Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 149679 May 30, 2003HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC, namely: IRENEA E. SENO, LIBRADA E. MALINAO, INES E. MIOZA, SOLEDAD E. CENIZA, RODULFO ERMAC and AMELITA E. BASUBAS, petitioners, vs.HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC, namely: BENJAMIN, VIRGINIA, PRECIOSA, DANILO, as HEIRS OF URBANO ADOLFO; BERNARDINO, CLIMACO, CESAR, ELSA, FLORAME and FE, all surnamed ERMAC, as HEIRS OF CLIMACO ERMAC, ESTELITA ERMAC, ESTANESLAO DIONSON, VICENTE DIONSON, EUFEMIA LIGARAY, EMIGDIO BUSTILLO and LIZA PARAJELE, LUISA DEL CASTILLO,* respondents.PANGANIBAN, J.:Ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 16, 2001 Decision2 and the August 6, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals4 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59564. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed [D]ecision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City is hereby AFFIRMED."5The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.The FactsThe factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA as follows:"In their Complaint, [respondents] claim that they are the owners of the various parcels of real property that form part of Lot No. 666, (plan II-5121 Amd.2) situated in Mandaue City, Cebu, which lot allegedly belonged originally to Claudio Ermac. Upon the latters death, the said Lot No. 666 was inherited and partitioned by his children, namely, Esteban, Pedro and Balbina. Siblings Pedro and Balbina requested their brother Esteban to have their title over the property registered. Esteban, however, was unable to do so, and the task of registration fell to his son, Clemente. Clemente applied for registration of the title, but did so in his own name, and did not include his fathers brother and sister, nor his cousins. Despite having registered the lot in his name, Clemente did not disturb or claim ownership over those portions occupied by his uncle, aunt and cousins even up to the time of his death. Among the occupants of Lot No. 666 are the [respondents] in this case. [Respondents]-heirs of Vicente Ermac claim ownership over the portions of Lot No. 666 now occupied by them by right of succession as direct descendants of the original owner, Claudio Ermac. [Respondents] Luisa Del Castillo and Estaneslao Dionson allegedly derived their title by purchase from the children of Claudio Ermac. [Respondent] Vicente Dionson, on the other hand, bought his land from the heirs of Pedro Ermac, while [Respondents] Emigdio Bustillo and Liza Parajele derived their ownership from the Heirs of Balbina Ermac-Dabon. [respondents] ownership and possession had been peaceful and undisturbed, until recently when the [petitioners]-heirs of Clemente Ermac filed an action for ejectment against them. The filing of the said ejectment caused a cloud of doubt upon the [respondents] ownership over their respective parcels of land, prompting them to file this action for quieting of title."[Petitioners], on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the [respondents], and claimed that the [respondents] have no cause of action against them. It is essentially claimed that it was Clemente Ermac and not his grandfather Claudio Ermac who is the original claimant of dominion over Lot No. 666. During his lifetime, Clemente Ermac was in actual, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of an owner of the entire Lot No. 666. With the help of his children, he cultivated the said lot, and planted corn, peanuts, cassava and fruit products. Clemente also effected the registration of the subject lot in his name. Upon Clementes death, [petitioners] inherited Lot No. 666, and they constructed their residential houses thereon. [Petitioners] claim that [respondents] recent occupation of some portions of Lot No. 666 was only tolerated by Clemente Ermac and the [petitioners]. [Petitioners] in fact had never surrendered ownership or possession of the property to the [respondents]. [Petitoners] also set up the defense of prescription and laches.x x x x x x x x x"After trial, the lower [court] rendered its [D]ecision, finding that the original owner of the lot in question was Claudio Ermac, and therefore, the property was inherited upon his death by his children Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. All the heirs of Claudio Ermac, therefore, should share in the ownership over Lot No. 666, by right of succession. The ruling [was] supported by the admissions of Irene[a] Seno, witness for the [petitioners] and daughter of Clemente Ermac, establishing facts which show that [petitioners] and their predecessor Clemente did not own the entire property, but that the other heirs of Claudio Ermac are entitled to two-thirds (2/3) of the lot. Since the entire lot is now registered in the name of Clemente Ermac, the shares belonging to the other heirs of Claudio Ermac, some of which have already been purchased by some of the [respondents], are being held in trust by the [petitioners] in favor of their actual occupants."6Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe CA held that the factual finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)7 should not be disturbed on appeal. The latter found that Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was inherited by his children -- Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. It ruled that respondents were able to prove consistently and corroboratively that they -- as well as their predecessors-in-interests -- had been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners.According to the appellate court, "[t]he fact that [petitioners] have in their possession certificates of title which apparently bear out that it [was] Clemente Ermac alone who claimed the entire property described therein [has] no discrediting effect upon plaintiffs claim, it appearing that such titles were acquired in derogation of the existing valid and adverse interests of the plaintiffs whose title by succession were effectively disregarded."8Hence, this Petition.9The IssuesIn their Memorandum,10 petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:"I. The validity of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 5, 1996 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, directing the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, to cease and desist from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 2401[;]"II. Whether or not O.C.T. No. RO-752 issued in the names of [Spouses] Clemente Ermac [and] Anunciacion Suyco is indefeasible and incontrovertible under the Torrens System[;]"III. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the property in the names of petitioners predecessors-in-interest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco[;]"[IV]. Whether or not laches ha[s] set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. 666[.]"11The Courts RulingThe Petition is unmeritorious.First Issue:Preliminary InjunctionPetitioners assail the validity of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC to restrain the ejectment proceedings they had filed earlier.This question is not only late, but also moot. If petitioners truly believed that the issuance of the Writ was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, they should have challenged it by a special civil action for certiorari within the reglementary period. Any ruling by the Court at this point would be moot and academic, as the resolution of the issue would not involve the merits of the case, which this appeal -- as it is now -- touches upon.Second Issue:Indefeasibility and Incontrovertibility of TitlePetitioners posit that pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), the certificate of title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Clemente Ermac, became incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from its issuance. Hence, it can no longer be challengedence, it can no longer be challenged.We clarify. While it is true that Section 3212 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy13 in law.14 The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.15Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.16 A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.17 Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.18Third Issue:Ownership of the Disputed LotPetitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of respondents, as well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio Ermac.We are not persuaded. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a factual issue already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial courts findings of fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.19Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.20 Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period of time, there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional evidence to support their claim of ownership.Fourth Issue:Prescription and LachesPetitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches, because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present action. We disagree.When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party.21 Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present case as the original owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since respondents were in actual possession of the property, the action to enforce the trust, and recover the property, and thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe.22Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations.23 It cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.24 Its application should not prevent the rightful owners of a property to recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.Puno, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., on leave.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. L-23300, Manarpaac et al. v. Cabantan, Director of Lands and Register of Deeds of Ilocos Nort, 21 SCRA 743 Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCOctober 31, 1967G.R. No. L-23300ANDRES MANARPAAC, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.ROSALINO CABANATAN, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS NORTE, in his capacity as such, defendants-appellees.Herman P. Coloma for plaintiffs-appellants.Harold M. Hernando for defendant-appellee Rosalino Cabanatan.Office of the Solicitor General for defendant-appellee Director of Lands.ANGELES, J.:On appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing the complaint, without costs.On December 7, 1960, the plaintiffs, numbering 24 in all, surnamed Manarpaac, filed this action against Rosalino Cabanatan, the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, on a complaint which as amended on December 22, 1960, alleges that the plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial, in actual possession as owners of two parcels of land, the first with an area of 8,742 sq. m. and assessed at P160.00 under tax declaration No. 034206, in the name of Rogaciano Manarpaac, the second, with an area of 12211 sq. m. and assessed at P390.00 under tax declaration No. 030876, both parcels are situated at Barrio 15, Batac, Ilocos Norte, specifically described in paragraph "2" of the complaint; that such possession has been public, uninterrupted and in the concept of owner; that they have their houses built on the land; that in the year 1956, the defendant Rosalino Cabanatan filed an application for free patent of a parcel of agricultural public land situated at Barrio Suyo, Batac, Ilocos Norte, with an area of 27,788 sq. m., and said defendant "taking advantage of the ignorance and lack of education of the plaintiffs, wilfully, fraudulently, maliciously, and surreptitiously without previous notice to the plaintiffs whatsoever, included the above described parcels of land" (par. "2" of the complaint) in his application for free patent; that on November 7, 1959, a free patent was issued in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan by the Director of Lands, and on December 3, 1959, certificate of title No. V-105031 was issued in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan by the register of deeds; that said certificate of title which included the land of the plaintiffs, is null and void, because the patent was obtained thru "fraudulent misrepresentation"; and that the proceedings leading to the investigation and survey of the land were without notice and without compliance with the requirements of the law. