Art 12 Section 4 of Philippine Constitution. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.TIPTON VS ANDUEZAOn the 30th day of October, 1899, Vicente Aguirre y Flores, as administrator of the San Lazaro Hospital, leased to the defendant in this case a tract of land belonging to the hospital. It was stipulated in the contract that the lease should run for a period of ten years from the 1st day of January, 1899. Aguirre, the administrator, was duly authorized to execute such contracts, but his power was general in terms and contained no provision specially authorizing him to make leases with respect to the hospital property for a period of ten years or any other specific term.

The plaintiff, as the present administrator of the hospital property, claims that the contract made by his predecessor, Aguirre, was null and void for want of power on his part to make such contract, basing his contention upon the provisions of article 1548 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The husband with respect to the property of his wife, the father and guardian with regard to that of his children or minor, and the administrator of property without a special power giving him such authority, can not execute a lease for a period exceeding six years."cralaw virtua1aw library

This provision plainly shows that Aguirre could not, as administrator, have validly executed a lease of the land in question for a period of ten years in the absence of special authority to that effect. This, in our opinion, vitiated the contract. This defect, however, did not affect the contract in its entirety, but only in so far as it exceeded the six-year limit fixed by law as the maximum period for which an administrator can execute a lease without special power. The contract in question was perfectly valid in so far as it did not exceed that limit, having been executed by the administrator, Aguirre, within the scope of the legal authority he had under his general power to lease. That general power carried with it, under the article above quoted, the authority to lease the property for a period not exceeding six years. There was no excess of authority and consequently no cause for nullification arising therefrom, as to the first six years of the lease. As to the last four, the contract was, however, void, the administrator having acted beyond the scope of his powers.

The trial court construed article 1548 of the Civil Code as applying only to administrators of estates of deceased persons. This construction is manifestly erroneous. The provisions of that article are general and apply as well to administrators of property of living as of deceased persons.

It is contended, on the other hand, by the defendant, that article 1548 is not applicable to public lands such as the property in question, nor to public officials as was Vicente Aguirre, the administrator of the San Lazaro Hospital.

As to the first contention, it is not stated in defendants brief in what sense the words "public lands" are used. It seems, however, that the defendant refers to lands of the public domain. He testified at the trial that the lands of the San Lazaro Hospital belonged to the Government of the United States. If such were the case his interpretation of these words would be erroneous. That property belongs to the public domain which is destined to public use or which belongs exclusively to the State without being devoted to common use or which is destined to some public service or to the development of the national resources and of mines until transferred to private persons. (Art. 339 of the Civil Code.) The land in question does not pertain to any of these classes. The best proof of it is that the defendant himself had been using it for his own personal and exclusive benefit. So that, assuming without deciding that the land in question belonged to the Government of the United States, it would be nevertheless private property under the provisions of articles 340 and 345 of the Civil Code, and as such, unless provided for by special legislation, is subject to the provisions of those articles. The defendant has not called our attention to any special law providing a method different from that contained in the Civil Code for the leasing of the lands belonging to the San Lazaro Hospital, and we do not know of the existence of any such law.

As to public officials, the only reason given by defendant in support of his contention that article 1548 does not apply to them is that it would be impossible for the Government to make a lease for a period, exceeding six years, because it has no legal capacity and must necessarily transact all its business through the medium of officials. This contention can not be sustained. It is a manifest error to say that the Government has no legal capacity or that if has no power to grant special authority to one of its officials for the leasing of Government property for a period exceeding six years, if deemed advisable. This is so apparent that it certainly requires no argument.

It is claimed, however, that Government officials do not act by virtue of any special power but under the law creating their respective offices, and that for this reason they are no affected by the provisions of article 1548, which refer to administrators whose acts may be governed by the limitations of a power of attorney. We think that this is a mere question of words. Power, according to text writers, means the authority granted by one person to another to do in his behalf the same thing which he would do himself in the premises. This is the sense in which the word power is used in that article and it refers to the private individual who administers property belonging to another as well as to the public official who administers patrimonial property or the private property belonging to the State. Such property, whether owned by the State or by a private citizen, is covered by the provisions of the Civil Code. In either case the administrator, in so far as he has the management of the property of another, is a mere agent whose acts must be governed by the limitations of the power which his principal may have conferred upon him. In neither case can he exceed these limitations, but must discharge his trust in accordance with his instructions. A public official is not, as such, exempt from the operation of this rule. He can not assume that he has the power to lease to others the patrimonial property belonging to the State for such time as he may see fit, say, for eighty or ninety years. He can not do so unless expressly authorized. Whether the administrator derives his powers from a legislative enactment, as in the case of a public official, or from the terms of a public instrument where private parties only are concerned, is immaterial. It is a mere question of form which does not affect the provision of the code above cited. What the law requires in order that the administrator may lease the property for a period exceeding six years is special power giving him such authority. The grant must be contained in a public document. (Art. 1280 of the Civil Code.) A public document may be either a public instrument or a legislative enactment, for legislative acts are also public documents under our code.

Furthermore it is very doubtful whether Aguirre was in fact a public official as the administrator of the San Lazaro estate. This question, however, was not raised in the court below, no evidence bearing on the subject having been introduced. We have merely assumed that he was such for the sake of argument.

It is further contended by the defendant that the complaint does not state a cause of action. This is not true. A mere perusal of the complaint will show the contrary. We hold that the facts therein set forth constitute a sufficient cause of action.

It is also contended that there is no allegation with respect to the interest of the plaintiff in this action. Without passing upon the correctness of this allegation which refers to the legal capacity of the plaintiff, it may be said that as no question was raised as to this point in the court below it can not be urged on appeal.

The court below expressly found that the Government had collected rent for four years and held that it had thereby ratified the contract. This question was not discussed in the court below and, legally speaking, the court should not and could not have made any such finding. We hold that this was error on the part of the trial court.

The judgment of the court below is hereby modified so as to declare that the lease in question was valid only for six years from the 1st day of January, 1899, to the 31st of December, 1904, and void as to the last four years of the contract term that is to say, the effects of its nullity should date from the 1st day of January, 1905. The defendant shall return the land in the form and manner provided for in the lease together with the proceeds derived from its possession since the last-mentioned date. The plaintiff will return to the defendant the rent received during the same period, provided the rent has in fact been paid to him, with legal interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. No costs will be allowed to either party in either instance. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and let the case be remanded to the court below for action in conformity herewith. So ordered.

