211 North Kosovo --- Dual Sovereignty in Practice

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1II. BELGRADES INFLUENCE IN THE NORTH ............................................................ 3

A. POLITICS...................................................................................................................................... 3B. MONEY ........................................................................................................................................ 4

III.(DIS)INTEGRATION ....................................................................................................... 7A. THE STRATEGY FOR THENORTH .............................................................................................. 9B. SENDING A MESSAGE:THE MITROVICA CEMETERY................................................................... 11C. THE CONSTRUCTION WAR......................................................................................................... 12

IV.CRIME: A COMMON PROBLEM .............................................................................. 13A. CRIME IN THENORTH ................................................................................................................ 13B. ECONOMIC CRIME...................................................................................................................... 15C. THE KOSOVO POLICE................................................................................................................. 16D. THE JUDICIARY .......................................................................................................................... 19

V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 20APPENDICES

A. MAP OF KOSOVO ............................................................................................................................. 22B. GLOSSARY....................................................................................................................................... 23C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 24D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE SINCE 2008 .................................................... 25

E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................ 26


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Europe Report N211 14 March 2011

NORTH KOSOVO: DUAL SOVEREIGNTY IN PRACTICE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The dispute between Kosovo and Serbia is most acute inKosovos northern municipalities. The North has not beenunder effective control from Pristina for two decades; itssparse and predominantly rural Serb population uniformlyrejects integration into Kosovo. Though small and largely

peaceful, it is the main obstacle to reconciliation and bothcountries European Union (EU) aspirations. A Kosovo-Serbia dialogue mediated by the EU began on 8-9 March2011 and is likely over the coming months to look atsome of the consequences of the dispute for regional co-operation, communications, freedom of movement andthe rule of law. For now, however, Belgrade, Pristina andBrussels have decided that tackling the Norths govern-ance or status is too difficult before more efforts are madeto secure cooperation on improving the regions socio-economic development, security and public order.

For some time, the North will remain in effect under dualsovereignty: Kosovos and Serbias. Kosovo seeks to ridthe region of Serbian institutions, integrate it and gaincontrol of the border with Serbia. It is willing to providesubstantial self rule and additional competencies as sug-gested under the Ahtisaari plan, developed in 2007 by thethen UN Special Envoy to regulate Kosovos supervisedindependence. But local Serbs see the North as their laststand and Mitrovica town as their centre of intellectualand urban life. Belgrade will continue to use its influencein the North to reach its primary goal, regaining the region

as a limited victory to compensate for losing the rest of itsformer province.

Serbia and Kosovo institutions intersect and overlap inthe North without formal boundaries or rules. The majoritySerb and minority Albanian communities there live withinseparate social, political and security structures. Theyhave developed pragmatic ways of navigating betweenthese parallel systems where cooperation is unavoidable.Yet, in a few areas notably criminal justice cooperationis non-existent, and the only barrier to crime is commu-nity pressure.

Northern Serbs across the political spectrum overwhelm-ingly cleave to Serbia. However, Belgrade and the Northern

political elites belong to different parties and are bitter

rivals. Apart from the technical work of managing the North, they share only one common interest: keepingPristina out and blocking any international initiative thatcould strengthen common Kosovo institutions, notably

police and courts. Two other groups, former local leaders

who retain strong influence behind the scenes and an or-ganised crime underworld focused on smuggling, sharethis one overriding goal. Belgrade prosecutes criminalsand rivals selectively, allowing others room to operate;their presence in the North provides plausible deniabilityfor many of its actions.

Observers in Pristina and friendly capitals see Serbiasmassive payments to the North as a major obstacle to theregions integration into Kosovo. As long as Serbianmoney sustains their way of life, Northerners have littleincentive to compromise. Yet, Kosovos own constitutionexpressly permits Serbian funding for education, medicalcare and municipal services, provided it is coordinatedwith Pristina, which currently it is not. Only the smallamounts that support Serbian police and court systemsdirectly undermine Kosovos integrity.

Virtually all Northern Serbs reject integration into Kosovoand believe their institutions and services are far betterthan what is offered south of the Ibar River, especially ineducation and health care. Recent scandals in Pristina,such as alleged massive corruption in the governing PDK

party and a December 2010 Council of Europe reportclaiming implication of top Kosovo officials in organtrafficking, reinforce this view. Serbs distrust Pristina, be-lieving that rights and protection promised now would bequickly subverted after integration. They are willing tocooperate with Pristina individually but not to accept itssovereignty. The North is subject to none of the pressuresthat brought a measure of integration to Kosovos southernSerb enclaves, and its views show no sign of softening.

Like Kosovo as a whole, the North suffers from a reputa-tion for anarchy and domination by gangsters and corrupt

politicians. And as in the rest of Kosovo, the reputation islargely false. Crime rates are similar and within the Euro-pean mainstream; urban Mitrovica has more than its shareof offences, the rural municipalities much less. Neighbour-


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North Kosovo: Dual Sovereignty in PracticeCrisis Group Europe Report N211, 14 March 2011 Page ii

ing Albanian-populated districts fall between these twoSerb-held areas in rates for violent and property crimes.The real problems are contraband and intimidation directedat political and business rivals and anyone associated withPristina.

Well-established Albanian-Serb networks, nevertheless,smuggle goods, free of duty and tax especially dieselfuel from Serbia via the North to southern Kosovo. Thetrade supports a criminal elite that, while small in the re-gional context, is still large enough to dominate NorthernKosovo. Curtailing this smuggling would benefit all andis achievable with the tacit support of Belgrade and most

Northern Serbs. Some goods remain in the North, how-ever, and residents feel no sympathy for policies thatwould enforce their separation from Serbia.

Nowhere is the Norths dual sovereignty as problematic

as in law enforcement. Rival Kosovo and Serbian systemseach have only partial access to the witnesses and officialand community support they need. The Kosovo policelack the communitys trust and have a poor reputation.Serbias police are barred by a UN Security Council reso-lution and operate covertly. Serbian court judgments andorders are enforceable only in Serbia itself and are limitedin practice to civil matters and economic crimes. KosovosMitrovica district court technically has jurisdiction northand south of the Ibar but is paralysed and can hear only ahandful of cases, judged by internationals from EULEX,the EUs rule of law mission. The insistence of Kosovo

and international community representatives that the Mi-trovica court can only fully function after Serbs accept itsauthority in the North adversely affects Kosovo Albani-ans in the south and undermines the sense that rule of lawis the priority.

The North suffers from a near-total absence of productiveemployment and depends on state subsidies for its sur-vival; rule of law is weak. These problems are real butinsignificant compared to the Norths effect on Kosovoand Serbia. Neither can join the EU while the Northsstatus is in dispute. Addressing local problems by im-

proving on pragmatic solutions already in place and find-ing a framework for criminal justice acceptable to the local

population would likely perpetuate its uncertain status, bykeeping it distinct from the rest of Kosovo. Belgrade andPristina should use the EU-facilitated talks to considerautonomy for the North in exchange for Serbias recogni-tion of Kosovo statehood, as Crisis Group recommendedin August 2010. If the political will for this comprehen-sive compromise is lacking, the parties should not allowthe dispute to block progress in other areas. They shouldinstead seek flexible, interim solutions to improve law

enforcement, customs collection, and allocation of finan-cial aid in the North.

Pristina/Mitrovica/Brussels, 14 March 2011


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Europe Report N211 14 March 2011

NORTH KOSOVO: DUAL SOVEREIGNTY IN PRACTICE

I. INTRODUCTION

Northern Kosovo (the North), including the municipalitiesof Leposavi, Zubin Potok and Zvean, and a small partof Mitrovica municipality north of the Ibar River,is aboutone-tenth of Kosovos territory (approximately 1,000square kilometres) and 3 per cent of its population.1 With

no census since 1991, it is estimated that between 55,000and 65,000 Serbsand 6,000 to 10,000 non-Serbs, mainlyAlbanians and Bosniaks, live there, predominantly alongthe north bank of the Ibar in Mitrovica, in one large village(abr/abra) in Zubin Potok and in a few small settle-ments in Leposavi.2

Small and mainly rural though it is, the North consists ofregions with different histories and mentalities and thathave scant historical ties to Kosovos Albanian majority.3Urban Serbs from across Kosovo, a large student popula-tion, and many economically challenged internally dis-

placed persons (IDPs) live in Mitrovica. Zvean (oncepart of Mitrovica municipality), is still largely a suburb ofthat city. In Zubin Potok, administratively part of Monte-negro at times in the twentieth century, Montenegrin dia-lects are still common, and society is clan based. Most ofnorthernmost Leposavi municipality was part of theneighbouring Serbian municipality of Raka until 1956,when it was transferred to Kosovo to increase the number

1For background on the North and its evolution since 1999, seeCrisis Group Europe Reports N131, UNMIKs Kosovo Alba-tross: Tackling Division in Mitrovica, 3 June 2002; and N165,Bridging Kosovos Mitrovica Divide, 13 September 2005.2Extrapolating from the number of primary school childrengives an estimate of 54,482 Serbs, to which some of the largeuniversity population (9,000 students) should be added. Schoolenrolments taken from Organisation for Security and Coopera-tion in Europe (OSCE) municipal profiles at www.osce.org/kosovo/43753. The extrapolation methodology follows A post-industrial future? Economy and society in Mitrovica and Zvean,European Stability Initiative, 30 January 2004.3According to the UN High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR),there were 7,317 internally displaced Albanians (IDPs) in the

Mitrovica region, along with 6,957 Serbs and 232 Roma;UNHCR Statistical Overview, January 2011. IDPs are fromall regions of Kosovo, though most Albanians resided in northernMitrovica town.

of Serbs there. It is pastoral and relaxed, its Serbian popu-lation having long had almost no contact with Albanians.

