c arrier aircraft December
scheduled to commence on April 1 . P l ans were advanced a day , It however , because the task force was s ighted on March 2 5 and 2 6 by Truk-based search planes . As was usual in these attac ks , U . S . submarines surrounded the Palaus in hopes of picking o f f f leet units escaping from the harbor . However , the Japanese were tipped o f f and the ma jor f leet units had already left at high speed and had avoided the waiting submarines . Los s of one submarine , TULL I BEE , sunk by one of its own torpedoes making a c ircular run , and unfamiliarity with Palau in general caused the submarines to be less success ful than at the Marianas . Only the super battleship MUSASHI , hit forward by one torpedo from U . S . s ubmarine , TUNNY , was damaged in the escape from Palau . Despite the retreat o f the Japanese Combined Fleet , Palau was not entirely de fenseless , and on March 2 8 the fast c arriers were attacked by Japanese torpedo bombers , with no damage to the f leet and many los ses for the Japanese .
By March 3 0 , 1 9 4 4 , Palau ' s de fenders were as ready as they could be for the attack , but readine ss availed nothing . The carriers BUNKER HILL , LEX INGTON and HORNET sent in their Avenger torpedo bombers , armed with mines , and sealed the harbor exits . They trapped over 3 0 ships , which were then destroyed at leisure during the fol lowing day and a hal f of air s trikes by the fast c arriers . Postwar accounts credit some 3 6 ships sunk or destroyed for almost 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 tons . A Losses to this air attack inc luded the f leet repair s hip W AKASHI ; old destroyer WAKATAKE ; PATROL BOAT NO . 3 1 ; submarine chaser CH- 6 ; auxi liary submarine chasers CHA- 2 2 , 2 6 and 5 3 ; naval tankers SATA , IRO and OSE ; auxil iary netlayers NISSHO MARU NO . 5 and SHOSE I MARU ; and auxil iary tankers AKEBONO MARU and AMATSU MARU among many others documented in the historical sources . Later TF- 5 8 raids and the invas ion of Palau would add still more victims to the l i s t .
As at Truk , many o f these s hips were part o f the f leet train of the Combined Fleet and the losses , particularly of naval tankers , had a pro found e f fect on the future c ourse o f the war . Palau ' s air bases and aircraft were also severely damaged , but the is land ' s proximity to the Phil ippines meant that the only real knock-out blow to Japanese air power would be by invas ion . As it was , the retreat of the Combined Fleet to Tawi-Tawi , Borneo and Lingga Roads was a severe de feat in itsel f . All of New Guinea now lay open to invas ion , and that invas ion by MacArthur ' s forces was not long in coming .
Fol lowing the Palau strike , the fast c arriers returned to Maj uro , striking Yap and Woleai on the way . By Apri l 6 , 1 9 4 4 , the fast carriers were all back at Ma j uro and were preparing for the support o f the Hol landia invas ion and additional raids in the Central Pac i f ic .
2 4 4
The raids on Truk , the Marianas and Palau set a new s tandard of warfare in the Pac i fic . Gone were t he fast isol ated raids by small carrier groups , replaced by mass ive long-range strikes sustained for days at a time . The addition o f night operational c apabilities a little later in the war would make 2 4 -hour operations poss ible as wel l . Combined with amphibious forces , the o f fens ive carrier forces would be unstoppable . Air operations combined with the constant attrition by submarines would bleed the Japanese Empire dry . First , however , a forward operational base would be needed to ensure the assault on Japan could not be out f lanked . The Marianas were ideal for this purpose and would also serve as bases for the new B-2 9 bomber .
One great advantage accruing to U . S . forces preparing for the assault on the Marianas was the fact that the fast c arrier task force had forced the Japanese Combined Fleet from Truk to Singapore and the home is lands . Gathering the Combined Fleet to de fend the Mariana s would now be far more d i f f icult , and the fuel oil s ituation would be critical , both elements o f disaster . While the Truk and Palau raids did much damage to shipping in the area , they also had strategic impact because they displaced Japanese forces from e f fective interference in the Marianas .
In the period from November 1 9 4 3 to April 1 9 4 4 , the fast c arriers and their supporting battleships , c ruisers and destroyers as s isted in the capture of two island groups in the Central Pac i f ic , pounded some 20 other small is l and bases into impotence , des troyed 2 maj or Japanese f leet bases at Truk and Palau , and shoved the still powerful Combined F leet some 2 , 0 0 0 miles westward without having directly engaged that f leet in air or surface action . The fast c arriers also supported a maj or invas ion in the South Pac i fic unt i l land-based a i r could take over , made the first strike into the Japanese inner defense perimeter , and gained enormous ly valuable photo inte l l igence in the proce s s . In the dark days o f February 1 9 4 2 , it had been ENTERPRISE and two c ruiser s on a lone raid into the Central Pac i f ic . Now it was ENTERPRISE and a carrier task force that , in battle disposition , covered some 4 0 0 square miles of ocean . Later in the war , the Okinawans would coin the phrase " typhoon o f s teel " to describe the e f fect of such a task force .
Assault on the Mariana I s lands
The Marianas presented a much di f ferent target for the American amphibious forces ass igned to its capture ( Fi gure 6 . 8 ) . Instead of small atoll islands , the Marianas were l arger , with rugged mountainous terrain . There was p lenty o f
2 4 5
room for defending armies to maneuver and plenty of tt opportunity for in-depth defens ive pos itions . Fortunately for the assault forces , al l was not wel l with the de fending Japanes e in the summer o f 1 9 4 4 .
Although Guam , Saipan and Tinian formed a maj or naval and air headquarters area , one o f the most important in the Pac i fic for the Japanese , none of the is lands had the defens ive pos itions or trained personnel it should have had to withstand an amphibious as s ault . Japanese planners had not expected the threat to the Marianas so soon , because Saipan was a part o f the inner defense perimeter , far from the front l ines o f early 1 9 4 4 . When the threat was realized , particular ly after the f irst f a s t c arrier raids , the Japanese began to mobilize forces for the defense of the Marianas . Army f orces with their equipment and supplies were loaded in convoys for the Marianas and additional air power was staged in from the home is lands , from the by-passed Central Pac i f ic base o f Truk and from Palau .
Although air reinforcements were fairly s uccess ful in reaching the Marianas , Army forces were not . By mid- 19 4 4 , the American submarine war was raging at its height . Now , instead o f a ship or two being lost on a long j ourney , entire convoys were be ing dec imated by s ingle submarines and groups of marauding submarines emulat ing the day-and-night , � wol f -pack tactics o f their German counterparts in the ., Atl antic . Many ships bound for Saipan and Tinian never made it ; thous ands o f troops and hundreds of thous ands o f tons of weapons and supplies were lost at sea , which dec is ively weakened the defenses of the Marianas . Probably for the f irst t ime in the war , the contribution o f U . S . submarines to the succes s o f an amphibious a s sault was equally as s igni f icant as was the power o f the covering naval forces and the grit and fortitude o f the as s ault forces themselves . In the Marianas operations , submarines alone accounted for the great ma j ority o f the losses o f supplies and reinforcements for these i s l ands be fore the battle had begun .
American p lanning for the Marianas took into account the s i z e o f the land mas ses t o b e attacked ; the Americ an forces were beefed up to accommodate the l arger s i ze o f the i s l ands . Under Admiral Nimitz ' s direction from Pearl Harbor , the attacking force cons isted o f the 5th Fleet under Admiral Spruance , which included Task Force 5 8 ; the fast c arriers and e ight modern battleships under Vice Admirals Mitscher and Lee ; and the Joint Expeditionary Force ( amphibious assault force ) under Vice Admiral Turner . This group comprised some 5 3 5 combat ships ranging from battleships and c arriers down to landing craft . They would put 1 2 7 , 5 7 1 a s s ault troops , 4 - 1 /2 reinforced divis ions , on shore at the two amphibious beachheads on S aipan and Guam . D-Day would be June 1 5 , 1 9 4 4 , 41t
2 4 6
° Far a l l o n d e P ajeros
Maug Islands og
'V Asu n cion Island
0 Agrihan
Pagan /)
MARIANA ISLANDS 'V A l amagan
Fig . 6 . 8 . preliminary 1 9 4 4 .
0 G u g u a n
0 Sarigan
o A n atahan
Far a l l o n d e Medini l la o
0 SA IPA N
T i n i a n Q o Aguijan
p R ot a
The as sault on the Mariana I s l ands began with air strikes on Guam , Saipan and Tinian in June
2 4 7
j us t 1 0 days after the invas ion o f Normandy , hal f a world e away . I n support of the assaulting naval forces would be the Service Force ; Pac i f ic Fleet , under Vice Adm . Wil l iam Calhoun ; a supply group capable of maintaining both the 5th Fleet and amphibious forces at sea for weeks . Also in support were the l and-based aircraft o f Vice Adm . John Hoover ' s Forward Area Central Pac i f ic , operating from i s l and bases recently in Japanese hands ; and , last , the submarine forces in support of the Marianas operation .
Such was the fortune o f materiel power for American forces in June 1 9 4 4 and misfortune for the Japanese . The Japanese would respond with the s ame feroc ity , tenac ity and s ingle-minded purpose on the battle f ield . The result , against overwhelming odds , was entirely predictable ; the cost in blood was not , and it would be high .
Genera l Hol land M . Smith , U . S . Marine Corps , was in command o f the as sault forces , which cons isted primarily o f the 2nd and 4th Marine Divi s ions , the 3rd Amphibious Corps and the U . S . Army ' s 2 7 th Infantry Divis ion under Lt . Gen . Ralph Smit h , U . S . Army . These forces were divided into a northern attack force ( TF-52 ) bound for S aipan , a s outhern attack force ( TF-5 3 ) bound for Guam , and a f loating reserve supported by seven escort c arriers . Amphibious forces for the a s s ault staged from Guadalcanal , Hawaii , Kwaj alein , � Eniwetok and Ma j uro , beginning on May 2 9 , 1 9 4 4 . � Beginning in early June 1 9 4 4 , American forces gathered at sea with Task Force 5 8 taking the point . During the approach to the Marianas , Army land-based air forces staged interdiction raids against Peleliu , Yap , Woleai , and Truk and American intell i gence began to pick up information that the Japanese were executing their plan to deploy ma j or naval forces in defense o f the Marianas . Whatever forces the Japanese sent , they would have to face 7 heavy and l ight carriers with over 8 0 0 airc raft , 8 modern 1 6 - inch gunned battleships , 8 heavy cru isers , 6 l ight cruisers , 4 antiaircraft light cruisers and 6 6 destroyers before even reaching the amphibious forces , which had 1 0 escort c arriers ( 3 with the fuel ing group ) , 8 old battleships , 6 heavy cruisers , 5 light cruisers , 6 8 destroyers and 2 0 des troyer escorts o f their own .
The Japanese were wel l aware o f the materiel superiority of the United States at this point of the war ; however , it is doubtful that even the most pes s imistic Japanese s taff planner could have predicted they would have to engage 2 2 3 ma j or warships in order to defend the Marianas and chase the invaders back into the sea . The bas ic Japanes e plan was , in part , dictated by Tas k Force 5 8 . Japan would have to use the nine remaining f leet and l ight c arriers from an advantageous lee pos ition east of the Phil ippines and west o f the Marianas 4lt
2 4 8
in order to launch mas s ive air strikes against the American c arrier forces . These c arriers and their escorting warships were on the move in early June but not in time to prevent the initial landing on Saipan , first o f the American targets .
Saipan Invas ion , June-August 1 9 4 4
Preliminary strikes on Guam , Saipan and Tinian commenced June 1 1 , 1 9 4 4 , when 2 1 6 a ircraft from Tas k Force 5 8 hit all three is lands , caused ma j or damage to facil ities , destroyed some 3 0 aircraft and sunk over 3 0 , 0 0 0 tons o f shipping . These strikes continued against all the Mariana I s lands for the next two days when the surface bombardment forces moved in .
Initial shore bombardment was conducted by the newer battleships detached from Task Force 5 8 on June 1 3 , 1 9 4 4 . This bombardment was relatively ineffective due to l imited practice by the crews , and the older battleships took over the next day . Al l told , 7 9 1 6 - inch r i f les and 7 2 1 4 - inch ri fles were employed in the bombardment , supported by the 8 - inch , 6 -inch , and 5 - inch guns from the cruisers and destroyers . Japanese communications were wrecked by this continuous shelling , and there was cons iderable damage to bunkers , caves , trenches and gun emplacements .
Underwater demol ition teams ( UDT } worked over the l anding beach approaches on June 1 4 , under cover of the naval bombardment group . By evening all was in readiness for the morning ' s assault as ships of the Northern Attack Force made a nicely-timed approach to the l anding areas o f f Saipan . Lieutenant General S aito , Lieutenant General Obata , Vice Adm . Chuichi Nagumo ( demoted from sea command following Midway and the Guadalcanal battles } and Vice Admiral Takagi with their 3 1 , 6 2 9 fighting men on Saipan had their work cut out for them .
D-Day , June 1 5 , 1 9 4 4 , on Saipan went much as the Americans had planned . Despite all prel iminar ies , resistance was s t i f f a s landings took place o n a two-divis ion front along Saipan ' s southwes t coast ( Figure 6 . 9 ) . The initial waves o f assault vehic les and troops hit the beach at 8 : 4 4 a . m . and within minutes over 6 0 0 landing craft had depos ited troops on every beach . Eight thousand Marines reached s hore in the first 2 0 minutes , which provided a beachhead broad and deep enough to a ll ow for later deployment , not unl ike the Normandy l andings . Although the l andings were succes s fu l , the Japanese , with plenty o f surviving f ield weapons , prevented any rapid advance . The f irst day ' s planned advance l ine was not captured for 3 days . By the end o f the f irst day ' s f ighting , some 2 0 , 0 0 0 troops were ashore , and it was obvious to all present that Saipan was not going to be easy . Early
2 4 9
Fig . 1 5 to
®
2d 1.nd !lth Narine O i v i a i ons l and. I & June.
27th l n h n t r y D i v i s i on ( Coru ,.nerve) lands: !65th I n fantry on n i ght 16- 17 June, IOSth I n fantry on 17 J u n e , 1 06 t h I n fa n t r y on 20 June.
J a 1 u n e a e l a u n c h n i '] h t t l n k · i n fantry counterattack 19a inst 6th
Marines. 16- 1 7 June.
I 65th t n f ar. t r y se i ze s . h i i to A i r f ield. II! June.
16 th �l� r i n e D i v i s ion reaches east coast. 18 June.
27th Infantry O i v i s io" coll'llll i t ted between t-t�rr i ne O i v i si'lns, encounters d i f f i cu l t i es in De11tb V a l l ey . 2. 3 June.
Goropan
SAY
Noluton Point
Marp• Po1nt
llth Marine D i v i s i on seizes Kag��an Pen i n su l a. 25 June.
I at B a t t a l i o n , 2 9 t h trb r tn e s , ceptu,.es peek of N t . Tapotchau. 25; June.
2d Marine D i v i s i on ruches Tanapag Seaplane Bue, p inched fr0111 1 inea. ' � .. , . ..lepanese l aunch a l l -o u t l an u i t.ttack, h i tt i n fJ t h e 1 s t i'iT1'a latta I ions, 105th t n hn t r y , and the 3d Batt a l i o n , tOth Mar i nes.
6-7 �uly.
lf t h Mar i ne D i Y i s i on p u s h e s t o i s l an d ' s n o r t h e r n e n d . $ a i pa n \et:., H e d . 9 J ll l 'J .
PRINCIPAL GROUND EVENTS BATTLE OF SAIPAN
1000 0 1000 3000 ...
6 . 9 . The battle August 1 0 , 1 9 4 4 ,
to capture Saipan continued when t he is land was dec lared
from June secure .
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in the morning of June 1 6 , Japanese troops unsucces s fu l ly counterattacked the Marine l ines several times and sustained los ses of more than 1 , 0 0 0 dead .
Vice Admiral Turner , commanding the amphibious forces , original ly set June 1 8 , 1 9 4 4 , as the day for the as sault on Guam , based on the progres s on Saipan . These plans changed when de f inite word of approaching Japanese warships reached Admiral Spruance from scout ing submarines . The Guam l andings were postponed , and the dec is ion was made to commit the 2 7 th Infantry Divis ion ( reserve units ) to Saipan because the f ighting there was obvious ly going to be tougher than antic ipated . American naval forces began to depl oy for the upcoming carrier battle .
While the battle o f the Phil ippine Sea was taking place to the west between massed c arrier forces , the bitter fighting on Saipan continued unabated until August 1 0 , 1 9 4 4 , when the island was dec l ared secure . The long f ight up the is l and c laimed thous ands of c ivil i an casualties inc luding those who kil led themselves j umping o f f the c l if f s at Marpi Point . American forces buried 2 3 , 8 1 1 enemy troops , with uncounted dead sealed in caves and bunkers . U . S . forces sustained c asualties of over 3 , 0 0 0 dead and 1 6 , 5 0 0 wounded . The c apture of Saipan , and o f Guam and Tinian to fol l ow , was to prove catastrophic for the Japanese . On July 1 8 when the loss of Saipan was announced to the Japanese pub l ic , the Japanese government col lapsed . Gen . Hideki To j o , who had headed the Japanes e government and mil itary for so l ong , res igned in disgrac e . The change was a pol itical admis s ion o f de feat , but the war would drag on for another year because no one in Japan was wil l ing to risk the wrath o f the Japanese Army ' s pol itical machine by propos ing peace .
The Battle of the Phi l ippine Sea , June 1 9 4 4
Japanese forces as sembl ing for the Marianas battle were commanded by Vice Adm . Jisp.buro Ozawa . Now called the Mobile Fleet , the naval forces were headed by nine aircraft c arriers in three divis ions : Carrier D ivis ion 1 ( CARDIV 1 ) was composed of the carrier TAIHO , largest in the f leet , and SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU , both veterans of Pearl Harbor . CARDIV 2 cons isted of JUNYO and HIYO , l ight carriers converted from merchant hul l s , and RYUHO , a naval auxi l iary convers ion . CARDIV 3 inc luded CHIYODA a nd CHITOSE , naval convers ions o f seaplane c arriers , and ZUIHO , also an auxil iary convers ion . Only the f irst divis ion had heavy f leet c arriers ; the rest , smal ler merchant or naval auxiliary convers ions , c arried fewer aircraft and were far les s e f fective warships . The carriers were augmented by the usual heavy support forces , inc luding MUSASHI , YAMATO and other fast battleships , as wel l
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as heavy and l ight cruisers and destroyers . Japanese 4t planning included support from some 5 0 0 land-based aircraft s taging into the Marianas . However , the great ma j ority of these a ircra ft never saw combat because they were cut down by American carrier aircraft before and during the battle , a fact Admiral Ozawa was unaware o f unti l f ar too l ate . Twenty- f ive Japanese submarines were also deployed to s upport the advanc ing carrier forces , but at least seventeen were sunk and the rest proved ine f fectua l .
The Japanese forces , sortie ing from Tawi Tawi and the home i s l ands on June 1 3 , 1 9 4 4 , were promptly reported by U . S . s ubmarines who tracked their progres s through the Phil ippines and east toward the Marianas . Oz awa expected to uti l ize three tactical advantages : l and-based air support , the superior range o f his aircra ft ( as c ompared to American ) , and the lee gauge of sail ing into the easterly wind , which meant he would not have to turn away from the battle center in order to launch or recover a ircraft as the American pos ition would require for TF5 8 . These advantages were more than o f f s et by the lack o f experience on the part o f Japan ' s naval aviators . Ozawa ' s best c arrier division pilots had only s ix months o f air operations training when it sortied for battle .
Air search was critical to this battle and in this respect .. the Japanese had the advantage . The location and disposition ., o f the Japanese f leet was a problem for the Americans throughout the battle , primarily because Admiral Spruance elected to keep TF5 8 within covering range of the Marianas , lest the Japanese split their forces for an end run as they had done so o ften in the past and would do again at Leyte . This served to keep the Americ an c arriers too far east of Ozawa ' s pos ition for American reconnaissance to loc ate the Japanes e carrier before they l aunched the f irst attacking waves . For once the Japanese were us ing a tactical dispo s it ion s imilar to that used by TF5 8 : keeping their c arrier groups together ; there was no plan to divide forces in a p incer movement as Spruance feared .
By the early morning hours o f June 1 9 , 1 9 4 4 , Ozawa reached his planned position and l aunched the first s trikes . Task Force 5 8 , s ituated between Ozawa ' s f leet and the Marianas , received air attacks from Guam early that morning but , despite the bes t Japanese e f forts there were only about 50 operational aircraft on Guam , not the 5 0 0 Admiral Ozawa was told would be available . The u . s . fast carriers had over 4 5 0 fighters available and they kept the task force from any damage from the direction o f Guam . Whi le TF5 8 f ighters were deal ing with the land-based planes , Admiral Ozawa launched the f irst o f four raids ; the Japanese fighters were picked up
.. on the TF5 8 radars by 1 0 : 0 0 a . m . on June 1 9 while more than .,
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1 5 0 miles from thei r targets . Every available f i ghter plane was launched to engage in what became known as the " Great Marianas Turkey Shoot . " Ozawa ' s forces lost wel l over 3 0 0 aircraft to TF5 8 whi le damage t o the American f l eet did not s top a s ingle ship .
While the American f i ghters stopped Ozawa ' s attacks , two u . s . submarines found Ozawa ' s carrier forces . ALBACORE put a torpedo into TAIHO , which caused fuel tanks to leak . I nept damage control compounded the problem and TAIHO blew up and s ank with heavy loss of life . TAIHO , newest and largest c arrier in the Imperial Japanese Navy , had been in commis s ion only about four months . Submarine CAVALLA found SHOKAKU the s ame day and hit it with four torpedoes . The veteran o f Pearl Harbor , Coral Sea and the Guadalcanal battles rol led over and s ank . By sundown on June 1 9 , Ozawa ' s forces were de feated , with two fleet c arriers gone and their air groups dec imated . The remaining c arriers proved ine f fective for the rest of the battle .
Ozawa ' s forces withdrew toward their planned fueling rendezvous on the evening o f June 19 , 1 9 4 4 , and two hours later TF5 8 finished recovering aircraf t and turned west i n pursuit . Bec ause o f their relative pos itions , Ozawa ' s forces were not s ighted unt il a p ilot from ENTERPRISE found them at 3 : 4 0 p . m . on June 2 0 . Admiral Mitscher launched everything he had late in the a fternoon while fully real i z ing his f l iers would have to return after dark . They located the Mobile Fleet at 6 : 4 0 p . m . and attacked immediately , s inking the carrier H IYO and damaging other carriers . One tanker was sunk and two des troyers were lost . The strike aircraft f lew back in the dark and many were forced to ditch be fore reaching the carriers ; many others went into the water while attempting to f ind a carrier to land on after finding the task force , even though Admiral Mitscher ordered the f leets ' l ights turned on . Los ses in aircraft were high but many o f the pilots and crewmen were recovered .
By June 2 1 , 1 9 4 4 , American forces were ret iring east to a fuel ing rendezvous , and the dec imated Mobile Fleet was heading for Okinawa . The Battle of the Phi l ippine Sea was over . Many historians have suggested that the U . S . forces should have been used more aggress ively and the Mobile Fleet closely engaged and destroyed by the American fast c arriers and battle l ine . Despite this critic ism , Spruance ' s more conservative tactics resulted in success fully accomplis hing the miss ion , which was to protect the Marianas assault forces and the continuing amphibious operations there .
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Guam Invasion , July-August 1 9 4 4
The invas ion of Guam was postponed because o f the Battle of the Phil ippine Sea and because o f the unexpectedly s t i f f res istance o n S aipan , which required committ ing the reserve 2 7 th Divis ion . I t was also suggested that it would be wise to use an extra divis ion o f troops to take Guam . The s ize and terrain o f Guam made it obvious that it would be tougher to take than Saipan , because Guam has more mountainous areas with c l i f f s , she lves , benches and val leys ideally suited to the Japanese style o f interlocking- f ire defense . The Army ' s 7 7 th Divis ion was available and was brought in for the l andings scheduled for July 2 1 , 1 9 4 4 .
Although the del ay in landing on Guam provided cons iderable benefit to the Japanese de fenders , about 1 9 , 0 0 0 fighting men under Lieutenent General Takashima , it also " . . . gave United States forces a chance to del iver the most intens ive and prolonged prelanding air bombing and naval bombardment that any Japanese-held pos ition ever received . . . " ( Moris on 1 9 5 1 ( VI I I ) : 3 7 4 ) . Troops in the Guam assault were the 3rd Marine Amphibious Corps , which consisted of the 3rd Marine Divis ion and 1 s t Provis ional Brigade , and the Army ' s 7 7 th Divis ion , a l l under Maj or General Roy S . Geiger , USMC .
During the fight for Saipan , Guam was not ignored ; air A bombardment and general haras sment by c arrier aircraft and W s ur face bombardment were scheduled whenever poss ibl e . The serious work s tarted on July 8 , 1 9 4 4 , when Vice Admiral Conolly ' s bombardment group moved in to begin systematically working over Guam . Assisted by aerial photography and interpretation , the battleships , c ruisers and destroyers continued shell ing day and night for 13 days . According to the naval gunf ire reports on the action , 6 , 2 5 8 rounds of 1 4 - inch and 1 6 - inch ammunition , 3 , 8 6 2 rounds of 8 - inch , 2 , 4 30 rounds of 6 - inch and 1 6 , 2 1 4 rounds o f 5 - inch were expended in a 6 -day period . This did cons iderable damage on Guam and certainly lessened c asualties in the landing force , but it was not enough even though Marine l iaison with bombardment forces was much c loser and more thorough than had been the c ase in the past .
Bombardment o f positions on Guam continued whi le the assault forces approached , and the sustained f ire became heavier and more concentrated as W-Day neared . Battleships delivered main-battery f ire on July 1 9 , 1 9 4 4 , and the continued operations o f the beach-cleaning UDTs gave the Japanes e their c lue that the landings would be on the Asan and Agat beaches . By the morning o f the landings , 6 battleships , 8 heavy and light c ruisers , 32 des troyers and 3 escort c arriers were engaged in a prelanding bombardment that , according to Japanese sources , destroyed al l the coast def ense e
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emplacements in the open and about hal f the hidden ones , as well as about hal f the smal ler emplacements inshore o f the landing beaches . Such continuous bombardment also had its e f fect on the defenders ' morale .
"W-Day " at Guam was July 2 1 , 1 9 4 4 ; the plan cal led for a split landing north and south o f Orote Peninsula at Asan and Agat on Guam ' s western coast . By 6 : 0 0 a . m . , a l l as s ault forces were in place and the troops and naval forces formed up to hit the beaches ; the f irst waves touched shore at 8 : 3 0 a . m . Within s ix hours the entire as s ault divis ion on the Asan beac hhead was ashore . At the Agat beachheads to the south , res istance was much tougher and the unloading s lower .
The Marines on the Asan beachhead had a long row o f low c l iffs to face and at Agat , Marine and Army units faced s teep hills and undestroyed Japanese emplacements . Al l u . s . forces faced intense return f ire from light and medium art i llery , machine guns , and the rif les o f the Japanese troops . The battle was vicious right from the landing beaches , but by July 2 8 , 1 9 4 4 , the two l anding forces had united east o f Orate and were preparing a " breakout " t o sweep the rest o f the island . During the intervening days , both l anding forces withstood several mas sed Japanese counterattacks . Fol lowing one particularly intense assault near As an , 3 , 5 0 0 Japanese bodies were counted . These battles broke the back o f the Japanese defenders . Generals Sigematsu and Takashima were kil led in early fights , and General Obata , who j u s t happened to be on the is land , as sumed command of the remaining forces . When General Obata took control , he had no tactic s left but a fall-back defense , which was employed w ith not surpris ing skill fulness .
Orate Peninsula , with its airfield and remains o f the old Marine barracks , was in American hands by July 2 9 , 1 9 4 4 , although there remained the dangerous c ave-c leaning duty . The Americ an flag flew over the old Marine parade ground at 3 : 3 0 p . m . that day , for the f irst time s ince December 1 0 , 1 9 4 1 . Between July 2 9 and August 1 0 , Marine and Army forces took the remainder o f Guam , kil l ing or c apturing over 1 9 , 0 0 0 Japanese . On August 1 5 , occupation forces took over and the ships and assault forces departed . Several thous and Japanese remained at large in the j ungles o f Guam and attempted to fight a gueril l a war . Guam remained dangerous until after the Japanese surrender . Even a fter the war , holdouts remained to wander out o f the j ungle and surrender or be captured for many years after the war .
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Tinian I nvas ion , July-August 1 9 4 4
Tinian , 5 miles wide and 1 0 miles l ong , lay c lose enough to Saipan to require its capture , unlike Rota and Agu i j an , which were not occupied by American forces until the Japanes e surrender ( re fer to Figure 6 . 8 ) . Tinian ' s proximity to Saipan could have made it a nuis ance once Saipan was developed as an Americ an forward base . Further , Tinian had an operat ional air base and three more under construct ion and its f latter terrain made it ideal for B-2 9 bases .
Americ an planning for the capture of Tinian called for a shore-to-shore operation us ing the s ame 2nd and 4th Marine Divis ion troops employed on Saipan . Maj . Gen . Harry Schmidt was selected as overall commander for ground operations on Tinian , and extens ive bombardment by air and surface forces was s t arted be fore the invas ion . Operational plans for the as s ault were issued on July 1 3 , 1 9 4 4 . J-Day was July 2 4 , and troops landed on two narrow beachheads on the north coast , where a landing was least expected . Japanese forces on the is l and comprised about 9 , 0 0 0 Army and Navy personnel under the command o f Col . Kiyochi Ogata , although the senior o f f icer on Tinian was Vice Adm . Kaku j i Kakuta .
Tinian was invaded on schedule , the firs t waves o f assault troops hit the narrow beachhead at 7 : 5 5 a . m . on July 2 4 , 1 9 4 4 . Expanding the beachhead to accommodate the landing was a top priority as troops fought inland . Although there was a tenac ious Japanese defense , Tinian was overrun and secured in nine days , one o f the most suc ces s ful operations o f the war . Tinian was dec lared secure on August 1 ; however , mopping up took three more months for an entire Marine regiment . u . s . forces suf fered 3 8 9 kil led and 1 , 8 0 0 wounded compared with over 5 , 0 0 0 Japanese known kil led and 250 pris oners taken . The other 4 , 000 troops probably died in sealed-up c aves , although a few may have escaped . As planned , Tinian was quickly developed into a mas s ive base to support B-2 9 operations against the Japanese homeland . Both atomic bombs were del ivered from Tinian .
As the fighting for Guam and Tinian tapered of f , the logistics fight was j ust beginning . The Marianas were turned into mas s ive forward bases for the mil itary , with the B-29 airfields receiving top priority . Admiral Nimitz moved Pac if i c Fleet Headquarters to Guam as did Admiral Lockwood for the submarines . Apra Harbor was enlarged and rebuilt along with the airfield at Orate P oint while other air base comp lexes rose all over Guam , Saipan and Tinian . Support and logistics organizat ions also continued with supply bases , motor pool s , magaz ine areas , rest and recreation fac ilities , hospitals and other fac i l ities springing up wherever needed .
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The naval and land victory in the Marianas is o ften characterized as the dec i s ive battle o f the Pac i f ic War . This view was advanced in some of the biographies and autobiographies of participating commanders , such as General Hol land Smith . I ndeed , the Marianas battle was the def initive break into the Japanese inner defense perimeter , and it poised military forces in the ideal position for kil l ing strikes into the Japanese inner empire , regardles s o f the Japanese forces now remaining i n the Phil ippines , Formosa , Okinawa and other areas . This battle also spl it the Japanese Empire in two . Submarines operating from Guam could continuou s ly attack the natural bottleneck in all Japanese ship traf f ic in the Western Pac i fic- -the Luzon Straits north of the Phil ippines . This e f fectively severed the Japanes e homeland from the oil resources t o the south , which had been one of Japan ' s main rea sons for going to war . The Philippines became vulnerabl e to attack and could be cut o f f from the rest o f the empire .
The Marianas battle can be cons idered dec is ive because o f the geographic position in which i t placed attacking American forces and because it s tripped the remaining Japanese carriers o f their aircra ft . This had disastrous results in the next naval battle at Leyte Gul f . The elements for a U . S . victory were in place , but a year o f war remained that would see bitter and sustained fights with ever- increas ing c asualties at sea and on land .
The strategic consequences o f the Marianas battle should be tempered with this thought in mind . Dec isiveness in war is relative to long-term results . I n this respect Midway , where a lone pilot from ENTERPRI S E made a dec is ion to turn north ; Guadalcanal , where Col . Merritt " Red Mike " Edson and his Marines held a sma l l ridge against the best the Imperial Japanese Army could o f fer ; and New Guinea ' s Kokoda Trail , where mostly Austral ian troops fought a retreating but ultimately victorious battle against better-equipped and s uperior forces must also be cons idered dec is ive battles . These battles were fought with backs to the wal l , l ittle hope for suf f ic ient supplies and equipment , l ittle support f rom home other than deepes t sympathy , inadequate intel l igence and communications , and mostly against superior forces . These were the truly dec isive battles . After these , for the Americ ans , there was nothing but victory ; for Japan , only de feat .
I f the battles o f 1 9 4 2 opened the doors to the Pac if ic , the Marianas battle c losed them on a Paci f ic Ocean that was now the property of the United States . With MacArthur ' s combined mil itary forces complet ing t heir long c l imb across the north coast of New Guinea , all Pac i f ic forces could be united in future operations , the main target being the Phil ippines .
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But before the enormous land mass and large armies in the e Philippines could be tackled , military planners had dec ided one more i s l and would need to be taken to protect the American flank on its approach to t he Phil ippines - -Pelel iu , i n the Palaus , last and by far the most di f f icult o f the Central Pac i f ic bastions to fall .
End o f the Line in the Central Pac i f i c
Palau had been a Japanese pos ses s ion s ince October 1 9 1 4 when a Japanese occupation force c ame to Koror I s land . The Japanese quickly established f irm administrative control over the is lands , more so than on many o f the other mandated i s l ands , and began l imited defens ive mil itary development . Ma j or harbor fac i l ities at Malakal and an airfield at Peleliu along with a seaplane base at Arakabesan were the extent of mil itary fac i l it ies at the outbrea k of the war . Fishing , phosphate mining and sc ient i f ic study had occupied mos t of the Japanese administration of the i s lands as war approached .
During the early part o f the war , Palau s erved as the j umping-o f f point for a small c arrier task force that assau lted the southern Phil ippines at Davao . Assault troops for the Mindanao invas ion were also staged through Palau , and the area would remain a critical l i nk in the Japanese supply routes from Saipan to the south in New Guinea and east toward Truk .
For eighteen months after the surrender of the Philippines , the Palau area command continued in the role of an intermediate staging ground for Imperial Japanese troops engaged in the hard- fought battles in New Guinea and the Solomons . I nfantry and artillery units used the Palaus as training and practice grounds before being sent to the southern fronts . The excellent harbor of Malakal provided safe anchorage for ships involved in the desperate struggle for Guadalcanal . Koror was also a ma j or supply base for the forward areas ( Gailey 1 9 8 3 : 7 ) .
Palau also had air bases on Pele l iu and Babelthaup for protecting the is lands and as staging areas for aircraft en route to the Southern and Central Pac i f ic battlegrounds . Palau was also used as an amphibious training ground for various mil itary units . It was t he potential threat from
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these air bases that figured heavily in Americ an planning for the capture o f the Palaus fol lowing the Marianas operations .
As with other bases in the Central Pac if ic , the Japanese had not really given much thought to heavily forti fying the Palau bases before the war or even early in the war . The Japanese were apparently far more i nterested in offens ive operations to ensure capture and consolidation o f the oil-rich s outhern areas than in strong defens ive fortification o f their existing ma j or Central Pac i f ic bases . It was not unti l September 1 9 4 3 that serious cons ideration was given t o improving the de fenses o f the inner defens ive perimeter , particularly in Palau and the Marianas . Even then , defens ive planning was based on Japanese intelligence interpretations o f u . s . military potential ; even the mos t pes s imistic Japanese planning analys is could not have predicted that the U . S . Navy alone could more than double in s ize in a year ( in terms of warships afloat , at least ) . Defens ive planning for the Palaus was , as for most of the Central Pac i fic , too late and too little , a fatal mistake that only became apparent when the u . s . Navy ' s Task Force 5 8 first ripped through the Central Pac i fic in February-March 1 9 4 4 .
The Japanese Army , always in control of overal l mil itary planning during the war , cons idered General MacArthur ' s c ampaign in the New Guinea area as the mos t dangerous threat to the Japanese defens ive perimeter . As a result of this assumption , Japanese naval airpower in the Central Pac i f i c was sent south to counter this threat , j ust in time f o r the U . s . Navy to hit the Marianas with Army and Marine a s s ault troops . u . s . naval maneuvers in the Central Pac i f ic were so rapid and extens ive they foiled adequate defens ive planning . Both prongs of the U . S . effort were equal ly dangerous to the Japanese Empire and could not be adequately defended against . Quite s imply , they did not have the res ources available , a consequence of the Japanese Army ' s continued ins istence on the China campaign in the face o f the appal l ing losses o f men and material i n the Pacific theater up to 1 9 4 4 .
By September 1 9 4 4 , the stage was set for Palau ( Figure 6 . 1 0 ) . The Marianas were in American hands and the inner defense perimeter broken ; MacArthur ' s forces had wrapped up the New Guinea campaign and were preparing for the Phil ippines operation , which would see the two-pronged Pac i fic of fens ive united into one . American planners , looking ahead to the Phil ippines , natural ly assumed that the Western Carol inas would have to be taken in order to sec ure the right flank of the Phil ippine invas ion , which was originally planned to start at Mindanao rather than the eventual target , Leyte . Peleliu was perce ived as a threat to any amphibious landing on Mindanao ; however , the fac t was that Palau did not have suff ic ient air forces to de f end
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itse l f , much les s the Phil ippines some 5 0 0 miles to the west . � Whether or not American intell igence estimates made accurate summations of the Japanese c apabilities in Pal au in mid- 1 9 4 4 has been part o f the controversy s urrounding that operation s ince the first postwar histories were written . I t is apparent that good intelligence about Palau was overlooked or ignored by the senior American p lanners and others . The result was the s urpris ing feroc ity of the battle o f Bloody Nos e Ridge during the ground f ighting to take Pelel iu . If those in command o f the American o f f ens ive had taken a harder look at the s ituation , it is conc e ivable that Palau would have been isolated and bypas sed l ike Truk . It also indicates that American planning was overconfident , in too much of a hurry , and de fective in many respects , which cost many l ives .
The overconfidence is not surpris ing , cons idering how the Marianas had been ef fectively s teamrol lered , but this overconf idence was in large part due to the mas s ive increase in men and mater iel avai lable in the Pac i f ic . The force became so mas s ive , in fact , that after the Marianas c ampaign the f leet , its supply and logistics train and supporting amphibious forces began to reach the l imits o f e f fective contro l . Fortunately , this would never be too serious a problem , although it had its ef fect at Leyte and Samar . Contributing to this was the f act that planning for the Palau operation was scattered among several commands in several areas , and senior commanders , who would be in charge of the a s s au l t operations , were still involved in finishing the Marianas operations and were not as direc tly involved in the planning stages for Palau as they should have been . Historical accounts also indicate that some o f the senior o f f icers were not the bes t of friends and did not work as wel l together as had been the case in the past .
P l anning for the Palau invas ion cons idered many pos s ible targets , f inal ly settl ing on Peleliu ( the main attac k ) Angaur , Ul ithi and Yap , although Yap was dropped a t the last minute . Operation " Stalemate , " as the Palau operation was named , involved the 1 s t Marine Divis ion and the U . S . Army ' s 8 1s t Infantry Divis ion with their attached units total l ing more than 4 3 , 5 0 0 o f f icers and men . They faced over 1 0 , 0 0 0 men , primari ly f rom the Japanese Army ' s 14th Divis ion , originally part of the Kwantung Army in China . This four-to-one advantage was i l lusory , however , because the f ight ing would involve about even numbers on both s ides , a s ituat ion " . . . that should have made even the most optimistic p lanners shudder " ( Gai ley 1 9 8 3 : 2 3 ) . The poor use of intel l igence data , complex logistic s , and lack o f cooperation among some commanders and their planning staf fs , among other fac tors , combined to make the fight for Peleliu as bad as it could be .
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Pelel iu and Angaur were the rec ipients o f the Navy ' s much-practiced , and therefore much- improved , c lose-in f ire support from the battleships and prelanding aerial a s s au l t from both the b i g fast c arriers and the smal ler escort carriers ass igned to the assault . Vice Adm . Jes s e Oldendorf ' s f ire support group inc luded 5 old battleships , 4 heavy c ruisers , 4 l ight c ru isers , 9 to 1 5 destroyers and 7 t o 1 1 escort carriers . A s before , i t would never b e enough against a wel l-dug-in enemy .
When the Americ an fast carrier task forces again raided Palau j ust prior to the invas ion , they discovered that there was still merchant shipping i n Palau ' s many harbor areas . During the attacks , aircraft from ENTERPRI SE and FRANKLIN took on some o f this shipping :
The Japanese knew that the favorite prey o f the blue plane s was ships , ships which could reinforce , resupply or evacuate . So he set airplane traps baited with ships .
As s oon as the f irst aircraf t was wel l committed i n its dive , the ships and the woods on all the surrounding islands began to smoke and sparkle with automatic weapons fire . Lead l aced back and forth acro s s the attacking formation . . . pilots and gunners returned the f ire .
Rockets , bombs , and strafing had no real ef fect on the shipping : " . . . nothing happened . The ships could not s ink . They were already sunk , resting on the bottom in the shal lows , holed and f inished by previous attacks , now only machine gun nests and AA empl acements ringed by other machine gun nests and AA emplacements " ( Staf ford 1 9 6 2 : 3 9 3 - 3 9 4 ) .
Palau and Ulithi I nvas ion , September 1 9 4 4
The invas ion forces for Palau staged from Hawai i and the Solomon Islands beginning on September 4 , 1 9 4 4 . While these s low-moving units were at sea , the planning for Palau c hanged again as a result of information from Admiral Hal sey ' s Task Force 3 8 . After hitting the Phil ippine I s lands , Tas k Force 3 8 operations showed the Phi l ippines to be far more weakly defended than presumed . Halsey sent a mes sage to Nimitz at Pearl Harbor , in which he recommended dropping Palau and Yap
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from the invas ion list and moving up the invas ion o f the e Phi lippines . After consulting with the Joint Chie fs o f Staf f then attending the Octagon Conference in Quebec , Nimitz dropped Yap from the invas ion t imetable and the Philippines invas ion was moved up . However , Nimitz did not drop the Palau plan ; Peleliu , Ulithi and Angaur would still be attacked , the rationale being that the Palau invas ion forces were already at sea .
Lt . Gen . Sadae Inoue , commander o f the Japanese 1 4 th Divis ion and o f Palau , was stationed on Koror I s land . Both he and his chief o f staf f , Colonel Tada , were of a mind to incorporate the lessons o f previous i s land invas ions in their de fense plans . Defenses were prepared as much as pos s ible , cons idering the pounding the various i s land bases had already taken f rom air assaults and the di f ficulty o f moving in more men and supplies through the ever- increas ing submarine blockade in the Western Pac i f ic area . There would be no usele s s banzai charges or attempts to throw the enemy back into the sea at the beach . Defenses were des igned to foil naval and air bombardment with deep c aves that could protect front- l ine troops until they met the enemy on the ground . On Pelel iu alone , over 5 0 0 natural and manmade c aves were used .
The Palau defenders staged a " dogged holding action " ( Gailey 1 9 4 4 : 4 0 ) against the assault troops . On Pelel iu , Colonel A Nakagawa , commander of the 2 nd Regiment , was obvious ly an W o f f icer o f skill and pro fes s ional ism ; his de fense o f Peleliu chewed up one Marine regiment and brought it to a halt , something that had not occurred be fore in Central Pac i f ic amphibious as s aults . Colonel Nakagawa was as s isted by Ma jor General Murai , a fort i ficat ions expert , sent to Peleliu primari ly to give the Army an o f f icer o f equal rank to the Naval commander on the i s l and . Unfortunately , there was no real cooperation in the j o int de fense preparat ions at Palau .
Colonel Nakagawa ' s and General Mura i ' s defenses centered on the southwest coast , which had the only realistically us able l anding beaches on Palau , and on the Umurbrogel Ridge area , along Peleliu ' s west coast , where the Japanese had wel l over a year to prepare forti f ications within the narrow val leys , c l i f f s and fault lines of the coral l imestone ridges . The de fending forces were understrength in heavier guns and mortars and many of the c aves proved inadequate against the newer models o f flame throwers but , overall , de fenses were much more logically laid out and prepared than previou s ly in the Central Pac i f ic . Some 1 3 , 0 0 0 Navy , Army and c ivilian personnel were estimated to be on Peleliu by September 15 , 1 9 4 4 , when the invas ion began . Colonel Nakagawa had the native Palauans evacuated to Koror before the fighting started , another indication of Colonel Nakagawa ' s stature as a military o f f icer . e
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The Palau operation began on September 1 2 , 1 9 4 4 , when Admiral Oldendor f ' s f ire support group of old battleships opened up on Peleliu and Angaur , interspersed with attacks from the aircra ft of the escort carrier groups as s igned to the invas ion . By midmorning o f September 1 2 , underwater demol ition teams were c learing the beach approaches and blasting paths through the coral . Palau had the mos t extens ive and formidable o f f shore beach defenses o f any o f the Central Paci fic is lands , a result o f Colonel Nakagawa ' s plan to try and destroy as many landing craf t as pos s ible be fore they could arrive at the beach . Beach preparations were quickly completed , but naval and air bombardment continued for the next three days .
By the morning o f September 15 , 1 9 4 4 , the landing forces were in position and the transports standing s ome 1 6 , 0 0 0 yards o f f the s outhwest beaches des ignated for the landing a s White Beach 1 and 2 and Orange Beach 1 , 2 and 3 , a l l on the southwest corner o f Peleliu . The l anding force c ons isted o f three Marine regiments , the 1 s t Regiment under the legendary Col . Lewis B . " Chesty " Pul ler , the 5th Regiment under Col . Harold D . Harris , and the 7 th Regiment under Colonel Herman H . Hanneken . Naval and aerial bombardment of the beaches continued as the assault waves formed up and moved out :
Almost as soon as the advance LVTs departed the ree f for the beac h , they were brought under f ire by Japanese l ight artil lery and mortars from the area immediately inland f rom the beach and by heavy artillery c oncentrated in the highlands . Some heavy f ire was l ater directed from the f lanks along the entire length o f the beach .
The f irst Marines landed on White Beach 1 at 0 8 3 2 , only two minutes behi nd schedule . Within four minutes troops were ashore on a l l the beaches and were met by heavy r i f le , machine-gun , and mortar f ire . . . . Some commentators have left the erroneous impres s ion that Colonel Nakagawa surrendered the landing area without a s truggle . Nothing could be further from the truth , but he had designated only approximately 1 , 2 0 0 men to his westward defense region , preferring to use the maj ority to de fend the highlands in order to make the capture o f Pelel iu a s costly as pos s ible for the attackers . The primary targets
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for the Japanese were the landing craft ( Gailey 1 9 4 4 : 6 8 - 6 9 ) .
Nakagawa I s de fense was succes s ful . Later reports e s t imate that more than 6 0 landing craft were damaged or destroyed at the beaches , and it was obvious from the moment troops were ashore that the f ight at the beachhead was to be as bad or worse than at Tarawa , although the l andings did go almost as planned despite the intense and devas tat ing f ire directed at the beach .
Pelel iu , with its daytime temperatures over 1 0 0° , high
humidity , and lack of water became pure hel l for the Marines even without the presence o f the Japanese , whose defense exceeded that of any previous engagement . By the end of the second day o f fighting , U . S . forces had a beachhead some 3 , 0 0 0 yards long and 5 0 0 yards deep and were engaged in a l i fe-and-death struggle along every inch o f it , with over 1 , 1 0 0 battle c asualt ies , inc luding 2 1 0 kil led .
Much o f Colonel Nakagawa 1 s defense system was destroyed in the f irst two days ; the Marines would not be tos sed into the sea . They would not wal k over the res t o f the is l and , either . Fighting occurred on every part of Peleliu where the Marines advanced . Eventually , the battle bec ame an inch-by- inch s truggle through the Umurbrogel Highlands , part o f which was the aptly named Bloody Nose Ridge . By the l ast week o f September , " . . . nine tenths o f the i s land had been c aptured and an estimated 9 , 0 0 0 Japanese had been kil led " ( Gailey 1 9 4 4 : 1 5 5 ) . Yet , despite a l l this , the s trongest defens ive pockets still remained on the ridge . F ighting was so intense and c asualties so high for the 7th and 5th Marine Regiments that the senior commanders had to s cramble to get fresh men ashore , mostly Army troops who had previous ly been involved in other operat ions or held in reserve .
A lthough Pelel iu was dec lared " secure " on September 2 7 , 1 9 4 4 , this was command bravado on the part of the Marines . Ground defens e , for example , was not handed over to base command ( nona s s au l t garrison forces ) unti l January 1 9 4 5 , and Japanese survivors continued to be a dangerou s problem up to the end o f the war . By October 1 9 4 4 , however , only a pocket some 3 0 0 by 4 5 0 yards was still held by about 1 , 0 0 0 Japanese defenders , inc luding the bri l l iant Colonel Nakagawa and General Murai . Gett ing to this f inal point had cost the 1st Marine Division almost 7 , 0 0 0 casualties , inc luding 1 , 3 00 k i l led .
The f inal phase o f the Pelel iu f ight belonged to Army units o f the 8 ls t Divis ion in rel ief o f the Marines . By November 2 4 , 1 9 4 4 , Army units broke the final pocket o f res istance , Colone l Nakagawa and General Murai c ommitted suic ide , and the �
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remaining 1 2 0 Japanese de fenders did the same or died in battle . By November 2 7 , a l l was quiet on the Umurbrogel , two and one hal f months after the initial assault . Army units o f the 8 1 st Divis ion suffered over 9 0 0 casualties and 1 1 0 kil led in the f inal as saults on Peleliu while kil ling some 1 , 5 0 0 of the remaining Japanese defenders .
While the f ight for Pelel iu raged , Angaur and Ulithi were c aptured by regimental combat teams of the u . s . Army ' s 8 1st Divis ion . Ulithi was undefended , and eas ily occupied by the 3 2 3rd Regimental Combat Team . Ul ithi , a maj or l agoon area , was the best and most useful prize in all o f Palau and became the ma j or forward replenishment area for the U . S . Navy for the remainder o f the war , a critically important s taging point for al l future U . S . Naval operations in the Philippines , Formosa , Okinawa and the Japanese homel and .
The 3 2 1s t and 3 2 2 nd Regimental Combat Teams a s s i gned to Angaur had a much tougher time o f it agains t Maj or Goto ' s de fending forces who , as usual , organized their de fenses around the princ iple of making the operat ion as costly as possible for the attackers . Army landings commenced on September 1 7 , 1 9 4 4 , with the troops f ighting the s ame fanatical enemy and the s ame heat and humidity found at Pelel iu . By October 1 9 , the l ast Japanese pos ition was overrun , the commander kil led and mopping up of s tragglers begun . u . s . forces suf fered some 2 6 0 men kil led with over 2 , 0 0 0 wounded or incapac itated by disease ; almost 1 , 4 0 0 Japanese were killed .
Capture o f Peleliu , Angaur , and Ul ithi c losed the c ampaign in the Central Pac i f ic . U . S . forces now had control o f the sea and air in this critical area , with maj or land bases and naval replenishment areas wel l secured despite the fact that the Japanese retained pos sess ion of i s l ands l ike Wot j e , Truk and Babelthuap . These bases did not surrender unt i l the end of the war . Beginning with the f irst invas ion in November 1 9 4 3 , it had taken only about a year to tear the Central Paci f ic from the Japanese Empire . This speaks volumes for the power and abil ity o f the U . S . Navy , Marine Corps and Army .
After the c lose of the war , the rema1n1ng Japanese-occupied i s lands of the Central Pac i f ic quickly surrendered to American naval forces and al l Japanese were repatriated . Most of the i s lands returned to their peacetime existence , but not a l l of them . Kwa j a lein remained an active mil itary base f irst for the postwar atomic tests and l ater as a missile test area , and Guam continues in the role o f a forward naval base .
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The many hundreds o f shipwrecks throughout the Central 4lt Pac i f ic are a testament to the rapid and violent col l apse of the Japanese island empire . The historical and cultural s igni f ic anc e of these ships w i l l always be tied to the pol itics that led to war i n the Pac i f ic islands and to the type o f warfare fought in t he area .
The artifacts o f war in the Central Pac i fic have gradually been dis appearing as a result o f both the inevitable actions o f the sea and the actions of man . Fol lowing the war , much material was salvaged for scrap or other uses , such as the Japanese salvage of TONAN MARU NO . 3 at Truk , and many s hips were blown apart to clear harbor anchorages and entrances . Concurrent with this type of activity was much postwar dumping o f materiel and equipment into the sea , such as wrecked landing craft , s tripped aircraft , machinery and suppl ies . When the Americans packed up and c l eared out of many areas , even usable material was disposed o f at sea , as it was not worth the trouble to haul home- -part o f the bitterly expens ive waste of war .
Rebui lding and expans ion o f vil l ages into towns and towns into c it ies has contributed extens ively to obl iterat ing the remains o f world War I I on many is lands , which leaves only the material in the oceans as a relatively intact and undis turbed record of the war years in the Central Pac i f ic . � These fragile and deteriorating remains at sea are the best resource for archeological and historic research as soc iated with this period . As suc h , they merit the protect ion and management necessary to preserve them for future research without the threat represented by unthinking sport diving or , in the case o f deep-water wrecks , exploitation diving w ith advanced technology .
Much undoubtedly still remains to be discovered of the World War I I wrecks in the Pac i f ic , and even the sma l lest details o f these wrecks - -ships and planes , Japanese and American al ike - -wil l make a contribution to understanding the s acri f ice and the violence o f the Pac i f ic war .
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CHAPTER VII. POST WORLD WAR I I, THE NUCLEAR AGE TO PRESENT
By Toni L . Carrell
Introduct ion
The is lands of Micrones i a c ame under temporary military government as each was l iberated . The American i s land commanders had o f f icers specially selected and trained to improve the wel fare of the newly-liberated c ivil ians and maintain publ ic order . Distinctions were quickly made between the various is land ethnic groups ; most were treated as innocent victims or , in the case of Japanese c ivil ians , rounded up and treated as harmless enemies .
After V-J Day , the role of the American mil itary o f ficers was forma l i zed . They were given the task of administering the numerous bypas sed and recaptured islands . For the previous f ive years thous ands of Japanese , British and Americans fought and worked in these i s lands ; they displaced native populations , introduced new materials and ideas , and upset is land economies and tribal relations . When the s urrender teams put in at islands that had been bypassed , such as Truk , Ponape and Koror , they found want and devastation among both Japanese and natives .
E f forts were immediately made to repatriate all Japanese and Okinawan c ivil ians and return i s landers to their homes . Most islanders needed medic al help , many o f their homes and other buildings were in ruins , their boats destroyed , l agoons and ree fs depopul ated of fish from the bombings , l ives tock killed , and their gardens and groves devas tated and threatened by pests .
Rapid demobili zation and the general disintegration o f a l l communication and supply fac il ities created additional problems . I nexperience and lac k of long-range administrative goals res ulted in continued chaos and l ittle stab i l ity in the years immediately after the war .
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Trust Territory of the Pac i f ic I s lands
For two years fol lowing the war , the isl ands ' status was in l imbo . Then , in 1 9 4 7 , the United Nations responded to cons iderable pressure and agreed to place the is lands into a trusteeship , the only such instance where the basis was s trategic importance . The legal status of the United States Trust Territory of the Pac i f ic I s lands was based upon an agreement between the United States and the UN S ecurity Counc i l ; the agreement took e f fect July 1 9 , 1 9 4 7 .
U . S . Pres ident Harry S . Truman delegated authority for the c ivil administration of the territory to the Secretary o f the Navy on an interim bas i s . Vice Adm . Louis E . Denf ield was named the f irst high commiss ioner of the territory , headquartered in Hawaii , and Rear Adm . Carleton H . Wright was appointed deputy high commiss ioner 1 headquartered i n Guam . I n 1 9 5 1 the adminis tration of the i s lands pas sed to t he u . s . Department o f the I nterior . I n 1 9 5 3 , however , a l l o f the is l ands in the Marianas 1 except Rota , were returned to the control o f the Navy Department for " security " purpos es .
This s ituation continued until mid- 1 9 6 2 when control reverted to the Department of the I nterior , and the Northern Mariana I s lands became the Mariana I s lands District o f the Trust e Territory . Headquarters for the t erritory were tran s ferred from Guam to Saipan at that t ime , and f ive other districts were estab l ished : Palau , Yap , Truk 1 Ponape and the Mars hall i s l ands .
The Micrones ians began to move toward self rule in January 1 9 6 5 when the f irs t elections were held for a bicameral Congres s o f Micrones ia . A commiss ion was established in 1 9 6 7 t o determine the future pol itical status o f the i s l ands . In 1 9 7 0 the commiss ion recommended t hat the territory s hould e ither become a self -governing s tate in free assoc iation with the United States or have complete independence . After 2 years o f negotiation , it was agreed that the Micrones ians would be guaranteed four bas ic rights : the right to dec ide their own constitution , the right to control their own l and , the right o f self -determination , and the right to unilateral ly terminate any compact with the United States . This agreement did not cover the future s tatus o f the Mariana I s lands , however , which was handled separately .
Northern Mariana I s lands
The invas ion o f the is lands by American forces in the s ummer .. o f 1 9 4 4 left devastation in its wake . The battle resulted •
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in high casualties on both s ides and the destructio n o f muc h o f the islands . Saipan and Tinian became forward bases for the o ffens ive , with airstrips and a variety of related government bui ldings . From 1 9 4 5 to 1 9 4 7 the is lands continued under U . S . military occupation . Under the interim American military government , Chamorros were relocated from the various Carol inian isl ands to Tinian , Rota and Saipan .
The northern i s l ands came under trusteeship s tatus in 1 9 4 7 . The islanders partic ipated i n the f irst elections , held for a bicameral Congres s o f Micronesia , in 1 9 6 5 . Following the report of the Commiss ion on the Future Pol itical Status o f the islands , in 1 9 7 0 negotiations began o n a compact between the United States and the Trust Territory . From the outset , the people o f the Northern Mariana I s l ands made known their desire to integrate permanent ly with the United States . Once it became apparent that the aspirations of the is landers were irreconc ilably dif ferent from those of the remainder of the Trust Territory , negotiations began in earnest for territorial s tatus .
I n 1 9 7 5 the " Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth o f the Northern Marianas in Political Union with the United States " was voted on by the i s landers . It was approved in June 1 9 7 5 , and a separate constitution and government were proc laimed in January 1 9 7 8 .
I n the years fol lowing the war , e fforts toward agricultural rehabilitation began . During the Japanese era , sugar c ane and other agricu ltural products wre the bas is of the area ' s economy . Unl ike the Carol ine I s lands , the natives on t he Northern Mariana I s lands had moved away from direct farming . During the Japanese era they acted as the middleman , collecting copra , keeping small stores , supervis ing labor and other s imilar tasks . When the Japanese and Okinawans were repatriated , this presented serious problems for agricultural activity on the i s l and .
Despite the di f f iculties , agricultural productivity has grown . As on the rest of the islands , commercial and local f ishing are present . Saipan ' s port c an accommodate a variety of international and interisland craft , inc luding bulk cargo , international f ishing f leets , pas senger-carrying copra boats and small local f i s hing boats .
No spec i f ic ef fort was made to research modern shipping losses in the Northern Mariana I s l ands . It is presumed that they cont inue to re flect the maritime activit ies extant in the region . Sma l l local craft , for f i s hing and pleasure , most l ikely comprise the ma j ority o f losses s ince the c lose of world War I I .
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Guam
As soon as Guam was liberated, e f forts began in earnest to trans form the is land into a mil itary bas e . Al l other requirements were subordinated to building and supplying bases for the final assault on Japan and the Phil ippines . Military and c ivilians existed in makeshift c amps . As many i s landers as pos s ible were encouraged to work for the military .
After the war , development o f military fac i l it ies continued as did improvements of the is land in general . Because o f the spec ial relationship that Guam had with the United States , an Organic Act was pas sed by Congres s in 1 9 5 0 . Thi s gave Guamanians United States c iti zenship and s ome local autonomy .
Guam continued to receive spec ial attention , but it was not until the mid- 1 9 6 0 s that the i s land was permitted a measure o f nonmil itary economic growth and international trade . The copra economy had long s ince given way to nonagricultural employment and smal l-scale manufacturing . Today the island supports a thriving tourist trade , and it i s a ma j or international port for both s hips and aircraft in the Pac i f ic .
Ship losses in Guam s ince World War I I mirror the marit ime activities extant at the island . Small local craft , for f ishing and p leasure , and some larger commerc ial s hips have sunk .
Caro l ine I s lands
American f leet aircraft attacked Truk in early 1 9 4 4 and destroyed 2 3 s hips and 2 0 1 planes . However , Ul ithi Atol l was the only i s l and in the Carol ines to be occupied by American forces be fore the Japanese surrendered in 1 9 4 5 .
The Caroline I s lands , l ike the res t o f Micrones ia , stayed under U . S . mil itary occupation for 2 years after the war , then under trusteeship until 1 9 7 2 . Negotiat ions for free assoc iation continued through the 1 9 7 0 s . I n 1 9 7 8 the remaining districts of the territory drafted a proposal that de fined three separate pol itical groupings : Palau , the Federated States o f Micronesia , and the Marshal l I s lands .
The United States began negotiations with each o f the groups for a free assoc iation relationship in 1 9 7 8 . By 1 9 8 0 the Federated States of Microne s ia ( FSM ) and Palau had loc ally enacted const itutions , and constitutional governments were e
2 7 0
installed in the Federated States on May 1 0 , 1 9 7 9 , and in Palau on January 1 , 1 9 8 1 . At that time the name Bel au was o f f ic ially adopted . Negotiations were final ly completed i n 1 9 8 2 , and the compact and i t s related documents were s igned by the United States and Belau on August 2 6 , and with the Federated States of Micrones ia on October 1 . The trusteeship was not terminated in the F SM until 1 9 8 6 .
The only export o f consequence continues to be copra , which is exported to Japan . Other lesser exports inc lude bananas , betelnut and trochus shell . Small farm enterprises inc lude black pepper , poultry and egg rais ing . Management o f the FSM ' s 2 0 0 -mile marine economic zone has moved toward international l icen� ing agreements . Loc al fishing continues , but no commercially operated companies exist for f ishery export . Local industry inc ludes handicrafts , coconut o i l extraction , garment manufacture and soap-making . There are also plans for a c annery .
The maj or international ports are at Yap , Pohnpei , Kosrae and Truk . These accommodate the variety of international and interis land craft , inc luding bul k c argo , international f ishing fleets , passenger-carrying copra boats and sma l l local f ishing boats .
No spec i fic e f fort was made to research modern shipping losses in the Federated States o f Microne s ia . It is presumed that they continue to ref lect the maritime activities extant in the region . Sma l l local craft , for f ishing and pleasure , most l ikely comprise the ma j ority of losses s ince the close of World War I I .
Marshall I s lands
When Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1 9 3 5 , the Marshall I s l ands , l ike many o f the other mandates , were forti fied and provided with extensive facil ities . It was from these i s lands , princ ipally Kwa j alein Ato l l , that the Japanese launched attacks against Nauru , Ocean I s land and the Gilbert I s lands . The A l l ies were not able to l aunch counterattacks on the area until after strategic i s l ands i n the Gilberts were secured in l ate 1 9 4 3 . Kwaj alein Ato l l was the f irst recaptured , in February 1 9 4 4 . An American military administration was immediately established and preparations began to trans f orm Kwa j alein into a staging area for further movement across the Pac ific .
The Marshall I s lands became part o f the United States Tru s t Territory of the Pac i f ic I s lands i n July 19 4 7 . They remained in this status unt i l the Compact of Free Assoc iation was
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s igned in 1 9 8 2 . Under this agreement , the United States e retained respons ibil ity for de fense and the use o f Kwaj alein as a miss ile-testing range . I n return, the Marshallese were s l ated to receive $ 7 0 0 million i n economic aid over 1 5 years . The compact did not take ful l ef fect until late 1 9 8 6 , when the United Nations trusteeship was f inally terminated .
