21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 26

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HEADQUARTERS

\ ' . . . X X I B O M B E R C O M M A N D

A PO 284

MISSION 26

T A C T I C A L MISS ION R E P O RPort . and Built-up U r b a n Area.KOBE...JAPAN 4 f FEB..'945



FOREWORD

This ini tiIIITacti cal M~ssion Report

of the XXI B"o.ruberOommand, the first

!1llblished for general distribution"

l.s the report. of the first major

strike employing two Bombardment Wings.

Prior strikes had either been missions

of a nature 1'o.r whioh no formal report

was n e ces sury or efforts by a. single:

Bombo.rdment Wing. whose re-ports ra-

o ai ved l im ite d di st ri bu ti on.

Prepntecl bit

m~Cl."



Fi.eld. or der-s No. 22 Mi.IH.ion No. 26

HEADqUA,RT3RS

XXI BOMBER COMMAND

AP02.34

TACTICAL MISSION REPORT

Te.rget: Port e.ndbull t-UF"urba.n o.raa.,

KOBE. J.il.PAN

4, F ebrue.ry 194.5

Tabla of Contenta

Ta.ctical No.rra.tl ve Repcrt

AnneX A-- Opere:t1ons Repo.rta

Part 1-- Navig~tion

Part II ....Bombard.ier

Part IlI--Flight Engineering

Port IV- Rad,ar

Po..rt V-- Gunnery

Part VI- Air -Seu Rescue

Annex B-- Pllrt I-~Weo.ther

Annex C-- Communications Reports

Po.rt 1-- Raclo;r Counter Meo-sures

Pnrt II ..- COlJ1ll1unicntion's Officer's Report

Annex 0.... Intelligence Reports

P"ort 1-.. Enemy Air Oppoai tien

Part· II- ..EMmy Antiaircraft

Pnrt III-Bombings Results and DBm~geAssessment

Annax E.... CensoUde.ted Statistical SUlI I I I ID.ry

,;.nnex F-- Field Orders



=!'r~":!~~~ ~~ ~~ ':.11 := ;=1 '::1 Z

I:' SECRET II

:IBy ~uth. o r the C.GI!:I XX I Bomb er' COIDmo.nd! ' l: I, "!i .'In'~s I0'-;- I I

:I Do.te Ini tiD.10 II

, H E AD Q UA R T!ilR .S

XX I BOMB En COMMAND

APo.234

SUBJECT: Report of' Opero.t,lons, 4 . Fabruo.ry 19'45.

TO. Commandin!: Ganer!l.l. Twantie th All' For CSt Wash1ngton 2S.

D . c .

1. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Fi,eld Order Number 22, Bsm.dquarters XXIB,omber Com-

mand, dated :31 January 1945, directed the 73rd and '313th Bombard-

ment Wings to PQrtlclpo.ta In the fir,st coordinated o.ttII.ckby t.u

wings of this command on 0. target in Honshu.

b. Targe ts S'EG 'C Hied;

(J:) ' Pr imo.ry Tar get :. Port end buH t-up urbnIl area-

of the city of Kobe: Object.iva folder 90.25Me.p M-9.(2)' Secondary Target: Nons

(:3) Las t ReBort Till"get: Any ind ustr 10.1 cIty.

2 . S T R A T E GY A N D PLAN OF OP E R A T IONS I

a,. Reasons for Selection of Torgot:"

C 1 Y The wao.ther forecast presented to the Cc l l1 tl 8 .nd . .

ing Gener!:!.l on :3 Februo.ry prognostlco.ted tbree. to four-tenths· cloud

covero,ge in the Kobe area, with favo·rable oondi tions en route a.nd at

bases for tg,ke-off' and lo.nd :lng. COnBequently, deo Ls ion was made toatta.ck Kobe on 4 February. This COllUU8.nd had been continually strik-

ing the Tokyo and Nagoya a.rea's and the enemy had possibly ceneen ..

tratad dar enses in these two er eaa, .A n Iltto.ok on Kobe, in addi tiOD

to damo.ging the urban areaa, would possibly force the enemy tosprea.d. his defenses ...-o.1rc.raft and nnt1o.ircrtU't--weakenlng his po..

81tion in the Tokyo and Nagoya e.l"eo.s.

b. lmporta.noe of Ta.rgetl

(1)' Kobe, sixth largest oity in Japan with .:

popula.tion of apprOXimately 1.000, 000, is Japan's prinoipd port.

Ita Shipyards represent Japan's large.st ooncentration of ship-build ...

ing and marine engine oo.po.city. At Kobe, the Sanyo main rail line

from the western tip of Honshujoin8 with the Tak:o.ldo main line west

to Osaka and Tokyo. Key industrial plants. such as steel. railwayequlpment. maohinery. rubber and ordnanCe. are closely integrated

with Kobe's tro.nsportlltion aotivities. A national hlghwe.y, th8 only

nota.bly good road in and out of Kobe, also runs through the oon-

gested seotions of the oity. The o.reo. seleoted for attack: WD .S the

highly congested Core of the otty. ho.ving !'l. popUlation avera.ge o rover 100,000 per sqpare m11e.



«C

< to

l\Io

o.o

c. De.tallS of Plp,nning--Oper o.tiono.l

(l); BombingPlans!

(0.) oetermination of BombLoad.

(1) Because of the h1gh degree of in,..flamm~bllity of the Kobe urban areo., an incendio.ry o.tto.ck was con-Sidered most effect1ve. The E-28. 500 poundincend1ary (Haster(o.ctuo.l weight. 3.50 Ibs.)' WaS selected bac euse it is the best o.vo.ll-able incendl(\ry weapon. The T4.E4, 500 pound fragmentation. cluster

(actual weight. 42.0, Ibs.) WaSused as an anti-personnel we!l.pontohinder potential fire fighters. thus increasing the effectiveness

of the incendi!l.ry attack.

(2) Incendiaries were fused to open

o.t. SOQ ! ! ) feet becouse the best po.tterns are obtained .from tho.t 0;1-

titude. Fragmentation olusters were fused to open 1000 feet below

the o.ircraft for the eo.mereasons.

(3) Intervo.lometer settings of 500

feet (or mllXlmumpossible under pred.icted winds) were used to give

proper spread to individulll incendic.ry bombs in each te.q;eto.reo..

Prop'sr density of bombs Was obt~lned through number of aircrnft bomb-

ing in eueh f ormo.tion.

(4) A mixed lond insured even d1s-tribatlon of' f'ro.gment~tion olusters and inccmdinrles on the target.

The fro.gmentlltlon olusters were loaded to drop last bac::l.USShe &0-

tu~l range for the f'ro.gmento.tlon· bombs Was less than tb.nt for In-

cend Iary bombs o.ml it W!LS desirable tha.t the fro.gmento.tion banb

.pattern coincide with the incendiary bomb pattern.

NOTE: The entire mission was planned in ace rdo.nee with

the AhF Boara Report 'Incendiary Attack on Jnpanese

Cities~' dated 1 Sept. 1944. Only devintioDS In pl~lng

were those necessito.ted by opero.tiono.l l1mlto.tions nnd

o.Vo.ilability of nircraf't.

(b)' Bombo.rdiert s Planning;

(1' Tako.tuski was originally selected

0.8 on initial paint, but enchange in foreCast wind direction from o .n

cwere.ge of 260 degrees to 292 degrees necessito.ted a change to Otau

1n order to cut down excessive drift on the bomb run. The upwind

approach Wo.sused because the lower ground speed. n8 contrasted with

0. downwind run, ~llowed the bombardier more time in the 1mmedio.te

target vicinity for Qcc~rate synchronization.

(2)' Since the objective was ILno.reameo.sured. in miles, vulnerable nreo.s a'OO~by 4.000 teet ~re selec-

ted. The designnted approaoh, QXis of attack of 318 degrees. w n sused so that the formo.tion would be on the longtltudlno.l o.x1s of the

selected areas. Four aiming pOints, clenrly discernible to the

bombardiers on the 316 degree nxis of attaok, were designated so as

to cover four vulnerable areo.s, indico.ted on XXI Bomber COJIIIIandLitho-Mosaio No. 90.25 as 0 56 11 5, 0 71 12 3, 09213& and 119188.

(3) The strength of the atto.ak on tlwnecessary o.xis of attack Wo .B not believed to be great enough to a o o a a -

plis~ destruction of incendiary zone I (reter to appended ino&Dd1~

- 1'-

.II.',:



+ +. & . . .

+

+ + +

+

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+ 0+

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-=ne map ot'K'ob£l). C-en!i:1Q,erati<:no£ W",dlcted nigh winds e.nd lntel'-

valo!!leter!lettln~ tndtl)di-t.ed' 'the b'omb patte.rn of a squadr:on -'' 'ould

oover anru'ee: II.PPl'o.xlmately 1700 by 3500 fee·t~Consequently. to ob-

tain maximumde~t.,ructlont the e££ort II.g!l.lnst e-aeh !;I;imtng point was

d.latr 1buted !lS .f ollowa;. 0561"15I :3 3~ndr'ons; 07Tl2:!i I 2 squad rona;

092132, 2 squ.,!ldrons, and 119126.3 IiIqu.adrons. This placed the sf-

1'ort801' 5 sque.dronarea.Bonably concentrO;ted in the large area westof the main TIl..Uro(l.dstatlon o.rulflve sqy.ndrons les,s concentrated in

the long narrow ar en to the west. .

I j t lVig;o. ti.on P1o.nnlng i

Route,Bnae

1700N ..' 140008

2900N ... 135458

Ransone forCholc e

"i.ng d.epo.rture point.

A we ster1y course a: t low a1ti tude to utili Z6

most favora.ble winds in clim;b o.nd prevent slow

groun,d speed resul tlng fro.m excessive hand winds.

3328N .. 1354.sE Center of peninsl.l.1ll.,. allowing leeway for lUlv1-

gat 1on er ror on ei ther sid e of COW' sa.

3431.N .. l3S23E(xp)

Ea.sily identified radar n.nd visual cbeck polnt

on the ,oo:Q.st.

A s-Gut'hea.steI'1I:y o'olH'se to bue to utili ze t.e.!1Wli la.,

2:300N - 145coB; A sou'ther!l.y route ciose to the northern Wo.ri:MC.S

'f!~tlld!1rt!b'(;k pollfU as well OJ I a tool reter.ence po.i.nt .1 '0 '1 ' ditched alrcraft.

(3) Flight Eng1noer's Planning;

(a.)' Flight plan, speeds and altitudes 1I'Sl'e

UBed as outl1nedin XXI Bomber Command Regulat.ion No. 55-3 to obta.in

maximum fuel economy •.

(b) Fuel requirements were enlaulo.ted for an

a.vero.ge aircra.tt flying the worstpoaition in the formntion with

o.nticipo.ted wind conditions. The fuel consumption estimc.te ind!-

catedthe best safe minimum bomb land wniS 6,000 pounds. However, this

wnsreduced to 5,000 pounds tor the 313th Bombo.rdment Wings inC. this

Was their first lo.rge-aca.le opera. tion Clnd on extra fuel load nil

deemed desirable in 00.1313 of errors which would lengbten. plo.nned fly-ing time.

(4) Rader Plg.nnin.g I L!lllllf'all on the southern oonst-

lin.e of Honshu a.t Knshillloto Ilnd no.vigation north to the oOll.8tl1ne

ini tlalpoint of Ot.su provided excellent ro,dar oheok po1.nts. The

in1 tieJ. point wOl.lld be oleo.rly visible on the scope o.nd the upwing

run o.t 318

0

could be Ilcoomplished with 11 ttle or no drift. The tor-getltself would show up fI.8 D . long na.rrow return, with a defIn1te

br1ght return showing just southwest of the center of Kobe. Use at'" defInite wa.ter-la.nd radar oontrast made fo·r ea.sy identlfloo.tion o rmming point. whether for visuill or radar bombing.



(5) Radar Counter Mea-auresI A divers ionOoryIltto.okWa. .B not deemed neoessOorybecuuae of the diV'ersiona.TYo.BpeotBof theselected route to Kobe. Counter me c.aur-e Oogo.instenemy ro.dor con-trolled antiairoraft were not oonsidered BincEiintense a.ccurOotefire from Buch controlled wellpons WOoSot expected.

(6) Air-Sea Rescue Plo.nningt,

• (a.) The Na .vy WOoSurnished with the deto.lls of

the mission and requested. to furnish o.vallo.ble facil1ties foro.1r-

sea. r escue purpose~. The following fo.cl11t1es were made ava11a.ble.(See Annex A, Put VI. for Air-Sea'Resoue ma.p).

(1) Twosubmarines were diverted from their

routine patrol o.gninst Japanese shIpping c.ndwere stationed as

follows during and ofter the mission until released by Super-Dumbos: 310 30'N .. 1350 45'E u n a 30°00' N .. 13801S'E.

(2) One patrol ~estroyer waS directed to

the following positions On the following time SChedule: 22°00' N-141030' E from 0~2$45Z to 040100Z and to proceed to 22°00' N-l'~o

Jor E from 041030Z to 041400Z.

(3) TwoDumboairpla.nes ware a.ssigned tothe following stations for air-sea r asoue work during tbe mission:

2.2°50' N - 140000' E from 04003.0Zto 0402:5,OZ,a.nd 22°00' N _ 14200 t E

from 032300Z to D4020CZ.

(4.)PIcket boat s and cra.sh boats were ass-

igned to the lmmedill.te vicinity of Sa.ipo.n and Tinion to enrry out

A-ir -&teo. ze aeue work during the critical periods of tak6.~f o.nd

landing as follows: a. picket boat in Saipan channel 2CGOZ to

032Z30Z and 041100Z to 0415COZto guo.rd 6970 kes •• IUld 0. cra.sh

bont of~ west end of Tinill.n north strip 0411COZ to 0415 O Z to

guaz-d 6970 kc s ,

(b) This command a.ssigned 2 Super-Dumbo ~ir-

planes (8-29's;) to orbit subma.rine position 31030'N_136o45'E to

assist in spotting, receiving distress signals, drop emergency

equipment. o.ndd1:rect the subma.rines in event o.ir-see. rescue fo.ci-

litles were reqUired. T he Super -Dumbos were instruoted to release

submo.ritlas to routine patrol duties when all planes ho.d pc.ssed

e n route back to base.

c . Details of Planping--Intelligence

(1) EnemyFighter Reaction: K be. which foIls

within the Kure-Nagoya region for purposes of enemy fighter ana-lysis, has o.n estim ..ted 3,02 eneau o.1rcro.ft in its a.rea.. and !lssu.ming

70 per cent would be opera.tional, 211 a.ircro.ft would be a.vail~b1e

for the enemy's defense system. This fl\otor plus pe.st experience

indica.ted enemy air oppositi~n would be no ~ore than normal for an

operation in the Kure-N~oya. nrea nnd selection of target, route.

a.ltitude, and time of bombing WaSnot affeoted by enemy fighter

rea.ction oonsider~tions.

(2) §new IIl1tldrcro.ft I A heo.ding of 310 to

330 degrees would bring the o.tta.oking aircraft into range of the

Kobe-Osaka. defenses for the lea.st o.mount of time sinoe the approach

WaSOver Oso.ka.Bay. Furthermore, winds were such tho.t this hend1D&

could be used without experiencing excessive drift •

.~-JJ.Q.B!l



3. EXECUTION:

u, Take-Oft: The first group of the f.3rd Wingwas scheduled to tQke off at 0322l0Z nne'.he first of the 313thWing ~t Oa2255Z. Actual tuke-ofr wns accomplished as follows!