While Serbs lived throughout Kosovo, the 1999 war and2000 anti-Serb reprisals transformed Mitrovica into thenew hub of Kosovo Serb life. Its large hospital and a newuniversity, displaced from Pristina, is where many seekmedical treatment and higher education. Investment from

Serbia flows disproportionately to the North and is visiblethroughout its sparsely populated, rocky, rural areas. Anew flood of Serbs, fleeing the March 2004 riots, rein-forced its lead role.4

A Kosovo Serb political elite developed, taking influentialpositions in state institutions increasingly supported bySerbia.5 When Kosovo independence was declared on 17February 2008, Northern Serbs quickly distanced them-selves from the new state.6 In May 2008, Serbia organisedlocal elections in Kosovo Serb areas for the first time,resulting in the re-election of the mayors of the three pre-

existing municipalities of Zvean, Zubin Potok and Le-posavi and creation of a new Mitrovica municipality.

The Kosovo government and states that recognise it referto the northern municipalities as parallel authorities.This is misleading. The municipal governments wereelected outside the framework of the UN Interim Ad-ministration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK),7 whose chief,

4The Serb enclaves south of the Ibar once had a larger popula-tion than the North, but it has declined more rapidly. Exactpopulation figures are unavailable, and the two populations areprobably similar.5Serbia was still extending its institutions power, telephonyand administrative offices into the North as late as 2007.Development of new parallel structures in Kosovo Serbian in-habited areas, UN code cable made available to Crisis Group,15 October 2007.6Gates 1 (Jarinje) and 31 (Brnjak), the crossing points betweenthe North and Serbia proper (considered border posts by Kos-ovo and mere checkpoints by Serbia) were burned in February2008, the court was shut down, and Serbian flags were dis-played at Kosovo Police Service stations.7Municipal authorities, elected under UNMIK supervision, ex-isted throughout Kosovo until 2008. After the declaration ofindependence, municipal governments ceased to recogniseUNMIK authority but continued operating as local authorities


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North Kosovo: Dual Sovereignty in PracticeCrisis Group Europe Report N211, 14 March 2011 Page 2

Joachim Rcker, declared the May 2008 polls illegal butdid not annul them. The Kosovo government also declaredthem illegal but extended the mandates of the elected of-ficials, except in the newly formed Mitrovica municipality,since most of the same people who had operated underthe UNMIK framework were re-elected.8 Since then,

UNMIK administration has in effect ceased to operatethroughout Kosovo, except in Mitrovica, where it over-laps with the Serbian municipal administration. The Ser-

bian municipalities are the only authorities north of theIbar; nothing is truly parallel to them. They operate prettymuch as if in Serbia, although with resident UNMIK offi-cials, who mainly communicate with minorities and haveno executive powers.

According to the UN, UNMIK is still the only legitimatesource of civilian authority in Kosovo. All sides exploitthis legal fiction to their benefit. Serbia does not allow

Kosovo representatives to join any international bodieswithout an UNMIK chaperone, yet holds elections andoperates administration in the North in violation of UNrules. Northern Serbs ignored UNMIK before 2008, becausethey wanted to distance themselves from the provisionalPristina government then operating under UN auspices;after independence they quickly hoisted UN flags. Pris-tina, the International Civilian Office (ICO) that overseesKosovos supervised independence and friendly capi-tals all rule out any restoration of UNMIK authority northof the Ibar, yet complain that Serbian institutions thereviolate UNMIK law.9 UN Security Council Resolution1244, which ended the war of 1999 and established UN-MIK, describes and regulates a situation that no longerexists.10 The Councils inability to replace it with a new

of the new Kosovo state; south of the Ibar, new municipal gov-ernments were elected under Kosovo law in November 2009.8Originally appointed by UNMIK, the mayors of Zubin Potokand Zvean were re-appointed (within the Kosovo system) byPrime Minister Hashim Thai, then elected within the Serbiansystem that provides most of their funds and local legitimacy.Extraordinary elections in Leposavi in 2009, however, pro-

duced a change in leadership Pristina does not recognise. Formore on the period after February 2008, see Crisis GroupEurope Reports N200, Serb Integration in Kosovo: Taking thePlunge, 12 May 2009; N204, The Rule of Law in IndependentKosovo, 19 May 2010; and N206,Kosovo and Serbia after theICJ Opinion, 26 August 2010.9For the ICO and supervised independence, see Crisis GroupEurope Reports N182,Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to theAhtisaari Plan, 14 May 2007; N185, Breaking the KosovoStalemate: Europes Responsibility, 21 August 2007,;N188,Kosovo Countdown: A Blueprint for Transition, 6 December2007; and N196,Kosovos Fragile Transition, 25 September2008. Crisis Group interviews, Kosovo government, ICO and

U.S. officials, Pristina, December 2010-February 2011.10Resolution 1244 also authorised KFOR, the NATO-ledpeacekeeping mission that remains throughout Kosovo. Its roleis under pressure from member states, eager to draw down forces

resolution tailored to the 2011 situation erodes the UNsauthority and contributes to insecurity in and around the

North.

Abused by all, the UN still does important work in Kosovo.It facilitates cooperation that would otherwise founder on

the parties irreconcilable positions. EULEX, the EU ruleof law mission, could only deploy throughout Kosovo byaccepting the notional superiority of UNMIK in its deal-ings with Belgrade and the North though with Pristina,it operates under the plan named for Martti Ahtisaari, theformer UN Special Envoy who developed it in 2007 toregulate Kosovos supervised independence, and that waslargely integrated in Kosovos constitution. The UNs six

point plan, a compromise hammered out by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Serbian president Boris Tadi andthen-EU High Representative Javier Solana, was meant toregulate policing, justice and customs procedures under

EULEX authority in the North. Rejected by Kosovo, ithas since been undermined by Serbia, especially on cus-toms issues.

The UNMIK Administration Mitrovica (UAM) still func-tions, much to the dislike of Pristina and many in the in-ternational community. Its international staff is small, andabout half its 123 employees also work for the (Serbian)Mitrovica municipality. UAM provides international le-gitimacy for the Serbian municipality decisions it approves,mostly as a matter of course. Long considered redundant,it is now the object of two overlapping international ef-forts. The ICO would like to see it evolve toward a newmunicipality in the North, anticipated in the Ahtisaari

plan. UNMIK itself is eager to revitalise the UAM Advi-sory Board, which has not met for years. The Board mirrorsthe composition of the Serbian municipal assembly. Ifsupplemented with additional representatives for non-Serbs, it could serve as a bridge between Kosovo authori-ties and the Serbian municipality, easing cooperation andcommunication.11

In practice, Serbia and Kosovo both exercise partial sov-ereignty over the North. Civil administration, health, edu-cation, public services and land use regulation all run onSerbian rules, leading some local observers to deny thatthere is even a shred of Kosovo in the North.12 Yet the

police wear Kosovo uniforms, report ultimately to Pris-tina and occasionally deliver Serb suspects to an Albanian

for needs elsewhere, and from Serbia, which seeks to modify theKumanovo ceasefire agreement (1999), which bars its police

and armed forces from Kosovo territory.11Crisis Group interview, Serb NGO activist, Mitrovica, 17February 2011.12Crisis Group focus group, Mitrovica, 17 February 2011.


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judge sitting in Vushtrri, south of the Ibar.13 Serbian po-lice, prosecutors and judges work, too, but out of uniformand without any coercive authority.14 Shops accept andgive change in both euros (legal tender in Kosovo) andSerbian dinars. Kosovo and Serbian power companies

provide electricity and try, without much success, to col-

lect payments. The border with Serbia flickers in and outof sight depending on who is crossing and the mood ofthe officers. For Serbs, it is a mere administrative bound-ary within Serbia, one they can cross without passports;for Kosovars and foreigners, it is a formal internationalline. In practice, the predominantly Serb KP officers atthe border seldom even stop passenger buses plying theMitrovica-Belgrade route.15

In many ways, sovereignty is determined by individualidentity and choice. Most non-Serbs in the North accessKosovo government services, either through local com-

munity offices (LCOs) or by driving south of the Ibar;Albanian schools use the Kosovo curriculum and answerto the Kosovo education ministry. The LCOs dispensemunicipal services and often deal directly with Pristina,

but for some issues they need mediation of a municipalgovernment. Serbian officials in Zvean and Zubin Potok(who also hold UNMIK-era appointments extended byKosovo) put on a Kosovo hat for those cases and sign offon LCO paperwork.16

This report focuses on current realities in the North: localattitudes, Belgrades influence, Pristinas limited attemptsto engage, international strategy and problems in law en-forcement, justice and border controls. It builds on previousreporting on Kosovos Serbs and the North, on Kosovostransition to independence and its relations with Serbia.In March 2011 Belgrade and Pristina started an EU-facilitated dialogue to address the practical problems thathave developed due to their disagreement over Kosovosstatus. The North is not on the agenda, yet progress inmost areas will produce change there as well. Kosovo andSerbia are far apart on the Norths status and future, andthe topic will remain acute for a long time. This report

provides the background for policy discussions on theNorth and recommends implementation of interim solu-tions to improve law enforcement, customs collection andthe provision of financial assistance.