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed that the free patent and the certificate of title be declared null and void, and the same should be cancelled; "4. That in case the title issued may not be annulled, that the defendant Rosalino Cabanatan be ordered to reconvey unto the plaintiffs their lands unlawfully and fraudulently included in said title"; that the defendant be ordered to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00; and "6. That the plaintiffs pray for such further relief and remedy as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises."The defendants filed separate answer.In his answer dated February 8, 1961, Rosalino Cabanatan denied the material allegations in the complaint, and, as special defense alleged: (a) that the issuance of the free patent and certificate of title in his name were regular and after compliance with the requirements of the law; (b) that the plaintiffs never protested with the Director of Lands against the defendant's application for free patent; they did not appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands awarding the land to said defendants; and the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust the administrative remedies required by law, and, therefore, the decision of the Director of Lands has become final; (c) that the original complaint was for nullity of title, however, the amended complaint is for RECONVEYANCE which is legally impermissible, for it changed the cause of action, and hence, the amended complaint should have been dismissed, and the plaintiffs required to file a new complaint.In its answer dated January 6, 1961, the Director of Lands alleged that the issuance of the free patent was regular and after compliance with the requirements of the law; that "2. . . . he admits the allegation in paragraph 6 of the complaint to the effect that one year from the issuance of patent has not yet elapse"; and that the plaintiffs never filed any protest with the Bureau of Lands against the application for free patent filed by Rosendo Cabanatan.The Register of Deeds in his answer dated January 11, 1961, alleged that the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan was in pursuance of a decree of patent presented to its office and that he merely acted in compliance of the law.On September 22, 1962, Rosalino Cabanatan filed a motion to dismiss on the following ground: "That even assuming that plaintiffs have a right over the land in suit, their action has already prescribed and that the court, therefore, has no jurisdiction", predicating the contention of the rulings that "When any public lands are alienated, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of Section 22 of the Land Registration Act and shall become registered land . . . and a certificate of title shall be issued as in other cases of registered land (Diwaling Sumail, et al. v. CFI of Cotabato, L-8287, April 20, 1955), and the one year period under Section 38 of Act 496 should, in the case of public land grants (patent), be counted from the issuance of the patent by the Government under the Public Land Act (Nelayan v. Nelayan, L-14518. August 29, 1960).The plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss.On September 23, 1963, the court issued an order dismissing the complaint holding that the free patent having been issued on November 3, 1959, and the first complaint was filed on December 7, 1960, the action for review of the decree was, therefore, filed more than one year after the issuance of the patent.From this order, the plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court.From the averment of facts in the complaint, it clearly appears that the plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial in possession as owners of the disputed land, have declared the land for tax purposes in the names of two of them and have built their houses on the land, but that through fraud and irregularity, defendant Rosalino Cabanatan succeeded in securing for himself, the certificate of title in question. The foregoing recital of facts in the complaint are sufficient averment of ownership. Possession since time immemorial, carries the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or, that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. And so, we said in one case . . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial. FOR SUCH POSSESSION WOULD JUSTIFY THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND HAVE NEVER BEEN PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OR THAT IT HAD BEEN A PRIVATE PROPERTY EVEN BEFORE THE SPANISH CONQUEST. (Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, citing Cario v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 394.)Whether this presumption should hold as a fact or not, is a question appropriately determinable only after the parties have adduced, or at least, are given the opportunity to adduce, their respective evidence.The ruling in Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 414 [re-affirmed in Mesin v. Pineda, L-14722, May 25, 1960] sustained on all fours the validity of plaintiffs' theory, thus In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts. If by legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the state, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.In the case at bar, predicated upon the allegations in the complaint, together with the admission of defendant Cabanatan in his answer that the amended complaint is an action for reconveyance, which are deemed admitted on a motion to dismiss, there can hardly be any debate that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action for recovery of possession of the land for, settled is the rule that the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. (Casilan v. Espartero, 95 Phil. 799).WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Costs in this appeal against the defendant Rosalino Cabanatan.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando JJ., concur.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-65129 December 29, 1986TOMAS AVERIA, JR., petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA, in her capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch LVII, Lucena City, and VERONICA PADILLO, respondents. CRUZ, J.:We gave due course to this petition against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Lucena City, 1 which is questioned on a pure questions of law, more specifically whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell. The oppositor, petitioner herein, refused to participate in the hearing of the registration proceedings below, claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the said case under Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise known as the "Land Registration Act." The respondent court then held the hearing ex parte and later rendered a decision ordering the registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent herein. 2 In his petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, it is argued that the lower court had no competence to act on the registration sought because of the absence of unanimity among the parties as required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. 3 The petitioner cites Fojas as v. Grey, 4 where this Court, through Justice Serafin Cuevas, declared: The aforequoted provision of the Land Registration Act (Sec. 112) was relied upon by appellant Apolinar Fojas in petitioning the court a quo for the annotation of the Deed of Assignment. However, while he had the right to have the said Deed annotated in the owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-2376, the serious objection of Saturnina de Grey to the same raises a substantial controversy between the parties. In a long line of decisions dealing with proceedings under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act, it has been held that summary relief under Section 112 of Land Registration Act can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes contentious and controversial which should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in any case where the incident properly belongs. 5While this was a correct interpretation of the said provision, the same is, however, not applicable to the instant case. The reason is that this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which became effective on June 11, 1979. In Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided that: SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.-Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system. Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine a questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof. The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even this contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before. It appears that the respondent court proceeded to hear the case below notwithstanding the manifestation by the petitioner of his intention to elevate to this Court the question of jurisdiction he had raised. 6 The trial court should have given him the opportunity to do so in the interest of due process, pending a categorical ruling on the issue. As it happened, it arrived at its decision after considering only the evidence of the private respondent and without regard to the evidence of the petitioner. 7WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated September 23, 1983, is set aside. Let a new trial of Cadastral Case No. 1, GLRO Cad. Record No. 202, Lot No. 2810-B, Lucena Cadastre, MC No. 374-82, be held, at which the petitioner, as well as other interested parties, shall be given the opportunity to be heard. Our temporary restraining order of October 5, 1983, is hereby lifted except as to the registration of the questioned deed of sale which shall depend on the outcome of the said case. SO ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, and Feliciano, JJ., concur. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent.