Aircraft First Last

Wing Airborne A ir cr af t T ak ec ff alrcro.!'t Takeoff

73.rd 72 032056Z 032137Z313t.n ~ 032129Z 032155~

Total 110 032056Z CZ-2155ZNo assembly diffioulties were experi €Incd by ai ther 'wing.

b. Route Out: The Bemb ar dmerrt, 'I1ngs'formationsmade landfall within 10 miles of the briefed point on Honshu. withthe exception of the SOOth and 504th Bombo.rdment Groups. Navigat-ional error--failure to estimate correctly turn position prior toClimb and compensate for increased velocity of crass winds exper-ienced in the climb to bombing altltude--resulted in the SOOthBombardment Group mak L n g bndfd1 50 miles eaa t of the briefedcourse. Consequently, this group was UMble to r ench Kobe beocuaeof the strong he ad winds on 0. due westerly course, whioh mc.de f orexcessive fuel consumption, and the formation turned eastward tobomb Mo.tsuauko.. a last resort t~rget. The 504th Bombnrdment Groupovercorreoted to the west and Was [l;bout30 miles west of briefed

course at landfall. However. because the group was flying on a

d ow nw in d h ea di ng , it was able to bomb the assigned objective.

c. PI"imN'Y T.?U;ot: F "r mo .t i~ ns e r r i!ri3d in'thetarget o.reo.an o.vero.geof 40 minutes late becQuse of wind velo-

c iti es g re o. te r t ho .n f or ec o.s t. T he a ir cr o. ft o .t to .c ke dt he t ar ge t

in seven formo.tions. with 5 formo.tions of 49 o.ircre.ft--9 to 10aircraft per formatiQn--dropping on the leaders who bombed by

radar and 2 formations of 20 aircraft dropped on leaders wbo bombed

visually. From 5/10 to 6/10 strata-cumulus cloud and several thin

layers of cirrus clouds between 23.0GG and 30,000 feet were exper-

ienced in the tnrget area. Atotnl of 69 B-29's dr op ~e d 159.2 tons

of incendio.ry clusters nnd 13.6 tabs of fro.gmento.tlon clusters on

Kobe from 24,500 to 27.000 feet from 04C557Z to 040656Z. (See

Annex E, Part I,Consolicuted Statistico.l Summary, for details.)

Dnmo.ge assessment report; stnte 2,651,000 square feat were dDJn:.l.gedin tha target Qreo..

d. Secondnry Target: None nssigned.

e. Lnst Resort Target: One formntion of 15B-29' II: of the SOOth Bomb:::.rdmentGroup bombed Mntsuukfl. for the

reasons given above in paro.gro.ph lb. Fourteen other B-29's bombed

other last resort targets. Atotfl.lof 69.4 tons incendl~ry clus-

ters rund 5.8 tons fragmentntion clusters were jropped by 29 B-Z9's.

(For details see Annex E, Part I, Consolldnted Stntistico.l Summnry).

f. Targets of Opportunity, One B-2S returningearly dropped 2.6 tons incendiary clusters and 0.2 tons rr~men-tation clusters on Pagrun islBnd.



g. Route Ilo..ck: Ai'tar bombfng, formationsbroke up beyond enemy fight"'r l:'o.ngeC l n e ! retu..rned 0.:; briefed, uti-1izing s ta.rs Ilnd pI anats dW ing the Ills t 3 hour II of' fli ght. The'

nQrth~"rn M«rlo.ho.s were also utilized as radn.r oheck poInte, oae

B.zg of the 73rd Bomba.rdmentWing, whan 1t ran out of fuel 12 milesfrom Silipun aft",r· suffe,r:lng b;:).tle damllga 1n the Kobe oxell, waG forOad

to ditch. The"-pi:l'ot··he.dHbe an killed. pr 10rto ditc hi ng • The r ema.ln-ing ten crew members were picked up by air/sao. rescue.

h,Landing:' .Aircro.ft Io.nded o.t baaes undergood wea,thsr conditions ns follows:

Numbar Aircraft Firs t .Land lng Lo.st LIUl,dlng

73rd. Wing

313th Wing

Total

71

. . . l . .§_

109

041104Z

041225Z

0413D2Z

041:n1Z

One' ai r-craft of the 73rd Bombo_rdm.entWing hud its number 1 e'ngine

c~tch fire and th", o.lrcra;f't burned aft~er la.ndin.!l;!l.t Saipe.n. Itw~s cIaSGified as HL0st to survey.~

1 .. Operlltiona Summary;

(1) No.vlgo.ti on: (Sea Annex A. Pa.rt I for

details). Winds Vlere 30 knots more than predicted and the ne.v1gnt~ion problem was pr Imar lly one of proper drift correotion in the

cltmbphase on the route out. The ne,ed for inorea.sed training end

diSCipline in tht', l use of ro.da.r eqUipment in the target area. as 11

lJ;avigutiono.l aid was i.ndica.ted since groups .f'c.ile~ to f'ly directly

Over the initial point daspi ta its eas.ily c.istinguisbable br igbt

return on the scope.

(.2:) Bomblng: (See Annex A•. Part II. for

detal.1a). The majorIty of bomb runs and relea.ses were accomplished

byra.dar w.ith short vLsunl checks. Errors in bombing lfereattrI ...

butable to both personnel und equipment mnll'unotlon.s. The mest

prevalent personnel error Wus the Lack ofalr c..iscipline. The use

of l'ad10 bomb reI eo.ses woul d help this si tun ti on. &overc.l m:ll-

functions of the A-2 r e.Lease system neceas ito.tec! so.lvoing of bombs.

(3) Fli~ht Engineering: (See Annex A.Po.rt III ror details). Becaus 9 of unexpeO ted head wInds. more tIme

was to.ken. to rench planned al ti tude at the' t!lrget, thus using an

o.vero.ge 0 . 1 " ' Il?p.roximately 350 more gallons of' gascline ~er drcrc.rt

than. planned. B-29 A' a were employed for the first time by this

commo.ndand due to the smnl Ler center wing seetle-h, these nirernft

operate on 200 gallons less fuel. On future missions, these o.lr~

planes were to be gl ven more udvo.ntngeous p osi ti ona in the for-ma.tions.

(4) Ra.d!U': (See Annex 1.., Part IV for detllils)

AN /.APQ-13 eqUipment WIlS used for target 1U'6U no.vigo.tlon. wind

determination nnd a.pproach for visu!'t.lo.nd rada.r bombing. Employ ...

ment of SCR 718 radio 0.1timeter nnd SCR-69S IFF equipment wn.8 normal.

Fixes W<3retaken using ;"W'APN.4 equipment. ;,. majority lfere at a.

range between. 8(.'0 to 900 miles.

(5) Gunnery: (See Annex A. FartV for

deta.il e ); GUnners showed improvement in controlling their bursts.

I:lsing the interphcne. and designating their targets •

.. is ~



-(6) M" ...6" S:?jC'g'l (SSie l . n n . ~ . ~ . Fut. 'VI l"r ci6to:l1!{)'. oib 8-29 d,ttldhed.· DoippMximlttoly 12 lillIe. -trOll

Sa..ij ll ;Ul.. The ten ehWm_~:iJ _n:pl.~ked ! 1 p by t.lr/II"'" r•• <J!le

~<:ta1.1 i.tf..)'i.

Ir., ~,., . g.Weath#£l. (S·!ul'~QxB, Ff!l"t ,I retr d..tdl.'.tl ).e>- ttig.t-e.-r aa h a : . d - 0. E;i/IO 'to. 6 /1 08 01 t dr ;: 1I ,1 Xil 11 ue 0101111 bpd1ci l at 14 ,

l•. POC't:eot 'W1thhp-a at 16, .00 '"1; !ut a.S C(1)tru~.!l~·dth >t.bef(lT~'"

. _ r - : o£ '3/1 b to ' 4/1Q' clou:d. eO'9ler-~"e~' '«ind,s OTer the -to.rget v.a1ell-f-I"Qia--~ 'e

290 - d e .~ . \: ;. I! o . • i4:5 klil::nte to' 260 i1egrfl;s. lao '!Coote. ....eo.the"J'roon:dltidJal..., _?-'t"bo.,Sft. f'dr., the tcll:.e...o f ' : ( . " end 1•• Ung were good.

-:

,I ~ •.• .b,.· Oc·I!l!l!!Efcp t1.oM !,

. - '• , ," . ~ 1) . R -a.dllJi' QO!.l,ntef. »t!§ureg I, {S'-H Annex C.

Flirt '1 ·.for de:tdb}. FeuI' ROMse-o.Z'c-hn1.r~rnft, ea-ch.with one R e m -Qib:f1tlT.-vdr.partie: ipElto d- 'i'l'l. th.! o I ! I :m i s..siO'n.. Soar ch- wa's mo.de for enl!lnw

EllfraF!Wa.rn1ng Ra.!iM- E:Oqui'Pm~~tun'til the Jno.inl!Uld WeJJ rea.ched, lfhere

sli'.lJ"l'~h.~'lQll.am a d e £0';11 , o c a ~,nd GL ,TI1!infB and ~elJfY fighter pO'mm.unico.t-io:ns channels. AtO'to.1 of 51 ra.dal' signals we.s logged a.nd 3 enemy

VHF vo1Ce tra.n,smilil.!lions were recorded.

(2) Cemmunications: (See Annex C. P!1rt I1fer details). All strikli: ~~q.qenefes were jammedor interfered

with a.t d1ffe, rent periods during tha mb slon. The percentB.gebreakdown O'f tra.ff1c par frequency follows: 45 pel" cent en 3145

kilocycles; 28 per cent on 11060 kilocycles. and 27 per cent on

6055 kllocyc Le s , Radi.o s11ene e was maintained to the target andovero;ll security W(l.S ge1d.•' "_:,'_;'_~ ; , : _ ::o . _ _ ~ _ ' ~, r . e,,~...L ~).. r _ " ~ ......-

_,L " ;"":~._" t·, lri.tel;J,,:I;gence summary :

(1 )F'rO'mRGM interoep ts o.nd the pre S9nee

of' pacer airoraft, l.t iL:li&l t,ell7ed"1:;hnt >the" eneIllY' had¥ ee.rly pdor

wara1-n-g - 0 ' 1 ' the.. attack !l-n:dwas a:b1 :e to· Iilert hi s :" d&feneea., -

~" . . (~)Enemy 'Air Opposition: (See Annex D,

Fort "I ,fer de'tails).· Ehemy-n.ir cppos,l t-1on 1m.S strong. with e.n

eatlmnted 205· ;enemy e:i·rcrllf't. making 273. attacks... Using averages,ea.cb 8..29 Bustnl ne d 2. 8 Q. ttaoks t whi 0: h is I as s then that $JtpBr-

Lenced on prev.1ous m,is.i!o.n.a.i.._._:_-Each.l-a:po.nese fighter IIlade 1.3 atta.oks.

which i.s a.bout normal. One per cent of the B..29 force WIll> dee ..

trO'yGdo.nd 12 pSI' cent 4 ' l lD l b , g d : . . ' b ) l ! . .. . J Q . : 9rlnoae : .r1gb_t~r-s. ;l'ojos. and

Tanya: made 51 per:. c.ent of 011 attacKs. The nes e o.ttack stUl pre-

domlllf1:.ted as· the ,enemy' B ,fnvo·rl te",be1ng used in 61 pel' cent ot' the

o.ttllcks.A bI'aakdown of aP&lroQ.Qhitactios &howed 41 p&rctmt for

approa,che.s. £'rem below; 25 pel' cent frO'm above. o.nd 34 - par cent

level. FIve coordino.ted o.tto.cks were reported. Some Tony', Tojo.

a.nd Nicks wore obsernd. to lower their lo.ndlng geo,f' prior to o.tta.clc.

possibly to redu.ce spe~d and imp.rove e.pproaoheffect.lveneU. A

few eT,Ie~yairoraft met the B-29'. at sea and trailed the forma.t-iona, probo.bly communi.oo.tlng with their nntia.lrcro.tt nnd fighter

controllers.

(3) Ant1o.1rcro.rt: (See Ann.x J), Port II

tor deto.lls). There were no lOlilses to nntIa1rorc..ft, but 21 a-ap'lI Ior 3C per Gent of the o,tto.Ok1Dg toroe, sutfered ba.ttle dmage.

J.ntla1roratt the was no deterrent trom landta.ll to the torget aEld

trom to.rget to' lc.ndt a e'nd. OVer the tnrget. accura.te, raodero.te to

intense fire through the overoa.at was experienoed by all formo.t1oM.

One o.lrcraft Observed. fl. pho spbcr-oua burst. deaerthad o.a • 'fib 1t.

umbrello.-shaped pa.ttern.' in the lobe area. The burst was approx-

iJno.tely one mUe to the rear or the reporting airoraft.

- . , -



(4) B011loi.ngRs.s,ul ts ",n-'. DI".l1lCl.ge;,8ses sme·n't·~

(See Annex D• I'nrt III f(1T '\e.tr.ils). i'hotoip.terpretuti'1'n ofi'hoto RGC()nn"isn.n.oc Unit photosobt""ine don 5th :lnd 6th Fobrur,ry.

1945, showert vis iole :l~_m[\gecovGring 2.651. CCC s qunr"re e't. The

three. ilJr.?orto.nt industrid~ te;rg_sts in the n.reC'. were ~laj"ilage·da s

follows:

Tnrget 169, Mltaubishi Her'LvyIn"lustri:3s, Ltd,. --J,,,,p1'ox1-

mo;tely 68,0(,[ s·qu('.ref'eet ( 2 p e.r cen.t ) 'lI: the p1D:nt wn,s ~eatroyEia.Tar 6ei>.786". Knnognfuchi Sock ..In.~lustry--;,p~roximnte ly

820,0(.(. aquur e feet ( 49 per C.ent ) of the :;>1nt Wt'.S destroyed.

T(\1" get 11,. Knw(',saki Locom,",tiva ..nne.. Ca. r CO!!l;luny--j,pproxi-mntsly 22, COCaquo.re res't of roof nr ea We.s destroyed.

In (l.ddition. miscell::.neo\J,.s dnmnge cnountillg to o.}?proxi-

mate ly 1, 741.(,0(' s quc.I''S l'eat wns sus tc.i ned bysmo.l I indull tri e s

Clnd housing nnd bus;Lnssa dLstricts centere::'!. o.bout the th1'eetnrg;ets

1sted abo ve ,

// - r-V'.Jf f' I (,I 'r', t;'/-}}/"C UR TIS E l.L EM AY 'I.

Major Ge·nerr..l, u.S.}..

Oommanding

- 8. -

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A NNE : {

A

OPE R ..;T ION S R E POR TS

Exhibit .. Trr.ck Chnrts

Part I -Nc.vlgr.i.torJ It RCJ?~.rt

Part III .. Flight Enc,1n<3ol'~1l Report

p~t IV ...Ro.dllJ"01'tl0·er"R"i'ort

Exh1b1t..A1I'..Seo. Res.Qo.e~ap

Mission No. 26

4 . Fobruc.ry 1945

SECRET. _ , - ~ - . . . -- - - _ . . . . . . . .- - - - _ . - - - _



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qPERATIONS. REPORTS

PART_l I'" .NAVIGATORS R E P O R T

1. Na.vigation on this m19sio'n 'W11$ mainly !I. problem of making

proper dr.1ft correction in the climb. phase. Three groups of the731"dWing made l.e.ndfdl 11.5 brlefed.with the navigator applying. aproper additional left correction to compensate for the :liO.knot in-crease 1npred.l.o ted windve 1eci ty. yetro winds werese t1ma.teda t

290/130 knots D..ndexp e.rie.need a.t 270/160 knots.

2. T.b.e500tb Group 0 . 1 ' t.he73,rd Wing made landf'all 50 m11eseast of course. the inltlCLl error baving been m.ll.dein the first

phas til of the f'li ght b et'.o.rSl· tho. climb phase. The lead navi ga:tor t 8

estimated position of turn lfas30 ml1eseo..stof' the briefed turn.o .t 2900N ... 1354.58. Not being awareof' h1aerror in posl t101\. the

navlgo.tor IlIAdeoo1".reotion on the !I.ssumption he WD;S on the briefed

route. Hill .1'io0.1 lo.ndtall error WaS 0. combino.tion Gt' the inl tisl

er,ror and o.faUure to correot .1'or the increased velocity of' the

cross ..rind BJq)erlenced In the climb.. H1srada.r AN..APQ-13 gave

poor roturns, lUld the nc,v1.go.tor failed to observe his error in

suf'f'ic'1ent time to nw.ke' the necessary correction to ilie briefedle.ndfallpoint. Upon dj.s!cove.ry of hie error,the formation lea.der

!ltte.mptod to reach Kobe,but th.G excessive head wind on the due

'W9ster:ly course necessary to reach the targe,t resulted in exeee ...ive f l l 'Ql .c ooaa.umptio.n a.nd the f'ormation turned ao.st\'la.rd nnd bombed

the 10.st resort target.

3. The 3.l3th Bombardm.ent Wing l'Iflvigation was good. consider ..

ing the oxcessivElwll'ld proble'm EI.xpGrience,don its first o'psro.tionnl

mission, No..vigators in. the S04.th Group overcorrected to the "West.

Na.vigation errors to the west Can be easily oorrected on c. down

wind heading, but errors to the east make correction.s to the initial

polnt, impossible because of excessive' headwinds.