TDC VS MANILA (, MANILA LODGE NO. 761, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF THE ELKS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF MANILA, andTARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION) STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENTOF THE FACTSThese two cases are petitions on certiorari to review the decision dated June 30, 1975 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51590-R entitled "Tarlac Development Corporation vs. City of Manila, and Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc.," affirming the trial court's finding in Civil Case No. 83009 that the property subject of the decisiona quois a "public park or plaza."On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. l360 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act provided that the reclaimed area "Shall be the property of the City of Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension x x x at the north end not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for a hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of the Governor General, to a responsible person or corporation for a term not exceed ninety-nine years."Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the City of' Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site.The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares. The City of Manila applied for the registration of the reclaimed area, and on January 20, 1911, O.C.T. No. 1909 was issued in the name of the City of Manila. The title described the registered land as "un terreno conocido con el nombre de Luneta Extension, situato en el distrito de la Ermita x x x." The registration was "subject, however to such of the incumbrances mentioned in Article 39 of said law (Land Registration Act) as may be subsisting" and "sujeto a las disposiciones y condiciones impuestas en la Ley No. 1360; y sujeto tambein a los contratos de venta, celebrados y otorgados por la Ciudad de Manila a favor del Army and Navy Club y la Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, fechados respectivamente, en 29 de Diciembre de 1908 y 16 de Enero de 1909."1On July 13, 1911 the City of Manila, affirming a prior sale dated January 16, 1909 cancelled 5,543.07 square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the U.S.A. (BPOE, for short) on the basis of which TCT No. 21952was issued to the latter over the Marcela de terreno que es parte de la Luneta Extension, Situada en el Distrito le la Ermita ... ." At the back of this title vas annotated document 4608/T-1635, which in part reads as follows: "que la citada Ciusdad de Manila tendra derecho a su opcion, de recomparar la expresada propiedad para fines publicos solamete in cualquier tiempo despues de cincuenta anos desde el 13 le Julio le 1911, precio de la misma propiedad, mas el valor que entonces tengan las mejoras."For the remainder of the Luneta Extension, that is, after segregating therefrom the portion sold to the Manila Lodge No. 761, PBOE, a new Certificate of Title No. 21963was issued on July 17, 1911 to the City of Manila.Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, subsequently sold the said 5,543.07 square meters to the Elks Club, Inc., to which was issued TCT No. 67488. 4 The registered owner, "The Elks Club, Inc.," was later changed by court oder to "Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc."In January 1963 the BPOE. petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property This petition was granted on February 15, 1963.On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for the sum of P4,700,000 the land together with all the improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC, for short) which paid P1,700.000 as down payment and mortgaged to the vendor the same realty to secure the payment of the balance to be paid in quarterly installments.5At the time of the sale,, there was no annotation of any subsisting lien on the title to the property. On December 12, 1963 TCT No. 73444 was issued to TDC over the subject land still described as "UNA PARCELA DE TERRENO, que es parte de la Luneta Extension, situada en el Distrito de Ermita ... ."In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to repurchase; the court, after haering, issued an order, dated November 19, 1964, directing the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotatein totothe entry regarind the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property after fifty years. From this order TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on July 31, 1968 affirmed in G.R. Nos. L-24557 and L-24469 the trial court's order of reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring another action for the clarification of its rights.As a consequence of such reservation, TDC filed on April 28, 1971 against the City of Manila and the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 83009 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, containing three causes of action and praying -a) On the first cause of action, that the plaintiff TDC be declared to have purchased the parcel of land now in question with the buildings and improvements thereon from the defendant BPOE for value and in good faith, and accordingly ordering the cancellation of Entry No. 4608/T-1635 on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73444 in the name of the Plaintiff;b) On the second cause of action, ordering the defendant City of Manila to pay the plaintiff TDC damages in the sum of note less than one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);c) On the third cause of action, reserving to the plaintiff TDC the right to recover from the defendant BPOE the amounts mentioned in par. XVI of the complaint in accordance with Art. 1555 of the Civil Code, in the remote event that the final judgment in this case should be that the parcel of land now in question is a public park; andd) For costs, and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.6Therein defendant City of Manila, in its answer dated May 19, 1971, admitted all the facts alleged in the first cause of action except the allegation that TDC purchased said property "for value and in good faith," but denied for lack of knowledge or information the allegations in the second and third causes of action. As, special and affirmative defense, the City of Manila claimed that TDC was not a purchaser in good faith for it had actual notice of the City's right to repurchase which was annotated at the back of the title prior to its cancellation, and that, assumingarguendothat TDC had no notice of the right to repurchase, it was, nevertheless, under obligation to investigate inasmuch as its title recites that the property is a part of the Luneta extension.7The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, in its answer dated June 7, 1971, admitted having sold the land together with the improvements thereon for value to therein plaintiff which was in good faith, but denied for lack of knowledge as to their veracity the allegations under the second cause of action. It furthermore admitted that TDC had paid the quarterly installments until October l5, 1964 but claimed that the latter failed without justifiable cause to pay the subsequent installments. It also asserted that it was a seller for value in good faith without having misrepresented or concealed tacts relative to the title on the property. As counterclaim, Manila Lodge No. 761 (BPOE) sought to recover the balance of the purchase price plus interest and costs.8On June 15, 1971 TDC answered the aforesaid counterclaim, alleging that its refusal to make further payments was fully justified.9After due trial the courta quorendered on July 14, 1972 its decision finding the subject land to be part of the "public park or plaza" and, therefore, part of the public domain. The court consequently declared that the sale of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff TDC was a purchaser thereof in g faith and for value from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the latter; and that BPOE is entitled to recover from the City of Manila whatever consideration it had 'paid the latter. 