13Crisis Group interviews, Mitrovica municipal prosecutor andjudge, Vushtrri, 21 January 2011.14Police and court orders issued by Serbian institutions are en-forceable north of the border in Serbia.15Even the Kosovo Police (KP) implicitly recognise this frag-mented reality, seldom stopping buses to and from Belgradeused mostly by Northern Serbs, but recording immigration and

emigration of Albanians and foreigners. Repeated Crisis Groupobservations, Leposavi border post, 2009-2011.16Crisis Group interviews, Albanian Local Community Officeofficials, abr (abra) and Lip (Lipa), 13 January 2011.

II. BELGRADES INFLUENCEIN THE NORTH

A. POLITICS

Until mid-2008 the North was dominated by the Democ-ratic party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije, DSS),whose prominent local leaders included: Marko Jaki,member of Serbias parliament and director of the Mi-trovica medical centre; Milan Ivanovi, deputy mayor ofZvean; and Vuko Antonijevi, senior official of Bel-grades Kosovo and Metohija ministry. The Zvean, ZubinPotok and Leposavi mayors were all DSS members.17They controlled many aspects of day-to-day life, such asconstruction, the buyouts of Albanian houses and prop-erty in the North, employment, local businesses and IDPaid allocation.

DSS ideology is based on defending Serbias territorialintegrity. It rejects partition of Kosovo and accuses Presi-dent Tadi and the Democratic party (Demokratska stranka,DS) of secretly negotiating for that result with the U.S.18The DSS tries to keep the North as free as possible ofKosovo government and international influence. Somelocal observers believe its strategy is premised on the as-sumption that Mitrovica is in the centre of attention onlywhile it is a gray zone. Once the issue of Kosovo is settled,it will become just another poor southern town.19

The DSS lost the May 2008 Serbian elections. Eager tomove EU accession forward, the new DS-led governmentin Belgrade favoured a more relaxed Kosovo policy. Itsstrategy for the North was to secure EULEX deploymentas a status-neutral mission under a UN umbrella and pre-vent a violent reaction from DSS structures. In late 2008,it moved against illegal DSS activities in Kosovo, culmi-nating in the arrest of Milorad Todorovi, a senior partyofficial. The pressure worked, and EULEX was deployed,

but the DSS was enraged, and tensions with Belgradegrew.20 The long-time internal affairs ministry (Ministarstvo

unutranjih poslova, MUP) commander in the North and

17As were a majority of municipal coordinators established byBelgrades Coordination Centre across Kosovo. Before Serbiaslocal elections in Kosovo in May 2008, it dealt with KosovoSerbs through the Coordination Centre, whose local coordina-tors served as the link between the population and Belgrade.See Crisis Group Report, Serb Integration in Kosovo, op. cit.18Crisis Group interview, Serb politician, Serbian NationalCouncil, Mitrovica, November 2010.19Crisis Group interview, Serb professor, Mitrovica University(officially Pristina University temporarily displaced in Kos-

ovska Mitrovica), Mitrovica, September 2007.20The May 2008 Serbian local elections were also held in Kos-ovo, despite being against UN Security Council Resolution1244. The DSS won in all the Northern municipalities.


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DSS ally, Dragan Delibai, was removed.21 RadenkoNedeljkovi (DS), a Jaki critic, was appointed to headthe Mitrovica District, imposing some control over theDSS-led municipalities. After a car carrying the new min-ister for Kosovo, Goran Bogdanovi (DS), was stonednear Leposavi on 27 June 2009, Jaki was blamed and

fired from his hospital position.

As the DS controls Serbian funding, DSS mayors inZubin Potok and Zvean cooperate with it. When Le-

posavi and Mitrovica proved more difficult, Belgradeimposed temporary measures and forced new electionsthat the DS won in Leposavi in late 2009 and in Mi-trovica in mid-2010. But the party political cadres wereweak and inexperienced, and the municipalities were inessence run by Nedeljkovis Mitrovica District. Pristinafelt the Serbia-run elections were a violation of its sover-eignty, while Belgrade claimed they would reduce the influ-

ence of hardliners. By mid-2010, it was clear that Belgradewas not interested in prosecuting and removing the most

prominent DSS officials in the North, who had long beenidentified by the international community as the biggest

problem. Belgrade preferred to keep them in play to con-trast with its own moderate policies and as a reminderof what the alternative could be.

Under the DS, fuel smuggling declined, impromptu road-side petrol stations were dismantled, and several largesmuggling chains were broken, with dozens of arrests inlate 2009. MUP control on the Serbian side of the two

Northern gates strengthened. Large, angry rallies in north-ern Mitrovica, once a regular feature of life in the dividedcity, declined and then stopped. Yet financial crime con-tinued, now in more sophisticated forms, such as taxfraud exploiting Serbias VAT exemption for Kosovo.22

In the last quarter of 2010, however, the DSS took backcontrol of the Mitrovica municipality, in coalition withthe Serb Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka,SNS) and two dissidents from the Social DemocraticParty (Socijaldemokratska partija Srbije, SDP). Jaki,significantly weakened since 2008, was seen as thecoups mastermind.23 As in the past, he himself took a

back seat, letting the more popular but less experiencedSNS provide municipal leadership. Nevertheless, the DSS

21Smenjen Delibai nastala konfuzija [The dismissal of De-libai created confusion], JUGpress, 5 January 2009.22Several techniques are in use, including claiming VAT re-funds for non-existent goods, for goods that never leave Serbiaor for goods exported to Kosovo and re-imported to Serbia;Crisis Group interview, international official, Mitrovica, Febru-ary 2011.23Thanks to long-term lobbying and, according to some, largecash payments, Jaki is considered to have caused the breakupby encouraging two local deputies of the Social DemocraticParty to leave the ruling coalition.

is calling the shots, and the North remains the only placein Serbia where the party has survived intact. Having ac-cess to a municipal budget worth over 6 million willstrengthen its position further.

Serbias control over the North is partial, and many of the

elements that most worry the international communityand Pristina DSS hardliners and organised criminals have kept their autonomy. Belgrade derives advantagesfrom this: incidents can be blamed plausibly on hard-liners. But the DS has weakened them and cut much oftheir access to Serbian funds. Toppling the power verticalset up by the DSS in 2000-2008, when rule was often

based on fear, is not complete. But even if this happens,Northerners are unlikely to embrace Pristina. Popular dis-pleasure with the DSS is not linked to its position onKosovo but to its corruption, other illegal activities andcronyism.

B. MONEY

Serbia spends some 200 million annually on the North,down from over 300 million in the middle of the previ-ous decade.24 This sustains the Kosovo Serbs way of life.They are grateful, though those who receive little pen-sioners, the unemployed and self-employed resent thewell-connected elites wealth. Pristina and internationalofficials argue the aid destroys any local appetite for inte-gration with Kosovo and should be more transparent.25

Others believe it not only harms Kosovos integrity butalso goes against the interests of average Northern Serbsby sustaining an isolated, lawless environment and fundingcriminals, who harass the people it is meant to help.26 Ifthe funding declined sharply, some would have to be re-

placed by Kosovo or international sources, and job lossesand emigration would ensue.

Mitrovica University is home to some 9,000 students27and costs between 30 million and 35 million annually.28

24Crisis Group interviews, Serbian government official, Bel-grade, 6 December 2010; senior Western diplomat, Pristina, 5November 2010. This comes out roughly to 3,636 per person.In contrast the EU provides 37.29 per capita in Instrument forPre-accession Assistance (IPA) funding to Kosovo.25Crisis Group interview, Serb opposition politician, Mitrovica,25 November 2010.26Crisis Group interview, international official, Pristina, 11February 2011.27Crisis Group interview, Serb professor, Mitrovica University,Mitrovica, 25 December 2010.28Crisis Group interview, Serbian government official, Bel-grade, 7 December 2010. Administrative staff receive between

350 and 400 a month; the lowest paid docents, at the Facultyof Philosophy, earn between 1,000 and 1,200; Crisis Groupinterview, Serb professor, Mitrovica University, Mitrovica, 24November 2010.


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Salaries are higher than the Serbia standard. Not all thismoney stays in the North; about 70 per cent of facultycommute from Serbia or elsewhere, spending little timein Mitrovica.29 But its impact on the region is significant,as students, professors and staff support the citys shops,

bars and apartment rental market. The university is also a

symbol of Serbias commitment to staying in the North the whole campus was built from scratch. It is determinedto be seen as a modern and progressive institution, withclose ties to regional and European universities. Its newfacilities are superior to much larger university centres in

Ni, Kragujevac, Novi Sad and, in some respects, eventhose in Belgrade. But students complain bitterly aboutthe administration and faculty, who are often traditionaland nationalistic, barely competent in their fields or proneto favouritism.30 Graduates lack job opportunities, andmany leave Kosovo in search of work after completingtheir degree.31

Primary and secondary education cost Serbia even more,an estimated 45 million per year. Officials in Belgradeand on the ground admit there is deliberate overstaffingof the 21 elementary and nine high schools, primarily byIDPs who worked in education before the war.32 In ruralLeposavi, 127 teachers have only 566 secondary schoolstudents; some rural schools are even more overstaffed.33Large sums are spent on salaries and other benefits, in-cluding school books and equipment for all pupils. Re-construction and refurbishment of buildings, most of whichwere in poor condition, continues. The Serbian educationministry has an office in Mitrovica to oversee a systemthat is key to keeping Serb families from emigrating.