The country produces only one agricultural c rop o f any s ignif icance : copra . The ato l l o f Arno is the highest producer . Other cash c rops inc lude banana , papaya , pandanus and breadfruit , sold in the markets at Maj uro and Ebeye . The fishery resources o f the islands are l argely unexploited , although Japanese f ishing f leets are active . Local cooperatives are also active ly f is hi ng , but as the c atch of the overseas f leets increases , the amount taken by local cooperatives decreases . A number o f private companies have begun j oi nt venture projects in fishing . Trochus s hell process ing and black pearl culture are being developed a long with oys ter and c lam farming . Local industry is l imited to the manufacture o f handicrafts , fish salting and small boat building . The maj ority of the popul ation is conce ntrated on Ma j uro and Kwa j alein .
The maj or port fac i lity is located on Ma j uro . A variety of international and interis land craf t , inc luding bulk c argo , international f is hing f leets , passenger-carrying copra boats , � and sma l l local f ishing boats vie for space in the lagoon . A � growing number o f c ruis ing yachts are vis iting the port as we l l .
No spec i f ic effort was made to research post- 19 4 7 shipping los ses in the Marshall I s lands . They continue to ref lect the general maritime activities in the region . Small local craft , for fishing and pleasure , are probably the ma j ority of losses s ince the close o f World War I I . The maj or exception to this is the s inking of 2 3 ships during atomic testing in the mid- 1 9 4 0 s at Bikini Atoll .
Postwar Postscript : Operation Cross roads
Immediately after the war the inhabitants o f B ikini were relocated to Rongrik Atol l . The remaining i s landers were he lped to resettled in their former homes as best as pos s ible . Many chose to stay in Kwaj alein and Ma j uro , c lose to the u . s . mil itary bases , for economic reasons .
I n 1 9 4 6 , the United States began us ing Bikini for the f irst in a series of atomic tests : tests Able and Baker , an air burst and subsurface burst . Both tests were conducted us ing an array of 7 0 ships , landing craf t and submarines around ground zero to test the e f fects of heat , blast and e
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radiation . The ships c arried tons of mil itary equipment- trucks , guns , tanks and p lanes - -as wel l as l ive animal s . Some o f the ships s ank during the tests and remain in Bikini Lagoon . Others were disposed o f at Bikini a fter radiologic al testing . Those ships that remain are in relat ively deep water .
Table 7 . 1 . Ships Sunk in Bikini as a Result o f Atomic Tes t s o r Posttest Activity
ANDERSON ( DD-4 1 1 ) APAGON ( SS - 3 0 8 ) ARDC - 1 3 ARKANSAS ( BB - 3 3 ) CARLISLE ( APA- 6 9 ) GILLIAM ( APA-5 7 ) LAMSON ( DD- 3 6 7 ) LCI - 6 2 0 LCT- 4 14 LCT- 8 1 2 LCT- 1 1 1 4 LCT- 1 1 7 5 LCT- 1 1 8 7 LCT- 12 3 7 LST- 1 2 5 NAGATO ( ex-Japan BB ) P ILOTFI SH ( SS - 3 8 6 ) SAKAWA ( ex-Japan CL ) SARTOGA ( CV- 3 ) WAINWRIGHT ( DD- 4 1 9 ) Y0- 1 6 0
Destroyer Submarine Concrete repair doc k Battleship Merchant Merchant Destroyer Landing craft , infantry Landing cra ft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing cra ft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing ship Battleship Submarine Cruiser Aircraft carrier Destroyer Concrete oil barge
Many o f the ships that survived both Able and Baker test s and were not sunk l ater at Bikini were towed t o Kwa j alein . Tests continued on these s hips until 1 9 4 8 when the vast maj ority were used for target practice or were scuttled and sunk in deep water . Of the remaining s hips , some were taken back to scrap yards . on the Pac i fic coast and sold , while others were used for target practice and sunk .
I n 1 9 4 7 isolated Enewetak was chosen for further tests , and its 1 4 6 inhabitants were resettled on Uj elang . The f irst u . s . hydrogen bomb was exploded at Enewetak on March 1 , 1 9 5 4 ; two more were detonated in the following weeks . No ships were involved in these tes t s , which were repeated in 1 9 5 6 , 1 9 5 8 and 1 9 6 2 .
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Table 7 . 2 . Ships Sunk at Kwaj alein
BANNER ( APA- 6 0 ) BARROW ( APA- 6 1 ) BRACKEN ( APA- 6 4 ) BRISCOE ( APA- 6 5 ) BRULE ( APA-6 6 ) BUTTE ( APA- 6 8 ) CARTERET ( APA-7 0 ) CATRON ( APA- 7 1 ) DAWSON ( APA- 7 9 ) FALLON ( APA- 8 1 ) MYRANT ( DD-4 0 2 ) MUGFORD ( DD- 3 8 9 ) MUSTIN ( DD-4 13 ) RALPH TALBOT ( DD-3 9 0 ) RHIND ( DD-404 ) STACK ( DD-4 0 6 ) TRIPPE ( DD-4 0 3 ) WAINWRIGHT ( DD-4 1 9 ) WILSON ( DD-4 0 8 ) PENNSYLVANIA ( BB-3 8 ) PENSACOLA ( CA- 2 4 ) KMS PRINZ EUGEN ( ex-German ) YOG- 8 3 LST-5 2 LST- 1 3 3 LST- 2 2 0 LST-5 4 5 LST-6 6 1 LCI - 3 2 7 LCI - 3 3 2 LCI - 6 2 0 LCI - 4 1 2 LCT- 7 05 LCT-7 4 6 LCT- 8 1 6 LCT- 8 1 8 LCT- 8 7 4 LCT- 8 1 8 LCT- 8 7 4 LCT- 1 0 7 8 LCT- 1 1 12 LCT- 1 1 1 3 LCT- 1 1 1 5
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Merchant Merchant Merchant Merchant Merchant Merchant Merchant Merchant Merchant Merchant Destroyer Destroyer Destroyer Destroyer Destroyer Destroyer Destroyer Destroyer Destroyer Battleship Cruiser Cruiser
Gasoline barge Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , infantry Landing craft , infantry Landing craft , infantry Landing craft , infantry Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank Landing craft , tank
Kwaj alein continued to be used as a U . S . naval base after the war , and the period 1 9 5 1- 1 9 5 6 saw increased activity because of its pos ition on supply routes for u . s . operations in Korea and nuclear testing in Bikini and Enewetak .
Enewetak was formally returned to its original inhabitants in September 19 7 6 ; at that time , the U . S . began an extensive clean-up and rehabilitation program . In 1 9 8 0 about 5 5 0 people were returned from U j elang .
In August 1 9 6 8 , a fter the completion of the atomic testing program on Bikini , the is land was announced fit for human habitation . By 1 9 7 1 , two o f the is lets had been c leared of debris . At that time 140 Bikinians were al lowed to return . However , tests in 1 9 7 7 revealed that despite a $ 3 mill ion decontamination pro j ect' , Bikini groundwater was still too radioactive for human consumption , as were the coconuts , fruit and vegetables grown in Bikini soil . The Bikinians were resettled once again ; some were sent to Kil i and others were scattered on Maj uro , Ebeye in Kwa j alein , and Jaluit . Ef forts at rehabilitation and decontamination have continued but with mixed results . In 1 9 8 9 , estimates for full decontamination ranged from 2 0 to 9 0 years . Enui I sland , in the Bikini group , could be resettled in the near future , but all o f the risks have still not been determined .
The influence of the United States , particularly on Maj uro and Kwaj alein , has been tremendous . The effects range from diet to social behavior . I n the more remote atolls the impacts are far less pronounced . Despite this , traditional chiefs still command a good deal of respect and their importance has been recognized in the constitution of the republic .
Gilbert I slands
On December 9 , 1 9 4 1 , two days after the raid on Pearl Harbor , Japanese aircraft bombed Ocean Island ( Banaba ) , and reconnaissance parties landed briefly on Tarawa and Butaritari . Within a few months , most of the Europeans on those is lands were evacuated . Some government o f f ic ials stayed , j oined by miss ionaries and coast watchers from New Zealand . Twenty-two coast watchers were eventually kil led by the Japanese . Tarawa and Makin atolls were trans formed into forward bases . Throughout the Japanese occupation the Gilbertese res isted pass ively , their only course of action .
Temporary headquarters for the rema1n1ng islands o f the colony , not in Japanese hands , were trans ferred to Sydney . They remained there until November 1 9 4 3 , when American forces
2 7 5
recaptured the islands . British c olonial o f f icials returned tt to the islands with American Marines and immediately set up a labor corps that handled a good deal o f the stevedore responsibilities in preparation for the campaign in the Marshal l Islands . New government headquarters were set up on Tarawa , where they have remained .
When Ocean Island was reoccupied in 1 9 4 5 , all o f the Gilbertese labor force were dead and the native Ocean I s landers had been deported to Nauru and Kosrae in the Caroline I slands . When Nauru and Kosrae came under Allied contro l , the Ocean Islanders chose to go to Rabi I s land in Fi j i rather than return to their former home .
Within a few years of the war , most o f the people o f the islands were resettled , the displacements and disruptions mended as best as possible . An important postwar move in the main islands was the strengthening of the cooperatives that were originally established in the late 1 9 3 0 s . This made it unpro f itable for any foreign trading f irm to return to the group .
There was also a move in the late 1 9 5 0 s to give the islanders a greater degree of self-determination . I n 1 9 6 3 an executive counci l and an advisory council were created, giving the islanders a formalized advisory role . I n 1 9 6 7 the advisory A counci l was replaced by a house of representatives . It did .r not have legislative powers and acted much in the same manner as did the advisory council .
I n 1 9 7 1 , the house of representatives was replaced by a legislative council of 2 3 elected members , and the government counci l was replaced by an executive council . On January 1 , 1 9 7 2 , the colony moved out from under the j urisdiction o f the Western Pacific High Commission and the resident commis sioner was sworn in as the first governor . I n 1 9 7 4 the Ellice I s landers voted to secede from the colony , and in Apri l and May 1 9 7 7 more than 2 0 0 members o f local government councils , churches , traditional leaders , and cooperative societies met to draft a new constitution . I ndependence was formalized on July 1 2 , 1 9 7 9 , with the presentation of Letters Patent formal ly declaring the country ' s independence from Britain . Upon independence , the name Kiribati was adopted .
I n September 1 9 7 9 , a treaty of friendship was s igned between the Republic of Kiribati , which now included the Phoenix and Line islands , and the United States . Under the treaty the U . S . relinquished all c laims to 14 islands in the Line and Phoenix group that had been made under the Guano Act of 1 8 5 6 .
Copra still continues to be the only exported agricultural product . Other foodstuffs are grown , and fishing is done e
2 7 6
princ ipally for local consumption . The creation o f a 2 0 0-mile economic zone and agreements with several nations for fishing rights are leading toward the development o f commerc ial fishing i n the region . Plans t o develop a national tuna-fishing industry have begun , and fis hing boats , both donated and contracted , are in use . Butaritari is the proposed base for the commercial operation . E fforts are also being made in aquaculture , principally farming of milkfish and lobster .
Local industry is limited to the manufacture o f handicrafts , fish salting and small-boat building . The phosphate mining industry on Banaba ( the name was changed from Ocean I s land at the time of independence ) c losed down in 1 9 7 9 . In late 1 9 8 8 the possibility o f commencing operations once again was being considered .
The main overseas port faci lity is at Betio in Tarawa . All large ships are worked by tugs and barges from anchorages o ffshore . Commercial shipping is handled by several companies . Nauru Pacific Line carries both cargo and pas sengers . The Philippines , Micronesia & Orient Navigation Company offers a regular container service from Honolulu to Tarawa . In addition , Asia Pacific , KAP New Guinea Line , China Navigation and Star Shipping serve the is lands .
No specific ef fort was made to research modern shipping losses in the Gilbert Islands . It is presumed that they continue to reflect the maritime activities extant in the region . Small local craft , for fishing and pleasure , most l ikely comprise the maj ority of losses since the c lose o f World War I I .
The Modern Era
The nature of transoceanic shipping has changed dramatically s ince the c lose of World War I I . Commerc ial passenger l iners , large bulk cargo and container freighters , and tankers are the ships . that today ply those waters . They move the general merchandise , bulk cargos of grain , crude oil , raw and refined minerals , fue l , people and manufactured goods that form the backbone of modern industrial economies on both s ides of the Pac ific . Modern military ships also roam the region . Unlike their predeces sors and many of their contemporaries , some of these s hips are nuclear-powered .
The advent of satellite-l inked communications and pos itioning has reduced not only the potential for grounding but has provided a safety net to expedite rescue operations . Although losses still do occur , they are most numerous among
2 7 7
the Small boatS 1 lOCal fishing Or WOrk bOatS 1 and pleasure e craft o f all sizes .
Record keeping , part of the duty of the various Ports Authority , tracks the coming and going of hundreds of ships a month . Far from being relegated to second class status as a result of the preeminence of aircraft transport , shipping is greater than ever . While aircraft do handle the bulk of passenger traffic , shipping in the region is concentrating on the manufactured goods and raw materials needed to support an interlinked world economy .
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CHAPTER V I I I .
SHIPWRECKS : THE HISTORICAL RECORD
By Toni L . Carrell
Introduction
Documented ship losses in Micronesia span more than four centuries , from the first European ships accompanying Magellan in 1 5 2 0 to modern yachts and pleasure boats lost each year . Of course , the undocumented losses go back to the earliest peopling of the region . Unfortunately , to date , no prehistoric watercraft have been discovered . However , every maj or historic trend and activity in the region is mirrored in the record of ship losses . Early exploratory ships and traders , gal leons , privateers , colonial presidio boats , whalers , mis sionary ships , military cruisers , mail s hips and passenger ships as well as every type of modern mil itary ship used in two world wars and those used in atomic testing have been lost in the islands of Micronesia .
The vast maj ority of shipping losses occurred during World War I I , although , proportionate to their historical numbers , whalers did not fare well either .
A wide variety of sources , from archival documents housed in Spain , Mexico and the Phil ippines to modern mil itary histories was examined during the research for this chapter . As a result o f the combined e fforts o f the many contributors to this report , the l ist of s hips known to have been lost in the region numbers 5 8 1 . By no means is this l ist exhaustive . We were not able to search Japanese archives nor could every ship l isted in the report of Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War I I by Al l Causes ( Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee , 1 9 4 7 ) be traced .
However , the bulk of the known ship losses now forms the core of a shipwreck data base at the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit off ices in Santa Fe . Obviously , the exact location o f each of the 5 8 1 ships i s not known , nor have but a handful been located and investigated , even on a preliminary bas is . The data base forms a starting point from which to work and also makes handling the many pieces of information about the ships more manageable .
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide a frame of reference , that is , the historical documentary structure within which these sites can be evaluated . It is geared to al low the resource manager a quick understanding o f the range o f resources and the numbers o f s ites of a spec ific type or from a specific time period that may be present . This basic information is an important part of the process by which s ites are evaluated for their s ignif icance . It is also useful in planning for resource research and surveys . In other words , those respons ible for the protection, management and interpretation of submerged resources need to know what their resource base is .
The chapter is organized by era and island chain . Because o f the vast numbers of ships lost during World War I I , a l ist o f those s ites , broken down by type , is provided . I n a few cases , some additional background on the ship types is also presented .
Ship Losses , 152 0 - 1 9 4 1
Mariana I s lands
Saipan
Forty-one documented ship losses have occurred in and around Saipan ; o f these only four predate World War I I . The earliest known is the Manila galleon , NUESTRA SENORA de la CONCEPCION , wrecked in 1 6 3 8 . Two other ships , as yet unidentified through historical research , were also lost in the vicinity of Saipan later in that century . Finally, the whal ing ship , LIZ Z IE JARVIS , was lost in 1 8 6 5 .
Tinian
Seventeen s hipwrecks are known to have occurred on Tinian . The earliest is that of the U . S . brig , BRAMIN , wrecked in 1 7 9 7 . Other early shipwrecks from the period of colonialism and commerc ial expansion are the packet ESPERMAN ( 17 9 9 ) , the Spanish bark MARIA DEL ROSARIO ( 1 8 7 2 ) , and an unidentified bark ( 1 8 7 6 ) . The remainder are World War I I merchant and naval s hips .
The 1 2 known shipwreck s ites on Rota span nearly four c enturies . Five of those predate World War I I . The earliest documented wreck is that of SANTA MARGARITA , a manila galleon lost in 1 6 0 1 , somewhere j us t offshore of the isl and . Four other ships are reported to have been lost in the vicinity o f
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Rota during the Spanish colonial period . They are the presidio ships NUESTRA SENORA de LUMEN ( 1 7 4 6 ) and SAN FELIPE ( 17 7 6 ) and the ocean-going canoes SAN FERNANDO and SAN FRANCISCO ( 1 7 8 6 ) .
There have been 6 3 documented s hipwrecks in and around Guam over the last four centuries . Twelve were from the Spanish colonial period . The earliest was the manila galleon , SAN PABLO , sunk at anchor when a typhoon struck in 1 5 6 8 . SAN PABLO , a small galleon of 3 0 0 tons , was the first o f its type to be lost in the Acapulco-Manila trade . Because o f its small size , SAN PABLO was not typical of the ships used later in the trade . Three other galleons are known to have been wrecked at Guam : NUESTRA SENORA del PILAR ZARAGOSA , NUESTRA SENORA del BUEN VIAJE ( 1 7 5 4 ) and NUESTRA SENORA de la CONCEPCION ( 1 7 7 5 ) . A typical reconstruction of a Manila galleon , based upon archival information and limited s ite excavations , shows the compactness of these slow , but c apac ious , ships ( Figure 8 . 1 ) .
The commercial trading and whal ing period is represented by 2 3 ships , all sunk between 1 8 0 2 and 1 8 8 6 . One each from the American Naval period on Guam and from World War I are also represented .
A well-known shipwreck was the Cunard liner , SCOTIA . It was converted from a side paddle wheeler to a twin screw cable s hip in 1 8 7 7 after an extreme ly succes s ful 1 6 -year career as a passenger ship ( Figure 8 . 2 ) . The ship wrecked in 1 9 0 4 o f f the tip of the Glass Breakwater i n an area referred t o a s the Spanish Rocks .
The fol lowing overal l compilation of ship losses in the Mariana Islands was researched by Mrs . Marj orie G . Driver and Fr . Thomas B . McGrath .
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OUTBOARD PROFILE AND SAIL PLAN
LONGITUDINAL SECTION
0 1 0 2 0
FEET
Fig . 8 . 1 . Profile of a typical ( Adapted by NPS from drawing appearance of galleon SAN AGUSTIN ,
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Manila gal leon , ca . 1 6 0 0 . by Ray Aker o f assumed 1 5 9 5 )
Table 8 . 1 . Spanish and American Naval Era Ship Losses , 152 1 - 1 9 4 1 , Mariana Islands
Name
SANTA MARGARITA SAN PABLO SANTA MARGARITA NUESTRA SENORA
de la CONCEPCION Name unknown SAN FRANCISCO
XAVIER NUESTRA SENORA del
PILAR de ZARAGOZA Name unknown Name unknown
Name unknown Name unknown SANTO THORIBIO SAN JOSEPH SAN FRANCISCO
XAVIER SAN FERNANDO Name unknown NUESTRA SENORA
de LUMEN SANTO DOMINGO
de GUZMAN NUESTRA SENORA
del BUEN VIAJE Name unknown SAN PEDRO ( ? ) NUESTRA SENORA de
la CONCEPC ION , alias DESENGANO
SAN FELIPE SAN LORENZO SAN FERNANDO SAN ANTONIO SAN FRANCISCO SAN JOSE SAN VICENTE ESPERMEN NUESTRA SENORA
del ROSARIO , alias LA PALOMA
Name unknown Name unknown
Yr Lost
1 5 5 2 1 5 6 8 1 6 0 0
1 6 3 8 1 6 4 8
1 6 8 3
1 6 9 0 1 6 9 6 1 6 9 6
1 7 0 9 1 7 1 0 1 7 2 2 1 7 3 2 1 7 3 2
1 7 3 2 1 7 4 0 -4 6 1 7 4 6 - 4 9
1 7 4 6
1 7 5 4 ?
1 7 5 9 - 6 8 1 7 6 6 1 7 7 5
1 7 7 5 1 7 7 6 - 8 6 1 7 8 6 - 9 4 1 7 8 6 - 9 4 1 7 8 6 - 9 4 1 7 8 6 - 9 4 1 7 8 9 1 7 8 9 1 7 9 8
1 8 0 2 - 0 6 1 8 0 6 - 1 2 1 8 12 - 2 2
Type
Caravel Galleon Gal leon
Galleon Sampan
Patache/s loop
Galleon Schooner Unknown
Patache Balandra/sloop Patache Patache Sloop
Banca ( canoe ) Pres idio ship Pres idio ship
Pres idio s hip
Galleon
Banca Type unknown Frigate
Frigate Pres idio ship Banca ( canoe ) Banca ( canoe ) Banca ( canoe ) Banca ( canoe ) Banca ( canoe ) Banca ( canoe ) Packet boat
Frigate Banca ( canoe ) Presidio boat
2 8 3
Loc at ion
La drones Guam Rota , Atetito
Saipan Saipan Guam , Umatic
Guam , Cocos Saipan Guam , Santa Rosa Banks Guam vic inity Umatic-Belau Guam vicinity Guam , Merizo Guam
Rota Guam-Tinian Rota
Rota
Guam , P.:=tgo?
Guam-Tinian La drones
Guam Rota Ladrones Rota Guam-Tinian Rota Rota-Guam Guam-Tinian Tinian
Guam Rota-Guam Guam
Name
SANTIAGO , al ias INFANTE DON CARLOS ,
Yr Lost
LA CONSTITUCION 1 8 1 4 RESOURCE 1 8 1 9 CLARINGTON 1 8 2 5 PRONTO 1 8 2 9 - 3 7 CANDIDA 1 8 2 9 - 3 7 FALCON 1 8 2 9 - 3 7 I SABELLA 1 84 2 ? COURRIER des INDES 1847 CANTON 1 8 4 8 E . L . B . JENNY 1 8 5 1 AUSTERLITZ 1 8 5 1 WILLIAM T . SAYWARD 1854 LIZ Z IE JARVIS 1855 INVENCIBLE 1856 WILLIAM BADGER 1856 AS IA 1 8 5 6 Name unknown 1 8 5 6
LA CHAMORRITA PFEIL Name unknown SAN FRANCISCO
de BORJA Name unknown Name unknown Name unknown Name unknown Name unknown MARIA DEL ROSARIO CASHMERE SAN JOSE Name unknown SECRETO F . H . DREWS YAP YOSEMITE CS SCOTIA SMS CORMORAN DAI -ICHI MARU TOGO MARU
Caroline Islands
1857 1 859 1 8 6 0
1 8 6 2 1 8 6 7 1 8 6 7 1 8 6 8 1 8 6 8 1 8 7 0 1 8 7 2 1 8 7 3 1 8 7 4 1 8 7 6 1 8 8 6 1 8 8 8 1 8 9 1 1 9 0 0 1 9 0 4 1 9 1 7 1 94 0 1 9 4 0
Type
Frigate Type unknown Frigate Bergan tin Berg ant in Whaler Frigate Type unknown Frigate Whaler Type unknown Bark Whaler Bark Type unknown Whaler Banca ( canoe )
Brig Schooner Brigantine ?
Banca ( canoe ) Local boat Lancha ( launc h ) Pilot boat Brig Lancha Bark Frigate Schooner Bark Schooner Type unknown Schooner Steam launch Cable ship Pass /Cruiser Steamer Steamer
Location
Guam Ladrones Guam , Umatic Guam , Apra Hbr Tongatabu ( ? ) Ladrones Marianas ( ? ) N . Mariana I s . Tinian Guam N . Mariana I s . Mariana Is . Saipan Guam Anatahan Guam Guam-N . Mariana I s . Guam Guam Guam
Guam-Rota Guam Guam Guam Guam vicinity Guam Tinian Anchor , Umatic Mariana I s . Saipan Guam Mariana Is . Guam Guam Guam Guam Guam Tinian
Except for World War I I shipping losses , whaling ships are the most numerous shipwrecks in the Caroline I slands . Whalers wrecked from the Belau I s lands in the west to Kosrae in the east .
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Republ ic o f Belau
Seventy-nine ships are known to have wrecked in the islands of Belau . Of those , only 10 predate World War I I . One o f the most famous o f the early wrecks in Belau was that o f the British East India Company ( E IC ) ship , ANTELOPE . Captained by Henry Wilson , ANTELOPE ran aground on a reef near Ulong Island in 1 7 8 3 . Wilson and his crew began what would prove to be a long period of British influence in the internal affairs of these islands . Some 2 7 years later , the British MARTHA ( 1 8 10 ) wrecked on Helen ' s Reef in the south ; LADY RAGLAN ( 18 5 8 ) is also there . The whaler , MENTOR , ran aground in the northern islands in 1 8 3 2 , while the British trader, RENOWN , wrecked in 1 8 7 0 . The trader , LILLA , is reported to have wrecked at Melekeok in 1 88 0 . Three unidentified s hips , a patache ( 1 7 0 9 ) , a s loop ( 1 7 1 0 ) , and a s hip of unknown type ( 18 5 3 - 1 85 4 ) , are reported to have been lost in the vicinity o f Belau .
Federated States of Micronesia
State of Yap
Of the 1 4 ships known to have been sunk within the state , 6 predate World War I I . The earl iest was that of the American schooner , DASH , wrecked on Ngulu in 1 8 3 2 while on a trading voyage . The ship , EBBA BRAHE , l ikely involved in trading or whaling , also wrecked on Ngulu in 1 8 6 6 . The trade r , BELVEDERE , and the mail ship , AGUSTIN , both wrecked a t Yap in 1 8 7 1 and 1 8 8 2 , respectively . The schooner , CAROLINE , wrecked near Faraulep in 1 8 8 2 .
State of Truk
All of the 7 5 documented losses in Truk are Japanese World war I I merchant and naval ships .
State of Pohnpei
According to historic documentation , 23 ships were sunk in Pohnpei ; of those , 17 predate World War I I . All were lost during the whaling and trading era ( 1 8 3 6 - 1 88 4 ) .
2 85
Table 8 . 2 . Whal ing and Trading Era Ship Losses , 1 8 3 6 - 1 8 8 4 , State of Pohnpei
Name Yr Lost Type Location
I SABELLA 18 1 1 Trader Oroluk FALCON 1836 Whaler Mwokil SHAW 1843 Trader Oroluk HOWARD 1844 Whaler Pohnpei SARAH MOORES 1853 Trader Ngetik MAINTONOMI 1854 Whaler Pohnpei CONSTANCE 1 8 5 8 Trader Oroluk Unidentified 18 6 0 Trader Pohnpei NORNA 1 8 6 1 Trader/coal Oroluk PEARL 1 8 6 5 Whaler Pohnpei HECTOR 1 8 6 5 Whaler Pohnpei HARVEST 1 8 6 5 Whaler Pohnpei EDWARD CAREY 18 6 5 Whaler Pohnpei MALOLO 18 7 0 Trader Pohnpei KAMEHAMEHA 1 8 7 3 Trader/guano Pohnpei Unidentified 1 8 7 3 Whaler Pohnpei BOTHWELL CASTLE 1884 Trader Ngetik
The mos t famous of these wrecks are those of the whalers , PEARL , HECTOR , HARVEST and EDWARD CAREY ( Figure 8 . 3 ) burned in Lea Harbor by the Confederate raider , SHENANDOAH .
State o f Kosrae
Eleven of the twelve shipwrecks at Kosrae were whalers and traders . WAVERLY and HONDURAS , a whaler and a trading ship respectively , both wrecked in 1 8 3 5 . These are the earliest ship losses known on the is land . The whaler , HARRIET , wrecked in 1 8 4 2 , followed by the trader , GENI I , and another , unidentified whaler in 1 8 5 2 . PARAGON and LEXINGTON ( Figure 8 . 4 ) , both whalers , wrecked in 1 8 5 3 and 1 8 5 9 . The miss ionary packet and trader, MORNING STAR I I , wrecked in 1 8 6 8 . The brig , LEONORA , used in Bul ly Hayes ' blackbirding and trading act ivities , sunk in Port Lottin , Utwa anc horage , in 1 8 7 4 . The trader , STAGHOUND , sank in 1 8 8 3 , followed by MORNING STAR I I I in 1 8 8 4 .
Republic of Marshall Islands
The Marshall I s l ands never s aw the numbers of whalers that were so prevalent in the Carol ine Is lands to the west . Traders , princ ipal ly interested in obtaining copra , she l l and beche-de-mer , predominated in the years before World War I I . I n all , 1 8 ships are known to have wrecked in the islands , all during the colonial era ; not one was a whaler .
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Fig . 8 . 2 . CS SCOTIA wrecked outside Apra Harbor in 1 9 0 4 . ( Photo courtesy o f Jim Brandt )
Fig . 8 . 3 . EDWARD CAREY of Nantucket was one of four whalers sunk in Lea Harbor by the Con federate raider, SHENANDOAH . ( Photo courtesy Peabody Museum o f Salem)
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Table 8 . 3 . I s lands
Colonial Era Ship Losses , 1 8 3 2 - 1 8 8 4 , Marshall
Name
CANTON WILLIAM NEILSON Unidentified GLENCOE SEA NYMPH Unidentified CLARA D . ROBBINS FRANZ MARIA SYRINGA Unident ified MANA ALFRED JULIE REITZ Unidentified Unidentified CORYPHAEUS RAINIER
Yr Lost
1832 184 6 185 1 1852 1852 ca 1 8 6 1 1 8 6 3 186 3 1 8 6 3 1 8 6 8 1 8 6 8 1 8 74 1 8 74 1 8 75 1 8 75 1 8 75 1884 1 8 8 4
Type
Bark Brig Schooner Schooner
? ?
Schooner Schooner Schooner Bark Schooner Schooner Brig Bark Schooner Schooner Bark Schooner
Location
Bokaak Ebon Namorik Ebon Jaluit Bikini Maj uro Rongrik Ebon Jaluit Namorik Jaluit Jaluit Jaluit Jaluit Jaluit Ailuk Uj ae
The earliest of the wrecks was that of the E IC trader, CANTON . Typically the Indiamen were 14 0 feet long and 3 5 feet i n beam , twice the s i ze of a n ordinary eighteenth-century merchantman ( Figure 8 . 5 ) . Although beauti fully appointed with a carved taffrail and oriel windows in the stern and quarter galleries , the ungainly hull was too long for its breadth . In order to s tow the maximum c argo for the lowest possible tax fees , the British E I C built its s hips long, narrow and deep . As a result , an 8 0 0 -ton I ndiaman could carry nearly 1 , 0 0 0 tons of tea .
Because of its shape , however , it was a poor sailer . With a blu f f bow and rounded bottom , it could only make 3 or 4 knots , hal f the speed of its contemporary warships . When s ailing c lose to the wind, its high superstructure acted l ike a sail , forc ing the ship sideways rather than forward . Even in calm waters , the ship would tend to lurch and rol l , often making the crew seasick . Despite their drawbacks , EIC ships roamed all the world ' s oceans and extended British influence wherever they docked . MARTHA , wrecked at Helen ' s reef in 1 8 1 0 in Belau , may be another example of this type of ship .
Gilbert I s lands , Republic of Kiribati
The 18 ships wrecked among the Gilbert Islands that predate World War I I represent the trading , whaling ,
2 8 8
Fig. 8 . 4 . The whaler LEXINGTON wrecked in Kosrae in 1 8 5 9 . ( Photo courtesy Peabody Museum o f Salem)
Fig . 8 . 5 . A typical British East lndiaman of 1 7 7 5 .
2 8 9
labor-recruiting , and phosphate-mining dominated the islands for a century .
Table 8 . 4 . Colonial Era to Post-World 1 8 3 4 - 1 9 2 8 , Gilbert Islands
Name Yr Lost Type
CORSAIR 1834 Whaler COLUMBIA 1844 Whaler FLYING FOX 184 8 Trader RODOLPH 185 1 Trader ONTARIO 1852 Whaler INGA 1852 Whaler ORWELL 1 8 8 1 Whaler JULIA 1 8 8 4 Laborer GEORGE NOBLE 1 8 8 8 Trader ELBA 1 9 0 4 Bulk cargo HIRAM BINGHAM 1 9 0 9 Trader OCEAN TRANSPORT 1 9 2 8 Bulk cargo
activities that
War I Ship Losses ,
Location
Tabiteuea Nonouti Nonouti Tabiteuea Butaritari Nauru Beru Nikunau Nonouti Banaba Butaritari Banaba
Nearly 3 0 whaling ships wrecked in the islands o f Micronesia . They were lost a s result of human error , conflict with the native peoples or natural causes . Whatever the reason , they are among the most numerous of a speci f ic type predating World War I I .
Whalers shared certain traits , among them a tubby , capac ious hul l that was framed and planked throughout with s trong , durable oak ( Figure 8 . 6 ) . Speed was not important ; the best ships were those that could plod along for months or years while accumulating barrels of whale oil in their holds . Typically, these ships made little more than 5 knots . The bark rig , preferred on whalers , and fore-and-aft sails on the miz zenmast meant that fewer men were required to handle the sails .
The plan of CHARLES W . MORGAN ( Figure 8 . 7 ) , a c lassic example built at the peak of the whaling period , shows the deck arrangement . S l im whaleboats hung from davits off the rails , three on the port and two on the starboard . A sixth boat was stowed on the deck . Steering was aft and the tryworks forward , between the fore and main masts . The two large iron caldrons in the tryworks were surrounded by brick . Three small hatches broke up the deck and were located forward o f the tryworks and forward and aft o f the main mast . The ' tween decks hold was unbroken with the exception of a bulkhead at the forecastle and another aft , leading to the crew and cook quarters .
2 9 0
"
Fig . a . 1 . Museum)
Fig . 8 . 6 . Typical New England whaling ship, ca . 1 84 1 .
PORT BULWARK
OECI< PLAN
STARBOARD BULWARK
Deck plan of CHARLES MORGAN .
6 10 11'1 20
SCALE IN F"EET
( Courtesy of Mystic Seaport
Whaling activity dramatically impacted the islands of Micrones i a , and the whalers themselves , as wel l as their descendants , heralded an era of dramatic change .
Ship Losses , 1 9 4 1- 1 9 4 6
More than 3 0 0 ships were sunk i n Micronesia during World War I I . They are summarized in Tables 8 . 5 and 8 . 6 , compiled by Don Boyer .
Table 8 . 5 . Representat�ve List o f Imperial Japanese Warships and Maj or Fleet Auxilaries Sunk within Central Pacific I s lands
� Date/Location2 Agency
SHOKAKU Aircaft Sunk 6 / 1 9 /4 4 u . s . carrier 1 4 0 run N ob Yap submarine ( Shokaku Is land ( 1 1 CAVELLA class ) 4 0 ' N , 1 3 7° 4 0 ' E )
HIYO Aircraft Sunk 6 / 2 0 / 4 4 Aircraft from carrier 4 5 0 run NW of Yap CVL BELLEAU ( Junyo c lass ) Is land ( 15° 3 0 ' WOOD
N , 1 3 3° 5 0 ' E )
1sources : Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1 8 6 9 - 1 9 4 5 and Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee ( JANAC ) Report ( 2 /4 7 ) . The recently published U . S . Submarine Attacks During World War I I has not been cross-referenced with this l ist .
2Latitudes and longitudes can only be cons idered as approximate except for some ships definitely located at Truk , Palau and Guam . All latitudes and longitudes for s inkings by submarines listed in JANAC use the submarines ' pos ition rather than the target vesse l . Many ships lost in shallow waters have been partially or fully salvaged in the postwar years . No attempt was made here to identi fy these vessels as they are no longer in the area .
2 9 2
e
TAIHO
NAKA
YUBARI
KATORI
AGANO
SUSUKI
KIKU
Aircraft carrier ( Taiho Class )
Light cruiser ( Sendai class )
Light cruiser ( Yubari clas s )
Light cruiser ( Katori class )
Light cruiser ( Agano clas s )
Old3
destroyer ( Momi class ) ( renamed PATROL BOAT #34 in 1 9 3 9 )
Old destroyer ( Momi Class ) ( renamed PATROL BOAT # 3 1 in 1 9 3 9 )
Date/Location
Torpedoed 6 /1 9 /4 4 1 8 0 nm NNW o f Yap ; b lew up and sunk s ev5n hours later ( 1 2 OS I N , 1 3 8° 1 2 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /4 4 3 5 nm W of Truk ( 0 7° 1 5 ' N , 1 5 1° 1 5 ' E )
Torpedoed 4 /2 7 /4 4 Nea0 Palau ( O S 2 0 ' N , 1 3 2° 1 6 ' E )
Damaged 2 / 1 7 /4 4 a t Truk by TF 5 8 aircraft ; sunk same day 4 0 nm NW of Truk ( 0 7°
4 5 ' N , 1 5 1° 2 0 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /4 4 1 6 0 nm N o f Truk ( 1 0° 1 1 ' N , 15 1° 4 2 ' E )
Sunk 7 / 3/44 at Truk ( under repair from col l is ion )
Sunk 3 / 3 0 / 4 4 off Palau ( 0 7° 3 0 ' N , 1 3 4° 3 0 ' E )
3ship terminology is discussed i n the text .
2 9 3
Agency
u . s . submarine ALBACORE
Aircraft from CV BUNKER and CVL COWPENS
u . s . submarine BLUEGILL
Aircraft and U . S . CAs MINNEAPOLI S NEW ORLEANS and DDs RADFORD and BURNS
u . s . submarine SKATE
Air attack
TF-5 8 aircraft
WAKATAKE Old destroyer ( Wakatake exYuri class )
TACHIKAZE Old destroyer ( Minekaze c lass )
OITE Old destroyer ( Kamikaze class )
FUMIZUKI Old destroyer ( Mutsuki clas s )
IKAZUCHI Destroyer ( Akatsuki clas s )
SAMIDARE Destroyer ( Shiratsuyu c lass )
UMIKAZE Destroyer ( Shiratsuyu c lass )
SUZUKAKE Destroyer ( Shiratsuyu c lass )
Date /Location .
Sunk 3 / 3 0 / 4 4 68 nm N of Palau ( 0 7 5 0 ' N , 134° 2 0 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 17 /4 4 at Truk ( 07° 0 4 ' N , 1 5 1° 55 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /44 at Truk ( 0 7° 4 0 ' N , 1 5 1° 4 5 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1g/44 at Truk ( 0 7 24 ' N , 1 5 1° 44 ' E )
Sunk 4 / 1 4 / 4 4 2 0 0 nm S S E of Guam
Wrecked 8 / 1 8 / 4 4 off Palau ( grounding ) ; later torpedoed and sunk ( 8 / 2 5 /4 4 )
Torpedoed 2 / 1 /�4 S of Truk 0 ( 0 7 1 0 I N I 1 5 1 4 3 I E )
Torpedoed 1 /2 6 /44
���a�: ��:oo; 1 ' N , 1 5 7° 1 0 I E )
Agency
TF-5 8 aircraft
TF- 3 8 aircraft
TF- 3 8 aircraft
Aircraft from CV ENTERPRI SE
u . s . submar�ne HARDER
u . s . submarine BATFI SH
u . s . submarine GUARDFI SH
u . s . submarine SKIPJACK
4The submarine sinkings data in the JANAC Report were never very wellreceived in the U . S . Submarine Service bec ause of some glaring errors and a tendency to discredit ( although not intentionally ) eyewitness accounts . The u . s . submarine attacks book referenced in Note 1 above sheds cons iderable light on the sub j ect .
2 94
MAIKAZE Destroyer ( Kagero class )
Date /Location
Sunk by gunfire 2 / 1 7 /4 4 4 0 nm NW of Truk ( 0 7° 45 ' N , 15 1° 2 0 ' E )
GYORAITEI Motor torpedo Sunk 9 / 19 / 4 3 off NO . 2 and boat ( Gyoraitei ) Tarawa ( both ) NO . 3
GYORAITE I Motor torpedo NO . 10 boat
R0-6 0
R0-3 8
R0-4 0
R0-42
R0- 4 4
R0-45
Vickers L ( 4 ) type submarine ( ex No . 5 9 )
Kaichu ( 6 ) type submarine
Kaichu ( 6 ) type submarine
Kaichu ( 6 ) type submarine
Kaichu ( 6 ) type submarine
Kaichu ( 6 ) type submarine
Sunk 2 / 16/44 at Truk ( 8 7 5 1 ' N , 15 1 59 ' E )
Wrecked 1 2 / 1 9 /4 1 on north point of Kwa j al5in ( 0 9° N , 1 6 7 3 0 ' E )
Miss ing a fter 1 1 / 1 9 /4 3 en route to Kiribati Islands
Sunk 2 / 1 6 /4 4 45 nm NW o f Kwaj alein ( 0 9° 5 0 ' N, 1 6 6° 35 ' E )
Sunk 6 / 10 or 6 / 1 1 / 4 3 9 0 nrn ENE o f Roi , Kwaj alein Atol l ( 1 0° 05 ' N , 1 6 8° 2 2 ' E )
Sunk 6 / 1 6 /4 4 1 1 0 nm E of Enewetok ( 1 1° 13 ' N, 1 6 4° 15 ' E )
Japanese records indicate mis sing from 4 /3 0 /4 4 ; US records indicate poss ibly sunk same day 6 5 nrn SSW of Truk ( 86° 13 ' N , 1 5 1 1 9 I E )
2 9 5
Agency
u . s . task group 5 0 . 3-2 BB , 2 CA , 4 DD
Aircraft from CV LEXINGTON , CVLs PRINCETON and BELLEAU WOOD
TF- 3 8 aircraft
Operational accident
Unknown
US DO PHELPS , minesweeper SAGE
US DE BANGUST
US DE BURDEN R . HASTINGS
US DDs MCDONOUGH , STEPHEN POTTER aircraft from CVL MONTEREY
Name � Date/Location Agency
R0-47 Kaichu ( 6 ) Missing from US DE MCCOY type 9 /2 4 / 4 4 ; possibly REYNOLDS submarine ( sunk 9 /2 6 /4 4 88
nm w of Yag ( 0 9 1 9 ' N , 1 3 6 4 4 ' E )
R0-4 8 Kaichu ( 6 ) Missing from us DE WILLIAM type 7 / 1 4/4 4 ; poss ibly c . MILLER submarine sunk 7 /1 4 / 4 4 7 5 nm
W of Saipan ( 15° 1 8 ' N , 14 4° 2 6 ' E )
R0- 114 Kaisho type Sunk 6 /1 7 /4 4 8 0 nm US DDS submarine W of Tinian ( 15° MELVIN ,
0 2 ' N , 1 4 4° 1 0 ' E ) WADLEI GH
R0- 1 17 Kaisho type Sunk 6 / 1 7 /4 4 3 5 0 nm u . s . Marine submarine SE of Saipan ( 1 1° Corps
05 ' N , 1 5 0° 3 1 ' aircraft E )
I - 1 6 5 Kaidai type 5 Missing from 6 /4 5 u . s . Marine ( ex I - 6 5 ) submarine possibly sunk Corps
6 / 2 7 /4 5 4 5 0 nm E aircraft e of Saipan b 15° I 2 8 ' N , 1 5 3 3 9 ' E )
I - 1 6 9 Kaidai type 6A Sunk 4 /4 / 4 4 at Accidental ( ex I - 6 9 ) submarine Truk flooding
while avoid-ing attack .
I - 1 7 4 Kaidai type 6B Missing from u . s . Marine ( ex I - 7 4 ) submarine 4 / 1 1 / 4 4 ; probably Corps
sunk 4 / 1 2 / 4 4 N aircraft of Truk
I - 1 75 Kaidai type 6B Missing from US DD ( ex I - 7 5 ) submarine 1 / 3 0 / 4 4 ; probably CHARRETTE , DE
sunk 2 / 4 / 4 4 1 0 0 nm FAIR NW of Jaluit ( 0 6° 4 8 ' N , 1 6 8° 0 8 ' E )
2 9 6
Name � Date/Location Agency
I - 1 7 7 Kaidai type 7 Missing from US DE SAMUEL ( ex I -7 7 ) submarine 9 / 2 4 /4 4 ; probably B . MILES
sunk 10/ 3/44 6 0 nm NNE o f Ngeaur ( Palau� ( 7 0 4 0 ' N , 1 3 3 2 8 ' E )
I-184 Kaidai type 7 Missing from US CVE ( ex I- 8 4 ) submarine 6 / 15/44 ; probably SUWANEE
�u�� ��!!/4i380 nm aircraft
0 1 ' N , 144b 5 3 ' E )
I- 1 85 Kaidai type 7 Missing from US DD ( ex I-85 ) submarine 6 / 15/4 4 ; probably NEWCOMB ,
sunk 6 /2 2 /44 9 0 nm minesweeper ENE of Saipan . CHANDLER
I-5 Junsen type 1M Missing from US DE WYMAN submarine 7 / 1 9 /4 4 ; probably
sunk same day 3 6 0 nm E of Guam ( 1 3° 0 1 N , 1 5 1° 58 ' E )
I - 6 Junsen type 2 Missing from Unknown submarine 6 /3 0 /44 in Saipan
area
I- 1 0 A ( 1 ) type5 Missing from us DD DAVID submarine 6 /2 8 /4 4 ; probably w . TAYLOR and
sunk 7 /4/44 6 5 nm DE RIDDLE ENE of Saigan ( 15° 2 6 ' N , 147 4 8 ' E )
5 It is quite possible that type "A " midget submarines may be found among the Central Pacific wrecks . Many were lost in action in most battle areas throughout the war ( beginning with five at Pearl Harbor ) . Since these short-range boats required a "mother ship , " e ither a submarine or surface vessel , and since they were small enough to transport , they may be found in the Central Pacific as well , most likely in harbor or as cargo on various vessels or with submarines stationed at Kwaj alein , Saipan and Truk .
2 9 7
- - - - - - - ----------------------
Name � Date/Location Agency
I- 1 2 A ( 2 ) type Missing from Unknown submarine 1/5/45 in Central
Pacific
I - 1 9 B ( 1 ) type Sunk 1 1 / 2 5 /43 60 nm US DD RADFORD submarine W of Makin ( 0 3
10 ' N , 1 7 1° 55 ' E )
I-2 1 B ( 1 ) type Missing from Unknown submarine 1 1 / 2 7 / 4 3 off
Tarawa
I- 2 8 B ( 1 ) type Sunk 5 / 1 7 /42 45 nm u . s . submarine SSE of Truk ( 0 6° submarine
30 ' N , 1 5 2° E ) TAUTOG
I-32 B ( 1 ) type Sunk 3 /24 /44 sg nm US DE MANLOVE submarine S of Wot je ( 08 and PC- 1 1 3 5
30 ' N , 17 0° 10 ' E )
I- 35 B ( 1 ) type Sunk by ramming and US DE FRAZ IER submarine
���f���a!;
/�� {�
3
2 2 ' N , 1 7 2° 47 ' E )
I - 3 7 B ( 1 ) type Missing from US DEs submarine 1 1/ 2 0/44 ; probably CONKLIN,
sunk 1 1 / 1 9 /4 4 in and MCCOY �=l��
s���op��7a��
, REYNOLDS
134° 1 6 ' E )
I - 3 8 B ( 1 ) type Missing from US DD submarine 1 1 /5/44 ; probably NICHOLAS
sunk 1 1 / 1 2 /44 85 nm S of Yap ( 0 8° 04 ' N , 1 3 8° 9 2 ' E )
I - 3 9 B ( 1 ) type Sunk 1 1 /2 6 /4 3 DD BOYD submarine in the Gilbert
Islands
I-42 B ( 2 ) type Sunk 3 /2 3 /44 6 nm u . s . submarine SW of Ngeaur, submarine
Palau 60 6° 40 ' TUNNY N , 149 1 0 ' E )
2 98
I -43
I-48
I -55
I-362
MUTSURE
B ( 2 ) type submarine
C ( 2 ) type submarine
C ( 3 ) type submarine
D ( 1 ) type submarine
Escort/patrol vessel ( Etorofu type )
SOKUTEN Minelayer ( Sokuten class )
KAHOKU Auxiliary MARU minelayer
NICHIYU Auxiliary MARU minelayer
OKINAWA Merchant cable MARU ship
Date/Location
Sunk 2/ 15 /44 2 88 nm ESE of Gua{g ( 12 4 2 I N ' 14 9 1 0 I E )
Missing from 1/2 0 /45 ; probably sunk 1/23 /45 2 5 nm NE of Yap 609° 4 5 ' N , 1 38 2 0 ' E )
Missing from 7 /14/44 ; probably sunk 7 /2 8 /44 4 08 nm E of Tinian ( 14 2 6 ' N , 152° 16 ' E )
Missing from 1 / 1/45 ; probably sunk 1/ 13/45 3 28 nm NNE of Truk ( 12 0 8 ' N , 154° 2 7 ' E )
Sunk 9 /2/43 85 nm NNW of Truk ( 08° 4 0 ' N , 1 5 1° 3 1 ' E )
Sunk 7 /25/44 Malakal Harbor , Palau ( 0 7° 2 0 ' N , 1 3 4° 2 7 ' E )
Sunk 6 /8 /4 3 N of Palau 60 8° 5 8 ' N ' 1 34 14 I E )
Sunk 7 /16/44 Apra Harbor , Guam
2 9 9
Agency
u . s . submarine AS PRO
US DEs CONKLIN , CORBEISIER and RABY
US DEs REYNOLDS and WYMAN
US DE FLEMING
u . s . submarine SNAPPER
TF-58 aircraft
u . s . submarine FINBACK
Surface ship bombardment
u . s . submarine SILVERS IDES
HIRO MARU
KASHIMA MARU
KOEI MARU
KOKKO MARU
NISSHO MARU NO . 5
SHOFUKU MARU
SHOSEI MARU
W-2 2
CH- 6
CH- 10
Net layer ( auxiliary )
Net layer ( auxiliary )
Net layer ( auxiliary )
Net layer ( auxiliary )
Net layer ( auxiliary )
Netlayer ( auxiliary )
Net layer ( auxiliary )
Minesweeper ( W- 19 c lass )
Submarine chaser ( CH- 1 type , also known as CH-7 class )
Submarine chaser ( CH- 1 type , also known as CH-7 class )
Date/Location Agency
Sunk 1 /3 1 /44 U . S . NNW Saipan submarine
TULLIBEE
Severely damaged CV ENTERPRISE 2/ 1/42 at aircraft Kwajalein , later stricken , probably scrapped or destroyed by Japanese prior to end of war
Sunk 9 /2 1 /42 U . S . S of Truk submarine
TROUT
Sunk 6 / 1 2 /44 1 8 0 Aircraft nrn NW of Saipan
Sunk 3 / 3 0 /4 4 at Palau
Sunk 8 / 7 /42 off Wotj e
Aircraft
u . s . submarine TAMBOR
Beached 3 / 3 0 /44 Aircraft at Palau ; probably no longer exists
Sunk 1 1 / 1 1 /44 at Mine Babelthaup , Palau
Damaged and beached Aircraft 3/ 3 0/4 4 at Babelthaup , Palau
Stranded in Palau Operational 562 /44 ( approx accident 7 2 0 ' N , 1 34° 3 0 ' E )
300
CH-1 2
CH-24
CH-2 9
CHA-1 4
CHA- 1 8
CHA- 19
CHA-2 1
CHA-2 2
CHA-2 6
CHA-2 8
CHA-3 8
CHA-52
Submarine chaser ( CH- 1 type , also known as CH-7 class )
Submarine chaser ( modified CH-1 type )
Submarine chaser ( modified CH-13 type )
Auxiliary submarine chaser ( CHA-1 class )
Auxiliary submarine chaser ( CHA- 1 class )
Auxiliary submarine chaser ( CHA- 1 class )
Auxiliary submarine chaser
Auxiliary submarine chaser
Auxiliary submarine chaser
Auxiliary submarine chaser
Auxiliary submarine chaser
Auxiliary submarine chaser
Date /Location I
Lost 8/44 off Palau
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /44 W of Truk by gunf ire ( 0 7° 1 0 ' N , 1 7 7° 42 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1�/44 off Truk ( g7 25 ' N , 1 5 1 45 ' E )
Sunk 1/30/44 Mili Atoll , Marshall I s lands
Sunk 1/30/44 at Kwajalein
Sunk 1 / 3 0 /44 at Mili Atoll
Sunk 1 / 3 0 /44 at Kwaj alein
Sunk 3 / 1 /�4 at Palau b0 7 3 0 ' N , 1 3 4 3 0 ' E )
Sunk 3 / 1 /44 at Palau
Sunk 1 /3 0 /44 at Mili Atoll
Sunk 4 / 30/44 at Truk
Lost 1 0 /25/4 4 at Palau ( 27° 3 0 ' N , 134 30 I E )
3 0 1
Agency
Unknown
DD BURNS
Aircraft
Aircraft
Aircraft
Aircraft
TF-5 8 aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
TF-5 8 aircraft
Possible operational loss
CHA-53
CHA-54
CHA-6 6
Auxiliary submarine chaser
Auxiliary submarine chaser
Auxiliary submarine chaser
Date/Location
Sunk 3 / 3 0 /4 4 at Palau
Sunk 6 / 1 5 / 4 4 at Rota
Sunk 8 / 7 / 4 5 ( ? ) at Truk
Agency
T-58 aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
Aircraft
The next six ships are requisitioned small merchant vessels , motor or steam trawlers and the like , as dif ferentiated from the previous purposely built ships .
FUJI Auxiliary sub-MARU marine chaser NO . 1 1
KYO MARU Auxiliary sub-NO . 6 marine chaser
KYO MARU Auxiliary subNO . 8 & marine chasers 1 0
SAPPORO MARU
SHONAN MARU NO . 10
SHONAN MARU NO . 15
T- 1
Auxiliary submarine chaser
Auxiliary submarine chaser
Auxiliary submarine chaser
High-speed transport ( T-1 type )
Sunk 2 / 6 /4 4 at Kwajalein
Grounded 1 1/2 7 /43 , Namu I s land , Marshalls
Possibly sunk at Saipan , 2 /2 3/44
Sunk 5 /4 / 4 4 at Truk
Sunk 2 / 1 / 4 2 at Kwaj alein
Possibly sunk 2 / 17 /4 4 at Truk
Sunk 7 /2 7644 at Palau 60 7 3 0 ' N , 134 3 0 ' E )
3 0 2
TF-5 8 aircraft
Operational loss
Aircraft
Aircraft
CV ENTERPRISE aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
TF-5 8 aircraft
-------------------------------------------------------------- - --
Name �
T-150 Tank6 7 landing ship ( type 1 0 1 and 1 0 3 )
AKAGI Armed8 MARU merchant
cruiser ( transport )
KIYOZUMI Armed merchant MARU cruiser
( transport )
BANGKOK Armed merchant MARU cruiser
( transport )
AIKOKU Armed merchant MARU cruiser
( transport )
HEIAN Auxiliary sub-MARU marine depot
ship
Date/Location Agency
Sunk 7 /2 764 4 at TF-5 8 Palau 60 7 30 ' aircraft N I 134 30 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /4 4 NW of TF-5 8 Truk ( 0 7° 5 4 ' N , aircraft 1 5 1° 24 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /44 at TF-5 8 Truk following aircraft damage 1 / 1 /4 4 from submarine
Sunk 3/2 0/4 3 E of U . S . of �aluit Atoll submarine ( 05 4 7 ' N , POLLACK 1 6 9° 4 2 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /44 TF- 5 8 at Truk aircraft
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /44 TF-58 at Truk aircraft
6There were four Navy ES type landing craft ( SS-8 , 1 0 , 1 4 and 15 ) lost during World War ! !--date , cause and location unknown . It is possible some of these may have been lost in the Central Pacific area .
7The Imperial Navy and Army ordered about 5 , 55 5 small ( 10-to- 17 meter ) landing craft of varying capacities and configurations . All were commonly referred to by the Allies as "Daihatsu " landing craft . It is certain they were used in all island areas under Japanese control in the Central Pacific for transport and small craft duties around the many island bases , particularly Palau , which served for part of the war as an amphibious training center .
8somewhat of a misnomer , as armed merchant cruisers did not operate as such except briefly in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific . All ships on this list were being used as transports when lost .
3 0 3
RIO DE JANEIRO MARU
YASUKUNI MARU
AKASHI
ASAKAZE MARU
IWASHIRO MARU
SANSEI MARU NO . 2
SHINSEI MARU NO . 6
SHINYUBARI MARU
SOYO MARU
SATA
IRO
OSE
Auxiliary submarine depot ship
Auxiliary submarine depot ship
Repair ship
Collier/supply ship
Collier/supply ship
Collier/supply ship
Collier/supply ship
Collier/supply ship
Collier/supply ship
Naval tanker
Naval tanker
Naval tanker ( captured Dutch GENOTA )
Date/Location
Sunk 2 /1 7 /44 at Truk
��n�r�k3
t 6�� �� · N , 1 4 7° 1 3 ' E )
Sunk 3 / 3 0 /4 4 at Palau
Sunk 1 2 / 5 / 4 3 at Roi , Kwa j alein I sland
Sunk 1 / 1 5 /4 3 off Kwaj alein
Damaged 9 / 15/43 N of Truk ( subsequent fate not known ) .
Sunk 8 /2 1 /4 2 off Po nape
Sunk 2 / 2 3 /44 W of Saipan
Sunk 1 2 / 7 /42 N of Truk
Sunk 3 / 3 0 /4 4 at Palau
Sunk 3 / 3 0 /4 4 at Palau
Sunk 3 / 3 0 /4 4 at Palau
3 0 4
Agency
TF-5 8 aircraft
u . s . submarine TRIGGER
TF-3 8 aircraft
Aircraft
u . s . submarine WHALE
u . s . submarine HADDOCK
u . s . submarine TAMBOR
u . s . submarine SUNFISH
u . s . submarine POGY
TF-5 8 aircraft
TF-5 8 aircraft
TF-5 8 aircraft
Name �
KAZAHAYA Naval tanker
Date /Location I
Sunk 9 /6 / 4 3 2 4 0 nm � of Truk ( 1 0 0 1 ' N , 1 4 8° 3 1 ' E )
Agency
u . s . submarines TINOSA and STEELHEAD
The following 15 ships were merchant tankers converted for naval use . Most were requisitioned .
NOTE : The war standard merchant ships , of which approximately 1 , 1 0 0 were built or being built through 8/ 4 5 , are not listed by location of loss in Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1 8 6 9 - 1 9 4 5 . Most are known only through being lost . JANAC report ' s latitude/longitude would have to be cross-referenced to determine losses among these vessels undoubtedly sustained in the Central Paci fic area .
ARIMA MARU
CHOKO MARU
AKEBONO MARU
AMATSU MARU
FUJI SAN MARU
GEN ' YO MARU
HOYO MARU
KAIJO MARU NO . 2
Fleet tanker
Fleet tanker
Fleet tanker
Fleet tanker
Fleet tanker
Fleet tanker
Fleet tanker
Fleet tanker
Date/Location
Sunk 4/ 3 / 4 3 N of Palau
Sunk 2 /5/44 off Saipan
Sunk 3 / 3 0 /4 4 at Palau
Sunk 3 / 3 0/44 at Palau
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /44 at Truk
Scuttled 6 /2 0/44 W of Saipan after air attack
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /4 4 at Truk after 1 1/ 6 /4 3 damage from submarine
Sunk 3/5/42 off Truk
305
Agency
u . s . submarine HADDOCK
u . s . submarine '!lANG
TF-58 aircraft
TF-5 8 aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
Aircraft
Aircraft
u . s . submarine GRAMPUS
Name �
KEN ' YO Fleet tanker MARU
SAN Fleet tanker CLEMENTE ( KUREMENTE ) MARU
SHINKOKU MARU
TERUKAWA MARU
TOA MARU
TOE! MARU
TON AN MARU NO . 3
Fleet tanker
Fleet tanker
Fleet tanker
Fleet tanker
Fleet tanker
Date/Location .
Sunk 1 / 14 /44 SE of Palau
Sunk 5/4 / 4 3 o f f Palau
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /4 4 off Truk
Sunk 1 2 / 2 1 /43 NW of Truk
Sunk 1 1 /2 5 /4 3 N of Ponape
Sunk 1 / 1 8 /4 3 100 nm SW of Truk
Sunk 2 / 17 /44 at Truk
Agency
u . s . submarine GUARDFISH
u . s . submarine SEAL
TF-58 aircraft
u . s . submarine SKATE
u . s . submarine SEARAVEN
u . s . submarine SILVERS IDES
TF-58 aircraft
Table 8 . 6 . Representative List of Japanese Merchant Auxiliary Vessels Sunk Within the Central Pacific Islands .
Name �
AKIBASAN Transport MARU
AIKOKU Guard boat MARU
AMAGISAN Transport MARU
ARATAMA Ammunition MARU ship
Date/Location
Sunk 1/30/44 SW of Uj ae Atoll , Marshall Islands
Sunk 6 / 30/44 at Kwaj alein
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /44 at Truk
Sunk 4 /8 /4 4 s of Guam ( now in Talafofo Bay, Guam )
30 6
Agency
DD BURNS
Coastal artillery
TF-58 aircraft
u . s . submarine SEAHORSE
e
ATLANTIC Transport MARU (ATORAN CHIKKU MARU )
BANSHU Depot ship MARU NO . 5 ( ex N0 . 15 )
BATAVIA MARU ( BATABIA )
BORDEAUX MARU ( BORUDO ) CHI YO MARU
Transport
Transport
Store ship ( ? )
CHOAN Gunboat MARU NO 2 ( ex CHOAN MARU )
CHOKO MARU
Transport
CHOKO Gunboat MARU NO . 2 ( ex CHOKO MARU )
DAIDO Gunboat MARU
EBISU Guard boat MARU NO . 1 1
E IKO Transport MARU NO . 2
FUJIKAWA Aircraft MARU transport
Date/Location
Sunk 3/30/44 off Guam
Lost en route to Yokohama from Truk about 4 / 15 /43
Sunk 6 / 13/44 1 6 0 nm NNW o f Saipan
Sunk 2 / 1/42 at Kwajalein
Sunk 5/2 6 /4 4 W of Marianas
Sunk 5/ 10/44 N of Carolines 6 1 1° 3 1 ' N , 14 3 4 1 ' E )
Sunk 1 2 /5/43 off Kwajalein
Sunk 1/ 1 2/4 4 SW of Truk ( 0 3° 3 7 ' N , 1 4 7° 2 7 ' E )
Sunk 1 2 /464 3 NE o f Ponape ( 9 0 6 ' N , 159° 0 2 I E )
Sunk 7 / 8 /44 off Saipan
Damaged by aircraft 1 2 /5/43 at Kwajalein ; sunk by gunfire 1/ 3 0/44 at Kwaj alein
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /4 4 at Truk
3 0 7
Agency
u . s . submarine PICUDA
Unknown
TF-5 8 aircraft
CV ENTERPRISE aircraft
u . s . submarine TAMBOR
u . s . submarine SILVERS IDES
TF-5 0 aircraft
u . s . submarine ALBACORE
u . s . submarine APOGON
Aircraft
Aircraft/ surface ships
TF-5 8 aircraft
FUKUEI Guard boat MARU NO . 3
FUKUYAMA Gunboat MARU
FUKUYOSHI Guard boat MARU NO . 5
GORYU MARU
GOSE I MARU
GO SHU MARU
GO ZAN MARU
Water tanker
Transport
Aircraft transport
Transport
HAKKAISAN Gunboat MARU
HANAKAWA Transport MARU
HARUNA Victualling MARU stores ship
( reefer )
HARUTA Guard boat MARU
HEIJO Gunboat MARU
Date /Location
Sunk 7 / 8 / ? off Saipan ( probably 1944 )
Sunk 2/ 2 2 /44 4 0 nm W of Saipan ( 14° 4 7 ' N , 14 4° 5 0 ' E )
Wrecked 1 /5/44 at Wot je
Sunk 2 / 4 / 4 4 at Jaluit , Marshall Islands
Sunk 2 / 17 /44 at Truk
Sunk 3 / 3 0 /4 4 at Palau
Sunk 3/3 0 /44 at Palau
Sunk 10/2 2/4 2 8 0 nm SW of Tamana , Kiribati I s lands ( 0 3° 3 0 ' S , 1 7 5° 1 5 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /44 at Truk
Sunk 1 / 1 6 /44 SW of Palau
Sunk 6 /2 3 /44 off Pagan , Mariana I s lands
Sunk 9 / 4 / 46 SW of Ponape ( 0 5 2 5 ' N , 1 5 6° 3 7 ' E )
3 0 8
Agency
Aircraft
u . s . submarine TANG
Aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
TF-5 8 aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
DD gunfire
TF-5 8 aircraft
Collision with KYOEI MARU
Aircraft
u . s . submarine ALBACORE
HEIYO MARU
Troop transport
HINO MARU Gunboat NO . 2
HIROSHI MARU NO . 5
HOKKO MARU
HOKOKO MARU NO . 2
HOKUYO MARU
Guard boat
Victualling stores ship ( reefer )
Guard boat
Transport
HORAISAN Transport MARU ) ( ex-DAIHO MARU NO . 1 )
HOSE! Guard boat MARU NO . 1
HYUGA Victualling MARU stores ship
!BARAK! Guard boat MARU
IKUSHIMA Gunboat MARU ( rerated
transport 5/42 )
IKUTA Gunboat MARU
Date/Location
Sank 1/2 1/43 NE of Truk following 1/ 1 7 / 4 3 submarine attack
Sank 5/4 /44 follow-��gT!��0 {6�0a���ck
N , 1 5 1° 45 ' E )
Sunk 7 / 1 0/44 at Saipan
Sunk 3/2 0 /44 off Yap
Sunk 1/38/45 off Ujae ( 0 8 42 ' N , 1 6 7° 44 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7,�4 4 at Truk
Sunk 5/20 /44 NW of Saipan 11::
/ !