'The dispositive part of the decision reads:+.wph!1WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares that the parcel of land formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos 2195 and 67488 in the name of BPOE and now by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73444 in the name of Tarlac Development Corporation is a public' park or plaza, and, consequently, instant complaint is dimissed, without pronouncement as to costs.In view of the reservation made by plaintiff Tarlac Development Corporation to recover from defendant BPOE the amounts mentioned in paragraph XVI of the complaint in accordance with Article 1555 of the Civil Code, the Court makes no pronouncement on this point.10From said decision the therein plaintiff TDC as well as the defendant Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, appealed to the Court of Appeals.In its appeal docketed as CA-G.R. No. 51590-R, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, avers that the trial court committed the following errors, namely:1. In holding that the property subject of the action is not patrimonial property of the City of Manila; and2. In holding that the Tarlac Development Corporation may recover and enforce its right against the defendant BPOE.11The Tarlac Development Corporation, on the other hand, asserts that the trial court erred:(1) In finding that the property in question is or was a public park and in consequently nullifying the sale thereof by the City of Manila to BPOE;(2) In applying the cases of Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602, and Government vs. Cabangis, 53 Phil. 112, to the case at bar; and(3) In not holding that the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to ,recover damages from the defendant City of Manila.12Furthermore, TDC as appellee regarding the second assignment of error raised by BPOE, maintained that it can recover and enforce its rigth against BPOE in the event that the land in question is declared a public park or part thereof.13In its decision promulgated on June 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals concur ed in the findings and conclusions of the lower court upon the ground that they are supported by he evidence and are in accordance with law, and accordingly affirmed the lower court's judgment.Hence, the present petitions for review oncertiorari.G.R. No. L-41001The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, contends, in its petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. L-41001, that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) disregarding the very enabling acts and/or statutes according to which the subject property was, and still is, patrimonial property of the City of Manila and could therefore be sold and/or disposed of like any other private property; and (2) in departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it simply made a general affirmance of the courta quo'sfindings and conclusions without bothering to discuss or resolve several vital points stressed by the BPOE in its assigned errrors.14G.R. No. L-41012The Tarlac Development Corporation, in its petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. L-41012, relies on the following grounds for the allowance of its petition:1. that the Court of Appeals did not correctly interpret Act No. 1360, as amended by Act No. 1657, of the Philippine Commission; and2. that the Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings in that it did not make its own findings but simply recited those of the lower court.15ISSUES AND ARGUMENTSFIRST ISSUEUpon the first issue, both petitioners claim that the property subject of the action, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended by Act No. 1657, was patrimonial property of the City of Manila and not a park or plaza.Arguments of PetitionersIn G.R. No. L-41001, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, admits that "there appears to be some logic in the conclusion" of the Court of Appeals that "neither Act No. 1360 nor Act No. 1657 could have meant to supply the City of Manila the authority to sell the subject property which is located at the south end not the north of the reclaimed area."16It argues, however, that when Act No. 1360, as amended, authorized the City of Manila to undertake the construction of the Luneta extension by reclaimed land from the Manila Bay, and declared that the reclaimed land shall be the "property of the City of Manila," the State expressly granted the ownership thereof to the City of Manila which. consequently. could enter into transactions involving it; that upon the issuance of O.C.T. No. 1909, there could he no doubt that the reclaimed area owned by the City was its patrimonial property;" that the south end of the reclaimed area could not be for public use for. as argued by TDC a street, park or promenade can be property for public use pursuant to Article 344 of the Spanish Civil Code only when it has already been so constructed or laid out, and the subject land, at the time it was sold to the Elk's Club, was neither actually constructed as a street, park or promenade nor laid out as a street, park or promenade;" that even assuming that the subject property was at the beginning property of public dominion, it was subsequently converted into patrimonial property pursuant to Art. 422 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as it had never been used, red or utilized since it was reclaimed in 1905 for purpose other than this of an ordinary real estate for sale or lease; that the subject property had never been intended for public use, is further shown by the fact that it was neither included as a part of the Luneta Park under Plan No. 30 of the National Planning Commission nor considered a part of the Luneta National Park (now Rizal Park) by Proclamation No. 234 dated December 19, 1955 of President Ramon Magsaysay or by Proclamation Order No. 274 dated October 4, 1967 of President Ferdinand E. Marcos;"19that, such being the case, there is no reason why the subject property should -not be considered as having been converted into patrimonial property, pursuant to the ruling inMunicipality vs. Roa7 Phil. 20, inasmuch as the City of Manila has considered it as its patrimonial property not only bringing it under the operation of the Land Registration Act but also by disposing of it;20and that to consider now the subject property as a public plaza or park would not only impair the obligations of the parties to the contract of sale (rated July 13, 1911, but also authorize deprivation of property without due process of law.21G.R. No. L-410112In L-41012, the petitioner TDC stresses that the principal issue is the interpretation of Act No. 1360, as amended by. Act No. 1657 of the Philippine Commission,22and avers that inasmuch as Section 6 of Act No. 1360, as amended by Act 1657, provided that the reclamation of the Luneta extension was to be paid for out of the funds of the City of Manila which was authorized to borrow P350,000 "to be expended in the construction of Luneta Extension," the reclaimed area became "public land" belonging to the City of Manila that spent for the reclamation, conformably to the holding inCabangis,23and consequently, said land was subject to sale and other disposition; that the Insular Government itself considered the reclaimed Luneta extension as patrimonial property subject to disposition as evidenced by the fact that See. 3 of Act 1360 declared that "the land hereby reclaimed shall be the property of the City of Manila;" that this property cannot be property for public use for according to Article 344 of the Civil Code, the character of property for public use can only attach to roads and squares that have already been constructed or at least laid out as such, which conditions did not obtain regarding the subject land, that Sec. 5 of Act 1360 authorized the City of Manila to lease the northern part of the reclaimed area for hotel purposes; that Act No. 1657 furthermore authorized the City of Manila to sell the same;24that the express statutory authority to lease or sell the northern part of the reclaimed area cannot be interpreted to mean that the remaining area could not be sold inasmuch as the purpose of the statute was not merely to confer authority to sell the northern portion but rather to limit the city's power of disposition thereof, to wit: to prevent disposition of the northern portion for any purpose other than for a hotel site that the northern and southern ends of the reclaimed area cannot be considered as extension of the Luneta for they lie beyond the sides of the original Luneta when extended in the direction of the sea, and that is the reason why the law authorized the sale of the northern portion for hotel purposes, and, for the same reason, it is implied that the southern portion could likewise be disposed of.26TDC argues likewise that there are several items of uncontradicted circumstantial evidence which may serve as aids in construing the legislative intent and which demonstrate that the subject property is patrimonial in nature, to wit: (1) Exhibits "J" and "J-1", or Plan No. 30 of the National Planning Commission showing the Luneta and its vicinity, do not include the subject property as part of the Luneta Park; (2) Exhibit "K", which is the plan of the subject property covered by TCT No. 67488 of BPOE, prepared on November 11, 1963, indicates that said property is not a public park; (3) Exhibit "T", which is a certified copy of Proclamation No. 234 issued on December 15, 1955 is President Magsaysay, and Exhibit "U" which is Proclamation Order No. 273 issued on October 4, 1967 by President