The Mitrovica health centre employs some 1,600, on anannual budget of 16.5 million.34 It has long been associ-ated with hard-line politics: Jaki was the director foryears, and it was involved in one way or another in allmajor anti-Kosovo incidents in the North.35 To the over-

29Crisis Group interview, Serb professor, Mitrovica University,Mitrovica, 24 December 2010; Crisis Group focus group, uni-versity students, 17 February 2011.30Crisis Group focus group, university students, Mitrovica, 17February 2011.31Ibid.32Crisis Group interview, Serbian government official, Bel-grade, 6 December 2010.33OSCE municipal profiles, September 2009, op. cit.34By comparison, the health centres in Kragujevac and Ni,both of which cover large areas and have half a million patientsa year, employ 2,200 and 2,988 people respectively. Healthcentre Ni data is at: www.ekapija.com/website/sr/page/245749;health centre Kragujevac data is at: www.kc-kg.rs/o-nama/klinicki-

centar-danas.html.35The most often cited example is the use of ambulances toraise alarms across Mitrovica and Zvean in order to ensurecrowds gather; examples include the attempted takeover of the

whelming majority of Northerners, however it is the cor-nerstone of the Serbian presence, as it offers jobs and topmedical facilities.36 All other medical centres in the North-ern municipalities are under its management, and it worksclosely with centres in the southern enclaves. It considersitself superior to anything in the Albanian health system.

Management points out that there are a dozen Albanianemployees, which is a dozen more than there are Serbsemployed in the Pristina health centre, and that in the

past year 871 non-Serbs received treatment at the hospi-tal, in addition to 587 who visited its clinics in other partsof the North.37

Municipal budgets are much smaller; Mitrovicas thelargest, is 6.4 million per year.38 UAMs budget of 2.7million also helps pay salaries and supports public utili-ties, such as sanitation and water. Belgrade funds someconstruction projects (IDP housing, schools, sports halls

and roads), though most high-priority projects have beencompleted, so this spending has drastically fallen. It also

provides loans to companies operating in the North (as itdoes throughout other Serb areas of Kosovo) and under-writes loans taken out by the municipalities, notably 9million to build a water supply system for Mitrovica,Zubin Potok and Zvean.

Truly controversial spending is comparatively limited.Several million Euros are believed to go to the MUPevery year, assuming there are about 200 clandestine of-ficers in northern Kosovo.39 Most of these do nothingsubstantively harmful, though their mere presence is inviolation of Security Council Resolution 1244. Some workin the MUP office in Mitrovica, issuing Serbian docu-ments, including driving licenses and ID cards; othersguard public buildings. But some of the 200 are hardMUP, who presumably organise violent protests, recruitthugs and commit arson and bomb attacks. Their salariesand expenses probably add up to 1 million or less.

The North, benefiting from unprecedented infrastructuredevelopment since 1999,40 enjoys advantages over neighbour-

Mitrovica courthouse by UN forces in March 2008 and the open-ing of a Kosovo government civil registry office in spring 2010.36The health centre has nine operating theatres, and its seven-teen departments can perform any surgery except cardio- andneuro- surgery.37Crisis Group interviews, Mitrovica health centre official, Mi-trovica, 26 November 2010; Albanian physicians and patients,south Mitrovica, January 2011.38Crisis Group interview, local Serb politician, Mitrovica, 17February 2011.39Estimates of MUP strength in the North vary; Kosovos in-ternal affairs minister estimated up to 200 non-KP officers. Cri-sis Group interview, Bajram Rexepi, Pristina, 17 November 2010.40In 2007, Zubin Potok municipality became the highest recipi-ent per capita of Serbia funds under the National Investment


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ing Serbian municipalities that are struggling economi-cally.41 Jobs came with the subsidies, and a fair portion ofconstruction tenders went to cheaper Albanian firms,

Northern politicians note.42 But projects and money arerunning out, and it is becoming increasingly obvious thatthe North needs production capabilities, not only infra-

structure.

The bulk of the 200 million that Belgrade pumps in an-nually goes to salaries and pensions for some 19,500Serbs that are much higher than in the rest of Kosovo.43

Northerners are worried that funding has decreased andwill continue to do so.44 Until 2007, employees in the

North regularly obtained a double salary, 200 per centof what people doing the same job in Serbia earned. Thiswas reduced to 150 per cent in early 2010, and a law thatwould curtail other benefits and set clear guidelines againstholding two or more jobs may soon be adopted.45 Never-

theless, the money from Belgrade dwarfs all internationaland Pristina aid in the North.

Northern reliance on the public sector is in stark contrastto the rest of Kosovo, where the private sector is develop-ing.46 Some private initiative emerged in 2010 a fewcompanies from Serbia opened shops with local partners,

but the numbers are small compared to enterprises in thesouth. The Serbian Chamber of Commerce in Mitrovica

North offers no projects, seminars or incentives; its workrevolves around maintaining databases. A business asso-ciation registered in both Kosovo and Serbia in March2010 with the help of the UN Development Programme(UNDP) and around 30 businessmen mainly does fund-

Plan. Crisis Group interview, focus group, Zubin Potok, 30November 2010.41Serbia has invested in building and reconstructing roads,most symbolically one that weaves through rocky hills betweenMitrovica North and Zubin Potok, without passing through Al-banian-inhabited areas. It also paid for schools, health centres,sports halls, IDP housing, apartment blocks and new churchesin Mitrovica North and Leposavi.42Crisis Group interviews, Serb politicians, Zubin Potok, Mi-trovica, Zvean, December 2010.43Crisis Group interviews, international official, Mitrovica, 9December 2010; Serbian government official, Belgrade, 6 De-cember 2010.44Crisis Group interviews, Zubin Potok, Mitrovica, Leposavi,Zvean, November/December 2010.45Crisis Group interview, Serbian government official, Belgrade,6 December 2010.46Kosovo Serbs have historically relied on state jobs and funding,a characteristic that increased after 1989, when Kosovos auton-omy was abolished and the local Serb population started livingoff Belgrade handouts. Albanians presence in public institu-

tions stopped post-1989, and they have subsequently developedtheir private sector. However, while jobs in state institutions inthe past were popular above all due to their security, they arenow financially very lucrative.

raising and investment training. That emerging Northernbusinesses are more likely to cooperate with southernpartners is especially evident in areas like computer re-tail.47 Yet, public sector salaries are generally higher,48indicating that Serbian state funding undermines privatesector growth and economic development.49

Kosovo and Serbian banks both operate in the area, butneither offers a full range of services. By far the most

popular bank in Mitrovica is the Komercijalna Banka,whose ATM machine gives out only Serbian dinars andwhere everyone is on the Serbian state payroll. However,the Mitrovica branch only provides salaries; for loans,clients need to go to Serbia. Raiffeisen and Pro Credit

banks, which operate within the Kosovo system, havelarge and modern branches but few clients. They offerloans, sometimes even to non-account holders, but cannot

process Serbia salary payments and in most cases require

Kosovo or UNMIK documents to even open an account.50

Much of todays Serbian funding was foreseen under theAhtisaari plan. Whether this heavy state funding and theresulting bloated public sector are sustainable and actually

beneficial for long-term socio-economic development isdebatable. But the Ahtisaari plan explicitly envisagesSerbia funding municipal institutions to cover education,health, pensions and grants.51 It also says, however, that

47Crisis Group interview, Serb businessman, Mitrovica, 8 De-cember 2010.48My salaries of 600 a month are good even by Belgradestandards, let alone Mitrovica or Pristina, yet all my employeeswith any skill leave for much better paid jobs in Serbia-financed institutions. Ibid.49Some public enterprises, such as the Lola Fot factory inLeak, turn a profit. Crisis Group interview, Serbian govern-ment official, Belgrade, 6 December 2010. But most factories,such as Ivo Lola Ribar in Zubin Potok, are closed, while thosethat are working, such as the timber processing factory Hrast inLeposavi or the Trepa administration, record big losses andserve only to ensure that employees do not lose their jobs. Crisis

Group interview, focus group, Zubin Potok, 30 November 2010.50Crisis Group interviews, Raiffeisen and Pro Credit bank offi-cials, Mitrovica, 8 December 2010. People receiving salariesfrom Pristina institutions as well as from Serbian ones still usethe trusted method of waiting for a years pay to accumulatebefore opening a bank account, withdrawing the money thenclosing the bank account. Many pensioners are under less scru-tiny if they receive payments from both and thus first wait inline at the Komercijalna Banka for their Serbian pension beforewalking 200 metres to the Bosniak Mahalla and the local NLBBank branch to collect their Kosovo pension. Raiffeisen bankaccepts either Kosovo IDs or expired UNMIK IDs, while ProCredit will accept a Serbian ID only if the holders domicile is

Kosovo.51The Ahtisaari plan refers in this report to the overallscheme contained in the Ahtisaari Report and ComprehensiveProposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement, read together. UN


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Serbia should declare its aid to Pristina, use Kosovobanks and accept other conditions that it refuses becauseit does not recognise Kosovos independence. Serbianfunds and their destination are not the problem the lackof coordination with Kosovo is, and this is what Belgradeshould change. Only the small amount spent on Serbian

police, courts and security services flatly violates both theAhtisaari plan and Resolution 1244.