Sunk 7 /8 /44 at Saipan
Sunk 3 / 1 6 /43 W of Marianas
Sunk 3 / 3 0 /4 4 at Palau
Sunk 4/ 3 0 / 4 4 NW of Marianas STINGRAY
Sunk 1/ 1 2/44 at Kwaj alein 60 8° 4 2 ' N , 1 6 7 4 4 ' E )
3 09
Agency
u . s . submarine WHALE
TF-58 aircraft
Uncertain-probably aircraft
u . s . submarine PICUDA
US DD BURNS
TF-5 8 aircraft
u . s . submarine S ILVERS IDES
Aircraft
u . s . submarine FLYING FISH
TF-58 aircraft
u . s . submarine
Aircraft
Name �
IMIZU Gunboat MARU ( transport
5 /42 )
I SUZUGAWA Guard boat MARU
JOZAN Transport MARU
KAHOKU Gunboat MARU
KAIHEI Transport MARU
KAIKA Transport MARU
KAIKO Guard boat MARU
KAISHO Transport MARU
KAIYO Guard boat MARU
KAMIKAZE Torpedo MARU port/repair
ship
KAMO Guard boat MARU
KATSURIG- Transport !SAN MARU
Date/Location
Sunk 6 / 1 2 /�4 at Saipan ( 1 7 3 2 1 N , 144° 10 1 E )
Sunk 7 / 1/44 �w of Marianas ( 31 2 6 1 N , 14 1° 1 1 1 E )
Sunk 2/ 17 /44 sw Truk
����u7�� '�
35: 1
of
N I 134 14 I E )
Sunk 4/15 /43 NE of Marianas
Sunk 4 / 16 /44 S of Carolings ( 4° 0 4 I N I 14 8 14 I
Sunk 9 / 15 /44 in Marshalls
Sunk 8 /2 2 /4 3
of
E )
��;:e7�o
6r�� �
a�� 1 4 7° 2 5 1 E )
Sunk 1/16 /44 at Maloelap Atoll , Marshalls
Sunk 3/30 /44 at Palau
Sunk 7/1/44 NW of Marianas ( 2 1° 2 6 1 N , 14 1° 1 1 1 E )
Sunk 1/4/44 NE of Truk
3 10
Agency
TG-5 8 . 4 aircraft
u . s . submarine BATFISH
Possibly U . S . submarine CERO
u . s . submarine FINBACK
u . s . submarine SEA WOLF
u . s . submarine BLACKFISH
Aircraft e u . s . submarine TULLIBEE
Aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
u . s . submarine BATFISH
Japanese mine
------------------------------------------------------------ · · -- --
KAZU MARU Guard boat NO . 1
KEIYO MARU
Aircraft transport
KEMBU Transport MARU ( captured vessel , previous ID unknown )
KENAN Transport MARU
KENSHO Transport MARU
KIKUKAWA Transport MARU
KIKYO Guard boat MARU
KINA! Transport MARU
KITSUGAWA Water tanker MARU
KOMPIRA MARU
KOMPIRA MARU NO . 1
Guard boat
Guard boat
KOSEl Victualling MARU stores ship ( ex-NARENTA, ex-NEGANTI )
KOTOHIRA Guard boat MARU
Date/Location
Sunk 9 / 15/44 in Marshalls
Beached 6 / 1 2 /44 on Saipan
Sunk 12/4 /4 3 at Kwaj alein
Sunk 5/ 3 /44 NW of Tinian ( 15 0° 2 9 ' N , 145° 42 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7/44 at Truk
Lost by fire 1 0 / 7 / 4 3 at Truk
Sunk 2 / 6 /44 at Kwaj alein
Sunk 5 / 10/43 E of Saipan
Sunk 6 /2 7 /4 4 at Guam after 4 /8/44 damage from submarine SEAHORSE
Sunk 6 /2 1 /44 off Tinian
Possibly sunk at Tinian 7 /44
Sunk 4 / 864 3 NW of Truk ( 0 8 5 0 ' N , 1 4 7° 0 6 ' E )
Sunk 4 / 15 /44 at Truk , broken up
3 1 1
Agency
Aircraft
TF-3 8 aircraft
TF-50 aircraft
u . s . submarine SANDLANCE
TF-5 8 aircraft
Operational acc ident
TF-5 8 aircraft
u . s . submarine PLUNGER
TF-5 8 aircraft and SEAHORSE
Gunfire
Aircraft ( ? )
u . s . submarine TUNNY
Aircraft ( ? )
KOTOSHIRO Guard boat MARU
MANJU Transport MARU ( ex-JUFUKU MARU )
MAR UDAl MARU
Guard boat
MATSUTANI Transport MARU
MEIHO MARU
ME I TEN MARU
MI IKE MARU
MIKAGE MARU NO . 18
MISAKU MARU
Guard boat
Transport
Transport
Collier
Transport
MITAKESAN Transport MARU
MOMOKAWA Transport MARU
MUKO Transport MARU
Date/Location
Sunk 4/4/45 in Marshalls
Sunk 1 1 /2 9 /4 3 W of Mariana5 ( 1 9° 3 0 ' N , 1 3 9 5 8 ' E )
Sunk 6 / 1 7/44 at Saipan
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /44 at Truk ( 0 7° 2 3 ' N , 1 5 1° 05 ' E )
Sunk 2/ 6 /44 at Kwajalein
Sunk 6 /2 0 /4 3 W off Marianas ( 15° ( 5 7 ' N , 1 4 0° 57 I E )
Sunk 4 /2 7 /4 4 SW of Yap ( 0 8° 34 ' N , 134° 4 9 I E )
Sunk 5 / 1 0 /4 4 N of Carolines b1 1° 2 6 ' N , 1 4 3 4 6 ' E )
Sunk 4/ 9 /44 W of Marianas ( 15° 3 2 ' N , 145° E )
Sunk 5 / 1 1 /4 4 W of Marianas ( 1 4° 5 7 ' N , 14 3° 3 0 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /4 4 at Truk ( 0 7° 2 0 ' N , 1 5 1° 5 3 ' E )
Sunk 11/ 1 2/4 3 N of Truk ( 0 9° 2 0 ' N , 152° 4 6 ' E )
3 1 2
Agency
Aircraft
u . s . submarine PARGO
TF-3 8 aircraft
TF-5 8 aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
u . s . submarine TAUTOG
u . s . submarine TRIGGER
u . s . submarine S ILVERS IDES
u . s . submarine SEAHORSE
u . s . submarine SANDLANCE
TF-5 8 aircraft
u . s . submarine THRESHER
NAGISAN Transport MARU
NANIWA Transport MARU
NANKAI Transport MARU NO . 2
NARUTO Ammunition MARU ship
NEIKAI Transport MARU
NICHIEI Guard boat MARU
NICHIRO Ammunition MARU ship
NIKKAI Gunboat MARU ( rerated
transport 10/4 3 )
NIKKO Transport MARU
NIPPO Water carrier MARU
NITCHO Transport MARU
Date/Location Agency
Sunk 4 / 30644 at TF-5 8 Palau 60 7 3 0 ' aircraft N , 134 3 0 ' E )
Sunk 8/3/�2 W of U . S . Palau ( 0 7 1 7 ' N , submarine 150° 4 6 ' E ) GUDGEON
Sunk 12/23/43 at Aircraft Mili Atoll , Marshalls 606° 05 ' N , 1 7 1 4 3 ' E )
Sunk 8 / 8 /43 NW of U . S . Marianas ( 2 3° 15 ' submarine N , 142° 4 5 ' E ) WHALE
Sunk 1/26/44 S of Aircraft Truk ( 0 3 45 ' N , 1 5 0° 3 8 ' E )
Sunk 1/ 3 0/44 o6f US DD BURNS U jae Atoll ( 0 8 4 2 ' N , 1 6 6° E )
Sunk 2 / 17644 off u . s . Palau 60 8 5 0 ' submarine N , 1 35 4 0 ' E ) SARGO
Sunk 1 1 / 2 6 /�3 SW U . S . o f Truk ( 0 4 12 ' submarine N , 1 4 8° 2 0 ' E ) RAY
Sunk 1 1/20/4d NE of U . S . Marianas ( 2 3 1 0 ' submarine N , 147° 2 2 ' E ) HARDER
Sunk 2 / 1 7 /44 at TF-58 Truk ( 07° 2 0 ' N , aircraft 1 5 1° 4 0 ' E )
Sunk 6 / 12/44 W of TG-5 8 . 4 Marianas ( 17° 31 ' aircraft N , 143° 10 I E )
3 1 3
OGASHIMA Transport MARU
OKITSU Transport MARU
PALAU Guard boat MARU ( PARAU )
RAIZAN Transport MARU
REIKAI Transport MARU
REIYO Transport MARU
RYOJUN Gunboat MARU
RYOTAKU Transport MARU
RYUKO Transport MARU
SACHITAKA Guard boat MARU NO . 3
SAGAMI MARU
Transport
Date /Location
Sunk 1/20/44 off Namu Atoll , 0 Marshalls 60 8 0 7 ' N , 1 6 8 E )
Sunk 1/2 6 /�4 N of Ponape ( 0 9 3 0 ' N , 157° 5 0 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 6 / 4 4 at Kwaj alein
Sunk 3/30644 off Palgu ( 07 3 0 1 N , 1 3 4 3 0 1 E )
Sunk 6 / 12 /4 4 NW of Saipan 6 17° 3 0 1 N , 1 4 4 E )
Sunk 2 / 16/44 at Truk ( 07 2 5 1 N , 1 5 1° 4 5 1 E )
Sunk 7 /2 664 4 near Palau ( 07 3 0 1 N , 1 34° 3 0 1 E )
Sunk 9 /2 2 / 4 3 NW of Marianas ( 2 0° 4 5 1 N , 142° 1 0 I E )
Sunk 3/3064 4 at Palau 60 7 3 0 1 N , 1 3 4 3 0 1 E )
Sunk 7 / 8 / 4 4 at Saipan
Sunk 1 1/364 2 at Palau 60 7 0 2 1 N , 125 3 3 I E )
3 1 4
Agency
Aircraft
u . s . submarine SKIPJACK
TF-58 aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
TF-58 aircraft
Aircraft
u . s . submarine TROUT
TF-58 aircraft
Aircraft
u . s . submarine SEA WOLF
SAN Transport FRANCISCO MARU ( S . FURANSHISUKO )
SANTO MARU
SEIEI MARU NO . 2
SEIKO MARU
Gunboat
Guard boat
Transport
SEIZAN Transport MARU ( ex-SHING HO , ex-CAPE PREMIER , ex-BARUNGA , ex-WAR FAITH )
SENKEI Gunboat MARU
SHIGAN- Transport OURA MARU
SHINKOKU Transport MARU
SHINSEI Transport MARU NO . 18
SHINSHU Torpedo MARU recovery
vessel
Date/Location
Sunk 2 /1 7 /44 at Truk ( g7° 22 ' N , 1 5 1 54 ' E )
Sunk 9/2 9/43 off Saipan ( 15° 2 8 ' N , 145° 59 ' E )
Sunk 3/30�44 at Palau 607 3 0 ' N , 1 34 3 0 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 16/44 at Truk ( 0 7 2 2 ' N , 1 5 1° 45 ' E )
Sunk 2 /2 3/44 near Saigan ( 15° N , 1 4 5 3 0 ' E )
Sunk 10/7/42 in S . Carolinas ( 0 1° 1 0 I N ' 153° 31 ' E )
Sunk 1 1 /30/46 W of Marianas ( 18 3 8 ' N , 1 3 9° 35 ' E )
Sunk 2 /2 8/43 S o f Saipan ( 15° 0 9 ' N , 159° 3 0 I E )
Sunk 3/30�44 at Palau ( 07 3 0 ' N , 1 3 4° 3 0 ' E )
Sunk 7 / 9 /42 at Kwaj alein 60 8° 4 3 ' N , 1 6 7 3 3 ' E )
3 15
Agency
TF-58 aircraft
u . s . submarine GUDGEON
TF-5 8 aircraft
TF-5 8 aircraft
Aircraft
u . s . submarine AMBERJACK
u . s . submarine SNOOK
u . s . submarine HALIBUT
TF-5 8 aircraft
u . s . submarine THRESHER
SHOAN MARU
Transport
SHOE! Transport MARU ( ex-GENERAL , ex- OAKWIN , ex-WAR OASIS )
SHOE! MARU
SHOE! MARU
SHOHO MARU
SHOKA MARU
SHOKEN MARU
SHOKO MARU
SHOSEI MARU
SHOTOKU MARU
Gunboat
Gunboat
Transport
Transport
Transport
Gunboat ( rerated transport 1 1 /4 3 )
Gunboat
Gunboat
Date/Location
Sunk 2/2 3 /�4 at Saipan ( 15 15 ' N , 145° 4 2 ' E )
Sunk 1 2 / 1 9 /4 3 at Kwaj alein 60 8° 4 2 ' N , 1 6 7 4 4 ' E )
Sunk 5/25/43 off Rota , Marianas ( 14° 1 7 ' N , 144° 5 0 ' E )
Sunk 3 / 3 0 /4 4 near Palau
Agency
TF-58 aircraft
Aircraft
u . s . submarine WHALE
Aircraft
Sunk 1 2 / 3 1/43 in E . u . s . Carolinas 605° submarine 40 ' N , 1 6 0 GREENLING 2 0 ' E )
Sunk 5/25/42 in u . s . Carolinas 604° submarine 05 ' N , 1 4 4 E ) TAUTOG
Sunk 5/2 9 /4 4 W of u . s . Marianas ( �6° submarine 19 ' N , 145 SILVERSIDES 25 ' E )
Sunk 1 2 / 1 / 4 3 N o0 Ulithi Atoll ( 14 3 1 ' N . 1 4 0° 1 8 ' E )
;u�� ��;�1113
�0 nm
32 ' N , 144 3 6 ' E )
Sunk 6 / 2 8 / 4 3 off Rotg , Marianas ( 14 0 7 ' N , 145° 0 7 ' E )
3 16
u . s . submarine PARGO
u . s . submarine SILVERS IDES
u . s . submarine TUNNY
SHOUN Transport MARU
SHUNZAN Transport MARU NO . 2
TAIAN Transport MARU
TAIHO Transport MARU
TAIHOSAN Water carrier MARU
TAIJUN Transport MARU
TAIKOKU Transport MARU
TAITO Transport MARU
TAKEURA Guard boat MARU
TAMA Transport MARU
TAMAHIME Transport MARU ( ex-WAR SPRAY )
TAMASHIMA Transport MARU
Date /Location .
Sunk 6 /26-24 /44 at Rota ( 14 1 0 ' N , 1 4 5° 10 ' E )
Sunk 2 /2 4 /4 4 off Kos0ae , Carolines ( 0 5 2 0 ' N , 1 6 2° 5 8 ' E )
Sunk 1/23644 S of Palgu ( 05 5 0 ' N , 1 3 4 14 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 16/44 at Truk ( 0 7 22 ' N , 1 5 1° 34 ' E )
����p�/b� ��31��
f
N ' , 1 5 8 45 ' E )
Burned at Truk 4 / 1 1/42
Sunk 5 / 1 7 /44 W of Marianas ( 14° 5 8 ' N , 144° 4 9 ' E )
Sunk 5/25644 N of Palau ( 1 1 14 ' N , 1 3 5° I 12 ' E )
Sunk 2/ 6 /4 4 at Kwa j alein
Sunk 7 /4 /44 off Palau ( 0 7° 44 ' N , 1 3 3° 17 ' E )
Sunk 6 /5/44 � of Marianas ( 18 4 0 ' N , 1 4 0° 3 5 ' E )
Sunk 1/3 0/44 NE of Marianas ( 2 1° 12 ' N , 1 4 9° 18 ' E )
3 1 7
Agency
TF-58 aircraft
Aircraft
u . s . submarine GAR
TF-5 8 aircraft
u . s . submarine PLUNGER
Operational accident
u·. s . submarine SAND LANCE
u . s . submarine FLYING FISH
TF-58 aircraft
u . s . submarine GUAVINA
u . s . submarine SHARK
u . s . submarine SPEARFISH
TEMPOSAN Transport MARU
TENRYU- Transport GAWA MARU
TERUSHIMA Gunboat MARU
TOEI MARU
Transport
TOHO Transport MARU ( ex-ARDGAY , ex-ERNEMORE )
TOKAI MARU
Transport
TONE! Transport MARU
TOYO Transport MARU NO . 2
TOYOHAMA Guard boat MARU
TOYOTSU Gunboat MARU
TSUNU- Transport SHIMA MARU
Date/Location
Sunk 1 2 /2g/43 off Palau ( 88 0 3 ' N ' , 1 3 3 5 1 ' E )
Sunk 6 / 12 /44 NW of Saipan ( 17° 32 ' N , 144° 1 0 ' E )
Sunk 5/ 1 8 / 4 3 bn Marshalls c!,0 8 3 3 ' N , 17 1 E )
Sunk 2 / 1/44 in Carolines ( 04° 24 ' N , 1 4 3° 15 ' E )
Sunk 6 / 1/44 NW of Marianas ( 68° 0 8 I N ' 14 1 14 I E )
Sunk 8 /2 7 /4 3 in Apra Harbor , Guam after previous damage in harbor by FLYING FISH
Sunk 10/ 1 /4 3 in S Carolines ( 04° 0 1 ' N , 143° 4 7 ' E )
Sunk 4 /264 3 W of Truk ( 87 3 2 ' N , 14 9 1 8 ' E )
Wrecked 1 0 /8/42 at Wot je
Sunk 2/ 1/42 at Kwaj alein c!,0 9° 12 ' N , 1 6 7 1 8 ' E )
Sunk 10/2 0/43 S of Truk ( 0 1° 2 6 ' N , 1 4 8° 3 6 ' E )
3 1 8
Agency
u . s . submarine SILVERS IDES
TF-3 8 aircraft
u . s . submarine POLLACK
u . s . submarine SEAHORSE
u . s . submarine PINTANO
u . s . submarine SNAPPER and FLYING FISH
u . s . submarine PETO
u . s . submarine TUNNY
Operational accident
CV ENTERPRISE aircraft
u . s . submarine GATO
UDO MARU Transport
UNKAI Transport MARU NO . 6 ( ex-VENUS )
UKARAMI Salvage MARU vessel
YAMAFUKU Transport MARU
YAMAGIRI Transport MARU
YAMAKISAN Transport MARU ( captured Panamanian ship )
YAMASHIMO Repair ship MARU
YAMASHIRO Guard boat MARU
YAMATO MARU NO . 2
ZUKAI MARU
Transport
Transport
Date/Location
Sunk 11/1 9 /46 N of Marianas ( 2 2 2 8 ' N , 147° 2 2 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7 / 4 4 at Truk ( 0 7° 2 5 ' N , 1 15° 4 5 ' E )
Sunk 3 / 3 0�44 at Palau 60 7 3 0 ' N , 1 3 4 3 0 ' E )
Agency
u . s . submarine HARDER
TF-58 aircraft
TF-5 8 aircraft
Sunk 1 1/2 8/46 NW of U . S . Marianas 618 submarine 2 1 ' N , 40 0 8 ' E ) SNOOK
Sunk 2 / 16/44 at TF-58 Truk ( 0 7 2 3 ' N , aircraft 1 5 1° 51 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 16/44 at Truk ( 0 7 25 ' N ,
Sunk 2 / 2 2 /�4 W o f Saipan ( 1 4 4 5 ' N , 144° 32 ' E )
Sunk 2/ 6/4 4 at Kwajalein
Pos sibly sunk 1 1/ 2 2 /4 3 § of Palau 60 7 0 9 ' N , 1 3 4 3 4 ' E )
Sunk 2 / 1 7 / 4 4 NW of Truk ( 0 7° 4 6 ' N , 1 5 0° 2 7 ' E )
TF-5 8 airgraft 15 1 4 5 '
u . s . submarine TANG
TF-58 aircraft
u . s . submarine TINOSA
TF-5 8 aircraft
E )
Of particular interest are the many sites located in Belau . Sixty-six Japanese ships were lost in that archipelago , second only to Truk ' s seventy-five . Sport diving on these sites has increased dramatically in the last 10 years . With it has also come the desire to accurately identify the individual wreck sites . E f forts in that regard have been made by Lindemann ( 1 9 8 8 ) and Bailey ( 1 9 86 ) . The dif ficulties
3 1 9
associated with ship identifcation and the haste with which 4t they are often made have resulted in a number of identification errors . A critical aspect of the identification process , often overlooked , is archival research . That avenue can often provide the only clues that can unequivocably identify a particular wreck .
A well-known map of ship losses , based upon aerial photography taken on March 3 0 and 3 1 , 1 9 4 4 , by U . S . planes , has been used as a guide to search for ships . Numbered and with general type indicated on the original , the s ites mainly lie within Ngeruktable ( Urukthapel ) Anchorage and Ngemelachel ( Malakal ) Harbor . Only the locations of the first 3 0 were indicated on the map ; 7 others merely have a notation in the corner . Information on all 37 is provided in Table 8 . 7 . The orignal map has been redrawn as Figure 8 . 8 for clarity . The number and Naval designations for each ship , as a result of intelligence evaluation , are provided below .
Table 8 . 7 . Key to Base Map of World War I I Ship Losses in Belau ' s Maj or Anchorages
Number 1 : Number 2 : Number 3 : Number 4 : Number 5 : Number 6 : Number 7 : Number 8 : Number 9 : Number 10 : Number 1 1 : Number 12 : Number 1 3 : Number 14 : Number 15 : Number 16 :
Number 17 : Number 18 : Number 1 9 : Number 2 0 : Number 2 1 : Number 2 2 : Number 2 3 : Number 2 4 : Number 2 5 : Number 2 6 : Number 2 7 : Number 2 8 :
Small AK sunk Small AK damaged , not seen in later photo Small AK sunk Medium AK sunk Small AK sunk Large AO sunk Small AK beached Small AK beached , damaged Large AK beached , badly damaged Small AO sunk Small AK beached , damaged Medium AK , sunk Small AK beached , damaged Small AK beached , burning fiercely Small AO beached , burning fiercely Large repair ship beached , down at bow , burning fiercely Small AK sunk Small AK sunk ODD damaged Medium AO sunk Medium AK beached, damaged Large AO sunk Large AK sunk Small AO beached , burning fiercely Large AO sunk Medium AO , burning fiercely Small AK beached , damaged Medium AK sunk
3 2 0
• 3
• 1
. . « 1 1 :' q,.,
1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 !'o 0 ./ / / 1 7 1 8 1 9 {\
·�-/ •/ ·�----� U D
. . . ;:_..---------• $ . - 2 0 ... 00 a
Fig . 8 . 8 . Damage to shipping in and around Palau Harbor from photographs of March 3 0 and March 3 1 , 1 9 4 4 . ( Redrawn from original )
3 2 1
Number 2 9 : Number 3 0 : Number 3 1 : Number 32 : Number 3 3 : Number 3 4 : Number 35 : Number 3 6 : Number 3 7 :
Medium AK sunk e Unidentified , probably ODD , PC or CM sunk Small AK sunk off Karamadoo Wan Small AK beached off SE Babelthaup ODD sunk in open sea Medium AK sunk , unplatted Small Ak burning fiercely west of Angaur Medium AK beached and damaged on reef ODD sunk in Karamadoo Wan
Although the 1 9 4 4 map is extremely useful for general locations and type of ship , it does nothing to help . c lear up their identification . As part of the research for the joint US Naval Reserve-National Park Service operation in Belau in 1 9 8 8 , interviews were conducted with local residents who were in Belau during the war years . In particular 1 the individuals had some knowledge of postwar salvage operations by Japanese companies . Those interviews led to the identification of the company that conducted most of the salvage in and around Belau , Fuj ita Salvage . The Japanese company still exists and , after an exchange of letters , the owner , Mr . Fuj ita , agreed to release copies of the only documents still retained by him on the salvage of the wrecks . Recent translation from the Japanese has resulted in more complete information on the identity and location of 27 sites . A portion of that information is provided below .
Table 8 . 8 . Names , Locations and Depths of World War II Japanese Ships Sunk in Belau
Depth Name Location (meters )
GO ZAN MARU 7°16 ' 3 6 " N 1 5 1 34 25 ' 5 0 " E
AKASHI 7°1g ' 5 4 " N 12 1 34 2 6 ' 3 2 " E
Tanker 7°22 ' 2 2 " N 4 1 34 2 6 ' 4 4 " E
HOKUTAI MARU 7°16 ' 4 6 " N 7 1 3 4 2 7 ' 1 3 " E
Landing craft 7° 16 ' 5 0 " N 1 ( tank ) 134 2 7 ' 1 6 " E
T . 1 5 0 7°22 ' 2 6 " N 7 1 3 4 2 6 ' 2 6 " E
3 2 2
Depth Name Location (meters )
URAKAMMI MARU 7°1g ' 4 2 " N 3 9 1 3 4 2 6 ' 5 3 " E
OSE 7°1g ' 4 1 " N 1 4 1 3 4 2 7 ' 14 " E
AMATSU MARU 7°2g ' l 0 " N 4 0 1 3 4 26 ' 2 3 " E
GOSHU MARU 7°2g ' 4 2 " N 1 6 1 3 4 2 6 ' 4 8 " E
KIBI MARU 7°1g ' 5 5 " N 1 4 1 3 4 2 6 ' 55 " E
MATSUEI MARU 7°1g ' 4 9 " N 1 7 134 2 6 ' 52 " E
Whaler 7°1g ' 0 1 " N 1 0 1 3 4 2 7 ' 2 2 " E
Whaler 7°16 ' 5 9 " N 1 3 1 3 4 27 ' 2 4 " E
Minesweeper 7°1g ' 4 1 " N 7 134 2 6 ' 4 4 " E
Sub chaser 7°1g ' 4 1 " N 7 1 3 4 2 6 ' 3 7 " E
Whaler 7°17 ' 55 " N 1 3 4°2 7 ' 2 5 " E
8
RAI ZAN MARU 7°2g ' 5 0 " N 3 3 134 2 6 ' 12 " E
Tanker 7°1g ' 3 3 " N 1 3 1 3 4 2 8 ' 2 0 " E
Watch boat 7°2g ' 2 7 " N 1 0 1 3 4 2 6 ' 52 " E
AKEBONO MARU 7°17 ' 58 " N 1 1-2 6 1 3 4°2 6 ' 3 8 " E
Work boat with 7°1g ' l4 " N 7 crane 1 3 4 2 8 ' 3 9 " E
3 2 3
Depth Name Location (meters )
SHINSEI MARU 7°12 ' 7 " N 2 7 No . 1 8 1 3 4 25 ' 4 5 " E
Water supply boat 7°22 ' 4 " N 2 134 2 8 ' 0 " E
KAMIKAZE MARU 7°1g ' 3 5 " N 3 2 134 2 5 ' 9 " E
ASASHIO MARU 7°2 1 ' 3 0 " N 4 0 1 3 4°25 ' 35 " E
Special ore 7°22 ' 3 6 " N 7 crusher 1 3 4 3 2 ' 15 " E
Cross-checking between the latitudes and longitudes given in Table 8 . 8 and the locations generated during the 1 9 8 8 U . S . Navy-National Park Service pro j ect o f known and identified s ites resulted in an excellent match . Clearly , both the identifications given and their locations remove any doubt about the names of more than two dozen ships in Belau .
Other Known Sites
Above and beyond the Japanese shipping losses , four U . S . ships were lost in the battle for Beliliou in 1 9 4 4 . They were LCI ( G ) -4 5 9 , a gunboat ; YMS- 1 9 , a minesweeper ; USS TULLIBEE , a submarine ; and PERRY , a destroyer/minesweeper . Another boat associated with the battle for Beliliou is the very deteriorated wreck of a wooden-hulled motor yacht . It is reported to have been used by General MacArthur .
In Guam , the station ship , PENGUIN , was bombed and severely damaged in 1 9 4 1 . The crew scuttled the ship in order to prevent its capture . There is also a report that the USS ROBERT L . BARNES , a tanker , was strafed and burned at Orote Point in Apra Harbor .
Ship Losses , 1 9 4 6 - 19 9 0
Immediately following World War I I , 7 0 ships were involved in the atomic bomb testing at Bikini Atoll . Of those , 60 remained within the Marshall islands , either sinking directly as a result of the testing or scuttled later . Twenty-two ships remain either within the lagoon or in deep water of fshore of Bikini . Thirty-eight ships from the test were e
3 2 4
taken to Kwaj alein and sunk or scuttled . Both groups are discussed in Chapter 7 of this publication .
At Guam , other sites , predominantly the remains of fishing boats and modern ships lost s ince 1 9 4 6 , have been located . These s ites have not been documented ; only preliminary , identification has been completed . Their locations are based upon the work of Paul Edwards in 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 0 . The number of each site was arbitrarily assigned by Edwards ; the Guam Historic Preservation Of fice has continued to use Edwards ' original list and des ignations . Those s ites , as wel l as others not included in Chapter 9 , are mapped onto a base map of Apra Harbor ( Figure 8 . 9 ) . The numbering system used i s that assigned by Edwards .
Table 8 . 9 . Key to Base Map of Apra Harbor Shipwreck Sites
Site Number 1 : Site Number 2 : Site Number 3 : Site Number 5 : Site Number 6 : Site Number 7 : Site Number 8 : Site Number 9 : Site Number 10 : Site Number 1 1 : Site Number 12 : Site Number 15 : Site Number 1 6 : Site Number 17 : Site Number 18 : Site Number 2 1 : Site Number 2 2 :
Piti Back Bay--work boat Piti Back Bay--work boat Piti Back Bay--fishing boat Gorco Pier--NICHIYU MARU Former Marianas Yacht Club--WHISPER Former Marianas Yacht Club--yacht Former Marianas Yacht Club--EXPLORER Former Marianas Yacht Club--fishing boat Former Marianas Yacht Club--ONDINE Seaplane Ramp--tug Dry Dock I s land--YTM-41 9 Buoy # 1--SMS CORMORAN Buoy #1--TOKAI MARU Southwest of Buoy # 1--naval tug Southwest of Buoy # 1--KITSUGAWA MARU Harbor Mouth--CARIBA N of Harbor Mouth--CS SCOTIA
Other sites not included by Edwards but sunk at Guam s ince 1 9 4 6 are the freighter GUAM BEAR ( 19 6 7 ) off Orote Peninsula ; PC-7 0 5 , a patrol craft sunk in 1 9 6 2 in Apra Harbor ; PEACE OCEAN , a steel-hulled ship sunk 1 0 miles west of Apra Harbor in 1 9 7 9 ; and SILDRE , a ship sunk 1 mile west of Facpi Point .
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Orote Island
APRA OUTER HARBOR
OROTE PENINSULA
MARIANA ISLANDS APRA HARBOR ISLAND OF GUAM TERRITORY OF GUAM
Scale l:JO,OOO Guam 1963 D111tum
l/2 MILES
Apuntua Pt
Neye Island 0
Commadore; Cut
APRA INNER HARBOR
Fig . 8 . 9 . Base map of known shipwreck sites in Apra Harbor
Edwards 1 9 7 6 ) .
( after Paul
CHAPTER IX.
SHIPWRECKS : THE ARCHEOLOGICAL RECORD
By Toni L . Carrell , Daniel J . Lenih� , David T . Lotz and James E . Miculka
Introduction
This chapter is devoted to a discussion of shipwreck s ites documented by the National Park Service ' s ( NPS ) Submerged Cultural Resources Unit ( SCRU ) , GovGuam and the WAPA Submerged Resources Dive Team . They date from 1 8 7 4 , with the loss of the brig LEONORA in Kosrae , to the destruction of both merchant and warships during the atomic testing at Bikini in 1 9 4 6 . Most of the ships reported on were lost during World War I I ; this emphasis on "modern " ships is a function of the management orientation o f most of the research activity . Larger , intact s ites rece�v�ng heavy visitor use or having a potential for vis itor use by sport divers received the greatest emphasis .
The scope of most of the shipwreck research was l imited to the documentation of known sites , not to the search for those previously unlocated , although survey technology was often used to relocate some of the more obscure shipwrecks . Not all of the sites known to exist by the sport diver volunteers , park professionals and archeologists working on these proj ects were investigated . Rather , an effort was made to examine as many different site types as possible and to include those resources in this chapter . The coverage presented here is , therefore , neither comprehensive nor exhaustive but intended to be representative .
Of necessity , the s ite discussions and analyses are generally brief , reflecting constraints of time and space , not the individual significance of the ships . For example , the depth of information gathered on each of the sites in Guam and Palau could readily permit these reports to stand alone as
1with contributions from Dennis Blackenbaker , William Cooper , Rose S . N . Manibusan and Edward Wood .
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individual s ite reports in the SCRU report and publication series .
Sometimes capsulized results are presented because the material has been or will be published in a separate forum . For example , the results of the investigations on LEONORA in Kosrae were published by the Micronesian Archaeological Survey . The extens ive research j ointly conducted by the SCRU , the u . s . Navy and the Department of Energy on the ships in Bikini Lagoon , briefly discussed in this chapter , will be published as a separate report within the year ( Delgado , Lenihan and Murphy ) . Also , conspicuous in its absence is a discuss ion of the shipwrecks in Chuuk Lagoon . Although the SCRU visited Chuuk in 1 9 8 1 and dived on several s ites in the lagoon , it was decided that little could be added to what has already been stated in the large body of available literature on this subject .
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a frame of reference , that is 1 the archeological context by which the known s ites and those yet to be discovered can be measured . It is geared to allow the resource manager to evaluate both site s ignificance and integrity and to establish minimal standards of s ite documentation for intersite comparisons . I t should provide enough detail for interpreters to explain the " story " of the ship to the public--its los s , its use in e the past 1 and its appearance today . This chapter is also designed to inform the wreck divers about the features of each s ite and , hopefully, to add to their enjoyment and increase their sensitivity when visiting these underwater museums .
The obj ective of field work was to gather as much descriptive data as possible given the constraints imposed by equipment , time and personnel resources . All research was completed using a nondestructive methodology emphasizing mapping of exposed wreckage , photography , artistic depictions , videotape and written description . No excavation was undertaken , nor were any artifacts removed . Logistics also influenced the overall research approach . Although the islands of Micronesia in the jet age are not as functionally remote as they were at the turn of this century , reaching them still entails considerable travel .
The research emphasized short , intense , field investigations that leaned very heavily upon volunteers , park professionals resident in the is lands and u . s . Navy divers . As a result , this chapter contains written contributions from a wide variety of authors . The chapter is organized by island chain with island and site types grouped together for discussion and analysis .
328
Mariana Islands
Shipwreck investigations were undertaken on the islands of Saipan , Rota and Guam . Sites on Saipan l ie within American Memorial Park and Saipan Lagoon . The sites investigated on Rota all lie within Sasanhaya Bay , whereas the ships on Guam are located either in Apra Harbor or Talafofo Bay .
Saipan
More than 4 0 documented ship losses have occurred in and around Saipan; the earliest known is the Manila gal leon NUESTRA SENORA de la CONCEPCION , wrecked in 1 6 3 8 . Two other as yet unidentified ships were also lost in the vicinity of Saipan later in that century . The vast maj ority of s hips , however , were sunk during World War I I . Ranging from small Japanese guard boats to f leet tankers , transports and submarines , they total 3 8 shipwrecks .
To date , only five sites have received much attention : a small Japanese tug , an unidentified freighter and a submarine chaser from World War I I , an unidentified small boat to which no date can be ascribed , and the Manila galleon . With the exception of the galleon , each of the other sites was investigated by the NPS or contract archeologists to the u . s . Army Corps of Engineers as part of resource assessment or environmental impact studies . These s ites are discussed in this chapter . The galleon was excavated by the treasure salvage company , Pacific Sea Resources , in 1 9 8 7 - 19 8 8 ; no professional publication on their findings is known to be available ; however , the s ite is discussed in National Geographic magazine , September 1 9 9 0 edition .
American Memorial Park and Saipan Lagoon2
There have been a total of four assessment surveys carried out by the War in the Pacific National Historical Park ( WAPA ) submerged-research team . The first survey was carried out October 2 8-3 0 , 1 9 8 3 , by James E . Miculka , Chief Ranger , and
2This section on shipwrecks within American Memorial Park was written by James E . Miculka and Rose S . N . Manibusan . The discussion of s ites in Saipan Lagoon was written by James E . Miculka with contributions from Edward Wood , William Cooper and Dennis Blackenbaker .
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Rose S . N . Manibusan , Park Ranger , WAPA . The focus of that e survey was to locate and identify sites within American Memorial Park (Miculka and Manibusan 1 9 8 3 ) . It was also done to veri fy the existence of and gather statistical data on a previous partial survey conducted for the U . S . Army Corps of Engineers in March 1 9 8 0 .
A second survey was carried out on December 1 5 - 1 7 , 1 9 8 3 . This survey was done to locate additional submerged resources and to follow up on s ites not covered in the October survey (Manibusan and Miculka 1 9 8 3 ) .
A third survey was conducted in cooperation with the University of Guam ' s Micronesian Area Research Center ( Miculka , Carter and Ichihara 1 9 8 4 ) . This was done on December 3 - 5 , 1 9 8 4 , by James E . Miculka , Chief Ranger ; Kevin J . Carter , Park Ranger ; Jimmy C . Garrido , Park Ranger ; and Nobuo Ichihara , exchange ranger from the Environment Agency , Government of Japan . The intent of the survey was to locate , identify and assess the underwater sites related to the Defense Environmental Restoration Program ( DERP ) . The University of Guam and the Micronesian Area Research Center were awarded a contract to asses s sites in the Mariana I s lands . The WAPA research team was asked by the University of Guam to assist in the pro ject . This was the first dive to explore waters outside the park and they covered areas of Saipan Lagoon .
The fourth assessment was carried out on January 2 2 -2 5 , 1 9 9 0 . The team consisted of James E . Miculka , Chief Ranger , WAPA ; William Cooper , volunteer diver , WAPA ; Dennis Blackenbaker , volunteer diver , WAPA ; and Edward Wood , Ranger-in-Charge , American Memorial Park . The purpose of this survey was to locate , measure , photograph and videotape in detail the World War I I s ites in and around Saipan .
Site-Specific Investigations
As a result of the four surveys , over 5 0 sites were identi fied within the scope of this study . The majority of these were represented by post-World War I I wreckage from nonshipwreck sites . Many of the remains were in poor condition and were not considered to be s ignificant resources . With the development of the Smiling Cove Harbor in American Memorial Park , many of these wreckage fields were removed . These sites were identified and described in the American Memorial Park Submerged Cultural Assessment ( Miculka and Manibusan 1 9 8 3 ) .
Four shipwreck sites associated with either the interwar years or World War I I are discussed here . Two are located within the boundary of American Memorial Park ; the remainder e
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are within Saipan Lagoon . None of the sites has an official s ite designation number , and they are referred to by their investigation number from either the 1 9 8 3 or the 1 9 8 4 survey ( Figures 9 . 1 and 9 . 2 , respectively ) .
Site Number 1 : Japanese Tugboat
A small Japanese tugboat was relocated during the 1 9 8 3 survey of American Memorial Park ( Figure 9 . 1 ) . Previously examined in 19 8 0 during a survey for the Corps of Engineers , the s ite was identified by Michael R . Thomas and Samuel T . Price ( Thomas and Price 1 9 8 0 ) . According to their report , the tug was used during the 1 9 3 0 s . During the 1 9 8 3 survey , approximately 15 feet of the boat protruded above the water surface . The ship was in very poor condition with only the midsection remaining . Not enough of the site remained to make a positive identification . The wreck measured 5 2 feet long and 15 feet wide and was in 5 feet of water . The site was destroyed in 1 9 9 0 to widen the channel to Smiling Cove Marina within the park .
Site Numbers 2 5 and 2 6 : Unidentified Small Boat
Two sections of wreckage , poss ibly from the same boat , were discovered during the 1 9 8 3 survey . Site number 2 5 ( refer to Figure 9 . 1 ) is the stern section and prop of a boat . I t measured 1 5 feet long and 8 feet wide . A bow section , number 2 6 on the 1 9 8 3 base map , was 2 0 feet long by 12 feet wide . The present status of these remains is unknown .
Two other sites are located within Saipan Lagoon . They were first examined in 1 9 8 4 and again in 1 9 9 0 .
Unidentified Japanese Freighter
The remains of a small World War I I freighter sunk in Saipan Lagoon ( refer to Figure 9 . 2 ) were first examined by NPS divers in 1 9 8 4 . The disarticulated remains lie in 35 feet of water on a sandy bottom ( Figure 9 . 3 ) . Very little of the ship is intact except for a small section of the bow . A section of the wreckage contains the remains of a boiler ( Figure 9 . 4 ) . The overall length of the wreckage is about 3 4 8 feet , but it is scattered over an area of 9 0 0 feet .
Nearly two dozen merchant ves sels ( trawlers , whalers , etc . ) were sunk in or around Saipan during World War I I . Commissioned during the war years , they served as auxiliary submarine chasers , guard boats and transports . Of these , two were small steam whalers , KYO MARU No . 8 and KYO MARU No . 10 , both built in 1 9 3 8 and reported to have been sunk at Saipan on February 2 3 , 1 9 4 4 . The presence of a steam boiler on Site Number 1 may indicate that this is the remains of one
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w w I\.)
R ESIDENTIAL
A M E R I C A N M E M O R IA L PAR K , S A I P A N
1 HARBOR PENINSULA
0 2 6
T A N APAG BAY
N
I Fig . 9 . 1 . Location of Japanese tubgoat and unidentified remains of a smal l boat discovered during a survey of American Memorial Park , October 1 9 8 3 .
S A IPAN
' GARAPAN
N
NOT TO SCALE
Fig . 9 . 2 . Base map of shipwreck sites identified during a 1 9 8 4 survey of Saipan Lagoon .
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Fig . 9 . 3 . The disarticulated remains of a smal l Japanese freighter are scattered over a wide area in Saipan Lagoon . ( Photo by W i l liam Cooper)
Fig. 9 . 4 . An upended boiler from a Japanese freighter sunk during World War I I . ( NPS photo )
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of the two whalers . This site was also tentatively identified by Jim Brandt in 1 9 9 0 as the SHOAN MARU . Without additional information , however , this is s imply a working hypothesis upon which to base additional research on the site .
Japanese Submarine Chaser
This site , located in Saipan Lagoon ( refer to Figure 9 . 2 ) , was identified by tour operators as a submarine . After the 1 9 9 0 survey , however , the site is believed to be a Japanese submarine chaser . The overall length of the site is about 1 4 2 feet . Only about 42 feet of the ship remain intact , the bow section ( Figure 9 . 5 ) . The beam at the rear of the bow section is about 1 3 feet long . The rest of the ship is in many fragments ( Figure 9 . 6 ) .
Administrative Status
The American Memorial Park is administered by the U . S . NPS . However , the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands ( CNMI ) can request the park back at any time . The area of Saipan Lagoon is administered by the commonwealth .
Present Threats and Impacts
The developing tourism operations of the CNMI could cause heavy visitation to these sites by scuba divers . There is already a commercial tour submarine on Saipan that of fers tours of some underwater sites . There have been reports of this tour submarine damaging some of the sites .
Rota
National Park Service Submerged Cultural Resources Unit archeologist , Toni Carrell , and diving technician , Ken Vrana , visited the island in 19 8 7 at the suggestion of Mark Michael , owner of Dive Rota . Michael , representing the Governor of Rota at a submerged cultural resources training workshop held on Guam , requested assistance in identifying submerged cultural resources located in Sasanhaya Bay . Since the NPS visit , Michael has continued to document the remains o f submerged sites around the island .
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F ig . 9 . 5 . Bow of possible Japanese submarine chaser sunk i n Saipan Lagoon . ( Photo by W i l l iam Cooper)
Fig . 9 . 6 . The disarticulated and scattered remains o f a Japanese ship, possibly a submarine chaser, sunk in Saipan . ( Photo by Tim Rock)
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. . f . I t " . 3 S1te-Spec1 1c nves 1gat1ons
The known shipwreck sites on Rota span nearly four centuries . The earliest documented wreck is that of SANTA MARGARITA , a manila galleon lost in 1 6 0 1 somewhere j ust off shore of the island . Four ships are reported to have been lost in the vicinity of Rota during ' the Spanish colonial period , from 1 74 6 to 1 8 12 . Historical research identified two Japanese World War II merchant ships , SHOUN MARU and SHOTOKU MARU , as lost at Rota . Along with the merchantmen , two auxiliary submarine chasers , CHA 54 and CHA 5 6 , are also confirmed losses . A more modern wreck o f a wooden-hulled , twin-engined boat is also known to have been wrecked here . Two other World War I I ships , a gunboat and a steam transport , were lost in deep water near the island . Of the resources known to be at Rota , SHOUN MARU , CHA 54 , CHA 5 6 and an as yet unidenti fied submarine chaser were investigated .
SHOUN MARU
This World War I I Japanese merchant ship is lying on the bottom of Sasanhaya Bay on the western end of Rota ( Figure 9 . 7 ) .
Historical Background
No specific documentation has come to light on the operational background or historic description of this ship . SHOUN MARU is referenced in Jentschura , Jung and Mickel only as a transport of 4 , 3 9 6 gross registered tons ( 1 9 7 7 : 2 7 9 ) . A Japanese visitor to Rota , who c laims to have been on the island during the war , told Mark Michael that the ship was bui lt in Kobe , Japan , by the Matsuoka-Kisen Company ( personal communication ) . This informant also spelled the name of the ship as SYOUN-MARU . Based upon the archeological remains , it appears that SHOUN MARU may have been built generally along the lines of the old freighters ( Figure 9 . 8 ) , as identified in ONI 2 0 8-J ( Department of the Navy 1 9 4 2 ) .
SHOUN MARU , a bulk cargo freighter used in the transport of phosphate ore , was anchored j ust offshore in late June 1 9 4 4 . Only a week earlier the U . S . had initiated the invasion of
3This section on the shipwrecks on Rota was written by Toni Carrell based upon information gathered in 1 9 87 by Carrell , Vrana , and Mark and Lynne Michael and subsequent investigations by Mark and Lynne Michael and Mark Gunderson in 1 9 8 9 and 1 9 9 0 .
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w w co
SASANLAGO
SHOUN MARU --·
SASANHAYA BAY
SUBMARINE CHASER SITE NUMBER 1
SUBMARINE CHASER SITE NUMBER 3
SUBMARINE CHASER SITE NUMBER 2'
ARATSU BAY
r .05
MILES
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
MARIANA ISLANDS
ROTA . From U.S. N•vy Surv-v• 10 1965
SCALE 1:25.000
Fig . 9 . 7 . Base map of documented shipwreck sites in Sasanhaya Bay , Rota .
w w \0
HOLD
Fig . 9 . 8 . 2 0 8 - J )
HOLD S H A F T TUNNEL
D E E P TANK
HOLD
Typic a l interior profile of Japanese " old freighter . "
HOLD
( ONI
Saipan , and two submarine chasers , anchored in the same bay , � had been sunk . In a precarious position and probably without armed escort , SHOUN MARU was riding at anchor when it was attacked and sunk by a torpedo bomb on June 2 3 or 2 4 ( Figures 9 . 9 and 9 . 10 ) . Bombers , deployed from U . S . Task Force 5 8 , were actively seeking targets throughout the islands during raids associated with the invasion o f Saipan and preinvasion attacks on Guam .
Present Description and Analysis
The vessel sits upright in 70 to 110 feet of water on a white sand bottom . The longitudinal axis of the ship is nearly due east and west at 2 6 0 degrees . A mooring buoy is attached to the windlass in the bow , which , like the stern , is substantially intact ( Figures 9 . 1 1 and 9 . 12 ) . The approximate length of the ship at the level of the main deck is 3 9 3 feet . Sometime in the late 1 950s or early 1 9 6 0 s , salvage activities were undertaken , reportedly by Jim Tolan , a long-time Guam resident and commercial scrap metal salvor . The forward holds were dynamited open as part of this salvage ef fort .
The vessel is intact from the stem aft to the first cargo hold . Three decks are present in the bow ( Figure 9 . 1 3 ) . The chain locker is intact , although a portion of the main deck .. has fallen in . Another compartment contains lanterns , and • paint cans are on the shelves in the paint locker . A ventilator stack , rigging , a variety of cable shackles and numerous gas cylinders are also present in the bow . Truck frames , the cab of one truck and five bicycle frames are present on the second deck ( Mark Michael personal communication ) .
The port and starboard sides are blown out from the first cargo hold aft to the machinery space ( Figure 9 . 14 ) . Two scotch marine boilers and the triple expansion engine are s itting upright in their original locations ( Figure 9 . 15 ) . Breaching for the boilers is partially damaged , and a portion of the stack lies to port of the engine . No c lear evidence of the upper deck works was observed , although additional examination of the various pieces of sheet wreckage scattered about would likely result in identification of this feature .
Aft of the machinery space , the sides are bowed out , either from the dynamiting or from the bombing attack . The aft cargo space is reasonably intact up to the level of the main dec k . Several truck frames and a small ore cart are present . A motorcycle remains in the No . 4 cargo hold ( Figure 9 . 16 ) .
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F i g . 9 . 9 . SHOUN MARU was a bulk cargo transport used to carry phosphate ore to Japan . The trail o f a torpedo can s t i l l be seen in the water at the moment of impact . ( Photo courtesy of National Archive s )
Fig . 9 . 10 . Severely damaged by aircraft from Task Force 5 8 , SHOUN MARU is shown burning and sinking in Sasanhaya Bay, Rota . ( Photo courtesy of National Archives )
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Fig. 9 . 1 1 . View athwartships at bow from port side of SHOUN MARU . ( Photo by Mark Michael )
Fig . 9 . 1 2 . Number 3 .
View toward the stern of SHOUN MARU from hold ( Photo by Tim Roc k )
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Fig . 9 . 1 3 . SHOUN MARU ' s bow is intact from the stern a f t to the first cargo hold, and three decks , up to the spar, are present . ( Photo by Mark Michael )
Fig . 9 . 14 . The port and starboard s ides are blown out from the first cargo hold aft to the machinery space . One o f SHOUN MARU ' s kingpost masts lies o n the bottom . ( P hoto by Tim Rock)
3 4 3
F ig . 9 . 15 . SHOUN MARU ' s triple-expansion steam engine sits upright in its original location . ( Photo by Mark Michae l )
F ig . 9 . 1 6 . Japanese motorcyle in Number 4 cargo hol d . ( Photo by Mark Michae l )
344
The stern is in good condition and nearly intact . A cargo winch and a capstan are present and in their original locations , although a portion of the deck has collapsed onto the capstan . A row of portholes , still in place , is present along the port side of the aft compartment ( Figure 9 . 1 7 ) . The propeller was salvaged in the past ; however , the rudder is in place below its counter stern ( Figure 9 . 1 8 ) . Scattered throughout the ship is a wide variety of small artifacts , inc luding sake bottles , shell casings and helmets . One o f three bathtubs located on the ship i s in the stern in what may have been a berthing area . Another is on the deck , while the third is lying on the sand bottom on port s ide , approximately amidships .
The remains of the ship ' s kingpost-style cargo masts are lying among the wreckage .
Japanese Auxiliary Submarine Chasers
The remains of three auxiliary submarine chasers lie on the bottom of Sasanhaya Bay ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 ) .
Historical Background
Documents provide information on two submarine chasers that were sunk here , CHA 54 and CHA 5 6 ( Jentschura , Jung and Mickel 1 9 7 7 : 2 1 8 ) ; no historical evidence has come to l ight to help in the identi fication of the third .
Constructed during the 194 1 - 1 9 4 3 war programs , the auxil iary submarine chasers were based upon the design of the experimental tugs , EISEN No . 1 1 82 and No . 1 1 8 3 . Intended for use as f ishing vessels , after the war , these wooden-hulled boats were built by 1 of 16 commercial shipyards that specialized in fishing craft .
Generally referred to as the CHA 1 Class , these boats were 85 feet , 4 inches long at the water line and had a beam 18 feet , 4 inches long ( Figure 9 . 1 9 ) . The pilothouse was located amidships , and both the bridge and engine room were protected by 4 -mm armor plate . They were powered by 4 0 0 standard horsepower diesel engines with a s ingle shaft . Carrying a complement of up to 2 3 , these chasers were equipped with one 7 . 7 -mm machine gun forward of the bridge , at least 2 depth-charge launchers , and 22 depth charges . Each was armed and equipped by the naval dockyards at Yokosuka , Kure , Maisuru or Sasebo .
Auxiliary CHA 54 was CHA 5 6 was sunk two victims of bombing identified in 1 9 8 7 ,
attacked and sunk on June 15 , 1 9 4 4 , and days later on June 1 7 . Both were the attacks from Task Force 58 . Until both sites were bel ieved to be the
345
Fig . 9 . 17 . Portholes are s t i l l intact in a stern compartment on SHOUN MARU. ( Photo by Mark Michae l )
F ig . 9 . 1 8 . The counter stern i s intact, but the propeller on SHOUN MARU was salvaged. ( Photo by Mark Michae l )
3 4 6
remains was not chaser . only as
of fishing boats . Their condition is such that it pos s ible to determine which site was which specific
In the following discuss ion they are referred to auxiliary submarine chaser sites Numbers 1 , 2 and 3 .
Present Description and Analysis
Auxiliary submarine chaser site Number 1 i s located in 5 0 feet o f water at a popular dive s ite locally referred to as Cable Run ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 ) . Wreckage is scattered in an area approximately 4 0 0 feet in diameter and l ies among a coral reef that has grown over much of the boat .
The ship ' s diesel engine is lying about 9 0 yards o f fshore on its port s ide ( Figure 9 . 2 0 ) . The engine appears to be intact with l ittle or no damage to the block or generator mounted on its top . The engine mount is 16 feet , 1 1 inches , overal l ( 5 meters , 1 5 centimeters ) . Approximately 4 0- 5 0 feet from the engine , the shaft and screw l ie on the s and . The intact shaft , along with two of its mounts , is constructed in two sections , 12 feet , 6 inches long and 8 feet , 3 inches long , respectively . Overall , the length including couplings is 2 2 feet , 1 1 inches ( 6 meters , 6 0 centimeters ) . The 14- inch , three-blade propel lers remain on the shaft , with two blades buried in the sand . The remains of two gas cylinders , approximately 8 feet , 4 inches long ( 2 meters , 5 0 centimeters ) , lie nearby ( Figure 9 . 2 1 ) . High-pressure air cylinders were used to help start diesel engines and are a good indicator of the type of engine used . The remains o f the engine room skylight are also i n the vicinity o f the shaft and cylinders . Approximately 2 0 feet away , the remains of what may be a radio were discovered ( Figure 9 . 2 2 ) .
In addition to the principal features , the remains of an anchor winch , with link chain running through it , and a capstan are present . Bits of the wooden deck are visible on the c apstan base . The ship ' s port anchor is easily located by following the played-out anchor chain . According to Mark Michael , owner of Dive Rota , the starboard anchor was removed from the s ite in 1 9 8 7 . At the time o f its removal , it too was attached to the anchor chain . That anchor is presently being used to anchor a mooring buoy in East Harbor . The ship ' s spare kedge anchor , measuring 4 feet , 1 0 inches from base to the ring , is on the site ( Figure 9 . 2 3 ) .
Miscellaneous pieces of sheet metal , pos sibly the armor plate from the engine room and bridge , are scattered among the corals on the site . Small arms ammunition , most l ikely for the 7 . 7 -mm antiaircraft machine gun ( Figure 9 . 2 4 ) ; a portion o f the depth-charge launchers ; and seven depth c harges have been identified on the site as well .
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0 I
10 I
20 I
SCALE IN FEET
F ig . 9 . 1 9 . I l lustration o f the auxiliary submarine chasers of the CHA 1 Class lost at Rota in June 1 9 4 4 .
Fig . 9 . 2 0 . The engine from the "cable run" auxil iary sub chaser lies on its port side in 50 feet of water . ( P hoto by Mark Michael )
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Fig . 9 . 2 1 . High-pressure air cylinders being measured by volunteer divers documenting the wreckage o f submarine chaser site Number 1 near Cable Run . ( Photo by Mark Michael )
Fig. 9 . 2 2 . The remains o f what appears to be a radio lie on the coral reef . ( Photo by Mark Michael )
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Fig. 9 . 2 3 . Spare kedge a nchor from auxiliary chaser site Number 1 . ( Photo by t-1ark Michae l )
submarine
Fig. 9 . 2 4 . Small arms ammunition, possibly for the boat ' s antiaircraft machine gun, are lying near the engine . ( Photo by Mark Michael )
350
The large area of wreckage indicates this auxiliary submarine chaser was destroyed by a tremendous explosion , most l ikely from a 5 0 0-pound bomb . The location and condition of the anchors , with the anchor chain played out , suggest that the boat was not underway at the time it was attacked .
Auxiliary submarine chaser site Number 2 is lying on a white s and and scattered coral bottom in 9 0 feet of water in an area called Coral Gardens ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 ) . When this s ite was examined in 1 9 8 7 , the " 5 5-gal lon drums " bel ieved to be from a fishing boat were identified as depth charges , and the site type was confirmed ( Figure 9 . 2 5 ) .
The wreckage is scattered over an area of approximately 3 0 0 feet in diameter . The chaser ' s diesel engine , identical to that found on chaser site Number 1 , is s itting upright on its engine mount . The shaft and screw are intact and attached to the engine ( Figure 9 . 2 6 ) .
The remains of the bridge , stack, engine room skylight and a fuel or water tank lie to port of the engine . Forward of the engine a high-pressure air cylinder is partially buried ; s l ightly to port the anchor windlass and anchor chain are present . Nearby , the remains of the wooden hull framing are exposed in the sand ( Figure 9 . 2 7 ) along with a c leat attached to a portion o f the rail .
The base and pedestal for the chaser ' s 7 . 7 -mm antiaircraft machine gun s it upright on the sand bottom forward of the engine ( Figure 9 . 2 8 ) . Numerous depth charges are scattered among the corals to the port of the engine . I n addition to the maj or features , the ship ' s binnacle ( Figure 9 . 2 9 ) has been identi fied as well as the running lights ( Figure 9 . 3 0 ) . A brass of fering bowl , the remains of a shoe or boot , sake bottles , the depth-charge launcher , engine room grating and a variety o f other miscellaneous debris have all been discovered at this s ite . Because of the extens ive remains , this site is an excellent "bench mark " with which to compare the remains o f the many other CHA 1 Class auxiliary submarine chasers that are lost throughout Micronesia .
Auxiliary submarine chaser site Number 3 was located in late 1 9 8 9 by Mark and Lynne Michael . It is lying on the sea floor bel ow " the second Japanese gun emplacement " ( Mark Michael personal communication ) , which is located on the road that enc ircles the island ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 ) . Identification of this s ite as a CHA 1 Class submarine chaser was based upon comparison of features found here with those found at Cable Run and Coral Gardens .
The wreckage is scattered across an area of approximately 5 0 0 feet i n diameter and lies i n 3 0 t o 9 0 feet of water . Much o f
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Fig . 9 . 2 5 . Depth charges found on the auxiliary submarine chasers in Rota . ( Photo by Mark Michael )
Fig . 9 . 2 6 . The diesel engine from auxiliary submarine chaser site Number 2 at Coral Gardens sits upright with its shaft still attached. Note the fuel tank beyond the diver . ( Photo by Tim Rock)
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Fig. 9 . 2 7 . Remains of the wooden hull framing are exposed on the starboard side in the bow and in the stern . ( Photo by Mark Michae l )
Fig. 9 . 28 . The antiaircraft machine gun base and pedestal are present on the Coral Gardens site ( located lower right ) . Framing is visible sticking out of the sand (middle right ) . ( Photo by Tim Rock)
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Fig . 9 . 2 9 . The binnacle is heavily recognizable. ( Photo by Mark Michael )
encrusted but still
F ig . 9 . 30 . A diver examines the running light from the Coral Garden submarine chaser. ( Photo by Mark Michael )
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the debris field is in the reef and is heavily overgrown . The boat I s diesel engine , identical to those found on the other two chasers , is lying on its port s ide . Other remains inc lude the propeller and shaft , anchor , high-pres sure air cylinder , ladder , c leat and rail , and bul lets . In addition , s everal brass discs found on the valve wheels o f the air cylinders were identified by a Japanese vis itor . These discs are identical to those found on the Cable Run s ite .
The depth charges and depth-charge launcher are identical to those found on the other s ites ( Figure 9 . 3 1 ) . A plate from a depth-sounding machine was also identified by a Japanese vis itor ( Michael , personal communication ) .
A section of the ship I s planking, partially buried in the s and , was discovered in an area some distance from the main concentration of wreckage ( Figure 9 . 3 2 ) . In addition , a bras s f ire extinguisher and a hatch cover have been located ( Figures 9 . 3 3 and 9 . 34 ) .
Although no historical documentation has come to light to c orroborate the s ite Number 3 as a CHA 1 Class , the archeological record leaves l ittle doubt about its identity .
Administrative Status
All of the s ites in and around Rota are administered by the local government and are under the umbrella of the historic preservation law of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana I s lands .
Present Threats /Impacts
Sport diving is a popular activity on Rota . At present there i s l ittle effective control over the removal o f artifacts from s ites . The local dive shop owners , Mark and Lynne Michael , do not encourage divers to remove artifacts and have made strong e fforts to record the location and photograph artifacts from submerged s ites around the island .
Guam
The more than 6 0 documented shipwrecks in and around Guam span a period of more than four centuries . The earliest i s the manila gal leon SAN PABLO , sunk at anchor when a typhoon struck in 15 6 8 . Ships representing every period in Guam ' s history : the Spanish colonial period , whaling , American c olonialism , World Wars I and I I , and up to the modern era are known to have been wrecked here . Not surpris ingly, the galleons have been the target of treasure companies in e fforts to obtain salvage rights ; to date no galleons have
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Fig . 9 . 3 1 . Depth charge found on the recently discovered auxiliary submarine chaser s i te Number 3 in Rota . ( Photo by Mark Michael )
Fig. 9 . 32 . Planking partially buried in the sand was discovered some distance away from the main wreckage field . ( Photo by Mark Michae l )
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Fig . 9 . 3 3 . A diver holds up the brass fire extinguisher found on the third auxiliary submarine chaser site . ( Photo by Mark Michael )
Fig. 9 . 34 . Number 3 .
A small hatch cover from submarine chaser site ( Photo by Mark Michae l )
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been excavated on Guam . Various others have been the subj ect 4lt of scholarly document research ( Corey 19 7 1 ; Driver 1 9 7 6 ; and others ) .
Only five ships from the twentieth century have been the focus o f underwater archeological investigation . Interest in the wrecks has stemmed from their association with World Wars I and I I , their access ibility to scuba divers and their relat ive integrity . They are CORMORAN from World War I ; KITSUGAWA MARU , TOKAI MARU and NICHIYU MARU lost in Apra Harbor ( Figure 9 . 35 ) , and ARATAMA MARU sunk in Talafofo Bay ( re fer to Figure 9 . 56 ) , all from World War I I .
Site-Speci f ic Investigations
SMS CORMORAN4
In 1 9 7 8 the Department of Parks and Recreation conducted a prel iminary survey of CORMORAN . I n 19 8 3 while on Guam to survey the o f fshore areas o f WAPA for historic features , the SCRU completed a video and photographic survey and an artist ' s perspective drawing of CORMORAN and the adj acent TOKAI MARU ( Figure 9 . 3 6 ) . During the summer of 1 9 8 8 , the SCRU and the WAPA submerged-resources team began detailed mapping of SMS CORMORAN and TOKAI MARU . In 1 9 8 8 the U . S . Navy placed a mooring buoy over both ships for scuba divers . � Mapping documentation o f the s ite was completed in late � 1 9 8 9 . The German auxiliary cruiser , SMS CORMORAN , is lying on the s ilty bottom of Apra Harbor on the west s ide of Guam ( refer to Figure 9 . 35 ) .