4. The 504th Group me.de landfa.ll 30 miles west o r course o.nd

corrected to the in1t10.1 point. The 50Sth Group mude landfo.ll 10

milaswest of bri.efed poi.nt.

S. Navigo.tl.on in the to.rget o.reo. Wtl.S made wi tb the AN.APQ-13.

Crews were still not nm.king proper use ·o f this equipment for the

preols10n n"vig&tion. neoessl;U'y in target D.reo.s.. The initio.l point

wo.e eaSily d.istlngulsha.ble on the ro.dlir soope, but groupsfo.iled

to po .SB directly over it as br.ief'ed,. A progrrun has been instituted

to give increa.sed turn nnd target :tro.ining to o.ff'setthe bnndioe.ps

of high wind velOCitIes,

6. The 313th Wing ori tic !zed mission planningo.nd expressed

the desirefo·r 0. down wind run. The high r'ate of closure with

ground speeds up to 500 MPHwith the ccnsequenb shortening of time

tor to.rgG.t ide.ntlflco.tlon. bombsight. and re.d8.Tadj.us"baents mue

upwind runs necessary on ..11 tnrgets. except In Oases ..here the

probo.biHty o r flak: druDa.ge outwelgbJ the o.ddl tional possibility ofincreased bombing D.ocuru.oy. Critic Ism lrO.lI al. so lI1!lde of the dog

legs to Q.I1dfrom the tArget. 1118110n8 ere planned to utilize the

winds on all routes. During the olimb phase. 11 northerly helldlng

cuts d:-wn·ltb.G' eff.,)ct of' wGiiterly he.::.d··wIf1d:s. A'southwes:t;erl·,·

he_cl.~ o~ ...~ route" home iocrec.ses the ground ~Bad a.nd cotwlJ.ly

dImInishes thatoto.l time r lewn.





PART III. - FLIGHT ENGINEER'S REPORT

A. COIll!ll~nt8onoruis~ control during th() mission o.re asf011owst,

1. I , t O W , Al ti tude erni se,r

(0.) 'l'h~ low e.Ll tudo crulaato the point of climb rill·

q,uired o.pproximntely 6« hours or 10 minutes lass tho.n plllnned fer

both th.a 73rd. and 313th Wl.ngs. whi.ch indlcntl:lB tbt\t pro.ctically no

unexpGcted wind oon<lltions were e,ncountered on this leg of the

flight plan.

(b ) The powers etti ngll req u1r ad o :t tbe B tt\l't o£ tha

inlthl.l cruise wers normnl for the 73rd Wing. However. some &.11 ' -

pI una s of' the 31!3th W:I..ngrequ:l.1'6dnu to 1 ' : 1 . ch power settings for the

fir st half hour dUl':l.ng naBembly. Subsequentpowerse ttlngs were

normal.

2. G1:I.mbtcBombing Altitude, The time for climbwll.S

Ilpproximo.tely 75ml.nutes, 0.5 planned; neither wi.ng required rntea

power satti.ngs te > lllD.1nto.:l.nthe formation.

3. Cruise at !:lombing Altitude:

(a) Beciluse of unexpected helld winds, both wings Silent

o.pproximo.tely 77minute.s at bombing altitude pri.or to rellch1ng the

target. This Was 30 minutes longer than pIe._nned, ond cauee d the

conswnption of on Ildd1tiona.l 350 go.llons of fuel per a.1rCJ"t'l't.

(b) Pewar settings for both wings in "this cruise C U l d A i

on the bo.mbing run were as predicted. In no instance WIle; more tbrul

ro.tedp_ower necesso.ry to mainto.in forma.t.ion posi tion .•

4. Re_turn . :E Base I Good tail w1nds aided considerably 1n

sa;vlng fuel eri the return to base. The two types of l i lE l .Ximwn. range

return procedures employed ... Constant Letdown and Righ Al tl tudeBest Wind .. worked equally well.

5• Genero.l Gomme.nts;

(I).) Th1s misSion. was axtremelysucoe.ssful from the

. . t nT.u :WC!in t of flight. eng1n.eering.. The only dev1c.tlon from the pre-

dicted 1'1l~1 .ootlBul!lPt;1on w a G oo.\1sod byunexpeotec! high o.l tl tude Yind

condItions.

(b) B-2~A' s ware employed for the first time by thh

Commo.nd. Due to the5mal1er center wi.ng seotion. these olrcro.i't

operate on 200 ga.llons loss tllel. On futqre missions, these air-

pla.nes were to be given the more advo.nto..g,eousposi tions in the for-

ma.t1ons.

PAR T IV .. R ADAR OFfmElt's REPPR t

1. Re.diU' Emplovmen'b

1. A N I APQ...13 Blbd Bombingt

- :5 -



(a) The ra,dnr- eqllipm~:mt wa.s used for target area.

no.vlga.ti.on •. wind determination. and rndal'

a.ppro[l.Ch to vi sued, bcmbd ng a.nd-complete rll.dll.1'

bombing .•

(b ) Radar was emp1eye d by 5 le!lod a1rcro.f t.wi ttl. 44

dropping on them .•

2. sea ne (RadioAl tlroeter): Employment W!l.S norm.o.l.

3. A N I .APN~4:,Fixes were taken at Il. tlm;XimUIn of 1000 miles,A mnjorlty ra.nged between eOO-900mHes, with one ftx bat.ng nt 1400

miles.

4• s e a -695 (IFF)I Em p1oym.e:nt'I1l.S normal.

2, ~ .Egui.pment. Pel'i'orma.nce j

(el.) 71 A le were ro,de.r equipped.

(b) 61 A le reported ro.dnr opero.tion so.ttsi'actory

ror bombing,

(a.) 38 Ale were rade.r equ;lpped..

(b) 21 A/ereportCId .radar opera.tion satisf'e,ctory

for bomclng.

(0) 7 N e with radea-were aborted Ale . Two were due

to radar malfuIiction.

3. Malfunctions:

6lo. AN/APQ-13.:

(1 ) Two: N o signalS a.t altitude.

(2) One: Inoper!l.ttve on return, no data.

(3) One: Lowcrystal and trn.nslIlltter current.

(4) Three: Tro.nsmitter current cut out,

(5) O n e : No ~ e e p

(6) Three: No signo.ls.

(7) a n a : Til tmeoho.nism stuck.

b . WAPB-4 ,

(1) One: N o s i g n a . l s ,

(2) One I Unsteo..dy inverter v o l t a . g a •

o. SCR-US I O n e Altimeter fa1lure,

d. Sg§..S95I O n e IFF reported out.

- ~ . .



§. .!LQ!L§.1

PART V - .GUNNERY OFFICEll.'S REPORT

1. The mission f rol11. the gunn.ery attl:lldpo1n.t Wo,shlghlyauc-cesa.tu1• The O.F. C. ays tam Wo.s98% opel' 0.t1 ve and the ma.ohine guns"Were 97% ope,ro.tive. Gunners bego.n to show remarko.ble, improvement

in eontr'o11ing their burets, use of the intarphene, and target dea-igna'tion. The enemy was still usi.ng '0. ro,inbow of' colors with nc

de!' ini te p o.ttern o,!, oolor scheme in the mo.rking of thair niroro.f't.

They respected.!l

tight i'ormationand .oro not .o.ggressive o.go.i.netSUCh 0. f'ormntien. E! A still f 0.V'orthe nose attl),Ck from ten to two

0' clockf'rom hi,gh. ,levelilDd below, It ~s noted on thl s mission

tha.t Tonys. Tojos o.nd Nicks were the predomlnan't aircro.f't., These

three types of E V A were reported by gunnery observe,re of the 73rd

Wl,ng as letting their geo.r .down.possibly to slow down the 1"o.te of

oloslU'G or to af d furthe·r their r,o.lII!Dingo.ctlcs, lrvint;s were met

,5 0 mfLes from 1ll.ndl'c.1l and were evidently rela.ying infoMl!:ation to

AA bo.tter1G1l on our o.ltitUde. airspeed. and direction of flight.

73rd.Wlqg 313th Wing

.. , 50 cal, Ammunition

Expendi ture 66.000 rds. 46,.000 rds 132,000 rds,

b_ Opl3ration G,F.G.System 9a% 98% 96%

o . O}'leratlon used

50 c1l1. M,G. n% 97% 97%d . Guns loaded Cold Ho t

3. Enemy 0.1r opposi.tion (See Annex D .~ Intelligence reports

for detail s),

PMT VI - AIR-SEA R ESCUE R EPOR T

A .summary of tho ditching incident occurring on this misSion

ronows:

a. J..ircraf't 42-24629. call sign9V607 - 73rd Bombarement 'nng.was ditched on route to baae ,

(1) First messc.ge received by this headquo.rters at 041506,

" ' M e 42-24629 ditched o.pprox1mlltaly 12 roUes from Snlptm on !l benring

of 3.30 deg. Wing Super-D.umb0 Cyclone 22 (A2U). eye lone 2l CU)

circled ditched aircraft until relieved by Naval DUlIlbo."

(2) Second messo.gG recoi ve d D .t 041543. ·Ten (10) survivors

rescued from ditched o.ircro.ft 9V60T."

comment: The rescue 1'n.oi1i.ties o.vo.ilo.ble for this mission were on

course, but it is believed had this ditching occurred north of Iwo

Jimo.·. the possibil1ty ,.,1' effeoting rescue would hnve baen remote,

(See Air-Seo. Rescue mo.p en fonowing po.ge).



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I \'C li'.J I!I 'lE R R E :P OR T

Co lL.. This operation. \".'as planned on a. :f!orec.ast li!resented to the

collJlnB.nding Ge.reraL OL l :3 February 19.45. Three to four tentbs cloudt verage was forecast for the target area. TI:le route was tt>reaast

o have ol;oodweather with a \leak £rant 1D e r-ose , and the bases "ereex 'J ;lect"3d to have good v:eather tbrou,Bhout the day.

:t. ~. Tbe bases at take-.off had tub tsn.t hs cumulus 'iii th bases e.t. .

lfteen. hundred £eet and tops a.t six thousand feet. Visib:i.l.ity was

:fti'teen. miles. These conditions ];!1'e"lllsiled to nineteen degrees north

Where cloUd cover increased to ~ tell).tbB am sc.attered showers were

<:tncountered, reducing v.isibility to t'ilO miles.. From this "Zoneto

t,:"enty three degreos north there \7aS five tenths stratocUJlUl.g.a v.i. tilaJ.X tel:itths al.tocumu1.us based at twelve thou.sarIL :i!ee'lt. E,eitr>ieen twonty:fl:bUl!'egmss and tt"lenty ~ht degreos north a frontal "Zonauas en-

cOllJ:intGred<7ith overaast cumulus a.ni strs.tocumu.l.us· clouds=. Ceil...in.&l

were tv{elve hundred feet. lovrering to five hundred taet in shOfters.

Eight tenths altostratus was Jjlrosent in this area "dith b.ases at twel-m

thousand feot and a c i.1'roo tx:at:u.s over cnst was prese nt at thirty

thousand feet. Visibilities ill this area 'iieI'e a.bout e i~ht miles,

dropping to a mile in sho'lera.. From twenty E l i . ght degrees nortb to the

target tbere was five tenthS cumulus based at . th:aee thousand feet

,1ith tops at eight thous.and :freet.1 !tour ten111S altostratus ba.sed at

fifteen thCl:lBand feet ard ··Qight ten1h s cirrostratus at thirty thoo.-

send feet;..

3. The target had six to eight tenths altocumulus (l..OIrerbased

at fourteen thousand feet v a th tOIlS at sixteen thousand feet him

necessitated radan· bombing wi tb short 'IT l;:,u.al 41:loclcs.

4.. The "Weather on the route on return. ,·Ias aI;lpraz:im:l.tely too

same as the route out.. Rasa conditions 11em the same as they had.

been. at take-off time.

S. Winds reported over th0 target voriod frCltl 280 degrees, 145knots ~ 280 degreos _ 180 knots.

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A N N E X

aO M MU N IC .i;.T IO NS R E PO R TS

Pl);rt I - Rndnr Counter Mansuras

Pr.rt II - COllllllllnicntio.na Officer' B Report

Mission No. 26

4 Februlll7' 1945



Part I .~ i,; D b a CQlI~

1, Gab.eX'd = Fo.ur RC.Meeil.l'ch .o,ircrilft., eo.ch",ith one RCM Ob~

server pnrti.cipa,tea in. this' mia,sion. Sea.rch for Eo.r~y Warning R:ulnr

equipment wns (l.coompli,shed until the mil.1nla.nd w!).sreo.ched. wruH;'e II. lIe-

arch for OOI and. at ro-dare o.nd enemy r.1ghter cammunications 0,110:1"11"1.918.

Was l!Ie.cle. Frequencies aras to. 3000 mols were searChed.

2" R.Elsults =

... A totlll .af 51 ra.dar signllis waelo.gged and 3 enemy VHFvo 1Ce transml.sB 1o.m. wetere·cord edo

B. No.D/Fing of (my signlll was possible due to the 1D.ck ofsuitable a n t e n n a s .

0;. Al'thou.gh fla'll: wo.s gGnel'Q.}ly mo.derate and inaccuro.te, to.accurate. aLx signals were nenr d in. the €;enera1 target tLl'ee. which Irlay

h!lvebeen employed for gu:n laying. These er e c.s follows:

.Freguencl{ Pulse Wldth

190 .me

198 me

225 me

253. me

3.03: mc

3"07 me

1400

1250

100014001500

1500

5

8

3,5

5

9

10

d.. No evidence of radar fighter vectoring was discovered.

6:. The complete slgn.:a1 intercept .Log is as follows:

(1) Ta.rget Areo.

Ii'reguency PL PRF Re1llLl.rks

92~94 33..5 250 Sweeping102 31 300 Sweeping1013 14 4S0 Sw~epinglOB f?0 200 Sweeping112 54 400 SWeeping145-146 15-45 250 Sweeping

150 10 200 Sweeping152 10 200 Sweeping155 7 1000 Sweeping186 6 750 'trc.<*lng190 5 HOC Tracking190 15 250 Sweep' rate l f R P V194.198 6-8 1250 S w e e p ra.te 3 R P M225 3.5 1000 Traoking253 5 1400 Tracking503-307 9-10 1500 Tracking3 3 3 - 45'1 ' Sweeping: . \75 20 300 Traokinguoo Sweeping

- 1...

§J;Q1Li.I



(2) From Target . . §

f'l'egueno.y 1:1 ! ! . B E . Remg,rIss

195 8 1600 Tracking

190 12 1500 Tracking

160 8 SOC T:r!);cli:ing

155 5 750 TrMlking

153 27 250 Tro.oking

150 9: 200 TrackIng

1148 3,0 750 Sweap ra.te

s R P M145...47 8-10 250 TrD:!Cklng

lOS..loa 15 1500 Trncking

107 29 " 450 Tra..cking

106 13 1100 'l'r(l.cklng

106 40 4('0 Tro.ckln.g103 3 4 - 1500 Tru.cking

102 20-36 7CO-100e Trncking

93-94 35 70000800 SweepIng

80 4C 40,,-500 Sweep rute

1/3- R P M(3) To Target

Frequency .E b

7576

7982

94.

9697

5)9

loal e a10'-

600240

IOOe.

300

1000

1'0001200

1000

500 ..000700

250 E

30

.2 6

45

3,1

25

6.5: 3 . 0

6.550

:3

~O

10., 15 1000

lOO-He143

147150..152

151

15:fo.155

40-5012

147~

7

6

~oo500

450

325-400

1000':1250

350-850

Remnrks

TrackingTr(l;Cklng

TrackingT l " E l .Ck1ng

Tracking

TraCkingTracking

TrackingTro.c)c.ing

Tracking

Sweep rate

2 R PM

Sweep ro.1;)e

1 R P .M

Tr!l.cking

Sweeping

Tro.ok'ing

Track.ing

Tracking

Sweep ro.te1/3 RPM

Inter cap!t Lool\,'t.191li

S U ! l l 1 s u Araa.S u m 1 s \ t Area

Vo1onno I!Iltl.ndEl

Vol·ca.no Islands

Voloano Ialo.:ndD

VolcQ.llo IsIQ.l'l.ds

Volca.no IsIQllds

Bonin Isbnds

Bonin. Islo.ndsVOICMO Islo.nds

votouno Ialo.nde

Volco..no I alQ.ndsSofu Ge.n

Sofu Gall

SofuGc.n

Sumisu

In.ter cap t Lace.tion

Iwo J1me.

f. Enemy jeJllJning on the .f'ollowing cornmunico..t10QS frequ.enolesWllS noted I

.Freguenc" Type Jo.mming

l1060KC60S5

3145SOOIW

3. Equipment:

Ef' f acti ven esS

5~

5(%

1 0 %

Loco.tion

Neo.r BoniuNear Banlus

Bonlns to Bue

Over ElDpbe

&. N oW r Antennas had been received to do.te o.nd !LD insuffio-ient number o . : f ' O-lO/APA.-6X o.oll1e.tors were o.va.lla.ble.

b. Two recei vera AN/APR-4 and A I l ! JJ.>A-6 pulae ~al,yr.8r8 ban

been borrowed tor uae by the 313th Bombardment Wing.



o. Equipment malfunctions on this mission ~are oneA N !APA-6 whioh eased functioning. This equipment being bench Checked.