Special Envoy Maarti Ahtisaari submitted these documents to

the Secretary-General in March 2007, who in turn forwardedthem to the Security Council with his approval. Serbian fundingof health and education is discussed in Articles 7, 10 and 11 ofAnnex III.

III.(DIS)INTEGRATION

Few Serbs accept Kosovo independence. South of theIbar, many participate in Kosovos institutions, acceptingintegration within the Ahtisaari plans terms but without

explicitly endorsing separation from Belgrade. Serbs inthe south voted in the December 2010 Kosovo electionsin numbers approaching those of their Albanian neighboursand greater than those in the last parallel polls organ-ised by Serbia. In the North, however, Serbs reject bothintegration and independence.52 Only two Serbs voted inthe December 2010 elections; no local candidates stoodfor office. The most recent Serbian elections, those of May2010 in north Mitrovica, attracted heavy turnout ap-

proaching 80 per cent.53

Northern hostility to Pristina is deeper than the status

dispute. Serbs overwhelmingly reject integration intoKosovo society as it is now.54 Months of interviewsacross the political spectrum found no Serbs who favouredintegration willing acceptance of Kosovo sovereigntyand participation in its institutions. A small minority saidthat if integration was inevitable, it was because we arein Kosovo; otherwise they saw no reason to cooperatewith Pristina.55 The language barrier reinforces division.Since 1999, there has been no bilingual education on eitherside of the Ibar, and younger Albanians and Serbs com-municate in English. Older Serbs in the northern munici-

palities are far less likely to speak or understand Albanian

than their kin in the southern enclaves.

Albanians, Serbs and international observers give differentcauses for Serb rejection. For many Albanians and someleading embassies, the fault is Belgrades.56 In this view,

Northern Serbs will remain intransigent as long as they

52Crisis Group interview, UN Development Programme(UNDP) official, Pristina, 17 November 2010.53Crisis Group interview, DS official, Mitrovica, 16 February2011. The campaign for these elections featured repeated visitsby top Serbian opposition leaders, including the moderate Ser-bian Progressive Party (SNS, Srpska napredna stranka), andrhetoric heavily slanted to nationalistic themes, with scant or noreference to practical, local concerns. Crisis Group observa-tions, Mitrovica, May 2010.54Crisis Group interview, prominent Serb businessman andpolitician, Mitrovica, 23 November 2010.55Crisis Group interview, Serb opposition politician, Mitrovica,25 November 2010.56Crisis Group interview, Isa Mustafa, leader of LDK, Pristina,18 November 2010. 46 per cent of Albanian respondents named

the influence of Belgrade as the main cause of tense inter-ethnic relations, with Serbs reluctance to integrate in secondplace (16 per cent); Early Warning Report 28: Kosovo, UNDevelopment Programme (UNDP), April-June 2010, p. 25.


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feel supported by the Serbian capital.57 If that supportweakens, integration would follow. But this is premisedon Brussels making it clear to Belgrade that its EU fu-ture depends on real cooperation on Kosovo.58 Admit-tedly, if Serbia accepts Kosovos territorial integrity, the

North is too small and weak to resist accommodation

with Pristina. Yet, Serbs overwhelmingly cite Albaniansinsufficient efforts to woo them, followed by their owncommunitys rejection of Kosovo society, as the leadingcauses of poor inter-ethnic relations; only a handful be-lieves Belgrade is an important factor.59 For them, Bel-grade is not holding back Northern interest in integration:that interest does not exist.

Even though Northerners admit that they suffer from highunemployment, crime, an uncertain future and neglect byinternational organisations, they believe life is betternorth of the Ibar. The North has suffered ten years of an-

archy, yet our system is [still] more organised than thesouth, and our services are much better. This sense ofwell-being is partially sustained by a decade of Serbianinvestment Northern Kosovo municipalities are much

better-equipped than comparable southern Serbian ones and by relatively high public-sector salaries. The achieve-ments of EU and U.S. aid elsewhere in Kosovo seem paltryin contrast. Who, northerners wonder, wants to integrateinto an inferior system?60

There is little trust. Serbs are convinced they would faceheavy discrimination if they accepted integration. A doc-tor at the Mitrovica health centre complained: attemptsat integration are aimed at destroying us. Becoming partof the Kosovo health system would mean a drastic jobloss, with many positions eliminated, others filled by Al-

banians, resulting in Serb emigration, they say. Interlocu-tors do not understand why Albanians preferences shouldoutweigh theirs: Albanians did not want to live underSerb rule, and we dont want to live under their rule.61

57The former UN regional representative in Mitrovica worriedthat for many people in Pristina it remains an idee fixe that thenorthern Serbs only resist [Kosovo] independence because ofBelgrades interference or the negative influence of the radi-cal leaders. These people believe that a real show of force,or maybe some arrests, will break this hold and free the Serbsto accept the benefits of the new Kosovo. This is simply notaccurate. Kosovo a struggle over who gets the north, in-terview with Gerard Gallucci, Transconflict (www.transconflict.com).58Kosovo: Strategy for northern Kosovo an important step inthe right direction, cable from U.S. embassy Pristina, 29 Janu-ary 2010, as made public by Wikileaks.59Early Warning Report 28, op. cit., p. 25.60Crisis Group focus group, Zubin Potok, 30 November 2010.61Crisis Group interview, Mitrovica health centre official, Mi-trovica, 25 November 2010. In part, this fear is based on reality:the health centre is highly overstaffed for the small region itserves; see above.

Civil society representatives agree: why do Albanianshave the right to leave my country, while I dont havethe right to stay?62

The small community of independent businessmen isfar readier to interact with Kosovo institutions.63 Non-

governmental organisations (NGOs) also cooperate withsouthern colleagues and the Kosovo government.64 Yet,their leaders complain about being coerced to registerwith Pristina by international agencies such as UNDP, asa condition for funding. Many accept money from Pris-tina as long as it comes without strings, but fear that theywill be ostracised by the community they wish to serve ifthey do so publicly. Even among this cosmopolitan groupthere is the sense that Pristina has failed to make a singlegoodwill gesture toward the Serbs since 1999.65 Moneyis not the answer. In the recently-opened civil registry of-fice, local officials complain: Pristina and the interna-

tionals just want to throw money at the Serbs so they canwrite reports about successful integration. That is notthe way to go.66

International officials argue that though Serb participationin Kosovo political life once seemed impossible, southernSerbs voted in large number in the November 2009 localand December 2010 national polls. Popularly-electedSerbs in Kosovos government may help persuade NorthernSerbs to participate.67 Others reason by analogy: if south-ern resistance was surmountable, then Northern hardlinerscan soften over time. But this overlooks fundamental dif-ferences. Scattered in enclaves and surrounded by areasunder Kosovo state authority, southern Serbs had littlelong-term alternative to integration.68 Northerners get allthey need documents, health, education, salaries, mostgoods and services locally or across the porous borderwith Serbia and cross the Ibar only for occasional shop-

ping or socialising. Many never cross. None of the forcesthat propelled southern integration exist in the North.

Northerners see their region as the victim of an interna-tional experiment devised by actors with little or no knowl-

62This reflects the widely shared view that the North remainspart of Serbia and is not seceding from Kosovo; Crisis Groupfocus group, Zubin Potok, 30 November 2010.63Crisis Group interview, Serb businessman, Mitrovica, 8 De-cember 2010.64Crisis Group interviews, Sadri Ferati, local government ad-ministration minister, Pristina, 22 November 2010; Kosovocivil registry office official, Mitrovica, 24 November 2010.65Crisis Group focus group, Zubin Potok, 30 November 2010.66Crisis Group interviews, Kosovo civil registry office offi-cials, Mitrovica, 24 November 2010.67Kosovo: Strategy for Northern Kosovo, op. cit.68Crisis Group Report, Serb Integration in Kosovo, op. cit., andCrisis Group Europe Briefing N56,Kosovo: trpce, a ModelSerb Enclave?, 15 October 2009.


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edge of its conditions. Integration sounds very aggressiveto us, suggesting a desire to control and dominate, theysay.69 Explanations based on preserving Kosovos territo-rial integrity ring hollow; for Northerners, it is Serbiasintegrity that was violated, by the same actors (Pristinaand many NATO members) who now lecture on the im-

portance of borders.

A. THE STRATEGY FOR THE NORTH

Two main concerns drive international policy on theNorth. Avoiding partition is paramount. Many fear thatchanging Kosovos borders, whether by partition or ex-change of territories, could lead to the dismemberment ofneighbouring Macedonia and destabilise the western Bal-kans.70 Protecting the Kosovo government from nationalist

pressure is also important. For ten years we told the

Kosovars to trust us let us handle the situation and wewill protect you and now the government of independ-ent Kosovo is increasingly asking us when we are goingto make good on that commitment, warned a senior dip-lomat.71 The governments failure to exercise sovereigntyover the North provokes frequent criticism both withinthe governing coalition and from opposition partiesacross the political spectrum.

Key players the ICO and the U.S. embassy, consultingwith EULEX and several EU missions crafted a Strat-egy for the North to meet these concerns. It took shape

late in 2009 and was endorsed by the Kosovo governmentearly in 2010.72 Several of its 33 recommendations havebeen implemented, though with little effect, and its mostambitious goals seem more remote than ever. Its troublesare instructive, as it still guides international policy towardthe North.