Historical Background
The ship was constructed in 1 9 0 9 by the German Schicau dockyards for the Rus s ian Volunteer Fleet Association and was christened SS RJASAN . The cargo transport was captured on August 4 , 19 14 , at the beginning of World War I by the German c ruiser , SMS EMDEN , at the Straits of Tsushima . It was c arrying a cargo of iron rails , wine , lemons , salt meat , black Russ ian tea , and a few passengers on a voyage from Shanghai and Nagasaki to Vladivostok . A prize crew was placed aboard , and RJASAN steamed to Ts ingtao , China , a German base . RJASAN reached Tsingtao on August 6 .
On August 7 , 1 9 14 , decommiss ioned , and
the old German gunboat , RJASAN was renamed SMS
CORMORAN , CORMORAN
was and
4The discuss ion of previous work and CORMORAN ' s historical background was written by David T . Lotz . 4lt
358
w (JI \0
TOKAI MARU /
KIZUGAWA MARU-o � NICHIYU MARU SMS CORMORAN �----�'�L-��--�--1)
Orote Island
Spanish Rock
APRA OUTER HARBOR
OROTE PENINSULA
MARIANA ISLANDS APRA HARBOR ISLAND OF GUAM TERRITORY OF GUAM
Scale 1:10,000
Guam 1963 Datum
112
West Channel
Commadores Cut
', '., MILES
Neye Island 0 ,. �;
Fig . 9 . 35 . Location o f CORMORAN , MARU in Apra Harbor , Guam .
KITZ SGAWA
. Jadl
Shoals
APRA INNER HARBOR
MARU , TOKAI MARU and NICHIYU
------------ - - - - - -
w 0'1 0
Fig . 9 . 3 6 . Perspective of CORMORAN and TOKAI MARU . ( Drawn by Jerry L . Livingston )
- - -- _______________________ .....
commis s ioned into the Imperial German Navy ( Figure 9 . 3 7 ) . Eight 1 0 . 5 -cm guns were trans ferred from the old CORMORAN to the new CORMORAN along with stowing provis ions and equipment for a crew o f 15 of ficers , 8 petty o f ficers , 2 18 enlisted men , 2 8 New Guinea men , and 4 Chinese under Capt . Albert Zuchschwerdt for a 5-month cruise . The old CORMORAN was sunk by explos ives outs ide Ts ingtao ' s harbor .
CORMORAN sailed on August 1 0 , 1 9 14 , from Tsingtao to Nj elang in the Marshall I slands where , it arrived on August 2 1 with the rest of the German squadron arriving on August 2 7 under Vice Adm . Graf von Spee . CORMORAN received provis ions , left the squadron , and headed southwest to wage raider warfare against merchant ships . On September 4 , the cruiser reached Kavieng , New Ireland , which was still in German hands . After the Japanese declared war on Germany , they moved as quickly as poss ible to take control in Micronesia while hunting for German ships .
CORMORAN sailed on September 6 , 1 9 14 , westward toward the Celebes , seeking a supply of coal . Finding none , it sailed to Yap . On September 17 , CORMORAN reached Yap and sailed on September 19 for Alexishafen , New Guinea , where it arrived on September 2 3 , still looking for coal . The ship escaped capture by an allied squadron and steamed toward Yap where it arrived on September 2 8 .
On September 3 0 , 1 9 14 , CORMORAN left Yap for Friedrich Wilhemshafen to attack the Aus tralians there . This plan was abandoned because of unfavorable c ircumstances . The cru iser sailed back to Yap on October 7 , but sailed to Lamotrek Atol l when a Japanese cruiser was s ighted near the entrance t o the channel to Yap . CORMORAN arrived on October 12 at Lamotrek and left on December 12 , headed for Guam .
CORMORAN entered Apra Harbor on December 14 , 1 9 14 , with only 5 0 tons of coal on board . As a United States possess ion , Guam was neutral in 19 14 . Captain Zuckschwerdt requested provis ions from the American naval commander on the is land but the request was denied . Instead , he was forced to accept interment . Interment lasted under reasonably good conditions unti l the United States entry into World War I on April 7 , 1 9 1 7 .
Only two hours after Pres ident Woodrow Wilson s igned the dec l aration o f war in Washington , Lt . Owen Bartlett , USN , representing Capt . Roy C . Smith , requested the surrender of CORMORAN . Captain Zuckschwerdt of fered to surrender the crew but not the ship . As Lieutenant Bartlett ' s barge left CORMORAN at 8 : 0 3 a . m . , a demolition charge was exploded to scuttle the ship as the crew abandoned ship . CORMORAN sank
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F�g. 9 . 3 7 . Historic photograph o f SMS CORMORAN. courtesy of GovGuam )
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( Photo
with a los s of seven crewmen ; their remains were later recovered and buried in the Agana Naval Cemetery .
The U . S . Navy conducted salvage operations on CORMORAN in 1 9 1 7 and 19 1 8 , and basically removed guns , cartridges , chain , anchors , winches , and the ship ' s bell .
Built as a f lush-deck mail steamer with superstructure amidship and engine house aft , it is a 3 , 4 4 3 gross tonnage ship with a length o f 334 . 9 feet , a beam of 45 . 9 feet , and a draft of 2 2 . 9 feet . It has four boilers and a triple-expans ion reciprocating engine . The bow is plumb and the stern is counter . The two funnel s are medium and the ventilators are cowl type . The ship had a foremast and a ftermast , both of which had a topmast .
Present Description and Analysis 5
CORMORAN l ies on its starboard s ide in 1 2 0 feet o f water ( Figure 9 . 3 8 ) . Its keel is almost touching that of TOKAI MARU with the latter on its port s ide bow facing almost due north . The bow of CORMORAN is facing approximately northeast . Although the propeller blades have been removed from CORMORAN , it is apparent that they must have been intact at the time of TOKAI ' s s inking . There are hull plates stove in on the TOKAI where it would have contacted CORMORAN ' s blade in s inking ( Figure 9 . 3 9 ) .
The ship ' s rudder is attached at the pintles but has been bent sharply and embedded in the s il t . This suggests that CORMORAN hit the harbor bottom stern- f irst , and the weight o f the ship c ame down us ing the j uncture of the rudder and sternpost as a fulcrum . Because this i s one o f the strongest parts o f the ship in construction , it bent instead of collapsing under the enormous pressure applied by the settling ves sel .
There has been no maj or damage to the ship ' s hul l or superstructure f rom the explosion or s inking , so the ves sel has a generally intact appearance to the diver , the obvious exceptions being the result of sea growth and corrosion . A diver approaching CORMORAN from above will see that the lower part of the fantail disappears under the tilted port gunnel o f the TOKAI , which is a large ship that has more rel ie f f rom the bottom ( Figure 9 . 40 ) .'
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5The discuss ion o f CORMORAN ' s present description and analysi s was written by Daniel J . Lenihan .
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--------------------------------------------- -- -- -
Fig . 9 . 3 8 . Perspective o f SMS CORMORAN . ( Drawn by Jerry L . Livingston )
Fig . 9 . 39 . Dan Lenihan videotaping hole in hull plates o f TOKAI MARU where i t hit propeller blade of CORMORAN . Propeller hub o f CORMORAN is visible but blades have been salvaged. ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
Fig . 9 . 4 0 . Fantail of CORMORAN on left o f photograph passes under bilge keel of TOKAI MARU as seen on right . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
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Moving from the stern towards the bow , the diver wil l see an 41 intact cabin on the stern followed by two holds . Along the entire length of the deck the wooden decking has been eaten by marine borers and microorganisms except for small islands of wood that have been impregnated by corrosion products from the metal f ittings they surround . The ship is eas ily penetrated at many points and has been over the years by sport divers .
There are two anchors lying on the ship approximately amidships . One lies on the lower part of the upturned port hull and the other has fallen between two davits and i s lying against the superstructure at the main deck level . Some of the engine room skyl ights are open and others are broken .
Both of the ship ' s stacks are broken o f f and lying in the s ilt on the harbor bottom . This was not the case in 1 9 8 3 when the NPS team first surveyed the ship ( Figures 9 . 4 1 and 9 . 4 2 ) . The ship appears to have been stripped o f ground tackle and armament during the early salvage operations . None of the ship ' s own anchors or chain remains in place , and a long , uncontrolled , sport diving history on the s ite has ensured that not many portable artifacts are available for viewing without penetration ( Figures 9 . 4 3 and 9 . 4 4 ) .
TOKAI MARU6
I n 1 9 7 8 the Department of Parks and Recreation conducted a prel iminary survey of TOKAI MARU . I n 1 9 8 3 an artist ' s perspective drawing was completed o f the TOKAI MARU and the adj acent CORMORAN by Jerry L . Livingston of the SCRU ( refer to Figure 9 . 3 8 ) .
TOKAI MARU was used during World War I I as a transport by the Imperial Japanese Navy . I t presently l ies at the bottom of Apra Harbor ( refer to Figure 9 . 35 ) .
Historical Background
TOKAI MARU was built in the Mitsubishi Heavy I ndustry Shipyard in Nagasaki , Japan . Construction started on November 2 6 , 1 9 2 9 ; the ship was launched on May 1 6 , 1 9 3 0 ; and construction was completed on August 14 , 1 9 3 9 ( Figure 9 . 4 5 ) . The ship was built for the Osaka Shosen Company and its fast service for cargo and passengers to New York City .
6 The discussion of prior research on TOKAI MARU and its .. historical background was written by David T . Lotz . .,
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Fig . 9 . 4 1 . NPS diver swimming over intact stack of CORMORAN in 1 9 8 3 . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy)
F ig . 9 . 4 2 . Stack of CORMORAN, 1 9 8 3 . Murphy)
367
( NPS photo by Larry
Fig. 9 . 4 3 . Dan Lenihan videotaping CORMORAN wreckage . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
Fig. 9 . 4 4 . Gravestone o f CORMORAN crew member in Agana . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
3 6 8
On October 1 7 , 19 4 1 , TOKAI MARU became a transport under contract with the Imperial Japanese Navy at Kure . TOKAI MARU ' s movements from that time until the initial attack on the ship in Apra Harbor are not known . On January 24 , 1 9 4 3 , the transport was anchored in Apra Harbor .
The U . S . submarine , FLYING FISH , under the command of Lt . Comdr . G . R . Donaho , sailed to the Mariana I s lands from Brisbane , Australia , on January 6 , 1 9 4 3 , on its fourth war patrol . FLYING FISH arrived o f f Apra Harbor on January 2 4 and observed one ship anchored i n the harbor . The submarine quietly patrolled outside the harbor for 3 days while waiting for ships to enter or leave the harbor . At 1 7 1 0 on January 2 6 , FLYING FISH fired two torpedoes at TOKAI MARU from 1 , 5 0 0 yards outs ide Calalan Bank . They were both set at zero depth to clear the shallows ; however , the second torpedo exploded on Calalan Bank .
When the first torpedo hit , " . . . the target was completely obscured by water and spray momentarily and black smoke was visible after the spray subs ided . Target replied with gunfire , apparently aimed at random " ( report of war patrol , u . s . submarine FLYING FISH , 1 9 4 3 ) . As a result of this attack , TOKAI MARU was damaged but not sunk .
USS SNAPPER , on its seventh war patrol under the command of Lt . Comdr . M . K . Clementson , approached Apra Harbor on August 2 0 , 1 94 3 , and noticed two large ships moored in the northeast area of the harbor . SNAPPER secretly patrol led outs ide the harbor for 7 days with the intent to s ink the ships when they left the harbor . However , SNAPPER did not know that the vessels were the previous ly damaged TOKAI MARU and NICHIYU MARU . After waiting a week , SNAPPER made a submerged attack on August 2 7 , described in the patrol report as follows :
1 4 0 0
1 4 4 5
1 5 2 2
Headed i n to a pos ition bearing 3 1 3°T 1 6 0 0 yards from center of harbor entrance channel .
Battle stations . Main gyro oscillating so used auxiliary gyro for f ixes .
In pos ition , targets are presenting about 1 0 0°
port track . Patrol vessel dead astern about 3 5 0 0 yards . Exposed about s ix feet o f periscope to check on any obstructions along torpedo track and as none were sighted dec ided that chances favored a hit . At 152 3 , fired three torpedoes at bow , midships and stern of nearer ship and one torpedo at center of further ship . Swing ship hard left to clear shallow water coming to course 2 5 0°T . Observed patrol ves sel minding his own busines s and proceeding slowly to northward . At 0 6 : 05 sighted
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Fig . 9 . 4 5 . Historic photograph of Japanese transport TOKAI MARU . ( P hoto courLesy of GovGuam)
N06 � target down by stern and heading 1 0 - 1 5 to port , stern envel oped in gray-black smoke and air filled with debris . 0 7 : 0 0 stern of ship submerging and more debris in vicinity of #1 target around stern . 0 8 : 0 0 last view of target showed it submerged from amidships aft and bow quite high . Believe his stern was on the bottom . The water line was seen to be about hal f way up the after king posts with a 1 5 angle down by the stern . At 1 1 : 0 0 heard two very faint explos ions a few seconds apart which may have been the other two torpedoes exploding on beach . For the next 1 0 - 1 5 minutes heard some very distant explosions undoubtedly ins ide the harbor and one explosion about 1 5 0 0 yards away , probably from the patrol vessel . His screws were not heard after this so it is believed poss ible that this nicely ineffic ient gent probably decommiss ioned himsel f . Departed from area at good speed and depth , however .
Following the attack, TOKAI MARU settled on the bottom , touching the World War I German auxiliary cruiser , CORMORAN .
TO:KAI MARU is an 8 , 359 -gross -ton , Japanese , passenger and c argo ship with two two-cycle , six-cyl inder , diesel engines . The ship has a net tonnage o f 5 , 04 7 tons , a displacement o f 1 5 , 8 0 1 tons , a dead weight of 1 0 , 1 0 8 tons and a cargo volume of 1 7 . 45 5 cubic meters . The water l ine length is 1 3 5 . 9 4 meters with a width of 18 . 4 4 meters , a depth of 1 2 . 4 2 meters and a draft of 8 . 5 3 meters . The engines developed a horsepower of 8 , 1 3 8 with a cruising speed of 14 . 1 9 knots and a maximum speed of 1 8 . 3 2 3 knots . The ship ' s serial number is 3 6 0 9 9 and call sign was JJJC .
The passenger and cargo ship was built as a modern motorship with a superstructure amidship of four decks . On top is a squat funnel . The deck is f lush except for a raised poop . The bow is plumb and it has a cruiser-spoon stern . TOKAI MARU has four masts , and the foremast and aftermast have cross trees , while the mainmast and mizzen are goal posts . Numerous derricks are attached to the masts .
Present Description and Analysis 7
TOKAI MARU lies on its port s ide at an angle of 8 5 degrees in 1 2 0 feet of water _ ( Figures 9 . 4 6 and 9 . 4 7 ) . The depth at the
7The present description and analysis section on TOKAI MARU was written by Larry Murphy .
37 1
starboard rail is 9 5 feet , the port rail amidship 1 1 0 feet , tt and the minimum depth on the site is 5 0 feet at the midships structure . The bow points about 44 degrees magnetic .
There is a gunmount on the bow ; however , the gun has been removed , reportedly by the US Navy in 19 6 5 , and displayed at Polaris Point , Guam . The gunmount has none o f the wooden decking , but the circular beams that supported it are present . Damage is vis ible on the starboard bow . There are three 3 6 - foot-long forward holds , each with a set o f masts and cargo winches ( Figure 9 . 4 8 ) . The forward mast , a s ingle mast , is broken about 2 5 feet above the deck with the 2 0- foot upper portion still attached but hanging down over the lagoon floor ( Figure 9 . 4 9 ) . Booms extend forward and aft from the forward mast and second mas t .
The second mast is a 55-foot , " goal post , " twin mast j oined by a crosstree . The top o f this mast and the 4 0 - foot masts j ust forward of the amidship superstructure apparently serve as ventilators . There are vent-like openings in the rounded mast cap of all four masts ( Fi gure 9 . 5 0 ) . There are deckhouses at the base of the masts .
The ports ide hull of the Number 2 cargo hold is damaged , apparently by a blast . Scrap steel , including car and truck frames , is reported in the cargo holds . � The bridge and four decks of superstructure are intact ( Figure 9 . 5 1 ) . Boat davits remain in place . The stack is in place as are ventilator shafts . A corporate emblem made of welded plate is visible on the stack . Down the starboard hull , the 1 15 -foot-long bilge kee l can be observed . The CORMORAN stern lies directly below the aft end o f the bilge keel .
The forward set of aft masts are o f the " goal post " type and are s ituated between the two aft hatches . The forward booms are in place over the hatch , the aft booms have dropped into the open hatch .
The single aft mast has no booms attached , but the cargo winches are in place and undamaged . This mast would have probably had booms forward and aft to service the holds . Both doors of the deckhouse beneath this mast are open .
There is a stern deckhous e that contains four depth charges on the port s ide . US Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal ( EOD ) divers have identified the depth charges as Japanese Type 9 5 . Marine growth prevented the determination of whether the devices are armed or not . The cylindrical steel charges each contain 3 2 5 pounds of explos ives and present a safety hazard . Discuss ions between EOD and the Guam State Historic tt
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Fig . 9 . 4 6 . Deck view of TOKAI MARU .
Fig . 9 . 4 7 . Planimetric view o f TOKAI MARU site. Jerry L. Livingston)
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( Drawn by
F ig . 9 . 4 8 . Cargo-handling winches on deck of TOKAI MARU . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
F ig . 9 . 4 9 . Broken forward mast of TOKAI MARU hangs suspended over lagoon bottom . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
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Fig . 9 . 50 . Valve handle, probably for ventilator, on mast cap of TOKAI MARU . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
Fig . 9 . 5 1 . Superstructure starboard amidships of TOKAI MARU . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
375
Preservation Officer are being disposition of the explosives .
conducted regarding e The screws have been removed and the rudder is missing . The hul l is torn above the starboard shaft .
A torpedo has blown a hole in the Number 2 port cargo hold . There is some damage to the starboard bow around the railing . The cargo holds contain scrap steel , car and truck frames , bed springs , and a truck . Some parts o f the ship have been removed by divers including the 8-cm bow gun removed by the U . S . Navy in 1 9 6 5 . The gun is presently located at Polaris Point . Except for the war-damaged and the removed parts , the vessel is intact .
KITSUGAWA MARU8
KITSUGAWA MARU was located during a 1 9 7 6 survey o f Apra Harbor . In 1 9 7 8 the Guam Department of Parks and Recreation c onducted a prel iminary survey of the s ite . In the summers o f 1 9 8 6 through 1 9 8 8 , the U . S . Navy in cooperation with the SCRU ( Proj ect SeaMark ) accomplished mapping of the KITSUGAWA MARU with the ass istance of Naval reserve mobile diving and salvage units . This proj ect gave the Navy a focus for reserve diver training in addition to historic preservation goals . e KITSUGAWA MARU was used during World War I I as a transport by the Imperial Japanese Navy . It presently lies at the bottom o f Apra Harbor ( refer to Figure 9 . 35 ) .
Historical Background
KITSUGAWA MARU was launched on September 15 , 1 9 4 0 , from the Kawanan Kogyo Shipyard in Nagasaki , Japan ; construction was c ompleted on June 2 7 , 1 9 4 1 ( Figure 9 . 52 ) . Although it was built for the Toyo Kaiun Company , it became a transport under c ontract to the Imperial Japanese Navy at Yokosuka on September 2 9 , 1 9 4 3 . On October 2 0 , 1 9 4 3 , it left Saeki for New Guinea via Palau in convoy 0 1 0 . On November 2 8 , 1 9 4 3 , the transport left Palau on the return voyage and arrived in S aeki on December 3 , 1 9 4 3 , on convoy Hr 0 0 9 . On January 2 5 , 1 9 4 4 , it left Saeki and arrived in Palau on February 6 , 1 9 4 4 . The subsequent departure date from Palau is not known .
8The discuss ion of previous res earch and historical ._. background on KIZUGAWA MARU was written by David T . Lotz . �
37 6
Fig. 9 . 52 . The transport KITSUGAWA MARU after being commissioned into the Japanese Navy. Note the deck gun in the bow . ( Photo courtesy of GovGuam )
However , on the night of April 8 , 1 9 4 4 , the U . S . submarine , tt SEAHORSE , was conducting a night attack to the southeas t of Guam on a Japanese convoy of three freighters escorted by two destroyers . Departing Pearl Harbor on March 1 6 , the SEAHORSE , under the command of Lt . Cdr . Slade Cutter , was on its fourth war patrol . Cutter made contact with the convoy by us ing sonar and then conducted a submerged attack . Four torpedoes were f ired at 0 2 2 1 at a large transport , with torpedoes set to run 1 0 feet below the surface .
Three hits were heard and a tremendous explosion shot flames high into the air . At 0 2 2 2 , a second attack was conducted us ing the same method as the first , by firing a spread of torpedoes at a second large transport . One torpedo hit the middle o f the target and caused the ship to burst into flames . Three hours later , one of the targets was observed listing low in the water and on f ire . ARATAMA MARU was hit in the f irst attack and KITSUGAWA MARU was hit in the second . KITSUGAWA MARU did not s ink but was severely damaged and was towed into Apra Harbor . It remained there while the Japanese attempted to repair the damage .
American aircraft carrier attacks on Guam began in June 1 9 4 4 , prior t o the invas ion of Guam in mid-July . The strike force was launched on June 2 5 from USS ESSEX , part of Task Force 5 8 , and comprised planes from Air Group 15 . The strike led � by Lt . Comdr . J . E . Rigg took o f f at 1 0 2 7 and focused on W Japanese installations on and around Orate Field . The force consisted of 15 F 6F-3 Hellcat fighters , 12 SB2C-1C Helldiver dive bombers and 5 TBF-1C Avenger torpedo bombers .
During the approach to Orate Field , Lt . C . H . Sorensen , f lying a TBF- 1C , was directed to f ire rockets on a freighter in Apra Harbor , KITSUGAWA MARU . Sorensen approached east to west . He dived from 6 , 00 0 feet in a 4 5 -degree dive , fired eight 5-inch rockets in pairs from 2 , 5 0 0 feet to 1 , 0 0 0 feet in altitude , and pulled out at 5 0 0 feet . Six hits were seen amidships without apparent damage .
On June 2 7 , 1 9 4 4 , a strike force from Air Group 1 0 was launched from USS ENTERPRISE at 14 0 0 to attack Apra Harbor and Orate Field . The strike force comprised 12 F6F-3 Hellcat fighters , 1 2 SBD-5 Dauntless dive bombers , and 9 TBF-1C Avenger torpedo bombers . The f irst division of dive bombers attacked the damaged KITSUGAWA MARU and scored two direct hits and three near misses to s ink the ship where it rests today .
KITSUGAWA MARU is a 1 , 9 1 5-gross-tonnage , Japanese -built , steel-hull freighter with a s ingle engine . The ship has a net tonnage of 1 , 05 6 tons , displacement of 4 , 14 9 tons , dead
.. weight of 2 , 8 3 8 tons , and a cargo volume of 3 , 6 3 1 cubic W
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meters . The water l ine length is 8 2 . 82 meters with a width of 12 . 2 0 meters , a depth of 6 . 2 0 meters and draft of 5 . 4 0 meters . The engine developed 1 , 6 84 horsepower with a cru1s 1ng speed of 1 1 . 0 knots and a maximum speed of 12 . 8 knots . Its serial number is 4 8 6 4 3 and the call sign was JHQP .
The transport was built with the machinery space and superstructure aft and bridge j ust forward of amidships . I t is well-decked with islands fore and aft . The bow is raked and it has a counter stern . The stern funnel is medium-sized and not raked , and the ventilators are a cowl type . It has a foremast , an aftermast , and goalpost mainmast ; all three masts have derricks .
Present Description and Analys is 9
KITSUGAWA MARU presently lies in 140 feet of water in Apra Harbor ( Figure 9 . 5 3 ) . KITSUGAWA was torpedoed by the submarine , SEAHORSE , on April 8 , 1 9 4 4 . The ship was severely damaged and towed into Apra Harbor , where it was sunk by U . S . bombers on June 2 7 . KITSUGAWA MARU , long known as "The Bow Gun Wreck , " lies in 140 feet of water about 5 0 0 yards south of Hotel Wharf in Apra Harbor .
The bow gun of the ship is in 1 1 0 feet of water ( Figure 9 . 5 4 ) . The gun is in place and pointing toward the port quarter . The gunmount had a wooden deck mounted upon a c ircular beam arrangement built above the deck . Access to the mount is from the port side . Ready boxes of ammunition , which still contain rounds , are to the aft of the mount . The mount appears typical of bow mounts observed on other transports and may represent a standardized arrangement for Japanese military convers ions .
The bow deck machinery is present and in good shape , and there are few s igns of battle damage . Two wire rope mooring winches are between the bow quarter bitts port and starboard . The windlass is in place , and an anchor cable of open-linked chain comes up out of the deck from the chain locker across the windlass and down the starboard hawse pipe .
Two cargo winches are on the f ' c ' sle deck , each with a s ingle warping drum . The booms are in place and secured in their mounts against the forward bulkhead of the bridge . The strongbacks are also all in place in the forward hatch , which
9The discus s ion of KIZUGAWA MARU ' s present description and analysis was written by Larry Murphy .
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w CX) 0
Fig . 9 . 53 . Planimetric view of KITSUGAWA MARU . and Tony Wiley )
( Drawn by Jerry Livingston
Fig. 9 . 54 . Bow gun of KITSUGAWA MARU . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
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indicates the hold was probably secured for sea , rather than 4t prepared for cargo handling .
The bridge has sustained severe damage . Most of it has been leveled and only the thwartship beams are present . I nterior spaces can be entered . A bath has been reported amidships and a radio room reported below on the starboard s ide .
The 6 0 - foot mainmast , which is a " goal post " configuration with two masts linked at the mast top , is standing , but the booms have been damaged . Portions of the booms are lying in the main hatch . The four cargo winches that s erved the main hold contain no wire rope . It is unlikely this was removed as a part of salvage operations ; rather they must have been in the process of rerigging the main hold l i ft gear after the April 1 9 4 4 torpedoing .
Forward o f the main kingpost are two tanks o f unknown purpose . The starboard one is damaged , the port one intact . Two hatches , port and starboard , j ust aft the kingpost lead down to the midship machinery spaces .
The main hold has one strongback in place . The interior of the hold was not investigated , and it is unknown whether the rest of the strongbacks are in the hold or were removed before s inking . Because there is a half-meter hole in the port hull amidships , the strongbacks may have been removed after the April torpedoing to fac i litate repairs . The port hull hole may be torpedo damage . The mud line is 14 feet below the rail of the main deck .
The aft mast had four booms aft are rigged with cable . the two forward ones have gunwale .
and four cargo winches . The two The two aft booms are in place ;
been displaced and lie over the
The maj ority of battle damage is in the stern area aft the stern mast . The stern rail is in 1 4 0 feet of water . The stack has fallen to the port and is col lapsed . The boiler room may be intact , but the engine spaces appear to have suffered a direct hit . The most extens ive damage is on the port s ide where a maj or s ection o f deck and hull have been blown out . About 4 0 feet o f hull have been af fected with a 3 0 -by- 15 foot section blown out . The starboard hull s ide has been pushed outboard by the blast . Casualties are not reported for this shipwreck , but if the stern crew spaces were occupied , casualties must have been heavy .
Emergency steering and binnacle mounts remain on the quarterdeck . The starboard ventilator cowl is in place near a skylight . Judging from the damaged structure on the
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starboard side , there must have been a deckhouse o f some sort on the quarter deck .
Although the interior spaces were not surveyed , it i s expected that crew ' s quarters , machinery and steering spaces could be entered and likely contain s ignificant artifacts . The starboard door to the spaces is lying on the main deck .
Mooring winches are in place on the deck , port and starboard . These winches may have been confused by some a s depth charges ; earlier reports describe a 5 5- gallon-drum-sized obj ect on a " release rack " on the stern .
KITSUGAWA MARU was damaged by the anchor of AS IAN LILY , which was observed moored over the site in August 1 9 9 0 ( Pac i f ic Daily News , August 7 - 8 , 1 9 9 0 ) . A group led by NPS ranger Jim Miculka assessed the damage and determined the LILY ' s anchor had hit the forward kingpost on the starboard s ide and dis lodged the mast c ap . The cap damaged a ladder, and there was evidence that the anchor hit the cabin and pul led a portion of a bulkhead upward . Coral was damaged , and other ship pieces were observed .
KITSUGAWA MARU has a large hole blown in the port hul l amidships , about 0 . 6 meters in diameter . The port derricks have fallen into a hold amidships . There is coal in the port stern and a small compressor starboard stern . Access to the holds is via ladders amidships , bow and stern of holds . A deck-level door leads to the aft superstructure . This door i s j ust to port of a ladder leading up t o the deck . The door has been blown off and l ies on the deck . The doorway opens into a large storage area that contains four or five shackles . The engine room has been blown up . The stern portion o f the ship was blown away from the hull .
NICHIYU MARU1 0
In 1 9 7 8 the Guam Department of Parks and Recreation conducted a prel iminary survey of NICHIYU MARU . NICHIYU MARU was used during World War I I as an auxiliary minelayer by the Imperial Japanese Navy . It presently lies at the bottom of Apra Harbor ( re fer to Figure 9 . 35 ) .
1 0The discuss ion of NICHIYU MARU was written by David T . Lotz .
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Historical Background
N ICHIYU MARU was built for the Kisen Nissan Steamship Company . Although launched on March 3 , 1 9 3 3 , at the Kawanan Kogyo Shipyard in Nagasaki , Japan , its construction was not completed until December 2 8 , 1 9 3 3 . The ship was requisitioned by the Japanese Navy in 1 9 4 0 ( Figure 9 . 55 ) .
USS PERMIT ( SS - 17 8 ) , under the command of Lt . Comdr . Wreford G . Chapple , arrived off Guam from Midway on May 4 , 1 9 4 3 . While submerged off the harbor on its eighth war patrol , PERMIT observed two ships leaving the harbor with a torpedo boat escort . At 0 8 2 2 , on May 5 , 1 9 4 3 , four torpedoes were f ired at the second ship with one hit being heard ; NICHIYU MARU was damaged in the attack . The torpedo boat escort immediately attacked and depth-charged PERMIT , which c aused s light damage to the submarine . After the attack , NICHIYU MARU returned to Apra Harbor to attempt repairs .
Unable to escape from Apra Harbor , NICHIYU MARU awaited its f inal fate as the U . S . fleet approached Guam in June , 1 9 4 4 . The Battle o f the Philippine Sea occurred on June 1 9 -2 0 , and afterwards there was increased attention to Guam , scheduled for invasion on July 2 1 . Forti fications , airfields , and shipping in Apra Harbor were targets for destruction by the 5th Fleet .
On June 2 4 , 1 9 4 4 , two planes of Air Group 15 from the USS ESSEX spotted a large cargo ship in Apra Harbor . Flying TBF-IC , Avenger torpedo bombers , Lt . ( j g ) R . L . Bentz and Ens . Harry A . Goodwin attacked with rockets and machine guns .
On June 2 5 , 1 9 4 4 , USS CAPERTON ( DD-2 5 0 , Fletcher c lass destroyer ) was on l i feguard duty north of Ritidian Point , Guam , for the early afternoon strike o n Guam . After picking up a pilot in the water , the crew observed a large freighter in Apra Harbor . After permission was received , CAPERTON c losed the harbor and commenced shell ing at 17 2 2 .
After three f iring runs on the freighter , 3 2 0 rounds of 5 -inch, 3 8-caliber ammunition were expended , and about 40 hits were observed ; the ship was left in a damaged and sinking condition . A hurried departure , at 3 3 knots , was made by CAPERTON , which steered a radically evas ive course to evade the shore battery fire that was straddling the ship .
NICHIYU MARU is a 6 , 8 17 -gross -ton , Japanese steel-hull freighter . The ship has a net tonnage of 3 , 9 9 0 tons and a cargo volume o f 9 , 82 7 cubic meters . The water line length is 1 3 6 meters with a width o f 17 . 7 meters , and a depth of 10 meters . The engine developed 4 , 5 3 7 horsepower for a maximum
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Fig . 9 . 5 5 . Historic photograph of NICHIYU MARU after requi s i t ioning by the Japanese Navy . ( Photo courtesy of GovGuam )
speed o f 15 . 5 knots . The serial number is 4 5 4 9 7 and its call It s ign was JUVM .
NICHIYU MARU was built with a superstructure amidships . The ship was well -decked and raised fore and aft . The bow was raked , and it had a spoon stern . The single funnel was medium and raked . The ventilators were cowl type . The s hip c arried a foremast , mainmast , miz zen and aftermast . The foremast and aftermast each had crosstrees . The mainmast and miz zen were goal posts ; all masts had derricks .
Present Description and Analysis
NICHIYU MARU l ies below a commerc ial fuel pier in 100 feet of water in Apra Harbor ( refer to Figure 9 . 35 ) . The s hip was heavily damaged as the result of blasting done by commercial divers to remove the upper structure of the ship to increase the depth in the area for commercial shipping . The forward third of the ship is relatively intact with the kingpost blasted off ; the remainder is broken up . The shallower blasted portions are characterized by heavy siltation . Cargo hold Number 1 contains electric fans and scrap metal . Hold Number 2 is heavily damaged . The aft section of Number 2 has collapsed . The main deck is now nearly lying on the deck below as a result of blasting to reduce the navigational hazard . The engine room is spac ious but broken up . On the A port s ide , a kingpost boom l ies against the hull . �
ARATAMA MARU1 1
In 1 9 8 7 the Guam Department o f Parks and Recreation sponsored an underwater archeology survey and training program with the SCRU , NPS . The 2 1/2 -week course in May 1 9 8 7 brought participants from the Northern Mariana I slands , Belau , Kosrae , and San Francisco to Guam for classroom sess ions in shipwreck archeology and protection is sues and f ieldwork in s hipwreck mapping and photography on the ARATAMA MARU . They also made a video documentary of the ARATAMA MARU during the pro j ect .
ARATAMA MARU was used during World War I I as a transport by the Imperial Japanese Navy . It presently lies at the bottom o f Talafofo Bay on the southeast s ide of Guam ( Figure 9 . 5 6 ) .
1 1The discussion of prior research and the historical background on ARATAMA MARU were written by David T . Lot z . 4lt
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Historical Background
On August 2 7 , 1 9 4 1 , ARATAMA MARU was contracted by the Imperial Japanese Navy as a transport and was used to move supplies to Japanese installations in the Marshalls and Palau from 1 9 4 1 to 1 9 4 3 ( Figure 9 . 5 7 ) .
In March 1 9 4 4 , ARATAMA MARU left Yokusuka , Japan , under the command o f Captain Oshikura . The ship arrived in Palau on March 27 and left on March 2 9 , with s ix other ships , for Saipan where they arrived on April 5 . On April 7 , ARATAMA MARU left in a convoy with other ships and two escorts . During the darkness of the early morning of April 8 , the convoy was 1 0 nautical miles east of Guam and travel ing at 1 3 knots on a course of 250 degrees to the west-southwest .
The convoy was spotted by the submarine , USS SEAHORSE , that subsequently conducted a night attack on the Japanese convoy to the s outheast of Guam . Departing Pearl Harbor on March 1 6 , SEAHORSE , under the command of Lt . Comdr . S lade Cutter , was conducting its fourth war patrol . Cutter made contact with the convoy by us ing sonar and then conducted a submerged attack . Four torpedoes , set to run 10 feet below the surface , were fired at 0 2 2 1 at a large transport . Three hits were heard and a tremendous explosion shot flames high into the air . At 0 2 2 2 , a second attack was conducted us ing the s ame method , firing a spread of torpedoes at a second large transport . One torpedo was observed to hit the middle o f the target , which caused the ship to burst into flames . Three hours later , one of the targets was observed l isting low in the water and on fire . The damaged ship was also observed by the USS GREENLING , which was in the vicinity on a special photographic reconnaissance mission . KITSUGAWA MARU and ARATAMA MARU were both hit in the attack .
ARATAMA MARU suffered a torpedo hit in the Number 3 cargo hold forward of the bridge on the starboard s ide . The ship was immediately engulfed in f lames , and the engines stopped when the engine room was flooded . The crew abandoned the ship and were picked up by one of the escort vessels .
For 3 days , ARATAMA MARU drifted north-northwest toward Guam . After drifting unmanned , the ship initially hit and rested on the reef at the north edge to the entrance of Talofofo Bay . On April 1 2 , 1 9 4 4 , ARATAMA MARU was observed by GREENLING beached at Ipan Point , the northern entrance to Talofofo Bay . Later , the currents and surge moved the ship to the present location o f f the south shore of Talofofo Bay immediately offshore from Gayloop Cove with the bow fac ing the mouth of Talofofo Bay . It ultimately sank in that location , and all of the immediately s alvageable items o f the c argo were taken off to YASUKUMI MARU ( Figure 9 . 5 8 ) .
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N
TALOFOFO e
ISLAND OF GUAM
0 2 3 4 5
MILES
Fig . 9 . 5 6 . Location of ARATAMA MARU in Talofofo Bay , Guam .
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Fig . 9 . 5 7 .
GovGuam) Historic photograph of ARATAMA MARU . ( Photo courtesy of
ARATAMA MARU is a 6 , 7 8 3 -gros s-tonnage , Japanese , steel-hull freighter with a steam turbine . The transport was built by the Tsurumi Steel Shipyard in Japan and launched on July 2 7 , 1 9 3 8 . It was built with a passenger superstructure amidships and wel l-decked fore and aft . The bow is raked with a cruiser spoon stern . The s ingle funnel is medium and squat . The ship carried a goal-post foremast , mainmast , miz zen , and aftmast . All masts had associated derricks .
The ship had a net tonnage of 4 , 0 5 8 tons , displacement of 14 , 5 6 7 tons , dead weight of 10 , 2 0 0 tons , and a cargo volume o f 15 , 6 3 7 cubic meters . ARATAMA MARU ' s water l ine length was 1 3 4 meters with a width of 1 8 meters , a depth o f 1 0 . 3 meters , and draft of 8 . 2 meters . The engine developed 3 , 838 horsepower with a cruising speed of 12 knots and a maximum speed o f 15 . 2 knots . The ship ' s serial number is 4 4 8 5 0 and its call s ign was JUHM .
Over the years , the vessel deteriorated because o f several factors . ARATAMA MARU was used for target practice by U . S . military aircraft . A c ivilian firm , Pacific Rock Company, removed copper steam pipes during 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 6 4 . Tropical storms and typhoons , especially Typhoon Karen in 1 9 6 2 , resulted in further damage to the ship . During the period 1 9 4 4 to 1 9 6 2 , ARATAMA MARU was still partially vis ible above the surface of � Talo fofo Bay ( Figure 9 . 5 9 ) . However , after Typhoon Karen , it was no longer possible to see the ship from the surface { Figure 9 . 6 0 ) .
Present Description and Analys is 12
The wreck o f ARATAMA MARU currently l ies bow to seaward and the stern toward inner Talofofo Bay . The vessel c ame to rest in 50 feet of water at the base of the western reef face and shows s igns of extensive alteration due to both natural and cultural processes . Most of the hul l is present , with little superstructure noted ( Figure 9 . 6 2 ) .
The bow section is lying on its port s ide and is rel atively intact from the stem post aft to the end o f the deep floors ; i . e . , frames that have been deepened form the narrow bow and stern sections -of the hul l . The bow section contains the windlass with stud-l ink chain still attached and rigged to
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1 2 The present description and analys is o f ARATAMA MARU was written by SCRU archeologist Larry Murphy as part of a f inal report to GovGuam in preparation for a nomination of � the s ite to the National Register o f Historic Places . ..,
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F ig . 9 . 5 8 . ARATAMA MARU resting on the shallow bottom o f Talofofo Bay in the 1 9 4 0 s . ( Photo courtesy of GovGuam )
Fig . 9 . 59 . ARAT�� aircraft in the 1 9 5 0 s .
MARU a fter target practice ( Photo courtesy of GovGuam)
by u . s .
F ig . 9 . 6 0 . Talofofo Bay after typhoon Karen in 1 9 6 2 . The shipwreck is no longer visible above the surface . ( P hoto courtesy of GovGuam)
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Fig. 9 . 6 1 . Group photo o f participants in 1 9 8 7 submerged cultural resources training program hosted by the Government of Guam and taught by the National Park Service Submerged Cultural Resources Unit . ARATAMA MARU was documented for the National Register as a course exercise.
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the anchors . The chain comes from a l arge pile , in what was the chain locker , through the deck and over two half-c irc l e fair-leads . The fair-leads have been torn intact from the deck and are hanging on the chain cables . A folding stockless anchor remains in the anchor pocket in the bow ( Figure 9 . 6 3 ) .
Directly aft o f the bow section is a s ection of hull bottom that has been broken off from the bow . Thi s section i s s lightly curved and contains a portion of the cast-iron kee l that comprised the forefoot of the stem post .
Off to the port s ide of the bow is a deck stringer plate with the forward starboard gunwale . There are two winches in the immediate vic inity . The smaller , which is c loser to the deck stringer plate , is probably the forward mooring winch . The larger winch is a cargo winch l ikely as sociated with the forward kingpost and Number 1 hatch .
The frames o f the vessel are made of channel iron 30-by-10 centimeters , with the channels fac ing forward , and the bow frames are on S O -centimeter centers . The shell plates are double chain-riveted with alternating inner and outer s takes . There is triple riveting where the fore and aft plates overlap . The upper stakes overl ap the lower , and the forward plates overlap the stern .
Aft o f the bow section, approximately 7 0 feet from the stem and to starboard , is a section of hul l s ide , with the weather deck . Approximately 1 7 0 aft of the s tem is a portion o f kingpost ( Figure 9 . 6 4 ) and a standing bulkhead . Originally , there were other bulkheads forward of this one , and at least three forward holds . There is extens ive damage in the area forward of this bulkhead , which may have been the result o f the torpedo damage , natural forces , o r later salvage activity . The deck and hull s ides are broken , and large sections of structure are not present within the main s ite c oncentration area .
Two hundred feet aft , another bulkhead i s standing , probably at the Number 3 hold where a torpedo was reported to have s truck . The primary damage appears to have been forward o f the machinery spaces , which is cons istent with the historical records . Hold pillars ( stanchions ) , 2 0 inches in diameter , are present and run down the port and starboard of the ship , rather than on the midline ( Figure 9 . 6 5 ) . No remains o f c argo were located in this area . The only cargo located was aft of the machinery spaces and cons isted of bags of cement , which had hardened .
The bulkhead forward of the machinery space is still standing . Directly aft of the bulkhead are three cylindrical
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F i g . 9 . 6 2 .
ARATAMA MARU
TALOFOFO BAY, GUAM
DEPARTMENT OF
PARKS AND RECREATION
GOVERNMENT OF GUAM AND
SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES
UNIT. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
'"'-' · : · , ···· �···
Base map o f ARATAMA MARU .
Fig . 9 . 6 3 . The folding stockless anchor still remains in the anchor pocket in the bow . ( NPS photo by Ken Vrana)
Fig . 9 . 6 4 . Upper portion of a kingpost just below the bridge . ( NPS photo)
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( Scotch-type ) boilers in place . The boi lers and vis ible � piping are substantial and indicate a high operating stem pressure . Some of the steam pipes and auxiliary pipes are broken , a result of either salvage operations or typhoon activity . The engine is not visible . Historical documentation indicates the ves sel was powered by a steam turbine , which , i f still aboard , is buried in the sediment to the top of the boilers . The hull s ides are substantially intact i n this area .
Aft o f the machinery space , approximately 2 9 0 feet from the stem , the deck has partially collapsed and covers the aft bulkhead of the machinery spaces . The main ship power wiring harnes s i s on the forward s ide of the bulkhead and indicates the probable location of the generator .
There i s a 1- foot-high deckhouse located 3 2 0 feet aft of the stem to the port side ; this may have been for fuel storage . There was no coal located around the wreck . Most Likely the ves sel was oil-fired . Additional examination is needed to document the fuel distribution system and the auxiliary pumps used .
A section of deck with a portion of hatch coaming in place is to starboard aft of the deckhous e area . Further aft , the starboard s ide has collapsed toward the reef . At least one .. and poss ibly two holds were in the stern aft of the � superstructure . No shaft alley was observed in the bottom of the hold area . It is not c lear what the arrangement o f the shaft and its surrounding structure was in this vessel . The alley structure was probably removed by salvors if they recovered the shaft and screw .
The s teering quadrant is presently 4 6 0 feet from the bow ( Figure 9 . 6 6 ) . The steering engine is a dual-piston engine that moved the rudder by rotating the quadrant along a semic ircular toothed track , which is still in p lace .
The rudder head is located aft of the steering quadrant and appears to be turned 1 8 0 degrees from normal . The rudder is buried and the screw boss plate , if it remains , and other stern features are not vis ible .
Historical documentation indicate s the vessel remained in view f or a period, with the superstructure and stern exposed . Photographs show the bow submerged and the forward kingposts canted at opposite angles , a result of serious structural damage to the hull aft of the bow . The stem and deep-f loor section were separated from the hull , and the forefoot o f the stem post and forward section of keel were torn off the bow . This probably occurred as a result of the pivoting of the bow � after it was hard aground , evidently at or near its present �
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location . The vessel sank , and the bow separated and came to rest on the port side , while the rest of the hull settled on an even keel . The damage between the bow and machinery room bulkheads reflects the extens ive impact of a torpedo reported to have struck the vessel . Despite these impacts , the s ite is substantially intact , and the remaining structure has both historical importance and archeological research potential .
Administrative Status
Sites located both within Apra Harbor and immediately outside the harbor mouth are on submerged lands under the j urisdiction of the U . S . Navy . This includes CORMORAN , KITSUGAWA MARU , TOKAI MARU and NICHIYU MARU . ARATAMA MARU is on lands under the j urisdiction of the Government of Guam .
On April 4 , 1 9 7 5 , CORMORAN was l isted in the National Register of Historic Places . The Navy nominated TOKAI MARU to the National Register of Historic Places in cooperation with the Guam State Historic Preservation Office ; it was accepted on the National Register on July 14 , 1 9 8 8 . Als o , in 1 9 8 8 the U . S . Navy placed a mooring buoy over both ships for scuba divers .
ARATAMA MARU was accepted to the National Register o f Historic Places on June 2 , 1 9 8 8 .
Present Threats and Impacts
Active sport diving on all s ites around Guam is a potential threat . Although e fforts have been and continue to be made to preserve sites , depredation s ince the 1 9 6 0 s has resulted in the removal of most portable artifacts as wel l as bras s f ittings , instruments , gauges , etc . Today the heaviest impact is diver visitation ; the numbers of divers touching , bumping up against , and handling features remaining on the s ites will accelerate their deterioration .
Caroline Islands
Shipwreck investigations were undertaken on the is lands o f Belau and Kosrae . The s ites at Belau l ie within Ngemelachel ( Malakal ) Harbor , Ngeruktabel ( Urukthapel ) Anchorage , the channel to Kobisang Harbor , and Chelbacheb ( the Rock I s lands ) . The s ite investigated in Kosrae lies w ithin Port Lottin near the village of Utwa .
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Fig . 9 . 6 5 . Hold stanchions forward of the machinery space . (NPS photo by Ken Vrana)
Fig . 9 . 6 6 . Steering quadrant in the stern . Dan Lenihan)
398
( NPS photo by
Republic o f Belau1 3
From April 1 1 to June 17 , 1 9 8 8 , archeologists from the SCRU, NPS , supervised field operations aimed at identifying s ignificant underwater archeological s ites . The pro j ect director was Daniel Lenihan and the assistant proj ect director was Toni Carrell . This operation was requested by and heavily supported by the Belau Office o f Historic Preservation . Mr . Moses Sam , and later Ms . Vicky Kanai , were primary points of contact . The U . S . Navy enhanced the e ffectiveness of this pro j ect by providing personnel and heavy equipment for the research in the context of active duty training for u . s . Navy Reserves attached to Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit ( MDSU ) One , Pearl Harbor . Primary Navy coordinators were Comdr . David McCampbel l , Commanding Officer MDSU One in Honolulu , and Reserve Comdr . James " Otto " Orzech from Solana Beach , California ( Figures 9 . 6 8 , 9 . 6 9 and 9 . 7 0 ) . During the course of f ield operations , f ive ships were mapped with Navy assistance , three others were brief ly examined , and a sketch map was begun on another .
S ite selection was based , in part , upon accessibility and type ; the aim was to look at a variety o f site types in a number of locations in order to gain a broad understanding of the potential resource base . Only previously discovered s ites were documented .
Site-Spec i fic Investigations
Nearly 8 0 ships are known to have wrecked in the is lands o f Belau . They span nearly three centuries of exploration , whal ing , trading and war . They are also spread from the southernmost is land at Helen ' s Ree f to the northernmost at Ngeruangel . The earliest reported loss in the islands was that of a patache in 1 7 0 9 while it was attempting to reconnoiter the " Palaos " islands ( Driver 1 9 88 : 2 ) . One of the most famous of the early wrecks in Belau is that of the British East India Company ship , ANTELOPE . Captained by Henry Wilson , ANTELOPE ran aground on a reef near Ulong I s land in 1 7 8 3 . This encounter between European and Belauan forever changed the islands ' future .
The most numerous wrecks are those that date from the Japanese occupation of the is lands during World War I I ( Figure 9 . 6 7 ) . Some 66 ships are known to have been sunk as
1 3Th . h bl " f 1 e sectlon on t e Repu lC o Be au was written by Toni L . Carrell .
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Fig . 9 . 6 7 . Several Japanese transports and other vessels l i e i n the deeper portion o f the l agoon a t depths o f approximately 1 0 0 feet . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan)
Fig . 9 . 6 8 . The U . S . Navy provided personnel services and assets to the 1 9 8 8 survey as a part of Project SeaMark. Barge being used as staging plat form for surface-supplied divers . ( NPS Photo by Dan Lenihan)
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Fig . 9 . 6 9 . Mobile Diving Salvage Unit One used the project for active duty training of Naval Reserve divers . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan)
Fig . 9 . 7 0 . Toni Carrell working with Navy dive team . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan)
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a result of aerial bombing attacks . Along with those are e four American ships lost during the battle for Beliliou .
Of these many s ites , it was possible to completely document only f ive and to briefly visit three others , which are reported on in this chapter . They include AMATSU MARU , T . l , RYUKO MARU , RAI ZAN MARU , SATA , IRO , NAGISAN MARU , KAMIKAZE MARU , an unidentified merchant ship and an unidenti fied small motor torpedo boat or submarine chaser .
AMATSU MARU ( B : OR-1 3 : UR : Ol )
AMATSU MARU , a Japanese tanker , is lying in the northwestern corner of Ngemelachel Harbor ( Malakal Harbor ) ( Figure 9 . 7 1 ) . This ship was erroneously identi fied as SATA by local divers ; it has also been called SATA MARU ; both designations are incorrect . Field examination and documentation confirmed its identification fj AMATSU MARU . Documents received from Fuj ita Salvage , the Japanese company that salvaged many o f the ships in Belau in the early 1 9 6 0s , corroborates the identific ation o f this ship and its location . The ship was accurately located by Fuj ita at 7°2 0 ' 1 0 " north , 1 3 4°2 6 ' 2 3 " east .
Historical Background
This ship is a St�ard 1TL Type Tanker , built . in Japan by 4t Nagasaki Shipyard . The keel was laid on November 8 , 1 9 4 2 , and the ship was del ivered to owners I sihara Kisen on June 1 0 , 1 9 4 3 . The ship ' s registration number was 5 0 2 3 9 . Its gross tonnage was 10 , 5 6 7 tons , and its capac ity was 1 7 , 1 6 2 cubic meters . Constructed of steel , it is 5 2 6 feet , 7 inches ( 1 6 0 . 5 0 meters ) long overal l ; 5 0 2 feet ( 1 5 3 meters ) between perpendiculars ; 6 5 feet , 7 inches ( 2 0 meters ) in breadth ; 37 feet , 8 inches ( 1 1 . 5 0 meters ) in depth of hold , and has a draft of 3 1 feet 5 inches ( 9 . 6 0 meters ) , loaded . Its turbine engine could produce 8 , 6 0 0 horsepower and run at 1 5 knots .
14 I n August 19 8 8 , Mr . Fuj ita of Fuj ita Salvage provided copies of documents on the location , and suitability of salvage for 3 7 ships in Belau . Lacke of Tokyo Friendship was instrumental in these documents .
generously condition
Mr . Paul obtaining
15 Information on the historic description and miscellaneous particulars for AMATSU MARU is based upon documents generously provided by Dr . Sanae Yamada . Trans lation was done by Taka I noue .
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KOBASANG HARBOR
RAIZAN MARU �
KOIIEBAIL _ LAGOON BABELDAOB
� GORAKLBAD PASSAGE KORAK
""o '�'..-� ARANGEL CHANNEL �
NGELL CHANNEl
'NGADARAK REEF
MALAKAL PASS
KOROR ROAD
j_ AUGULSELU REEF
Fig . 9 . 7 1 . Locations o f AMATSU MARU 1 GOZAN , RAI SAN , T . l and RYUKO .
NAGISAN,
1.0 0.5 2 MILES
NORTH PAClFJC OCEAN
CAROLINE ISLANDS PALAU ISLANDS
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ARANGEL CHANNEL AND KOROR ROAD from a suryey by the USS TANNER In 1969
SATA , IRO , SHINSEI # 1 8 ,
Fig. 9 . 7 2 . Historic Preservation O f f ice Cultural Resources SpecialisL Vince Blaiyok positions wreck site with a horizontal sextant . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan)
Fig. 9 . 7 3 . Efforts were made to train Belauans i n the use o f many of the recording tools . Historic Preservation O f f ice diver David Orak videotapes Navy divers on AMATSU MARU . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan)
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AMATSU MARU carried a complement of 6 5 and was cons idered a f irst-class ship of the Communication Department in Ocean District . The tanker has a split superstructure , with the bridge j ust forward of amidships , the engines aft , and a s ingle funnel ( Figure 9 . 7 4 ) . It is wel l-decked , has a raked bow , counter stern , single screw and unbalanced rudder . The standard class tankers , repres ented by this ship , are s imilar in construction to their prewar counterparts and were intended to be economical vessels for postwar use .
The tanker was attacked by planes from Task Force 5 8 on March 3 0 , 1 9 4 4 . After a fire and explosion in the engine room , AMATSU MARU quickly sank ( Figure 9 . 7 5 ) .
Present Description and Analys is
AMATSU MARU is s itting upright in 100 to 1 3 0 feet o f water on a s and/silt bottom . This ship is substantially intact , and the damage area is generally confined to the stern machinery space ( Figure 9 . 7 6 ) .
The bow is undamaged and , with the exception of the miss ing anchor winch probably salvaged in the 1 9 6 0s , is l ittle changed from its wartime configuration . The only evidence of the winch location are the bed plate and the breaks . Anchor chain lies piled up on the forecastle deck and threads past bits down into the chain locker via a hole in the deck ( Figure 9 . 7 7 ) . Surpris ingly , no chain runs through the heavily reinforced hawseholes on the deck ( Figure 9 . 7 8 ) . No evidence of the anchors remains ; they were most l ikely s alvaged along with the winch and most of the chain .
Two ladders , one each on port and starboard , lead from the forecastle to the main deck ( Figure 9 . 7 9 ) . Doorways lead into the forecastle . Five expans ion tanks ( openings ) are present on the forward well deck ( Figure 9 . 8 0 ) . Numerous longitudinal pipes and valves for handling the cargo of fuel run from the forecastle aft to the bridge ( Figures 9 . 8 1 and 9 . 8 2 ) . Two ladders again lead from the well deck up to the bridge .
The bridge and deckhouse are amidships ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 6 ) . The structure is intac t ; however , the wooden decking as wel l as all interior equipment have been salvaged ( Figure 9 . 8 3 ) . Loose wiring and a urinal remain in the upper deck , and loose wiring is vis ible on the second deck . An open rail rings the pilothouse roof ; an expansion tank l id is lying on the framing .
Immediately aft o f the bridge , two catwalks are present , both at the level of the upper deck ( Figure 9 . 84 ) . The larger , to
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Fig. 9 . 7 4 . Historic photograph o f AMATSU MARU. courtesy of Dr . Sanae Yamad a )
( Photo
Fig . 9 . 7 5 . attack on Archives )
AMATSU MARU burning after U . S . aerial bombing March 3 0 , 1 9 4 4 . ( Photo courtesy of National
406
SKY LIOHTD HA.TCH D =
Fig . 9 . 7 6 .
AMATSU MARU B:OR-13:UR:01 528 O.A. 65"·7" BEAM REPUBLIC OF BELAU
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=
Base map o f AMATSU MARU , sunk in Belau , March 1 9 4 4 .
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BOW 81'·0'
F ig . 9 . 7 7 . Anchor chain i s s t i l l present on the bow o f AMATSU MARU. { NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
Fig . 9 . 7 8 . Hawsehole and chain break in the forecastle deck . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
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port of centerline , extends the full length of the aft well deck and terminates in the stern just forward o f the deckhouse and machinery space ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 6 ) . The second , on centerline , leads to a small pumphouse approximately 15 feet aft of the bridge ( Figure 9 . 8 5 ) . Intact , the pumphouse door is open and it is possible to enter . The skylights on the roof of the pumphouse are in place and s l ightly open ( Figure 9 . 8 6 ) .
Two disarticulated ventilators lie on the deck near the pumphouse , one a few feet from the pumphouse door and a second starboard of the structure on the deck . Transverse and longitudinal piping is present on the aft wel l deck . Seven expans ion tanks are present on the aft wel l deck ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 6 ) . The deck has buckled inward approximately 8 0 feet aft of the bridge , which resulted in a break in one of the main longitudinal pipes . Smaller pipes are scattered about , but overall damage in this area is minimal . Two heavy segments of hose lie on the deck, one on the port s ide and a second on the starboard . Ladders lead from the well deck up to the stern deckhouse .
The upper deck in the stern is also buckled , and the roof o f the aft deckhouse i s collapsed inward . Engine room intakes are standing , although damaged . The funnel l ies to port atop the deckhouse framing . A smaller deckhouse , possibly stern steering , is outlined and partially visible beneath the slightly f lattened funnel . The damage area extends beyond the end of the stern machinery space and deckhouse with a large area of stern deck destroyed . The Japanese salvage documents s imply state " . . . completely sunk , fire in engine room " ( unpublished documents in possession of author ) . A photograph taken during the aerial attack in 1 9 4 4 conf irms that the damage vis ible to the machinery space was caused by bombing and not by later postwar salvage ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 5 ) . Boat davits are present on either side o f the aft deckhouse . The area is heavily overgrown with wire corals and sponges .
There is some buckling o f the deck plating aft of the immediate damage area, although the stern does retain good integrity and the counter is intact . Examination o f the ste rn revealed that the s ingle propeller was not salvaged .
The combination of archeological evidence , historic photographs and Japanese documents leaves no doubt that this s ite is the remains of AMATSU MARU .
T . 1 ( B : OR- 1 3 : UR : 02 )
The fast transport , T . 1 , is lying on the north s ide of Ngerchaol ( Ngargol ) Island ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 1 ) . Although
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Fig . 9 . 7 9 . Ladders lead from the forecastle to the main dec k . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
Fig. 9 . 8 0 . Five raised expansion tanks are present o n the forward well deck, two of which retain their covers . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
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Fig . 9 . 8 1 . Piping runs from the forecastle aft to the bridge. Doorways still permit entry to the intact forecastle . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
Fig . 9 . 82 . Longitudinal p1p1ng, u-shaped expansion j oint and valve on the forward well dec k . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
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Fig . 9 . 8 3 . Interior of deckhouse on AMATSU MARU . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
Fig . 9 . 8 4 . Aft of the intact bridge are two catwalks ( lower left and lower right) that lead to the stern and a small pumphouse . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
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Fig . 9 . 8 5 . The intact pumphouse is 1 5 feet behind the bridge on the aft well dec k . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
Fig . 9 . 86 . The pumphouse skylights are still intact and partially open . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
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it was mis identified as an armed cargo ship that was reported 4t to have been covered with camouflage paint , f ield examination and documentation confirmed its identif ication as a T . 1 Class , armed , fast attack transport .
Historical Background
The T . 1 Class ships were constructed by Kure Dockyard and Mitsubishi , Yokohama , under the 1 9 4 3 war program . They were fast and heavily armed transports des igned to carry landing craft , amphibious tanks or midget submarines . Their construction was simple with a welded , flush-decked hul l and no sheer or tumble home ( Figure 9 . 8 7 ) . According to Jentschura , Jung and Mickel the sections were assembled at Kure and construction took 3 to 6 months ( 1 9 7 7 : 2 2 6 ) . They could carry four Daihatsu landing c raft , which were launched over the stern by using rollers . Alternative c argos were 7 Type 2 amphibious tanks and 2 2 0 tons o f cargo , or 2 Koryu midget submarines and 1 8 4 tons of cargo , or 6 Kaiten human torpedoes and 2 4 3 tons of cargo , or 4 5 0 to 5 0 0 tons o f cargo and 4 8 0 marines .
The T . 1 Class transports were 3 1 5 feet long overall , had a 3 3 - foot , 6 - inch beam , and 1 1- foot , 9 - 1/2 -inch draft , l ight . The ship in Belau , the namesake o f the c las s , was completed May 1 0 , 1 9 4 4 . It was armed with 4 2 depth charges ; two 5 - inch , 4 0 -caliber antiaircraft guns ; and 1 5 2 5 -mm antiaircraft guns .
T . 1 was still under construction during the March 1 9 4 4 raids that claimed so many ships . It did not arrive at the islands until June or July and was sunk on July 2 7 by aircraft from Task Force 5 8 during the invas ion o f Beliliou .
Present Description
T . 1 is severely damaged and l ies on a rocky s lope near the end of Ngerkebesant ( Kobesang ) Channel in 7 0 to 1 0 0 feet of water . The ship has a welded, flush-decked hul l , composite superstructure with a single funnel aft . The ship is in three sections , the smal lest is the bow , s itting s lightly angled to the slope on the starboard side . The 2 3 -foot-long bow piece is disarticulated aft of the upright c apstan .
The second section of ship , aft of the capstan to the machinery space , is lying nearly upside down . The bridge is flattened under the hul l ; however , both triple and double-mount antiaircraft machine guns are vis ible on the ups lope s ide of the ship ( Figure 9 . 8 8 ) . In addition , both of the 5 -inch , 4 0 -caliber antiaircraft guns are vis ible on this same s ide ( Figure 9 . 8 9 ) .
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F i g . 9 . 8 7 . The T . 1 fast transports were designed to carry landing craft and amphibious tanks or midget submarines . ( Photo courtesy of U . S . Naval Institute Press )
Fig. 9 . 88 . Fifteen-inch, 2 5-mm, antiaircraft guns on T . 1 . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
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Fig . 9 . 89 . guns on T . l .
Twin 5-inch, 4 0 -caliber, antiaircraft ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
machine
Fig. 9 . 9 0 . The badly damaged midships machinery space on T . l . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
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HULL INVERTED
AFTER BREAK
TWIN 5" 40-CALIBER GUNS
I 2 5 MM ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS
/
E L E VATION
Fig . 9 . 9 1 . T . l type landing ship ( transport ) . Rough sketch by Kevin Foster .
The midship machinery space has been blown open and badly e damaged ( Figure ( 9 . 9 0 ) . The boiler tubes and mud drums of the two boilers are present and identifiable . However , the geared turbine engine is not readily visible ( Figure 9 . 9 1 ) .
Aft o f the machinery space , the ship ' s bottom is completely ups ide down . The bottom ( of the hull ) , the keel , shaft , and rudder are c learly exposed . The s ingle screw is miss ing and is assumed to have been salvaged ; the rudder and shaft are undamaged . The stern is intact and is an identi fying feature of the wreck . Looking up underneath the ship , one sees that the deck s lopes gently down to the water line , and a number o f rails and rollers are attached to the deck to facilitate the launching of landing craft .
