I. What is a Common Carrier? (Article 1732)

PEDRO DE GUZMAN vs. CA and ERNESTO CENDANA

Facts:

Cendana is a junk dealer from Pangasinan who brings such material to Manila for resale. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles with cargo which various merchants deliver to Pangasinan. For that service Cendana charged freight rates commonly lower than the regular rates.

In 1970, de Guzman a dealer of General Milk contracted Cendana to deliver 750 cartons of Liberty milk to Pangasinan. The controversy arose when 600 cartons never reached Pangasinan as the truck which carried these boxes was hijacked.

De Guzman sued Cendana seeking to recover the value of the goods. It is the contention of de Guzman that as a common carrier Cendana failed to exercise extra-ordinary diligence in dealing with the goods. As a defense, Cendana alleged that he is not a common carrier for the reason that this is not his principal line of business, he only do this occasionally, and that he has no certificate of convenience.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Cendana is a common carrier.2. Whether or not a Certificate of Convenience is a prerequisite before one can become a common carrier.3. Whether or not Cendana should be held liable.

Ruling:

1. Yes.

Cendana is a common carrier. Article 1732 defines common carriers as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. The article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity or as sideline. Article 1732 carefully avoids making distinctions between a person and/or enterprise offering transportation service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e. the general community or population, one who offers services or solicit business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

Common carrier may coincide neatly with the notion of public service under the Public Service Act which at least supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code. Public service includes, ”xxx any person that now or hereafter may own , operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes xxx”

2. No.

A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. That liability arises the moment a person or a firm acts as common carrier, without regard whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise.

The law imposes duties and liabilities upon common carriers for the safety and protection of those who utilize their services and the law cannot allow a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by simply failing to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations.

3. No.

The Supreme Court held that Cendana should not be held liable under the circumstances. The hijacking of the carrier’s truck does not fall within any of the five (5) categories enumerated in Article 1734 and that list is exclusive. Therefore, there is a presumption as provided under Article 1735, in other words, the private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of Cendana.

Article 1745 (6) provides that a common carrier is held responsible – and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility – even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted “with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.” The Court believes and so hold that should there be “grave and irresistible threat, violence or force” the limits of extraordinary diligence would be reached. In this case ARMED robbers held up the truck of Cendana and in fact these men were apprehended and were tried before the CFI and were convicted for robbery.

In these circumstances, the SC hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event.

Therefore, Cendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely beyond his control.