~. Conc1sions ,:

a . Photo coverage of this area is incomplete. The avail-

able photos have been studied for gun laying ralia.r installations

but none have bean liiscovered to date in spite of the possible l5unlaying raliar slgno.ls interoepted.

b. The signnl interoepted at 14.00 m ol II corresponds to the

Signal of 1'10 Incl s once bafor& reported over the Tokyo !rail. Its

usa i6 still unknown.

o , The possibility of constructing n D/F a.ntenna., using

a simple bor1r.onto.l di.polelarra.ngement, sha.ll be investigated by

the command.

d. No signals of Wurtzburg ro.d!U' characteristics haa

thus far been intercepted.

PART II - COMMUN ICATIONS OFF ICE:R' REPo .RT

1. Strtke Reporta:; A.iroraft radio operators trllnBmittedeleven Strike Reports (Bombs Away); Ilil were received by the Ground

Sta.tion. It waS directed that, effeotive with this Field Order.eun pl 1fie d S tr ike Re po rts wo uld no t b e t re. ns mitt ed.

2. Fox Transmissions:: 'Waather enooded in UCOFAC and Time

Ticks were transmitted simultaneously on all strike frequenCies on

the half hour and the hour. respectively. No requests tor wea.theror time ticks were made by aircraft in flight.

3. Freguenciesr All strike frequenCies were jammed or inter-fere4 with a.t d ifferent periods during the mission. The 73rd Wing

reported moderate interferenoe on 11C80 kcs while aircraft radio

operators were transmitting the Bombs AWay Reports. During the

final hours of the mission, interference became greater on 1iOBC

koso while 6055 kcs was olear until approximately four bours betore

aircraft were due to land. At this time MeW signals caused b&a~

interference. but aircraft signals were readable through it. In-effective interference was received by 3145 kcs and the majority

of t raf fi o WaS carried out on this frequency. In a percentage

breo.kdown of traffio per frequency, forty-five per oent ....oarried out on 31~ kCIJi twenty-eight per cent on 11080 koe, ud

twenty-seven per cent on 6055 koso The 313th Wing reported slightinterferenoe on 3410. k oso 7310 kos and 11160 koso

4. The 73rd Wing ground sta.tion receivedforty-seven requests for beDringsj forty-three of these wereobtained. Airoraft weak signals and priority o r u rg en t b ea ri ng sover check betU"ings were the Co.use for four bearings not being ob-

to.ined. The 313th Wing grOllnd station reoeived twenty requests torDVF bearings and twenty QlF contAots were completed. All airoraft

utilized Radio Range ~d Homer and reported good results,

5. Ret DisCipline . r .u Seoyr1txl Ra.d10 sUenoe wa.s ma1ntained

to t h e t a l' g4l tO D a.ll six strike trequenc1es. S80uri ty tor themission w~s very good a.s tar &s the radio operator was Gono.rued.Only o ne v io la ti on ot AR 380-5 _8 Doted. One message sent to ~g ro un d 8 ta ti on h a d a code group r.pe~ted t.ic.. A vlol~t1oD at

-s-

~~£111



a(1IOUl'ly ¥ja.s noted when the apee d, 10our-se, and al ti tUde ware epok~1n

in. the olear en VBF over and near 1;-he tar!;et.

6. Enemy Tro.nsmi sa ions; Kano oode intercepted on. iiI I etl" ike

1're quanc ias a.pp ar an tly " jwnbl a of 1attar sins ofa.r as Alneri0an op:-

erators ore eoncerned. Groundetc.tion WCl.SnbLe to work Cl.irornf't

through GneDly tr'fl.nsmlsa ione. Aircrtlft ra.dio opero.tors ar-e notbriefed to log Jumbo .jwnbo 100no code.

7. Distressz The ground. et!l;t:Lon reoeived one 80S wbioh 'NCl.S

imtned1a.taly ohanged to Urgent when the condi t.ion ofthi a alroroJ't

1D1proved. Thisa:!;rcrni't fiDally d.itchedt\pproximfl.tely 12 miles

from bas e , with tbe ground. station working the ,uircra.f'tcontlnu,ouelyuntil it WaS a:ppro:dmately 600 feet· from the water. Tbe (draraft

Wo.Sunr..ble to notify the ground sta:tion. of the di,tching; howeve'r,

Clos e 11aisol'l was affected wi th the ME'tVlltn1 en c.nd the exac t po-

s 1tion of the downed o.ircr E lf tWlle Imtned1n te ly known. F iva WUrgent ~rsqu.ests .for HF:/IF bearings were received by ground stl.l.tlonll; 0.11were obtained.

8. Equipment .Malfunctions; AN/ART 13 :. one tranemitter with

no sidetone, and one tra:neIIl!tter with intermittent short;; SCR5221

one inoperative;; Tra.iling wire El.ntennaes, one inopera.tive, on'S

stl eking;; RC::':36.: 'two sharted j~.o1: boxes,~ .:.nd three mike buttOp.s

&tlc'1Hngf.:.N(J.RN-7: fOl.1r sense ~lltenn~es lead ..{n·s broken, one Ln-

opera:tive P.ri:...#Oo;:rJ?':l.s"S" :,?ositron. :>.nrJ one inoper~.t.ive -On "•.ntenn;l.1

posl tlon;. BO-348: one arrsenna grounded and one raoei ver noisy.



ANNEX

D '

IN T EL L IG EN C E R EP OR T S

M1u1on No. 26

4 February 1945

Fart I .. Enemy Figh.ter Action Report

Po;rt 1I-Enemy Ant1dl'craft J'ire Report

Part III -Do.mOJgeAsS0Ssment Repo.rt



I NT EL LI GE NC E R E PO R TS

fARI_! - E N E M Y F IGHTE R R EACTION RE rOR T

A. Genero.l

1. Enemy air oppo aI tion was strong. 205 enemy aircro.rt

making 273 ~ttacks. Howaver. with the 313th Wing mnking its first

trip to Japan. the Size of our B-29 fGl'ce was increased approxim~tely

50 per oent. Consequently, the o.vera.ge B-29 sustained 2.8 attacks,.

which is less than average for previous miSSions. The average Jo.p

righter made 1.3 0.tto.cks. Whioh 1s about o.verage.

2. One percent (one B-29) of our c.ir force over Japa.n WIlS

lost o.s 0. result of ditching Caused by enemy fighter o.ttack and 12'

per cent (12 B-29's) were damf.\ged by Jap fighters.

B. Loco.tlon of Attacks: Eighty six per cent of all attacks (a.reoord) were ma.de prior to bombs away. P'revlous hlghestpercon~o

of enemy attacks prior to bombs away was 67% which occurred on

M1ssion No. 20, (Akashi). Following is a breakdown of the locc.tion

of attllcks:

No. of Percent of

l&ca.tlon Attacks Total Atto.cks

Prior to La.ndfall 1 0After Landfall to In1t ia1 Foi nt 102 37

.After IF to Bombs Away 134. 49

After Bombs AWay to Coast 34 13A ft er l ea vi ng Coast __! ..J.

Totul 273 l O a

C. TYpe of EVAAttacking.: Tojo and ToW made 31 QJld 30 per cent ..respectively, of all of the attacks. On 0.11 pr ior m issio ns, Toj omade 28 per cent of all attacks. The bre~down follows;

T v p e .&IAAtta.cking N o , of Attacks Per cent of T o t o . l A t t a c k s

Tojo 84 31

Tony 63 30

Zeke 39 14 .

Zeke 32 10 ~Osoa.r 10 4V a l 11 4I r v i n g 10 4

N i c k 5 aJ a e k :5 1Fro..nk 1 0

t r / I TIE 5 Z :

tTlI S lE 12 4

Total 273 100

JI~B..I1



D.. Direction 0'1' Apprpll-Chl Noae atto.cks still predominated. S1x.ty

one par cent 0.1' all of the Il.tto.eks ""re !Mde from tha nose quarter.Thi.s :I : B tha h1ghe.~t peroentage of o;tt(l.okS yet mnde on o.ny qu.a.rter.

The followi.ng Chart shows percento.ge d1st.r1but:l:on of attacks onqUQl'ter bnsf s t

E. Le.vel of App.roo.ch; Forty-one ,per cent of 0.11 of' the attacks

were mo.de.f.roJn below. and o.n.ly 25 per cent of the attacks were made

from above. Level o..ttacksacaounted. for the remdning 34 per cent

of all 0.ttll.cka •

F o. Direction and Level of Approo.oht Th.e nose' ntta.oks were o.lmostevenly divided among high. level. !lnd low tlppronches, beIng 19, 20,

and 22 pel" cent re ape ctively • Low tail S o ttnokaconstl tu ted on!Y 6

per cent of all o.tto.cks. (See dhgro.m on the follo'lfing page)

G. FIlCingl_ A few E V A met our B..298 o.t sec, and trrt11ed our tor ...

.mo.t1ons, probably ClOmmunioo.tingwith AA and flight controllers.

H. Coordlnllted Attaoks! There ware only five reported ooo1"&n-o.ted atto.cks, comprhing less tho.n2 per cent of all o.tta.oks. Do. to .

is available on two ooo.rdine.ted atto.oks:

It". Over IF , at an estima tednl ti tude of 25..5CO teet, twoTojos CllJIIe in !4breo.st, mll.king a frcnto..l attaok frolll

above ago.1.nst one of our Ala: These two fighters re-mained together throughout the ~ttacks.

b . O v er target, at 25,000 feet. two Tanya oo.me in abreast

from above at 11 o'clock. let wheels down. pressed

olosely. and broke o . w o . y o .t 3 and 5 o'olock.



Direction and Level of Approach

of' .Snemy F19htaZ' A le

-~:~::~;::::::::::~~:\,"' 'Fr o m . hv&I

34 ' 1 {

,Fran below

4.1;l



I. Ro.mm:1ng o z-New TyPe Attack

1. Qvorthetu.rget area.. some T0rl¥S, To.jos !>.ndH,iok·!!. ",erel'e:pQl"ted to Mve 1ower$ d. the 1r ge,a;r just pr ior '00 prell sing a.l:1a'btack.Observing orews Were of the op,i.ni.on that thlr;1technlqlle Wtl.S tore-duce Speed or tc improve r o.mmi.llg appr o..oh efi'a oti vene.r;!S.. 'l'wc' lr ..Vinge Were cdso seenf'lying .~bre'Clst. lowering their g6ar. but mak-ing (I, bre ok away before e oming wi thin % "f.\nge.. .

...Black with orange ball an nose and 1'use1o.ge.

.. O.D.with red cowl~ng..

. . R e d wings,

.. All Silvor,

.. Dark green. r1sing sun iri.slgmo..

.. SilVIe!", red roundels.

... Allsllver,

.. Sh11V blaak, r1s1ng sun insIgn1a.,

.. De.rk In color,

.. Green, red. rounliels.

...Four-root wide orimso~ band on ao.ah wing

base color dark green. with white belly ..

- Dork brown. red. strlp.eon rusela.ge... Camou1'la.ged.

- Elntirely bla.ck.

...Sllv'sr, red roundels.

.. Yellow oowling.

_.8hct&; White,

-All S11VEIl' •- S11Vel' w1th red dots.

.. Dark green. light Colored belly.

... 810.0k, Yellow oowHng.

2. One B..29 evaded what was beli.eved. to bean o..t.te!IIPtact rllbllDlng by ra1.sing !1:ndlowEliring the nose or the 8-29.

J. Breako.ways I: .Bdfrolls. dives. ejlli t~s'a, strtl.1.ght fly..hrough5,and turns to let t and. rl gbt wer e lIJI1on,gho ee rap 'or t e ( > d.

X.. Type Enemy Armll.me.nt ani Type Projectiles I

1. Zekss were reported fir:l.ng hso.vy MGthrough props .•

2~ One Totl,y'Was reported 0./3 firing; 0. 2O-mmc.annon thrO\ligh

the propeller bub,

3. Two Irvings o.nd OnG unidentified twin ..engln.EI Ughtsr

were reported I i l . : 8 having nose o.nd wing firing cn.nnon.

4. One Jo.ek WQ ,S .reported a.s he.v1.ng six guns. This air ..

Gr!li't was not ebserved until It hn.d. pressed 1.ts

o.tte.ok to .about 150 yards at which tim.s two machine

guns (believed to be 7.7) wets f'l.ring. These tw oguns were mounted low on the sides of the fuselage

at the wing roots.

5. One unidentified S/E gol.ng o .way from a B-29 w as seen

to fire bcok rrom his can.opy.

L. Enemy Ail'crlif't. Markings

2.Zeke

1 Zeke

1ZElko

1 Z e k o1 Zake·

1Zeke

1Tony1Tony1Tony

1TolV4, Tony

2 Tony

1Tony

1Tony

1To.ny

1Tojo

7 Tojo

4 . Tojo

1Tajo2 Tojo

1Tojo



. , .' ~~

4 . Toje _. Dark: Green•. r1sing sun .1o,1 31gn1o..

1 Tojo .. Ollrk in 'color.

5 rojo - Silver. rising eun 1n:s,1,gnla.

J . Tojo - .Brown. red ro';'!ndsls._1 T"ojo -, El1'tlrely Black •..

l, Tojo '- <i!a.mouflaged.· .1 N10k - BllleR:' or da.rk gre'ao.I 1,rv1ng-' ,Bhok or da):'k green.,

3 Irving .. "Euti,rely black.

2i lrvlng .. S11vsr, brigh;t rri roundels

1 Ramp - i>l,srupti,ve .painting.

1 Val .. ,Entire-ly Black.1 T IE ' .. ,Entirely Black.' ,

!o,-ll,na

unident1f',ied

I Mike .. Black, GermM mo.rk1,nga.

7 Unl~ent .. D~k green, rl,Blog .BunlnS1!;~1!l..

M. Claims by TY)?e E/A Wid by GlinPos.1tlon

Destroyed Probo.bly ,Destroyed Damaged

Irony

I Tony

1 'tony

1 Irving

2 Tony2 Tony,z . Tony

1 Tony

1Irving

1Tojo

1Tojo2 Tojo

2 ZE lke,

1 ZfJke,i ZekelZeke 32

1 Oscar

1 Vol" 1 U/I

1 Tony

lTollYI'l'ony5 Tony

2 Tony

1T o n y

I'Irving2 Irving

. ·1 Irving.1 "Irving2 rojo

3 Toja

4 - Toja2 Toja1 Zek'e

1Zltke

I_ Zake ,32

1 Zeke 32..~ .-~ .

..... 8

G u n Positions

(Fe'

aSGTGas ! )

BombardierTGBollibardler & : CFO

R.G.R SG

BombllJ'dier.era, R ·G -

ere. R .G .

R SG

Bombardier

Bom.bardier,R. G;

ROO .-

Bom.bo . rd le~

R .G .

CF CBombardier

TG ,

UnknownTO ~

- .

Bombardier

B6J1lbard!er,RSO

LG

TO

"RSORSO.Bombardier

1 .0

R o.

-RSo .

.Bombo.l"dhrTOBoJllbard1eJ'

RSORSO

Bombardier



SEC RET-- _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. Q l a i m a by Type EllA and by Gun P O S i t i o n (cont'd)

Probably Destroyed D f l l l I a g e d . GunPositions

R S G

B o m b n r d l e r , T G

LG

2 Oscur1 OaoD-r

1 Vo.l

IS/E U/I2 Ull

1U/I

1 &{'E U/I

Bombnrdier

LG

Bombnrdier

LG. TO

PART n-EN EMY ANTIAIRCWT FreE RErOR!