[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]

ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the ares covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.

D E C I S I O N

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons.

These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters.cralawnad

Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.

The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain.

Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.

During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.

Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2) private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .

". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted that during that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the District Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as a public forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that even under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown.

"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of the application;

the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he had been in

"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,

it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that; the result must be to deny all these applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment;

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the application as well as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.chanrobles law library : red

The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin in their petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.

The petition is without merit.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant petition.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Berebers witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate courts finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.

The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that Lot No. 88S never ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.

In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public land classified as forest.

Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."cralaw virtua1aw library

We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by this finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Relova, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 136965. March 28, 2001]UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEGUNDINA ROSARIO, respondent.D E C I S I O NPARDO, J.:The CaseThis is an appeal[endnoteRef:2][1] from the decision of the Court of Appeals[endnoteRef:3][2] setting aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City which denied respondent Segundina Rosarios (hereafter, Segundina) motion to dismiss[endnoteRef:4][3] and cancelled the notice of lis pendens annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042. [2: ] [3: ] [4: ]

The FactsThere being no controversy as to the facts and the petition raising pure questions of law, we adopt the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, as follows:[endnoteRef:5][4] [5: ]

On September 7, 1971, Datu Ditingke Ramos filed with the Court of First Instance, Quezon City, an application for registration of title covering a parcel of land situated in Quezon City, with an area of 100,000 square meters and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended.[endnoteRef:6][5] [6: ]

On August 31, 1972, petitioner University of the Philippines (hereafter, U. P.) filed with the trial court a motion for intervention in the case, claiming that the land covered by the application (by Datu Ditingke Ramos) is within its property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462.On March 15, 1973, U.P. filed with the trial court an opposition and motion to dismiss Datu Ditingke Ramos application for registration.On June 6, 1973, the trial court issued an order which reads as follows:Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the University of the Philippines and considering the certification, sketch plan (Exhibits O and P). the testimony of the Acting Chief, Geodetic Engineer as well as the written manifestation of the Land Registration Commission to the effect that the land subject matter of this application and covered by plan SWO-15055 does not encroach on the property of the University of the Philippines and that it is not inside any decreed property, the motion to dismiss the application is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.[endnoteRef:7][6] [7: ]