The Strategy aims to marginalise and weaken the paral-lel Serbian institutions, establish and strengthen legiti-mate Kosovo institutions and reinforce law enforcementin the North. It does not contemplate use of force againstSerbian entities or imposing Kosovo officials. The idea

has been to show Northern Serbs they are in Kosovo, notSerbia, encourage them to cooperate with Pristina and

69Internationals fear of visiting the North is a perennial com-plaint. Crisis Group focus group, Zubin Potok, 30 November 2010.70See Crisis Group Report, Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJOpinion, op. cit., pp.14-17. Surveys have found strong supportamong Albanians throughout the region for including parts ofMacedonia in a common Albanian state, if Kosovo and Albaniawere to unite; Gallup Balkan Monitor (www.balkan-monitor.eu).71Kosovo: Strategy for Northern Kosovo an important step inthe right direction, op. cit.72Crisis Group interview, Prime Minister Hashim Thai, Pris-tina, March 2010.

make the Serbian municipal governments irrelevant.73 Toachieve this, it proposed actions in three areas: rule oflaw, municipal government and economic development.74

The rule of law recommendations involve EULEX andare the most grounded and least controversial, but imple-

mentation is painfully slow. EULEX has slightly increasedits visibility in the North, notably by a program of night-time traffic stops (Operation Night Owl), and doubledits judges at the Mitrovica courthouse. Yet, visibility isstill low;75 Night Owl has had little impact, netting only afew illegal guns.76 There has been no progress on themain benchmarks: hiring Albanian and Serb judges forthe Mitrovica court and collecting customs fees at the

Northern gates.

Pristina and the international community set more ambi-tious goals for municipal government. They planned to

introduce Kosovo institutions into the North, use them tofunnel generous funds to communities and build a cadreof skilled, respected local leaders, culminating in newelections. This involved setting up three new entities inMitrovica. A Civil Registry Office (CRO) opened in theethnically mixed Bosniak Mahalla neighbourhood. It wasto issue Kosovo documents and host a small, mixed Serband Albanian team to promote decentralisation by multi-ethnic projects and small-scale investment, mainly through

NGOs. It was also to host the Municipal PreparatoryTeam (MPT) for North Mitrovica, tasked with laying thefoundations for a new municipality within the Kosovosystem.77 Finally, the EU opened an office (the EUHouse), meant to increase visibility and coordinate policy.

These plans stumbled at the first step. The opening of theCRO was met by Serb demonstrations that spiralled outof control, with one death. The CRO is seldom visited,78

73Crisis Group interview, senior EU diplomat, 2 December 2010.74Recommendations one to six cover law enforcement; seven to23 deal with North Mitrovica and 24 to 30 with the other threemunicipalities; 31 to 33 address the social and economic situa-

tion. Strategy for Northern Kosovo, ICO paper made availableto Crisis Group, 19 January 2010.75Crisis Group saw only one patrol in four weeks of intensivetravel through the North between November 2010 and February2011.76Crisis Group interview, EU official, Brussels, 20 January 2011.77The MPTs are part of the decentralisation process laid out inthe Ahtisaari Plan, which mandated the creation of five newSerb (and one new Turkish) majority municipalities with en-hanced competencies. MPT members are internationally ap-pointed but paid by the Kosovo government. Their job is tosurvey infrastructure and training needs, organise the new mu-nicipality, negotiate with parent municipalit(ies), and explain

the process to residents.78During a Crisis Group visit in November 2010, the Civil Reg-istry office consisted of three nervous officials guarded by a KPdetachment; a KP office for motor vehicle registration that re-


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though by the end of 2010, it had implemented four mod-est projects in the North and organised a conference inMacedonia that attracted 100 NGOs from both sides ofthe Ibar.79 Coordination with the MPT could be better; itis dismissed as people unknown to the public, with nostanding in the community.80 Efforts are further ham-

pered by accusations of corruption and nepotism in grantmaking.81 Pristina is responsible for managing the officesand staffs; its laxity is seen as a demonstration of its dis-interest in making engagement with the North work.

The MPT ran into so much intimidation and harassmentthat its members could not work publicly.82 The team wasreduced to trivial projects: distributing free firewood toIDP camps, setting up Christmas lights and organising a

photo competition.83 Its largest project has been renovatingthe playground at the Mitrovica North kindergarten, com-

pleted on 26 January 2011. The playground is tolerated,

but the sign attributing it to the MPT drew a crowd thatdelayed the opening ceremony.84

With even modest investment running into opposition andits members driven underground, the MPT could not moveon to its main task: preparing for municipal elections.

Neither the KP nor EULEX were effective in protectingits members from violent intimidation. Unrealistically,the Strategy suggested promoting Kosovo elections asstatus neutral, arguing that the biggest hurdle facing de-centralisation in the north is the perception that the crea-tion of the new municipality of Mitrovica North requiresacceptance of Kosovos independence.85 The MPT web-site, which seems to have been written in English andtranslated imperfectly into Serbian and Albanian, makesscarcely any reference to Kosovo.86 The next steps fol-

ported about five visits per week; and a branch of the localgovernment affairs ministry (MLGA).79Projects implemented included Sports for All, a cancerprevention scheme for the Roma population, televised debatesand an ecology venture. Crisis Group interview, Kosovo CivilRegistry Office official, Mitrovica, 24 November 2010.80Crisis Group interview, Kosovo Civil Registry Office offi-cial, Mitrovica, 24 November 2010.81Crisis Group interview, Serb NGO activist, Mitrovica, 24November 2010.82The Mitrovica North MPT is the only one whose membershiphas not been made public on the ICO website (www.ico-kos.org) or its own (www.mpt-mn.org). Members spent part of2010 being trained at capacity-building seminars in the U.S.Crisis Group interviews, U.S. embassy official, Belgrade, 21April 2010; Serb NGO activist, Mitrovica, October 2010.83Mitrovica North MPT website, www.mpt-mn.org.84Crisis Group interview, Serb NGO activist, Mitrovica, 1 Feb-ruary 2011.85Strategy for Northern Kosovo, op. cit.86The only significant references to Kosovo are in the Impor-tant Documents section, where links point to the (English-only) versions of five Kosovo laws.

lowing up on Mitrovica elections with similar moves inthe three Northern municipalities were not tried.87

Not only is the majority of the local population opposed,but the funds on offer are less than Belgrades and dis-tributed to relatively unknown community leaders prone

to infighting. Government spending that directly benefitsSerbs, such as the 2.7 million for the Mitrovica Northadministration, is seldom noted and admittedly a fractionof what Belgrade offers. When Pristina steps in, it is oftento reaffirm sovereignty in ways that locals view as har-assment, such as the January 2011 order to confiscateSerbian vehicle licence plates with northern municipalitycodes and the 2010 shutdown of Serbian mobile telephoneantennae south of the Ibar.88

When international organisations, working with the Kos-ovo government, attempt to support projects in the North,

they encounter status and contracting problems. The U.S.Agency for International Development (USAID), for ex-ample, has established a 5 million trust account for the

North,89 with up to 1 million for activities in support ofthe Mitrovica North MPT, in addition to ongoing projectsin economic development, rule of law and media. Projectsare to be implemented with the MPTs in the Decentral-ised Effective Municipalities Initiative (DEMI). But Bel-grade insists that Serbian municipalities approve them,and USAID refuses to work with them.90 Local Serb au-thorities are suspicious, however, feeling the aim is to

pave the way for Ahtisaari plan decentralisation.91

Each project can cause tensions, and the situation is thesame in Zvean, Leposavi and Zubin Potok, for which

87The Strategy recommended establishing Advisory Councilsfor the three Northern municipalities, in lieu of MPTs, becausethe latter only operate to form new municipalities, not to shep-herd existing ones from Serbias system to Kosovos. Thiswould require amending the law on local self-government.88The Kosovo government removed Serbian mobile telephonetransmitters south of the Ibar in 2010. Serbs rejected Pristinas

explanation, that Serbian operators were unregistered in Kos-ovo and were causing losses for legally registered operators, andsaw it instead as a move aimed at pressuring them. In the North,they guarded Serbian antennas and blew up those belonging toKosovos IPKO and Vala operators. In January 2011, Pristinabegan confiscating new Serbian car plates with Kosovo munici-pal codes. EULEX quickly facilitated a temporary compromiseand defused tensions.89Crisis Group interview, Serb NGO activist, Mitrovica, 1 Feb-ruary 2011.90USAID has worked around these restrictions by goingthrough NGOs and others; in one case, it purchased equipmentfor an NGO that placed it in the Mitrovica University health

centre, while retaining ownership; Crisis Group email corre-spondence, USAID, 10 March 2011.91Crisis Group interview, senior Serb official, Mitrovica, 25January 2011.


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USAID/Pristina has allocated 3 million to 3.5 million.Locals are tempted but unhappy at the conditions andworried participation will be seen as integration.92 Whilelocal authorities expressed interest in building threeschool annexes,93 there is no progress because USAID re-fuses to sign contracts with Serbian municipalities that

refuse to be bypassed.

Investment from the European Commission Liaison Of-fice (ECLO) is more status neutral and thus more toSerbian taste. Its 27 million investment plan for thewhole of Kosovo, including the North, received promi-nent Serbian press attention. A health clinic is being built inZubin Potok and a water sanitation plant in Leposavi,94though the Strategy recommended caution about such

projects, warning donors against legitimising the Serbianmunicipalities or replacing Serbias own declining contri-

butions.