RYUKO MARU ( B : OR- 1 3 : UR : 0 3 )
RYUKO MARU , a Standard lC Type Merchant Ship , is east of T . 1 on the north s ide of Ngerchaol ( Ngarol ) Island ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 1 ) . This ship was erroneous ly identified as KAMIKAZE MARU . Field examination and documentation confirmed its identification as a Standard 1C Type Merchant ship . I5 was not until documents received from Fuj ita Salvage , the Japanese conmpany that salvaged many of the ships in Belau in the early 1 9 6 0 s , were translated that pos itive identification of this ship , as well as its two s isters , A c ould be confirmed . � Historical Background
Three vessels o f this c las s were sunk in Belau : SHINSEI MARU No . 1 8 , RYUKO MARU , and RAIZAN MARU . SHINSEI and RYUKO were completed in 1 9 4 1 and 1 9 4 2 , while RAI ZAN was finished in 1 9 4 3 . These ships were built as part of the war standard contruction program . Private shipyards provided the basic des igns , which were modified to accommodate mas s production . All o f the Type 1C ships were compl eted under the first war s tandard program ( Jentschura , Jung and Micke l 1 9 7 7 : 2 5 5 ) , were s imilar to their peacetime counterparts , and were intended to be economical vessels for postwar use . Twenty- f ive Type 1C. ships were construction by various builders ( Figure 9 . 92 ) . Each is 3 2 1 feet long overall ; 44 feet , 11 inches , at beam ; and 2 0 feet , 10 inches , in draft .
1 6unpubl ished Salvage on salvage for
documents provided by Mr . Fuj ita of Fu j ita the location , condition and suitabil ity of 3 7 ships in Belau .
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Fig . 9 . 92 . Historic photograph o f SHINSEI MARU No . 1 8 , s ister ship to RYUKO MARU . Three standard 1C type merchant ships were sunk in Belau , SHINSEI MARU No . 1 8 , SYUKO MARU and RAIZAN MARU . ( Photo courtesy o f Dr . Sanae Yamada )
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�0 ....,_,. --d:!.JitQ) H: "'"' -
.,.., .,,._ •• tt4 ....
Fig . 9 . 9 3 . Line drawing o f 1C freighter sunk in Belau , March 1 9 4 4 , possibly RYUKO MARU .
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Tsurumi Shipyard launched RYUKO MARU on December 1 8 , 1 9 4 1 , e and �7livered it to owners Taiyo Kogyo the following year . The ship ' s port of registry was Kobe , and it was ass igned registration number 4 8 9 8 6 and call letters JDHR . The c argo steamer ' s vertical , triple-expans ion engine could generate 1 8 0 0 indicated horsepower ( ihp ) and could make a maximum speed of 14 knots . The three sister ships were sunk on March 3 0 , 1 9 4 4 , by aircraft from Task Force 5 8 .
Present Description and Analysis
The ship is sitting upright on a s and and s ilt bottom in 80 feet ( to the dec k ) to 1 0 0 feet ( to the bottom ) in the channel leading to Kobes ang Harbor ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 1 ) . The ship is substantially intact , with damage conf ined to the midships area . The merchant ship has a compos ite superstructure , wel l-decked , raked bow , cruiser/spoon stern , and a s ingle medium funnel amidships ( refer to Figure 9 . 9 2 ) .
The forecastle is intact and , with the exception o f the miss ing windlass , is undamaged ( Figure 9 . 9 3 ) . The only evidence of the location of the windlas s is the bedplate . Chain brakes are present directly aft of the hawseholes on the deck . Hul l inspection by U . S . Navy divers on both the port and starboard s ides revealed that there was no damage to the hul l in the bow area and that anchor chain runs out the hawse pipe on the starboard s ide and into the sand and s ilt � bottom . The forecastle is ringed by an open rail , and at the aft bulkhead two small boom winches are present . Fairleads , bol lards , mooring bits and ventilators complete the forecastle .
Ladders on port and starboard lead from the forecastle to the main deck and holds 1 and 2 . The holds are separated by an intact winch house . Hold Number 1 is considerably smal ler and narrower than hold 2 , an accommodation for the narrowness of the bow . Only the base of the single forward mast remains on the winch house . The mast itsel f is lying on the bottom in 1 0 0 feet of water on the port side of the ship . Heavy wire rope snakes its way over the gunnel toward the mast . The crosstree and topmast are both present .
All four forward cargo booms are still attached to their stout boom masts that also serve as ventilators . The booms for hold Number 1 are lying together , to port , on the hatch
1 7 rnformation on the historic description and miscellaneous particulars for this ship is based upon documents provided by Dr . Sanae Yamada .
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coaming . The booms for hold Number 2 are lying on the hatch coaming , the loose end of the starboard boom dropping slightly into the hold . The four small boom winches , two forward and two aft , are present on the deck at the forecastle bulkhead and at the midships deckhouse bulkhead , respectively . Three large steel plates l ie on the deck on the port s ide of hold Number 1 . I nspection of the two forward holds found no cargo . The four forward mooring bits are on the deck .
Ladders lead from the well deck into the second level o f the superstructure , which is three decks high . On the port s ide the ventilator funnel is broken off and l ies on the ladder . Doors at the deck level are open , and it is pos s ible to enter the deckhouse here . The bridge is intact , although only the metal framework remains . All bridge instruments have been stripped from the s ite .
The machinery space , immediately aft of the bridge , s hows extens ive damage . The funnel is off to port , and the port s ide has been blown outward . I nspection o f the starboard s ide revealed evidence of an inward puncture of the hul l at or j ust below the level of the water l ine . Presumably , the damage is from the skip bomb that sank the ship . The engine room skylight i s located immediately behind the bridge . Only the bases to the large intakes for the engine are standing . The small hold in the midships area was for coal to fuel the triple-expans ion engine . Prel iminary inspection in this area did not reveal the presence of any coal . Mas s ive coral growth and l imited visibility hampered mapping in this area . Engine room grating and miscellaneous debris are scattered across the deck . A very small deckhouse , presumably the radio room , is located on the starboard stern corner o f the coal hatch . Two small , hand-operated winches are on this deck aft of the coal hatch . The cowlings to four ventilators are also scattered about .
Ladders once again lead down from the machinery deck to the wel l deck in the stern . Aft o f the machinery space , the ship shows l ittle damage . The holds are intact and devoid o f cargo . The booms are present and articulated t o their posts with only the port boom for hold Number 4 broken o f f . I t l ies over the port gunnel with the end in the s ilty bottom . The aft mast is broken off and lying adj acent to the boom . A ladder runs up the mast to j ust below its intact crosstree .
Two short ladders , located on centerline , lead from the wel l deck up to the poop . The raised poop i s undamaged , although the stern windlass is also missing . Two boom winches are present on the deck .
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Inspection o f the stern showed that the plates around shaft were buckled , presumably during postwar salvage . rudder was removed and is lying a short distance from stern . The propeller shaft is s lightly damaged , and propeller i s gone .
RAI ZAN MARU ( B : OR- 13 : UR : 0 5 )
the The the the
This ship was erroneously described as intact and fully laden with cargo . Locally called the " Hotel Wreck , " it is located approximately 1 nautical mile from the Palau Pac if ic Resort out in the deep water of Kobesang Harbor ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 1 ) .
It was not until documents received from Fuj ita Salvage , 1 8
the Japanese company that salvaged many of the ships i n Belau in the early 196 0 s , were trans lated that pos itive identificat ion of this ship , as wel l as its two s isters , RYUKO MARU and SHINSEI MARU No . 1 8 0 could be confirmed . The ship was located by Fuj ita at 7 2 0 ' 5 0 " north , 134°2 6 ' 12 " east ( unpublished documents in possession of author ) . Further corroboration from these documents i s the depth in which this ship , and its sisters , were lost . RAI ZAN MARU was reported sunk in 34 to 38 meters o f water , that i s , 1 1 1 to 1 2 4 feet of water . That matches almost exactly with the depths recorded , 1 1 0-130 feet , from the brief reconnaissance � dive c onducted on the s ite . ..,
Historical Background
RAI ZAN MARU , a Standard 1C Type Merchant Ship , was built by the Na�aya Dockyard in Osaka during the f irst war program . I t was launched in July 1 9 4 2 , c ompleted later that year , and registered as number 4 9 0 7 3 at the port of Wakamatsu . The owners were Tsurumaru Kisen . Like its s isters , the steel-hulled ship was used as a cargo transport during the war . It was sunk on March 3 0 , 1 9 4 4 , by aircraft from Task Force 5 8 .
1 8unpubl ished documents provided by Mr . Fuj ita o f Fuj ita Salvage on the location , condition and suitabil ity of salvage for 37 ships in Belau .
1 9 Information on the historic description and miscellaneous particulars for this ship is based on documents provided by ._. Dr . Sanae Yamada . ..,
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Fig. 9 . 9 4 . Side scan image of what appear to be the remains of RAIZAN MARU, sister ship to RYUKO MARU and SHINSEI MARU No . 18 .
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Present Description and Analysis
Although badly damaged , the s ide scan image obtained during the j oint NPS-USN operations in May 1 9 8 8 clearly shows that the bottom and s ides of the ship remain ( Figure 9 . 9 4 ) . A brief reconnaissance dive on the site revealed that the raised poop on the stern is recognizable and frames are exposed on the starboard s ide . The ship ' s 1 0-inch shaft is in place ; however , the rudder and propeller are miss ing . Deck or hatch cover beams lie in the area of holds 3 and 4 , aft o f the machinery space , along with a ladder and several 55-gallon drums . The superstructure in the machinery space is collapsed . Broken pipe and s ections of catwalk are vis ible .
It appears that the ship had two holds forward ; all traces of the winch houses and masts are gone . The break between the forecastle and forward holds is discernible by the presence o f the bulkhead . Very little remains of the forecastle . The stem is vis ible and the bow is recognizable . Little damage was observed on the port side of the ship . Follow-up on this s ite is recommended to clarify the identification and documentation of remains .
IRQ ( B : OR-15 : UR : Ol )
IRO , a Japanese oiler and sister ship to SATA , is located in the southern portion of Ngeruktabel ( Urukthapel ) Anchorage ( re fer to Figure 9 . 7 1 ) .
Historic al Background
A total of 1 0 Shiretoko Class oilers was constructed between 1 9 2 0 and 19 2 3 . Five different builders contracted to build these large ships . IRQ was launched on August 5 , 1 9 2 2 , and completed on October 1 3 at Osaka I ron Works . These oilers were des igned with a split superstructure , bridge amidships , and engine room aft . The ship has a raised forecastle , a wel l deck fore and aft of the bridge , raised machinery space , a short well deck in the stern and a raised poop ( Figure 9 . 9 5 ) . These oilers _ were equipped for replenishment at sea with athwartships fueling pipes mounted on kingposts .
The Shiretoko c lass oilers are 4 7 0 feet , 8 inches , long at the water line , 5 7 feet long at the beam , and 2 6 feet , 6 inches , in draft . All have a plumb bow , counter stern and s ingle screw . I RQ was rated at 15 , 4 5 0 net registered tons and carried a vertical , triple-expans ion engine and four boilers . It was reboilered between 1 9 2 8 and 1 9 3 2 with four Kampen Type " Ro " boilers . The engine could make 14 knots at an indicated horsepower of 5 , 5 0 0 . This class used e ither A c oal or oil for fuel . �
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F i g . 9 . 9 5 . Historic photograph of the Shiretoko class oiler IRO. ( Photo courtesy of Dr . Sanae Yamada)
F ig . 9 . 9 6 . attack on Archives )
IRO is shown burning after the aerial bombing March 3 0 , 1 9 4 4 . { Photo courtesy o f National
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5 0-caliber , In 1 9 4 0 , the
4 0 -caliber , guns were
IRO was armed with two 140-mm ( 5 . 5 1-inch ) ; low-angle guns ; and two 80-mm high-angle guns . 1 40-mm guns were replaced with two 80-mm , high-angle guns and four 1 3 . 2 -mm antiaircraft added . The ship was rated to carry a crew of 1 6 0 .
On March 3 0 , 1 9 4 4 , the ship was at anchor in Ngeruktabel ( Urukthapel ) Anchorage . Given the importance of these ships in the overall war effort , it is dif f icult to understand why IRO remained in the anchorage following the standard reconnaissance f lights j ust prior to the aerial attack . The records of submarine attacks provide some ins ight . According to those records , IRQ received medium damage west o f Jaluit by USS PLUNGER on February 2 8 , 1 9 4 3 . Four months later , on June 1 0 , IRO was hit again southeast of Fuka Island by USS TINOSA ; damage was estimated as l ight . On March 2 2 , the ship was in Komebai Lagoon , north of Ngemelachel ( Malakal ) Harbor , when it was torpedoed by USS TUNNY . Damage was estimated as heavy ( Alden 1 9 8 9 : 34 , 4 6 , 9 0 ) . When the u . s . aerial attack began on March 3 0 , IRO was probably in no condition to attempt escape ( Figure 9 . 9 6 ) .
Present Description and Analysis
This o iler s its upright in 1 2 0 feet of water on a sand and A s ilt bottom . A lush carpet of corals and sponges covers W· this s ite . The ship is substantially intact , and damage appears conf ined to the stern machinery space .
The forecastle is intact and is dominated by an 80-mm , 4 0-caliber , high-angle naval gun . The forward gun and bandstand are intact , although decking on the stand is absent ( Figure 9 . 9 7 ) . The forecastle is enclosed by a rail .
The forward mast has fallen aft and l ies on the deck . A catwalk runs along the port s ide from the forecastle to the bridge ( Figure 9 . 9 8 ) . Both the forward and aft wel l decks are littered with debris . The bridge structure is intact , although all fittings and instruments have been salvaged . Aft of the bridge , the kingpost for the athwartships fueling gear remains upright , although both fueling pipes have been dis lodged ( Figure 9 . 9 9 ) . The starboard pipe now lies aft of the kingpost .
The stern deckhouse structure is undamaged but has been stripped ( Figure 9 . 10 0 ) . Wooden floor and roof decking is absent and only the supporting frames remain . The funnel lies to port and is attached to the cowling . Numerous raised expans ion tanks are present on both the forward and aft well decks ( Figure 9 . 10 1 ) .
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F ig . 9 . 9 7 . One of two 8 0 -mm , 4 0-caliber, high-angle guns on IRO . Wooden decking on both the forward gun ( seen here ) and the aft gun bandstand has deteriorated . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrel l )
Fig . 9 . 9 8 . A catwalk runs t:he entire length of the ship. ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
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Fig. 9 . 9 9 . Kingposts for athwartship fueling gear . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
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Fig . 9 . 1 00 . Carre l l )
Deckhouse aft o n IRO. ( NPS photo by Toni
F ig . 9 . 1 0 1 . Raised fuel tank hatches on aft well dec k . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
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Fig. 9 . 102 . Book found on 1 5 : UR : 0 1 IRO . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan)
Fig. 9 . 10 3 . Page removed from book on 1 5 : UR : 0 1 . James Roybal )
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( Photo by
The stern gun and bandstand are intact as is the stern area . Damage to this ship is below the water l ine as no vis ible structural damage is vis ible from examination of the deck .
The s ite was documented only with photographs and videotape . Some l imited measurements were taken to faci litate an artist ' s drawing . No formal mapping was undertaken on the ship in order to avoid adversely impacting abundant fragile marine l i fe present .
A large book was found on the ship during the NPS /Navy survey and one page was carefully removed for analysis . I t was determined to be a technical manual related to operation o f the ship . The book was returned to the place i t was found and covered over for protection ( Figures 9 . 10 2 and 9 . 1 0 3 ) .
SATA ( B : OR-15 : UR : 05 )
SATA , s ister to IRO , is located in the middle o f Ngeruktabel ( Urukthapel ) Anchorage ( refer to Figure 9 . 7 1 ) . Only one brief reconnaissance dive was made on SATA , although an ROV ( remote operated vehicle ) was used to examine the s ite at a later date . At press time , it has come to our attention that researchers Klaus Lindemann and Frances Toribiong have otained new information suggesting the identity of the two sister ships ( SATA and IRO ) are reversed ( Rock 1 9 9 1 ) . We c annot conclusively confirm or rej ect this hypothesis , but the s ite descriptions herein would apply regardless o f name identification .
Historical Background
One of 1 0 Shiretoko Class oilers built between 1 9 2 0 and 1 9 2 3 , SATA was built by the Yokohama Dock Company . It was launched on October 2 8 , 1 9 2 0 , and completed February 2 4 , 1 9 2 1 . Like its s isters , SATA had a split s uperstructure , bridge amidships and engine room aft ( Figure 9 . 10 4 ) . Between 1 9 2 8 and 1 9 3 2 , i t was reboilered with 4 Kampen Type 1 boi lers . Like its s ister , IRO , it was rearmed with two 8 0-mm , 4 0-caliber , high-angle guns , and four 13 . 2 -mm antiaircraft guns were added .
On February 1 7 , 1 9 4 4 , SATA was steaming north of Chuuk when it was attacked by USS SARGO . SARGO estimated that damage inflicted was only medium ( Alden 1 9 89 : 8 5 ) . By March, however , SATA was at anchor in Ngeruktabel ( Urukthapel ) Anchorage . On March 30 , 1 9 4 4 , when the U . S . aerial attack began , SATA was attacked and fatal ly damaged ( Figure 9 . 1 05 ) . Its presence in the anchorage probably indicates that the ship was in no condition to attempt escape .
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Fig. 9 . 1 04 . Historic photograph of installation of forward high-angle guns . Dr. Sanae Yamada )
SATA prior to ( Photo courtesy of
Fig . 9 . 105 . SATA sinking in Ngeruktabel ( Urukthapel ) Anchorage . Barrels of fuel oil can be seen float ing in the bay . ( Photo courtesy of National Archives )
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Present Description and Analys is
The wreck coral and making it The ship partially
now lies upside down in 1 10 feet of water on the sand bottom . The ship lists s lightly to port ,
pos sible to look underneath on the starboard side . is resting on its superstructure , which has
sunk into the soft sediments o f the bottom .
The bow o f the ship appears intact , and anchor cable runs out o f the starboard hawsehole . Approximately 1 0 0 feet aft of the stem on the port side , there is a 3 0 -by-2 0 - foot hole in the hull . A lateral crease in the plating runs almost from the starboard bilge keel , across the bottom to the area o f the explosion . At the hole , the hull plating i s blown into the interior of the ship , obviously damage from a torpedo that skimmed under the bottom of the ship before exploding .
Wel l-de fined bilge keels , 2 8 feet , 6 inches from the centerl ine , run nearly the length of the ship ' s bottom . No centerline keel is present . The bottom o f the ship has retained its shape and other than the hole , forward , is l ittle damaged . The bottom of the hul l in the area stern is also undamaged . The propeller for the large s ingle screw measures 4 feet , 8 inches , wide and 6 feet , 1 1 inches , long , while the rudder is 10 feet , 7 inches , wide . The ship is oriented 30 degrees west of magnetic north .
Although no damage is apparent on the starboard s ide o f the hul l , another large hole is on the port s ide . A photograph o f the anchorage , which was taken at the time o f the U . S . aerial attack , shows the torpedo trail leading toward the stern o f the oiler { Figure 9 . 1 0 6 ) . The combination of the damage in the stern , which caused the ship to s ink stern f irs t , and the hole in the bow , which caused a loss of res idual buoyancy , resulted in the ship capsi zing .
Unidenti fied Merchant Ship ( B : OR- 1 5 : UR : 02 )
This ship has been called HOKOTAI MARU by local divers and identi f ied as GOZAN MARU by others ( Lindemann 1 9 8 8 : 2 4 ) . Field examination of the remains eliminated both o f these ships as pos s ible candidates . I n addition , documents received from Fuj ita Salvage place GOZAN MARU wet� north of this location in Ngemelachel ( Malakal ) Harbor . Correct identification of this ship was not pos s ible from available
2 0 rnformation on the particulars for this by Dr . Sanae Yamada .
historic description and miscellaneous ship is based upon documents provided
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F ig . 9 . 1 0 6 . Ngeruktabel ( Urukthape l ) Anchorage during the bombing Gtrikc on March 3 0 , 1 9 4 4 . SATA is the middle s h i p , approximately center. ( Photo courtesy o f National Archives )
N
�
Fig. 9 . 10 7 . Location of unidentified merchant ship south of Ngeruktabel ( Urukthape l ) Anchorage .
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\
Fig . 9 . 1 0 8 . Belau .
B:OR-1 5:UR:02 MERCHANT SHIP STAT: 389'-6" oa 52'·6" BEAM
FEET
Base map of unidentified merchant ship in the Rock I s l ands ,
archival information . Additional archival research should e clarify the identity o f this ship .
The large , unidentified , merchant ship is located south of Ngeruktable ( Urukthapel ) anchorage in the channel leading south to the Rock I slands ( Figure 9 . 1 0 7 ) .
Historical Background
As yet , no archival documents have come to light that provide information on the identity of this ship . It is known that the ship was sunk during the aerial bombing attacks 6n March 3 0 - 3 1 , 1 9 4 4 , because it is accurately located , as number 2 9 , on a map drawn from aerial photographs taken on those two days ( refer to Figure 9 . 1 0 7 ) .
Present Description and Analysis
The ship is listing 6 9 degrees to port in 1 0 0 feet of water on a sand and s ilt bottom . The ship is substantially intact , and the damage appears confined to the starboard s ide , below the water l ine and the Number 2 cargo hold ( Figure 9 . 1 0 8 ) . This ves sel has a compos ite superstructure , single funnel , raked bow , c ruiser stern and s ingle screw . It is well-decked with four cargo holds , raised forecastle and poop , and a 5-inch outs ide diameter gun mounted in the stern .
The forecastle machinery--the winch and chain breaks--are intact and in good condition . Anchor chain runs through the winch down through the hawseholes in the deck into the chain locker . The port anchor has slipped out of its pocket and is buried in the soft sand and silt bottom . The starboard anchor remains in its hous ing . Mooring bits , fair leads and small c argo boom winches , two on starboard and one the port s ide , located along the aft rail complete the bow . A fourth winch l ies below the forecastle deck on the well deck below .
Ladders lead from the forecastle down to the forward well deck . Doors at the deck level lead into the forecastle compartments . Four large cargo winches , a small mast house , and the s ingle forward mast occupy the space between holds 1 and 2 . Hatch cover beams are in place over both holds ( Figure 9 . 1 0 9 ) . The ship is double-decked in the holds , and beams also remain in place on the second deck in hold 1 . The ' tween deck height is 9 feet , 1 inch . None of the wooden hatch cover decking is present , and no cargo remains in either hold .
Because o f the ship ' s the gunnel and their cargo boom has broken from hold Number 2 .
list , all of the cargo booms lie across tips reach toward the bottom . A heavy loose and lies under the starboard boom Unusual features of the cargo-handling
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Fig. 9 . 109 . Cargo hold hatch cover beams on the large, unidentified , merchant ship . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
Fig . 9 . 1 1 0 . Open door into the bridge at the main deck. ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
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equipment are its square , lattice-work booms and short , square , boom stands . The forward mast remains in place , and a l adder runs up more than 4 0 feet from the base . Overall , the mast is 6 4 feet long . Forty feet from the base , a rectangul ar platform , 8 feet by 2 feet , 4 inches , is present and was pos sibly used by the supervisor o f cargo-handling . Three other , smaller , platforms for the ship ' s running l ights are 2 feet , 6 inches , 10 feet , and 1 7 feet above the cargo supervisor ' s platform .
A l arge hole has been torn in the port s ide o f the ship in the area o f hold Number 2 , j ust forward o f the bridge . The explos ion , which tore into the hul l and made a hole approximately 15 by 15 feet , folded the steel plates inward .
An unu sual feature is located on the starboard s ide of the wel l deck . Two steel racks parallel the Number 2 hold . Thes e racks are each 44 feet , 2 inches , long and extend from the midships deckhouse to j ust beyond the Number 2 hatch coaming . They are 2 feet , 4 inches , high overall with a 1/4-inch plate on top that is scalloped . The scallops are uniformly 2 feet , 9 inches , from outside edge to outs ide edge . These racks are welded to the deck and so do not appear to be c argo . The starboard access ladder to the bridge is neatly wedged between these unusual features . Doors lead A from the wel l deck into the lowest level o f the bridge W ( Figure 9 . 1 1 0 ) . The port door is open whereas the s tarboard door i s lying on the deck .
The bridge and machinery space superstructures are intact ; however , the bridge has been stripped of instruments and f ittings . Wooden decking is absent , and only the metal framework remains over the bridge and machinery space deckhouse . The pilothouse curves slightly forward in a shallow arc . Immediately aft o f the bridge is the hold for receipt of fuel for the ship , very probably coal . Two cargo winches are located on either s ide of this small hatch ( Figure 9 . 1 1 1 ) .
Immediately aft of the engine room hatch , the large intakes are in place . The funnel is disarticulated and lying on the port s ide ( Figure 9 . 1 12 ) . On the starboard s ide of the ship outs ide the hul l , there is a short gangplank ladder . The machinery space deckhouse is intact , but it too has been stripped and none of the wooden decking is present . The engine room skylights have their glass in place , and f ive of the s ix ventilators are cowled . The ship ' s l ifeboat davits are also in this area . Three of the four are in place , swinging downward , on the starboard s ide . On the port s ide , only two of the four remain .
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Fig . 9 . 1 1 1 . cargo hatc h .
Small cargo winch located at the engine room ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
F i g . 9 . 1 1 2 . The large funnel has broken o f f and i s lying to port; only the base cowling is still in place . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
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Ladders lead from the second level of the deckhouse to the aft wel l deck . With the exception o f a clutter of twisted pipe on the starboard s ide of hold Number 3 , the deck is c lear . The hatch covers are in place only on hold 3 , and the wooden decking is absent . No c argo is present in the aft holds . The boom stands , located both forward and aft along the gunne l , swing down toward the port s ide . All four o f the aft c argo booms are articulated , although the port boom for hold Number 4 is broken . The aft mast has broken away from its base and fal len to port . The cros s tree is attached , although the topmast has broken o f f and l ies a short dis tance away . A sma l l box or container , about 4 by 4 by 4 feet , is in the s ame vic inity .
The stern is reached by two ladders . Just behind the rai l in the stern are three , smal l , cargo boom winches , two on the starboard s ide and one on the port . The raised poop is dominated by a gun mount that is 1 4 feet , 9 inches , in diameter . Two platforms , holding ammunition boxes , are attached to the mount , which no longer has any o f the wooden decking . The mas sive s i ze o f the mount dwarfs the gun that is in place . The barrel is only 4 feet , 7 inches , long . Aft of the gun is a large winch . Two bol l ards and a fourth small c argo drum are in this area as wel l . A p iece o f sheet metal is lying adj acent to the port bol l ard while two pieces of twisted wrec kage l ie on the starboard s ide . The stern f l agsta f f is present .
The stern is intact , and the rudder and propel ler are in place . The ship measures 3 8 9 feet , 6 inches , long overall and 5 2 feet , 6 inches , in breadth .
NAGI SAN MARU ( B : OR- 1 5 : UR : 0 3 )
NAGI SAN MARU , a Japanese c argo ship , is located in the southeast area o f Ngeruktabel ( Urukthapel ) Anchorage behind a sma l l i s l and . I t is accurately loc ated as number 2 6 in a s ketch o f the anchorage based upon information obtained from aerial photography ( re fer to Figure 9 . 1 0 7 ) .
Historical Background
NAG I SAN MARU was bui l t by flle Tama Factory shipbui lding department o f Mitsui Bus s an . The keel was laid on hull number 1 8 1 on August 1 4 , 1 9 3 0 , and the ship was del ivered to
2 1 I nformation on the historic description and misce l l aneous particulars for this ship is based upon documents provided by Dr . Sanae Yamada .
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Fig . 9 . 1 1 3 . Historic photograph of NAGISAN l1ARU. courtesy of Dr . Sanae Yamada )
( Photo
F ig . 9 . 1 1 4 . The heavy carpet of corals on the bow o f NAGISAN MARU disguises the anchor winch (centP.r) and cargo boom winch ( right ) . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
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owners Mitsui Bussan on April 2 5 , 1 9 3 1 . Constructed as an armed c argo transport , the s tee l-hul led ship was registered as number 3 6 5 6 0 at the port of Kobe . The s hip ' s gross tonnage is 4 , 3 9 1 and it had a c apac ity o f 9 , 0 4 5 cubic meters ( bale ) . It is 3 6 2 feet long on the water l ine , 50 feet in beam , 2 9 feet in depth of hol d , and 2 3 feet , 6 inches , draft , ful ly loaded . I t could carry a c rew o f 3 3 and was cons idered a f irst-class ship of the communication department .
The s hip has a split superstructure , bridge forward of amidships , and engines and s ingle funnel aft . It is we l l-decked , with raised forecastle and poop , raked bow , counter s tern , and s ingle screw ( Figure 9 . 1 1 3 ) . Five hol ds , two f orward and three aft , are present . Three sets of kingposts , one forward and two aft , serve the holds . I ntended to be armed , gun mounts are located j ust aft o f the forecastle and between holds four and f ive . NAGI SAN MARU was equipped with a diesel engine capable of 1 2 knot s .
Little is known o f NAGI SAN ' s operational history . I t was a genera l merchant ship prior to being requis itioned by the Japanese Navy as a transport and having gun mounts installed on the deck . What is known , however , is that on February 6 , 1 9 4 3 , the s hip was torpedoed near Tinian by USS FLYING F I SH . Damage from the attack was estimated a s medium ( Alden 1 9 8 9 : 3 1 ) . Why NAGI SAN did not leave Bel au prior to the e attack on March 3 0 , 1 9 4 4 , is not c lear . Archeological evidence indicates the ship was ful ly l aden with fuel oil , which may have been sorely needed by the Japanese on the island . I n any case , NAGISAN MARU was sunk by aircraft from Task Force 5 8 on March 3 0 , while moored behind a sma l l i s l and in the southeast corner o f the anchorage ( re fer to Figure 9 . 1 0 6 ) .
Present Description and Analys is
NAGI SAN MARU s its upright in 1 0 0 to 1 1 0 feet of water in a s il ty cove . The ship is badly damaged , with the exception of the forecastle ( Figure 9 . 1 1 4 ) .
The forecastle is intact and heavily overgrown with corals ( Figure 9 . 1 1 5 ) . The f l agstaf f in the peak l eans back and a lmost touches the deck . The anchor winch and chain breaks are in place , and chain runs from the winch through the breaks and down into the hawseholes on the dec k . The port anchor is out , and chain runs down into the s ilty bottom . Port and starboard , aft o f the anchor winch , are the two sma l l c argo boom winches for hold Number 1 . A rail rings the forecastle . The only obvious damage to the forecastle is evidenced by the forward gun mount , which has t ipped a ft into hold Number 1 . The " bands tand " or base o f the mount is also
4 4 2
B:OR-1 5:UR:03 NAGISAN MARU
liD
F i g . 9 . 1 15 . Base map o f NAGI SAN MARU .
- - - - - ----------------------------'
overgrown with corals , and all o f the wooden decking is gone . Only the base o f the former gun remains .
Ladders on port and starboard lead from the forecastle to the forward wel l dec k . A 5 5 -gallon drum , part o f the s hip ' s former c argo , l ies on the starboard s ide o f the dec k below the ladder . The main deck o f the ship from bow to the raised poop is warped and buckled . The main deck s ags downward unt i l it is j ust a few feet above the lower dec k . Surpris ingly , the shape o f hatch Number 1 is not distorted . I t s odd shape ( re fer to Figure 9 . 1 1 4 ) was the result o f an e f fort by the builders to accommodate the narrowing o f the hul l in the bow .
A w inch deckhouse and a kingpost mas t separate holds Number 1 and 2 . The forward kingpost mast has fal len into hold Number 2 , which c aused the winch house to collapse aft as wel l . The kingpos t topmas t c aused additional d amage to the battered and c rumpled bridge .
A paravane s it s on its mounts on the port s ide o f the Number 1 k ingpost set . Brackets for a second paravane are present on the starboard s ide . The evidence o f a towing bracket or other support equipment for deployment o f the paravane was observed on the site . A paravane was used as part of mine s weeping gear , deployed from the bow of a ship.. e The s tarboard gunwale curls inward to just aft o f the Booms appear to have been melted rather than broken . photographs of this ves sel show it ablaze . Evidence drums l itters the ' tween decks and main dec k .
bridge . Aerial
o f fuel
The second kingpost mast , between holds 3 and 4 , remains upri ght atop the winch house ( Figure 9 . 1 1 6 ) . The cargo booms are badly deformed , looking l ike l imp Dal i watches . Debris and fuel drums l itter the aft dec k . The gun mount between holds 4 and 5 tilts aft .
Ladders lead up from the buckled wel l deck to the s tern deckhouse and machinery space ( Figure 9 . 1 1 7 ) . The third set o f kingposts , which served hold 5 , is also intact inc luding the topmast . The s tarboard boom i s present , and the port boom is disart iculated .
The s tern is heavily damaged with the deckhouse and machinery space blown outward . The counter is indistinguishable , and i t appears the final several feet of stern have been obl iterated . The funnel lies to port .
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Fig . 9 . 1 1 6 . Deck winch house between holds three and four . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrel l )
F ig . 9 . 1 1 7 . Ladder to stern deckhouse and machinery space . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
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Fig. 9 . 1 1 8 . Historic photograph of KAMIKAZE MARU. ( Photo courtesy of Dr . Sanae Yamada )
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KAMIKAZE MARU ( B : OR- 15 : UR : 0 4 )
KAM IKAZ E MARU is lying on a s and and s ilt bottom in 1 0 0 to 12 0 feet of water in the channel south of Ngeruktabel ( Urukthapel ) anchorage . I t i s accurately located as Number 2 8 in a s ketch o f the anchorage based upon information obtained from World War I I aerial photography ( re fer to Figure 9 . 1 0 7 ) . The identi fication o f this s ite has been disputed , but f ield examinat ion and information trans l ated f rom documents received from Fu j ita salvage leave l ittle room ���
th ,do
1u3b4t0}5
2, 9 ,,
T�:s:�ip was located by Fu j ita at 7 ° 1 6 • 3 5 "
Historical Background
KAMIKAZE MARU was des igned with a composite superstructure , that i s , with bridge and machinery space amidships . I t had a raised forecastle and poop , raked bow and cruiser stern . Two holds forward and two aft were each separated by a winch house mounted by a kingpost mast ( Figure 9 . 1 1 8 ) . Its s leek hul l was painted blac k while the superstructure was white .
KAMIKAZE MARU was built at the Os aka Tetsu·kosho S akuraj ima Factory from July 3 1 , 1 9 3 7 , when the keel was laid , to Mar2� 1 9 , 1 9 3 8 , when it was del ivered to owners Todai Kisen . The ship was registered at the port Os aka and given serial number 4 4 3 6 0 . The steel -hu l led c argo ship had a gross tonnage of 4 , 9 1 6 . 04 and a displacement o f 1 0 , 0 8 5 . I t was c apable o f c arrying 9 , 2 32 cubic meters of cargo ( bale ) . Its length was 3 6 9 feet at the water level , 5 4 feet in beam , 2 9 feet , 3 i nches , in depth o f hold , and it had a load draft o f 2 4 feet .
I ts geared turbine engine was able to make 1 3 knots , and the s hip was rated to carry a crew of 4 3 . It was cons idered a f irst-c lass ship o f the Communication Department .
KAMIKAZE MARU had an interesting operational history . According to Dr . Sanae Yamada :
2 2unpublished S alvage on s alvage for
documents provided by Mr . Fuj ita o f Fu j ita the location , condition and suitability of 37 ships in Belau .
2 3I nformation on the historic description and miscel laneous particulars for this ship is based upon documents provided by Dr . Sanae Yamada .
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After being requ i s itioned by the Navy on July 2 8 , 1 9 4 1 , KAMIKAZE MARU was sent to Uraga and equipped as a spec ial torpedo mother boat . It was then trans ferred to Kure . On October 1 , 1 9 4 1 , it carried out a supply task as a special torpedo mother boat ass igned to the Number 2 f leet at inland and Bakou areas . I n December 1 9 4 1 , she j oined as a supply soldier boat of the supply fleet under direct control o f a southern force , preparing for open war . On December 7 , 1 9 4 1 , she left [ indec ipherable ] at 1 : 0 0 pm , then anchored at [ indec ipherable ] harbor ; she j oined the instal lment o f an advanced air base .
From January 1 , 1 9 4 2 to March 2 3 , she c arried out supply tasks at [ indec ipherable ] and the Bakou area . From March 2 4 to July 1 5 , she c arried out supply tasks along the mainland and from April 1 4 to 2 2 , it was f ixed at Kure doc k .
From July 1 6 , 1 9 4 2 to November 1 4 , she c arried out supply tasks between Japan and the Truk islands under the direct ion o f the advanced force . In addition to this , on September 8 , she belonged to a spec ial attac king force against Guadalcanal I s l and and helped the high- speed transport f leets .
From January 19 to 2 2 , 1 9 4 3 , she was f ixed at Kure Doc k . Between August 1 3 , 1 9 4 3 and March 2 9 , 1 9 4 4 it carried out supply tasks under the direction of a f lying column as an advanced force at Truk and Palau . [ In that c apac ity ] on December 1 , 1 9 4 3 it sailed up as 8 0 1 2 f leet to Palau , then arrived at Truk on December 8 .
On March 3 0 , 1 9 4 4 , she sank at [ indec ipherable ] island in Pel au by attacking o f air bombers from No . 5 American Fleet ( Dr . Sanae Yamada , personal communication ) .
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Present Description and Analys is
Thi s s ite was vis ited only brie fly by NPS divers . Because o f depth , l imited vis ibility , and time c onstraints , only the forward hal f of the ship was examined . However , that examination , coupled with information provided by Avi and Orli Klapfer , the original discoverers o f the s ite , supported the identi f ication as KAMIKAZE MARU .
Thi s ship is badly damaged , but still -recognizable features are present . The hawseholes are discernible on the bow , but l ittle else is . The remainder o f the forec astle is disarticulated f rom the forward wel l dec k . Coi l s of wire cable l ie in the c revice . The large forward holds may have been plated or somehow covered over during its s pecial convers ion , bec ause the deck was unbroken to the area o f the bridge . The deck plates were buckled , and the hul l bulges outward in this area . According to the Klapfers , the forward hol d is penetrable and contains the remains of boxes , gas cylinders , or torpedoes , still in their racks ( personal communication ) . It was this evidence that initially led to the identi f ic ation o f this s ite as KAMI KAZE MARU .
The bridge and machinery spaces are blown apart , the entire s tructure l isting sl ightly to port . A companionway i s identi fiable but no c lear evidence of the bridge s uperstructure remains . The steel hul l plates are twisted and bent , and only a portion of the funnel remains . The engine room is visible , and it is pos s ible to enter .
Only one s hip sunk in Palau is known to have been a torpedo transport , KAMIKAZE MARU . The presence o f torpedoes in t he holds explains the extens ive damage to the integrity o f the s hip structure .
Unidenti fied Small Motor Torpedo Boat or Submarine Chaser ( B : OR - 1 5 : UR : 0 6 )
Mistakenly identi f ied as an ammunition ship , this smal l , badly damaged, s teel-hul led boat l ies in 1 5 to 3 5 feet o f water near NAGISAN MARU . It is accurately located as Number 2 7 in a s ketch of the anchorage based upon information obtained from World War I I aerial photography ( refer to Figure 9 . 1 0 7 ) .
Present Description and Analys is
Only 28 feet of the forward portion o f the ship were observed on the bottom . A total of 4 6 feet o f shaft are present , partial ly exposed and lying up against the s hore . This feature has been mis identif ied as a section of mas t . The hul l shape is a deep " V " with flush dec k , and upright
4 4 9
c apstans . Chain runs from the chain locker I around both e capstans , and into the hawseholes . The bow portion is lying on its starboard s ide . A beam measurement , aft o f a f lush-deck scutt le , is 1 4 feet , 8 inches .
A sma l l bower anchor is present in the port anchor pocket . A 7 - foot - 7 - inch gear box is lying s l ightly o f f to starboard of the bow . Additional disarticulated remains are present above the s ite on the nearby rock is land .
Follow-up work on this s ite should inc lude a swimmer search o f the adj acent area and examination o f the rock i�land for additional remains .
Administrat ive Status
Title to a l l cultural resources is held by the Republ ic of Belau . An e f fort is being made to inventory s ites and to place s igni f icant ones on a Bel au National Register ; as of this writing it is not known whether any of the above s ites are on that register .
Present Threats and Impacts
The World War I I shipwrecks consistently receive the most attention from sport divers . An e f f ort is bei,ng made to A l imit the impacts o f " co l lectors " ; however , there is no W strict enforcement . Protection o f the s ites has been left to the diver shop operators who , at best , have a mixed set of standards for what is acceptable and not acceptable on the s ites . During mapping o f the as -yet-unidenti f ied merchant ship in the channel south o f Ngeruktable ( Urukthapel ) anchorage , a section o f airl ift was discovered . This recently discovered s ite contains many portable artifacts , which will rapidly dis appear i f not care fully protected . Mos t i f not all of the portable arti facts , brass f ittings , and instruments have been removed or salvaged from a l l o f the more frequently vis ited s ites .
With l ittle urging , the casual wreck diver is not inc l ined to remove art i facts . However , o f more concern are the hard-core wreck divers and avocational " researchers " who feel that they are not restricted to j us t looking . They feel that it is perfectly acceptable to remove china or dig in the sediments in the holds in an e f fort to " discover " the name of a particular s ite . Many come equipped with sophisticated metal detectors or magnetometers . They search for and dig s ites without control or the knowledge of the Divis ion o f Cultural A f fairs , the agency charged with preservat ion of these important s ites . These s ame individuals leave Belau with their arti f acts and notes on the s ites they have vis ited . To date , none o f these individuals has left copies o f their e
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PACIFIC OCEAN
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
CAROLINE ISLANDS
KOSRAE ISLAND From Japanese Surveys in 1920
Reef
PORT LOTTIN
'"
N
�· COQUILLE HARBOR
PACIFIC OCEAN
PACIFIC OCEAN
LELE HARBOR
F ig . 9 . 1 1 9 . Loc ation o f LEONORA near Utwa on Kosrae .
KOSRAE ISLAND
information with Cultural Affairs . Legis lation l imiting the 4t use o f metal detectors and magnetometers , s imilar to that currently in force within the U . S . national parks , would go far in l imiting the depredation of the s ites . Adequate funding to support local programs of education and a sys tem o f monitoring and enforcing preservation o f the s ites is also needed i f they are to remain a viable factor in increas ing tourism to the is l and ( Kelly 1 9 8 8 ) .
State o f Kosrae
A dozen ships are known to have wrecked in and around the island o f Kosrae . They span 1 5 0 years from the whal ing era to World War I I . One of the most famous wrecks in Kosrae is that of the schooner , LEONORA , lost in 1 8 7 4 .
Unl ike the ma j ority o f the islands in Micrones i a , the most numerous wrecks around Kosrae are those that date from the whal ing and trading era . Only one s ite from World War I I is known to exist , that of a transport .
S ite-Spec i fic Investigations
Of the many s ites in Kosrae , it was only poss ible to document LEONORA , sunk in Port Lattin near t he small village of Utwa ( Figure 9 . 1 1 9 ) .
LEONORA2 4
I n 1 9 8 1 , the NPS SCRU carried out a s ite reconnaissance on the remains o f a copper-c lad wooden vessel in Utwa Harbor , Kosrae . It was presumed to be the wreck o f the ship LEONORA , c aptained by the notorious Bully Hayes , an important historical figure in the Caroline I s l ands in the latter part of the nineteenth century .
The f ield work was requested by Chief Kan I s iah ( Figure 9 . 1 2 0 ) through the Kosrae State Historic Preservation O f f icer , Teddy John and Scott Rus sel l , then Director of the O f f ice o f Historic Preservation , Trust Territory o f the P ac i f ic I s l ands ( TTP I ) .
Tas ks identified in the scope-of-work were to
1 . determine i f the wreck was o f correct s ize , c l a s s and period to represent the remains o f LEONORA ;
2 4The section on LEONORA was written by Daniel J . Lenihan .
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KOSRAE ISLAND
F ig . 9 . 1 2 0 . Teddy John , Historic Preservation O f f icer for the State o f Kosrae , coordinated LEONORA site evaluation i n 19 8 1 . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
Fig . 9 . 1 2 1 . Utwa village, 1 9 8 1 . Tank- f i l ling operations became a community af fair with many vil lagers in attendance . ( NPS photo by Toni Carre l l )
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2 . locate the extent of the main s ite and identi fy It additional scatter areas ;
3 . map exposed portions of the wreck ;
4 . photo-document exposed areas o f the s ite ;
5 . construct a semicontrol led photomosaic o f the s ite ;
6 . describe the present state o f preservation ; and
7 . prepare a pro j ect recommendations .
report inc luding management
The pro j ect was directed by Dan Lenihan , unit chie f , and part ic ipants inc luded SCRU archeologists Larry Murphy and Toni Carrell . A historical background study was provided by Paul Ehrlich . Additional field personnel included Peace Corps volunteer Bob Adair from Ponape and Kosrae State Historic Preservation staf f led by Teddy John .
A l l pro j ect ob j ectives were accomplished during the 8 days spent on the ground in Kosrae , and a f inal report was submitted to TTPI and Kosrae several months later .
I t was determined that the s ite examined in Utwa met all of tt the test criteria des igned to assess whether it was indeed t he remains of LEONORA , which s ank in that vic inity in 1 8 7 4 . Even though much o f the s ite was covered with overburden , and excavation was not part o f the scope-of -work , enough was v i s ible to erase any reasonable doubt that this was LEONORA .
The report presented a number o f options for future s ite management emphasizing protection in place , interpretation to a vis iting publ ic , and eventual l imited testing or partial exc avation to learn more of its extent and integrity . The tenets o f low- impact " conservation archeology " as they appl ied to the s ite were discus s ed in detail . I temized budgets for conducting l imited subsurface testing and
· full
exc avations were also presented for cons ideration .
A phased list o f recommendat ions was then o f fered and discus sed as fol lows .
1 . Develop a long-range protection and strategy immediately for the wreck s ite .
monitoring
2 . Conduct l imited test excavations on the s ite w ith only highly selective removal of artifacts .
3 . I nterpret and display materials removed from s ite .
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Fig . 9 . 12 2 . Dan Lenihan, Chief of Submerged Cultural Resources Uni t , records artifacts retained by Historic Preservat�on Office, Kosrae . ( NPS photo by Bob Adair )
Fig . 9 . 1 2 3 . After returning from the 1 9 8 1 field work i n Kosrae , Lenihan visited �he STAR OF INDIA museum in San Diego and recorded several i tems removed by a Scripps Institution expedition whose members visited the site in 1 9 6 7 . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan)
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/
I
Fig. 9 . 1 2 4 . NPS SCRU, and Kosrae Historic Preservation Office personnel ready research boat for underwater video operations . In 1 9 8 1 the only available technology was black-and-white recording through hardline from a diver wearing a helmet . Left to right , Toni Carre l l , Larry Murphy ( s itting ) , Julian Jonah and Teddy John . ( NPS photo by Paul Ehrlich)
Fig. 9 . 12 5 . Chief Kan Isiah and other villagers review video footage at night from the day ' s diving . This is some o f the first television ever seen in this part o f Kosrae . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan )
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F ig . 9 . 1 2 6 . SCRU archeologists ( Lenihan--left , Murphy-right) making photomosaic o f LEONORA site . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
F ig . 9 . 1 27 . Julian Jonah holds end of baseline on LEONORA site, Kosrae, 1 9 8 1 . Lenihan)
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measuring tape to ( NPS pho Lo by Dan
Fig. 9 . 12 8 . Feature 5 , copper sheathing on shipwreck i n Utwa Harbor bel ieved to be LEONORA . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
Fig . 9 . 1 2 9 . Feature 1 , copperclad container on LEONORA . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
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Fig . 9 . 1 30 . MARU during Lenihan)
Toni Carrel l swimming through wreck of FUJIKAWA 1 9 8 1 assessment dives . ( NPS photo by Dan
Fig . 9 . 13 1 . Ready box for gun on NEW MARU with some shells freshly removed-- 1 98 1 . ( NPS photo by Toni Carrell )
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The subj ect report was entitled " The Utwa Harbor Wreck S ite : e
A Shipwreck Evaluation and Management Report " by Daniel J . Lenihan , Toni Carrell and Larry Murphy , 1 9 8 1 , and was reproduced for very limited distribution to the concerned agenc ies . This document was then used , a lmos t in its entirety , as the prime component o f a public at ion edited by Scott Rus sell as Report Number 1 5 in the Micronesian Archaeological Survey series . I t i s entitled Of Wooden Ships and I ron Men : An Historical and Archaeological Survey o f the Brig LEONORA .
The latter document inc ludes the Ehrlich history o f LEONORA and Bul ly Hayes and an additional brie f report by Lenihan on a trip to Scripps Institution and the STAR OF I NDIA Museum in San Diego to document arti facts removed from the s ite in 1 9 6 7 by the crew o f a Scripps ves sel ( Figure 9 . 12 3 ) . Researchers des iring more detailed information on the 1 9 8 1 NPS s ite work should consult this document , which is avai lable in the usual pro f e s s ional repositories . Original photographs and drawings and some black-and-white videotape are retained by the NPS , SCRU , i n Santa Fe .
Chuuk ( Truk )
We referred to these is lands as Truk in the earlier portions o f this volume because of keeping to contemporary usage for e historical accuracy . I n our discus s ions o f present day archeo logical researc h , we de fer to the islanders ' preferred usage o f Chuuk . Chuuk Lagoon i s probably the most f amous s ite for shipwrecks among sport divers in Micronesia . Much has been written about Chuuk in books ( e . g . , Rosenberg 1 9 8 1 , Rosenberg and Graham 1 9 8 1 , Bailey 1 9 8 2 ) and magaz ines inc luding National Geographic magaz ine . The SCRU vis ited only s ome of the sites brief ly over a 3-day period in 1 9 8 1 and c annot meaningfully add t o the body o f information presently easily available in other forms . I t does appear that Chuuk ' s management o f shipwrecks as historical resources has received mixed reviews as pioneer programs often do . At pre s s time for this report , there seems to be some action taking place by the administration o f Chuuk to reevaluate the submerged cultural resources base and exist ing management structure . There are also serious a l legations o f increas ing attrit ion to the s ites . Neither o f the c laims c an be ver i f ied by the research team at this time ; however , it should be c lear that attrition to Chuuk ' s submerged cultural resources will eventually result in eros ion of the i s l and ' s economic base .
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Fig . 9 . 132 . Mushroom cloud ris ing from "Able , " the first atomic explosion at Bikini during Operation Crossroads . ( Photo courtesy of National Archives )
F ig . 9 . 1 3 3 . NPS archeologist Larry remains of USS SARATOGA at Bikini . Murphy)
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Nordby i l lustrating ( NPS photo by Larry
Fig . 9 . 1 3 4 . Bikinian divers working with NPS/Navy team on the USS SARATOGA . They are measuring in the location of a "Christmas tree , � a specially designed tower for holding blast gauges and other test instruments . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
Fig. 9 . 1 3 5 . Dan Lenihan shining light into cockpit o f one o f three "Hel ldivers , " which can be seen when penetrating hangar deck of the SARATOGA . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
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Fig . 9 . 1 36 . A 5-inch gun protrudes from a forward casemate on the battleship USS ARKANSAS in Bikini Atoll Lagoon . It lies upside down as does Japanese battleship NAGATO close by . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
F ig . 9 . 137 . PRINZ EUGEN survived two atomic tests at Bikini but overturned in Kwajale1n Atol l . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy)
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Administrative Status
Cultural s ites in the Federated States of Microne s ia are under the j urisdiction o f the various states and are accorded protect ion under legislation in force on the i s lands .
Marshal l I s l ands
Bikini and Kwaj alein
Of the 2 3 known ships to have sunk in and around the is land o f Bikini , only one predates World War I I . An unident i fied ship , most l ikely involved in trading , was reported wrecked in the late 1 8 5 0 s ( Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 4 ) : 3 2 7 ) . All o f the remaining ships were involved in the atomic testing program o f the late 1 9 4 0 s . Twenty of the ships sunk during the test are Americ an , while two are Japanese ; each was i nvolved in the Pac i f ic theater of war ( refer to Table 7 . 1 ) .
I n August 1 9 8 9 and April 1 9 9 0 , the NPS , SCRU , conducted documentation dives on several ships in Bikini Atol l Lagoon that had been sunk as a result of atomic bomb tests during Operat ion Crossroads in 1 9 4 6 ( Figure 9 . 1 3 2 ) . The work was done at the request of the Bikini Council and the Department o f Energy ' s contracting firm , Holmes and Narver .
A detachment o f U . S . Navy personnel from Pearl Harbor located � and buoyed the s ites , and NPS and Bikinian divers drew and photographed the ship remains ( Figures 9 . 1 3 3 , 9 . 1 3 4 and 9 . 1 35 ) . The National Geographic Soc iety also helped with the photodocumentation .
Twelve large ships and fac i l ity barges l ie at the bottom of the lagoon plus an addit ional dozen or so landing craf t , most of the latter being some distance from the test array . Many of the ships that survived the Operation Crossroads tests were towed to other points for decontamination and/or eventual s inking in deep water . Among the l atter was the PRINZ EUGEN , which eventually overturned and s ank at Kwa j alein with its screws vis ible above the water ' s surface .
During the ship study , 6 of the 1 2 larger ships at Bikini were d ived and to various degrees were recorded along with 3 of the landing craft . PRINZ EUGEN was additionally dived on two occas ions by the team whi le they were pass ing through Kwa j al ein .
Most o f the recording time was concentrated on USS SARATOGA , which is the only aircraft carrier known to be within range o f sport divers . Additionally , some work was done on HIJMS NAGATO , f l agship of the Japanese Navy at the time o f the attack on Pearl Harbor ; USS ARKANSAS ( battleship ) ; USS 41t
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PILOTFI SH ( submarine ) ; USS GILLIAM ( armeef transport ) ; and Y06 0 ( yard oiler ) .
Bes ides mapping and photo documentation o f the s ites for his toric preservation purposes , the NPS conducted an evaluation o f the ships for use as the focus o f a marine park . The Bikinian people are cons idering development o f the lagoon as a diving attraction and have reques ted a n asses sment o f the s hips ' potential in that regard .
A comprehens ive report on this pro j ect is scheduled shortly for publication in the same series as the present report . I t wi ll be entitled The Archeology of the Atomic Bomb : A Submerged Cultural Resources Assessment of the Sunke n F leet of Operations Cro s s roads at Bikini and Kwajalein Ato l l Lagoons by James P . Delgado , Dan Lenihan and Larry Murphy .
The reader is referred to that document for an in-depth discuss ion of the shipwrecks of Bikini . A detailed map o f USS SARATOGA from these views will be available i n that report in addition to many photographs and narrative discus s ions o f the s ite vis ited . It is antic ipated that Bikini wil l become the focus of ma j or diving use once the dramatic nature of the s ite and the apparent l ack of res idual radiation problems become better understood by the general diving publ ic .
No shipwrecks other than PRINZ EUGEN were dived by the s tudy team at Kwaj alein Atol l . Many are there as a result o f fighting during World War I I o r surrounding deep water after Operation Crossroads . There is a very active diving c lub on Kwa j alein and there are s everal popular publications that describe the wrecks and diving activity on them . It is not c lear what the pol icy i s in regards to protection or interpretation of the s ites as historical resources but it i s evident that a systematic survey o f the s ites would be bene f ic ial .
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CHAPTER X. OTHER SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES
AND
UNDERWATER COMPONENTS OF LAND-BASED S ITES : THE HISTORICAL RECORD
By Toni L . Carrel l , Don Boyer and Tim Roc k
Introduct ion
This chapter is devoted to a discuss ion of the wide variety of other types of submerged cultural resources and underwater components of land-based s ites . These sites range from prehi s toric villages , f ishing and quarrying s ites , and caves to World War I I equipment and airplanes . An ef fort has been made to cons ider as many dif ferent potential types as pos s ible , based upon the historical record , that is , within the context of past human activity and archival documentation .
As in Chapter 8 , the information is presented to permit a quick understanding o f the extent and multipl ic ity o f resources that may be present . Although neither comprehens ive nor exhaustive , the initial overview is intended to be representative . The overview is fol lowed by a brie f discuss ion o f s ites that were spec i f ically investigated in the f ield . They i l lustrate the variety of submerged cultural resources in the i s l ands .
Site Types , Present or Potentially Present
Prehistoric S ites
The geologic origins of the islands , either volcanic or uplifted coral , and plate tectonic s have influenced the ability o f archeologists to discover the earl iest s ites o f human habitation i n Micronesia . I t is presently believed that initial occupation was along the coasts and that these s ites are now submerged . This view is supported by the knowledge that the western edge of the Phil ippine plate is dipping under its adj acent plate , which results in widespread subs idence in the i s l ands . The volcanic and l imestone origins of the is lands also provided early peoples with a
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honeycomb of deep and shallow caves perfect for habitation . caves have always been used for shelter and have often been the only sources of rel iable fresh water . In the i s l ands o f Microne s ia , caves continued to be used through World War I I . Some o f the best evidence supporting early human occupation in the islands has come from excavations in and near c aves .
Many c aves are known and have been explored on the i s l ands ; fewer are known underwater . Although to date no prehi storic s ites have been discovered in a submerged cave , it is accurate to say that few or no systematic archeological investigations have been conducted either . Complete ly or part ia l ly submerged caves hold the best potential for the discovery of early prehistoric s ites .
P l ate tectonics has also contributed to the s ubmergence of prehistoric vi llages on low coral atol l s . Three vil lages , a l l in Belau , are described in oral histories as s inking beneath the ocean . The s ite of one village in Bel au was brie f ly examined in 1 9 8 8 with no posit ive result s . Another very wel l -known s ite that is partial ly submerged is Nan Madol in Pohnpei . This s ite has been undergoing extensive archeological investigations for several years . L ike submerged c aves , shallow submerged reefs may ho ld evidence of early human habitation in the i s l ands . Oral histories may be the bes t c lues to the locations o f these ephemeral s ites . � Prehistoric interisland migration , c ommerce and communication led to other types of s ites . When the people of Yap s ai led their l arge c anoes to Belau to quarry the stone money they so highly pri zed , they spent months away from their i s l and home . On Belau they continued to practice the ir traditional food-gathering and f ishing . Evidence o f one type o f f i shing strategy can be found in the presence o f cora l - l ined f ish traps on the shal low o f fshore ree f s of Babeldaob . These low wal l s o f mounded corals dif fer markedly from tradit ional Belauan fish weirs , which are made of organic reeds bent into a basket- like shape .
The Yap stone money quarries on the island o f Babeldaob and Garreru suggest another type of s ite , that o f landings or docks where the numerous large c anoes could be kept . The formidable task of travelling to Bel au , quarrying the huge s l abs o f stone and shaping them i nto smooth rings required many people and canoes . The same quarries were used year after year , which suggests traditional l andings along the shorel i ne .
E l sewhere on Belau , prehistoric vi llages built i n the interior of Babeldaob adj acent to s treams or mangrove swamps quite often have wel l -developed stone docks . Between 1 9 7 9 A and 1 9 8 1 , six prehistoric village s ites with docks were ..,
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identi f ied during preliminary archeological surveys of Babeldaob .
Wherever people gather , wherever people land or moor their watercraft , the potential exists for the acc idental los s o f equipment and the purposeful depos ition of refus e . Submerged prehistoric refuse areas adj acent to vi l lages , l andings or docks have been investigated as potential si1tes . These s ites would probably contain only the remains o,f broken or lost ground- stone tools and other more durable ,arti facts such as c lams hel l utens ils and ceramics .
·
Final ly , there are the tombolo or pier- l ike features constructed of coral that connect two small is lets . These features may have been used to increase the l iving area available and to fac i l itate access between adj acent is lets . This s ite type has been found in Belau and may be pres ent elsewhere in the is l ands of Micronesia .
Historic Sites
As soon as the f irst Europeans arrived in the Pac i f ic , they began to add to the potential range of s ites . The proces s o f exploration and discovery was a dif ficult one , and the many s hal low ree fs and low ato l ls were perfect ship traps . Grounding certainly occurred , and with that the los s o f anchors and the casting-of f o f equipment , bal last or c argo to lighten a ship and free it .
Traditional prehistoric landings very l ikely continued into the historic period . They may have been improved with the addition o f Wes tern- l ike p iers or docks or , as l ike ly , s tone or coral rubble docks .
The arrival o f Spanish colonial masters also brought the construction o f smal l forts on the island of Guam . Buil t along the coastl ine , refuse areas below them may contai n a variety of period art i facts .
Europeans introduced iron tools and other more durable items to the islanders . Refuse areas adj acent to contact and colonial -period villages and traditional landings may contain the remains o f these Wes tern goods . As copra product ion and general trade increased , so did the potential for the acc idental loss of equipment and materials as soc iated with this activity .
The whal ing era dramatically impacted the l ives o f the i s landers . Coming into port to obtain water , wood and women , these sailors added further to the archeological record . Equipment used in whaling that could not be repaired , re fashioned into something useful , or traded may have been
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often tossed into the shallow bays or anchorages in the i s l ands . Like modern anchorages , the s ame general area would be used during each vis it , which would create an underwater midden o f re fuse . Ship ' s boats , used to transport people and supp l ies from the is land proper to the ship anchored o f fshore , may have capsi zed , spi l l ing their contents into the sea .
The development o f sugar cane plantations and refining in the Mariana I s l ands suggests remains associated with that activity . In Saipan , a narrow-gauge railroad was used in the sugar c ane industry . Railroad cars have been abandoned and dumped in Saipan Lagoon . Equipment used in the ref ining process was probably also dumped when it was no longer useable .
Fishing , an important part of the subs istence activity prehistorically , changed in the historic period . Japanese f i s herme n , organi zed into small f leets , roamed throughout the i s l ands . Equipment losses as sociated with this activity are also pos s ible .
His toric mining o f phosphate , used in both fertilizer and in explos ives , added another level of industrial refuse . The remains of ore cars , cable runs , ramps and chutes may be present . At Rota , equipment from the phosphate mine l itters � the shallow bay in an area cal led Cable Run . Phosphate mining occurred on Ngeaur ( Angaur ) in Bel au , Banaba ( Ocean I s land ) in the Gilberts and Nauru . Abandoned equipment as soc iated with mining may be present immediately offshore of these steep islands .
Although World War I added the German cruiser CORMORAN to the archeological record , l ittle thought has been given to the depos ition o f refuse from the ship during its long interment in Apra Harbor . World War I I contributed both Japanese and Americ an planes , tanks , l anding craft , barges , pontoons , mines , unexploded ordnance , guns and c annon . After the war , thous ands o f tons of equipment were unceremoniou s ly dumped in the ocean rather than transported back to the United States . One such dump s ite is located on the western coast o f Guam ; no doubt there are many others throughout the islands .
World War I I planes may represent one o f the most diverse col lection of s ites in the islands . American and Japanese Army and Navy aircra ft numbering nearly 1 0 0 dif ferent types were used in the Pac i fic theater of war .
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Japanese and American Aircraft 1
The early carrier attacks during World War I I brought American and Japanese naval aircraft into battle for the f irst time . The general superiority of mos t Japanese aircraft in range and f l ight characteristic s compared with their American counterparts in the first 2 years o f the war is well documented in historical sources . The toughness o f American aircraft al lowed the American combat pilots to develop techniques in combat that at least held the l ine against fast and highly maneuverable aircraft such as the A6M Zero until American industry began to produce superior types o f aircraft , which eventually swept Japanese aircraft from the s kies during the latter hal f of the war .
The ma j ority o f airc raft downed in Micrones ia from 1 9 4 2 - 1 9 4 5 were Japanese , and this ratio will certainly be ref lected in the wrecks now found in the area . Cons idering the nature of the Japanese Navy ' s prewar training , the probabil ity is high that aircraft lost to operational acc idents or weather before the war remain to be found as wel l .
Japanese aircraft losses in the area inc lude every type used during the war-- f ighters ; bombers ; torpedo bombers ; long- and medium-range patrol and reconnaiss ance aircraft , inc luding several types of biplanes ; transport and cargo aircraft ; and cruiser float planes . The Imperial Japanese Navy was respons ible for the defense of its Pac i fic pos sess ions and used both land- and sea-based forces that were " quant itatively and qual itatively the mos t important Japanese Air Force during the Pac i f ic War . . . and . . . bore the brunt of the fighting against the A l l ied Forces . . . " ( Franc il lon 1 9 7 9 : 3 7 ) . For this reason , most o f the Japanese aircraft wrecks known in Micronesia are naval types .
However , Japanese army aircra ft types mus t also be cons idered in any historical research of aircraft wrecks in the area . Many o f these army aircra ft may have pas sed through the Pacific islahd areas , particularly in the Mariana and western Carolines , while is land-hopping en route to the battle areas in the south in New Guinea . There are probably far fewer army-type Japanese aircra ft in Microne s ia than navy types because army aircraft were trans ient and none were permanently stationed on Micronesia ' s island bases . Japanese army aircraft were also des igned to meet dif ferent operational c riteria , that i s , land warfare . Consequently ,
1The section on Japanese and American aircraft was written by Don Boyer .