D .a From 1a. n.11£a.11otal' get heo.vyCl ok was encourrber ed bydifferent formations as follow!.!:

1.. The 504th Group of the3!:3th Wing with l2A/C o.t25. 200 .ft. flying OV('l r tin undereo.st I'M :I .nto meager Innc OU I'D.te

flnk a .tWa.ke:ynmll.~

Squndrons.2. The 505thGroup of the 3l3th Wing went in 1n two

(w) The .first squadron flying at 25,500 ft. over

nn under Co.st encounter ed mode n. ts and 0..0 cur ate eon t 1nu.ou5 Iy pOinte d

fl r u e . through ol,ouds at Wa.ko,ynmo.. The burs tswsrs ble.ck. level.

behind to ahead. At least one nave.] veaselwn.s reported in o.ction ...

(b) the second squadron at 26,000 ft. encountered

con.tlnuou.slypointed flnk Il.t Shionomis Ilki.. The f'la le was mao.ger and

innccuro.ta. Ba.uek'tlursts Il.ppaared o.hea.d to behind. Mil 40DC ft.

below the formo.tion.

a, The 73rd Wing (497th, 498th, 499th and SOOth Groups)

i'1r:>t mot heo.vy AAfire at landfall ( 3 5 .0 35'N - 1360 OOIE) flying

between2S,OOO and 27,000 ft. Flak was of predicted con.ce.ntro.tion

QIld ba.rr;!l.ge type. Jneager, o.nd inaccurate. The bursts were level.behind, and to the r.ight.

4. FroJn 1. P, to the target heavy flo.k wasmodera.te.

ELCcuro.te to inaccurate, level to above. nnd to the right. Naval

vesse·ls in Osaka Bay firad bur abs which rocked some of the AI:.Hotb contin\1ously pOinted o.ndbo.rrllge fire encountered.

5. At target (Kobe) o.ccuro.te to extremely o.ccuro.te

heo.vy fInk. modern.te to intense 'o'I!1.smet by :l11 formations throUgh

und.er-cas b of 6/10..09/10, Black bursts were level. o.he~.d to behind;

also some whi tebursts were observed.

6. Three Ale of tM 504th Group suffered minor damage;13. out 0 . 1 ' .20 A le of the SOSth Group sustaIned fhk damage i 5 out

of 39 A /e of the 73rd Wing (1 sque.dron of the 497th. 2 squadrons of

th.e 498t h o.nd lsq Uo.dr on of the 4.9S1th Group) sllato.ined mi.nor fl r 1 k :do.mp.ge.

27,000 ft.7a The SOOth Orou4' bombed MfltSIlZo.ko. from as,oeo to

Only two AA bursts ware seen.

8. The second squadron of the 499th Grollp bombed v~lou.last resort to.rgets. At To.nllbe o.nd Shingu. meager. inaccurate flat

was reported.

- 6 -



9. En rout" to hom~ base th" flo.k: was reported by

1Te.rlous Ale as follows;

(Il.) 505th Group reported. that on d~,scanding

turn on wi thdr Clwo.l, at tel' bombs away, both sq uo.d.rons 6.000 unterad

bursts 1'011owing the plo.nee down wi tn o,o!widel'o.b lellccuro.cy.

(bl) At Ni,shl NoShlllU.1.,. o.t 1.5.500 ft••meager.

ino.ocur'o.te flClk wo.s reported. It WOoslow and traDing. Also.j, to

8 s/r, beums weN observed whioh fail sd tQ illuminate any .of our ;Je •.

(c) At lwoJimo. !!Iet:>ger InOoccuro.te flo.k wo.s reported

at 16.000 to 18,000 ft,

c . 1i.1r-to-dr .Bombing 'P,nd.R o c k e t s

(d ) A t Ako.sh.i t he 504t h Or-oup reported smaller

CaLi bel' f'Lak tho.n o.t other 1000.11 ties,

10, The 73rd Wing repor-ted moage r and ina.ccurate flak

at land' s end (330 45'N - 1340 40 IE). The bur St8W", rees tilllD.ted as

mucho.s 4000 f t , below the formo.tion.

b. OU.r To.ctios Ver.suS AA • None

1. None observed by the 313th WLngo

2. One Ale of the 73rd Wing. o . . t 2$.000 ft, 1n the vic-

inity of Kobe reported D . phosphorous bomb burst. describing it C1S

B. ftwhi te umbre 11a-a ho.ped po.ttern II !Ipproximu.tely 1 mil e to the ra [I.r

of our Ale. The E/ A releasing the projectile W!l -S no,t seen.

3. Mother B-29 in the aame Group reported eo large

tro.oer or r·ocketof redd! sh color rired from nn un.observed F/A in

the s 0JIl6 game r0.1 are 0..

d . Remarks

The wind o.tbombing o.ltitude wns from 280'0 ,o.t 145K, ond

bombing was generally upwind.



. PMT ill.~. A ] j J . N J E . ASiSESS~i l l -R :EP( )RT.

KOBE B A R B OR AR EA

(34/39 N--135/10 E)

..Ref9renc~Photograt:hy:

Pra~atrike :Pr'e~strike, :Post-a trike:Post- str i.ke:

3P:R.SM9 IV:27p31j 2:89-107----20 January 1945-3PR5M17 IV'41-43r 2:50-55----·-18 Januu-y 1945.3PR5M33iV:I,3-20--------------5 February 1945.3PR5M36 2:19-21; iV:1l-15·----6 Feb.ruClry 1945.

SUMMARY

Tll.rget Z§.5.: 49 percent (about 820,000

square feet) of the plant

was destroyed .•

2 pe.roent (about 68,000

squaee feat) of the plant

Was destroyed.

Fou.r smull buildings (ap-

proXimately 22,000 square

feet of roof nren) were de,-

st.royed.

Th1.s reportlll,S se'sse s dEl.mnge'to Koos,

fol.1owing the bomb strike of 4 February1945.

Visible drona.gs is Umited to Tar-

get 169, 1.!i.1s ubish i l:isll.vyI ndust.r ie s, Ltd .•i

Target 785. Kellsgafuohl Sodn Industry;,

Target II, Ko.wD.sD.k1Ooomotlvo and Cllr

Company. and ruis 0911an,eous's 9ott ons in toovioinity.

Allv1s1hle do.mF.lge oovers a total

urea of e.pproxlma.tel y2. 651, O OO s:q • . ft•.

Target 169:

Tp,rget 1 1 . =

Misoellang2us dQQlflf1's: Areas damo.ged in small industries.

housing a.ndbusiness districts (centered

aboutTo..rgets169, 785 and 11) totol approximately 1•.741,000squ.aro

feet.

(Notc: s1x-lnohphoto ooveragc lsoompll3te from Kobe

east to 1350 18'. Five-tl3nths c l oud oOVl3r partio.lly ob-soures northern Osaka.)

All o.I'l.notntions in this report refo.r to print3PRSM19 2:89.

TJiRGETm= (34/39 N~-13.:5/10 E) KflDognfuohi Soda Industry

(IlnIlot ati on 1): Approxima tolyB20 ,000 sqUllts feat of the pl ant

area. that part almost oompletely oooupted by buildings, wus

Cicstroyl3d. Tho prinoipa.l buildings in this target aroa. are of

SElwt oot h-.r oof' oonsb ruotl on • The greater part of' t,he damn£;e to

the' plQ.nt is 1n these buildings. FirG walla in thG mo.1n bul1d~ingsworG off'eot1vo in oontrolling the apzead of f'lamoa.

- e -



- 9 -

DJ i .1 !A3 B A .S S E S S M .E N T R E PO R T , C ont , d •

limE.. 162: (34/3'3 N~~135/11 E) Mftsub1l3hi Heo.v.~Industries. allLtd. (o.onoto.tion 2).. Dwn.age to the pln.ot repI'G'sopt!.l only a amt .

Part <;I f tho totnl te.rget o.reo.. Appro;dmfl.toly 68,200 squo.re ree

of' destruotion inoludes':

About 45.500 sqo,o.l'O reet gut.ted in building with or 19innl

l'oofe.rea of appJ'oxlmo..toly 7'3.000 square feet.

Sixsmbll buil ding ,B de strayed • The build.1 og B covered a

total n,rea of npproximntely 27,700squar'e f;;lot .•

Total d!lIll.nge o.pproxlm at.:>ly 2 pe r'cent of thE!'pl.nnt des.t reyed •

!_ARG:E1'1: ( .34139 N~-135/10 E) KnwaSllkl Locomotive eLndCOol"CompanYlnnnatatlon 3). Four small s'tructul'OS have beon d"lstroy-ed. Their total roof oraa wo..s about 22.000 SqUill'S feet.

MISCEL4ANEOUS. D . A l y G . € = Tho Q.I'OIlbetweon Tnrgots 169 end 785(U't1noto.tion 4) is fllled with housl11l!;. offico struoturos, 'l'l'Ql'e-

hoasss and sm.all industrhs. About 1,084,000 aquar e feet of thoaroo. hils boon burned cus ,

A residGntlnlo.nd smiU1 busines.s o.l'ell (annotation .5 ) hasabout 205,000 squo..re feot of dtrno.geq area.

Flr0s visiblo (annotation 6) on .5 Fob.ruary 1945 ( 3PR . 5M 3 3 )aN still smoking on 6 February 1945 C.3PR5M36), the burned arOQ

inoludes two unid·entified industries, one of which may be purt

of TClrge:t 11. The o.reo. dam..uged ccvers o.ppro:Y1mo.tely 356,000 squaretoet. Furthar spread .o f tho fire appears improbable.

A fire vis.1ble (annoto.tlon 7) on . 5 February 1945 (3PR5l! 33)is still smoking the noxt do.y <"PR5Y .3 6) . The dest rayed al'ea

in this small unidentified indust.ry coveza about 23.500 squarefoot. Futher spread of the tire appears improbable.

A residential or business Ilrea (annotation 8) hc.s an area

of tl.pproximatl:ll;V 73 •.000sqU.are feet destroyod.

A small bUilding (o.nnoto.tion 9) on the wnterfront in tbe

north pllrt of 'I'o.rgot 169 hlilsbeen almost oomplete1 y burned out.

The dwne.g0 is visible on tho original photo coverage of the nrGa.

It is posslble that this damuge is the result 9£ weather-strike

mis s,lons, Severn1 surrounding buildlngs shew pos s.lbl e damo.ge.

Luck of oompnrati.ve photogro.phyin thi sore&. prGvents posl theIls.sessment.

Print 3PRSM19 - 2:89 DnDotatsd o.ndattnohed.

Pr int 3PR,5M36 .. 2:20 attaohed.



7itJ' A lk C I l .A F T B O M B IN G · 6 9VIS U A L bO M f>IN O I t A O A I \ . f>OM&ING

!

A l e 60MBING A le D R O P P I N G IA l e SIGHTING FO i l . . A l eI

" I ·OPPING &Y lA O""" O N L E A D A le

R &D R A N G E ON

LEAD A le 5 44

l2 I 17

I





E

ANNEX

CON SOL IDA TED STA TISTICA L SUMMA Ry

-~- _ . . . . . . _

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4 . Feb;rqnry 1945



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.§ . ~ £ .E ~ .1 MISSION u26 jM1.ddl!lman tit)Dl':TF . : 4F o brull ry 19.45

F UE L C ON eUMP TIO N & F LIG HT D j\.T il

M a x i m u m

M i n i m 1 : U l l

C o n s u m e d f r o m T l l r g e t t o B a s e :(A/cwi th Malfunction)

A v e r a . g e

SEE W E I G H T DATil S H E E T!

II I

\

i

6 : 5 0 6 : . 3 7 ! 6 ; / . 0 6:1l 6:.33\

1 : 1 5 1 : 1 0 1 : 1 0 1:23 \ 1:141 : 0 0 1:13 , Id5 I 1:25

I1:19

'1.1.:39 1 4 : 5 2 1 5 : 0 0 , 1 4 : 2 7 1 4 : 4 5

2845 2864 3 0 0 1 2872 \ 2899

JJ

4860 4 6 ' 7 0 4671 4 6 4 5 \ 4669

•5111 5 1 0 0 5 1 3 1 4 8 7 5 I 5 1 3 1

\3 5 5 4.390 42-61 4470 t.261,

j

I

!!Ie COMPLETING MIS:nON

~ EIGH T D ATA. Avg Basic I'1t. o rAl e

Avg Fuel Loaded (Gals.)

Avg Bombs Loaded (Los.)Avg Gr os 'S W t . at Take off

L I G H T . D A T AAvg Time at Low Altitude

_Avg Time of Climb to Bombing

AltitudeAvg Time at Bombing AltitudeAvg F lyi ng T im eAvg Distance Flown (Nautical

Air Miles)

F tJ E L C ON S U l lJ lP T IO N

Consumed t o T arg et :A v e r a g e

M a x i m w n

Minimum

1 9 9 6 2006 1 9 1 2 1 9 7 2

2233 2330 2116 2100

1 6 4 ' 7 1 ' 7 3 1 1.315 1 6 7 6

6 6 9 3

6 9 1 3

6255

1878 2131

2078

1 6 4 3

669.3 6570 6 6 1 5

7108 6990,

6845

6)80 6 0 6 0 6.213

6 6 3 3

7108

Oonsumed F r o m ' 1 ' a r g e t T o B I . 'e:(Ale Without Malfunction)

Average

Max imum

I l

I

Minimum

Total Fuel Used:

A v e r a g e

548

1105

1

7378 519

1390

.360

737

M a x i m u m

Minimum

Total Fuel R e m a i n i n g :A ' l r e r a g e

Maximum

Minimum

A v g Gals. Fuel C o n s u m e d perHour

Avg Gills. Fuel Consumed perMile

456.9

2 • ..3 5

1 0 2 0 1187 1187

15 5 592

4 3 8 . 0 4 5 7 . 8 449.4

2.1.9 2.)0 2 . 2 9

T O TA L FU EL CONSUMEP A ND LO ST ON I\ A I R B O R N E l ! . I R C R A F T 7 7 9 . 3 5 1 5 . 3 0 1 ? , 113797. 1 0 9 ' 7 . 2 1 ! 4544?O

.W~m- all AIr.~nrnpletins missd.on i. not aVl!.i1able. A'II8!"llgeea!"8 -_ ....

tZder $aeh group a8 mission. Howewr, ToW ~is _sed. on all &U~_ ~At.. .rt



SEC RET,~-~--IIISSION 26 (tUddlenwn Ill)

DNrE 4 February 194';

FUEl. CONSUMPTION 3. FLIGHT DA'rJl.

/C ' CO MP LE TIN G M IS SIO N

EIGHT DATA

Avg R - l . s i cWt.ofA/CAvg Fuel Loaded ( G a l s , . )

Avg BombsLoaded(Lbs.)- AvgGross wt. at Take off

L ! C H r D A T AA vg Time at Low A1 ti tude

AVg Time oj' Climb to BombingA l t i t u d e . .

Avg Time at Bombing AIUtudeAvg Flying Time

AVE{ D i s t a n c e F l o l m (NauticalAir _Miles)

DEL CONS I1' ,' iPT ION

Oonsumed tQ Ta.rget:Average

M s . : d m u m

M i n i m 1 i l J J 1

Cons'l:Utled .From. Target to Base:. A / C Wi t h o u t M a l f u n c : t i r o n )

A v e r a g eMa:dmum

r.~inimum

C o n s u m e d FrmnTr,,,rget t o B a s e :( A / e W i t h M a l f u n c t i o n )

AverageM E l x i m u m

M i n i m u m

Total Fuel Used:

Average

M ' n x i m u mM i n i m u m

Total Fuel Rmuo:il:J.ing~A v e r£ l_ ge

M a x i m u mM i n i m u m

A v e r a g e Gals. F u e l C o n s u m e dPer Hour

Average Gals. F u e l C o n s u m e d

Per Mile

xx r B. C.

SEE !llEmHT D A T A SREF . T

I6:30 6:27 6:29

\:10 1:27 1:211:13 1:08 1:10

lL.:4·7 14:54 14:51 ,

I2760 2850 2816

I!