Winning Serbs loyalty with infrastructure spending wouldbe an uncertain proposition at best, and the Strategy doesnot come with the funding needed to make a serious at-tempt. The ICO Mitrovica office has identified over 100million in projects in Mitrovica town alone, a sum greaterthan total EU and U.S. assistance to Kosovo. Interna-tional assurances notwithstanding, only a tiny fraction ofthis sum has been appropriated. Nor have the Strategysauthors shown the political will to implement it. An in-ternational policy board to coordinate action on the

North has never met.95 The EU House, in an office suiteabove the Mitrovica KP station, has few visitors.

The fundamental problem with the Strategy is that it isbuilt on a contradiction. Its appeal is pitched at empoweringSerbs to promote the interests of their communities, yetSerbs see their primary interest as rejecting Kosovo andremaining loyal to Serbia. It fails even to acknowledgethat it strikes at this basic Serb interest. It also assumesthat Belgrade can be persuaded not to obstruct NorthernSerbs rapprochement with Kosovo but devotes no atten-tion to how this might be done.

A few of the Strategys components survive but will re-quire much greater commitment from the international

92Crisis Group focus group, Zubin Potok, 25 November 2011.93Primary schools Sveti Sava, erovnica village, Zvean Mu-nicipality; Banovi Strahinja, Banjska village, Zvean Munici- pality; Vuk Karadi, Zvean, Zvean Municipality. CrisisGroup interview, Serbian government official, Belgrade, 21January 2011.94EU Finansira Nove Infrastrukturne Projekte na Kosovu[EU Finances New Infrastructure Projects in Kosovo],Politika,

2 February 2011.95The policy group was to coordinate the ICO, EULEX, ECLO,KFOR, USAID and UNMIK, as well as the Quint embassies(France, Germany, Italy, UK and U.S.).

community and Pristina if they are to have a good effect.ICOs investment plans deserve support, and EULEX isworking in the North and could do much more. Yet, itwill face a choice between reinforcing Kosovos judicialsystem and actually improving the rule of law in the

North and will have to tread carefully.

B. SENDING A MESSAGE:THE MITROVICA CEMETERY

To build trust and confidence, Kosovo authorities need tobe attentive to culture and religious symbols, such as theSerb Orthodox cemetery in Mitrovica, on the Albanian,south, bank of the Ibar.96 The main Albanian cemetery isin the North and intact. The Serb cemetery is devastated,hundreds of headstones in shards and the chapel at itscentre desecrated and burned.97 Most of the damage dates

to 1999 and March 2004, but also to 2007 and 2008. Thesite is unguarded and open to sporadic vandalism, someallegedly perpetrated by residents of a neighbouring Ashkalisettlement apparently seeking to ingratiate themselveswith Albanians by lashing out at Serbs.98 Northern Serbsoften cite the two cemeteries as signs of their toleranceand Albanian hostility.99 The Kosovo authorities failureto repair and secure the graveyard sends a terrible mes-sage to Northern Serbs: this is what your future will looklike, once you have integrated.

Several attempts to repair the cemetery have foundered

on political symbolism and pride. The ICO notes thatevery attempt to solve the problem gets stuck when thetwo sides start arguing over who has legitimacy.100 Mi-trovica municipal officials have insufficient funds for afull repair and complain that Serbs refuse to cooperate.The municipality says it cleans the gravesites twice ayear.101 The cemetery is also cleaned by Serbs whose deadare buried there, most often on All Souls Day, when or-ganised visits, under police escort, take place. The Ortho-dox Church argues that most initiatives by the southernmunicipality and internationals have taken place without

96The predominantly Orthodox southern cemetery also servesthe small Catholic community.97Crisis Group site visit, November 2010. According to the Ortho-dox Church, 868 headstones are destroyed and need replace-ment; another 713 are lightly damaged and can be repaired;Crisis Group interview, Serbian Orthodox priest, Mitrovica, 25January 2011.98Crisis Group interview, Serb NGO activist, Mitrovica, 17February 2011. The Ashkali are Albanian-speaking Roma.99Crisis Group interviews, Northern politicians, September-January 2010/2011.100Crisis Group interview, international official, Mitrovica, 26January 2011.101Crisis Group interview, senior Kosovo municipal official,Mitrovica, 12 January 2011.


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any consultation with us they cannot do this withoutus.102 Northerners want repairs to involve the northernMitrovica authorities, whom the south does not recognise.Southerners believe the Church and Serb leaders deliber-ately refuse cooperation because the ruined cemeteryserves as a valuable symbol against integration.

The desecration of the chapel and gravestones is Pris-tinas to address the likely perpetrators and the site arewithin its jurisdiction. However obstructive or unreason-able the Church or Northern officials may be, Pristina hasthe authority to order the repairs. The persistent failure todo so and guard against vandalism suggests that this issimply not a priority, and, therefore, neither is Serbian in-tegration.

It may already be too late to repair the damage to publictrust. Serbs largely avoid the southern cemetery; burials

now mostly go to new graveyards in the North.103 Indeed,several families exhume relatives from the southerncemetery each month for re-burial in the North. But the

problem is soluble; Mitrovicas church was repaired in an(uncontroversial) UNESCO project years ago. The solu-tion requires attention at a higher level local authoritieson both sides are too entrenched and cooperation be-tween trusted international representatives, Bishop Teo-dosije of the Diocese of Raka-Prizren, which includesKosovo, and the Pristina government, backed by donors.Until then, the south Mitrovica municipality should repairthe fence around the cemetery and install video camerasto deter more vandalism.

C. THE CONSTRUCTION WAR

Many Northern Serbs are IDPs from elsewhere in Kosovo,and many Albanians who once lived north of the Ibar aredisplaced to Mitrovica and points south. Though IDP re-turns are still controversial throughout Kosovo, open vio-lence is rare, but both communities use the reconstructionof IDP housing as a subtle weapon to maintain the ethnic

balance.

Violent demonstrations met early attempts to build hous-ing for Albanian returnees in the Kroj i Vitakut (Brdjani)hamlet in Mitrovica. High-level mediation and interven-tion by EULEX riot police firing tear gas allowed con-struction to proceed, and dozens of houses are availablefor settlement. Interspersed through this tiny hamlet,

102Crisis Group interview, Serbian Orthodox priest, Mitrovica,25 January 2011103Catholic burials still take place but very few Orthodox, ibid;Crisis Group interview, Serb NGO activist, Mitrovica, 17 Feb-ruary 2011.

however, are several four- and five-storey apartmentblocks, prepared for Serbian IDPs.104

Mitrovica Serbs fear an influx of Albanians, especially inperipheral neighbourhoods to the west that, if connectedand taken over, could jeopardise Serb control of the town

centre. No such influx is visible. Instead, many restoredAlbanian homes appear vacant, and anecdotal evidencesuggests they are meant for sale to Serbs. Zvean officialsare especially nervous about a large building under con-struction in the hamlet of Vidimiriq, overlooking theirtown.105 They speculate it is meant for a Kosovo riot police(or Kosovo Security Force) base that could be used for aneventual offensive against the North. Currently just a private

building, the site is the best possible location if anyonewants to launch an attack on Zvean and is near an im-

portant transmission tower for Serbian mobile telephony,television and internet services.106

The fate of apartments built for Serbs who fled Croatiantroops in August 1995 and are still displaced shows howlittle room there is for return. The flats were quickly oc-cupied and usurped by other Serbs themselves displacedfrom Svinjare village in South Mitrovica.107 The SvinjareSerbs all owned homes rebuilt by the international com-munity but refused to live in them, terrified by Albanianintimidation (or persuaded to sell).

104Crisis Group observations, Kroj i Vitakut (Mitrovica), Feb-ruary 2011.105Crisis Group interview, international official, Mitrovica, 2December 2010. Vidimiriq (Vidomiri) is an Albanian-majorityhamlet assigned by the Ahtisaari plan to the southern Mitrovicamunicipality. Southern Mitrovica municipal officials state thehouse is nothing more than a private dwelling; Crisis Groupphone interview, 10 March 2011.106Crisis Group interview, international official, Mitrovica, 8December 2010.107Crisis Group interview, Serbian official, Zvean, 2 Decem-ber 2010.