On June 8, 1973, the trial court First Instance decided the application as follows:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application is hereby granted, declaring the applicant Rosario Alcovendras Vda. de Ramos (surviving spouse of the original applicant who was substituted as party applicant in the order of April 24, 1973) the absolute owner of the property applied for and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended, confirming her title thereto. Upon in the order of April 24, 1973) the absolute owner of the property applied for and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO 15055, as amended, confirming her title thereto. Upon this decision becoming final, let the required decree of registration be issued and after payment of corresponding fees, let the certificate of title be issued in favor of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, widow, Filipino and a resident of Quezon City.SO ORDERED.[endnoteRef:8][7] [8: ]

On March 19, 1974, the trial court[endnoteRef:9][8] issued an order stating: [9: ]

The decision rendered by this Court in the above-entitled case under the date of June 8, 1973 having become final, the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission is hereby directed to comply with Section 21 of Act 2347.[endnoteRef:10][9] [10: ]

On May 8, 1974, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decree No. N-150604 in favor of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, pursuant to which the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued OCT No. 17 in her name.On November 21, 1976, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled OCT No. 17 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 also in the name of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos due to errors in the technical description.[endnoteRef:11][10] [11: ]

On February 23, 1988, Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Segundina Rosario (hereafter Segundina) covering the parcel of land embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619.On June 11, 1988, fire razed the Quezon City Hall Building which housed the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 was one of the titles destroyed by the fire.Subsequently, Segundina Rosario requested the Register of Deeds to reconstitute Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-78195 (223619).On March 11, 1993, U.P. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Quezon City[endnoteRef:12][11] a petition for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N-126671) 367316 naming Segundina, Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, among others, as respondents. [12: ]

On November 10, 1994, Segundina caused the registration with the Register of Deeds of the deed of absolute sale. Consequently, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 in Segundinas name, resulting in the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-78195(223619).On November 19, 1996, after the parties had presented their respective evidence, U.P. filed an amended petition alleging that it is the true, absolute and registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and that the unlawful acts of ownership being exercised by (Segundina) and (Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation) as well as the existence of their spurious certificates of title, create a cloud of doubt on the title of (U.P.).In its third cause of action, U.P. prayed that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 or the reconstituted titles or derivatives thereof be declared null and void ab initio for being spurious and fraudulently issued.On May 15, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court an omnibus motion for the dismissal of U. P.s third cause of action in the amended petition as well as the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. 121042.On November 10, 1997, the trial court denied Segundinas omnibus motion. On December 30, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration questioning the denial of her motion to dismiss and praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens.[endnoteRef:13][12] [13: ]

On April 16, 1998, the trial court[endnoteRef:14][13] denied Segundinas motion for reconsideration and motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens.[endnoteRef:15][14] [14: ] [15: ]

On November 10, 1997, the trial court[endnoteRef:16][15] again denied Segundinas omnibus motion to dismiss and cancel notice of lis pendens.[endnoteRef:17][16] [16: ] [17: ]

On May 26, 1998, Segundina filed with the Court of Appeals[endnoteRef:18][17] a petition for certiorari[endnoteRef:19][18] assailing the orders of the trial court denying her motion to dismiss. [18: ] [19: ]

On September 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in favor of Segundina. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the third cause of action is barred by res judicata and that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Segundinas motion to dismiss.[endnoteRef:20][19] We quote its dispositive portion: [20: ]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the Orders dated November 10, 1997, and April 16, 1998, are declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE insofar as they deny petitioners Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens. The Third Cause of Action in respondent University of the Philippines Amended Petition is ordered DISMISSED and the Notice of Lis Pendens annotated on TCT No. 121042, CANCELLED. The writ of preliminary injunction, insofar as it relates to the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 121042, is LIFTED.SO ORDERED.[endnoteRef:21][20] [21: ]

On October 26, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals, a motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted decision.[endnoteRef:22][21] [22: ]

On December 17, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[endnoteRef:23][22] [23: ]

Hence, this appeal.[endnoteRef:24][23] [24: ]