L.712 ,031 4912 14994 5 4 2 3

5 4 2 3

,

4301 . . 4621 4304 I

!2005 190.4 1942

II

1'786 2096 1786

I109 1644 1641 ,

1

I

\1

6:32

1:16

1:16

14:48

2871

4750

54234261

NOm: l l f O N EO N E

6692 6840 6'786 6683 "7 0 3 6 7)01 7301 73016 398 64/.8 6398 6060

708 560 616 696lO;:~7 952 1027 US7.389 99 99 1

452.8 459.1 456.7 451.13

2.42 2.4 I· 2.41 2 . 3 3

80304 1433.38 223642 6?8ll2

T O T A L F U E L C O N S U M E D A N D L O S TO N A I R B O R N E A I R C R A F T

* Data for all A/e completing miSSion is not avellable. Aversges are based OIlthe missions shown undcr each group as completing missi.on. HOWBver,Total FUe l

C O R s u m e d a n d L o s t i s b a s e d o n a l l a i r b o r n e a i r c r 3 f t .

SECRET_.._---."..



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--. j~==~==.~.-~.-j:,===.~_t~==.=====C=-:=!~~~

NOrlN



ANNEX

F

F IELD OR DER S

Hildon RD, 2 .6

" Februnry' 1945



FIELD ORDER 22. Middleman. NO 1.

1 , r < l . I ' o rm a ti o < l .

XXI SOUlb....;, Ccmunand

APO 23 431 January 1945

A. )'i'riondly

(1) Air

(a) CTF 93 will provide air de,!'ense of' the ' o p e r 6 . t i n g bases.

(b) Dumbo service,; TO follOYI.

(2) ro.ll.val

(a) l , i f ' e g l : l . . a r dSubmnr1na,: To !'ollovr.

P RIM AR Y TARGET

port and bui1 tup urban area of

the city of Kobe: objeotive

folder 9o_25 M a. p M -9

1..I1!.I1m POUlT

to follow

(b) Dost royer: To foll 01'1.

(1) .Aircroft: ApprOXimately .228 c p e r a t i c n u l e n e m y t'igi'lturs " r e knownto be in tho Kobo·l~agoya hrea.

(2) .Anti ·./:l.irqruft I Thoro ar-e 71 hoc.vy Anti-Aircr::..ft guns in i!:ob~-Osait..

Area. within effeotivo range of planned route to t-rgot.

2. Dooi 6i on: Tho XXI Eomb"'r Goilllil.md I'd 11 a ttClok targots dosigna.ted b" l,.w on

H D " D.1Y.

3. Ins'tructlons to uni.ts.

A. 73rd wing Objeotives.:

S E CQ N D 1,R Y T A RGE T : r . r o n e- .

LASTRESORT: Any industrial city

F OR C E R EQU IR ED: 7 Sq_uadrons

B. 31)th Wing Objo,otivos:

PR IM AR Y TA R GE T

port and built u.p urban area oftho oity of [obe: Objootivo

folder 90.a5 Map M-9

1 .n ,,: IN G PO IN T

to rollOlr

LAST RESORT: Any ind~strial city

FORCE : REQU IRED : 3 Slluudrons

C· Soheme of Maneuvor;

(1) Mothod of atta.ok: By aqu.l.drons in column. utto.oking with u min1Jlwa

timo intorvul b ot we on o om ba t squadrons. Tho pri~~y t~rg6t will beo.ttaokod by viSu.f~l b om bi ng m et ho ds if' possiblo Illld b, ro.d.a.z-bomb1lJCmethods if noooBSo.ry.

(2) A%ie uod altitude of attcok:toot.



XXI [J,,~Jb..r Cornroond

IJPO 2.34

(.3) Time Qon.trol: The r1r·st combat group '0 £ thl;) 73rd Wing will leo.ve the

departure. paint c.t "H~ Hour. The first oombat group or th~ 313th

Wing ",111 ll;)(l.ve the de'p[!>.rture point <"t approx1m"te,ly "H" Hoia' plult4S minutes.

D. Routes - 73rd a.nd 31]th Wings.

Base

17Q

oo, N 144.°00•E (Departure point)

29°00'N 135°4.5'8J4°4,S'N 135°S3'J! :34°5b~i 135°36'1.': (IP)Ta.rget

33°oo'N 13S"'15'E23°00'N 14.5°0Q·EBaSe

X . (1) "'D" Dtl.y ond " . e n Hour: To follow.

(2) Bomb Loud:

73rd Wing - iio.xim\Ua load p,ossible. A mmamum load of 6.000 lb., typo

g28.ailfi&ble i,noe'.Ildiary oluster fused to cpen at 5.000 ft will be

oarried. Eaoh aite'ra..£'t wHI D.ll.rry O.D I : I 500 lb T 4 2 : 4 frag oluster tuaedt,o open 1,000 Caat below the airoraft.

31.3th Wing ~ E)aoh alro t:a.ft wi 11 0arry a millimUJn of 5 t000 1be of aamatype bombs speoified for 73rd Wing

O J »'< ::

It 3'SQ ' (;:l['j

< : : _ o.0 ~. ....t U)

U1 !S..."

;;e

(3) rntervolomate'r setti.ng: Soefeot,.

4. Su.pplyanQ Adminlsha tion.:

A. BTIergol'lcy land~ng f i o l d s :

(2) w e s t F i e l d , Tinien

(3) Navy Agana,. G\llml

(4) Depot Field. Guam

5. communioation~:

A. SOP XXI Bomber Commandwill govern the use of radio ald to na.VigatiOb. aDdIlse of' l's.dio7!O1!' reporting purposes.

B. operational Air-around station:

(1) 731'd Eombardment Wing Ql!l.ll Sign OOv530

(2) 313th BGmbardment Wing oall sign Oov535

BY oOllllllo.ra{l, of Major General LeW.Y:

OFFICI11L :, W ILSON

O/OPNS



X I. [ I.H)JI>!: Ivr C ' '' '' ,ao .I> . d

I .PO 234

CONS0LDATED AMEl\TD!~gNTS F'OR FO #22

MIDDLEMMl 1

Amcndmont 1: a. .3 ,l to read,

73J"d VliD.g Obj(;)ctl,voa

PR1R' .ARY T:.RGET IlmUG POINT

90.25· 139137ZOllO 1 of Map M-9 1~6136

079132

FOa.CE R&;'_llIam

2 S q t 1 l ! 1 . d r o n s -

2 S q u (o .d r on s

3 S Q _ u o . d r o n s

COll!m:&ild Li tho s.o " ...10.iming poi::tt r",f,.,renoo on i'J: I Bor. 'bor

Number 90 •. : 1 5 - u r b ! : : l l . .

SECO~'MRY TJ'1.GBT - NonolJ'.STRES·OR T - Any industrial (Iiy

FORCE REQ.UIRED - 7 Squ •. dr one

b., P!:::l".3 B torsc.d ~

B. 313th wing objootives

PRI:.t'l.RY TARGET I.mINCe POINT ?ORCli. ¥;n.RED90.•25 Z01l0 1 of 074125 3 squ~ro;u!lflilp M-9

Aiming point ref'ore.nce. on XXI Sonber Co;:;",·,~.:::.diU.o ,0$,-10

Numbsr 90.25 - Urb!lJl.

S F ; c o : m r , R Y TJ ,R GET - NOnG

LAST RBSORT- ;llly ind"str 10.1 oi tyF O R C E REQUIRED - :3 Squadnons

c. pa.r 3. X (4) to roud.

(4) Bombing instrllOtions; prevailing surf<:.ca wi!;.... ov~r t~

target urea t.ne I'r-om the west norta'"V1est. Ir. ordor to

p,:-o11',,;nt smok", from proco"ding c..t-e:"CkE obsouri::::.g thu '-iningpoi.nts for Eucoodiug .. tto.Q!cs th", :;'illLiLlg points ...111 beuttl;loko.d ill tho follOWing order:

1. 139137 -2. 1061363. 0791324. 074125

AUlcmdmont2: a. change pllr 3X(3) to road: int()rvdow.,~t"r sottings: ).,'fU.illlU.lll.

• Amondment j: Chungo

X (2)

0,. pu.r 3X(2) torer.:.d:

Bomb Load:

73rd Wing: p;!inimum o.{)oeptc.blc for =.11 i\/C will be 6,000Lbs, This does not preo Iudo , :. 0 ever , loc..ding l./c c.boft

minimum eand st enc with st..1'oty. ..bil i ty of cbe iod.1 V1dlKol

o0mbr..t a rlllW , ..:.nd laJ,o'lln oharr.ot"ristics of tbo IndiV1dw..l

Al e . EI-och de: Typo E-28, l,.imo.ble inc.:.lDo.h.ry clU6tor

fusod to open ...t5,000 i't ,lud one 500 lb T 4 ~ trt..g oluate

fu s e t o op~n 1,000 r t b e l o w the ~iroraft. The tr~ bgabwi.1 be loaded so ~s to drop lirst.

313th Wing: Each we will of.l.rry U QinimuJD or 5.000 Ib

of sume typo of bomb loud spooifiod for 73rd Wing.

b. Add to pur 3x: (5) Tho 1'r.:.g bcrab will hv loadod to drop ti!'u..Bombardiers will b..Jbriefed to scLvo toclbe oV.Jr th.l tw-got ~

in Ousa the bWubs fo.11 to roleaso on tho loleot1vo method.

Amendment 4: tL. pc.r 3X(1 ) should road: (1) "DR Day ane. gH- Hoar O8lOJ2 Flobruc..ry 1 9 4 5

Amondlaont 5: a , pl.l.r 1.\ to road::

A~ Fri~ll.dly

(1) Air

(a)

(b)



XXTf;o",br.r COflUll!l.T,d

APO "3!~

frOlll l030K to l230K. call s1g,n l24v2lJ,. Bot.h

guard 4474·ke,s and .500~es. eM-Ilnol "C. on. VHF.

(~) N a v a l,

(n) L~foguard sub~ar ine: g submarines 'lItH be; on

statio'll at 32 JO'N 137 OO'E, 3l03 0' N l :) Bo OO 'Eand 30

000'JII 139°15 'E du.ring ~ntire mission. -

(b) Destr oyer: f. ge stl' oyor wi 11 be onresoue duty

at 22000'N 141 30'£ fram 0945K to nOOK. se.ma

dos br-oyor- will bean duty fr·om 2030K to 2400K

El.t posi. tiou 22°00 'N 144°30 I Er Voiue o~11 H.lyard.

h. Ch~nge p~r 3D to re~d:

D. Routos - 73rd and 31 3t h '!Ii ng e:

Basa

17°00 'N 144 °00' E (Departure point)<?900QIN 135°45'£

34°45'N 13 5 ° 5 3 1P,34°Sl'N 135°36,£ (IP)Tlll"gst

3 40171N l35°0l'E

33°00'N 135°15'£23°0Q'I~ l45°o0'E

BUSs

Amendment 6: a. Add to p~r lA(l)(b)(h) 2 8-29 i)UlI,OOS will be ov:erHfe gue.r6, sublllflrine station

(3 1 Q 30'N 136 °45IE) o.ppro::dm&.te1y 140QK.

b. Chnngo pa.r 1J.(2) (a) to read;

(a) B sUbmiUiM!l will be on station at 31030'!I l36°45'E.

30°00.N 1,)8°15' E end 28°15 iN 14-0°00IE dur ing entire

mission.

,Amendment 7~ a. canoel middleman one repeat ouuce I midaleman aile soheduled

for 2 Feb 4 5 .

b. Change par 3X(1) ~o read: R ~ " D~y and - E O Hour: to f ollow .

Amendmont B: 6.. Cna.nge pa:r 3 A to rend:

I,. 73rd '.'lring objective;

FRI ;U .1 l . Y Tl • .RGET AIl.: IN G FaINT FORCE REq,irIR ED

90.25 05811.5· 3 Squa.d.rOll8ZOl le 1 of ' M~·p1-9 071123 2 S'luo.drons

092132 2 squadrcmaAiming point refa·renoe on XXI Bomber GOOImandLitho Moso.io

number 90.25 - urban. Ballastic wind have been taken into

oonsidc)ration in selection of aimiug pOints and no oorrea.

tion w ill be made.

S E C O l m : . R Y T_'illGET: NoneL A S T R E S O R . T : A n y industri.;..l oity.

F OR CE R EQ UIR ED : 7 squndrons.

b . Change par 3B to read:

B. 313th Wing Objeotive:

PR IW .. R .Y T f.. RG£T90.2.5

..i.I1~ING POINT

119128'lOll~J 1 of Map M"S!

.Aiming point referenoa on XXI Bomber Comma.ndLitho Moat.numbor 90.~ ur ban, Bnlle.stl0 wl.ads ha.ve be~A tabn1$o on si de r~ ti on i n s el eo ti on of aiming pOints aD4 ~ ~reotion will bo made.

~. changa par 30(2) to re~J

(2) Mean axis and fJ.lt;l.turie o£ atta~kltl.lde of :5.000 tela.





DISTFtIBUTIO.N

O F

XX I B OM BS C 'O lm :A ND

~.ACnCAL MISSION REPORT

MiSB1ollj..ito. 26

4 P9bruJ;~ 3.945



Copy No.

1a

:34

5

6

7

a9

10

lli.121 314

1 51 61718

1920

0-t , o J .

(j21

:> 2 .20000 23;;

24. . . .m

2. 5 26- -27

28

29

3:0

: 3 1

3233 1

34 , .

35

363,.7

38 - 3940 - 59

7071

72-

73

74

7S75

'n

7879

60

6162

63648586 - 100

DISTRIBUTIO~

TACTICAL MISSION REPOR TS

Commanding Gen0r'o.l, .. Twentieth Air Force.COmIDllnd.i.ng.Oanero-I,. XXI Bomber Commo.nd

Depu.ty Com.mo.ncler•. Twentieth Air· ForoeChief of Stllff. Twentieth Alr Force

Chi sf of: Sta.f'f, XXI Bombe r COmDIll.!ld

Dep!~ty C/S. O~ms. & : Irr'.:., XXl Bomber COmJ!lundDeput.y cis, Sup. & Mo.lnt •• XXI Bomber GOlnmtllldlI/C' of S, A-g,. XXI BOfJl:t ie r C ' ol'lmand

OOmDlllndil ' lg Genero.l, Army Air Forces. Att~ntton: ;"O/;'SInte::'ligsnC'G .,

Commo.nder In Chief:. P ac if'ic OCeiln Areo.e (;'dv. Hq.)

Commnnder In Chief" Pa;c if ic Ocea.n Arens (Rear Her.)Chief of No.va l Intelligence. 0?-16~V

Joint Inte llige 'nc e C ente r, P ac if ic O ceo ..n Area.sCommo.nde' ;,ir Force, J.-'ElcU'ic Fleet

Commander, ~ifth Fleet

Commander. Fir st Carrier To.sk Force

Commander. Forward MallCommrutding Genera.l. U.. S•. J!.rrny Force g in FlU East

Commanding Ganerti l. {T. S. Army l i 'o roes , Po.c 1fic Oce.o.n .-.reas

Command ing Generd • .All ied Air Forces. S:lUthw9StPnc1fic Araus·

Comrnand ing Gene 1'0.1. U. S. Strate'giC .hiI' F0rc e8: In SUr ope

Gommr.nding Genernl.· Ei.ghth Air Force

Com .mo . nd :L ng Gena r 0 .1 , Me:!iterro.ne~n All iel! Air Porce s

aommnndi.ng General, F:' .f te" 'nth Air PoroeCommanding Genera.1t Seventh i.ir Force

COlJ !mo .nd ing Genero.l. Seventh Bomber COl i l I IUU l d

Co.mmanding Genera ] , Seventh Fighter Command

Gommnnd l .ng Genera.l. XX Bomber C'o ! l l lD .o .nd

Coml ! l o .nd ing Genet':tl, 5f ,th B om b W ing

Commanding GC;Jnerlll, 73:.rd Bomb Wing

Commanding Genera l . 313th Bomb 'Vlng

OOlllllll'.nding Gensrn. l . 314th B om b W .ing

Comma.nd in g Genero.l, 3l5th Bomb lJing (Adv. Hq.)