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IV.CRIME: A COMMON PROBLEM

There is no effective criminal justice system in the North,and the civil justice system is fragmented, its judgmentsunenforceable.108 Kosovo police (KP) lack respect, exper-

tise and support; their relations with regional superiorssouth of the Ibar and with the judiciary are strained. Ser-bian police, barred from Kosovo by Resolution 1244, lurkin plainclothes but have no enforcement powers. Kosovocourts have not operated in the North since independence,apart from a trickle of cases handled by EULEX judges.Serbian courts operate in judges apartments, handlingcivil matters, but unable to enforce their judgments. North-ern Serbs resent depictions of their region as crime-riddledand anarchic, however.109 Local mayors and oppositionactivists some themselves the victims of violence arguethat the image is propagated as a cover for integration

through imposition of Kosovo rule of law institutions.110

Bleak as it is, the Norths weak rule of law has not producedan explosion of criminal activity, though residents fearthe growing influence of a gangster elite. Northernersuniformly desire a more orderly and secure environment.A Mitrovica university official complained that despitethe proliferation of law enforcement agencies in the area

the KP, the Serbian MUP and civil defence, EULEX,NATOs KFOR and UNMIK none could help againstthugs and intimidation. The only practical option is tovisit the Number One restaurant, an informal meeting-

place for the Northern elite and to seek help from influen-tial locals there.111

The international community has made rule of law a pri-ority, but it means different things in different places. ForPristina, the highest priority is control over customs andthe border posts, followed by extension of Kosovos legalsystem to the North measures that northern Serbs reject.For them, rule of law means cutting down on petty crimeand prosecuting Mitrovicas criminal gangs. The EU setup EULEX in large part to take over security from theUN, but, as noted above, it is mostly invisible in the North:Crisis Group saw one foot patrol in two weeks of touring,and that was next to the main Mitrovica bridge. EULEX

participates in joint checkpoints with KFOR but is over-shadowed by the military, and these Operation NightOwl are of dubious use. Attempts to arrest criminalshave had little success some were immediately released

108See also Crisis Group Report, The Rule of Law in Independ-ent Kosovo, op. cit., pp.18-21.109Crisis Group focus group, Zubin Potok, 25 November 2010.110Ibid; Crisis Group interview, Serbian official, Zvean, 1 De-cember 2010.111Crisis Group interview, DS official, Mitrovica, 24 November2010.

on legal technicalities, others turned out to be the wrongpersons. Tensions are rising over KFOR as well. Onceseen as the guarantor of security by local Serbs, it is nowviewed more suspiciously due to the expansion work un-derway at the Nothing Hill base near Leposavi.

International organisations have few tools at their dis-posal. Insofar as reinforcing the police and judiciary meansintegrating them closer with Kosovo institutions, local

people would feel alienated. Strengthening the links be-tween the Northern KP and Pristina headquarters wouldweaken police credibility and increase suspicions they aredisloyal to their people. Delaying court proceedings forthe greater Mitrovica region pending installation of thedisputed district court on the north bank keeps the pres-sure for integration on but cripples prosecutions on both

banks, allowing criminals to operate with impunity. Crack-ing down on Serbian police and judicial institutions oper-

ating covertly and in violation of Resolution 1244 wouldweaken Serbias influence but remove the only jurisdictionthat can effectively tackle intra-Serbian financial crime.

A. CRIME IN THE NORTH

Northern Kosovo has long suffered from a reputation as agangster paradise where ordinary citizens cower in fear,yearning for rule of law a Balkan version of Somalia,afflicted by a rash of smuggling and organised crime,overseen by a thuggish and criminalised Serb leader-

ship.112 The reality is very different. Crime rates are gen-erally low. Rural and sparsely populated by ageing, tightlyknit communities, Leposavi, Zvean and Zubin Potokare arid soil for petty crime and too impoverished for or-ganised crime.

North Mitrovica is the exception: there, many Serbs fearleaving home after dark.113 Original residents are outnum-

bered by IDPs, many without jobs, and a large studentpopulation. Its frontline status underpins a tense atmos-phere. In 2010, the KP registered seven cases of grandlarceny in Zubin Potok compared to 74 in Mitrovica; Le-

posavi had eight cases of light bodily injury, while Mi-trovica had 50.114 Domestic violence is underreportedthroughout Kosovo Albanian women fear complainingto police, while Northern Serb counterparts do not know

112Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Pristina, 5 November2010; cable from U.S. embassy Pristina, 23 February 2009, asmade public by Wikileaks.113Mitrovic/a Public Opinion Survey, UNDP, November2010, p. 24.114 KP Mitrovica regional headquarters annual report madeavailable to Crisis Group, February 2011. KP statistics are un-reliable; see Crisis Group Report,Rule of Law in IndependentKosovo, op. cit.


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that it is responsible for high crime or extensive familybreakdowns and homelessness.126

Inter-ethnic crimes are rare, and often have economic mo-tives. A series of attacks on an Albanian-owned bakery inZvean, once thought to be ethnic harassment, turned out

to be extortion.127

Young Serbs and Albanians occasion-ally fight in and around the mixed Bosniak Mahalla andMikronaselje (Kodra e Minatrove) neighbourhoods. Mo-ments of political tension sometimes lead to inter-ethniccrime. A popular Bosniak paediatrician died on July 22010 from wounds sustained in a grenade explosion duringa demonstration against the opening of a Kosovo govern-ment office in the Mahalla.

B. ECONOMIC CRIME

Like its political status, the Norths economy is murkyand distinct from that of both the rest of Kosovo and ofSerbia. The North is one large duty free zone, largelyoutside Kosovos and Serbias revenue systems.128 Pris-tina sees its lack of control over the two Northern border

posts and the ineffective customs regime as a key gap inits sovereignty. Northerners believe they are part of Serbiaand regard imposition of customs as forcible separationfrom their homeland that they would resist by force.While much opposition comes from smugglers, even pro-gressive Serbs flatly reject Kosovo customs.129 Belgradeformally accepts the international consensus that Kosovo

is a single customs area but refuses to allow the govern-ment to collect revenue, insisting that only UNMIK is soauthorised.130

Smuggling used to be even more widespread. That of fuelreached its peak in 2007, when Crisis Group observedtrucks parked outdoors in daytime as canisters and mini-vans were filled and sent back into Serbia to re-sell petrolin towns like Raka and Kraljevo. Since the new govern-

126Crisis Group interview, international official, Mitrovica, 16February 2011.127Crisis Group interviews, KP officer, Mitorivca, 12 January2011; prosecutor, Vushtrri, 21 January 2011.128Crisis Group interview, international official, Mitrovica, 8December 2010.129Crisis Group interviews, EULEX officer, Leposavi, 17 Feb-ruary 2011; EULEX Mitrovica regional staff, Mitrovica, 16February 2011; Crisis Group focus group, Mitrovica, 17 Febru-ary 2011.130UNMIK established a separate Kosovo customs area underits authority; in 2008, it transferred responsibility for customsto the Kosovo government. Customs duties are the largest revenuesource for the Kosovo budget. On two occasions, Special Rep-

resentative of the UN Secretary-General Lamberto Zannier cer-tified Kosovos customs stamps (which make no reference tothe Republic of Kosovo) as compliant with Resolution 1244.Nonetheless, Serbia refuses to accept them.

ment was formed in Belgrade in mid-2008, these activi-ties have been curtailed, with many arrests in 2010.131 Butdiesel is still much cheaper at the Norths improvised fuelstations than elsewhere in Kosovo or in Serbia.132 Kosovohas set up customs checkpoints along the Ibar, while Serbiatries to block goods that have entered the North free of

VAT and other taxes from returning to Serbia.133 Bel-grade and Pristina are doing what they can to stop the

North from harming their respective budgets, but theirefforts have little impact on goods that remain in the

North.134 This allows small and medium-sized businessesto make larger profits on their goods than in neighbouringSerbia there are no fiscal receipts or taxes, while pricesare relatively the same.135

Kosovo loses 30 million to 40 million annually in reve-nue at the Northern gates.136 Up to 85 per cent of importsthrough the North are destined for Kosovo south of the

Ibar.137 Some importers pay customs at the terminal insouth Mitrovica, as they are instructed by EULEX offi-cials at the border to do, but seven out of ten do not. Fuelremains the most smuggled commodity, followed by

building materials, medicines, cars, food, drink and other

131With good cooperation between MUP Serbia and EULEX,there have been over 60 arrests for smuggling near the twoNorthern gates since 2008. Another way this was done was byimposing stricter controls on who buys and transports fuel intothe North.132As low as 0.73 a litre, compared to 1.10 or more in Kosovoand still more in Serbia133The controls have become so strict that even replacing faultyproducts or sending them back to Serbia for maintenance isproving impossible. Crisis Group interview, Serb businessman,Mitrovica, 8 December 2010.134While Pristinas losses from the North stem from a lack ofcustoms collections at Gates 1 and 31, Belgrades losses up until2008 came mostly from goods entering the North tax free andbeing smuggled back into Serbia and sold at reduced prices.135Prices in the North, despite being free of taxes, are higherthan in Albanian stores across the Ibar. Crisis Group has ob-served small items like chocolate bars being some 5-7 euro

cents cheaper in the south; bigger items like washing machinesare up to one fifth cheaper. While south Mitrovica has numer-ous furniture and home appliances stores, the Norths situationis the opposite; the owner of the only home appliance store onNorth Mitrovicas main street told Crisis Group on 8 December2010 that people buy TVs and stoves in either the South orSerbia, and prices in the North are higher because there is nomarket, and those who come here to buy do so only when it isan emergency.136The Kosovo customs service estimated a shortfall of 30million; Crisis Group phone interview, Adriatik Stavilevci,spokesperson, Pristina, 23 December 2010. EULEX customsofficials estimate a weekly loss of 750,000 (39 million per

year). Crisis Group interview, international official, Mitrovica,16 February 2011.137Crisis Group interview, international official, Mitrovica, 16February 2011.


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goods.138 Some everyday items are also cheaper in Northernshops,139 but most are more costly or entirely unavailable.The Northern market is tiny, and retailers lack theeconomies of scale available in Belgrade or Pristina.Worse, smuggling sustains criminal networks on bothsides of the Ibar. If only a fraction of the millions of euros

involved goes to payouts and bribes, it is enough to un-dermine the local economy.

Kosovo Albanians and Serbs cooperate in the trade. Cris