Petitioners SubmissionsFirst, U.P. contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously allowed Segundinas motion to dismiss as Segundina has yet to prove in a full-blown hearing whether her reconstituted title traces its roots to OCT No. 17. According to U.P., the issuance of Segundinas title was highly anomalous.[endnoteRef:25][24] [25: SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 117734. February 22, 2001]VICENTE G. DIVINA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and VILMA GAJO-SY, respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J.:Before us is a petition for review of the decision[1] dated October 27, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03068 reversing and setting aside the judgment dated July 7, 1979 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch II, in LRC Case No. N-147. The facts of this case are as follows:Lot No. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Antonio Berosa. On July 22, 1960, he sold it to Teotimo Berosa. The portion is particularly described as:A parcel of land unirrigated situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, with an area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square meters and bounded on the North by Lot #1464 - Fausto Ayson and Lot #1888 - Gloria Fajardo: on the East, by Lot # 1446 - Silverio Garcia: on the South, by Lot #1891 - Antonio Escobedo and on the West, by Lot #1880 - Federico Faronas and Lot #1890 - Eugenia Espedido. Cadastral concrete posts are the visible signs of boundary. It has no permanent improvement thereon. Designated as Lot 1893 of Antonio Berosa. Declared under Tax No. 13038, valued at P760.00 for the current year in the name of ANTONIO BEROSA[2]On March 23, 1961, the Berosa spouses sold the same Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos. In the deed of sale to Gamos, the lot was more particularly described as:A parcel of RICE land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, with an area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square meters and bounded on the North, by Lot #1462 - Fausto Ayson and Lot #1888 - Gloria F. Estonante: on the East, by Lot #1464 Zacarias Espadilla; and Lot #1466 - Felix Arimado; on the South, by Lot #1898 - Silverio Garcia; and on the West, by Lot #1890 - Eugenia Espedido and Lot #1892 - Antonio Escobedo. Concrete cements posts are the visible signs of boundary. No permanent improvements thereon. Covered by Lot #1893 of Teotimo E. Berosa, and declared under Tax No. 13039, valued at P760.00 for the present year in the name of TEOTIMO E. BEROSA.[3]On April 26, 1960, Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix Arimado, a boundary owner of Lot 1893, a 20,687 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot 1466, also in Gubat. It adjoins Lot 1893. On March 28, 1961, Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax Declaration No. 13237 and declared it had a total area of 4.0867 hectares. He also had the property resurveyed by private land surveyor Antonio Tiotangco. In 1967, Tax Declaration No. 13237 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 9032 in Gamos name.The re-survey plan (AP-9021), of Lots 1466 and 1893 conducted on June 16, 1961 for Gamos, showed that the consolidated properties contained a total area of 100,034 sq. m. This plan was approved on July 12, 1961 by the Acting Director of Lands.On November 23, 1968, Tax Declaration No. 12927 which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 9032 was secured by Gamos and declared therein that the area of the consolidated property was 10.0034 hectares with 2500 sq. m. planted to coconut, 3.8187 irrigated for rice planting and 5.9347 were thickets.On January 19, 1967, Teotimo Berosa conveyed to Vicente G. Divina, herein petitioner, a portion of Lot 1893 referred to as Lot 1893-B. It is described as follows:A parcel of dry and thicket land situated in San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, Philippines, having an area of 54,818 square meters and bounded on the N., by Lot 1888 (Inocencio Eroe); Lot 1887 (Jaime Enaje); and Lot 1462 (Heirs of Zacarias Espadilla); on the (Illegible), by Lot 1466; on the SE, by Lot 1893-A; on the S., by Lot 1898 (Heirs of Silverio Garcia); on the E., by Lot 1892 (Antonio Escobedo) and Lot 1890 (Eugenia Espedido); and on the NE, by Lot 1889 (Pedro Fajardo); all of Gubat Cadastre. NOTE: This lot is designed as Lot 1893-B, a portion of Lot 1893, Cad 308-D.[4]On November 28, 1968, two years from the date of said sale and five (5) days after November 23, 1968, when Gamos secured Tax Declaration No. 12927 declaring the consolidated property as containing 100,034 sq. m., the deed of sale was registered. An undated Subdivision PLAN of Lot 1893, was prepared for petitioner. The plan, without Bureau of Lands approval, showed that Lot 1893 was divided into two, Lot 1893-A and Lot 1893-B. On July 24, 1970 Gamos sold the consolidated property to private respondent Vilma Gajo-Sy, for P20,000.00. The land was particularly described as follows: A parcel of land located at San Ignacio, Gubat, Sorsogon, under Tax Declaration No. 12927 in the name of Jose P. Gamos, covered by Lots No. 1466 and 1893 of the Gubat Cadastre, with an area of 100,034 sq. m., more or less.[5]On July 29, 1970, Tax Declaration No. 13768 secured by private respondent, was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 12509. On August 28, 1972, she filed an application for registration of title to the property at the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, docketed as LRC Case No. N-147, GLRO Record No. 42920. The application was amended on March 8, 1973, on order of Branch II of the said court to include therein the postal address of Inocencio Erpe, adjoining owner of Lot No. 1893 described in Plan AP-9021.The land registration court, by Decision of July 29, 1975, ordered the registration of private respondents title over Lots Nos. 1466 and 1893.On July 13, 1977, pending issuance of the final decree of registration petitioner filed before the same court a Petition for Review of the July 29, 1975 judgment. He alleged that he is the owner of a portion of Lot 1893 consisting of 54,818 sq. m. conveyed to him by Teotimo Berosa on January 19, 1967; that he was unaware of the registration proceedings on Lot 1893 due to private respondents failure to give him notice and post any notice in the subject lot; and that private respondent fraudulently misrepresented herself as the owner of the disputed portion despite her knowledge that another person had acquired the same.Private respondent opposed the petition alleging that the registration case had long become final and the court no longer had any jurisdiction thereon; and that lack of personal notice to the petitioner of the registration proceedings did not constitute actual fraud.The trial court, in its Decision[6] dated June 7, 1979, found that the petition for review was timely filed. It also ruled that the failure of private respondent to include a known claimant in her application for registration constituted deliberate misrepresentation that the lot subject of her application is not contested when in fact it was. Private respondent, according to the trial court, should have included in her application at least the person of petitioners cousin, Elena Domalaon who had, before respondent filed her application for registration, made known to the latters sister her apprehension of their land being included in respondents application for registration. This misrepresentation, according to the court, amounted to fraud within the contemplation of Section 38 of Act 496.