Marcos, do not include the subject property in the Luneta Park-, (4) Exhibit "W", which is the location plan of the Luneta National Park under Proclamations Nos. 234 and 273, further confirms that the subject property is not a public park; and (5) Exhibit "Y", which is a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333 in the name of the United States of America covering the land now occupied by the America covering the land now occupied by the American Embassy, the boundaries of which were delineated by the Philippine Legislature, states that the said land is bounded on the northwest by properties of the Army and Navy Club (Block No. 321) and the Elks Club (Block No. 321), and this circumstance shows that even the Philippine Legislature recognized the subject property as private property of the Elks Club.27TDC furthermore contends that the City of Manila is estopped from questioning the validity of the sale of the subject property that it executed on July 13, 1911 to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, for several reasons, namely: (1) the City's petition for the reannotation of Entry No. 4608/T-1635 was predicated on the validity of said sale; (2) when the property was bought by the petitioner TDC it was not a public plaza or park as testified to by both Pedro Cojuanco, treasurer of TDC, and the surveyor, Manuel Aoneuvo, according to whom the subject property was from all appearances private property as it was enclosed by fences; (3) the property in question was cadastrally surveyed and registered as property of the Elks Club, according to Manuel Anonuevo; (4) the property was never used as a public park, for, since the issuance of T.C.T. No. 2165 on July 17, 1911 in the name of the Manila Lodge NO. 761, the latter used it as private property, and as early as January 16, 1909 the City of Manila had already executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of the Manila Lodge No. 761; and (5) the City of Manila has not presented any evidence to show that the subject property has ever been proclaimed or used as a public park.28TDC, moreover, contends that Sec. 60 of Com. Act No. 141 cannot apply to the subject land, for Com. Act No. 141 took effect on December 1, 1936 and at that time the subject land was no longer part of the part of the public domain.29TDC also stresses that its rights as a purchaser in good faith cannot be disregarded, for the mere mention in the certificate of title that the lot it purchased was "part of the Luneta extension" was not a sufficient warning that tile title to the City of Manila was invalid; and that although the trial court, in its decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found the TDC -to has been an innocent purchaser for value, the court disregarded the petitioner's rights as such purchaser that relied on Torrens certificate of title.30The Court, continues the petitioner TDC erred in not holding that the latter is entitled to recover from the City of Manila damages in the amount of P100,000 caused by the City's petition for- reannotation of its right to repurchase.DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF FIRST ISSUEIt is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute,31and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered.32It is, therefore, necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent.Act No. 1360 which was enacted by the Philippine Commission on June 26, 1905, as amended by Act No. 1657 enacted on May 18, 1907, authorized the "construction of such rock and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of an extension to the Luneta" (Sec. 1 [a]), and the placing of the material dredged from the harbor of Manila "inside the bulkheads constructed to inclose the Luneta extension above referred to" (Sec. 1 [a]). It likewise provided that the plan of Architect D. H. Burnham as "a general outline for the extension and improvement of the Luneta in the City of Manila" be adopted; that "the reclamation from the Bay of Manila of the land included in said projected Luneta extension... is hereby authorized andthe land thereby reclaimed shall be the property of the City of Manila" (Sec. 3); that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension authorizedby this Actat the worth endof said tract, not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size,for a hotel site, and to lease the samewith the approval of the Governor General, ... for a term not exceeding ninety-nine years; that "should the Municipal Board ... deem it advisable it is hereby authorized to advertise for sale to sell said tract of land ... ;" "that said tract shall be used for hotel purposes as herein prescribed, and shall not be devoted to any other purpose or object whatever;" "that should the grantee x x x fail to maintain on said tract a first-class hotel x x x then the title to said tract of land sold, conveyed, and transferred, and shall not be devoted to any other purpose or object whatever;" "that should the grantee x x x fail to maintain on said tract a first-class hotel x x x then the title to said tract of land sold, conveyed, and transferred to the grantee shall revert to the City of Manila, and said City of Manila shall thereupon become entitled to immediate possession of said tract of land" (Sec. 5); that the construction of the rock and timber bulkheads or sea wall "shall be paid for out of the funds of the City of Manila, but the area to be reclaimed by said proposed Luneta extension shall be filled, without cost to the City of Manila, with material dredged from Manila Bay at the expense of the Insular Government" (Sec. 6); and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to borrow from the Insular Government ... the sum of three hundred thousand pesos, to be expended in the construction of Luneta extension provided for by paragraph (a) of section one hereof" (Sec.7).The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of "public" nature, the same having been made to a local political subdivision. Such grants have always beenstrictlyconstrued against the grantee.33One compelling reason given for the strict interpretation of a public grant is that there is in such grant a gratuitous donation of, public money or resources which results in an unfair advantage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should be narrowly restricted in favor of the public.34This reason for strict interpretation obtains relative to the aforesaid grant, for, although the City of Manila was to pay for the construction of such work and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of the Luneta extension, the area to be reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila, with material dredged from Manila Bay. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude maters which if included would defeat the policy of the legislation.The reclaimed area, an extension to the Luneta, is declared to be property of the City of Manila. Property, however, is either of public ownership or of private ownership. 35 What kind of property of the City is the reclaimed land? Is it of public ownership (dominion) or of private ownership?We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for public use.Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila as its patrimonial property, the City could, by virtue of its ownership, dispose of the whole reclaimed area without need ofauthorizationto do so from the lawmaking body. Thus Article 348 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that "ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without further limitations than those established by law."36The right to dispose (jus disponendi) of one's property is an attribute of ownership. Act No. 1360, as amended, however, provides by necessary implication, that the City of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed area without beingauthorizedby the lawmaking body. Thus the statute provides that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract ... at the north end, for a hotel site, and to lease the same ... should the municipal board ... deem it advisable, it ishereby authorized...to sell said tract of land ... " (Sec. 5). If the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the City, the latter could dispose of it without need of the authorization provided by the statute, and the authorization to set aside ... lease ... or sell ... given by the statute would indeed be superfluous. To so construe the statute s to render the term "authorize," which is repeatedly used by the statute, superfluous would violate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a statute should be so interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative or superfluous.37To authorize means to empower, to give a right to act.38Act No. 