Commandil"g Officer,' Srd Photo Recon, Squndroll

Communding Ofr'lcer •. 33rd Statistical Contt"l Unit

TllcUcs & Training Section, A-3. XXI BC'mber Commo . nd

Historicul Officer, XXI Bomber Commnnd

Com;llr..nding General, Army Air Forces. Attention I Ae/AS

Intellig~noe, Collection Division

Commolldir).gOffIcer, 6th B om .b G roup (VH )

Commanding Officer, 9th Bomb Group (VB)

Commf -nd lng OffIcer. 19th Bomb Group (VB)Com.. . l r .n .d .1ng OffIcer, 29th Bomb Group (VB)

Commo.nd ing Officer .. 39th B om b G roup (VH)

Comma.nding Off icer , 40th Bomb Group (VH)

Commanding Officer, 330th ~o m b Group (VH)

Commanding Offioer, 444th Bomb Group (VH)

Commc .nd ing OffIcer, 462nd Bomb G roup (VH )CommMd lng Of'fIcer, 466th Bomb Group (va)

Commanding Offioer, 497th Bomb Group (VX)

CommandIng Off ioer , 496th Bomb Group (VH)

Command ing Orricer~ 499th Bomb Group (VH)

COmmanding Officer, 500th Bomb Group (VB)

Command ing OrfIcer, 504th Bomb Group (VB)

Commo. .nd ing OffIcer, S05th Bomb Group (va)Repor t s Seotion,. .& . - .2 , X XI B om ber OopuDA.nd



.I.~R.A.I.I

S E C R E THEA DQUA RT EB B XX I B OM BZ R CO llL lA !JD

APO 2;;4. ~% postiaatltat'

San Francisoo, Oal1tcr nla

St]11IiC·l'I l'h,oto Reconnaisflance Procram tor ffeek 21' !lay - 2 .Nat

TO Stuff Photo Officer

1. Thi~. eonfi.rmathe reoonna1a8ance photog~phlC req\Wst.aagreed upon £I.t saturU&y Afternoonl• raeet1ns. 26 Hay 1945:

84 " and/or <lOot covllrago ot tho follmrlnz ~

a. Oolor

(1) Sample 12" to be taken pO.r a.greMlent. at. t.h... \lDaand pe~ memooi" 3 Uay trom A...2 to Staft fhct.o Offic.r.

h• .nIlS.

(1) Kobe-Osaka (per map from e.I.V.)

f2) .Kyoto (per map from C. I .U .)8) 01111" (per map fro. C.l.D.)4) Co as tal &re&a per request/map 16 Kay.

4. lbipR'.



S E C R E T

(per re,~ost .1' 20 !Jay)

(oQ) Hy~ru.l"ae.har.A/7's . t o e . pep re.que.at. co J&&y.

S t a f f ' ~ ) ' i o t o Officer



. _ S E.. C &~ T .PNI~-f'"T'\ R t . . \ - , r &rrrSC.U

wi 'Ii

HEADQUARTERS XXI BOMBER CQI;1l.1A,UDAPO 234, c/o postmast.er

S !i i nF r an c is c o, 8 (l . li fo r ni a

20 L l a y 1945.

SUBJ E CT: R .e co nn ai ss a,n ce P r o g r a m F o r W e e k 20 - 26 L ay In cl us i'V e

TO 3rd Photo R e co n Squ a d r o n (Via Lt. Col o n e l lladeau,

Ac tg . Staff P h o t o O f fi c e r )

a. F'lak

'If'>-",", (1) Strip from Atsugi - Fujisawa (per map from IIajor :>arby)

(2) Cant i.nue work on 16 May rellues t•

1. Tbi s c o r i firms t h e reconnais a a n ca photogra}'hio requests

agreed upon at saturday afternoon's meetin;;:, 19 L:.ay 19r~5~

24" and/or 40" c over-ag e of t h e fol1m7ing:

(I tis assumed comp 1ete pe st - s tri ke on 1'iai.0:'a has

been ob.t-a ined ) •

l Q . Damage A s s e s s m e n t( 1) T ok yo . A rs e na 'l ,A re a

:f P £51(2) 2008/792/HamamatsuIf: ,. US-(:3) 1702

c. Targets

2.$1 (1)

;u 7 (2)1IF(3);1~..~ (4)

Bendai (repeat 16 May)662 (if no t c o v e r e d in m i s s i o n no . 214)T a k a c h ay a (34/40-136/30. So u t h of T a r g e t 1214)

40" cover-age of T a r g e t 2047 ten (l)) m ile s E ofH i m e j i .AIr a nd v ic i ni ty.Hyalturagahara 36/11-140/26; Ishioka A lF 36/14-

140/15/30; Isl1ioka E 36/12-140/18; ana Chofu .Vi'(5)

d... ShippinS

~27(l) Shi mono sek i St rai ts an d an cho rag es(2) Ma.izuru!Miyazu(3) Tsuruga

Z,r(4) Harima N a d a

( per )lap.. II

It It

.. II

)



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS XXI Bm.m.ER COL11J.UIDAPO 234, c/o PostmasterSan Francisco, California

16 Ll:ay 1945.

SUBJ.ECT: .Reconna iss anc eP r 03ra m .f0r ' , ' 1 1 9 ek 13 - 19 L:ay Inc1 us ive

TO 3r d P h o t o R e c o n Sq u a d r o n (V i a L t . Colonel l 1a d e a u ,Ac t g . Staff F h o t o Officer)

1. T hi s c o n fi r m s the r ec on na is sa nc e p ho to gr ap hi c r eq ue st sagreed upon at Saturday aft·ernoon's meeting, 12 Ll:a~r1945.;

84" a n d /o r 40 11 o o ve r -a g e of t he following:

a . D a m a g e ,A s s e s s m e n t. . "$'>4 of #"l4'f1f Uf 1 f ' > 'l.!4

( 1) 67¥£674/1884/2l 21/1702(2) Miya:zald (per litho to Col. Na d e a u )

(3) NA€i,~ya- ~..~t Bay)(4) Atsugi/FuJisawa (p o s t 12 May str-Lke)

h . Te t r g e t $

(l) K o r i y a m a (i n o l 2025/X X I 61 29) Se n d a i per teIe c o n-#",,4 t o captain BekKer)

(2.) 69;/1547

(~) Hai~,ijo Jima (AAFFOA)(4) Kuma~oto ..(I!Ummamotoll~ ( c o py @f t e l e c o n to Bec'~er)(5) Y am ag uc hi(6) Oitr. T?,rget:s (per list to Captain Becker)

(7) Go}.AlF 35/31 - 140/06

(8) l033/2103 (Baka)(9)

K u n da - 7~ m i l e s NW o f Ma i zu r uo. ShippinG

(1) BBat Ushishima 33/52 - 132/01

(2) Ch an ne ls at SS/In l a n d Se a , Ko b e ap p r o ac h (pe r ma p )

d. Flak

(1) Key p o in t s on So u t h H o ns h u c o a s t/Sh i ko k u (p e r u p ,e. 949th Eng

(1) O s a k a



£ £ t Q E E . 1 .

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS XXI BOMBER COMl.!A}m

APO 23,4, .c/o F'ostmasterSa.n Francisco., California.

6 llay 1945

SUBJECT:' Reconnaissance ProGram For Week of .6 ~ ~3 1.:a1 Inclusive

3rd Photo Recon Squadron (Via Golonel Shephard, Stafr

Photo Officer)

TO

.1 Th1,$ oonfi rms the. r-ec onnai s sance photogra.phi c requestsagreed upon a t Saturday afternoon's meeting, 5 ~ay 1945:

24" a.nd/or 40" coverage of the following:

a. Targets

(1).".673/1.884(to be o b t a i n e d 6 !.lay)

(2)vlwakuni vicinity (to b e o b t a in e d 6 ~ay)

(. 3 )....-2.82

(4) .. Wakayama - 34/10 N-135/16 E(5)<V'Toyokawavicinity (per sketch given to Capt. Becker)

(6)"XX1 3098/1643

b. Damage A p s e s s m e n t

(I) 2008~ \I.,~~

(2) B009"(3) 660 .-

(4) Ka gos hi m a Ci ty-"'(5) Kyu shu Ai rfi el ds "

c. Shipping

(l) S h i m o n o s e k i Straits"(2) xc be/Os aka

2. Att ent ion sho uld als o be gi ven to la st w eek's request toc olor co~ era ge of ta rge ts. Als o inc lud ed as an ea rly priorit7 i8

th e 6" col or pho togr aphy r-eque.sted of Col one l Shephard by

Colonel Garcia.



-: SEC RET- 'S E - - - ~ ~

. C A E T

HEADQUARTERSXXI BOMBERCQf.;J:.IAlID

J. 0 234, c/o Postmaster

San Francisco, California

30 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance Program For ,,1eek of 2'3 A.I..ri1 - 5 J.:.ay

Inclusive

T O ord Photo Recon Squadron (Via Colonel 3he._hard, :t...rPhoto Officer)

1. Th iS o o n f i r m s t he r e o o n n a i s s a n ce :;:. ho t o cr < '-phi ce. U.es~

agreed upon a t Saturday's afternoon meeting, 28 ~pr i l 1945:

a. Flak - Good 24" and/or 40" coverage of ~ ..Shimonoseki Strai ts to Tokuyama. ~;'lso the west shore of CbihaP..eninsula. (Precise ar-eas outlined on ma r left \'lith S_ ", t a i n

Beolcer) •

, g o Damage Assessment

R eg ul ar p os t-s tr ik e photOGraphy on c ~ r r e n t(r;:yuShllirdromes, 2008, 792, 2009, etc.).

To~yo Ar s en a l A re a .14gQshima City.

is~ions(1)

(2 )

(3)

,£. Shipping - Good 24'1 a n d/ o r 40" coverage required 0'" .: e

fall o w i n g:

(1)

(e)

(3 )

East a na West entrances to Bhioonose'd Jtraits.

Hal'lbor facili ties in a n d a r o u n d ShirnonDse':i prior

t o s ta rv at io n #8 .Harbor facilities lnand ar-ound Kobe/Csa::a priorStarvation i18. (On the items i m n e d i a t e l y prec

the Shipping Intelligence Officer is to providea d v a n c e n o t i c e o f s t a r va t i o n #S so t h a t p h o t o sbe t a k e n prior thereto).Jiiroshi!1la~ Bay4)

.:!. Targets - 24" md/or 40n coverage is needed

(1) C o l o r photography of t h e following

2010/198, 356, 660, ~. 19.95,

1702, 26~a, 16Bl and 382.Usual b l a c k a n d w h i t e c o v e r a g e of:(~ ) K is ar az u ( r e c e n t cover age too ha2Y ~or(k) Wakayama - 34/10 N - 135/1& E(9) 283 and 66~.

(2)



34/51 N- 134/36 E

35/22 ~J - 136/32 E

34/28 N- 136/42 E

34/25 N - 133/06 E34/10 II - 132/12 E

36/20 lJ - 139 E.

36/23 t~ - 139/12 E36/23 n - 139/04 E36/20 11- 139/34 E36/27 N - 140/24 E38/16 Ii- 140/5'3 E35/36 Ii - 140/08 E35/34 Ii-140/08 E35/41 N - 140/05 E

S E C R E TGiving f.J.' rat priority to t-h thand/or 40

11. '.. " . . . e ~ree items listed above 24"

. Coverage· 15 also needed of the follov/inB~

a. Abashih. Tarui

C.• ' ITj iyamadad. Mihara~ , Iwaku:ni

f. Tal(as.akig. IseZaki

h. Maeba.shi

1. TaltlUnaj. Mitok , Bendai

1. Chiba

S E C R E T



HEA DQUA RTER .S . XX ! B OM BER COM MA NDAPO 2$4,c/o PostmasterSan Francisco,Qalifornia

22 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance, program For Week of 22-29 April Inclus1.ve

TO 3r d Photo Becon s q u a d r o n (Via Co lo ne l S he ph ar d, Staff

Photo Officer)

1 This confirms the reconnaissance photog.raphic request

agre ed u12on at Sa turdaY af ternoon Ia meeting., 21 A_pr11 1945 ~

A. .Flak Int.elligence Officer requests good 24" anel/or 40"

coverage of Target 193 a nd territory to the E a st a n d Northeast(annotated T·arget Ohart given toG:aptain Becker at the meeting).,

b . Elaoto Intelligence Officer,. A-B, pr es e n t e d fol l o wi ngrequest fOF - 24'" a n d/o r 40 1 1 c o v e r a g e needed by C . I.U . i n t e r p r e t e r s:

(1) Any and all islands oft the coae't.s of Japan,

pa r t i cu l a r ly So u t h ti p o f KyuShu.

(8) 84" a nd/o r 40" coverage o f fo l l owi n g a i r fi e l d a:

1

K ISARAZU

L~E l 3ASH I~TSUYA .h1 ! A

- -- -..J iYAKOR IG AHARA- - ~ASUMIGUARA

,-~-IIDA

- M IEUMIYAKAWA

" ,NARUTO

35/23 N - 139/55 E

36/21 N - 139/02 E36/0,8 N - 139/22 E56/11 N - 140/25 E36/03 N - 140/14 E36/27 N ,. .140/26 E36/88 N 139/49 E35/39 N - 140/31 E35/35 N - 140/26 K

( 3) 24" an d/o r 40n coverage of po s s i bl e m i li t a ry d epo tat 35/13 N - 139/43 E. Approximately 7 miles BEo f Yo ko su ka and i m m ed i a t e ly So u th. o f TJraga Ha r bo r .

c. F or Ta r ge t section, good 24" and/or 40" co v e r age 1s s t i

r eq ui "r ed o n:

(1) 90 .20-1635 -~i ct",: P r~(2) 541/62/1368 (po s si b l e s po t s whe r e bu z z b o .o s a r e .-4(3) D a m a ge assessment pho t o gr a phy o n ~o/Kawa 8a ki.

~. Shi ppi n g In t e ll i ge n ce O ffi ce r, s ti pu l a te d t he need torsome 24" and/or 40" pr e-st ri ke pho to gr aphy in adyance of S \ a r Y & t#8. (Captain Jeffr ey l eft .nJ'!qg~.dm a p wi th ca pta i n Beeker

t his purpose.) Shi ppi n g In~~~~ O ffi ce r 1s to gl ~ 3 PII a



u pl e d a ys a d v a n c e notice of D-Day on S t a r va t io n #8.

e. The following r e q u e s t fo r reconnaissance photography

o r i gi n a t e d outside t he Bomber Commandand wascoIDIDuuicated tothe 5 t ' d P h o t o Becan S q u a d r o n by the Staff P h o t o Officer:

(1) All Kyushu A1rdromes

(2) K o r e a n s t r a i t ~

(3) K u r e H a r b o r . a n d In l a n d S e a(4) All Shipping

S E C R E TliE.Q.R!l'.



--HEADQUARTERS XXI B OMB E R COMtI.AND

.APO'234 ,c/o Fost.masterSan Francisc6, California

16 Apri 1 1945.

SUBJECT: Baconnaissance Program For Week of 15-22 April Inclusive

3rd Photo Becan Squadron (Via Colonel. Shephard, StaffPhoto Officer)

i,

fo 110\'\18 :

24" and/or 40" coverage required for flak ana.lysis as

a. East shore Tokyo Bay.b. East-West shore Osaka Bay.

c. East-west lse Bay (annotated map submitted to CaptainBecker at meeting to indicate desired coverage).

2. 24" and/or 401 1 coverage for Shipping Intelligence Officer

as follows:First Priori ty - SI;.!28-nose)s.iStrai.tsv,- Inland Sea and Osak. . ._

Second P r i o r i t y - H i r o s b i m a Na g a s a k iYokohama S a s e b oShi zuoka F u k u o k aNagoya

c. Third PriG)"i ty - North Honshu ports (listed submitted

previous ly) •

a.Bay.

b.

3. 2411 and/or 40'1 cover-age of targets as follows:

a. 240'

1635. - 1 , , )

1547~ (Per talk w i t h Captain Bec k e r 16 Apr '4tI

b. Fast-strike p h o t o g r a p hy of Tokyo Arsenal Area,

(2) Kawasakl/SoutQ Tokyo.

S E O R E t



o SECRET

S E C H E THEADQUARTERS XXI BOMBER COL1!..AND

APO 234,. c/o Postmaster

San F~anci8Co. California

24 t4arch 1945 .•

SUBJECT; .Reconnaissance Pr o s r a m f o r W e e k o f 25 !. . a r c h'45.

TO 3rd Fha to R e c on S q u a d ron (Via Co10ne 1 Shsphara, 3taf fPhoto O f f i c e r )

1. Thi 5 conr irms the reconnaie aance photograph te requestaereed up on at this after-no on IS me,eting, 24 L!arch '45:

(Pres-;nt at meeting - CoLorieI Haas, .llajor ';'JOod, Captain Delaney,captain Becker and Lt. Judson).

/ a. Po s t-s tr ike pho tos on Tar-ge t J.93 (to be f lOrn 25 to.archj •

./ b. Kyushu air iDS ta 11atio na - 24" and/or 40" COverage.