[7] The trial court in its decision disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:(a)Setting aside the Decision rendered in the land registration case and revoking the order for the issuance of a Decree;(b)Declaring petitioner Vicente G. Divina the owner of the portion of the land applied for containing an area of 54,818 square meters which is described in paragraph 3 of the Petition for Review of Judgment; and(c)Allowing this land registration case to proceed as to the portion applied for which is outside the limits of the portion herein awarded to the petitioner Vicente G. Divina; and(d)Ordering a subdivision survey of the lots applied for, delimiting therein the area not contested and which is registrable in favor of applicant Vilma Gajo-Sy, and the area herein adjudicated to petitioner Vicente G. Divina, as to whom the land registration proceedings shall likewise be allowed to proceed after he shall have adduced such other evidence as are appropriate in land registration cases.SO ORDERED.[8]Private respondent assailed the decision of the trial court before the Court of Appeals. It averred that the trial court erred (1) in declaring petitioner-appellee owner of a portion of Lot 1893, in ordering a subdivision survey, and allowing petitioner-appellee to proceed with registration after adducing evidence as are appropriate; (2) in declaring respondent-appellant guilty of actual fraud in the land registration case; (3) in taking cognizance of the petition for review of judgment, setting aside the decision dated June 29, 1975, and revoking the order of the issuance of the final decree in the land registration case; and (4) in not dismissing the petition for review of judgment with cost.[9]The CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the petition. It ruled:In the case at bar, petitioner-appellee did not indeed appear in the survey plan as an adjoining owner of the subject property. Neither was he a known claimant or possessor of the questioned portion of Lot 1893 which was found by the court a quo to be untouched and thickly planted with bigaho. A fortiori, there was no need to mention in the application for registration the apprehension or claim of at least petitioner-appellees cousin Evelyn (sic) Domalaon in the application for registration, nor to personally notify Elena about registration proceeding.There could, therefore, have been no misrepresentation in any form on the part of respondent-appellee.x x xThere being no extrinsic or collateral fraud attendant to the registration of the property in the name of respondent-appellee, We find it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the assigned errors. Suffice it to state that Lot 1893 bought by Teotimo Berosa which he sold to Jose P. Gamos who in turn sold it to respondent-appellee in 1970 was designated by boundaries in such a manner as to put its identity beyond doubt; that the total area of Lot 1893 lot was determined after a resurvey/relocation was conducted for Gamos in 1961 the result of which is reflected in the Plan approved by the Bureau of Lands also in 1961; that what really defines a piece of land is not the area but the boundaries therein laid down (Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 Edition, p. 213); that the Lot 1893-B sold to petitioner-appellee made no mention of any tax declaration covering it, unlike the different deeds of sale covering Lot 1893, thereby raising the presumption that Lot 1893-B was really part of the Lot 1893 sold by Gamos to respondent-appellant; and that the subdivision of Lot 1893 into Lots A and B, caused to be made by petitioner-appellee who claims Lot 1893-B to have been the Lot 1893-B subject of the January 19, 1967 Deed of Sale in his favor which was registered on November 28, 1968, appears to have been made in 1977, ten years from the date of said deed of sale, a confirmation that there was no such Lot 1893-B subject of his purchase in 1967; and in any event, as the subdivision survey prepared for petitioner-appellee was not approved by the Bureau of Lands, it is not of much value (vide Flores vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 512 [1910]).In fine, not all the basic elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of the judgment rendered in the land registration case in respondent-appellants favor are present. The present appeal is thus meritorious.WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another rendered DISMISSING petitioner-appellees petition at the court a quo.[10]Hence, the present petition. Petitioner now assails the reversal of the Court of Appeals of the trial court decision. In substance, he raises the primary issue of whether or not, there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting actual fraud on private respondents part when she failed to give or post notice to petitioner of her application for registration of the contested land, such that it was error for the trial court to declare private respondent owner of the disputed land. Prefatorily, on the timeliness of the petition for review of judgment, we have repeatedly said that the adjudication in a registration of a cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of then final decree. As long as the final decree is not issued, and the one year within which it may be revised had not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing may set aside the decision or decree or adjudicate the land to another party.[11] In the present case, a certification was issued by the Land Registration Commission that no final decree of registration had yet been issued and by the order of the trial court dated September 28, 1977, it restrained the Commission from issuing such a decree. Clearly, the tolling of the one year period has not even began. Thus, the trial court did not err when it entertained the petition. Now, we consider the crux of the petition. Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioners name did not appear in the survey plan as an adjacent owner, nor claimant nor possessor. However, the trial and appellate courts differed in their conclusion on whether or not there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud in private respondents part when it failed to give notice or post notice to potential claimant and include their names in the application for registration. The trial court said there was, but the appellate court disagreed. Section 15 of P.D. 1529[12] is explicit in requiring that in the application for registration of land titles, the application shall also state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it shall state the extent of the search made to find them. As early as Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 22 [1980] we emphasized that a mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining owners is not sufficient but what search has been made to find them is necessary. The trial court was correct when it took notice that respondents sister Lydia Gajo-Anonuevo admitted that she had a conversation with petitioners cousin Elena Dumalaon about the latters apprehension that their land may have been included in respondents application for registration of the disputed land.[13] Respondents omission of this material information prevented petitioner from having his day in court. The trial court in its decision more than amply supported its conclusion with jurisprudence to the effect that it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.[14] Such omission can not but be deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud, a basis for allowing a petition for review of judgment under Section 38 of Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act. Additionally, it should be noted that petitioner acquired the bigger portion of Lot 1893 long after the initial survey of Barrio San Ignacio. Teotimo Berosa sold Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos who in turn sold it to respondent in 1970. Clearly, going by the records, petitioners name would not be found on the said survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1961, years before his purchase of the portion of Lot 1893. Petitioners claim is clearly meritorious.