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb it authorize" with the adverb "hereby," which means "by means of this statue or section," Hence without the authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360, the City of Manila could not lease or sell even the northern portion; much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed area. Consequently, the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila, not as its patrimonial property. At most, only the northern portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to be patrimonial property for, by express statutory provision it could be disposed of, and thetitlethereto would revert to the City should the grantee fail to comply with the terms provided by the statute.TDC however, contends that the purpose of the authorization provided in Act No. 1360 to lease or sell was really to limit the City's power of disposition. To sustain such contention is to beg the question. If the purpose of the law was to limit the City's power of disposition then it is necessarily assumed that the City had already the power to dispose, for if such power did not exist, how could it be limited? It was precisely Act 1360 that gave the City the power to dispose for it was hereby authorized by lease of sale. Hence, the City of Manila had no power to dispose of the reclaimed land had such power not been granted by Act No. 1360, and the purpose of the authorization was to empower the city to sell or lease the northern part and not, as TDC claims, to limit only the power to dispose. Moreover, it is presumed that when the lawmaking body enacted the statute, it had full knowledge of prior and existing laws and legislation on the subject of the statute and acted in accordance or with respect thereto.39If by another previous law, the City of Manila could already dispose of the reclaimed area, which it could do if such area were given to it as its patrimonial property, would it then not be a superfluity for Act No. 1360 toauthorizethe City to dispose of the reclaimed land? Neither has petitioner TDC pointed to any other law that authorized the City to do so, nor have we come across any. What we do know is that if the reclaimed land were patrimonial property, there would be no need of giving special authorization to the City to dispose of it. Said authorization was given because the reclaimed land was not intended to be patrimonial property of the City of Manila, and without the express authorization to dispose of the northern portion, the City could not dispose of even that part.Secondly, the reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila."40If the reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has been said that a power to extend (or continue an act or business) cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct.41It is not disputed that the old Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.42Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a public park or plaza and for public use.TDC, however, contends that the subject property cannot be considered an extension of the old Luneta because it is outside of the limits of the old Luneta when extended to the sea. This is a strained interpretation of the term "extension," for an "extension," it has been held, "signifies enlargement in any direction in length, breadth, or circumstance."43Thirdly,the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than an inlet of the sea. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the national domain open to public use. These are also property of public ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339 of the Civil Code of Spain.When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being property for public use, according toGovernment of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabangis.44The predecessor of the claimants in this case was the owner of a big tract of land including the lots in question. From 1896 said land began to wear away due to the action of the waters of Manila Bay. In 1901 the lots in question became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides. It remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of the Vitas estuary and dumped the Sand and - silt from estuary on the low lands completely Submerged in water thereby gradually forming the lots in question. Tomas Cabangis took possession thereof as soon as they were reclaimed hence, the claimants, his successors in interest, claimed that the lots belonged to them. The trial court found for the claimants and the Government appealed. This Court held that when the lots became a part of the shore. As they remained in that condition until reclaimed by the filling done by the Government, they belonged to the public domain. for public use .4' Hence, a part of the shore, and for that purpose a part of the bay, did not lose its character of being for public use after it was reclaimed.Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel sites. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion. Hence, applying the rule ofexpresio unius est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property. The application of this principle of statutory construction becomes the more imperative in the case at bar inasmuch as not only must the public grant of the reclaimed area to the City of Manila be, as above stated, strictly construed against the City of Manila, but also because a grant of power to a municipal corporation, as happens in this case where the city is author ized to lease or sell the northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited to such as are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the objectives of the corporation.Fifthly, Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that to property of public use, in provinces and in towns, comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares streets fountains, and public waters the promenades, and public works of general service paid for by such towns or provinces." A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article.The petitioners, however, argue that, according to said Article 344, in order that the character of property for public use may be so attached to a plaza, the latter must be actually constructed or at least laid out as such, and since the subject property was not yet constructed as a plaza or at least laid out as a plaza when it was sold by the City, it could not be property for public use. It should be noted, however, that properties of provinces and towns for public use are governed by the same principles as properties of the same character belonging to the public domain.46In order to be property of public domain an intention to devote it to public use is sufficient.47The, petitioners' contention is refuted by Manresa himself who said, in his comments", on Article 344, that:+.wph!1Las plazas, calles y paseos publicos correspondent sin duda aiguna aldominio publico municipal ), porque se hallan establecidos sobre suelo municipal y estan destinadas al uso de todos Laurent presenta tratando de las plazas, una question relativa a si deben conceptuarse como de dominio publico los lugares vacios libres, que se encuenttan en los Municipios rurales ... Laurent opina contra Pioudhon que toda vez que estan al servicio de todos pesos lugares, deben considerable publicos y de dominion publico. Realmente, pala decidir el punto, bastara siempre fijarse en el destino real y efectivo de los citados lugares, y si este destino entraa un uso comun de todos, no hay duda que son de dominio publico municipal si no patrimoniales.It is not necessary, therefore, that a plaza be already constructed of- laid out as a plaza in order that it be considered property for public use. It is sufficient that it be intended to be such In the case at bar, it has been shown that the intention of the lawmaking body in giving to the City of Manila the extension to the Luneta was not a grant to it of patrimonial property but a grant for public use as a plaza.We have demonstratedad satietatemthat the Luneta extension as intended to be property of the City of Manila for public use. But, could not said property-later on be converted, as the petitioners contend, to patrimonial property? It could be. But this Court has already said, inIgnacio vs. The Director of Lands,49the executive and possibly the legislation department that has the authority and the power to make the declaration that said property, is no longer required for public use, and until such declaration i made the property must continue to form paint of the public domain. In the case at bar, there has been no such explicit or unequivocal declaration It should be noted, furthermore, anent this matter, that courts are undoubted v not. primarily called upon, and are not in a position, to determine whether any public land is still needed for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters .50Having disposed of the petitioners' principal arguments relative to the main issue, we now pass to the items