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army aircraft lac ked the long range required o f over-water operations , and many army pilots and their crews l ac ked the f l ight and navigation experience essential to operations with few or no landmarks . These limitat ion s , though they d id not prevent the army craft from staging through the western Pac i f ic , did prevent extended combat operations by army aircraft in the islands . Later in the war when the Kamikaze e f fort was in full swing , any avai l able aircraft might be used in over-water operations ; however , this was a f ter the i s l ands were lost .
The most l ikely areas for army aircra ft are in the Marianas and western Carolines , i s l ands on the direct route to the s outhern battlefields and near the Phil ippines . How wel l used this route was i s not c lear , particularly a s other routes originating at ma j or army air force bases in Formosa and the Phil ippines were available and heavily used .
Combat losses o f American aircraft during the Pac i f ic battles were far fewer than their Japanese counterparts . The types o f American aircraft lost were the same as those o f the Japanese : f ighters ; dive-bombers ; torpedo-bombers ; l ong- and medium-range bomber and patrol cra f t ; c argo and transport craft ; and f loat planes from cruisers and battleships . Like those o f the Japanese , American naval aircraft were the maj ority involved in combat in Micrones ia . However I unl ike e their counterparts , u . s . Army aircraf t , primarily medium- and long-range bombers , were also heavily involved in attacking Japanese island bases and suffering many combat and operational losses .
As the American forces captured the is lands , many i s l ands became forward airfields for long-range bombers and other aircraf t used in support of the Pac i f ic advance . This build-up of army and navy aircraft would have brought noncombat aircraft , such as cargo transports , into the area , and operational losses of these types o f aircraft should also be cons idered poss ible in future research . The advent of American air bases and naval f ac il ities also added more materiel to the area when wrecked or worn-out aircraft were dumped at sea around all the American-occupied is land areas .
Accurate account ing of aircraft losses to both s ides during each o f the combat operations is outs ide the scope o f this publ ication . Even care ful modern historical researc h , such as Lundstrom ' s The First Team , which has the bene f it o f much Japanese data not previous ly available , c annot account for a l l los ses . Wartime combat report s , made in the heat and s tres s o f battle , can only be cons idered a starting po int for researc h , which makes the archeological research o f a ircraft wrecks found in Micronesia particularly important for both A cultural and historical reasons . ..,
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American aircraft are , for the most part , wel l documented i n both manu facturers ' records and mi litary records , a great help in tracking u . s . a ircraft found in Micrones ia . However , the s ame is not true for Japanese aircraft . The sport diver ' s common habit of stripping parts off aircraft wrecks i s thus o f deep concern to pro fes s ional archeologists , as well as historians , because it complicates identi fication o f a ircraft models within a type and can eas ily prevent any poss ibil ity o f trac ing the aircraft back to its origins with a particular air group or pi lot . The preservation and i nterpretation ethic of archeology is particu larly important to the history of aircraft in the Pac i fic becaus e aircraft are more fragile and less eas i ly traced in the historical records than are ships .
Air losses on both s ides are only brief ly covered elsewhere in this public at ion . A representative l ist of Japanese types most commonly operating in Micronesia is provided in Table 1 0 . 1 . Some are not wel l known or were not found in combat ro les or in great numbers during the Pac i f ic war .
Table 1 0 . 1 . Representative List o f Japanese Planes Los t i n Micronesia
Code Name
ALF
BABS
BETTY
CLAUDE
DAVE
Japanese Name and Type2
Kawanishi E 7 K , navy type 9 4 reconnai s s ance seapl ane
Mitsubishi Ki- 1 5 , army type reconnais s ance plane ; Mitsubishi type 9 8 reconnaissance plane
9 7 command C5M , navy
Mitsubishi G4MI /G4M3 , navy type 1 attack bomber ; Mitsubishi G6Ml , navy type 1 wingtip convoy fighter ; Mitsubishi G 6M1 -K , navy type 1 large land trainer ; Mitsubishi G 6M 1 -L2 , navy type 1 transport
Mitsubishi A5M , navy type 9 6 carrier fighter
Naka j ima E8N , navy type 9 5 reconnais s ance seaplane
2From Japanese Franc i l lon .
Aircraft o f the Pac i fic War , Rene J .
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Code Name
DINAH
EMILY
GEORGE
HAMP
HELEN
I RVING
JAKE
JILL
KATE
LILY
L I Z
MAVIS
MYRT
NATE
NELL
NICK
NORM
Japanese Name and Type
Mitsubishi Ki-4 6 , army type 1 0 0 command reconnaissance plane
Kawanishi H8K , navy type 2 f lying boat
Kawanishi N 1K1-J/N 1K 5 -J , navy fighter Shiden and Shiden Kai
interceptor
Mi tsubishi A6M3 , navy type 0 carrier f i ghter model 32 ( this aircraft was first coded HAP , then HAMP , and f inal ly Z EKE 32 )
Nakaj ima Ki-4 9 , army type 1 0 0 heavy bomber Donryu
Nakaj ima J1N1-C and -R , navy type 2 reconnaissance plane ; Naka j ima J 1N 1 -S , navy night fighter Gekko
Aichi E l 3A , seaplane
navy type 0 reconnaiss ance
Nakaj ima B6N , navy carrier attack bomber A Tenzan W Nakaj ima BSN , navy type 9 7 c arrier attack bomber
Kawasaki Ki-4 8 , army type 9 9 twin-engined l ight bomber
Naka j ima GSN , navy experimental 1 3 -Shi attack bomber Shinzan
Kawanishi H6K , navy type 9 7 f lying boat
Nakaj ima C 6 N , navy c arrier reconnaiss ance p lane Saiun
Nakaj ima Ki-2 7 , army type 9 7 fighter
Mitsubishi G3M , navy type 9 6 attack bomber ; Yokosuka L3Y , navy type 9 6 transport
Kawas aki Ki- 4 5 KAI , army type 2 two- seat f i ghter Toryu
Kawanishi E 1 5K , navy type 2 reconnaissance seaplane Shiun
4 7 4
high-s peed
Code Name
OSCAR
PAUL
PEGGY
PETE
RUTH
SALLY
SONIA
TABBY
THALIA
THERESA
THORA
TOJO
TONY
TOPSY
VAL
WILLOW
Z EKE
Z ERO
Japanese Name and Type
Naka j ima Ki - 4 3 , army type 1 fighter Hayabusa . Known for a time in China-Burma- India theatre as JIM .
Aichi E l 6A , navy reconnaissance seaplane Zuiun
Mitsubishi Ki-6 7 , army type 4 heavy bomber Hiryu
Mi tsubishi F 1M , navy type 0 observation seaplane
Fiat B . R . 2 0 , army type I heavy bomber
Mitsubishi Ki-2 1 , army type 9 7 heavy bomber ( formerly JANE )
Mitsubishi Ki-5 1 , army type 9 9 assault plane
Douglas L2D , navy type 0 transport
Kawasaki Ki-5 6 , army type 1 freight transport
Kokusai Ki-5 9 , army type 1 transport
Nakaj ima Ki- 3 4 , army type 9 7 transport ; Nakaj ima L lN , navy type 9 7 transport
Nakaj ima Ki - 4 4 , army type 2 s ingle-seat fighter Shoki
Kawasaki Ki- 6 1 , army type 3 f ighter Hien
Mitsubishi Ki-5 7 , army type 1 0 0 transport ; Mitsubishi L4M, navy type 0 transport
Aichi D3A , navy type 9 9 c arrier bomber
Yokosuka K5Y , navy type 9 5 i ntermediate trainer
Mitsubishi A6M , navy type 0 c arrier fighter
Mitsubishi A6M5
S ince the c lose o f world War I I , f ishing , pas s enger and airl ine traf f ic potential to the archeological record . Apra Harbor and Ngemelachel ( Malakal ) ,
commerc ial s hipping , have continued to add
Ma j or ports , such as and minor ports at
4 7 5
each o f the i s l ands continue to serve as the focus o f commerce . Equipment and tools dropped from the s hips that bring consumer goods and tourists to the islands are creating modern middens . Continued dumping o f re fuse , most o f it not biodegradable , will lead archeologists of the future to c ategorize our era as the pop-top horizon or the middle plastic .
Known S ites Not I nvestigated
Mariana I s l ands
A wide variety of the s ites span the period from early Chamorro habitation of the i s land , predating the arrival of Europeans in 15 2 0 , through the end o f World War I I .
Saipan
Caves3
This i s l and has both land and underwater caves . A l l hol d the potential for archeological remains from the prehistoric and historic eras .
One wel l -known s ite is that o f the Japanese Last Command Post . The s ite features natural c aves and forti f ic at ions where the Japanese held out to the end in a brutal battle that took many l ives on both s ides i n July o f 1 9 4 4 . The post is actually a c ave forti f ied with cement . In the front , there is a commanding view o f the sea and a col lection of tanks , howitzers , machine guns and naval guns .
Kalabera Cave is a short distance from the command post . Like it , this is another gaping hole in the c l i f f l ine along south Kalabera c l i f f and s its about 3 0 0 feet above sea level . The mouth i s about 3 0 feet high and can be entered only a short distance before it drops o f f steeply . This cave i s reported to have much past historical s igni ficanc e , having been used during the Spanish period as a prison for Chamorros found gui lty of felonious crimes .
Liyans Fal ingun Hanorn is an underground stream c ave . This cavern has an opening o f about 2 5 feet and was used by the Japanese during the war as a bomb shelter . It is situated
3 The discuss ion Tim Rock .
o f cave resources in Saipan was written by
4 7 6
about a hal f -mile south underground into the cave prehistoric t imes as wel l .
o f Kalabera . The stream goes and may have been used during
The grotto is a natural c ave fed by the sea . A large boulder j uts out near the center of the pool . The distance from the opening o f the grotto to the floor o f the c ave i s 5 4 feet , where an amaz ing natural formation is visible . There are three exits to the open sea where huge boulders rise up and overhead waves pound agains t the c l iffs .
One other underwater cave i s known to exist on S aipan ; it is cal led Wing Beach Arch .
World War I I S ites
A total o f 3 6 s ites in and around American Memorial Park and Saipan Lagoon were discovered . Two asses sments were conducted at the American Memorial Park in Saipan , on October 2 8 -30 and December 1 5 - 1 7 , 1 9 8 3 . The general purpose of thi s as ses sment was to make a prel iminary analys i s o f the submerged cultural resources within the park . The Micrones ian Area Research Center sponsored an underwater asses sment of Saipan Lagoon on December 3 - 5 , 1 9 8 4 . These e f forts were aimed at loc ating and identifying addi t iona! s igni f ic ant ob j ects of historical value that might be lying on the lagoon floor .
·
As a result o f these e f forts , more than 5 0 s ites were discovered , all dating to the pos t- 1 9 0 0 era . The vast ma j ority are the remains o f U . S . pontoons or barges . The shipwreck s ites are discus sed in Chapter 9 , and the remains of railroad cars , two planes and a gun are discussed in Chapter 1 1 . The s ites presented below have not been documented ; only their loc at ions have been noted , and a prel iminary identi f ication has been made .
The remains o f 2 8 American pontoons or barges a l s o exist in the park . Their locations are identi f ied below and on Figure 1 0 . 1 .
Table 1 0 . 2 . Key to Base Map o f Other Known Sites i n American Memorial Park
S ite Number 3 : S ite Number 4 : S ite Number 5 : S ite Number 6 : S ite Number 7 : S ite Number 1 0 : S ite Number 1 2 :
American fuel storage tank Scattered debris U . S . pontoon/barge , partially s ubmerged U . S . pontoon/barge , partially submerged U . S . pontoon/barge , partially s ubmerged U . S . pontoon/barge , partially s ubmerged U . S . pontoon/barge , part ially s ubmerged
4 7 7
M ICRO BEACH
EXIS���Gn HOT�
1 0
RESIDENTIAL
A M E R IC A N M E M O R I A L PA R K , S A IP O N
HARBOR PENINS ULA
3
4
SMALL BO�T
� 7 6HARB?R ))
... �2
2 2 0 2 1 1 9 2 0 2 3
1 8
2 7
T A N APAG BAY
39
N
J Fig . 1 0 . 1 . Base map o f other known s ites not investigated in American Memorial Par k , Saipan .
S ite Number 1 3 : S ite Number 1 4 : S ite Number 15 : S ite Number 1 6 : S ite Number 1 7 : S ite Number 1 8 : S ite Number 1 9 : S ite Number 2 0 : S ite Number 2 1 : S ite Number 2 2 : S ite Number 2 3 : S ite Number 2 7 : S ite Number 2 8 : S ite Number 2 9 : S ite Number 3 0 : S ite Number 3 1 : S ite Number 32 : Site Number 3 3 : Site Number 34 : Site Number 35 : Site Number 3 6 : S ite Number 3 7 : S ite Number 3 8 : S ite Number 39 : S ite Number 4 0 :
u . s . pontoon/barge u sed as dock U . S . pontoon/barge , submerged U . S . pontoon/barge , partia l ly submerged U . S . pontoon/barge , submerged U . S . pontoon/barge , partially submerged Sc attered debris U . S . pontoon/barge , U . S . pontoon/barge , U . S . pontoon/barge , Scattered debris
partially submerged submerged submerged
u . s . pontoon/barge , submerged U . S . pontoon/barge , submerged U . S . pontoon/barge u . s . pontoon/barge , U . S . pontoon/barge , u . s . pontoon/barge , U . S . pontoon/barge , u . s . pontoon/barge , U . S . pontoon/barge , u . s . pontoon/barge , U . S . pontoon/barge , U . S . pontoon/barge , U . S . pontoon/barge , U . S . pontoon/barge , U . S . pontoon/barge ,
submerged submerged submerged partial ly partially partially partial ly partially partially partially partial ly partial ly
submerged submerged submerged s ubmerged submerged submerged submerged s ubmerged submerged
Two Sherman tanks were discovered during the 1 9 8 4 survey o f Saipan Lagoon ( Figure 1 0 . 2 ) . Only partially submerged , they l ie about 3 0 0 yards from shore ( Figures 1 0 . 3 and 1 0 . 4 ) . These are in excellent condition and their turrets c an be seen above the high-tide l ine from s hore . Nearby are the s keletal remains of a U . S . landing c ra ft , S ite 9 ( re fer to Figure 1 0 . 2 ) . It is in poor condition .
Rota
Caves 4
On Rota , there is a honeycomb o f limestone c aves . Many s ites , l ike the small caves overlooking Sasanhaya Bay , were used by the Japanese and have c annons still protruding from them .
The cave at Puntan Senhanom c an only be reached by scuba divers . Located at the last point on the southwes t coast o f the Wedding Cake plateau before reaching the tip , this
4 The discuss ion of cave resources in Rota was written by Tim Rock .
4 7 9
,/ A M E R I C A N L A N D I N G
C R AFT
S A IP A N
' GARAPAN
N
N O T TO SCALE
Fig . 1 0 . 2 . Base map of other known s ites not investigated in Saipan Lagoon .
4 8 0
Fig . 10 . 3 . The partially submerged remains of two U . S . Sherman tanks lie 300 feet from shore in Saipan Lagoon . ( Photo by Tim Rock)
F ig . 1 0 . 4 . The Sherman tanks in Saipan Lagoon are often vis ited by snorkelers . ( Photo by Tim Rock)
4 8 1
underwater cavern opens to a sunlit inner pool . The mouth of � the cave appears a deep blue from the surface and is approximately 3 0 yards wide . The s loping coral wal l bottoms out near the c ave entrance , which i s between 4 0 and 6 0 feet deep . I n the interior o f the cave , large boulders take up space in the middle . The wal ls to the left rise up to an opening while the right leads back into a series o f dark fis sures . It is pos s ible to c l imb out o f the pool and sit along the edge in this grotto . Looking up , one sees the j agged edge o f Wedding Cake plateau through the large opening .
I n the vi llage of Songsong , Tonga c ave is marked by a park that leads to this historic s ite . This c avern has a huge entrance adorned by immense , overhanging stalactites . Following the surrender o f the Japanese to the Americans during World war I I , many Japanese f amilies stayed here until they could be evacuated . They took the place of many of Rota I s res ident s , who were being held prisoner on their island in this mammoth hole in the c li f f line . There i s also a network of Japanese c aves under the village itse l f .
The Glyph Cave , named for its petroglyphs , is replete with prehistoric pictographs that date back to the f irst Chamorros . Evidence o f past habitation is evident on the broad plain that is shrouded by c l i f f s on all s ides except A toward the open sea . Immense mortar stones l ine the trail , � and pottery sherds l itter the dry j ungle f loor . Clam-shells and ground-stone arti facts are also present .
A giant Taga stone is upright , with its capstone in place . Others had toppled but s t i l l remain in a row , evidence o f the base o f a structure . More Taga stones are a short distance away , all fal len but still in line and larger than the f irst one . This valley was also the home of Japanese during the war . I n one area the immense Taga capstones are l ined up bunker-style , fac ing the sea , apparently in preparation for a l ast stand that never c ame . Closer to the c l i f f l ine , a large bas in several yards long and made o f rocks is bel ieved to be a kiln , built but never used . Sake bottles , pieces of dishes , teapots , and gla s s ampules are scattered around the s ite . However , no weapons or evidence of remains are present .
The c ave is a long lateral and part ially uphil l walk to the base o f the c l if f line and a series o f sma l l c aves . Some are inactive , and some are still dripping ins ide , forming c rystalline rivers and stalagmites and s ta l actites . Pictographs are present that are s imilar to those on Guam at Gadaa I s c ave in Inara j an . Stic k f igures , apparently of people , predominate . Smaller " family " groups share the space with l arge strings of human forms . Other , larger , i ndistinct 4lt
4 8 2
----------------------------------------------------------------- - - - ---
drawings are painted on the rocks . They appear to take the form of animals . One part icularly resembles a turt le .
Another underwater c ave in Rota is at Tataacho Point . Although the only caves to exhibit prehistoric use are above water , they clearly demons trate the extens ive use these natural resources received prehistorica l ly . To date , none o f the underwater caves o n Rota has yielded prehis toric remains .
The old archeological s ite i n the Pagat area o f northeast Guam gives some ins ights i nto the l ives of pas t res idents o f the island . Naturally protected by huge c l i f f s l andward and a steep , rugged seawal l , the people here apparently l ived in relative isolation , unworried that enemies could attack .
Before reaching the c ave , the trail widens , and there are many s igns of a prehis toric vil lage . Mortars are strewn along the trail . Clamshe l l s used for drinking and uten s i l s are prevalent . Standing l atte stones give testament t o the village s ite . There is also another latte s ite nearer the sea . The c l i f f s here are s teep , and waves break below into a blue mist .
The c ave is below the drop-o f f . The trail down leads to the mouth of this cavern that i s thought to have provided the fresh drinking water for anc ient res idents . A stalagmite is bel ieved to have been quarried from here to be used as one of the nearby latte bases . There is also evidence that Japanese stragglers may have held out here , us ing the cave for water and as a hiding place .
The f irst c hamber is very s ha llow , but a squeeze through to the second room reveals a deep second chamber holding c lear water that is normal ly about 10 feet deep . Guam ' s crystal-c lear water o f fers a unique diving opportunity a long the honeycombed northeastern coast . This geologic phenomenon holds muc h of the island ' s fresh water . The rain i s f i ltered through the porous l imestone and forms cool pool s ins ide many caves .
A number o f caves along the coast are in 1 0 to 1 5 feet o f water . These caves are wide , high-ceil inged caverns accented
5The discuss ion of cave resources in Guam was written by Tim Rock .
4 8 3
by dripstone formations , stalagmites and stalactites . They e are bel ieved to have been sources for water for anc ient Chamorros and pos s ibly shelters for Japanese holdouts . Archeological excavations have discovered a variety o f art i f acts , and latte stone bases made o f s talagmites or stalactites have been found at some dig s ites .
Other s ubmerged c aves are Blue Hole and the Anae Caves .
World War I I S ites
The popularity o f sport diving and the interest in remains from World War I I on Guam have resulted in the discovery of a variety o f s ites in the harbor . I n July 1 9 8 6 , a survey o f the harbor floor by Pelages Corporat ion , i n preparation for the instal lation of four f leet moorings ( Pelages 1 9 8 6 ) , added further information to the resource base . I n addition to the f ive ma j or shipwrecks , one pos itively identi f ied airplane , and the pos s ible remains o f a second plane in the harbor , there are numerous other s ites , predominantly the remains o f landing craft and barges . These s ites have not been documented ; only prel iminary identification has been completed . Their locations are based upon the work o f Paul Edwards in 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 0 . The number of each s ite was arbitrarily as s igned by Edwards ; the Guam Historic Preservation O f f ice has continued to use Edwards ' original A list and des ignations . Those numbers are used here and on � Figure 1 0 . 5 to avoid confus ion .
Table 1 0 . 3 . Harbor
Key to Base Map of Other Known S ites in Apra
S ite Number 4 : S ite Number 1 3 : S ite Number 1 4 : S ite Number 1 9 : S ite Number 2 0 : S ite Number 2 3 : S ite Number 2 4 : S ite Number 2 5 : S ite Number 2 6 : S ite Number 2 7 : S ite Number 2 8 : S ite Number 3 0 :
LCU--Piti back bay Barge--Dry Dock I s land Barge--east of Dry Dock I s l and LCU--Glass Breakwater Barge- -ABJ Lagoon breakwater Barge--northeast of Adotgan Point LCU--north of Orote Barge--Glass Breakwater Barge--Glass Breakwater Barge--Glass Breakwater Barge--northeas t 2 6 , 2 7 Barge--Piti channel
4 8 4
Fig . 1 0 . 5 .
APRA OUTER HARBOR
24
OROTE PENINSULA
MARIANA ISLANDS APRA HARBOR ISLAND OF GUAM TERRITORY OF GUAM
Scale 1:10,000
Guam 1963 Datum
112
MILES
Apuntllll Pt
Neye faland t),·,
Commadores Cut
APRA INNER HARBOR
Base map o f other known s ites not investigated in Apra Harbor .
Carol ine I s l ands
Republ ic of Belau
Prehistoric Villages
Stories of sunken prehistoric villages are sprinkled in the oral history of the Belauans . Three prominent villages are mentioned : Ngibtal in Ngiwal State , Uchelbeluu in I rrai State and Ngeruangel in Ngcheangel State . Ngibta l is discus sed in Chapter 1 1 . The other vil lages , Uchelbeluu on the west s ide of Augul selu Reef and Ngeruangel at the reef on the f ar north of the archipelago ( Figure 1 0 . 6 ) , were never vis ited .
Prehistoric Yap Fish Traps
Cal led beng in Belauan , the fish traps built by Yapese when they c ame to Belau to quarry the large stone money are conf ined to the eastern s ide of Babeldaob . Several have been inventoried in Melekeok ( re fer to Figure 1 0 . 6 ) . This type o f trap i s made f rom coral heads stac ked i n an outl ining wal l about 2 t o 3 feet high . They are placed ins ide the reef where the water leve l stays 2 to 3 feet high at low t ide . The Yap coral traps dif fer markedly from Belauan traps , which are made of bent reeds in a basket-l ike fashion .
Prehistoric Stone Docks
All o f the s tone docks on Bel au are assoc i ated with the prehistoric period . Yawata ( Chapman 1 9 6 8 : 6 8 - 6 9 ) was the f irst scholar to attempt to understand village settlement . Like Chapman , he was struck by the apparent util i z ation o f the interior o f the larger islands before European contact . Yawata investigated the loe ations o f abandoned vil lages and conc luded that there was a movement from the coast to the interior . This movement was related to the construction of the large terrace systems in the interior and perhaps the need for de fens ible pos itions . Sometime be fore the arrival of Europeans , the people moved back to the coas t .
The prehistoric villages in Irrai that were investigated by Gummerman , Snyder and Masse ( 1 9 8 1 ) and that are built on streams invariably have stone docks as soc iated with them . Stone - lined pathways connect the various activity c enters in the vil l age with the boat docks . The wel l-developed docks are located where channels through the mangrove swamp lead to the ocean . At one s ite , B : IR : 1 , the s tones form a semic ircular landing ( Gummerman et al . 1 9 8 1 : 3 7 ) . Four s ites in Irrai have this inland dock feature . Prel iminary investigations in other states have uncovered s imilar docks
4 8 6
1 34° 1 5' E
Ngeruan9er
..'iiO���+ NGERUANGEL VILLAGE 8° 1 0 ' N
1 34° 20' E N g e r e k e b e a a n g � O reor
Ngerchaol �� N g e m e l a c h a l r:J �
Ulebaechel
C H E L B A C H E B
I'• (ROCK ISLANDS) f�Ngerukeuld � J\ M e c h e r c � & <
0'--'--'-�� tJ
Bablomekang 0 � STATUTE M I L E S
S o n a o r o l : F a n a
, P u l o A nna
•Merlr
BELAU OUTLIERS
Ngcheangel (7
BELAU
? (, \,,,�M
\\ '(, '· ')
·�· .
..... ·--�
r' I
.. �.(: .. / � ,.. . Oreor '1 / • . .";.j�� reke b esan
�� ,)
) ·�J
' .::.;:· � long �·� :�::�:�:: 1 r··. ·:.'· \, ' t: _,.--..._ UCHELBELUU VILLAGE
Tobl •
0 25 5 0 L-...L.....--J
STATUTE M I L E S
r···· . -'/ Ngeruktabel ····::.:·:.:: ...
Bablo m e k a n g 0 \ . a· �1 N geruk.eUid '.,:.- �MecherChar i I> .� ...
i; · .l : ,4 . :( Ngeml is·,,�
D>N.:.�:�rechong
Ngedbus {�:r- Ngercheu
.. M.��AMERICAN AIRPLANE
Bel i l iou fV.: Ngebad
'.·'
0 2 0
Fig . 1 0 . 6 . Belau .
Base map o f other known s ites not investigated in
4 8 7
at s ites in Orear , Ngchesar and Ngeremlengui { Gummerman et e al . 1 9 8 1 : 2 6 - 2 8 ) .
Osborne ( 1 9 6 6 ) also ment ions the presence o f pier-l ike ree f fragments connecting two islands . i s l and o f Ngerchur he described one such feature :
On the eas tern shore o f the tombolo are the remnants o f , presumably , an aboriginal dock . A l ine o f coral s labs paral lel to the shore , now largely buried in the sand , was probably part of the structure . The pier remnant itse l f is not only an elongated grouping o f stones 8 to 1 0 feet wide , which extends into the sea 2 0 to 3 0 feet and is at right angle to the line of stone in the s and . ( Osborne 1 9 6 6 : 2 9 4 )
tombolo , At the
I n addit ion to this example , Osborne also recorded another s imilar s ite on the southern i s l and o f Merir ( Osborne 1 9 6 6 : 4 9 -5 0 ) .
Caves 6
Capped in an emerald crown of greenery , many o f Belau ' s A is lands are pocketed with natural caverns and caves . One W such feature is the Yap Cave , said to be the refuge o f the s ea faring people of Yap . These travelers came to Belau to quarry s tone money and then to return the pieces by c anoe to their i s l and 4 0 0 miles away by open sea . The cave entrance i s hidden on a small is let at the southern t ip o f Irrai State . Here they would doc k their open-cargo canoes and rest a fter their long journey . On the western s ide o f the i s land is the cave that holds great legendary s igni f ic ance for Belauans . I t is also somewhat hidden and was formerly a place to hide women , children and the elderly during anc ient wars . The entrance was guarded by two warriors .
Nearby are the quarry caves . The Yapese placed great value on huge , round discs they formed from aragonite that composes the wal l s of the caverns . The stone money discs may be seen partially completed in the several l arge caves o f Metuke r ' ra Bisech I s land .
6 The discuss ion Tim Rock .
of cave resources in Belau was written by
4 8 8
Belau has an intriguing archeological past . There are s tone monol iths in Ollei far to the north , and on the isolated island o f Ulong in south-central Belau there are c aves few have seen . Figures and des igns adorn the cave wal l s that s i t high-up a long the northeas tern c l i f f l ine . Many o f these glyphs resemble people , shields and pos s ibly the s un . Their meaning and origin are being studied .
One cave that c an be explored by both scuba diving and by foot is the Chandel ier C ave . Located near Oreor , this s hallow cave comprises many chambers and a high ceiling that r ises above the water level , which allows divers to surface , talk and even take o f f diving gear and walk around in some o f the chambers . Stalactites and stalagmites l imit progre s s , but it is pos s ible to explore a small tunnel . I n a l l , there are four chambers that lead back to a l arge area where divers can again dof f gear , get out of the water and walk around .
The entry i s at a small cove in the Rock I s l ands about 2 0 to 2 5 feet through a j ungle undercut .
Other underwater caves in Belau are Siaes Tunnel and a s ite called the Soft Coral Tunnel . To date , no evidence o f prehistoric use o f now-submerged caves has been found .
Planes
During the aerial attacks o f World War I I , on March 3 0 - 3 1 and April 1 , 1 9 4 4 , a total of 2 , 6 4 5 sorties were f l own from the Task Force 5 8 f leet c arriers against the targets on Bel au , Yap and Woleai . Of those , 1 , 4 2 6 were f lown over Belau , and 4 0 1 tons of bombs and 35 torpedoes were dropped ( Report o f Carrier Based Strikes Against Pelau , Yap and Wolea i , 3 0 , 3 1 March , 1 April 1 9 4 4 : 1 ) . American aircraft did not s trike a defenseles s is land ; the Japanese launched a counterstrike and engaged U . S . forces in aeria l combat .
During the 3 -day operation , the American strike forc e sustained the loss o f 2 5 combat aircra ft and 1 2 operational aircraft . Japanese losses , however , were much heavier . A
total o f 1 1 0 aircra ft were s hot down ; o f that number 9 3 were shot down over Belau and the remainder were downed over deep water before the American strike reached the i s l and . The planes shot down at Belau represent eight dif ferent types o f aircraft used by the Japanese .
4 8 9
Table 1 0 . 4 . Japanese Aircraft Shot Down Over Bel au , March e 3 0 - 3 1 and April 1 , 1 9 4 4
Number u . s . Code Name Japanese Des ignation
4 Tony Kawasaki Ki-6 1 , army 7 7 Zeke Mitsubishi A6m , navy
3 Hamp Mitsubishi A6Me , navy 3 Oscar Naka j ima Ki- 4 3 , army 1 To j o Naka j ima Ki-4 4 , army 1 Nate Naka j ima Ki- 2 7 , army
Unidenti f ied 1 Pete Mitsubishi F 1M , navy 2 Betty Mitsubishi G4MI /G4M3 , navy
S ites o f known but not identi f ied airplane wreckage inc lude the remains o f American airplanes in Ngeruktable ( Urukthapel ) Anchorage , the is land o f Orear , and on the north s ide of Garreau . Another Japanese airplane is known to have wrecked on the southwest side o f Ngeruktable I s l and ( Figure 1 0 . 7 ) . F igures 1 0 . 8 through 1 0 . 14 i llustrate t he various planes lost in Bel au .
Mines
During the aerial attacks of World War I I , on March 3 0 - 3 1 and Apri l 1 , 1 9 4 4 , 1 0 percent o f the e f fort went into minelaying . This was the first such miss ion from c arriers ( Action Report , Commander Task Force 5 8 , Mining of Channel of Palau I s lands on 3 0 , 3 1 March 1 9 4 4 ) . The strategic harbors and channels that were mined inc luded Ngemelachel ( Malakal ) and Ngel l Channels , Kobesang Harbor , and the pas sage southeast o f Ngeruktable ( Urukthapel ) I s land , which is referred to as Sax Pas sage on some maps . During this e f fort , 2 5 Mark 1 0 Model 6 mines and 5 3 Mark 2 5 mines were laid .
Both types were painted with c amouf lage paint . The Mark 25 mines were a mottled s and color , said to be invis ible to a diver more than 1 0 feet away . The Mark 25 could also be set to del ay arming for as long as 3 5 days after being deployed . This mine was 2 2 - 7 / 1 6 inc hes in diameter and 8 9 - 1 /2 inches long with the parachute and 8 2 - 1 / 8 inches long without it . I t carried an explos ive charge o f 1 , 1 0 0 pounds o f TNT or 1 , 2 3 5 pounds o f Torpex . The Mark 1 0 Model 6 mine was described as a " needle-type , moored mine . " I t cons isted of three parts : an anchor , case and f iring mec hanism and parachute . It was 2 1 inches in diameter , 1 1 8 inches long and we ighed 1 , 8 5 0 pounds . Although the l ikel ihood of any o f the mines still being in and around Belau is l imited , that pos s ibil ity should not be discounted .
4 9 0
KOBASANG HARBOR
KOIIEBAIL
LAGOON
·'··< �NGADARAK REEF
' MALAKAL PASS
Fig . 1 0 . 7 . i s l ands o f
Base map Belau .
o f other
BABELD"AOB
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' +.e GOMAGANG RE,f.F
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LO 0,5
GORAKLBAD PASSAGE
MILES
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN CAROLINE ISLANDS PALAU ISLANDS
3
ARANGEL CHANNEL AND KOROR ROAD From • •urvey bl' the USS TANNER In 1969
known s ites not investigated in the central
KAWASAKI KJ:-61·11
Fig . 1 0 . 8 . marked the protection aircraft .
Code-named Tony , the Kawasaki Ki- 6 1 Army aircraft first attempt by the Japanese to incorporate armor and a self-sealing fuel tank in their f ighter ( Courtesy of Naval Institute Press )
M I T S U B I S H I A 6 M 2
Fig . 1 0 . 9 . The Zeke , the 1 9 3 0 s , eventually and A6M5 , known as Institute Press )
initially bui lt for combat in China in evolved into more effic ient model s A6M4
the Zero . ( Courtesy o f the Naval
4 9 2
M I T S U B I S H I A 6 M 3 MODEL 3 2
Fig . 10 . 1 0 . This aircraft was first coded Hap , then Hamp , and finally Zeke 3 2 . ( Courtesy o f Naval Institute Press )
NAKAJIMA KI·44-IIC 10 FT. �'--'--'---_j
Fig . 10 . 1 1 . Code-named To j o and called by the Japanese Devil-Queller , this Army interceptor fighter was used in the defense of the Japanese homeland near the end o f the war . ( Courtesy o f Naval Institute Press )
4 9 3
NAKAJIMA Kl-278
Fig . 1 0 . 12 . The Nakaj ima Ki- 2 7 Army extens ively in the war in China in ( Couretesy of Naval Institute Press )
MITSUBISHI F 1M2
10 FT.
f ighter was used the late 1 9 3 0 s .
Fig . 1 0 . 1 3 . The Mitsubishi F 1M2 was unique because it was the only type of naval aircraft in the observation c lass to go into mas s production . ( Courtesy o f Naval Institute Press )
4 9 4
K 1• 4 3 P R OTOTYPE
NAKAJIMA K l- 4 3 ·11 K A I
Fig . 1 0 . 1 4 . Code-named Oscar , Hayabusa , known to the Japanese as the first Japanese aircraft undercarriage . ( Courtesy o f Naval
4 9 5
, - , I 1 I I
0 5 1 0 FT. �·���-L·------�·
the Army Nakaj ima Ki- 4 3 Peregine Falcon , was among to have a retractable Institute Press )
CHAPTER XI . OTHER SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES
AND UNDERWATER COMPONENTS OF LAND-BASED S ITES :
THE ARCHEOLOGICAL RECORD
By Toni L . Carrell , Kevin Foster , Daniel J . Lenihan , David T . Lotz and James E . Miculka 1
Introduction
This chapter is devoted to a discussion of nonshipwreck s ites inc luding smaller watercraft . More speci f ically , these are s ites that range from the remains of pre-European contact fishing and quarrying to World War I I equipment and materiel either lost or abandoned during the heat of battle . Because nearly every human endeavor in Micrones ia involves interaction with water , an investigation and discuss ion of shipwrecks alone would present an incomplete picture o f the ful l range of the submerged resources potential to be found in the islands .
An effort was made to examine as many dif ferent s ite types as pos s ible and to inc lude an overview of those resources in this chapter . The s ites presented here are neither comprehensive nor exhaustive but are representative .
The obj ective of field work was to gather as much descriptive data as poss ible , given the constraints imposed by equipment , time and personnel resources . All research was completed us ing a nondestructive methodology emphasizing mapping of exposed wreckage , photography , artistic depictions , videotape and written description . Logistics also influenced the research approach . Because of the remoteness of the s ites , the research emphas ized short , intense , field investigations that leaned heavily upon volunteer divers and park pro fes sionals res ident in the is lands . As a result , this chapter contains written contributions from a variety o f
1with contributions from Dennis Blackenbaker , Wil liam Cooper , Ros e S . N . Manibusan , Mark Michael , Lynne Michael and Edward wood .
4 9 7
authors . It is organized into categories of is land chain, e island and s ite types , grouped together for discuss ion and analysis .
Mariana I slands
Investigations were undertaken on the islands of Saipan , Rota and Guam . Sites both within and outside American Memorial Park , Saipan , and War in the Pac i f ic National Historical Park , Guam, were visited .
Saipan
American Memorial Park and Saipan Lagoon2
There have been four assessment surveys carried out by the War in the Pac i f ic National Historical Park ( WAPA ) submerged research team . See Chapter 9 for a discuss ion o f these pro j ects .
Site-Spec i fic Investigations
As a result of the four surveys , more than 5 0 s ites were A identified within the scope of this study . The maj ority of ., these were represented by post-World War I I wreckage from U . S . pontoons or barges . Many of the remains were in poor condition and were not cons idered to be significant resources . With the development of the Smil ing Cove Harbor in American Memorial Park , many of these wreckage fields were removed . These s ites were identified and described in the American Memorial Park Submerged Cultural Assessment ( Miculka and Manibusan 1 9 8 3 ) .
A total o f 10n s ites associated with either the interwar years or World War I I are discussed here . The f irst three are located within the boundary of American Memorial P ark ; the remainder are within Saipan Lagoon . None of the s ites have offic ial s ite des ignation numbers , and they are s imply referred to by their investigation number from either the 1 9 8 3 ( Figure 1 1 . 1 ) or the 1 9 8 4 survey ( Figure 1 1 . 2 ) .
2This section on resources within American Memorial Park and Saipan Lagoon was written by James E . Miculka with contributions from Edward Wood , William Cooper and Dennis Blackenbaker .
4 9 8
A M E R IC A N M E M O R IAL PAR K , S A IPA N
0 HARBOR PE NINSULA
T A N APAG BAY
R ESIDENTIAL
Fig . 1 1 . 1 . Base map of s ites investigated during submerged resource s survey - of American Memorial Park , October 1 9 8 3 and 1 9 8 9 .
N
J cultural
SAIPAN
• GARAPAN
N
NOT TO SCALE
Fig . 1 1 . 2 . Base map of sites investigated during submerged cultural resources survey of Saipan Lagoon , 1 9 8 4 and 1 9 8 9 .
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S ite Number 9 : Japanese Harbor Dredge
Located o f f Micro Beach ( re fer to Figure 1 1 . 1 ) , this Japanese dredge is in fair condition with a length of 8 7 feet and width of 1 7 . 4 feet . The bow is 7 . 4 feet high . A large portion of this ship is out of the water . The wreck s its in about 3 . 3 feet o f water .
S ite Number 1 1 : Japanese Antiaircraft Gun
During the 1 9 8 3 survey , a Japanese antiaircraft gun was discovered ( re fer to Figure 1 1 . 1 ) . Located in the same general area as the dredge , it appeared to be a Model 9 6 ( 1 9 3 6 ) type 2 , 2 5 -mm AA/AT cannon, dual mount . It had a maximum rate of fire of 3 0 0 rounds per minute with a vertical range of 14 , 0 0 0 feet . The gun was in 5 feet of water and was in fair condition in 19 8 3 . It is pos s ible that it may have been removed during the intervening years because it could not be relocated during the 1 9 9 0 survey .
Site Number 2 4 : Japanese Railroad Cars
A total of 14 Japanese sugar cane railroad cars were discovered in 1 9 8 3 ( refer to Figure 1 1 -: 1 ) . They are partially submerged off a peninsula within the boundary o f American Memorial Park . The narrow-gauge railroad was constructed by the South Seas Development Company to transport sugar cane between three large plantations and two sugar mills . The molasses manufactur�d from some sugar cane was used to make alcoho l and l iquor , which were then converted into synthetic Scotch whisky , port wine , and other beverages for Japanese consumption . In 1 9 30 Saipan ' s chief exports were sugar and alcohol . The narrow-gauge railroad was used by U . S . troops after the American invasion in July 1 9 4 4 . Its steam locomotive was repaired to transport gasoline and bombs to Asl ito Airfield .
This s ite is definitely associated with the pre-American invas ion of Saipan ; the rai lroad was not rebuilt after the war . Most of the cars are in fair shape , rusted and covered with some coral growth . Several of the cars are partially exposed above the surface o f the water . Two sections o f narrow-gauge track were discov�red i n the same vicinity . The maj ority of these railroad c ars are s itting right s ide up and were pos sibly dumped at the s ite by the Japanese as part of the fill material when the peninsula was constructed before the war .
Sample measurements of one railroad car are a length o f 6 . 5 feet and a width of 3 . 3 feet . The wheel base i s 3 . 3 feet high .
5 0 1
The following seven s ites were f irst surveyed in 1 9 8 4 and e again in 1 9 9 0 . At present , they do not have s ite designation numbers and are referred to here by their number that resulted from the 19 8 4 survey ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 2 ) . Each l ies within Saipan Lagoon .
Site Number 3 : Japanese Landing Barges
This s ite contains two landing craft in 3 0 feet o f water ( refer to Figure 11 . 2 ) . I t was thought to be an American LCVP ( landing craft , vehic le , personnel ) . S imilar to S ite Number 6 in Saipan Lagoon , it is now felt to be a Japanese Army Daihatsu landing barge . Both craft are in fair shape and are about 1 5 0 feet from each other . The length of the vehicles is 5 7 feet and the width is 1 3 feet . There are two props located at the stern .
S ite Number 6 : Japanese Landing Barge
This s ite ( re fer to Figure 1 1 . 2 ) was originally thought to be the skeletal remains of an American LCVP ( landing craft , vehicle , personnel ) , known as a " Higgins Boat . " Further research by Sean Cahill , Park Ranger , WAPA , has led us to believe that it may be a Japanese Army Daihatsu landing barge ( Figures 1 1 . 3 and 1 1 . 4 ) . The length, width , bow configuration and winch arrangement all support this identification ( Figures 1 1 . 5 and 1 1 . 6 ) . I f this is a Daihatsu landing barge , it is a very unique s ite .
S ite Number 4 : Japanese " Emily " Flying Boat
Located outs ide the boundary of the park , this s ite in 35 feet of water has been identified by Will iam Cooper and Dennis Blankenbacker as a Japanese H8K3 " Emily " flying boat ( Figure 1 1 . 7 ) . This four-engine bomber is scattered over an area of 1 5 0 feet . The wing section remains intact . The fuselage i s destroyed ( Figure 1 1 . 8 ) . The tail is about 14 feet from the wing section ( Figure 1 1 . 9 ) . Engines two and three have separated from the wing s ection and l ie behind the wing section ( Figure 1 1 . 10 ) . The wing length is approximately 1 2 5 feet . The wreck is in fair condition .
S ite Number 5 : Japanese " Jake " F loat Plane
This is a small , single-engine , float plane located in 35 feet of water ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 2 ) . This plane has been identified by Cooper and Blankenbacker as a Japanese Aichi E 1 3A1 ( type 0 ) float plane , code-named " Jake " ( Figure 1 1 . 1 1 ) . This plane is almost intact , with one of the floats o f f to the s ide . It is lying ups ide-down , with the camera s ight hole , bomb racks and external fuel racks all vis ible ( Figure 1 1 . 12 ) . Also , somewhat recent additions are a bottle e
5 0 2
F .i.g . 1 1 . 3 . Japanese Daihatsu landing barge sunk in Saipan Lagoon . ( Photo by Tim Rock)
Fig . 1 1 . 4 . Port and stern quarter of Daihatsu landing barge . ( Photo by William Cooper )
5 0 3
. ...
Fig . 1 1 . 5 . Profile view of Japanese Daihatsu landing barge , s ite 6 , Saipan Lagoon . ( Sketch by William Cooper )
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Fig . 1 1 . 6 . Plan view of Japanese Daihatsu landing barge sunk in Saipan Lagoon . ( Sketch by Will iam Cooper )
5 0 4
KAWANISHI H8K3
F ig . 1 1 . 7 . Code-named "Emily, • this four-engined , long-range bomber and reconnaissance flying boat carried a crew o f 1 0 . ( Courtesy of Naval Institute Pres s )
Fig . 1 1 . 8 . Disarticulated engine from Japanese flying boat lost in Saipan Lagoon . ( Photo by William Cooper)
5 0 5
F ig . 1 1 . 9 . Tail section o f "Emi ly" flying boat . Note the breadth of the tail to permit gunner access to the tail cannon . ( Photo by W i l liam Cooper)
Fig. wing .
1 1 . 1 0 . Emily nose and fuselage debris forward o f the ( Photo by William Cooper)
506
Fig . 1 1 . 1 1 . The Japanese Aichi float plane was code-named "Jake . " ( Sketch by Will iam Cooper)
Fig . 1 1 . 12 . The camera sight hole, bomb racks and external fuel racks are visible on the remains of this Jake float plane lost in Saipan Lagoon . ( Photo by Wil l iam Coope r )
5 0 7
of sake and a Japanese prayer stick chained to the propeller tl ( Figure 1 1 . 1 3 ) . These may have been placed there during a Japanese memorial ceremony .
Unnumbered Site : Unidentified Japanese Plane
This s ite , first surveyed in 1 9 9 0 , has not yet been identified . Bec ause no attach points between the fuse lage and wing were visible , it was originally thought to be Japanese type 9 9 2EFB " Cherry . " The missing attachments at f irst suggested that the plane had a high-wing , suspended fuselage with two engines , much like the Cherry .
After further research, there are indications that this identification was incorrect . The dihedral , that is , the angle o f the wings in relat ionship to the fuselage , and the square engine nacelle with the presence of landing gear well in the nacelle , indicates that it may be some other type of aircraft . Not much is left of the s ite , but the wreckage is scattered over 5 0 feet . A portion o f the ups ide-down wing is the maj or identi fiable piece of the wreckage ( Figures 1 1 . 14 and 1 1 . 15 ) .
Unnumbered S ite : American TBM Avenger
This s ite is a s ingle engine aircraft located in 7 feet of A water about 1- 1 /2 miles south of Managaha Island and about W 1 5 0 feet ins ide the reef . It is lying ups ide-down and is broken off behind the cockpit . Only the wing and engine mount are left . The landing gear was extended and is of a type that retracts outward towards the wing tip . Also , what appears to be a radio box is about 2 0 feet behind the wreckage . According to Cooper , tentative identification is that of an American TBM Avenger because of its wing s ize width , fuselage and landing gear configuration .
During the 1 9 9 0 survey , William Cooper made an observation regarding the pos itions of the airc raft that may explain an observed phenomenon : all of the aircraft surveyed were ups ide-down . This could be due to s everal factors such as an unplanned ditching with the pilot unconsc ious or not in the aircraft . The deceleration combined with the weight of the engine could cause it to come to rest inverted . I n the case of the TBM , the gear being extended would also be a factor . Of course , one other explanation is t ime and weather . The lagoon is shallow , and storm surge could have inverted the craft and scattered debris .
Unnumbered S ite : American Landing Vehicle , Tracked
This s ite contains the scattered remains o f about 1 1 American � LVTs ( landing vehic le , tracked ) . All o f them are in poor W
5 0 8
F ig . 1 1 . 1 3 . Engine and prop from the Jake lost in Saipan Lagoon . The bottle of sake and prayer stick tied to the
5 0 9
Fig. 1 1 . 14 . One distinguishing characteristic of this unidentified plane is the angle of the wings in relationship to the fuselage. ( Photo by William Cooper)
Fig. 1 1 . 1 5 . The square engine nacelle on an undentified plane lost in Saipan Lagoon . ( Photo by William Cooper)
5 1 0
condition and are outs ide the ree f , north of Saipan Lagoon . Storm surge has probably damaged them . It appears that these vehic les were dumped on this s ite and not sunk as a result of battle action . These vehicles are in about 100 feet of water . A measurement on a sample vehicle shows a length o f 2 6 feet and width of 10 feet . At the north end of the s ite , a s tone cross approximately three feet in length is located .
Administrative Status
The American Memorial Park is administered by the U . S . National Park Service ; however , the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana I s lands ( CNMI ) can request the return of the park at any time . The area of Saipan Lagoon is administered by the commonwealth .
Present Threats and Impacts
The developing tourism operations of the CNMI could c ause heavy vis itation to these s ites by scuba divers . There is already a commercial tour submarine on Saipan that of fers tours of some underwater s ites . There have been reports o f this tour submarine damaging some of the s ites .
Rota
National Park Service Submerged Cultural Resources Unit archeologist , Toni Carrell , and diving technician , Ken Vrana , vis ited the island in 1 9 8 7 at the suggestion of Mark Michae l , owner of Dive Rota . Michael , representing Rota at a submerged cultural resources training workshop held on Guam , requested as sistance in identifying submerged cultural resources located in Sasanhaya Bay . S ince the NPS visit , Michael has continued to document the remains of submerged s ites around the is land .
Phosphate Mine Dock and Cable Run3
During the years between World War I and World War I I , phosphate was discovered on Rota . The Japanese quickly moved to exploit this important resource and established a mine and cable car run on the savanna ( Figure 1 1 . 1 6 ) . The cable c ars ran from the mine down the c li f f face to a processing factory f ac ing Sasanhaya Bay ( Figure 1 1 . 17 ) . The factory was built on a narrow shelf above the bay ( Figure 1 1 . 1 8 ) . From there
3 I nformation in this section was written by Toni Carrell based on information provided by Mark and Lynne Michael .
5 1 1
SASANLAGO
. . . ... ,,, · ··� .
�ED RAILROAD ARATSU BAY
Phosphate Mine, factory & cable runs
SASANHA Y A BAY r .05
MILES
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
MARIANA ISLANDS
ROTA Fro• U.S. N•vy Sunr•v• 10 1965 SCALE 1:15,000
Fig . 1 1 . 1 6 . Location of Japanese phosphate mine and ruins o f factory and cable c ar run on Rota .
�
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' .. -
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.. .
Fig . 1 1 . 1 7 . Cable cars ran island down to the factory courtesy of Mark Michael )
from the mine on the above Sasanhaya Bay .
top o f ( Photo
F ig . 1 1 . 1 8 . The phosphate factory on Rota was built on a small shelf above the bay . The concrete base of the jump ramp/loading dock is still intact today . ( Photo courtesy o f Mark Michae l )
5 1 3
the ore was trans ferred , again via c able cars , through a j ump It ramp above a small dock to barges and then to waiting c argo ships offshore ( Figure 1 1 . 1 9 ) .
Ruins of the mining operation on the savanna are overgrown . However , the remains of the cable car towers on the c liff face are vis ible . Thick growth obscures the remains o f the factory , and only the foundations o f the towers and loading dock, extending offshore in shal low water , are apparent ( Figure 1 1 . 2 0 ) .
The cement foundations are in less than 2 0 feet of water on a white sand bottom . Cables from the towers , anchor chain and an anchor are also present . The s ite , locally referred to as Cable Run , is a popular dive des tination because of the presence of large coral heads and sand f lats .
Administrative Status
All o f the s ites in and around Rota are administered by the local government and are under the umbrella of the historic preservation law of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana I slands .
Present Threats and Impacts
Sport diving is a popular activity on Rota . At present there is l ittle effect ive control over the removal of artifacts from s ites . The local dive shop owners , Mark and Lynne Michae l , do not encourage divers to remove artifacts and have made strong ef forts to record the location and photograph artifacts from submerged s ites around the island .
Guam
War in the Pac ific National Historical Park4
I n February 1 9 8 1 , the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit ( SCRU ) from Santa Fe , New Mexico , visited the park for the f irst time . They made a prel iminary assessment and suggested further underwater archeological s urvey needs . The team returned in September 1 9 8 3 for a more extens ive reconnaissance survey . This was the first survey of the two water units of the park . Although most of the survey took
4This section on resources within War in the Paci f ic National Park and nearby s ites was written by James E . Miculka and Rose S . N . Manibusan . tl
5 14
Fig. 1 1 . 19 . The phosphate ore was transferred to barges by a jump ramp, then towed out to waiting cargo ships . ( Photo courtesy ot Mark Michael )
Fig . 1 1 . 2 0 . The foundations of a cable tower adjacent to the loading dock are still visible . ( Photo by Mark Michae l )
5 1 5
plac e in Apra Harbor , SCRU and the park ' s dive team managed tt to look at selected s ites within the Asan and Agat units . A report and underwater video footage are on f ile from this survey .
The park ' s Submerged Resources Team ( SRT ) underwent training on submerged cultural resource management techniques in April 1 9 8 5 . This was conducted by SCRU and involved further field surveys o f the offshore areas of the Agat Unit . A 6 -week survey in conjunction with SCRU and the U . S . Navy took place in May-June 1 9 8 7 . During the summer of 1 9 8 8 , SCRU and the War in the Pac ific National Historical Park SRT began mapping the SMS CORMORAN and TOKAI MARU s ites .
The underwater surveys within the park are conducted as time permits . With the l imited staff ( currently two ) on the park ' s dive team and a couple of volunteers , survey activities are progress ing slowly but steadily . It should be mentioned that the submerged cultural resources management operations in the park could not take place without the assistance o f volunteers such as Bill Cooper , Tim Rock and Suzanne Hendricks .
S ix known s ites related to the Pac i f ic Theatre of World War I I are located within the two off shore areas of the park . These s ites were discovered during partial transects of each � unit with maximum depths of 6 0 feet . The information pres ented here was gathered during the 1 9 8 3 and 1 9 8 7 surveys and training dives by the park ' s SRT .
S ite-Spec i fic Investigations
Two known s ites related to World War I I are within the Asan Beach Unit ( Figure 1 1 . 2 1 ) . The entire Asan Beach Unit needs to be surveyed in detail and mapped under archeological conditions . It is pos sible that additional World War II equipment may be found in deeper water . The s ite numbers used in the following discussion are arbitrarily ass igned and referenced on Figure 1 1 . 2 1 .
S ite Number 1 : Amphibious Tractor Treads
On a transect survey carried out in 1 9 8 7 , a s ite located in approximately 6 0 feet of water was discovered . It is approximately 5 0 0 yards offshore . The remains appear to be treads from amphibious tractors , which are tangled among the coral . There do not appear to be any vehicles in the area assoc iated with the s ite . The s ite was examined only briefly at the time , and there has been no further investigation .
5 1 6
APUNTUA P O I N T
N
0
CABRAS I S LA N D
I AGAT U N I T/
I s GAAN POINT ' 4
--- PA R K BOUNDARY
WAR IN THE PACIFIC
NATI O N A L HISTORICAL PARK - Guam
Fig . 1 1 . 2 1 . Base map of submerged s ites in War in the Paci fic National Historical Park and adj acent areas .
5 17
Site Number 2 : American LVT
A well-known site , located j ust off the area known as Asan Cut and approximately 2 0 0 yards from the park ' s vis itor information center , is an amphibious tractor ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 2 1 ) . It is located in approximately 3 5 feet of water and is in generally poor condition ; for the most part , it is j ust a frame . This LVT ( landing vehicle tracked ) or " amphtrac , " is poss ibly that of a LVT- 1 .
The LVTs were produced by several manufacturers and generally shipped directly to staging areas or to the field . Average l i fe for LVTs was estimated at 6 0 0 hours with an average track life of 1 5 0 hours . Once in the field, it was found that 2 hours of maintenance were required for each hour of use , although they rarely received the required maintenance .
The LVT- 1 , which was the f irst in a series of four models to be produced , carried a two-to-three-person crew . On land it had a speed of 1 2 miles per hour and a radius o f 1 5 0 miles . While in the water , its speed was reduced to 6 miles per hour with a radius of 6 0 miles . It carried 8 0 gallons of fuel and had a s ix-cylinder Hercules engine . It measured 2 1 feet , 6 inches long , 9 feet , 1 0 inches wide and 8 feet , 1 inch high . The empty weight was 17 , 3 0 0 pounds and fully loaded it weighed 2 1 , 8 0 0 pounds . 4lt
Site Number 3 : Camel Rock Ammunition Dump
I n a report produced by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group One in 1 9 7 8 , the site is described as containing at least 6 4 tons o f unexploded World War I I Japanese and American ordnance . The ordnance ranges in size from . 3 0 -caliber bul lets to 5 0 0-pound bombs . The general phys ical condition o f the ordnance is poor , and the depths of the scatter range from 3 0 feet to at least 1 3 0 feet . The survey area included an area from the mouth of the Asan River to Camel Rock .
The ammunition dump at Camel Rock was the result o f a postinvas ion c leanup of ordnance . The Navy gathered the ordnance and sealed them in tar , loaded them on crates and then dumped the crates o f f Camel Rock ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 2 1 ) . No other information on the site exists except for the 1 9 7 8 report .
Three known sites have been examined in the Agat Unit ; each is related to World War I I military activity . Like the Asan Beach Unit , the Agat Unit needs more detailed surveys , which could l ead to the discovery of additional remains .
5 1 8
Adj acent to this s ite is a large outboard motor with an engine 3- feet , 6 -inches wide , a shaft 1 0 -feet , ? -inches long and a propeller 3-feet , 6 -inches wide ( Cooper 1 9 9 1 ) .
Site Number 4 : Gaan Point Amtrac
The best-known s ite is that of an LVT located about 5 0 0 yards offshore of Gaan Point ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 2 1 ) . This LVT-4 is in good condition and in approximately 35 feet of water . During a 1 9 8 5 training session , the site was mapped ( Figure 1 1 . 2 2 ) .
The LVT-4 differed from its earlier vers ion located in Asan . The LVT-4 contained a ? -horsepower Cont inental engine and had a land speed of 2 0 miles per hour and the same radius as the LVT- 1 . I n the water , it had a range o f 7 5 miles and a speed of 7 . 5 miles per hour . Its fuel capacity was 1 4 0 gal lons . I t is 2 6 feet , 1 inch long , 10-feet , 8 - inches wide and 8 feet , 1 inch high . Its empty weight is 2 7 , 4 0 0 pounds and ful ly loaded it weighed 36 , 4 0 0 pounds and carried a crew o f two t o seven people .
Very l ittle is known about the LVTs . It is purely conjecture whether they were sunk during the invas ion or later dumped as surplus equipment . No battle damage is evident on e ither tractor .
S ite Number 5 : American Pontoon Barge
Another s ite is located south of Gaan Point in a 7 0- foot crevice formed by f inger reefs ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 2 1 ) . The s ite cons ists of portions of a barge with a hoi s t or crane assembly used for the trans fer of fuel-oil drums or other supplies to amphibious vehicles . The s ite includes 1 2 5 5 - gallon drums , a partially buried wheeled cart , a crane or hoist assembly with a block , batteries still in their battery boxes , l arge pieces of sheet metal for the barge , and a soldier ' s helmet . Support for this tentative identificat ion comes from the following quote :
. . . all cargo [ of f Agat Beac h ] had to be restaged to amphibious vehic les several hundred yards of fshore . the cranes at Agat were mounted on pontoon barges moored along the line where the shallow water began . . . . Another device employed to expedite unloading was the construction of improvised pontoons . . . . The rafts could then be floated over the reef and in to shore ( US Army in World War I I : The War in the Pac i fic Campaign by Phil ip A . Crowl , p . 35 8 ) .
5 1 9
4-85 474 TLC 82001
. , . · . ·
. . : � · . . . . . . . . .
· · •· ·. . . ·lfJJi) · . . · . .
. . . .
East Elevation
LVT
WAR IN THE PACIFIC NHP
US National Park Service Submerged Cultural Resources Unit
3 2 SCALE
0 5
Fig . 1 1 . 2 2 . American LVT located off Gaan Point . ( Drawn by Toni Carrel l )
5 2 0
First discovered in 1 9 8 5 ( Carrell 1 9 85 ) , the s ite has not been vis ited s ince ; its current status is unknown .
None of the park surveys has concentrated on prehistoric s ites ; therefore , it is not known if any prehistoric s ites exist within the park .
Administrative Status
The submerged s ites lie within the authorized boundaries of the park . Titles to the o f fshore areas are currently held by the Government o f Guam and the U . S . Navy .
Present Threats and Impacts
Because access to some of the s ites generally requires the use of a boat , diver impact is not a primary concern at this time . The well-known s ites have been picked clean o f any arti facts . Other than informal patrols of the sites , not much is known about visitation to the s ites .
The ammunition dump has been identified as a hazardous s ite . All dive shops are aware of the dangers , and divers are warned not to remove or disturb ordnance . Only informal and infrequent patrols are made of the s ite .
Rizal Beach
Site Number 6 : Amphibious Tank Turret
Just north of Rizal Beach are the remains of an amphibious tank turret and a scattering of ammunition ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 2 1 ) . The main body of the tank was destroyed in a typhoon in 1 9 8 2 . The isolated turret lies in 4 0 feet o f water ( Figure 1 1 . 2 3 ) .
Apuntua Point
Site Number 7 : World War I I Equipment Dump
Located j ust south of Orote Peninsula , this s ite is a pos t-World War I I materiel dump s ite ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 2 1 ) . The bottom is l ittered with the remains of tracked vehicles , mess hal l trays , cables , small wheeled carts , tires , telephone PBX equipment , and radio and ammunition boxes , among other items . Wreckage is s cattered down a steep s lope and begins in j ust over 10 feet o f water and extends to at least 1 3 0 feet . The s ite has been locally referred to as Shark Hole ( Figure 1 1 . 2 4 ) ( Rock 1 9 8 6 : 9 ) and is wel l-known and regularly vis ited .
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F ig . 1 1 . 2 3 . Park Ranger Jim Miculka videotaping tank turret o f f invasion beach at Guam. ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
F ig . 1 1 . 2 4 . Tracked vehicles part of war materiel dump site at Shark Hole, Guam. This photo taken at depth of 1 4 0 feet . Materiel extends to at least 200 feet . ( NPS photo by Larry Murphy )
522
During the submerged cultural resources training course at War in the Pac ific National Historical Park in 1 9 85 ( Carrell 1 9 85 ) , two artist ' s perspective drawings were made of the area ( Figures 1 1 . 2 5 and 1 1 . 2 6 ) by volunteer diver James R . Roybal .
Aircraft Resources 5
During World War I I , numerous aircraft , both American and Japanese , were shot down in the air over Guam and the adj acent ocean . Comdr . David McCampbel l , Sr . , of the ESSEX noted on the afternoon of June 1 9 , 1 9 4 4 , that 17 fires or oil s l icks from downed aircraft were noted within a !-mile radius o f Apra Harbor . However , from these attacks only two Japanese aircraft are known to exist in shallow water access ible by scuba divers .
Japanese Navy Aichi D3A2 " Val "
Code-named " Val , " this small dive bomber from the 6 5 2 nd Naval Air Group , was shot down over Apra Harbor ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 3 1 ) . The two-seat carrier- or land-based dive bomber has a low wing monoplane configuration ( Figure 1 1 . 2 7 ) . The airplane is all metal construction with fabric-covered control surfaces and an enclosed cockpit over the wing . The landing gear is in the tailwheel , and all three wheels are nonretractable . The s ingle engine is a 1 , 3 0 0-horsepower Mitsubishi Kinsei 5 4 , 14 -cylinder radial engine driving a three-blade metal propeller with spinner ( Figure 1 1 . 2 8 and 1 1 . 2 9 ) . Armament is two fixed , forward- f iring , 7 . 7 -millimeter f ixed machine guns in the engine cowling ; one rear-trainable 7 . 7 -mill imeter machine gun and up to 8 1 6 pounds o f bombs mounted on the wings or below the fuselage .
This Val was part of the Raid IV from the Japanese carriers during the afternoon of June 1 9 , 1 9 4 4 , during the battle of the Philippine Sea . The raid was misdirected to a point south o f the American carriers . After reaching the antic ipated point of contact and finding nothing , 4 9 of the Japanese planes turned toward the fields of Guam and j ettisoned their bombs . This flight of 2 0 Mitsubishi A6M5 Z eros , Val dive bombers , and 2 Nakaj ima B6Nl Jill torpedo bombers approached Guam at 1 5 0 0 to be met by numerous U . S . Navy F6F-3 Hellcat fighters : 1 2 from COWPENS , 1 2 from ESSEX , 1 9 from HORNET , 8 from ENTERPRISE , 4 from SAN JACINTO and a few from PRINCETON . Thirty o f the forty-nine Japanese planes
5This section on aircraft resources was written by David T . Lotz .