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 24, 1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment in LRC Case No. N-147 of the then Court of First Instance, Branch II in Gubat, Sorsogon is REINSTATED. Costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED.Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 100993 March 30, 1993CONCEPCION MUOZ DIVINA as represented by her daughter Amelia Tinoco, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and JUANITA N. MUOZ. respondents.Bermudez, Bermudez-De Jesus Law Office for petitioner.Milagros Abrogar for private respondent.NOCON, J.:The petition before us is an action for recovery of sum of money based on an extra-judicial agreement. The counsel for the private respondent informed this court that respondent, Juanita Muoz has succumbed to old age during the pendency of this appeal, and that despite efforts exerted, none of her relatives has come forward to substitute the deceased in this proceeding.The contending parties are in-laws, who are contesting the inheritance of the deceased spouse of the now deceased respondent. Eleuterio M. Muoz was the brother of Trinidad Muoz-Marticio, Maximo M. Muoz and Concepcion Muoz-Divina (herein petitioner, represented by her daughter Amelia Tinoco). Eleuterio was married to Juanita, although their union was not blessed with a child. Upon Eleuterio's demise, Juanita invited her three in-laws to participate in the extra-judicial settlement of the estate of her husband, they being the only heirs.Eleuterio's properties, both personal and real, were assessed in the amount of P709,403.00, less the expenses for the burial, wake and other incidental costs, the remaining balance left for partition amounted to P669,458.50. Based on the "Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Eleuterio M. Muoz, with Deed of Sale" 1 the heirs agreed that three-fourths (3/4) of the total net value of the property or P502,093.87 shall be adjudicated to respondent, Juanita, while the remaining one-fourth (1/4) or the amount of P167,364.00 shall be divided equally among Eleuterio's brother and sisters, each to receive more or less P55,788.00.In the same instrument, the heirs agreed that Maximo, Trinidad and Concepcion were to sell to Juanita all their rights and participation to the estate and in consideration thereof, Juanita is to pay each of the heirs P55,788.00 or a total of P167,364.00 to expedite the settlement of the estate. The document was prepared and notarized by Atty. Teodulo C. Gabor, and signed by all the parties on December 18, 1980. On the same day, Juanita executed an affidavit promising to pay the other heirs their share in Eleuterio's inheritance within six (6) months from January 18, 1980. 2On January 24, 1984, Concepcion signed a "Statement of Partition, Assets of the Late Eleuterio M. Muoz". 3 This document itemized the amount due to Concepcion, the agreed deductions and advances made by her and her daughter, Amelia, from Juanita. Two days thereafter, Concepcion caused Juanita to sign a certification which states that the residential house located at 4548 Quintos Street, Makati, (where Amelia with her family used to reside) was part of the inheritance received by Concepcion from the estate of Eleuterio. 4Sometime on September 1986, Juanita filed an accion publiciana against Ernesto Tinoco, husband of Amelia and two other tenants occupying the apartments on Quintos Street. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 15030, 5 was decided in favor of Juanita and became final on March 1988, there being no appeal instituted by the defendants. Defendant, Ernesto, was ordered to immediately vacate the property and allow plaintiff, Juanita to recover possession thereof.On February 1988, or almost eight years after the signing of the extra-judicial settlement, Juanita's in-laws filed a complaint for revocation and annulment of the extra-judicial settlement of estate of Eleuterio, naming Juanita as defendant. In due time, however, Maximo and Trinidad withdrew as plaintiffs, leaving Concepcion, represented by her daughter, Amelia Tinoco, to pursue the case.The complaint alleges that Juanita, by means of strategy and stealth and through fraud and illegal means, convinced and lured the plaintiffs therein in executing the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Eleuterio M. Muoz; that defendant Juanita has not paid each of the plaintiffs the amount of P55,788.00 or a total of P167,364.00 contrary to the stipulation in the said document; and that a certain property (apartment units) designated as 4544, 4546 and 4548 located at Quintos St., Makati together with the parcel of land on which the units were constructed were not turned over by defendant to Concepcion as promised by her in the certification 6 she signed on January 26, 1984.The trial court, while upholding the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement, is of the belief that petitioner Concepcion was not paid the balance of her share giving credence to the affidavit of respondent Juanita signed in 1980 acknowledging such fact.The affidavit, however, was executed on the same day that the extra-judicial partition was signed. On that very day, it is understandable that respondent did not have the cash to pay her co-heirs and as she testified, she had to sell some properties in order to give her in-laws their agreed share. 7On the other hand, the appellate court, while also finding the Extra-Judicial Settlement valid, found that all the heirs, namely Concepcion, Trinidad and Maximo were indeed paid their share.Moreover, defendant-appellant's evidence reveal that the three (Maximo Muoz, Trinidad Marticio and Concepcion Divina) were paid their respective shares on different dates. On December 1, 1981, Maximo Muoz executed a sworn statement wherein he acknowledged receipt of P30.000.00 "as evidence and partial payment of my share to the estate (Exh. 13, p. 136, Rec.) Subsequently, on August 11, 1984, he acknowledged receipt of the amount of P9,762.00 in full payment of (his) share in the estate (p. 131, Rec.). Likewise, Trinidad Marticio signed a list which showed cash advances in the amount of P23,200.00 taken from defendant-appellant Juanita Muoz and her share of the estate tax in the amount of P16,056.00 or a total of P39,256.00. Thus, the total amount due her was only P16,532.00 of her share of P55,788.00 in the estate of Eleuterio Muoz. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the statement of partition on January 23, 1984. On January 24, 1984, plaintiff-appellee Concepcion Divina likewise acknowledge receipt of a statement of partition (Exh. 2) similar to those given to Maximo Muoz and Trinidad Marticio. It itemizes the cash advances taken either by appellee Concepcion Divina or her daughter Amelia Tinoco which totaled P15,415.00. Her share in the estate tax amounted to P16,056.00. Thus, the total amount due her was P24,317.00. While appellee's signature appears at the bottom of the statement of partition (Exh. 2), she, however, denies having signed it. To affirm the fact that the signature appearing on the statement of partition (Exh. 2 and Exh. E) is not hers, appellee wrote her name on a piece of paper in open court (Exh. F). The trial court, however, did not find any need to make a comparison . . . 