(Both the four targets in nhich \'IS are inter-eetee: andthe four targets on which Navy reported mos t of itsdamag e ) •

c. 24" and/or40!1 coverage Of Shimonoseki StraitsI (To be flown 25 and 26 March to complete flak coverage;

and as frequently thereafter as po~eible to check onshipp ing) •

d. Additional 24" and/or 40" post-strike coverage of Kobeand Na-~oya.

I f .

24" and/or 40" cov er-age on installations in Koriyaaa.(p 10k up 1544 and 1545 at the same time if p058 ib Le,. . v . J

24" and/br401 1 coverage on post-strike missions on :$and/or 29 March. , I

24" and/or 40" coverage of urban ar ees per 17 .March ' < & 5

request, "Reconnaissance Program for ';eek ot 18 March 14(Captain Delaney/C.I.U. to check the ~tatus of co.er on

these areas so that Target section can pass the lnfQre-tion to Captain Becker.)

Received by:

s~olo O f f i c e r



§. lL2. . ! ! E 1 =SECRET

HEADQUARTERS XXI BOMBER OOm1AbID

.APO 234. c/o PostmasterSa"n FranciscliI .• California

17 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Beco nna iss anee Program fo.t" Week of 18 L1areh' 45.

TO 3rd Photo Racon Squadron (Via Golone1Shephard. StaffPhoto Offic.er)

1. This confirms the reconnaisaance photographic requestagreed Upon in this afternoon's meetins, 17 arch 45:

a. Kobe/Osaka post-strike phetog.raphy 24" and/or 40"(eneairc.raft fer 18 M·arch). .

,2. 24" and/or 40" COv era ge of follcwing airdromes:

Kaney-a.- 31/22 - 130/60M iya z ak i - 31/63 - 131/27Tac h i a r a i - 33/24 - 130/37Nl t t a g a ha r a - 3.2/06- 131/26X e g o s h i m a - 31/33 - 130/34O m u r a - 32/56 - 129/56/15Ci t a - 33/15 - 131/38Sa~ki - 32/58 - 131/56

£. 24" and/or 40" co ve rage on any of t h e f.ollcwing urbana rea s n o tpr-evaous 1y covered;

" TOKYOI O s a k av Na go Ya"'Kobe~ Y a wa t a

j H i r o s h i m a..uku.oka

" K aw as ak i~ N a ga s ak i-l Xure

.~

t/ A i i i i S a S a ki" H am am a tau

~

(It is bel iev ed tha t t he 0017

c i t i es i n t h i s l i s ~ o n whickwe do n ot have ade qu ate 2'·and/or 40" c.overage a r eHiroshima, Xure, a nd Sa a& bo .It i s p o s s i b l e tha t 6· coyer .was obtained r e c e D t ~ onFukuoka and Om uta . en'eraseYawa ta 1s to i nc lu de IO kD ra ,Tobata, Wakaaat.811and 1ilreeakC.I.U •• ill be asked toavailable 24· aD4lIor 60-

on all these c1t.ies .... _-.1

8 E C A J :" t h a t w e h a v e it...)

SElT" ET- .. . -----1-



A-3

d. 24H and/or 40" c9Yerage of the W coast of lse Bayoover'!'ng Tau, Suzu.ka. TomJ. ta. and Kuwana; ala 0 Wanc r e or 'Chita Bay,. namely Handa and Kowa. Purpos.e. of this Pbotographyis to locate the miss.l.ngKawanishi assemhly paint. (Peraccompanying annotated t ar ge t c ha rt ).

e.. 2411 and/o.r 40" of aireraf t· targets. a t Omiya.Takarazuka and Hiro.

f. Ref·e.rence is a Lso made to Reconnaiseance Request #7.dated-S March '45 on the Nanpo Shoto •. O.I.U, will be asked·to oheck all of the coverage obtained since this request was

made to determine those isl~9d,s VJhich r-emaIn to be covered .•

Received by: Approved by:.

s taf fPb oto Off ice r

S . E G R E T

SECBET____ a-.



...+

I i iF rC 11\ . . ~ ' JN R 58 S E C R E T U R GE N T

NI'R251J

" , U B J E C T : PHOTO R E C O N N A I S S A N C E

, r,)n 'S/y

- - f " v C " (

CO SECRET

12 MAY.!,.,

FROM: DEF80l\1.AF 20 122:205Z

T O COMGE NBO MCOM 21

R E r : U E ! ' i T P H O T O RECONNAISSANCE O F H I R A T S U 1 (A NAVAL ARSENAL,

90.1'1-1336, AND JAPAN LIGHT METALS COMPANY90.18-1177.

DE,qIRABLE TI-m~ COVER BE ,OETAINFD WITHIN 48 HOURS IF POSS IBLE

TOD 11 AP. . . . . 2217Z RGlf

V E C R N R 58 • • z21n w a K

cap y



CIa,ssiflcation

S E c S I C R E T \X.Xl BOMCOM

Incomino Messag.e

Date -Time __Group

~

Message SerialNo,

100112Z-ROUT I NE

Signal Serial No.

I M-10-282425 ..

Originotor: COMGQl~AFPOA ~

A'otion Addressee.:.... __ cm~~ ~~I~~OM ~1 _. . C O M GE N F 'IT "C O M 7

Info Addressee :_-- - - - -- -- -- - - - ~

CT . f ' 9:5.4 TENT A T I VELV A . l E R T E : D TO STRIKE A TS U G I, FUJ I SM ' l l '

A IR F IE LD S O N . 12 MAY. R E Q U E S T 3 PH OBThlN POST-STPIKE P H O T C S

A S S O O N THEREAFTER A S PR AC TIC AL. . A LS O R EQ UE ST ED !S C OV E P

OF HACHtJO JIMA AIR fACILITIES. CONSIDER THIS PPlorlTV

REGUIREMENTI rt VIEW OF EIIEMY CAPAS I L T I Y OF USE OF THIS BA~E

fOR STAGING FIGHTERS AGAINST IWO OR FOR SURPRISE itITERCEPTlnN

EMPIRE STRIKES.

Closslficatlon

~ i 8ECRET I

Action Section wil l enter brief s,ummary of action taken or

thCit no action is required on r.yerse side and return to

Gen.ral.

~.

~

I s



XXI RO,~Th'lJlj\f"D ~;~""R SHED': FoT' tl'flnsTllis:;.iofi of ~;~T'-stcrr 1nfrrrm~t1on anddocUl"'ents. u.Nurnhe:t1''::tr'!'lS GQl'.:se~ut1.\1'",l:'Y' from 1:,0],) 'to ~otto!!'. h. Drew line

ll.c,roes sheet .9.i"t",Tcr;ch it~m. c. 'USE';fulJ width of dle",t for len th IITem',!'''".

su.z: r~CT: .Phot<1gl'll. llh'l,-e Goverage

<,

IFRQP i T O~ J Q I pr.T1i:

1llApr49 staff'I 3rd Poote'

I I Photo I " Recen. I

I II

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I

I I II, . I '1 . 1I ' r f II I

II I

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. R e q u e s t ph o t o co v e r a g e o n J c e a r e a f r o m X TI B o m b eCo mm an d n or th approximatelyelght m ~ ~e s fr om n or thsouth road along thair area, west to ocean. Th1a

request, is for XX I Bomber Comm:mdEngineering Section

~ SHEPHAFD

Colonel, Air Corps

Staff Photo Orficer



. . .Q. 1. " . 1J JIIIIID, __

AM . 23,.. 0/. PGI!lD.STU: JA R 'JW lC TS C8, Q AUP OR N IA

' r i o n.te ..... &qaaun aDIi )5\11. P1wte 'h*Idto)

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.eo 23,.,0/0 .;rOSl'll1ASftIlB A R 7 BJ I,WC lS OO ,a.u.l!'OJIRU

(Oo.bln.a. PI seoUon., ' r4 Photo RIIOR 8q\a4nn ..

)lllaroh 1 .C J J . . 5

'" ,oDO •• • • • • • • . ~ • • • ~ '... • • • 90 ~ (3 f t - 191 .1 5 )O~,., ••• ,.,. t! ,.".:. 9 0 ' ~ ~ ":QA .Q .Qn. " • •• .• ~ • • , •• •• " ,,~lOO~·· "'l 'b JC ~" • • • • • • .• • , . .. " 0 " '75 ~" "KOS•••• , ~•••• ~••• ,.100 ~" "Y IWUA" .... " • '.' '0 • • • •• 90'." "" 'I 'i" "J[O ~ •••• '•• '. ' • 1 1 . ' . , . ' • • ' . ,~80I· •~ 0 .100 ~ II "

cuao .sA l tX .0•• .•....• •• ••• 80·1" "'IOBdA ..••• """....0 •••••• 100 J" •

BlR08Bl1IA••••ii· .0 ••'• • •••

80 ...." ":rmr o,· OX4 .~ ', '• " " " , oil " • ' J , . Q I: :n w ~ m . ' 90 ~~ ~ •••••••••••••••OQ"" •EDII' ~ ", ••••• 100,.·· •8A8IBO " .. • 40"· •""Odll! 0 ••••••• , .; " ••• 100I" •HAMVlATSV "I ..90 ~" •O IIU 'fA ••• ' 100 ' ." . "UO'l'C) •••••••••••••••••• O . (018.'- ....bl.)

Sua.r:sc'1'1 V~bMl .uea 21.. Phot 0 COY ..

TO e'apt De,laney. Aaat A-a,:r.I •• S Q . XXI Bomb .. CODlIIDd

1 . I n . , " :J_t , lPo," ,D•• to , 70 , u r , ' , verbal . l ' e .q.u •• ' o r )1 'Yarob.lts."'he.t'el1ewbg Ul"DIIIl U ' ,. '" aHOQvc:.' " b 1 ~ " pb.otograph7:

C O N F ID E , T IA l



S E C R E T,,s -E -: - C -F . - E ~ T

HE A:DQU:A:RTEf ,. o S XXI ,BOMBEk eO!JjJllAND

AF0254. c/o postmasters a r t Fra~~isco, California

RECONNAISSANCE ,BEQUEST NO: 10

DATE: 20 March 1945

SHIMOJIPSijEKI STRAITS AREA

It'''M·i~''

l:;ot priority: Target NO: This Vlill confirm, priority need for

coverage of Shimonosheki Straits A.rea per exchange ofmelIloranda between A-3 and A-2, communicated to .

Colone 1 Sh ephard and Cap tai n Becker. Pr 10r ity ne adsfor post-strike photography fOiiowing recent urban

~ area attacks has preventedprocurement of des ired Shimonoshek1 Stra,i ts covera';:;,e.

Colonel Shephard and Oaptain Becker agreed to.day todispatch two (2) photo recon airc·raft to tbis area

on21 March '45 to cover the area deacribed as t iratand second priority by A-3. Captain Becker bas [I,c<..demap notations of these areas tor mission. lar,rine.

2nd ?r IH ity: Tar get No:

Desired RDute;

Received by: APproved by:

t 2 J • . . ·

cc.-r_• t

staff photo Officer

S E C R E TS-E-C-R"E"T



S e C R E T

P ri or it y Ta rg et s1. 7Ua rch 1. 945

1. Kobe & Osaka, & P os t St ri ke

2. K yu sh u Air fie ld s24" 40"

K a n o ya 31/22 - 1 3 0 / 5 0M iya ~a ki 31 /53 -1 31 /27

Tachiari3 3 / 2 4 - 1 3 0 / 3 7

Nittagahara 3 2 / 0 6 - 1 3 1/2 6K a g o s h i m a :31/33-130/34Omura 3 2 / 5 6 - 1 2 9 / 5 6 / 1 5Orta 33/05-.131/38Saeki 3 2 / 5 B-13 1/ 5 6

w V t. I~ rr e

" ~ ,~ ~ r 7 .

:;tv o F lO IS

3. Urban Areas1. Tokyo ,I'

2. Osaka . ,1 '

). Nagoya,l'4. Yokohama/5. Kobe t6. Yawata (Kokl1l'a Tobata l'iakamatsu-KurosaJri)

7. Hiroshima8. Fukuoka

9. Kawasaki....-Ie.. Nagasaki ~

11. Kure12. Saslbol3. Ama gas aki ,.,.14. Hamamatsu ....

15_ Omuta

4. K a w a n i s h i - N a g o ya

5. OmiyaTakarazuki

660 o : : t .K uR E

S E C R E T . : - . .' .'. .'

. . " ~ : . . .~ . ,~ ; 1 '



HEADQUARTEElS XX! BO\Vl.8ERCOMMANDAPO 234.. c/o P!Hl'tm as t er' .san .Francisco, callfor n.1a

RECONNhISS~NCE RE~UEBT NO: 9

DATEl: 11 March 1945

Reconnaissance Program for Week of 11 ~larch '4.5

«'II,pm·:·1 st prj,..e:j-ity : Targ et No.. Pos s_t.r ike Reconnaissance

e . To complete the cover age of the

Nansei Shoto.Desired RDl!l,te:

3. To .continue efforts to obtaincov"erat$e of aircra.ft targets f

660 - COmiya) - 240/1B33 - 1 7291724 - 1 5!? - 168 1 - 1378

ReceiVed by: APPl' 0ved by:

s t a ff ~ b o t o O f f i ce r

S E C R E T



RECONNAI SSANDE hE QUE&T NO: 9 ' "

DhTE: ?' l 1 A 1 . . / s:

S E C R E T 7 : . - ' .S-E-C-R-E"T . / : ? " _ ~

HEADQUJd':lTERS XXI BOMB.::!:R.GO"M~ qr ; r . " -Pd 234 c/o postmaste,r / P'l/f~ y)

san pr anci. sco, Cal H' ornia

1st Friority: Tar.get i>Jo:

t2nd Priori ty:. ·';Target No:

S~..;-a-

I~~

Desired Rout.e~

5

Rece 1ved by:

S E C R E T



HEADQUARTERS XXI BOMB!.R COMMANDAPO 2:5~4-c/o Po~·tmastersan Francisco, California

""'-RECGNNAISSiANCE hEQUEf:iT NO: -r

Df,TE:. 6, March 1945

NanpoSi'lDto

IlaNEP .AREA:

1st .frio'r.ity: Target No: Supp laments request Ho. :5 cated1 March 1945. See reverse sideof th isaheet for other Coveragereql1ested at this til'le.

Specia.l mission to be set upfor 7 ~arch 1945~to obtain be~tPOBS ib.Le 24l'and/or 40" coverageof 1s Landa., islets and rocks inthe Nanpo Shoto.. AlsO" requestt h a t 50 a n d 20-mi l e r a r i a r aoo epLc tur-as be taken on theseis lands where pOGS ible.

i l I . . . iL pT2..!2 tfi ' f J o b ] e " _ : ; t

2nd .Pri€irity: Target No:

:Desired Raute:

,

Rece.1 ved by!

V "~fyg~~S t a f t F h o t O f f i c e r A-2

nC~ .~ • 7"

· ra



s-E- C-R- Eo:.T'

H E A D Q U J $ T ~ ~ l ~ 1 1 E e l M B E ~ C OM M A N D. .APO234, c/o postmasterSan Fr aneisco. CalifQr nia

BE[; ONN"ISSANCE H E l i U E S T NO ; 6

DAT.!!:: 0, March 1945

T 0 !5YO . AREA :

1st Pri or iy.: Target No: ~~.90.17-357 (P~~)

Desired ROllte: J. ¥ 'r ~ 'fo"

From .Kumagawafo 110 \"I FIReast to Shovra throughTachikawa BE to approx J.390 38' E turning SEto pas s approx over Haneda, cross Tokyo Bayto p.ick up Ki.s.arazu. Per annotated T.arget

Chart attached.

;Deair ed F t cu te :

Received by: : APproved by:

' 1 - 2t~hoto Officer

It



SECRET .PRIORIl'I TARGETS ~ u Ma rch 1945

357 p. l919 p.2 (918 adjoining primary radar targets)3087 p.2

,3098

9O.~B20n p. l

193 p. l19B/2010 p.l194 p.2240/1833 p.21729 p•.21834 p•.21219/2012 p.2

T a k a r a ~ 34/47« - 1 35/22. E p .21 8

2 6 . 3 A

1547 p. l1702 p.,2

.2!hll 16d.~ 1Ii>.i. p•.

660 p.2

. S E C R E T .



NAN! 0 BRO TO 24" 40"

~ - 4 " - I •• y

"r. . - &4"11 r•• I- - • •.- - •- -:

~ (I • •

NOTE ,

Documents

21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 26