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Fig. 1 1 . 2 5 . Artist ' s perspective tracked vehicles off Apuntua Point . Roybal )
drawing of abandoned ( Drawing by James R .
Fig. 1 1 . 2 6 . Artist ' s perspective drawing of abandoned �ruck chassis at Apuntua Point . ( Drawing by James R . Royba l )
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Fig . 1 1 . 2 7 . Japanese Navy Aichi D3A2 dive bomber model . ( P hoto o f by David Lot z )
Alt:ttl DlA2 0 s I I I I' I
10 FT I
Fig . 1 1 . 2 8 . The Aichi D3A1 was used in the Battle o f the Phil ippine Sea on June 1 9 , 1 9 4 4 . ( Courtesy of u . s . Naval Institute)
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never made it to Orote Field , having been shot down by the e u . s . Navy fighters .
One Val that was shot down , landed on the water and sunk in outer Apra Harbor on the harbor s ide of Glass Breakwater and now l ies in 8 0 to 9 0 feet of water . The plane is buried nose first into the bottom with its tail and fixed landing gear pointing into the air . A good portion of the tail section is missing .
Some coral grows on the plane , but for the most part it is distinguishable as a Val . A swim to the left of the wreck brings one to the separate wing , again with its fixed landing gear intact . Both wheels have a portion of the tires on them as wel l .
Many years ago , there was an unsucces s ful the plane . Before this attempt , the plane the bottom . The unsuccess ful attempt not the s eparation of the wing but also ups ide-down .
attempt to raise res ted upright on only resulted in flipped the Val
Japanese Navy Mitsubishi A6M5 " Zero "
The remains of a second aircraft , a Japanese Navy Mitsubishi A6M5 Z ero fighter , are lying on a reef j ust north of Umatac . e The s ingle-seat carrier- or land-based fighter is a cantilever low-wing monoplane . The airplane is all metal except for fabric-covered tail control surfaces . The aircraft has retractable tailwheel landing gear and an enclosed cockpit over the wing ( Figure 1 1 . 3 0 ) . The s ingle engine is a 1 , 1 3 0-horsepower , Nakaj ima NK1F Sakae 2 1 14 -cylinder , radial engine driving a three-blade , metal propel ler with spinner . Armament is two 7 . 7 -millimeter machine guns in the upper fuselage decking and two wing-mounted 2 0 -millimeter cannon .
The Z ero was probably based at Orote Field 6 1st Air Flotilla . Res idents of Umatac , the say the plane took off from Orote , was shot fighter and crashed in Fouha Bay . Today upright in 4 0 feet of water on the reef .
as part o f the nearby village , down by a U . S . the Zero sits
Two of the three blades of its propel ler rest in the coral . The engine is exposed , and the canopy is no longer in place . One wing is hal f its normal length, and the instrument panel is without instruments . These instruments and other items have been taken by divers over the years .
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Fig . 1 1 . 29 . collection)
"Val " dive bomber in action . ( Courtesy of USAR
. .. ,..,
Fig . 1 1 . 30 . The Japanese Mitsubishi A6M8 and A6MS fighter Zero, was used throughout the Pacific theate r . ( Courtesy of u . s . Naval Institute)
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Apra Harbor
Administrative Status
Sites located both within Apra Harbor and immediately outs ide the harbor mouth are on submerged lands under the j urisdiction of the U . S . Navy . These include the materiel dump s ite o f f Apuntua Point . Other s ites discussed above are on lands under the j urisdiction o f the Government of Guam .
Present Threats and Impacts
Active sport diving on all s ites around Guam is a potential threat . Although ef forts have been made and continue to be made to preserve sites , depredation since the 1 9 6 0s has resulted in the removal of most portable artifacts as well as brass fittings , instruments , gauges , etc . , from all s ites . Today the heaviest impact is diver visitation ; the numbers of divers touching , bumping up against , and handling features remaining on the sites will accelerate their deterioration .
Caroline I slands
Investigations o f submerged cultural resources other than A shipwrecks were undertaken only within the Republic of ,., Belau . Also included in this section , however , is a brief discus s ion of the well -known prehistoric village s ite of Nan Madol on Pohnpei , in the Federated States of Micronesia .
Republic of Belau
From April 1 1 to June 17 , 1 9 8 8 , archeologists from the National Park Service Submerged Cultural Resources Unit supervised f ield operations aimed at identifying s ignif icant underwater archeological sites . During the course of field operations , several s ites were visited . Site selection was based upon accessibil ity and type ; the aim was to look at a variety o f site types , in a number of locations , in order to gain a broad understanding of the potential resource base . The s ites are arbitrarily numbered for identification on Figure 1 1 . 3 1 .
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KOBASANG HARBOR
KOIIEBAIL LAGOON BABELO'AOB
NGELL CHANNEL
� NGADARAK REEF
MALAKAL PASS
KOROR ROAD 1.0 0.5
GORAKLBAO PASSAGE
2 MILES
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN CAROLINE ISLANDS PALAU ISLANDS
3
ARANGEL CHANNEL AND KOROR ROAD From. a •urvev by the USS TANNER in 1969
Fig . 1 1 . 3 1 . Base map o f other s ites in areas o f Ngemelachel Harbor , Oreor and Babeldaob , Belau .
( Malakal )
Fig. 1 1 . 3 2 . Bombed-out Japanese communications center on Beliliou . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan)
Fig . 1 1 . 33 . Remains in landing craft wreckage in Vrana)
the water include aircraft and the shal lows . ( NPS phot.o by Ken
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Ul w .......
Fig . 1 1 . 34 . Cave in which Japanese holdouts were imported by advancing American troops on Pelilou . Vince Blaiyok at cave enLranc e . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan)
Fig . 1 1 . 3 5 . Shrines to Japanese soldiers inside cave at Pelilou . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan)
S ite-Spec ific Investigations
S ite �umber 1 : Japanese Type "A " and " G " Landing Craft
The remains of 1 1 landing craft and utility boats are present on the bottom and along the shores of four small coves and narrow channels located on the north s ide of Ngemelachel ( Malakal ) Harbor ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 3 1 ) . These remains are in varying states of preservation , ranging from intact to predominantly destroyed . All of the s ites are in slightly c loudy water , 1 5-20 feet deep , and surrounded by heavily wooded , overhanging stone wal ls . A variety of corals c over the bottom, and large numbers o f j ellyfish were present as wel l .
No chart we had acces s to accurately showed each of these coves and channels , although all are within the general larger inlet designated on Figure 1 1 . 3 1 . The following discuss ion describes the boats and locations in the order vis ited during the 1 9 8 8 survey . Arbitrary cove des ignations are used to dif ferentiate between the s ites .
Two Daihatsu type " A " landing c raft l ie scattered and severely decayed on the west s ide o f cove number one , oppos ite the entrance . Only the double-keel des ign of the e bow allowed identification of this s ite because large p ieces of structure l ie j umbled about . Several 8 - foot- long, 1 2 -inch-diameter riveted-steel , pressure cylinders lie interspersed with the wreckage . These may be high-pressure air cylinders for starting diesel or gasoline engines and are a good indicator of the engine type once f itted .
Another more complete Daihatsu type "A " rests with its stern bent upward at an angle against the left s ide o f the cove . This landing craft has its bow ramp down and is identi fiable as the variant of the bas ic des ign bel ieved by U . S . Navy Intel ligence to be used by the Japanese Army ( Figure 1 1 . 3 6 ) . The wreck measures 44 feet long from the angular , proj ecting s ide at the bow to the upward-bent , counter stern ( Figure 1 1 . 3 7 ) . This measurement compares well with the 4 9 - foot , 4 -inch recorded length of such craft . The hal f-round armor shield that protected the coxswain l ies dis lodged on deck forward of this position at the athwartships bulkhead . Five square viewing ports are cut through the armor plate of the
6The .discuss ion of Japanese landing craft in Malakal Harbor and the Aichi E 1 3A1 " Jake " f loat plane in Babeldaob were A written by Kevin Foster . ..,
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F ig . 1 1 . 3 6 . Japanese type " A " landing craft found in Belau . ( Photo courtesy o f U . S . Naval Institute)
Fig . 1 1 . 37 . Japanese type ' G " landing craft sunk in a small cove on the north side of Ngemelachel ( Malaka l ) Harbor . ( Photo courtesy o f U . S . Naval Institute)
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shield . Gaps in the armored engine compartment aft revealed � a multicylinder engine in place . A s ingle davit is mounted at the extremity of the stern . The wooden bulwarks of the boat are soft to the touch , and some thinner portions have completely deteriorated .
A diesel engine , about 8 feet by 4 feet by 2 feet , l ies on the bottom in about 1 0 feet o f water roughly 1 0 0 feet from the bow of the most intact type " A " Army landing craft . Other small items , including a small pipe davit and a complete exhaust system with muf fler , l ie nearby .
Three other wooden hulls lie on the bottom o f this cove . All are s imilar to one another and are sharp at both ends . These appear to be Japanese type "G " landing craft ( Figure 1 1 . 3 8 ) . All o f these wrecks have severely deteriorated . The remaining portions of the wooden keel , frames and keelson of each boat are roughly 4 0 feet long . Raking stem and sternposts rise from the keel , but only the bottom few feet o f the hull exist . The most prominent features o f these type " G " wrecks are the large rectangular , armor-plated , fuel tanks , which surround three s ides of the engine . Several individual wrecks are miss ing one or more o f these fuel tanks , but all appear to have once been f itted with s even tanks : three on each s ide and one forward . Only one wreck retains the engine . This i s a large I two-cylinder gasoline a engine in place on the boat nearest the right s ide of the W' cove .
A second cove , discovered by acc ident during an attempt to return to cove number one , is much smaller and narrower . It contains the remains o f two partially submerged type "A " landing craft . A type " G " landing craft l ies sunk in 1 5 feet o f water j ust outs ide the c ove . The two type " A " boats lie in l ine ahead in the shallow water along the shore with the front boat mostly exposed and the rear boat s lightly submerged . The front boat retains the armored coxswain shield . Both are mostly intact although they have lost most o f their bulwarks and much of the wooden decking . The j ointed ramps of both boats are extended with the ramp of the rear boat lying over the stern o f the front boat . Although the description of these boats is s imilar , they are not identical to each other . The front boat has an elegantly curved bulkhead with rolled edges separating the engine compartment from the rest o f the boat , while the rear boat has a straight angular bulkhead with cut edges in the corresponding space .
The type " G " boat outs ide the cove was only quickly surveyed and appears to be in a s imilar state o f aeterioration as the others observed in coves one and four .
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l.11 w l.11
High Hatch Fallen portion of armored helm
Breadth Minus Rubbing Straka 1 0 ' 7 " Stern b adly twis ted and torn. Possibly due to explosion ? with add it ional deteriorat ion, wreck "relaxed" over rocks and bent up.
Heavi ly deteriorated wooden f loor ing . Steel remains but has col lapsed onto bottom. Treadway remains.
lmp'erial Japanese Navy Landing Craft O.N. I . "A" Army V ariant
Fig . 1 1 . 3 8 . Japanes e sma l l cove in Belau .
Navy landing craft type ( Sketch by Kevin Foster )
" A , " Army variant sunk in a
Cove number three was discovered during a search for cove number one . The cove has a very small entrance and is almost perfectly round . I t contains a s ingle type " A " landing craft wreck in 2 0 feet of water along the shore across from the cove entrance . The wreck is in good c ondition and retains an unusual , hollow , helical screw propel ler . This wreck is the same length and breadth as the other type "A " landing craft but is built deeper , probably to provide enough buoyancy to carry heavier vehic les . No coxswain shield was found at this s ite .
The search for more landing craft revealed one more tiny cove with a single type "G " boat at the entrance . This cove is j ust off the back channel leading to the boat yard . Three s ide and one centerline fuel tank remain to the s ide of the l arge two-cylinder gasoline engine , transmission and shaft .
S ite Number 2 : Japanese " Jake " F loat Plane
The disarticulated remains of a Japanese seaplane lie on the bottom and along the shore of a small cove on the southern shores o f Babeldaob in Irrai ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 3 1 ) . Measurements and photographs of the pieces allowed this wreck to be identified as an Aichi E13A1 , s ingle-engine , twin-float reconnaissance seaplane . This type was in use aboard a number o f large warships based at Belau as well as with a e number of units f lying from shore bases . Three manufacturers built a total of 1 , 4 1 8 of these aircraft , making it the most numerous Japanese float plane . Known to the Allies as " Jakes " ( Figure 1 1 . 39 ) , they were used for long-range reconnaissance ( for the attack on Pearl Harbor ) , bombing miss ions , air-sea rescue , staff transport , shipping attack and Kamikaze missions .
The aircraft remains lie scattered on the cove bottom in 2-3 feet of water in soft s ediments . The left float rests upright in the center of the cove while the right . float is about 5 0 feet away on the shoreline . Both f loats show cons iderable corros ion but the right float appears to have been exposed to great heat as well . Aluminum portions of the wreck are less corroded than are the steel parts .
A large radial engine with two rows of cyl inders and a three-bladed propeller l ies behind the left f loat in the center of the cove . Exhaust pipes from the cyl inders are in place , but no s igns of the engine mount or the main portions o f the fuse lage or tail were visible . Several small pieces of piping and structural aluminum were scattered on the bottom near the engine , along with hal f of what appears to be a machine gun mounting ring . The two wings lie upright on the bottom to each side of the engine . The right wing has A loose and miss ing skin in several spots , and a large length ..
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of the leading edge assembly is det ached but nearby . The left wing is more complete but does not have a length o f the steel wing spar extending beyond the wing root as does the right wing .
No evidence of bullet or shrapnel damage could be detected in the wings or f loats . The presence of apparent f ire damage and lack o f proj ectile damage suggest that this aircraft may have been scuttled intentionally or destroyed by accident . No historical sources that mention the destruction o f this aircraft have yet been identified .
Pos itive identi fication of the s ite was made by Robert C . Mikesh , senior curator of the Aeronautics Department of the National Air and Space Museum , Smithsonian I nstitution . The design of the f loat struts and the placement of a s ingle s tep on the forward s ide of the front strut were mentioned as diagnostic for this type of aircraft .
Site Number 3 : Sunken Village o f Ngibtal
An ef fort was made to locate the remains of the sunken village of Ngibtal on the east side of Babeldaob north o f Melekeiok ( Figure 1 1 . 4 1 ) . The legend surrounding the s ite , described by Vince Blaiyok, Division o f Cultural Affairs , is as fol lows :
Milad , the granddaughter of Matmikiak , l ived on the is let of Ngibtal o f f Babeldaob . She posses sed a magic breadfruit tree with a hol low trunk that reached down into the lagoon . Once in a while a l arge wave forced up through it a large fish , which provided food for the vil lage .
In time people became j ealous and with clamshell axes , cut down Milad ' s magic tree . The ocean poured in through the stump f looding the island , which sank below the sea ( Blaiyok 1 9 8 8 , personal communication to T . Carrel l ) .
After consulting with the village chieftain and National Park Service and Divis ion o f Cultural archeologists made a dive in the area of the s ite . Lenihan later reported :
Nothing was seen on the dive that would lend support to the legend of a sunken village , but it should be noted that sea conditions were rough and there was
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e lders , A ffairs
Daniel
nothing comprehens ive or systematic about the examination . Although this dive would not be suffic ient to base a decis ion on , it has come to our attention that the area in Ngibtal was also examined by Frances Toribiong and Richard Marksburg . Having read that survey report , which was more intense and systematic , coupled with our own on-site reconnais sance , I can state with a reasonable degree of confidence that there is no evidence in this area of a sunken village s ite ( 1 9 8 8 : 12 )
S'ite Nljmber 4 : Japanese G4M " Betty " and Other Aircraft Wrecks
A large amount of disarticulated aircraft wreckage l ies stre� about the reef on the northeastern s ide of Beliliou near the tiny island of Ngargers iul ( refer to Figure 1 1 . 4 1 ) . Photographs and measurements taken on May 2 6 and 2 9 , 1 9 8 8 , allowed the wreckage to be identified as that o f at least two G4M " Betty " bombers ( Figures 1 1 . 4 0 , 1 1 . 4 2 and 1 1 . 4 3 ) and other unidentified , smaller , twin-engined aircraft . Wreckage from two fighter aircraft , probably Japanese Zeros , s erves as lawn decoration in Klouklubed village on the northern tip of .. Beliliou . Other aircraft wreckage was reported to be located � ip the mangrove swamps on the eastern s ide of Beliliou and outs ide the reef near Koska village but could not be vis ited in the limited time available .
S ite8Number 5 : Beliliou Near-Shore Survey and Bel i l iou Wall
Historical research indicates that a large number of amphibious vehicles were destroyed on the reef and j ust �ffshore during the recapture of Beliliou .
The f irst Marines landed at 0 8 3 2 , only two schedule . Within four were ashore on all the met by heavy rifle ,
on White Beach 1 minutes behind minutes troops
beaches and were machine-gun and
7This brief discuss ion o f Japanese aircraft wrecks written by Kevin Foster .
8The discuss ion of the Beliliou near-shore surveys Beliliou Wall wer.e written by Daniel J . Lenihan .
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was
and
A I C H I E 1 3A l
Fig . 1 1 . 3 9 . The remains of this type of Japanese float plane , Aichi E 1 3A1 , code-named " Jake , " were found in shal low water off Babeldaob in Belau . ( Drawing after Franc il lon )
MITSUBJSHI G4M3
Fig . 1 1 . 4 0 . Remains of identified on Bel il iou ( Drawing after Franc il1on )
0 5 lQ 15 20 FT.
a Japanese " Betty " bomber were near the island of Ngeregong .
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1 3 4° 3 8 ' E 1 34° 1 5' E
N g e r u a n g e l
so 1 0'N
1 34° 2 0 ' E
7° 20'
Ulebsechel
C H ELBACHEB (/1" {ROCK ISLANDS) � j\ M ec h e r c h a r
0'-.L..--'-�--'--
g�N g e r u k e u l d
IJ Bablomekang O � STATUTE M I L E S
1 3 2° E S o n s o r o l
: F a n a
• P u l o A n n a
• M erlr
4° N BELAU OUTLIERS
0 2 5 50
S T A T U T E M I L E S Tobl • @H e l e n
BELAU
Fig . cultural
1 1 . 4 1 . Locations of other resource s ites in Belau .
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Ngcheangel (tl
7° 30'
0 5 1 0 1 5 2 0 S T A T U T E M I L E S
investigated submerged
Fig. 1 1 . 4 2 . Looking forward at wing root and fuselage. Bullet holes visible below two small square openings . ( NPS photo by Kevin Foster)
Fig. 1 1 . 4 3 . Interior of G4M "Betty" bomber, forward . ( NPS photo by Kevin Foster)
looking
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mortar fire , especially on White 1 and Orange 2 . . . . The primary targets for the Japanese were the landing craft . . . . The official report placed the number o f LVTs destroyed at 2 6 , but uno f f icial accounts ranged upward of 6 0 . The discrepancy is in part accounted for by the Marines I ingenuity in getting damaged LVTs back in action and , perhaps , by the observers 1 inabil ity to distinguish between LVTs and DUKWs . Although waves two through s ix landed on schedule , subsequent waves were held up because of the losses of LVTs ( Wheeler 1 9 8 3 : 5 . 6 9 ) .
The instrument boat , MESIKI U , was used to make a magnetometer survey of the area j ust o f fshore from landing beaches White and Orange ( Figure 1 1 . 4 7 ) to locate these and any other wrecks near shore . The first lane was set to run over the area close to the reef l ine where the fathometer read 3 0 feet . This lane was moved out to water reading 5 0 feet and deeper hal fway through the run a fter a prominent coral head s nagged the tow f ish . After no indications of wreckage were found , lanes were run 5 0 yards and 1 0 0 yards offshore .
The second search method used scuba divers in a line abreast swimming along the reef edge . A s econd , faster and handier boat was used to accompany the divers on the surface as they searched . The area between shallow water and the reef drop-o f f of the three Orange beaches was examined . This examination confirmed the negative magnetometer findings . Only three , small , metal obj ects were found on the survey .
Conversations with Capt . Pablo Siangeldep and Faunny Blunt revealed that in addition to the cons iderable salvage and c leanup effort o f the American military on Beliliou , a " Chinese " company had worked on contract to remove wreckage from the reef and beaches . Wreckage removed from the beaches was dumped into the extremely deep waters in the channel between Beliliou and Ngeaur ( Angaur ) .
An ROV ( remote operated vehicle ) dive to a depth of 4 5 0 feet was also conducted at the Beliliou drop-off on the southern end of the island where the sheer reef wall fringes the shore ( Figures 1 1 . 4 4 , 1 1 . 4 5 and 1 1 . 4 6 ) . No cultural remains were observed ; however , the rich natural resource base here makes for an extraordinary dive . NPS divers also swept this area to a depth o f 1 0 0 feet and noted many large , free-swimming fish and healthy coral growth .
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Fig . 1 1 . 4 4 . ROV being tended from surface by Belau Historic Preservation O f f ice employee Thomas Techur. ( Photo by Barb Lenihan)
Fig . 1 1 . 4 5 . Diver on Pelilou Wall at 100 feet deep i l lustrates the steepness o f this feature , which continues to about 1 , 000 feet deep . ( NPS photo by Dan Lenihan)
Fig . 1 1 . 4 6 . ROV heading down f rom survey boat . by Dan Lenihan)
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( NPS photo
WHITE 1
WHITE 2
ORANGE 1
ORANGE 2
ORANGE 3
N
1 000 0 500
I
OINGEUAOL ISLAND
1 000 2000 YDS
F i g . 1 1 . 4 7 . Location of "White " and " Orange " landing beaches on Beli liou .
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Administrative Status
Title to all cultural resources is held by the Republic of Belau . An ef fort is being made to inventory s ites and to place significant ones in a Belau National Register ; as of this writing , it is not known whether any of the above s ites are in that register .
Present Threats and Impacts
Although the World War II shipwrecks consistently receive the most attention from sport divers , these nonshipwreck s ites are being impacted by the snorkeler or day picnic excurs ion group . Most , i f not all , of the portable-arti facts , brass fittings and instruments have been removed or salvaged from the airplanes and landing craft . What remains of the s ites is undergoing natural deterioration from the elements , somewhat accelerated by vis itation .
Federated States of Micrones ia
State of Pohnpei
Although field investigations were never undertaken by members of the National Park Service , the wel l-known ruins of Nan Madol have been receiving continuous archeological investigation since 1 9 7 8 . Under the direction o f Dr . William S . Ayers of the Univers ity o f Oregon , both the land and underwater portions of the site are being thoroughly researched ( Ayers 1 9 9 0 : 5 9 - 6 3 ) .
Located in a lagoon on the eastern s ite has excited the imagination since it was first reported to mid-1830s .
shore of the is land , this of visitors and scholars Western readers in the
There are at the northeast end of the is land , at a place called Tamen , ruins of a town , now only accessible by boats , the waves reaching to the steps of houses . The walls are overgrown with bread , cocoanut [ s ic ] , a nd other ancient trees , and the ruins occupy a space of two miles and a hal f . The stones of these edifices are laid bed and quoin , exhibiting irrefutable trace s of art far beyond the means of the pres ent savage inhabitants . Some of these hews stones are twenty feet in length by three to five each way , and no remains o f cement appear . The walls
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have door and window places . . . . Asked about the origins of these buildings --the inhabitants say, that they were built by men who are now above ( reprinted from the Hobartown Courier in The Sailor ' s Magaz ine and Naval Journal , New York , January 1837 : 9 , 1 6 6 ; in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 6 ) : 1 2 1 ) .
In 1 8 4 0 a Mr . Campbell , in the cutter LAMBTON from Sydney , visited the site and observed :
On the southern s ide of the island , and within one mile of the harbor of Metaleline , are extensive ruins , boasting perhaps an antiquity as great as that of the Pyramids of Egypt ; being , beyond a doubt , the work of a race of men far surpassing the present generation whose greatness and whose power can only now be traced from the scattered remains of the structures they have reared leaving to posterity the pleasures of speculation and conjecture .
The principal building is a triple quadrangle structure ; that is there are three buildings one ins ide the other , occupying an area of about one hundred yards square . . . . There is only one entrance to the building , which is on the s ide opposite to that fronting the sea . . . . Opposite the building on the s ide fronting the sea is a small harbor and a strong abutment or breakwater is built , inside of which a vessel of cons iderable size might anchor the whole forming the labor o f an age , in contemplating which , the mind is filled with astonishment ( The Polynesian , July 1 1 , 1 8 4 0 : 1 , 3 , 17 in Ward 1 9 6 7 ( 6 ) : 1 2 6 - 1 3 9 ) .
Based upon Ayers ' research , the initial construction on the s ite has been dated to about A . D . 5 0 0 . More than 1 0 0 stone structures constitute Nan Madol , which was erected offshore on is lets built up from a flat coral reef . In Pohnpeian "madol " means spaces between obj ects ; the name Nan Madol thus means the place of spaces , which refers to the waterways and spaces between the artificial is lets ( Jenks 1 9 7 0 : 7 ) .
Elaborate res idential and ceremonial complexes are surrounded
e.
by tombs and walls and cut by channe l s . The s ite attests to e\ 5 4 6
the power once held by chiefs to organize and control the local peoples . Rank and privilege are c learly evident by the presence o f beads and other ornaments in the res idential and ceremonial structures . Ayers and his colleagues have recovered " several thousand obj ects , inc luding large numbers of beads and shell tools , thousands of potsherds 1 stone pounding tools , some rare bone arti facts , and the remains of such prestige foods as giant parrotfish and dog " ( 1 9 9 0 : 6 2 ) .
According to Ayers , Pohnpei ' s oral tradition also describes underwater channels connect ing the s ite to Nahkap Bay to the northeast . In addition , archeologists are investigating reports of 12 vertical columns forming a row in 1 0 0 feet o f water o f f the s ite and the pos s ibility that underwater tunnels and other architectural features may exist .
Administrative Status
Cultural s ites in the Federated States of Micronesia under the j urisdiction of the various states and accorded protection under legislation in force on islands .
Present Threats and Impacts
are are the
A ma j or cultural resource on Pohnpei , Nan Madel is protected from the activities of salvagers or pothunters . The maj or impacts to the s ite come from vis itation . Little diving has been reported in the area o f the columns .
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CHAPTER X I I . MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUS IONS
By Toni L . Carrell
Introduction
The chal lenge of working in Micronesia is both a deterrent and an asset . The conditions are difficult , the i s l ands remote and the funding l imited . However , because they have been "off the beaten path , " many of the submerged cultural resources of Micrones ia are yet to be discovered . The islands have the opportunity to set up model programs , learning from the mistakes o f others , for the protection and preservation of this aspect of their cultural resources base . They are already actively involved in the inventory of land resources , and the mechanisms already exist to protect their cultural heritage . The next logical step is to extend existing programs and philosophies to the water .
Management Recommendations
These recommendations are presented only for those i s l ands that the SCRU has had an opportunity to vis it . They conc lude with a general recommendation for the islands of Micronesia .
Saipan
More than 4 0 documented ship los ses have occurred in and around Saipan ; to date only a handful of s ites has been investigated . Prominent among those is the earl iest known s ite , that of the Manila galleon NUESTRA SENORA de la CONCEPCION , wrecked in 1 6 3 8 . The site was excavated by a treasure salvage company under an agreement with the CNMI Historic Preservation Of fice . According to a superfic ial treatment in National Geographic ( September 1 9 9 0 : 3 9 -5 2 ) , the princ ipal investigators are a marine construction manager and a marine biologist .
As a result of this sanct ioned salvage operation , Saipan will get a percentage of the artifacts . The remainder will be sold off to the highest bidders and scattered throughout the world . The decision to enter into a salvage agreement for
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such an important historic resource does not comply with accepted guidelines for responsible resource management . The los s here is more than the artifacts to the people of the Mariana I s lands , the Philippines , Spain and Mexico . All nations involved in the Acapulco-Manila trade lose when ships are salvaged for the personal or corporate benef it of a few .
The recommended alternative to this decision would have been to retain public ownership of this piece of cultural heritage , and excavate it with qual i f ied archeologists . If Saipan had chosen to build a " working " museum where vis itors could see the conserved artifacts displayed and have the opportunity to observe archeologists and conservators at work , it would have attracted vis itors to the island well into the future . The dollars tourists spend reach into every segment of a community , and in an area that needs economic growth , tourism is extremely important . The dollars that the tourists coming to the museum would have spent over the next 2 0 , 4 0 , 6 0 or 1 0 0 years would have paid for the costs o f a museum , staf f , qualified archeologists and conservators many times over .
Continued inventory of the remaining offshore areas of the island could still provide interpretive benefits to visitors and enhance the ability of the historic preservation office to manage these s ites .
Rota
While prel iminary documentation exists o f the World War I I ships SHOUN MARU and CHA 5 4 , 5 6 and a n unidentified chaser, there has not been a systematic survey of the offshore areas of the island , nor have the submerged caves been evaluated for prehistoric sites . Mapping of SHOUN MARU , to the same level as the sites in Belau , could provide some interpretive benefits but , by and large , efforts should focus on survey and examination o f the caves .
Guam
The more than 6 0 documented shipwrecks in and around Guam span a period of more than four centuries . Remote-sensing surveys have been conducted in Apra Harbor , and mapping of three o f the six maj or shipwreck s ites has been completed . NICHIYU MARU , CS SCOTIA and SS CARIBA should be considered for the same level of mapping documentation that has been afforded KIZUGAWA , TOKAI and CORMORAN . Should a remote-sensing survey be considered in the future , the focus of those searches should be the earliest shipwreck sites _ at the island . These sites , although not necessarily the mqst s ignificant , tend to be the most threatened by the actions of salvors ( refer to Saipan , above ) . Recent dec is ions by the �
5 5 0
. -A"·
Guam courts have only minimally limited this potential . However , GovGuam should make an ef fort to bring these important sites under management control by determining their locations and actively preventing inadvertent impacts as a result of other activities .
Republ ic of Belau
Some limited follow-up work should be conducted on RAI ZAN MARU ; this s ite was only briefly examined and it should be documented . In addition , examination of all of the other remaining shipwrecks , including the Buoy 7 wreck in the main channel and the site locally referred to as ASASHIO MARU , should be conducted to round out the inventory o f presently known sites . These examinations should be done under the supervision of an underwater archeologist with knowledge o f World War I I ships . I f funding becomes available , additional remote-sens ing surveys in the main channels and south o f Ngeruktable Anchorage may be warranted . Help o f local volunteer divers who will operate within a no-impact framework should be encouraged .
Finally , every ef fort should be made to locate the most s ignificant shipwreck on Belau , the East India Company ship ANTELOPE . This can only be accomplished us ing remote-sens ing equipment .
Future work should be organized to l imit the numbers o f divers and maximize field supervisory and documentation training for the Division of Cultural Af fairs staff .
State of Kosrae ( FSM )
In 1 9 8 8 , the miss ionary ship , MORNING STAR , was reported to have been discovered in one o f Kosrae ' s harbors . This ship played a signif icant role in the history of the island . I f the ship has been located , every e ffort should be made to complete preliminary documentation and , if at all feas ible , complete mapping . Similarly , any ships related to whaling activities in the area should be investigated . Subsurface testing of the LEONORA site should be carried out .
State of Truk ( FSM )
There are many reports of laxity in the " guide system " with many artifacts still being removed from the ships . Obvious ly , this activity should be stopped before the attraction of the sites to divers is severely compromised .
Truk seems to have an active program in place to evaluate the resource base and to reevaluate resources management philosophy . These e fforts should continue .
5 5 1
Bikini
Continued documentation and evaluation should be undertaken in Bikini . These s ites have the potential for being the focus of a marine park or nuclear theme park interpretive program that would attract tourism should the Bikinians choose to reinhabit their island .
Conclus ions
The vast shipwreck and nonshipwreck resources of the i s lands have been underinvestigated , and their potential for increas ing touri sm and helping the economies of the various islands underrated . Should the islands choose to inventory submerged resources , they should do so with an eye toward their preservation and long-term protection , perhaps through the establishment of state or federation national parks . Even i f no preserves or parks are created , the islands should establish c lear ownership of and control over their underwater resources . Legis lation should seek to guarantee a " look but don ' t take " phi losophy . I f divers are permitted to remove artifacts from s ites , piece by piece the resources A wil l disappear and with them the potential for long-term W economic benefit to the is lands .
It is recommended that the various historic preservation o f f ices in Micronesia pool resources to create a standing team o f underwater survey and preservation experts who could be called in to work on pro j ects on each island as needed . From the experience we gained in conducting the submerged cultural resources training sess ion in Guam in 1 9 8 7 , it was c lear that the talent and the interest for such a cadre is present .
Submerged sites should be interpreted to the diving and nondiving public to create a broad base of vis itation . One of the best ways to accomplish this is through the establ ishment o f natural and cultural museums . These fac il ities can interpret the nonshipwreck s ites as well . Museums help to increase tourism by encouraging visitors to come to an island initially or to increase their stay . I s lands in the Caribbean have found the establishment of museums to be one of the most ef fective means of increasing the nonconsumptive industry of tourism , which directly benef its the local economy and the people .
Final ly , who wil l preserve the submerged cultural resources of Micrones ia? If those charged with resources management a allow individuals to excavate s ites for a split of the W
5 5 2
artifacts , then who benefits ? It is easy to be lured by the possibility of a quick return with little or no investment-clearly a deal too good to be true . Archeology , unlike many other endeavors , has the potential to preserve a bit o f our history and bring it alive today and for the future . Underwater sites should be excavated to the s ame standards , and with the same highly qual ified professionals , as s ites on land . Other countries are recognizing the value of keeping their cultural resources out of the hands of treasure hunters . As those engaged in harvesting arti facts from historic s ites for sale are being forced from the Caribbean , the United States and European nations , the South Pac i f ic becomes a target . By learning from the mistakes o f others , we all can preserve the most ephemeral bit of ourselves , our history .
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Gerard ( editor ) American Activities in the Central Pac if ic , 1 7 9 0- 1 8 7 0 : A History, Geography, and Ethnography Pertaining to American Involvement and Americans in the Paci f ic Taken from Contemporary Newspapers , etc . with introduction by Ernest S . Dodge , 8 vols . Gregg Press , Ridgewood .
Wawn , W . T . 1 8 7 0 - 7 4 Amongst the Paci f ic I s lands , 1 8 7 0- 1 8 7 4 .
Wheeler , 1 9 0 0
M1 9 7 1/ 2 9 4 . Alexander Turnbul l Library , Wellington , New Z ealand .
Joseph Report on the I s land o f Guam . U . S . Adj utant General ' s Office , Military Information Divis ion , Washington . U . S . Government Printing O f f ice , Washington , D . C .
Wheeler , Richard 1 9 8 3 A Spec ial Valor : The u . s . Marines and the Pac ific
War . Harper and Row , New York .
Wood , Junius B . 1 9 3 1 " Yap and Other Pacific Islands Under Japanes e
Mandate " i n National Geographic , Vol . XL : 5 9 0- 6 2 7 . Offic ial Journal o f the National Geographic Society , Washington , D . C .
Yatlilman , Andrew and Albert L . Williams 1 9 8 6 Preliminary Guide t o Micrones ian References in the
Paci f ic Manuscripts Bureau ( PAMBU ) New England Microfilming Pro j ect . Manuscript on f i le . On f i le Micronesian Area Research Center, University o f Guam , Mangilao .
Y ' Blood , Wil liam T . 1 9 8 1 Red Sun Setting : The Battle o f the Philippine
Sea . Naval Institute Press , Annapolis .
1 9 8 7 The Little Giants : U . S . Escort Carriers Against Japan . Naval I nstitute Press , Annapol is .
5 7 9
Z aben , John P . 1 9 8 7 " The Sage o f the ARATAMA MARU . " Guam Shinbun ,
April 2 3 , 1 9 8 7 .
Unpublished Manuscripts
( AGI ) Archive General de Indias , Sevilla . Filipinas 1 1 ; 1 2 ; 1 3 ; 1 6 ; 1 9 ; 8 2 ; 9 9 ; 3 3 1 ; 3 9 5 ; 4 1 5 ; 9 1 9 . Ultramar 5 6 1 ; 5 6 2 . ( MARC , SDC , typescript ) Micrones ian Area Research Center, Spanish Documents Collection .
( AGN ) Archive General de la Nac ion , Mexico . Filipinas 1 ; 2 ; 3 9 5 ; Selecciones . Inquisic ion Torno 6 ; 1 1 3 8 ; Varies Tomas . Marina 1 9 . Varies Ramos , Selecciones 1 .
( AHN ) Archive Historico Nacional , Mexico . 5 8 5 4 .
Ul tramar 6 8 5 3 ;
( AHPA ) Archive Historico de l a Provincia de Aragon , San Cugat del Valles , Barcelona . E- 1-a- 18 ; E- 1-c-6 .
( ARSI ) Archivum Romanum Societatis I esu , Rome . Philippinas 1 3 ; 14 . e ( LCM ) Records o f the Spanish Government in Islands . Library of Congress , Washington D . C . 2 ; 1 1 ; 1 6 ; 2 8 ; 3 2 ; 9 7 .
( MN ) Museo Naval , Madrid . M/S 6 14 .
( PNA ) 1 ( 1 ) : 8 ; 10 ( 1 ) : 2 .
Philippine National 1 ( 2 ) : 13 ; 3 : 7 ; 3 : 8 ;
Adj utant General ' s Office
Archives , Manila . 3 : 9 ; 3 : 1 1 ; 3 : 1 2 ;
the Mariana LCM Item 1 ;
PNA , 3 : 1 3 ;
Bundle 3 : 2 1 ;
1 8 9 0 - 1 9 17 Letter from Brigadier Genral Thomas M . Anderson to General H . C . Corbin . National Archives Record Group 9 4 , no . 14 4 6 8 7 .
Aguon , Joaquin C . 1 9 8 7 Oral History I nformant , Talofofo , Guam . May 1 9 8 7 .
Juan Pobre de Z amora 1 9 6 8 - 7 1 Relacion sabre la perdida del galeon San Felipe
[ 1 5 9 8 - 1 6 03 ] , Philippines MSS I I , Bloomington , I ndiana University , Lilly Library . Univers ity of Guam , MARC Microfilm Collection .
5 8 0
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Library of Congress 1 6 7 8 - 1 8 9 9 The Records of
Mariana Islands . the Spanish I tem 1 ; 1 8 .
Government in Washington , D . C .
the
Mantanona , Tito 1 9 8 7 Oral History Informant , Talofofo , Guam . May 1 9 8 7 .
Nagata , Yasuai 1 9 8 7 Personal correspondence , Kobe , Japan .
Safford , W . E . 1 9 0 1 The Mariana I s l ands . Notes from documents i n the
Archives at Agafia .
Tolan , Jim 1 9 8 7 Personal discuss ion , Asan , Guam . May 1 9 8 7 .
U . S . Navy 1 9 44 CAPERTON, Action Report . June 2 5 , 1 9 4 4 .
1 9 44 Commander Task Group 5 8 . 3 Action Operation Against Saipan , Tinian and Units Pat Task Group 5 8 . 3 . Naval Center . July 1 2 , 1 9 4 4 .
Report o f Guam from Historical
1 9 44 Commander Task Group 5 8 . 4 Operation in Marianas and Bonins , June 6 , 1 9 4 4 . Action Report on Naval Historical Center , July 13 , 1 9 4 4 .
1 9 4 3 FLYING FISH , Fourth War Patrol , January 6 , 1 9 4 3 to February 2 8 , 1 9 4 3 .
1 9 44 GREENLING , Report o f Special Mission , May 7 , 1 9 4 4 .
1 9 4 3 GUDGEON, Ninth War Patrol , September 1 , 1 9 4 3 to October 6 , 1 9 4 3 .
1 9 4 3 PERMIT , Eighth War Patrol , April 1 9 4 3 t o May 2 5 , 1 9 4 3 .
1 9 44 SEAHORSE 1 Fourth War Patrol , March 2 8 , 1 9 4 4 to April 2 7 , 1 9 4 4 .
1 9 4 3 SNAPPER , Seventh War Patrol , July 2 9 , 1 9 4 3 to September 1 7 , 1 9 4 3 .
Yamada , Sanae n . d . Personal correspondence , Ashiya City , Japan .
5 8 1
Magaz ines and Journals
Guam Recorder . Vol . 6 , 1 94 1 .
Guam Recorder . Second Series . Vol . 7 , 1 9 7 7 .
Guam Recorder 1 9 4 0 , Naval Government , Agana , Guam . February .
Guam Recorder . January 1 9 2 6 ; December 1 9 3 8 ; January , May , June 1 9 3 9 ; June , July 1 9 4 9 .
Journal of Pac i f ic History . Vol . 7 , 1 9 7 2 .
Phi l ippine Historical Bul letin . Vol . 15 . 1 9 7 1 .
Philippines Historical Review . 1 9 7 1 ; 1 9 7 2 .
Philippine Studies . 1 9 6 5 ; 1 9 7 2 ; 1 9 7 8 .
5 8 2
APPENDIX A
Micrones i an I s land Names*
Name s in all cap i tal le tters are standard names , i . e . , tho s e offic i al ly approved and recommended for current use by this guide in accord with the mos t recent authoritative s ourc e s .
Abamama = ABEMAMA Abone = EBON Ael ingnae = AILINGINAE Agai gan = AGUIJAN Agan = PAGAN Agiaguano - AGUIJAN Agiguan Ins e l = AGUIJAN Agiguwan = AGUIJAN Agiigan To = AGUIJAN A Grega = AGRIHAN Agri gan = AGRIHAN Agr igan = AGUIJAN Agri garn = AGRIHAN Agr iguan = AGRIHAN AGRIHAN Agr ij an = AGRIHAN Agr ij on = AGRIHAN Aguigan = AGUIJAN Aguiguan = AGUIJAN AGUIJAN Aguij an = AGRIHAN Aguij on = AGUIJAN Aguj an = AGRIHAN Agurigan = AGRIHAN Ahmo = ARNO Ail inglablab = AILINGLAPLAP Ail inglap = AILI NGLAPLAP Ail inglapalap = AILINGLAPLAP AI LINGLAPLAP Ail inlablab = AILINGLAPLAP Ailu = AILUK AI LUK Air inginae = AILINGINAE Air ingurapurapu = AILINGLAPLAP Airukku = AILUK ALAMAGAN Alamaguan = ALAMAGAN
� *Based upon Motte ler , 1 9 8 6 .
ANATAHAN Anataj an = ANATAHAN Anatans = ANATAHAN Anataxam = ANATAHAN Anataxan = ANATAHAN Anatayan = ANATAHAN Anathahun = ANATAHAN Andema = ANT Angaur = NGEAUR Angauru = NGEAUR A Ngeaur = NGEAUR Angegul = NGULU Angelul = NGULU Angorur I s land = NGEAUR Angour = NGEAUR Anguij an = AGUIJAN Angyaur = NGEAUR Aniaima = NAMONUITO Aninima = NAMONUITO Anonima = NAMONUITO Antaj an = ANATAHAN Ant iaj an = ANATAHAN Anto = ANT Apaia = ABAIANG Apaiang = ABAIANG Apamama = ABEMAMA Apemama = ABEMAMA Arakabesan = NGEREKEBESANG Armagan = ALAMAGAN ARANUKA Arao = KOSRAE Arec i fos = UJELANG Argigan I s land = AGRIHAN Arhno Atoll = ARNO Armstrong = KOSRAE ARNO Arora = ARORAE
5 8 3
Al emagan = ALAMAGAN Al imagan I s l and = ALAMAGAN Almagan = ALAMAGAN Almaguan = ALAMAGAN Amalgam = ANATAHAN Ana = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Anangai = WOLEAI Anangi i = WOLEAI Anatacan = ANATAHAN Ar tomagan = ALAMAGAN Aruna = ARNO Aruno = ARNO Arurai = ARORAE As cens ion = POHNPEI As tro lab I s l and = FAI S As tro labe = FAI S Aulong = ULONG Aurep ik Ins e ln = EAURIPIK Aur ipik = EAURIPIK Aurup ig = EAURIPIK Aurup ik = EAURIPIK Autumn I s l and = FEFAN
Baanopa = BANABA BABELDAOB Babeldzuap = BABELDAOB Babe lhoup I s land = BABELDAOB Bab e l taob = BABELDAOB Babelthaob = BABELDAOB Bab e l thaub = BABELDAOB Bab e l thaup I s l and = BABELDAOB Babelthoup BABELDAOB Babel thuab BABELDAOB Babelthuap BABELDAOB Bab e l tloab BABELDAOB Bab e l top = BABELDAOB Bab e l tuap = BABELDAOB Babe lutaobu = BABELDAOB Babelzuap = BABELDAOB Babe rudaobu To = BABELDAOB Baberutaobu J ima = BABELDAOB Babldaob = BABELDAOB Bablehoup I s land = BABELDAOB Bab l e thoup I s l and = BABELDAOB Bacim = GUAM Bacin = GUAM Badel zuap = BABELDAOB Bado Shima = FARALLON DE MEDINILLA
ARORAE Arorai = ARORAE Arrec ife = UJ ELANG Arrec ife s = UJELANG Arrec ifo s = BELAU Arrec ifos I s l ands = UJ ELANG Arr i c ifes = YAP Arr icifes = YAP I S LANDS Artemagan = ALAMAGAN Baubelth ouap = BABELDAOB Baxot r i s to = OROLUK BELAU BELAU OUTLI ERS Belid = GUAM BELI LIOU Bertrand I s land = TARAWA! Bigal i PIKELOT Bigini BIKINI Bigini RONGELAP Bigini RONGRIK Bikaar BIKAR Bike lot = PIKELOT Bird I s l and = FARALLON DE MEDINILLA Bi shop = TABITEUEA Bishop Junc tion = ERIKUB Blaney = NONOUTI BOKAAK Bonabe BANABA Bonab i = POHNPEI Bonaki = POHNPEI Bona V i s ta = TINIAN Bonebay = POHNPEI Bonebey = POHNPEI Bonham = JALUIT Bordelaise , La = OROLUK Bornab i = POHNPEI Bos ton = EBON Bota = MAUG I S LANDS Bota = ROTA Bo taha = ROTA Brown = ENEWETAK Brownsrange = ENEWETAK Buenavista = TINIAN Buluath = PULUWAT Bunker = NAMONUITO Bunkey = NAMONUITO Bur = PULO ANNA BUTARITARI
5 8 4
Bahan = GUAM Bahnam = JALUIT Bam = GUAM BAN ABA Baob e l taob = BABELDAOB Barbadas MURILO Barbados = MURI LO Baring = NAMORIK Bato = MAUG I SLANDS Calver t I s lands = AUR Campbellriff = OROLUK Carol ina = YAP Carol ina = YAP I S LANDS Carol inas , I s las = CAROLINE ISLANDS CAROLINE I S LANDS Carol ines , I le s = CAROLINE ISLANDS Carte ret = HELEN Casbobas I s lands = UJ ELANG Casobos I s l and = UJELANG Cata = PULUWAT Cathar ine = UJAE Cather ine = KWAJALEIN Cather ine = UJAE Chareguam = SARIGAN Charlotte = ABAIANG Chatham Islands = ERIKUB Chatham I s l ands = WOTJ E Che rega = SARIGAN Cheregua = SARIGAN Cheroga = SARIGAN Cheruguan = SARIGAN Chiangel = NGCHEANGEL Chi cagov = ERIKUB Chromts chenko = AI LINGLAPLAP Chuk = TRUK I S LANDS Clerk = ONOTOA Codoc opuey = TOBI Codopue i = TOBI Colapa = PULAP Colonia = POHNPEI Colony Koronia = POHNPEI Colony Town = POHNPEI Concepc ion , La = ALAMAGAN Conc ept ion , I le de la = ALAMAGAN Cons tantin I s land = KAPINGAMARANG I Cons tant ine = KAPINGAMARANGI Cook = TARAWA Cook - Ins eln = HALL I S LANDS
Button = UTRI K Button I s lands = TAKA Buvi = MAUG I SLANDS Bwokwaak = �OKAAK Bygar BIKAR Byron = NIKUNAU
Cadocapuee = TOBI Cadopue i = TOB I Cos tello Ree f = MINTO REEF Courant , Ile du = PULO ANNA Cove l = EBON Cove l l = EBON Current = PULO ANNA Daniel = ARNO Dawson = B IKAR De Cata = PULUWAT Des ierta = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Dj aluit = JALUIT Dog = NONOUTI Dove = KWAJALEIN Drummon I s land = TAB ITEUEA Drummond = TABITEUEA Ds chaluit = JALUIT Dundas = ABEMAMA Dunkin = NUKUORO Dupe rrey = LOSAP Duperrey = MWOKIL Dupe rry = MWOKI L D ' Urville I s l ands = LOSAP
Eap = YAP Eap = YAP Eas t Faiu Eas t Fayu EAURIPIK EBON
I S LANDS FAYU
= FAYU
Ebongruppe = EBON Eboon = EBON Egerup = ERIKUB Egeu = ULITHI Ego i = ULITHI Egoy = ULITHI Eilu Ins e ln = AILUK Elat = ELATO Elath = ELATO ELATO E l ivi Group = ULITHI
5 8 5
Cook ' s G roup = HALL I S LANDS Cook - Worth Inseln = HALL I S LANDS Coquille = JALUIT Coqui l le = PIKELOT Corer = OREOR C ornwall i s = BOKAAK Corral , El = NOMWIN Corror = OREOR Corrora = OREOR Enderby = PULUWAT ENEWETAK Eni a i dok = ENEWETAK Eniue takku To = ENEWETAK Eniwe takku = ENEWETAK Eniwe tok = ENEWETAK Enywe tok ENEWETAK EOT Eourypyg EAURIPIK Epon = EBON Erato = ELATO Ere gub = ERIKUB Ere gup = ERIKUB Ergua = AGRIHAN ERIKUB Er ikup = ERIKUB Er ippu = LIB Erukuppu = ERIKUB E s c acholtz I s l and = BIKINI E s chholtz Atol l = BIKINI E s chocho l tz Ato l l = BIKINI E s choltz = B IKINI E s ch s cho ltz = BIKINI Etaaru To = ETAL ETAL Etaru = ETAL Etat I s l ands ETAL E ten = ETTEN ETTEN Eunas I s l and = MAUG I S LANDS Eurup i g = EAURIPIK Evening = TOB I Expe r iment = KOSRAE
Fagauerak = WEST FAYU Fagau - P i s s i l a I s l and = FAYU Fagau - P i s s i lu = FAYU Fah i eu = FAYU Fah ieu = WEST FAYU
Eliza = B ERU Eliza = ONOTOA Elizabeth I s land = JALUIT Elleb = LIB Elmore = A ILINGLAPLAP Endaaab i i - Shoto = PULUWAT Endaab i i Shoto = PULUWAT Endab i i - Shoto = PULUWAT Endab i Syoto = PULUWAT Fala- Beguets = FANAPANGES Falabenas = FANAPANGES Falang = FEFAN Falebange s = FANAPANGES Falebenge s = FANAPANGES Fal iao = PIKELOT Fal i au = WEST FAYU Faloc = I FALIK Falope = POHNPEI Faloupet = POHNPEI Fanadik = PULAP Fanadyk = PULAP Fananou = NOMWIN Fananu = NOMWIN FANAPANGE S Fanedj ik = PULAP Fanno g = B ELAU X- 1 Fanope = POHNPEI Faounaoupe i = POHNPEI Faraarappu = FARAULEP Farallon = FARALLON DE PAJAROS FARALLON DE MEDINILLA Farallon de Paj aj os = FARALLON
DE PAJAROS FARALLON DE PAJAROS Farallon Paxzros = FARALLON DE
MEDINILLA FARAULEP Faraul ip Atoll = FARAULEP Faro ilap = FARAULEP Faroulap = FARAULEP Farro ilap = FARAULEP Farro i lep = FARAULEP Farukku = IFALIK Fatto ilap = FARAULEP Faunupe i = POHNPEI Fayaew = GAFERUT FAYU FE FAN
5 8 6
Faieu FAYU Faieu WES T FAYU Faij o GAFERUT Fai tuk = TOL Faiu = FAYU Faiu = WEST FAYU Faiyao = WEST FAYU Faiyou To = WES T FAYU Faj o = FAYU Forro i lep = FARAULEP Foueu = FAYU Fourteen I s l ands = EBON Franc i s = BERU Fraser = ANT Front I s land = EOT Fuhaesu = FAI S Furaarappu = FARAULEP Furukku = I FALIK Fuyu = UMAN
GAFERUT Gag il = GAG IL TAMIL GAGIL TAMIL Gag i l - Tomi l = GAGIL TAMIL Gagiru - Tomiru To = GAG IL TAMIL Gaj angeru To = NGCHEANGEL Gamirisshu - Shoto = NGEMLIS Gamudok Island = NGEBEDANGEL Gamudoko = NGEBEDANGEL Garakayo I s l and = NGERCHEU Garakayo To = NGEMLI S Garangoru To = NGERCHAOL Garb anz o s = ULITHI Gardner = FARAULEP Garuanguru To = NGERUANGEL Garyo To = NGEMLI S Gaspar Rico = BOKAAK Getsuyo To = UDOT Ge tuyo To = UDOT G ij en = AGRIHAN G i lb ert Arch ipelago GILBERT
I S LANDS GILBERT I S LANDS G irime su = GAFERUT Gnotoa = ONOTOA Goam = GUAM Goan = GUAM Goan Aora = GUAM
Fefen = FEFAN Fe fen Ruk = FEFAN Fe i s = FAI S Feys FAI S Flarik Inseln = IFALIK Foe shavlap = FARAULEP Fono Penges = FANAPANGES Foraulep = FARAULEP Foroilap = FARAULEP Grej e = AGRIHAN Gri ga = AGRIHAN Griga , Volcan de = AGRIHAN Grigan I s land = AGRIHAN Gr imes = GAFERUT Guaban = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Guadabusu = NGEDBUS Guadobusu I s land = NGEDBUS Guahan = GUAM Guahon = GUAM Guaj an = GUAM Guaj ano I s land = GUAM Guaj on I s land = GUAM GUAM Guamu To = GUAM Guan = GUAM Guana = AGRIHAN Guap = YAP Guap = YAP ISLANDS Guapatsu To = NGEBAD Guayan = GUAM Guban = GUAM Guerga = AGRIHAN Guguan = GUAM Guj eham = GUAM Gur i initchi To = KAPINGAMARANGI Gurimesu To = GAFERUT Gur initti = KAPINGAMARANGI Guxam = GUAM Guy Rock = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Gwadobusu To = NGEDBUS Gwam = GUAM Gwan = GUAM
Hall = MURILO HALL I SLANDS Harmanas , Los = NAMONUITO Harper = POHNPEI Haru - Shima = MOEN
5 8 7
Gofe rut = GAFERUT Good Lookout = NGERUANGEL Goreor = OREOR Goror = OREOR Graf Heyden = LIKIEP Greca = AGRIHAN Gre enwich = KAPINGAMARANGI Gregua = AGRIHAN Greguna = AGRIHAN Henderville = ARANUKA Herene Sho = HELEN He ren - Sho = HELEN H i gh = GAFERUT Hogoleu I s l ands = TRUK ISLANDS Hogolu I s lands = TRUK I SLANDS Hope = KOSRAE Hope I s l and = ARORAE Hopp e r = ABEMAMA Horu - Sho to = HALL I S LANDS Ho ten Rif = HELEN Houg = TRUK I S LANDS Huaj an = GUAM Huhaesu = FAI S Huiyao = WEST FAYU Hunepe t = POHNPEI Huraarappu = FARAULEP Hurd I s l and = ARORAE Hurukku = I FALIK Huyu- Sh ima = UMAN
I faelhuug = I FALIK I FALIK I falouk = I FALIK I faluk = I FALIK I fe louk = I FALIK I fe luc = I FALIK I felug = I FALIK I fe luk = I FALIK I guana = GUAM I l ilo = WOLEAI Inataj an = ANATAHAN Inglesa , La = FARALLON DE PAJAROS I n i s s ini fau - P i s s i la = FAYU I ro s = MOEN Iur ipik = EAURI PIK
J abatto To = JABWOT J abwat = JABWOT
Harve s t = NAMOLUK Hashmy I s lands = NAMOLUK Hashnys = NAMOLUK Hawe i s = ELATO Heap = YAP Heap = YAP I SLANDS Helato = ELATO Helen Ree f = HELEN Helut = A I LINGLAPLAP Jardines , Lo s = NAMONUITO Jaurep ik = EAURIPIK Jebat = J ABWOT Jebuat = JABWOT JEMO Jemu = J EMO J imo = J EMO Johnstone = TOBI Junc t ion = ERIKUB Jur ip ik = EAURIPIK Jurukku T o = I FALIK
Kabahaia Inseln = WOTHO Kabeneylon = KAPINGAMARANGI Kabonoylon = KAPINGAMARANGI Kadj angel = NGCHEANGEL Kadj angle = NGCHEANGEL Kadogubi = TOBI Kae i de J ima = PAREM Kaibakku = NGETEKLOU Kaide J im a = PAREM Kaj amble = NGCHEANGEL Kaj angle = NGCHEANGEL Kaj anguru = NGCHEANGEL Kalap = MWOKIL Kama = EAURIPIK Kapen-Ma i lang = KAPINGAMARANGI KAPINGAMARANGI Kap - In-Ma i lang = KAP INGAMARANGI Karorin Shoto = POHNPEI I S LANDS Kata = PULUWAT Katharine = UJAE Kather ine = UJAE Kaven = MALOELAP Kawen = MALOELAP Kayange l = NGCHEANGEL Kayangl e = NGCHEANGEL Kayo = FANAPANGES Kaz anguru To = NGCHEANGEL
5 B B
JABWOT JALUIT Jalwij = JALUIT Jame s = UJELANG J amo = J EMO J ap = YAP I S LANDS Japan Fayu = FAYU J ap - Gruppe = YAP J ap - Inseln = YAP I S LANDS Kingsmi l l G roup = SOUTHERN GI LBERT
I S LANDS Kingsmill I s lands = GILBERT I S LANDS Kingsmi l l I s lands = SOUTHERN
G ILBERT I S LANDS Kiri = KILl KIRIBATI K i r i i To = KILl Kiri To = KILl Kle imrong = RONGRIK Kle ine - Makin = MAKIN Kle in- Namo = NAMORIK KNOX Knox = TARAWA Knoy I s land = TARAWA Kodgub i = S ONSOROL ISLANDS Kodgub i I s l and = TOBI Kodo gub i = TOBI Kodokopue i = TOB I Kolonie = POHNPEI Koreor I s land = OREOR Koror = OREOR Kororu = OREOR Korrer OREOR Korror = OREOR KOSRAE KOSRAE , STATE OF Kotus off = UTRIK Kre iange l Inseln = NGCHEANGEL Krus ens tern = AI LUK Kuade len = KWAJALEIN Kuej e r in To = KWAJALE IN Kuej ie rin To = KWAJALEIN Kuezye r in = KWAJALEIN Kunto Shoto = NEOCH Kuop = NEOCH Kusae = KOSRAE Kus aie = KOSRAE Kuas i To = KOSRAE
Kentsch ikow = KWAJALEIN Kewley = UJELANG Kianguel = NGCHEANGEL Kile = KILl KILl Kimishima - Shoto = NEOCH Kimis ima Syoto = NEOCH Kimi s i s ima Sho to = NEOCH Kingsmi l l Group = GILBERT I S LANDS Kutusow = UTRIK Kutuz on Smolenski = UTRIK Kutuzov Smolenski = TAKA Kwadhe l in = KWAJALEIN Kwadj alin = KWAJALEIN Kwadj e l in = KWAJALE IN Kwadj el inn Ins e ln = KWAJALEIN KWAJALE IN Kwaj alin = KWAJALEIN Kwaj along = KWAJALEIN Kwaj e l in = KWAJALEIN Kwaj e l inn = KWAJALEIN Kwaj leen = KWAJALEIN Kwatelene = KWAJALEIN Kwe dhel in = KWAJALEIN Kwe ij ierin To = KWAJALEIN Kyangle = NGCHEANGEL
La Concepc ion = ALAMAGAN Ladrone Is lands = MARIANA ISLANDS Ladrones , Los = MARIANA I S LANDS Ladrones I s lands = MARIANA I S LANDS Lagulus = TRUK IS LANDS Lai = LAE Lambert = AI LINGLAPLAP Lambert = NAMU Laml iaur Ulu I s lands = NGULU Lamo liaur Ulu I s l ands = NGULU Lamo liau Ulu = NGULU Lamo l iau - Uru = NGULU Lamo l iork = NGULU Lamorsu = LAMOTREK LAMOTREK Lamul iur = NGULU Lamululudi = ULITHI Lamululutup = ULITHI Lamuniur NGULU Lamureck LAMOTREK Lamurrec LAMOTREK
5 8 9
Kus e i e Kus s a i Kus s iu Kuthiu
KOSRAE KOSRAE KOSRAE KOSRAE
Kutosow Ins e ln = UTRIK Kutusoff I s l ands = UTRIK Kutusoff Smo l ensky = UTRIK Kutus on Ato l l = UTRIK Kutus ov = UTRIK Ligiep LIKIEP Likieb = LIKIEP LIKIEP Lileb = LIB Linnez = EBON LI P = LI B Little Makin Little Makiu
MAKIN MAKIN
Livings ton = NAMONUITO Livings tone = NAMONUITO Lord Mul gave = MILl Lord Mulgrave = MILl Lord Nor th = TOBI Lo s Ladrones = MARIANA ISLANDS Lo s Mar i anas = MARIANA ISLANDS Lo s Matires = PULAP Los s op = LOSAP Los Val i ente s = NGETIK Louasappe = LOSAP Lous s appe = LOSAP Low I s l ands = EAURIPIK Lua s ap = LOSAP Luguen = PULUWAT Lugulos LUKUNOR Lugulus = TRUK I S LANDS Lugunor = LUKUNOR Luke i s e l = LOSAP LUKUNOR Lukunor - Gruppe = MORTLOCK I SLANDS Lumul iur = NGULU Lumululutu = ULITHI Luta = ROTA Lutke = LUKUNOR Lutke = NAMONUITO Lutke - Insel = FAYU Lutkem Faieu = FAYU Lydia = KWAJALEIN Lydia = PIKELOT Lydia I s l and = UJAE