8The appellate court, however, found the signature of Concepcion in the statement of partition (Exhibit "2") evidencing proof of payment of her share by respondent, genuine. Said the court:We, however, must disagree with the opinion of the trial court that "it cannot lend credence to the statement of partition (Exh. 2) as proof of payment of Concepcion's share by defendant." First of all, We are of the view that the signature of appellee Concepcion Divina on the statement of partition (Exh. 2) is in her genuine signature. We have compared it with her signatures on the Special Power of Attorney (p. 6, Rec.) and the extra-judicial settlement agreement (Exh. 8) and We find that it is strikingly similar to the questioned signature. By the naked eye, and by cursory examination of the three signatures, We are convinced that they were written by the same person, i.e., appellee Concepcion Divina. Additionally, since appellee disclaims her signature in Exhibit 2, she should have utilized a handwriting expert to prove it is a forgery.Moreover, if it is true that she was not paid her share, Concepcion Divina should have brought this to the attention of appellant Juanita Muoz within two (2) years from the time she signed the extra-judicial settlement agreement. There is nothing in the record that she ever made any written demand for payment of her share. On the contrary, the statement of partition (Exh. 2) indicates that she was fully paid her share in the estate of her brother. Surely, when she acknowledged receipt of the statement of partition (Exh. 2), she should have questioned the amount which reflected the cash advances taken by her or daughter Amelia. She did not do so at the time of receipt or immediately thereafter. In effect, she confirmed the contents of the partition settlement. 9The extra-judicial settlement agreement is a contract, wherein the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided that the legitime of the compulsory heirs are preserved. In the absence of fraud and provided all requisites are met, the same should be upheld as valid and binding between parties.Extra-judicial partition, being a speedy and less expensive method of distribution of the estate, is specifically provided for in Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, that in the absence of a will and where the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.In proceeding with the actual partition of the properties mentioned in the deed, the parties, of course, are duty bound to abide by the mutual waiver of rights agreed upon in the document. 10 A party can not, in law and in good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. 11WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED. The ruling of the appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.G.R. No. L-21355, Garcia et al. v. Bello and De Guzman, 13 SCRA 769 Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCApril 30, 1965G.R. No. L-21355BENJAMINA GARCIA, ANATALIA GARCIA, FABIAN GARCIA and VICENTE GARCIA, petitioners, vs.HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and PEDRO DE GUZMAN, respondents.Raymundo Meris-Morales for petitioners.Castillo and Castillo for respondents.CONCEPCION, J.:In their petition for certiorari and prohibition, Benjamina, Anatalia, Fabian and Vicente, all surnamed Garcia, pray that respondent Hon. Eloy B. Bello, be ordered, as Judge of First Instance of Pangasinan, to desist from further proceeding in and Registration Case No. 765, G.L.R.O. Record No. 18485, of said Court.The record shows that, on October 18, 1918, respondent Pedro de Guzman instituted said proceeding for the registration, in his name, of a tract of land situated in the municipality of San Carlos, Province of Pangasinan; that, on January 30, 1923, judgment was rendered in said proceeding as prayed for by De Guzman; that on July 18, 1923, Original Certificate of Title No. 25381 was, accordingly, issued in his favor; that on March 24, 1959, herein petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 13847-II of said court, against De Guzman, for the reconveyance of the aforementioned land in favor of herein petitioners; that on April 4, 1959, De Guzman moved to dismiss said Case No. 13847-II upon the ground that the same is barred by the judgment rendered in Land Registration Case No. 765, that petitioners have no cause of action and that the alleged right of said petitioners and their action based thereon are barred by the statute of limitations; that on April 27, 1959, said motion to dismiss was granted; that, on appeal taken by petitioners, the case was docketed in the Supreme Court as G. R. No. L-15988; that on September 1, 1959, respondent Judge had authorized, in said land registration case, the issuance of a writ of Possession in favor of De Guzman; that this writ of possession was not, however, executed, owing to the pendency of said appeal in the Supreme Court; that the latter rendered, on August 30, 1962, decision affirming order of dismissal appealed from; that soon thereafter, or oil December 29, 1962, respondent De Guzman reiterated in the aforementioned land registration case, his motion for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor; that on January 2, 1963, petitioners herein object to said motion of De Guzman, which was granted by respondent Judge on February 2, 1963; and that, accordingly, on June 4, 1963, petitioners herein instituted the present original action: for certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondent Judge from enforcing said writ of execution and further proceeding in said case, upon the ground that the decision rendered in the land registration case is not binding upon them cause because they were not parties therein and because they had taken possession of the land in question after the rendition of said decision.The petition herein is patently devoid of merit. To begin with, a land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and, accordingly, the decision therein rendered is binding upon the whole world (Sorogon vs. Makalintal, et al., 80 Phil. 259). Secondly, in civil Case No. 13847-II of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, petitioners herein sought to compel De Guzman to reconvey the land in question upon the theory that the decree of registration thereof in his name was based upon a deed of donation dated June 1, 1918 which had been fraudulently secured by De Guzman from Juan Garcia, the father of petitioners herein, who, allegedly, were in possession of said land at that time, and remained continuously in possession thereof. Apart from the fact that petitioners' complaint in said case indicated that petitioners were in possession of said land prior to and at the time of the institution of the land registration proceedings thus refuting their allegation in the present case to the effect that the decision in the land registration case does not bind them because their possession is subsequent to said decision the trial court, whose decision was affirmed by this Court, held that the alleged fraud in the execution of the aforementioned deed of donation had been disproved by the fact that, although petitioners' father, Juan Garcia, did not die until 1950, or thirty-two (32) years after the execution of said deed, he neither sought to annul the same nor opposed De Guzman's petition for the registration of the land in question in his name. Lastly, it was held in said case No. 13847-II of the lower court and G.R. No. L-15988 of this Court that the decree of land registration in favor of De Guzman bars the claim of petitioners herein.WHEREFORE, the petition herein is, accordingly, dismissed, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.Zaldivar, J., took no part.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------]

Second, U.P. assails the issuance of OCT No. 17 in LRC Case No. Q-239 as void ab initio. According to U.P., the Court of First Instance never acquired jurisdiction over LRC Case Q-239 as the requisite signature approval of the Director of Lands...over the survey plan...was nowhere to be found.[endnoteRef:26][25] [26: Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.BIDIN, J.:Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question.On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapia and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination:In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is inten