of circumstantial evidence which TDC claims may serve as aids in construing the legislative intent in the enactment of Act No. 1360, as amended. It is noteworthy that all these items of alleged circumstantial evidence are acts far removed in time from the date of the enactment of Act No.1360 such that they cannot be considered contemporaneous with its enactment. Moreover, it is not farfetched that this mass of circumstantial evidence might have been influenced by the antecedent series of invalid acts, to wit: the City's having obtained over the reclaimed area OCT No. 1909 on January 20,1911; the sale made by the City of the subject property to Manila Lodge No. 761; and the issuance to the latter of T.C.T. No. 2195. It cannot gainsaid that if the subsequent acts constituting the circumstantial evidence have been base on, or at least influenced, by those antecedent invalid acts and Torrens titles S they can hardly be indicative of the intent of the lawmaking body in enacting Act No. 1360 and its amendatory act.TDC claims that Exhs. "J," "J-l" "K," "T," "U," "W" and "Y" show that the subject property is not a park.Exhibits "J" and "J-1," the "Luneta and vicinity showing proposed development" dated May 14, 1949, were prepared by the National Urban Planning Commission of the Office of the President. It cannot be reasonably expected that this plan for development of the Luneta should show that the subject property occupied by the ElksClub is a public park, for it was made 38 years after the sale to the Elks, and after T.C.T. No. 2195 had been issued to Elks. It is to be assumed that the Office of the President was cognizant of the Torrens title of BPOE. That the subject property was not included as a part of the Luneta only indicated that the National Urban Planning Commission that made the plan knew that the subject property was occupied by Elks and that Elks had a Torrens title thereto. But this in no way proves that the subject property was originally intended to be patrimonial property of the City of Manila or that the sale to Elks or that the Torrens-title of the latter is valid.Exhibit "K" is the "Plan of land covered by T.C.T . No ----, as prepared for Tarlac Development Company." It was made on November 11, 1963 by Felipe F. Cruz, private land surveyor. This surveyor is admittedly a surveyor for TDC.51This plan cannot be expected to show that the subject property is a part of the Luneta Park, for he plan was made to show the lot that "was to be sold to petitioner." This plan must have also assumed the existence of a valid title to the land in favor of Elks.Exhibits "T" and "U" are copies of Presidential Proclamations No. 234 issued on November 15, 1955 and No. 273 issued on October 4, 1967, respectively. The purpose of the said Proclamations was to reserve certain parcels of land situated in the District of Ermita, City of Manila, for park site purposes. Assuming that the subject property is not within the boundaries of the reservation, this cannot be interpreted to mean that the subject property was not originally intended to be for public use or that it has ceased to be such. Conversely, had the subject property been included in the reservation, it would mean, if it really were private property, that the rights of the owners thereof would be extinguished, for the reservations was "subject to private rights, if any there be." That the subject property was not included in the reservation only indicates that the President knew of the existence of the Torrens titles mentioned above. The failure of the Proclamations to include the subject property in the reservation for park site could not change the character of the subject property as originally for public use and to form part of the Luneta Park. What has been said here applies to Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-3," and "W" which also refer to the area and location of the reservation for the Luneta Park.Exhibit "Y" is a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333 dated November 13, 1935, covering the lot where now stands the American Embassy [Chancery]. It states that the property is "bounded ... on the Northwest by properties of Army and Navy Club (Block No.321) and Elks Club (Block No. 321)." Inasmuch as the said bounderies delineated by the Philippine Legislature in Act No. 4269, the petitioners contend that the Legislature recognized and conceded the existence of the Elks Club property as a primate property (the property in question) and not as a public park or plaza. This argument is non sequitur plain and simple Said Original Certificate of Title cannot be considered as an incontrovertible declaration that the Elks Club was in truth and in fact the owner of such boundary lot. Such mention as boundary owner is not a means of acquiring title nor can it validate a title that is null and void.TDC finally claims that the City of Manila is estopped from questioning the validity of the sale it executed on July 13,'1911 conconveying the subject property to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE. This contention cannot be seriously defended in the light of the doctrine repeatedly enunciated by this Court that the Government is never estopped by mistakes or errors on the pan of its agents, and estoppel does not apply to a municipal corporation to validate a contract that is prohibited by law or its against Republic policy, and the sale of July 13, 1911 executed by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge was certainly a contract prohibited by law. Moreover, estoppel cannot be urged even if the City of Manila accepted the benefits of such contract of sale and the Manila Lodge No. 761 had performed its part of the agreement, for to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the City of Manila in this case would be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly what it could not do directly.52The sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and inexistent for lack of subject matter.53It suffered from an incurable defect that could not be ratified either by lapse of time or by express ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761 therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. Hence to consider now the contract inexistent as it always has seen, cannot be, as claimed by the Manila Lodge No. 761, an impairment of the obligations of contracts, for there was it, contemplation of law, no contract at all.The inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone who asserts a right arising from it, not only against the first vendee, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, but also against all its suceessors, including the TDC which are not protected the doctrine of bona fide ii purchaser without notice, being claimed by the TDC does not apply where there is a total absence of title in the vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser TDC cannot create title where none exists.55The so-called sale of the subject property having been executed, the restoration or restitution of what has been given is order56SECOND ISSUEThe second ground alleged in support of the instant petitions for review on certiorari is that the Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision. TDC in L-41012, argues that the respondent Court did not make its own findings but simply recited those of the lower court and made a general affirmance, contrary to the requirements of the Constitution; that the respondent Court made glaring and patent mistakes in recounting even the copied findings, palpably showing lack of deliberate consideration of the matters involved, as, for example, when said court said that Act No. 1657 authorized the City of Manila to set aside a portion of the reclaimed land "formed by the Luneta Extension of- to lease or sell the same for park purposes;" and that respondent Court. further more, did not resolve or dispose of any of the assigned errors contrary to the mandate of the Judiciary Act..57The Manila Lodge No. 761, in L-41001, likewise alleges, as one of the reasons warranting review, that the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and usual course of Judicial proceedings by simply making a general affirmance of the courta quofindings without bothering to resolve several vital points mentioned by the BPOE in its assigned errors.58COMMENTS ON SECOND ISSUEWe have shown in our discussion of the first issue that the decision of the trial court is fully in accordance with law. To follows that when such decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the affirmance was likewise in accordance with law. Hence, no useful purpose will be served in further discussing the second issue.CONCLUSIONACCORDINGLY, the petitions in both G.R. Nos. L-41001 and L-41012 are denied for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 30, 1975, is hereby affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