Lamutrik I ns e ln = LAMOTREK Lanomi tuk = TRUK I SLANDS Larkins = OROLUK Le giep I s lands = LIKIEP Leguischel = PULUWAT Lej eune = PAREM Lemarafat , Gruppe = HALL I S LANDS LIB Ligieb = LIKI EP MAIANA Maidi = MEJ IT Mai J ima = EOT Ma i - Shima = EOT Maj ej = MEJ IT Maj ro = MAJURO MAJURO Maj uruk = MAJURO Makarama = KAPINGAMARANGI Maki Meang Is l and = MAKIN MAKIN Makin Ato l l = BUTARI TARI Makin Maian = MAKIN Makin Meang = MAKIN Malacal = NGEMELACHEL Malacan = NGEMELACHEL Malaccan = NGEMELACHEL Malackan = NGEMELACHEL Malagal = NGEMELACHEL Malakal = NGEMELACHEL Maloelab = MALOELAP MALOELAP Mama = PULUWAT Manao = MAUG I S LANDS Mang = MAUG ISLANDS Mangs = MAUG I S LANDS MANILA REE F Mao = MAUG ISLANDS Map = MAAP Mapen - Mai lang = KAPINGAMARANGI Maple Tre e Is land = PAREM Mappu To = MAAP Marakaru To = NGEMELACHEL MARAKEI Maraki = MARAKEI Margaret = UJAE Margaret KWAJALEIN Margaretta = KWAJALEIN Margaretta I s l ands = NAMU
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Macaskill = PINGELAP Mackenz ie ULITHI Mackinz ie = ULITHI Madinilla = FARALLON DE MEDINILLA Madj uro = MAJURO Madschero = MAJURO Mae - Shima = EOT Mahj e ruv = MAJURO Mari annas I s lands = MARIANA ISLANDS Marianne I s l ands = MARIANA I SLANDS Marianne Ladrone Islands = MARIANA
I S LANDS Mariannes I s lands = MARIANA ISLANDS Mar itre s , Lo s = PULAP Maroe rappu = MALOELAP Marriere , Pulo = MERIR Marschal l I s lands = MARSHALL ISLANDS Marshal l Archipe l ago = MARSHALL
I S LANDS Marshal l - Gruppe = MARSHALL I SLANDS MARSHALL ISLANDS Marshal l ' s Archipe l = MARSHALL
I S LANDS Marshalls = MARSHALL I SLANDS Martires Island = PULAP Martyre s = PULAP Masharu - Shoto = MARSHALL I S LANDS Matan = ANATAHAN Mate letos NGULU Matelotas = NGULU Matelotos = NGULU Mat thew Island = MARAKEI Matires = PULAP Matires , Los = PULAP Matlocks Islands = MORTLOCK ISLANDS Matorokku- Shoto = MORTLOCK ISLANDS Matthew = MARAKEI Matthews = ABAIANG MAUG ISLANDS Mauga = MAUG ISLANDS Maui - MAUG ISLANDS Mauo = MAUG I S LANDS Maye J ima = EOT Mayug = MAUG ISLANDS Mcaskill = PINGELAP Medeinizya = FARALLON DE MEDINILLA Medini ij a To = FARALLON DE
Margarretta = NAMU Maria = BERU MARIANA ISLANDS Marianas = MARIANA ISLANDS Mar i anas , I s las = MARIANA I S LANDS Marianas , Los = MARIANA I SLANDS Mariana - Shoto = MARIANA I S LANDS Mar ianen = MARIANA ISLANDS Mar i anes , Les I les = MARIANA I S LANDS Meduro I s land = MAJURO Me id = MEJ IT Mej dit = MEJ IT Mej i chi To = MEJ IT MEJ IT Mej uro To = MAJURO Me l i = MILl Me l i e l = MERIR Mens chikoff = KWAJALEIN Mensch ikov Ato l l = KWAJALEIN Ments chikoff = KWAJALEIN Ments chikow Ins e ln = KWAJALEIN Mereyon = WOLEAI Meriel = MERIR Merier = MERIR Merieres = MERIR MERIR Meriru - Sho = MERIR Me s id = MEJIT Me talotus = NGULU Mez i t i = MEJ IT Mezyuro = MAJURO Miadi = MEJ IT Mile = MILl MILI Mille = MILI Milli = MILI MINTO REEF Minto Breakers = MINTO REEF Minto Riff = MINTO REEF Minto Sho = MINTO REEF Mire = MILl Miri = MILl Moenn = MOEN Mogal = MWOKIL Mogemog = ULITHI Mogmog = ULITHI Moguru = MAUG I S LANDS Mogu To = MAUG I S LANDS
5 9 1
MEDINILIA Medinilla = FARALLON DE MEDINILIA Medinizea I s l and = FARALLON DE
MEDINILIA Medinizya To = FARALLON DE
MEDINILIA Mediuro = MAJURO Medj i t = MEJ IT Medj uron = MAJURO Mortl ock I s l and = ETAL MORTLOCK I S LANDS Mortlock I s l ands = SATAWAN Mortlock - Ins e l = LUKUNOR Mo rtlocks = MORTLOCK I S LANDS Mortolockgruppe MORTLOCK I S LANDS Motorokku Shoto = MORTLOCK ISLANDS Mototokke Shoto = MORTLOCK ISLANDS Mo totokko Shoto = MORTLOCK I SLANDS Moug = MAUG I S LANDS Mougu = MAUG ISLANDS Mour i leu = MURILO Mour i lou = MURI LO Mugrnug = ULITHI Muki l = MWOKI L Mulgrave = MILl Mulgrove = MILl Mur i l a = MURILO Mur i l eu = MURILO Mur i l l o I s l ands MURILO MURI LO Mur iro = MURI LO Musgrave = P INGEIAP Musqu i l lo = NAMU Mwaloelab = MALOEIAP Mwek i l = MWOKIL MWOKIL
Nachikku To = NGETIK Naftan Rock = AGUIJAN Nafutan = AGUIJAN Naiad = ETAL Naid I s lands = ETAL NAMA Nama Ato l l = NAMU Narnaluk = NAMOLUK Narnarik I s l and = NAMORIK Narna - Sh irna = NAMA Narnchikku = LAMOTREK
Mokil = MWOKIL Mokiri = MWOKIL Mokiru To = MWOKI L Mokor = NAMOLUK Monday I s l and = UDOT Monj as = MAUG I S LANDS Monout i = NONOUTI Moore I s l and = NGCHEANGEL Morning S tar = UJELANG Narnolot = ETAL Narno loto = ETAL Narnolo tou = ETAL NAMOLUK Narnonerne i r = ETAL Narnone s o s on = ETAL NAMONUITO NAMORIK Narnorukku = NAMOLUK Namot ikku = LAMOTREK Namouin - Atoll = NOMWIN Namouttek = LAMOTREK NAMU Namuluc = NAMOLUK Namurech I s land = KILl Namureck = KILl Namur ic = NAMORIK Namur ik = NAMORIK Namur ikku = NAMORIK Namurrek = LAMOTREK Namuuin Shoto = NOMWIN Namwdik = NAMORIK Namwo = NAMU Namwoachi ig = LAMOTREK Nanalake = NGEMEIACHEL Nanouki = ARANUKA Nanuti = NONOUTI Naracobersa I s land Natan = ANATAHAN Nat ikku = NGETIK Natsu Sh ima = DUBLON Natu S ima = DUBLON Naura = NAURU
NGEREKEBESANG
Nauti lus = TABITEUEA Nau ' uru = NAURU Navoda = NAURU Navodo = NAURU Nawodo = NAURU Nema NAMA
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Nama = NAMA Nama = NAMU Namochikku To = LAMOTREK Namo i - Ins e ln = MORTLOCK ISLANDS Namo in = NOMWIN Namo l iaour = OLIMARAO Namol ip iafan I s lands = NOMWIN Namo l i p iafane = NOMWIN Namo lipiafano = NOMWIN Ngaregeu = NGERCHEU Ngarekobas ang = NGEREKEBESANG Ngarekobasanga = NGEREKEBESANG Ngargol = NGERCHAOL Ngar ic = NGETIK Ngarik = NGETIK Ngaruangel = NGERUANGEL Ngaruangl Re e f = NGERUANGEL Ngaruik = NGETIK Ngaryk I s lands = NGETIK Ngatik = NGETIK Ngaur = NGEAUR NGCHEANGEL NGEAUR NGEBAD NGEBEDANGEL NGEDBUS Nge iangl = NGCHEANGEL Nge lu = NGULU NGEMELACHEL Ngeme l i s Group = NGEMLI S Ngeme l i s I s lands = NGEMLIS NGEMLI S Ngeour = NGEAUR NGERCHAOL NGERCHEU Ngerchong = NGERECHONG Ngereb e s ang = NGEREKEBESANG NGERECHONG Nge re gong = NGERECHONG Ngerhong = NGERECHONG NGEREKEBESANG Ngergo i = NGERCHEU NGERUANGEL NGERUKEUID NGERUKTABEL Ngerukui d = NGERUKEUID Ngerwange l Re ef = NGERUANGEL Nge s ebus = NGEDBUS
Nema Peace = NAMA Nemu = NAMU NEOCH Neuj ahrs - Ins e l MEJ I T Nevil = TOBI Nevi lle = TOBI New Year = MEJ IT Ngabad = NGEBAD Ngaj angel = NGCHEANGEL Ngolog = NGULU Ngolu NGULU Ngoly = NGULU NGULU Ngurukadaoel = NGERUKTABEL Ngurukdape l I s l and = NGERUKTABEL Niaur = NGEAUR N i shidate To = NGERUKEUI D N i shitatsu T o = NGERUKEUID Nomi tuck = TRUK I S LANDS Nomo i = MORTLOCK ISLANDS Nomuti = NONOUTI Nomuts ch = NONOUTI Nomuuin = NOMWIN Nomuwin - Shoto = NOMWIN NOMWIN Nonouki = ARANUKA NONOUT I Nonuch = NONOUTI Nonut = NONOUTI Nonuti = NONOUTI Nonwin- Ins e ln = NOMWIN NORTHERN GILBERT ISLANDS Northern Gilberts = NORTHERN GILB ERT
I SLANDS NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS Novago Goda , Ostrov = MEJ IT Nugoro To = NUKUORO Nugoru = NUKUORO Nuguo r = NUKUORO Nukuor = NUKUORO Nukuwar = NUKUORO Nukuwor = NUKUORO Nuteck I s lands = NGETIK N ' Yaur = NGEAUR
Ocean I s land = BANABA Odia = AILINGLAPLAP Odia = WOTJ E
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NGETEKLOU NGETIK Ngge i ange l = NGCHEANGEL Ngi lu = NGULU Ngiul = NGULU Ngoba s ange l = NGEBEDANGEL Ngob o s angl = NGEBEDANGEL Ngo l i = NGULU Ngo l i i = NGULU Ol ima r i o = OLIMARAO O l l ap = PUIAP Olnea = WOLEAI Olobe t ape l - Ins e ln = NGEMLI S Olol Gruppe = NAMONUITO Olo tup ULITHI Olut a i = EIATO Olut e l = EIATO Omi a - J ima = GUAM Omi J ima = GUAM Onave ro = NAURU Onawe ro = NAURU ON GAEL Ono a t o a = ONOTOA Ono l u = NGULU Onomarai = OLIMARAO Onon = NAMONUITO ONOTOA Onoun = NAMONUITO Onoune = NAMONUITO Onoutu = ONOTOA 0 Puluot = PULUWAT Oraluk = OROLUK Ora- Magan = AIAMAGAN Orauru - Fe l s = MANilA REEF ORE OR Orokuizu = NGERUKEUID Oro l ong = ULONG OROLUK ORONA Orono = ORONA Oro rukku = OROLUK Ororu Sho to = NAMONUITO Orukuizu = NGERUKEUID Orulong = ULONG 0 S auk = PULUWAT O t = EOT Ota = MAUG I S LANDS Ota - Ma o = MAUG ISLANDS
Odj ia = WOTJE Odt ia = WOTJE Oj a = AILINGIAPIAP Ola = TRUK I SLANDS Oleai = WOLEAI Oleei = WOLEAI Olie = WOLEAI OLIMARAO Ol imarau = OLIMARAO Paanopa = BANABA PAGAN Pagaon = PAGAN Pagara = PAGAN Pagenema = PAKIN Pagan = PAGAN Paguenema = PAKIN Painipe te = POHNPEI Pais = FAI S Paiz = FAI S Paj aro s = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Pakeen = PAKIN PAKIN Palaoa = B ELAU Palao Ins e ln = BELAU Palaos I s l ands = BELAU Palau = BELAU Palau Group = BELAU Palau I s l and = BABELDAOB Palau I s lands = BELAU Palaus , The = BELAU Paleu = BELAU Pallay , Le Groupe = BELAU Pal lou I s l ands , The = BELAU Pally = BELAU Palo Anna I s land = PULO ANNA Paloc = BELAU Palolo = PULO ANNA Palos , Le s = BELAU Panipe te = POHNPEI Panlog = BELAU Panlog = BABELDAOB
Panlong I s land = BABELDAOB Panloq = BABELDAOB Pannog = BELAU Panopea = BANABA Paolo = PULO ANNA Papan = PAGAN Param PAREM
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Otdia I s land = WOTJE Otirik = UTRIK Oualan = KOSRAE Ouap = YAP Ouap = YAP ISLANDS Ouleai = WOLEAI Oulevai = WOLEAI Ouluthy = ULITHI Paxaros I s land = FARALLON DE
MEDINILLA Paygan = PAGAN Peace = NAMA Peaked Hill = TOBI Pedder = ARNO Pedul = NGEREKEBESANG Peeloo I s l ands = BELAU Pegan = PAGAN Pegon = PAGAN Peguenerna = PAKIN Pelau - Ins e ln = BELAU Pe lelap = PINGELAP Pelelep = PINGELAP Pele lew = BELILIOU Pele lew I s l ands = BELAU Pe leliou = BELILIOU Pe leliu = BELILIOU Pe leu = BELAU Pelew = BELAU Pelil iou = BELILIOU Pe lilu = BELILIOU Pel lew , Iles de = BELAU Pe l l i = BELAU Pe llow = BELAU Perem , Ins e l = PAREM Periadik = PAREM Pe riryu = BELILIOU Peroat = BERU Peru = BERU Pe scadaro = RONGRIK Pes cadore = RONGELAP Pes cadore I s lands = RONGRIK Pescadores = RONGRIK Pe scadores = KAPINGAMARANGI Petre l - Ins e l = BOKAAK Phi l ip = SOROL Ph i l lip Islands = SOROL Piage lap = PINGELAP Pigailoe = WEST FAYU
Parao = BABELDAOB Parao = BELAU Parao - J ima = BELAU PAREM Pas ion , I s las de la = NGETIK PATA Patterson I s lands = NAMU Paulogue = BELAU P ikaaru To = BIKAR Pikala = PIKELOT Pikaru = BIKAR P ike la = PIKELOT PIKE LOT Piki ini = B IKINI P ikinni To = BIKINI P ikirarn = KAPINGAMARANGI P i l i lau = BELILIOU P i l i le r = BELILIOU P i l i l iu = BELILIOU P i l i lj u = BELILIOU P i l ilu = BELILIOU P i l iu Insel = BELILIOU P i l l i lew = BELILIOU P ingarappu To = PINGELAP PINGELAP Pinge rappu = PINGELAP P ingoulap = PINGELAP Pitt = MAKIN Pitts = MAKIN Placeres = NOMWIN Pleasant = NAURU POHNPEI POHNPEI , STATE OF POHNPEI I S LANDS Pohnpey = POHNPEI Pokaakku = BOKAAK Pokak = BOKAAK Pokela = PIKELOT Pollap PULAP POLLE Po loac PULUWAT Poloat PULUWAT Poloot PULUWAT Polot = PULUWAT Polowat = PULUWAT Po lut = PULUWAT Ponape = POHNPEI Ponape I s lands = POHNPEI I SLANDS
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Piga l i = PIKELOT Pigelot = PIKELOT Pigerappu PINGELAP P i gero tto PIKELOT Pigoualao PIKELOT Pigoue lao PIKELOT P ihg = PIKELOT Pij = PIKELOT Pourappu = PULAP Pouynipe te = POHNPEI Pragan = PAGAN Praien = PAGAN Praj an = PAGAN Princ e s s a I s l and = JABWOT Princ e s s a I s l and = LIB Princ e s s e = LIB Providence = UJELANG Puinipet = POHNPEI Pul = PULO ANNA Pul = PULUWAT PULAP Pul lep = PULAP Pul lop = PULAP Pulo = PULO ANNA Pulo Ann = PULO ANNA PULO ANNA Pulo Anne = PULO ANNA Pulo Mer i e r = MERIR Pul o s uk = PULUSUK Pulu Suge = PULUSUK Puluhot = PULUWAT Puluo t = PULUWAT PULUSUK PULUWAT Punip iet = POHNPEI Punlac = B E LAU Punlog = B E LAU Pur = PULO ANNA Puru = PULO ANNA Puru Anna = PULO ANNA Puttep = PULAP Puynipet = POHNPEI Pwe l e = POLLE Pyghella PIKELOT
Quade l en KWAJALEIN Qualan = KOSRAE Queangal = NGCHEANGEL
Ponapei = POHNPEI Ponap i I s land = POHNPE I Pone = POLLE Ponpei = POHNPEI Poraro = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Poulo = PULO ANNA Poulouote = PULUWAT Pouloupa = POHNPEI Ral ick = RALIK CHAIN RALIK CHAIN Ral ik - Ke t te = RALIK CHAIN Rar ikku = RALIK CHAIN Rarikku Chen = RALIK CHAIN Ratack = RATAK CHAIN RATAK CHAIN Ratakku Chen = RATAK CHAIN Ratakku Retto = RATAK CHAIN Rattakadokoru I s land = ULONG Raven = NGETIK Raven ' s I s land = NGET I K Remp = NAMONUITO Remp l i e de Volcans = PAGAN Remski - Korsako ff = AILINGINAE Reye s , Lo s = MURI LO Reye s , Lo s = ULITHI Rikieppu = LIKIEP R {mski - Korsakoff = RONGELAP Rimski - Korsakoff Ato l l = AILINGINAE Rimski - Korsakoff I s land = RONGRIK Rimski Kor s akov = RONGELAP Rimsky Kor s acoff = RONGELAP Rocher = FARALLON DE MEDINILLA Rocher = TAMANA Rocher de Guy = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Rock I s lands = CHELBACHEB Rocker = FARALLON DE MEDINILLA Roger S imps on I s l and = ABEMAMA Romanz off = WOTJ E Romanzov = WOTJ E Romanzow = WOTJE Rongarappu = RONGELAP Rongdik = RONGRIK Rongelab = RONGELAP RONGELAP Rongerik = RONGRIK Rongirik = RONGRIK Rongir ikku = RONGRIK Rongorappu To = RONGELAP
5 9 6
Qui rosa = POHNPEI Quo lan = KOSRAE Quo llen I s land = KOSRAE
Radac = RATAK CHAIN Radack = RATAK CHAIN Radokala I s l ands = RONGRIK Ral i c = RALIK CHAIN Royal I s l ands = NEOCH Roya l i s t = NEOCH Roya l i s t = LOSAP Rue TRUK I S LANDS Rug TRUK I S LANDS Ruk FEFAN Ruk TRUK I S LANDS Rukgruppe = TRUK I S LANDS Ruku = TRUK I S LANDS Rukunoru = LUKUNOR Rukutee To = FAYU Rukute To = FAYU Rukuto = FAYU Rull = YAP Rumyantsov = WOTJE Runal in = PULAP Rvaen Group = NGETIK
Saepan = SAI PAN S aespara = SAI PAN S aint Andre = S ONSOROL S aint Andre = SONSOROL ISLANDS Saint Andrew = SONSOROL S aint Andrew = SONSOROL I SLANDS S aint Andrews I s l ands = SONSOROL
I SLANDS S aint Ange , I l e de = AGUIJAN S aint Anne , I le = ROTA S aint Charle s , I l e de = SARIGAN S aint Ignace , I l e de PAGAN S aint Jos eph , I le de = SAI PAN Sainte Jean = GUAM S a inte Laurent = MAUG I SLANDS S a inte Ph i l ippe , I le de = GUGUAN SAI PAN San Agus t ino I s land = OROLUK S an Andreas = SONSOROL S an Andre as = S ONSOROL ISLANDS S an Andre s = SONSOROL ISLANDS S an Barto lome = PULUSUK
RONGRIK Ronlat = PULAP Rora = MOEN Ro sappu = LOSAP Ro soppu Sho to = LOSAP Ro s s = NAMU Rotcher = TAMANA Roug = TRUK I S LANDS San Ignac io = PAGAN San Joachim , I le de = ANATAHAN San Joaquin = ANATAHAN San Joaquine = ANATAHAN San Jose = SAIPAN San Juan = GUAM San Lorenzo = MAUG I S LANDS San Rafael = NAMA Sanserol SONSOROL Sansero l SONSOROL I S LANDS Sansoral SONSOROL Sansoral I s lands = S ONSOROL I S LANDS Santa Ana = ROTA Santa Angel = AGUIJAN Santo Angel = AGUIJAN Sapan = ROTA Saraon = SOROL SARIGAN Sarignan SARIGAN Sarigoan SARIGAN Sariguan = SARIGAN Sari guwan = SARIGAN Sarigwan To = SARIGAN Saroan = SOROL Sarol = SOROL Sarpan = ROTA Sarpana O ' Rota ROTA S arpanta = ROTA Sas aon = SATAWAL Saspan = SAI PAN Sataawal SATAWAL Satahoal = SATAWAL Satahual = SATAWAL Sataoan = SATAWAN Sataual = SATAWAL Satauan- Ins e l = SATAWAN Satavan = SATAWAL SATAWAL SATAWAN Satawan = SATAWAL
5 9 7
S an Bartolomeo = PULUSUK S an Barto l omeo = BOKAAK S an Bartomeo PULUSUK S an Carlos = SARIGAN S an Carlos = TOB I S an Carol = SARIGAN S an E s tevan = NOMWIN S an Franc i s c o Javier AGRIHAN S chank = NAURU S chantz - Inseln = WOTHO S chanz = WOTHO S che ludsch = JALUIT S chuk = TRUK I S LANDS S eben I s l ands = NGETIK S e ipan = SAI PAN Seniavin I s lands = POHNPEI ISLANDS Seniavina = POHNPEI I S LANDS S eniavine I s lands = POHNPEI ISLANDS Seniawina Ins eln = POHNPEI ISLANDS S enj awin - Ins e ln = POHNPEI ISLANDS S enyavin I s l ands = POHNPEI ISLANDS S epam = SAI PAN S eque ira = NGULU Serpana = ROTA S erpent = UJAE S e span = SAI PAN S e teoel = SATAWAL S e toan = SATAWAL S e tuahal = S ATAWAL S even I s lands = NGETIK S eypan = SAI PAN Shank I s l and = NAURU Shanz I s land = WOTHO Shiraau = KOS RAE S iebz i g Ins e ln = NGERUKEUID S imp s on I s l and = ABEMAMA S ix I s le s = ABAIANG Skiddy = NAMOLUK Smyth = BOKAAK Snonimus = NAMONUITO S o i s o l = S ONSOROL S o i s o l = S ON SOROL I S LANDS S one s o r = S ONSOROL S one s o r = S ONS OROL I S LANDS S ongosor = SONSOROL S ongosor - S ONSOROL ISLANDS S oni s o l = S ONSOROL I S LANDS S onrol = SONS OROL
Satoan = SATAWAL Satoan = SATAWAN Satouwan = SATAWAN Satowal = SATAWAL Satowalairak = SATAWAL Satual = SATAWAL Satuwal = SATAWAL Saypan = SAI PAN Sonsonrro l = SONSOROL Sonsonrro l = SONSOROL I S LANDS S ons oral SONSOROL
S ONSOROL I S LANDS S ons oral SONSOROL SONSOROL I SLANDS Sonsoru = SONSOROL I S LAND S Sonsoru To = SONSOROL Sontsero l = SONSOROL Sontserol = SONSOROL I S LANDS Sonzeral SONSOROL Sonz eral = SONSOROL I S LANDS Sonz erol = S ONSOROL Soral = S OROL SOROL Sororu = S OROL Sorou To = SOROL So toan Ato lle = SATAWAN S ouserol = S ONSOROL Souserol = SONSOROL I S LANDS SOUTHERN GILBERT ISLANDS Souworoff Is land = TAKA Spencerkeys = NGULU Spr ing I s l and = MOEN Stawan I s l ands = SATAWAN S trong = KOSRAE S ts iuck = TRUK ISLANDS Suiyo To = TOL Summer I s land = DUBLON Sunr ise = RATAK CHAIN Suns et = RATAK CHAIN Supan = SAIPAN Survorov = TAKA Sus anne Bank = MANILA REEF Susuki J ima = S I I S Suvarov = TAKA Suwarow = TAKA Suzuki J ima = S I I S Swede = LAMOTREK Syb i l l a - Inseln = BOKAAK
5 9 8
Sonro l = SONSOROL I S LANDS S ons erol = SONSOROL S onserol = SONSOROL I S LANDS S ons e ron = SONSOROL S onseron = SONSOROL I S LANDS S onso l = SONSOROL S onsol = SONSOROL I S LANDS S onsonorol = S ONSOROL ISLANDS Takai = TAKA Take = ETTEN Takee = TAKA TAMAN A Tamatam = PULAP Tamatan = PULAP Tame s a Ree f = MANILA REEF Tame tam = PULAP Tanian = TINIAN Taongi = BOKAAK Tape teuea = TABI TEUEA Tape tua = TABETEUEA Tap i teouea = TABITEUEA Tap i teuea = TABITEUEA Tapi tuwea = TAB I TEUEA Taputeuea I s land = TAB ITEUEA Taputeuna = TABITEUEA Taputeuwea TAB ITEUEA Taputoouea = TABITEUEA TARAWA Tarawa = TARAWAI TARAWAI Tar itari = BUTARITARI Tarowa = TARAWA Tebat = JABWOT Tebot = JABWOT Tebut = JABWOT Tebut = LI B Tegi = TAKA Teke = TAKA Telut = JALUIT Temetem = PULAP Temo = JEMO Tendanie TARAWAI Tendanj e = TARAWAI Tendanye = TARAWAI Tenian = TINIAN Teyea = KOSRAE Teyoa = KOSRAE Thieve Islands NGULU
Sydeham Island = NONOUTI Sydenham = NONOUTI
Tab i teual = TABITEUEA TABITEUEA Tabuteuea = TABITEUEA Tagai = TAKA TAKA TINIAN Tinianion = TINIAN Togobe i = TOBI Toke = TAKA Tokobe = TOBI Tokob e i I s land Tokobi = TOBI TOL TOL GROUP Toloas = DUBLON
TOBI
Tomi l = GAGI L TAMIL Tomi l - Gamil = GAGIL TAMIL Ton = TOL Tonoas = DUBLON Tonowas = DUBLON Torakku- Shoto = TRUK I S LANDS Torres POHNPEI Torres = TRUK I S LANDS TOTIU Touching = BUTARITARI Traversey = AUR Trome l in = FAI S Troml in I s land FAI S TRUK , STATE OF TRUK ISLANDS Tsch i tschagoff ERIKUB Tsis = S I I S Tucker = SATAWAL Tues day I s land = FANAPANGES Tuna = MAUG I S LANDS Tunas = MAUG I SLANDS Tungaru = GILBERT ISLANDS Two S i s ters = I FALIK
Ualan = KOSRAE Ualang = KOSRAE Uap = YAP Uap = YAP I S LANDS Uauak = PULUWAT Udi ric = UTRIK
5 9 9
Th i eve ' s I s l ands = MARIANA ISLANDS Th i r teen I s l and = WOLEAI Thur s day I s l and = PATA T i erno = J EMO T imo = J EMO Tina = MAUG I S LANDS T indal = AILUK Tindal and Watts I s l and = AILUK U i e t o = NAMONUITO UJAE Uj ami l a i = UJAE Uj e l an = UJELANG UJ ELANG Uj i l ang = UJELANG Uj i l ong I s land = UJELANG Uj i r an To = UJELANG Uj l ang = UJELANG Uldi = ULITHI Ulea = WOLEAI Uleai = WOLEAI U l e ay = WOLEAI Uler = BELILIOU U levy = ULITHI Ulewi = ULITHI Ul i e = WOLEAI ULITHI Uli ti = ULITHI Ul i t i gruppe = ULITHI Ul l e a = WOLEAI ULONG Ululs s i Inseln = ULITHI Ulus s i = ULITHI Uluta = ULITHI Uluth i = ULITHI Uluthy = ULITHI Uluti = ULITHI Ulutup = ULITHI UMAN Umo l = UMAN Unawb = YAP Unawb = YAP I S LANDS Uneay = WOLEAI Unney = WOLEAI Uoe u Ins e ln = ULITHI Uoj j i e Atoll = WOTJ E Uola Ins e l = MOEN Urac = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Urac = MAUG I S LANDS
Udi rick I s lands = UTRIK Udj ae = UJAE Udj elang = UJ ELANG Udj elong = UJELANG UDOT Ue ito = NAMONUITO Ugeu Ins e ln = ULITHI Ugulut = TRUK I SLANDS Uramagan = ALAMAGAN Urckthap e l = NGERUKTABEL Uricas = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Urracas = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Urracas I s l ands = MAUG I S LANDS Urracas y Farallon de Paj aros
FARALLON DE PAJAROS Urracus = MAUG I S LANDS Urucdz ape l = NGERUKTABEL Uruckzap e l = NGERUKTABEL Urukdapel = NGERUKTABEL Urukds ape l = NGERUKTABEL Urukethaburu = NGERUKTABEL Uruks ape l = NGERUKTABEL Uruktapel I s land = NGERUKTABEL Uruktap i = NGERUKTABEL Urukthape l = NGERUKTABEL Urukthope l = NGERUKTABEL Urukutaaburu To = NGERUKTABEL Urukutaburu = NGERUKTABEL Urukutapuru = NGERUKTABEL Urushi = ULITHI Urus i To = ULITHI Usu Sh ima = S I I S Utet = UDOT Utorokku = UTRIK Utot = UDOT UTRIK Uyae = UJAE Uyap = YAP Uyap = YAP I S LANDS Uz iran = UJELANG Uzyae = UJAE
Valientes I s lands = NGETIK Val ientes , Los = NGETIK Velas Latinas , Is las de las
MARIANA I S LANDS Voge l ins e l = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Va lid = GUAM
6 0 0
Uracas = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Uracas = FARALLON DE MEDINILLA Uracas , Le s I l e s = MAUG I S LANDS Uraccas I s l and = MAUG I SLANDS Urakas = FARALLON DE MEDINILLA Urakas = MAUG ISLANDS Urakas = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Urakasu = FARALLON DE PAJAROS Warren Has t ings = MERIR Watehluhk = OROLUK Wa tts = AI LUK Wednes day I s land = TOL We la = MOEN We la- Tolos = DUBLON Weleeya = WOLEAI Welhimerahw = OLIMARAO We ll ington = MWOKIL We s t Faiu = WEST FAYU We s t Faj u = WEST FAYU WEST FAYU Wes tervelts I s lands = LOSAP W i l l i am IV - Ins e l = POHNPEI W i l l i am the Fourth = ANT Wilson = I FALIK Winter I s l and = UMAN Wi shard Re e f = MINTO REEF Woche = WOTJ E Woddo Inseln = WOTHO Woj j a = WOTJ E Woj j e To = WOTJE Wola = MOEN Wo la Haru = MOEN Wolai I s lands = WOLEAI Wolea = WOLEAI WOLEAI Wona = MOEN WONEI Wono = MOEN WOTHO WOTJ E Wo tsch = WOTJE Wotshe = WOTJE Wo ttho = WOTHO Wotto = WOTHO Wo z z i e = WOTJE Wuap = YAP I SLANDS Wuap , Insel = YAP Wuidj lang = UJELANG
Vo l in = GUAM
Walan = KOSRAE Walang = KOSRAE Walau = BELAU Wap = YAP Wap = YAP ISLANDS Waqab = YAP ISLANDS YAP ISLANDS Yapa = YAP Yapa = YAP ISLANDS Yappu = YAP I S LANDS Yappu To = YAP Yaruto = JALUIT Yaurwpi i g = EAURIPIK Ylatu = ELATO Yorop ie = EAURIPIK Yorupikku = EAURIPIK Yroup ikku To = EAURIPIK Young -Will iam = LUKUNOR Young Will iam I s lands SATAWAN Young William ' s Group SATAWAN Yur ip ik = EAURIPIK
Zaraol = SOROL Zarol = SOROL Zarpana = ROTA Zarpane = ROTA Zarpano = ROTA Ze ipan = SAIPAN Zerpan = SAI PAN Z inian = TINIAN Zwadj el inn = KWAJALEIN Zyabatto = JABWOT
6 0 1
Wul = PULO ANNA Wul l = PULO ANNA
Yae l uth = ELATO Yaluit JALUIT Yaluto = ELATO YAP YAP , STATE OF With persmi ss ion o f B i shop Mus eum
Pre s s , a l l copyr i ght laws s t i l l app ly .
6 0 2
APPENDIX B
WORLD WAR I I IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC--A CHRONOLOGY
1 9 14- 194 1
1 9 3 1 - 1 9 4 1
1 2 /3 / 4 1
1 2 / 7 / 4 1
1 2 / 8 / 4 1
1 2 / 1 0 /4 1
1 2 / 1 0 / 4 1
By Don Boyer
EVENTS
Japan gains control over the Central Pac i f ic Islands as a result of her participation in WWI . The League of Nations gives Japan a mandate over the Marshalls , Carol ines and Marianas ( with the exception of Guam ) . During the interwar years Japan develops areas of these islands as air and naval bases .
Japan ' s involvement in China and Manchuria , spurred by the controlling radical elements of the Japanese Army and their pol itical supporters , creates increas ing pol itical confl ict with the United States .
The coded signal "Niitakayama nobore " is sent to the Japanese fast carrier task force approaching Pearl Harbor , committing the Japanese to the attack on Pearl Harb0r .
Pearl Harbor attacked , initiating WWI I in the Pacific . Japan s imultaneously attacks Malays ia and the Dutch East Indies .
Japanese aircraft attack the Philippines , catching most o f Gen . Douglas MacArthur ' s air forces on the ground , in preparation for the upcoming amphibious invasion . Guam , Midway and Wake are also attacked by air , surface and submarine forces .
Guam surrenders to Japanese assault forces , after resistance by local defense forces .
Aircraft from U . S . S . ENTERPRISE s ink a Japanese submarine north of Hawaii , f irst warship vict im for the u . s . Navy .
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Japanese forces staging from the Central 4l Pacific attempt the first assault on Wake I s land . U . S . Marines repulse this attack . Three old Japanese destroyers are sunk and light cruiser YUBARI and several transports damaged .
Japanese invasion forces land in the northern Philippines .
Wake island falls to a second assault . The u . s . now has no between Hawaii and the Philippines .
Japanese territory
Rabaul , on the island of New Britain falls to Japanese forces along with Kavieng on the is land of New Ireland . These two well-harbored island bases become maj or naval and air bases for the Japanese , forming the southern leg of the Palau-Truk-Rabaul triangle which the Japanese intended to use as the j umping-o ff point for further expans ion in the south Pacific .
U . S . aircraft carriers ENTERPRI SE and YORKTOWN with accompanying cruisers stage the f irst A attacks against Japanese pos itions in the � Central Pac i f ic , raiding Jaluit , Mil i , Wot j e , Maloelap , Kwa j alein , Roi and Makin .
A U . S . carrier task force en route to raid Rabaul is detected and intercepted by Japanese land-based aircraft and forced to turn back without loss . Japanese aircraft losses were heavy , and the threat of carrier attack sets the Japanese timetable for the invasion of New Guinea back .
Two Japanese " Emily " seaplanes staging from the Marshall I s lands attack Pearl Harbor at night after refueling from a submarine at French Frigate Shoal s west of Hawaii . No damage was caused .
Carrier HORNET launches Lt . Col . " Jimmy " Doolittle ' s B-25s against Tokyo and other targets in Japan . Damage was light , but the attack caused cons iderable " loss of face " for the Japanese high command , who , among other things , delayed further expans ion into the Pacific and firmed up plans for the Midway operation . U . S . forces gain cons iderable tt
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5 / 3 /4 2
5/4-8/42
5/6/42
5/20/42
6 /3-4/42
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radio intelligence from fol lowing Japanese transmiss ions regarding the Tokyo raid .
Japanese forces occupy Tulagi I s land in the Solomons and later begin construction o f an airfield on nearby Guadalcanal . These bases were needed by the Japanese for their planned southward expans ion to cut the u . s . -Australia supply lines ; they were the last territorial gains by the Japanese in the Pac i f ic .
Battle of the Coral Sea . First naval battle between aircraft carriers . U . S . forces lose carrier LEXINGTON , oiler NEOSHO and destroyer SIMS ; fleet carrier YORKTOWN is damaged . Japanese forces lose small c arrier SHOHO and , destroyer KIKUZUKI , with ma j or damage to fleet carrier SHOKAKU . A tactical Japanese victory , strategically , the U . S . thwarted the New Guinea invas ion , delaying Japanese plans once again . Damage to SHOKAKU and the dec imation o f ZUIKAKU ' S air groups kept these two ships out of the Midway operation .
Corregidor in the Philippines surrenders , last U . S . territory in the Pac ific . A b itter and tragic defeat for the u . s . , the defense o f the Phil ippines had , in fact , occupied so many Japanese troops and so much equipment for so long that other operations in the Pac ific , particularly the Solomons /New Guinea operations , were set back and lacked full military support .
Adm . Chester Nimitz , Commander in Chief o f the Pacific Fleet , begins deploying his forces for the Battle o f Midway . Tipped o f f by intell igence decryptions of Japanese naval radio tra f f ic , Nimitz is not fooled by Japanese plans for a diversionary attack in the Aleutians .
The Battle o f Midway commences when aircraft from small Japanese carriers RYUJO and JUNYO attack Dutch Harbor , infl icting minimal damage and confirming U . S . intelligence estimates of the upcoming battle for Midway .
The Battle of Midway . Carriers ENTERPRISE 1 YORKTOWN and HORNET under command o f Admirals Fletcher and Spruance pul l o f f the greatest ambush in naval history . On June 4 ,
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8 / 7 /42
8 / 1 7 /4 2
8 / 2 4 - 2 5 / 4 2
dive-bombers from ENTERPRISE sink carriers � AKAGI and KAGA while YORKTOWN ' S aircraft get SORYU . Later the same day HIRYU is sunk by ENTERPRISE and YORKTOWN aircraft . Japanese heavy cruiser MIKUMA is lost the next day while U . S . forces lose YORKTOWN to air and submarine attack as well as destroyer HAMMANN . The American victory at Midway had enormous strategic consequences , as it deprived the Japanese Navy o f its primary c arrier arm , making their entire Paci fic empire far more vul nerable to attack and far less likely to withstand attack .
The 1st Marine Division reinforced o f some 1 1 , 00 0 men lands on Guadalcanal and Tulagi , securing these islands and the incomplete airfield on Guadalcanal by August 8 , initiating the longest battle in American history , the six-month and two-day fight for Guadalcanal . The attrition warfare that ensued was exactly the type of battle the Japanese could not succes s fully engage in , particularly as the Guadalcanal area was at the extreme limit of Japanese land-based air coverage from Rabaul . � U . S . Marine Raiders under Lt . Col . Evans F . Carlson stage a raid on Makin I s land in the Gilberts as a test of the defenses in the Central Pacific . The Japanese garrison was destroyed and the Marines lost about 3 0 men . I n a sense , the raid was detrimental to the u . s . war ef fort in that it tipped the Japanese to their weak defenses in the Central Pac ific and they began reinforc ing bases in the area--particularly Tarawa .
Battle of the Eastern Solomons . Japanese carrier forces staging from Truk attempt to support the Japanes e ef fort to recapture Guadalcana"l but are turned back by U . S . c arriers . Small carrier RYUJO is lost and SHOKAKU takes another pounding while American c arrier ENTERPRISE is severely damaged . This battle demonstrates that the Japanese c annot really cover the Solomons from their existing bases in Rabaul and the Central Pacific ; lack o f aircraft carriers contributes to this problem .
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1 1 /12 - 1 5/42
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Battle o f the Santa Cruz Islands . Japanese carrier forces , again staging through Truk , attempt to support the reinforcement o f Guadalcanal and destroy American carrier forces in the area . SHOKAKU suf fers severe damage again ; U . S . carrier HORNET is sunk and ENTERPRISE damaged . The Japanese again fail to recapture the initiative in the Solomons .
Two maj or night engagements between Japanese and American surface forces in two days result in severe losses for both s ides . Japan loses two battleships ( HIE! and KIRISHIMA ) as wel l a s 3 destroyers and 1 1 transports , failing in yet another attempt to reinforce Guadalcanal . u . s . forces lose 2 l ight cruisers and 7 destroyers , but turn a stalemate into a victory .
The Imperial Japanese Navy makes the formal recommendation to evacuate Guadalcanal because of the enormous losses of ships , aircraft and men . On 1 2 / 3 1/42 , the Japanese Army agrees to withdraw and form a new defense l ine centered on northern New Guinea .
Organized Japanese res istance on Guadalcanal ends following the success ful evacuation o f over 1 0 , 0 0 0 Japanese troops . The U . S . Navy and Marine Corps , in cooperation with the Army are in a pos ition to commence operations up the Solomons chain , aiming at Rabaul .
Adm . I soroku Yamamoto , Commander in Chief o f the Combined Fleet is ambushed and killed j ust prior to landing at Bougainville for an inspection tour . An intelligence decryption o f a Japanese radio message tipped the Americans o f f to Yamamoto ' s itinerary . Admiral Yamamoto ' s death was a severe blow to the Imperial Navy , as he was its guiding l ight for the early war years . Ironically, Yamamoto became Commander in Chief primarily because he so vehemently opposed war with the United States that he was under constant threat o f assass ination while he was serving ashore in the Navy Ministry before the war .
u . s . forces commence operations to c apture the upper Solomons , operations aimed at the eventual capture of Rabaul .
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u . s . Marines capture Viru Harbor o n New Georgia .
�
U . S . Army forces land at Munda , New Georgia .
Naval Battle of Kula Gul f .
Japanese evacuate Kiska in the Aleutians .
Army and Marine units land on Vella Lavella , bypas s ing Kolombangara .
U . S . fast carrier task force attacks Marcus I s land , the combat debut of the F6F Hel lcat fighter .
U . S . Navy and Army aircraft commence attacking Tarawa in the Gilbert islands , prelude to the upcoming invasion .
Fast carriers and surface ships attack Wake .
U . S . Marines invade Bougainville .
Japanese withdraw maj or units o f naval and A Army aircraft from Rabaul . Rabaul is by this � t ime e f fectively neutralized and is stricken from the American invas ion planning schedule .
Marines o f the 2nd Division land on Tarawa , f irst step in the capture o f the Central Pacific islands . The violent and sustained oppos ition of the Japanese to this landing despite the heavy pre-landing air and naval bombardment gave an indication o f what was to come in future amphibious as saults . Makin is also invaded , and all islands were secured by 1 1 /2 8 /4 3 .
American escort carrier LISCOME BAY is sunk by a Japanese submarine with heavy loss o f life while covering the Tarawa operations . This loss , and damage to carrier INDEPENDENCE , leads to changes in how aircraft carriers were used to cover invas ions .
U . S . carrier task forces commence heavy attacks on the Marshall is lands group , preparatory to invasion . The intent o f these raids was to eliminate Japanese airpower and A shipping in the area as well as damaging shore ..,
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2 / 16 - 1 8/44
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2 /2 3/44
defense instal lations , a pattern that would be repeated in all Central Pacific amphibious assaults .
U . S . forces invade Kwajalein in the Marshall islands .
Kwaj alein is declared secured . Japanese losses in the fighting were almost 5 , 0 0 0 men . U . S . forces rapidly build airfields and advanced naval facilities throughout the Gilberts and Marshalls which serve as staging areas for future assaults in the Pacific .
The Imperial Japanese Navy decides to abandon Truk as a maj or forward fleet base , as the capture of the Gilberts and Marshalls by u . s . forces makes Truk extremely vulnerable to attack . Truk maintains the large land-based air units in the area , but all maj or Japanese warships retreated to Palau .
U . S . naval forces headed by 9 f leet carriers and 6 new battleships strike Truk in the first step of Operation Hail stone , a sweep of the Central Pac i f ic is lands aimed at destroying as much of the facilities , shipping and airpower in the area as pos sible in preparation for poss ible future invas ion . Over 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons of Japanese merchant and naval shipping were lost at Truk in this attack .
u . s . forces occupy Eniwetok Atoll with sti f f resistance .
Army and Marine units capture Engebi Island , Eniwetok , overcoming f ierce res istance .
Eniwetok is secured and work begins immediately on building an advanced naval base . Eniwetok served throughout the remainder o f the war as a forward base for naval and air forces .
Japanese airc raft attack Task Force 5 8 ( the fast carrier force ) en route to the Marianas . No American ships were damaged and Japanese plane losses were heavy .
TF- 5 8 commences heavy air strikes on Saipan , Tinian , Rota and Guam in the Marianas .
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3 /3 1 / 4 4
4 / 2 9 - 3 0/44
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5 / 2 4 / 4 4
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6 / 15 / 4 4
6 / 1 9 -2 0 /44
TF-5 8 commences heavy airstrikes on the western Caro l ines , concentrating on Palau , Yap , and Ulithi . Over 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 tons of Japanese naval and merchant shipping were destroyed , along with well over 1 5 0 a ircraft . The ma j or units of the Japanes e Navy had already retreated to Borneo and Lingga Roads , near Singapore .
Adm . Mineichi Koga , Commander in Chief o f the Combined Fleet , is killed when his plane disappears in a violent storm between Palau and the Philippines . Adm . Soemu Toyoda assumes command .
TF-5 8 hits Truk agai n , this time aiming at doing as much damage to base facilities as pos s ible . Truk was so effectively neutral i zed by this and previous attacks that invas ion and c apture became unnecessary and Truk was by-passed by American forces , finally surrendering at the end of the war .
TF-5 8 battleships bombard Ponape island in conj unction with carrier air strikes .
Naval aircraft strike Marcus Is land .
Naval aircraft strike Wake Island .
U . S . naval forces commence pre-invas ion attacks on the Marianas , bombarding Saipan , Guam and Tinian , destroying most of the rema1n1ng l and-based airpower and damaging facilities and defense s on all three islands .
U . S . 2nd and 4th Marine Divis ion troops land on Saipan , securing a five-mile wide beachhead against some 1 7 , 0 0 0 defenders . On the s ame day , part o f TF-5 8 s trikes Iwo Jima and the Bonins to prevent Japanese reinforcements from reaching the Marianas .
Battle of the Philippine Sea . TF-5 8 engages the nine remaining Japanese a ircraft carriers . In two days the Japanese lose over 4 7 0 aircraft and 3 aircraft carriers ( 2 to submarines ) . Japanes e naval airpower in the traditional sense is eliminated for the remainder o f the war and the Marianas remained secure from attack .
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7 /24/44
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9 / 15/44
Vice Adm . Chuichi Nagumo , once commander of the Pearl Harbor attack force , commits suicide on Saipan . Admiral Nagumo had been rel ieved of sea command after the Battle o f Midway and the Solomons battles . Before his death he saw several of the battleships he had sunk at Pearl Harbor f iring at positions on Saipan .
Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands are again attacked by naval forces .
Guam bombarded by U . S . naval warships in the first installment of day and night bombardment until the island was invaded on the 2 1st .
Saipan is declared secure . The Japanese garrison of some 2 7 , 0 0 0 troops was decimated and many thousands of civilians were killed or committed suicide .
The announcement of the capture of Saipan in Japan causes the fall of the government . Lt . Gen . Hideki Toj o , Premier , War Minister and Army Chief of Staff , res igns in disgrace . The new government publically vows to continue the fight--primarily because to do otherwise risked assassination by the Army--while privately seeking a way out of the war .
3rd Marine Divis ion , 1st Marine Brigade and 7 7th Army Divis ion troops land on Guam against stiff resistance .
Two Marine Divisions land on Tinian from Saipan . the island was secured in about 9 days with over 5 , 0 0 0 Japanese killed .
Japanese resistance on Guam ends after at least 1 0 , 0 0 0 defenders are killed .
Wake Is land again attacked by U . S . naval units .
The U . S . fast carrier task force , now comprising some 1 6 heavy and light carriers commences strikes against Palau , Yap and Ulithi , first of a series of strikes preparatory to invas ion .
U . S . Marines l and on Pel iliu I s land in the Palau group following a three-day bombardment by ships and aircra ft . The fight for Peleliu
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1 0 / 14 /4 4
was as tough as any in the Pac i f ic war because 4t of terrain, climate and the well dug in defenders most ably led by Col . Nakagawa Gen Murai .
Angaur Is land in the Palaus is invaded by troops of the 88th Army Division and secured by u . s . troops after a bloody fight .
Peliliu is declared secure , although this was probably more bravado than fact , as the Japanese were still fighting into November . With the collapse of the defense of Palau , the war in the Central Pac ific came to a close , and the Pacific Ocean area was completely under American control . The American bases in the Central Pacific continue to serve as support bases for the rest of the wartime operations in the Phil ippines , Iwo Jima , Okinawa and the Japanese horne islands . Bypassed Japanese island bases in the Pacific all surrendered to American forces at the end of the war .
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS
DENNIS BLANKENBACKER : Dennis is the newest member of the War in the Pac ific National Historical Park ' s ( WAPA ' s ) Submerged Research Team . He has worked on projects in Guam and Saipan . He is a commerc ial pilot with a maj or airline and an aircraft mechanic .
DON BOYER : Don has been an avid student of U . S . Naval history for more than 3 0 years , with a particular interest in World War II in the Pac i f ic . As a military dependent , college student , and gunner ' s mate in the U . S . Navy during the Vietnam War , Don lived in the Paci fic Ocean area for 1 4 years , l iving i n and visiting many of the areas which were critical battle areas during the war including Hawaii , Guam , Saipan , Tinian , Palau , Kwaj alein and Japan . Don currently works for the Bureau of Land Management as a printing specialist and editor and l ives in Santa Fe , New Mexico , with his wife and son .
TONI L . CARRELL : Toni has worked on pro j ects ranging from a study of the effects o f submergence on terres trial archeological s ites in reservoirs to inventories of shipwrecks throughout the U . S . and the former Trust Territories . She has authored or contributed to f ive of the eight Submerged Cultural Resources Unit ( SCRU ) publ ications . In February 1 9 9 0 , Toni left the National Park Service ( NPS ) and accepted a pos it ion with Ships of Discovery in Dallas , Texas . She is presently pursuing a Ph . D . in Maritime Archeology at the Univers ity o f St . Andrews , Scotland .
WILLIAM COOPER : A diver for more than 15 years , Bill has been the chief volunteer diver with the WAPA ' s Submerged Research Team for 3 years . His research work inc ludes s ites on Guam and Saipan . He has also contributed the graphic i l lustrations for the Saipan section of this report . His diving interests inc lude the surveying and preservation o f underwater s ites . Bill is a commercial pilot with a maj or airl ine .
RICHARD DAVIS : He has served as the Territorial Archaeologist for Guam s ince 1 9 8 3 , and the Deputy Guam Historic Preservation Off icer s ince 1 9 8 7 . His cultural resource management experience inc ludes work with federal agencies and in nonpro fit archeological researc h organizations .
6 1 3
MARJORIE G . DRIVER : By now Marj orie is one of Guam ' s longtime res idents , having settled there in the 1 9 5 0s . Her early years were spent in a s ister territory , Puerto Rico , where she learned Spanish as a young child . After graduation from Russell Sage and Middlebury Col leges , and before going to Guam , she was a high school teacher of Spanish and history in Connecticut and New York states . I n 1 9 6 7 she was appointed to the Univers ity of Guam as one of the founding members of the Micrones ian Area Research Center ( MARC ) faculty , where she has been s ince . During her many years at MARC , she has served in administrative and research positions . For the past 1 0 years , she has been in c harge of Spanish documents collection and has published several booklets and numerous articles pertaining to the history of Guam and the Marianas , several of which have focused on maritime activities in the islands .
KEVI N FOSTER : Kevin is a former historian with the National Maritime I nitiative . In 1 9 8 8 he partic ipated in Proj ect SeaMark f ield operations in Palau . He has contributed to the discuss ions of World War I I s ites on Pel ileu and Malakal Harbor .
SUZANNE HENDRICKS : Suzanne has been a volunteer with the WAPA team s ince 19 8 3 . She assisted the SCRU team on documentation of the USS ARI ZONA in Pearl Harbor and as such was the first female to dive at this s ite . She served as a volunteer in the 1 9 84 Saipan assessment . I n 1 9 85 , she participated in the techniques of underwater archeology . As a diver for over 2 0 years , she has assisted WAPA in all maj or pro j ects relating to submerged cultural resources inventory and surveys . She is an avid supporter in the preservation of our natural and cultural resources .
DANIEL J . LENIHAN : Chief of SCRU s ince its inception in 1 9 8 0 , Dan has supervised most of the on-site operations of the unit in Micronesia . Before 1 9 8 0 , Dan ran the 5-year National Reservoir Inundation Study for NPS . He is also an avid sport diver having been certified as an instructor for the National Association of Underwater I nstructors in 1 9 7 2 and a c ave diving instructor i n 1 9 7 3 while completing his master ' s degree in anthropology at Florida State Univers ity .
DAVID T . LOTZ : Dave is a twenty-one year res ident of Guam who has contributed to numerous preservation and park pro j ects in Guam inc luding researching archival records on World War I I shipwrecks on Guam , ass isting in the c reation of the WAPA , and establ ishing the Guam historic preservation program . A WAPA historian , Dave has vis ited and researched many battle remnants in Guam and the Mariana I s lands . Since 1 9 84 , he has been the Parks Administrator for the Guam 4lt
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Department o f Parks and Recreation while for several years , along with his wife Beverly , they have been writing a hiking column " Making Tracks " in the Pac ific Daily News .
THOMAS B . McGRATH : Thomas B . McGrath , S . J . , is an assoc iate professor of anthropology at the Micrones ian Area Research Center o f the Univers ity o f Guam . His interests include the ethnohistory of Guam and Micronesia , the whalers in the Marianas , and the Capuchins in Guam . He is a member o f the Naval Reserve and also sai led on the Micrones ian c anoe Tipiew within the Marianas in the spring of 1 9 B B .
ROSE S . N . MANIBUSAN : A diver s ince 1 9 9 3 , Rose has been involved with many proj ects in Micronesia . She served as Assistant Park Dive Officer for 6 years with WAPA . I n January 1 9 9 0 , Rose accepted a f ire management pos ition in the Western Regional Office in San Franc isco , Californi a . She returned to WAPA in 19 9 1 as Chief Ranger .
JAMES E . MICULKA : Jim has been Chief Ranger for the WAPA and Dive Officer for the park ' s Submerged Research Team s ince 1 9 8 0 . He has been diving for nearly 2 0 years . He has been involved with pro j ects on the USS ARI ZONA in Hawaii , research work in Scotland and various pro j ects in Micrones ia . I n September 1 9 9 0 , James accepted a Chief Ranger position with Jean Laf itte National Historical Park in New Orleans , Louis iana . He holds an MSc in I nternational Resource Management from the Univers ity of Edinburgh , Edinburgh , Scotland .
TIM ROCK : Tim has been l iving on Guam s ince 1 9 8 1 and has been an active park service volunteer during those years . He has produced video and still productions for the WAPA and worked with SCRU . Tim is photoj ournalist specializ ing in the realm of the ocean and is also an experienced documentary photographer .
EDWARD WOOD : Ed has been the Ranger-in-Charge o f American Memorial Park s ince January 1 9 8 9 . He has 1 7 years o f experience with NPS and has worked in five areas . He has been involved with underwater research activities in Guam and Saipan . His hobbies include computers , ham radio , diving and mus ic ( pi ano and guitar ) .
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SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES UNIT REPORT AND PUBLICATION SERIES
The Submerged Cultural Resources Unit was established in 1 9 8 0 to conduct research o n submerged cultural resources throughout the National Park System with an emphasis on historic shipwrecks . One of the unit ' s primary respons ibilities is to dis seminate the results o f research to National Park Service managers , as well as the profess ional community , in a form that meets resource management needs and adds to our understanding o f the resource base . A report series has been initiated in order to ful fill this responsibility . The following are the categories of reports that comprise this series .
Submerged Cultural Resources Assessment
First l ine document that cons ists of a brief l iterature search, an overview of the maritime history and the known or potential underwater s ites in the park , and preliminary recommendations for lon�-term management . It is des igned to have application to GMP/DCP ' s and to become a source document for a park ' s Submerged Cultural Resources Management Plan .
Submerged Cultural Resources Survey
Comprehensive examination o f blocks of park lands for the purpose of locating and indenti fying as much o f the submerged cultural resources base as pos s ible . A comprehensive l iterature search would mos t l ikely be a part o f the Phase I report but , in some cases , may be postponed unti l Phase I I .
Phase I - - Reconnaissance o f target areas with remote sens ing and visual survey techniques to establish location of any archeological s ites or anomalous features that may suggest the presence of archeological s ites .
Phase I I - - Evaluation o f archeological s ites or anomalous features derived from remote sens ing instruments to confirm their nature , and i f pos s ible , their s ignificance . Thi s may involve exploratory removal of overburden .
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Submerged Cultural Resources Study
A document that discusses , in detail , all known underwater archeological sites in a given park . This may involve test excavations . The intended audience is managerial and professional , not the general public .
Submerged Cultural Resources Site Report
Exhaustive documentation of one archeological s ite which may involve a partial or complete s ite excavation . The intended audience is primarily profess ional and inc identally managerial . Although the document may be useful to a park ' s interpretive spec ialists because of its information content , it would probably not be suitable for general distribution to park visitors .
Submerged Cultural Resources Special Report Series
These may be in published or photocopy format . Inc luded are spec ial commentaries , papers on methodological or technical issues pertinent to underwater archeology , or any miscellaneous report that does not appropriately fit into one of the other categories .
Daniel J . Lenihan
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PUBLISHED REPORTS OF THE
SOUTHWEST CULTURAL RESOURCES CENTER
1 . Larry E . Murphy , Editor . Submerged Cu1 tural Resource s Survey : Portions of Point Reyes National Seashore and Point Reyes -Farallon I slands National Marine S anctuary . Submerged Cultural Resources Unit , 1 9 8 4 .
2 . Toni Carre l l . Submerged Cultural Resources Portions of Point Reyes National Seashore Reyes -Faral lon I s l ands National Marine Submerged Cultural Resources Unit , 1 9 84
I nventory : and Point Sanctuary .
3 . Edwin C . Bears s . Resource Study : Lyndon B . Johnson and the Hill Country , 1 9 3 7 - 19 6 3 . Divis ion o f Conservation , 1 9 8 4 .
4 .
5 .
6 .
Edwin C . Bearss . Historic Structures Report : White House . D ivis ion of Conservat ion , 1 9 8 6 .
Texas
Barbara Holmes . Historic Resource Study o f the Barataria Unit of Jean Lafitte National Historical Park . Divis ion o f His tory , 1 9 8 6 .
Steven M . Burke and Marlys Bus h-Thurber . Southwest Region Headquarters Building , Santa Fe , New Mexico : A Historic Structure Report . Divis ion of Conservation , 1 9 8 5 .
7 . Toni Carrel l . Submerged Cultural Resources Site Report : NOOUEBAY , Apostle I s l ands National Lakeshore . Submerged Cultural Resources Unit , 1 9 8 5 .
8 . Daniel J . Lenihan , Editor . Submerged Cultural Resources Study : I s l e Royale National Park . Submerged Cultural Resources Unit , 1 9 8 7 .
9 • J . Richard Ambler . National Monument .
Archeological Asses sment : Navaj o Divis ion o f Anthropology , 1 9 8 5 .
1 0 . John S . Speaker , Joanna Chase , Carol Popl in , Hersche l Franks , R . Chris topher Goodwin . Archeological Asses sment : Barataria Unit , Jean Lafitte Nat ional Historic al Park . Divis ion of Anthropo logy , 1 9 8 6 .
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1 1 . James E . Ivey , Marlys Bush-Thurber , James T . E s cobedo 'e Jr . , Tom Ireland . The Miss ions o f San Antonio : A Historic Structures Report and Administrative History . Divis ions o f Conservat ion and History , 1 9 8 7 .
1 2 . Roger E . Coleman . The Arkansas Pos t StokY . Divis ion of History , 1 9 8 7 .
1 3 . Toni Carrell , Editor . Submerged Cultural Resources S ite Report : Charles H . Spencer Mining Operation and P addle Whee l Steamboat , Glen Canyon National Recreation Area . Submerged Cultural Resources Unit , 1 9 8 7 .
1 4 . Hal Rothman . The Bandelier National Monument : An Administrative History . Divis ion of History , 1 9 8 8 .
1 5 . James E . Ivey . In the Mist o f A Lonel ines s . Divis ion o f History , 1 9 8 8 .
1 6 . Richard W . Sellars and Melody Webb . An Interview with Robert M . Ut ley on The History o f Hi storic Preservation in the Nat i0nal Park Service-- 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 8 0 . S anta Fe , 1 9 8 8 .
1 7 . Laura S . Harrison and Beverley Spears , Historic Structures Report , Chinle Trading Post , Thunderbird Ranch and Custodian I s Res idence . Divis ion o f History I e 1 9 8 8 .
1 8 . James P . Delgado and Stephen A . Hal ler . Submerged Cultural Resources Asses sment : Golden Gate Nat ional Recreat ion Area , Gul f of the Faral lones National Marine Sanctuary and Point Reyes National Seashore , 1 9 8 9 .
1 9 . Judith K . Fabry . Guadalupe Mountains National Park : An Administrative History . Divis ion of History , 1 9 8 8 .
2 0 . Peter J . McKenna and Scott E . I nvestigations at Thunderbird Anthropology , 19 8 9 .
Travis . Lodge .
Archeol ogical Divis ion of
2 1 . Peter J . McKenna and James E . Bradford . The T . J . Ruin, Gila C l i f f Dwell ings . Divis ion o f Anthropology , 1 9 8 9 .
2 2 . C . Patrick Labadie . Submerged Cultural Study : P ictured Rocks National Lakeshore . Cultural Resources Unit , 1 9 8 9 .
Resources Submerged
2 3 . Daniel J . Lenihan , Editor . Submerged Cultural Res ources Study : USS Ari zona Memorial and Pearl Harbor National
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Historic Landmark . 1 9 8 9 .
Submerged Cultural Resources Unit ,
2 4 . Robert H . and Florence P . Lister . Aztec Ruins National Monument : Administrative History o f an Archeological Preserve , 1 9 9 0 .
2 5 . Jil l -Karen Yakubik . Archeological Investigations of S ix Spanish Colonial Period Sites : Barataria Unit , Jean Lafitte National His torical Park and Preserve . Divis ion of Anthropology , 1 9 8 9 .
2 6 . Herschel A . Franks and Jil l -Karen Yakubik . Archaeological Survey on 6 5 Acres o f Land Adj acent to Bayou des Familles : Barataria Unit , Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve . Divis ion o f Anthropology , 1 9 8 9 .
2 7 . Walter K . Wait and Peter J . McKenna . Quarai Parking Lot Rehabil itation : Archeological Testing Program . Sal inas National Monunment , 1 9 9 0 .
2 8 . Diane Taylor , Lyndi Hubbel , Nancy Wood and Barbara Fielder . The 1 9 7 7 La Mesa Fire Study : A n I nvestigation of Fire and Fire Suppress ion Impact o n Cultural Resources in Bandel ier National Monument . D ivis ion o f Anthropology , 1 9 9 0 .
2 9 . Wes ley R . Hurt . The 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 0 Excavation Project at Quarai Pueblo and Mi s s ion Buildings . Sal inas Pueblo Miss ions National Monument , Divis ion of Anthropology , 1 9 9 0 .
3 0 . Roger E . Coleman . Archeological Investigation for Construction of a Pedestrian Trail and Ident i f icat ion o f Laundress Row . Divis ion o f Anthropology, 1 9 9 0 .
3 1 .
3 2 .
James E . Ivey . Pres ides o f the Big Bilingual publ ication , Engl ish and Spanish . History , 1 9 9 0 .
Bend Area . Divis ion o f
Neil C . Mangum . o f Occupat ion History , 1 9 9 0 .
In the Land of Frozen Fires : A His tory of El Malpais Country . Divis ion o f
3 3 . Jack B . Bertram . Archeological Investigations Along the Proposed Al ibates Tour Road Improvement Construction Route Al ibates Fl int Quarries National Monument , Potter County , Texas . Division of Anthropology , 1 9 9 0 .
3 4 . Robert Wooster , Ph . D . History o f Fort Davis , Texas . Divis ion o f History , 1 9 9 0 .
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35 . Bruce A . Anderson . The Wupatki Archeological Inventory �s�u�r�v�e�Y�--�P�r�o�j�e�c�t�=�--�F�l�· n�a�l--�R�e�p�o�r�t . Divis ion of Anthropo logy , 1 9 9 0 .
3 6 . Toni L . Carrell . Submerged Cultural Resources Asses sment o f Micronesia . Submerged Cultural Resources Unit , 1 9 9 1 .
3 7 . James P . Delgado , Daniel J . Lenihan and Larry Murphy . The Archeology of the Atomic Bomb : A Submerged Cultural Resources As ses sment of the Sunken Fleet o f Operat ion Cro s s roads at Bikini and Kwaj alein Ato l l Lagoons , Republ ic of the Marshal l I s l ands . Submerged Cultural Resources Unit , 1 9 9 1 .
3 8 . George Saba I I I , Randal l L . Guendl ing , w . Fredrick Limp , Margaret J . Gucc ione , Susan L . Scott , Gayle J . Fritz , Pamel a A . Smith . Archeological Inves tigations at 3MR8 0 -Area D in the Rush Development Area , Buf f alo National River , Arkans as , Divis ion o f Anthropologu , 1 9 9 0 .
3 9 . Larry E . Processes Florida .
Murphy . 8SL17 : Natural S ite-Formation o f a Multiple-Component Underwater S ite in
Submerged Cultural Resources Unit , 1 9 9 0 .
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Miss ion : As the Nation ' s princ ipal conservation agency , the Department o f the Interior has respons ibil ity for most o f our national ly-owned public lands and natural and cultural resources . This inc ludes fostering wise use o f our land and water res ources , protecting our f is h and wildl i fe , preserving the environmental and cultural values o f our nat ional parks and historical places , and providing for the enj oyment of l ife through outdoor recreation . The Department assesses our energy and mineral resources and works to assure that their development is in the best interests o f a l l our people . The Department also promotes the goals o f the Take Pride in America c ampaign by encouraging stewardship and citi zen respons ibil ity for the public lands and promot ing citi zen partic ipat ion in their care . The Department also has a ma j or respons ibi l ity for Americ an I ndian reservation communities and for people who l ive in I s l and Territories under U . S . Administration .
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11 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1991-576-943/45,182 REGION NO. 8