1. WHAT LANDS CAPABLE TO REGISTER?___________________________________2. HOW LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN OPENS FOR OWNERSHIP?ACT No. 2874As amended by Acts Nos. 3164, 3219, 3346, and 3517TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE LAWS RELATIVE TO LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 7.For the purpose of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this, Act.Section 8.Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature.Section 9.For the purposes of their government and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:(a) Agricultural(b) Commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes.(c) Educational, charitable, and other similar purposes.(d) Reservations for town sites, and for public and quasi-public uses.The Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the classification provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.Section 10.The words "alienation,'' "disposition," or "Concession" as used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use or benefit of the lands of the public domain other than timber or mineral lands.

Section 3 Article 13 of Constitution.Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, andpromote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth

Section 8 COMMONWEALTH ACT.141Section8.Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so However, the President may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their concession or disposition until they are again declared open to concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the National Assembly.

DELIMITED AND CLASSIFIED?

BAGUNU VS AGGABAOThe present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit (respondents) against the petitioners free patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR Regional Office).The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag.On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent3over the subject land with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau).4On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the petitioner,5who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The parties deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent application.6The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of Lands survey,7and the free patent applications uniformly identified the subject land asLot 322. The deeds covering the second and third sale also uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land.8On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioners free patent application. The respondents asserted ownership overLot 322based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.9The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an ocular inspection and formal investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates "the area in dispute including the area purchased by [the respondents]."10On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered:1. [The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application covering Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D xxx;2. [The petitioners free patent application] be amended by excluding Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D, as included in Lot No. 258;3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact area as indicated in [the parties] respective technical description of x x x Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls-541-D.11The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office denied the motion ruling that in determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are controlling. Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioners favor correspond to the boundaries ofLot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot 322.12On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed13the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After noting the differences in the boundaries stated in the parties respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded that the land claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties respective deeds of sale, the Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binags affidavit - claiming that the designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioners favor is erroneous - what the petitioner really acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.14The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).COURT OF APPEALS RULINGThe CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a technical determination by the appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not finality.15The petitioner assails this ruling before the Court.Civil Case No. 751In the meantime, on November 22, 1994 (or during the pendency of the respondents protest), Atty. Binag filed a complaint for reformation of instruments, covering the second and third sale, against Bautista and the petitioner (the civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court (RTC). Atty. Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land correctly identified theboundariesof the land sold, the deeds, nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject land as Lot 322, instead ofLot 258.16On December 9, 1994, the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC, citing the pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of Lands. The RTC held in abeyance its resolution on the motion to dismiss.17After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil case by filing a complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner. The complaint-in-intervention captioned the respondents causes of action as one for Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion and Damages.18The respondents alleged that the petitioners claim over Lot 322 is a cloud on their title and ownership of Lot 322. The respondents also alleged that they were in peaceful, continuous, public and adverse possession of Lot 322 from the time they fully acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August of 1992, when the petitioner, through stealth and strategy, ejected them from Lot 322 after transferring his possession from Lot 258.19The respondents asked the RTC to declare them as owners of Lot 322.After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretarys favorable resolution on the respondents protest, the respondents asked the RTC to suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretarys ruling.20In their prayer, the respondents asked the RTC to:1. [Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of Appeals xxx thus, the cause of action xxx for reformation of contracts be granted;2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and his [Free Patent Application] be amended to exclude Lot 322 xxx.3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim of the [respondents] for damages[.]THE PETITIONThe petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretarysjurisdictionto resolve the parties conflicting claims ofownershipover Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue is pending with the RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not Lot 322) from Atty. Binag and for adjudicating Lot 322 to the respondents, the DENR effectively reformed contracts and determined claims of ownership over a real property matters beyond the DENRs competence to determine.The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since the issue of who has a better right over Lot 322 does not involve the "specialized technical expertise" of the DENR. On the contrary, the issue involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters within the competence of the courts.The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretarys factual finding, as affirmed by the CA,is contrary to the evidence. The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in his favor clearly identified the property sold as Lot 322, which was the same land Atty. Binag identified in his free patent application; that the area of Lot 322, as previously determined in a survey caused by the vendor himself (Atty. Binag), tallies with the area stated in the deed in his favor; that he has been in possession of Lot 322 since 1987, when it was sold to him; and that his present possession and cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by the DENR Regional Office during its ocular investigation.The petitioner also invites our attention to the incredulity of the respondents claim of ownership over Lot 322, based on Atty. Binags testimony during the hearing on the respondents protest. According to the petitioner, the respondents could not have expressed interest in buying Lot 322 from Atty. Binag had they already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The petitioner adds that as early as 1979, the respondents were already aware of Atty. Binags free patent application over Lot 322. Yet, they filed their protest to the free patent application only in 1992 when the petitioner had already substituted Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims that the respondents inaction is inconsistent with their claim of ownership.Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents favor by claiming that the respondents presented no sufficient evidence to prove their (or their predecessor-in-interests) title.In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed CA Decision and for raising substantially factual issues. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, confining his arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.THE RULINGWe deny the motion for reconsideration.Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45The main thrust of the petitioners arguments refers to the alleged error of the DENR and the CA inidentifyingthe parcel of land that the petitioner bought an error that adversely affected his right to apply for a free patent over the subject land. In his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner apparently took a cue from our April 13, 2009 Resolution, denying his petition, since his present motion limitedly argues against the DENRs jurisdiction and the CAs application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the present case, theidentityof Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the identity of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in accordance with the parties respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there are instances where the Court departs from the general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case falls within the recognized exceptions.21On top of this legal reality, the findings and decision of the Director of Lands22on questions of fact, when approved by the DENR Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts,23and even on this Court, when these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall consequently confine our discussions to the petitioners twin legal issues.The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENRs exclusive jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands of the public domainThe petitioner insists that under the law24actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit for reformation of contracts belong, and those involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending before the RTC, the DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and ordering the respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot.In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the parties written agreement reflects their true intention.25In the present case, this intention refers to theidentityof the land covered by the second and third sale. On the other hand, in areivindicatoryaction, the court resolves the issue of ownership of real property and the plaintiffs entitlement to recover its full possession. In this action, the plaintiff is required to prove not only his ownership, but also theidentityof the real property he seeks to recover.26While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the courts jurisdiction to resolve controversies involving ownership of real property extends only to private lands. In the present case, neither party has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative findings of the DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting their own private ownership of the property. For his part, the petitioners act of applying for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by his application is a public land27whose management and disposition belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands. Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XIV of Executive Order No. 29228reads:Section 4.Powers and Functions.- The Department [of Environment and Natural Resources] shall:x x x(4) Exercisesupervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;x x x(15) Exerciseexclusive jurisdiction on the management and dispositionofall lands of the public domainand serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies[.] (Underscoring supplied.)Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192,29the Director of the Lands Management Bureau has the duty, among others, to assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141)30by having direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other forms of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest filed by the respondents against the petitioners free patent application. In resolving this protest, the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue ofidentityof the lot claimed by both parties. This issue of identity of the land requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative agency with direct control over the disposition and management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and dispose of public lands, must likewise determine the applicants entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the DENR Regional Office still has to determine the respondents entitlement to the issuance of a free patent31in their favor since it merely ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners own application.) Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival claimants to alienable and disposable public lands; courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR Secretary and the Director of Lands,32unless grave abuse of discretion exists.After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction,33such as the distinct cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same property. Note that the contracts refer to the same property, identified as "Lot 322," - which the DENR Regional Office, DENR Secretary and the CA found to actually pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split of jurisdiction34The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.35The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over public landsThe petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, claiming that the issue (of who has a better right over Lot 322) does not require the "specialized technical expertise" of the DENR. He posits that the issue, in fact, involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are all within the competence of regular courts.We disagree.Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact36In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies[. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies "where a claim isoriginally cognizable in the courts,and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution ofissues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such casethe judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view."37The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of [the Lands Management Bureau] are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.38(Emphases added.)The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts area of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given thepublic characterof the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192,39the disposition and management of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.40While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction overpossessoryactions instituted by occupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions and occupations),41the respondents complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession whetherde jureorde facto but likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for declaration of ownership of Lot 322.1avvphi1Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its ruling on the respondentsreivindicatoryaction pending final determination by the DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the respondents entitlement to a free patent, following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretarys exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and his consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within the DENR Secretarys exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case ofVicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al,42which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the then Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to questions on the identity of the disputed public land since this matter requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the courts must stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency.WHEREFORE, we herebyDENYthe motion for reconsideration. No costs

REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL VS LAOThis petition for review assails the decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230, which affirmed the judgment2of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-719.On September 4, 1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, an application for the registration of title over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of nine thousand three hundred forty nine (9,349) square meters under Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. Respondent alleged that she acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela, who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer.In the alternative, respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, also known as the Public Land Act, based on her and her predecessors open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years.At the hearing in the lower court, respondent presented the following witnesses: Candido Amoroso, who testified on the ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido in 1932; Vicente Laudato, who testified on respondents purchase of the property from Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and Fina Victoria So-Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her application for registration. Respondent likewise presented in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale3dated April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and Victoria in her favor, the survey plan and technical description of the property, and the tax declarations in the name of respondent as well as her predecessors-in-interest.On June 28, 1996, the trial court made the following findings, to wit:x x x the applicant acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela in 1994, and that applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and in the concept of an owner possession of the subject parcel of land for more than thirty (30) years now; and that the same parcel was declared for taxation purposes; that the realty taxes due thereon have been duly paid; that the land involved in this case is not covered by any land patent. Likewise, this Court could well-discern from the survey plan covering the same property, as well as technical description and other documents presented, that the land sought to be registered is agricultural and not within any forest zone or public domain; and that tacking her predecessors-in-interests possession to hers, applicant appears to be in continuous and public possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years.4The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-007770 and containing an area of nine thousand three hundred forty-nine (9,349) square meters as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of legal age, married to NELSON O. LAO, Filipino citizen, with residence at 1648 Yakal Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.SO ORDERED.5Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56230. On October 15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.6Hence, this petition for review raising the following errors:THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF RESPONDENT.7A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD AND ACTS OF POSSESSION.8B. THE TAX DECLARATIONS PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT CORROBORATE HER CLAIM OF THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PERIOD OF POSSESSION.9C. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT A CERTIFICATION FROM THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF HER APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.10In sum, the issues presented before us are (a) whether or not respondent was able to prove, by the quantum of evidence mandated by law, that she met the required period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in the concept of an owner, of the subject parcel of land; and (b) whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and alienable land of the public domain.Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.Respondent submits that Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by Republic Act No. 6940, which reduced the required period of possession to thirty years immediately prior to the filing of the application. Said law became effective on April 15, 1990. However, petitioner maintains that the required period of possession remained the same. RA 6940 explicitly states that its provisions amended sections 44, 45 and 47 of CA 141. Nothing in RA 6940 amends Section 48 (b). In other words, the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title set forth therein remains the same, namely, (1) possession of the subject land from June 12, 1945, and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals,11we held that:Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en concepto de dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this decree, "the provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals,12thus:This Court has held in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that, originally, "Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977." As amended Section 48 (b) now reads:(b) Thos