3. Armed Conflict and International Law.doc

8/14/2019 3. Armed Conflict and International Law.doc

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Armed Conflict and International Law: Contemporary Challenges

Clashes between great powers, regional conflicts, traditional interstate wars and armed

liberation/resistance movements remain relevant in international politics, but their number has

declined significantly. The contemporary era is witnessing the rise of conflicts that are markedly

different from those prevalent during the last century. The fact that most wars are fought within

rather than between states is only the most obvious transformation. Additionally, modern

warfare is distinguishable from the past by virtue of the following characteristics: 1

1. Goals: olitical goals related to foreign policy interests of states have been pushed

aside by the consolidation of new forms of power based on ethnic/religious homogeneity. !ven

though ethnicity and religious affiliation are rarely sources of armed conflict, they often are the

basis of social mobili"ation and an e#pression of the deeper causes of war.

$. Values: %ith few e#ceptions, notably the &'lobal %ar on Terrorism( )'%*T+,armed conflicts are no longer about universal principles, such as those advanced by fascism,

socialism or democracy, but about identities at the tribal and communal levels. Third party

intervention, in contrast, is most often guided by universal principles, including democracy,

human rights and humanitarianism.

. Mobilization: -ather than mobili"ing constituencies by creating a sense of national

patriotism, leaders use fear, corruption, religion, ethnicity and the media to advance the interests

of narrowly defined identity groups. n many instances, boys, girls, men and women are forciblyrecruited to serve as soldiers, cooks, and se# slaves or to perform other duties.

. Eternal !upport: n the absence of super0power patrons, e#ternal support comes

from iaspora communities, foreign mercenaries, criminal networks and bad neighbors. 2upport

is not limited to financial contributions, but encompasses active participation in the fighting. 3or

instance, 4ud5ahedeen of the -ussian0Afghan war have fought in 6osnia and 7osovo, and are

now supporting the rebels in ra8. n Africa, mercenaries are playing an important role in many

conflicts.


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9. "arfare: n most of today(s armed conflicts fighting is dispersed and fragmented

and front lines disappear. nstead of heavy artillery and tanks, armed non0state actors use light

weapons, rocket0propelled grenades and improvised e#plosive devices. 3orced recruitment and

child soldiers are common.

n traditional warfare, conflicting parties deploy organi"ed armies, relying on the

strength and 8uantity of e8uipment and troops. on0state armed actors do not have the military

capacity of states and the resulting mismatch in capabilities and methods of engagement results

in asymmetric warfare : The disadvantaged side must use special tactics to overcome the

military deficit. These tactics include hit0and0run attacks, the use of difficult terrain and urban

areas, various forms of violence, including terrorism.

;. #argets: The laws of war are increasingly disregarded and the civilian population

has become the deliberate target of atrocities, rape and siege. 'enocide, systematic rape and

other violence against civilians, including terrorism, are characteristic of asymmetric warfare.

nited ations Charter. Article $)+ of the > Charter


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prohibits the use of force and the threat thereof in international relations. This overall

prohibition of the use of inter0state force is sub5ect to two e#ceptions:

1. Article %&recogni"es the use of force as self0defense in response to an armed attack

by another state.

$. Articles '()*&allow military action authori"ed or taken by the 2ecurity Council, if it

is determined that there is a threat to international peace, a breach of peace or an act of

aggression.

The > Charter only regulates the use of force between states. There are no provisions

in the Charter, or anywhere else in international law, that regulate when it is proper to resort to

force in intra0state affairs.

Ius in bello

us in bello refers to international humanitarian law )?@+. ?@ is known by many othernames such as =humanitarian law,= =law of conflict,= and =laws of war.= All these terms refer to

the rules regarding the treatment of civilians and non0combatants in areas of armed conflict and

the rules of engagement for soldiers and combatants. ?@ is only applicable in times of war and

consists of two branches:

1. #he +ague Law, based on the 1BB and 1B< ?ague Conventions, relates to the

proper use of weapons and military tactics. t states that choice of methods and means of warfare

is not unlimited. n order to spare the civilian population, armed forces shall at all times

distinguish between civilians and civilian ob5ects on the one hand and military ob5ectives on the

other. The ?ague @aw sets forth the principles of military necessity and proportionality.

$. Gene,a Law, which relates, among other things, to the proper treatment of prisoners

of war, civilians and other noncombatants. t states that persons who are not, or are no longer,

taking part in hostilities, including captured combatants, shall be respected, protected and treated

humanely. They shall be given appropriate care, without any discrimination.

The main sources of ius in bello are the four 1BB 'eneva Conventions and the two

Additional rotocols of 1B


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The two bodies of law, ius ad bellum and ius in bello, are based on the premises that

there are clear distinctions between: $

nternational and non0international conflicts

Crimes and acts of war

'eographic boundaries

eace and war time

ndividuals

#he Impact of Globalization

The changes in the nature of contemporary conflict outlined at the beginning of this unit

have to be viewed in the conte#t of globali"ation. ncreased transnational activities, growing

interdependence and integration, as well as the emergence of non0state entities in international

relations have had a profound impact on the international system and local communities. As aresult, the distinctions on which the laws of armed conflict were based slowly eroded. The

advent of the new generation of wars and global terrorism have e#acerbated and accelerated this

erosion.

International ,ersus -on)international Conflicts

n $1, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was involved in a long standing civil

war with the orthern Alliance while at the same time fighting an inter0state war with the

American0led coalition as a result of the regime(s connection to al Daeda and the 2eptember 11

attacks.

The internal conflicts in 6osnia and 7osovo have resulted in an international

response.

The >.2. invasion of ra8 in $ to remove 2addam ?ussein because of his threat

to international peace has triggered an internal armed struggle among the 2hia, the 2unni and, to

a lesser degree, the 7urds.

The problem is not only that the boundaries between international and non0international

conflicts have become blurred for analytical reasons. 3ar more important is the fact that as a

result, it has become difficult to determine and even disputed which body of law is applicable in

a specific case.
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Crime ,ersus Armed Conflict

The 'eneva Conventions, its Additional rotocols and the >nited ations Charter all

assume that not every act of violence constitutes an act of armed conflict. Additional rotocol

states that the rotocol:

= . . . shall not apply in situations of internal disturbance, and tensions such as riots,

isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed

conflicts.=

n 1Bnited ations 'eneral Assembly defined aggression as:

=. . . the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or

political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of

the >nited ations . . . =

This statement raises three important 8uestions with regard to the distinction between

crimes and armed conflict:

1. %hat is the threshold level of violenceE

$. %ho uses violenceE

. %hat is the purpose of the violenceE

The threshold level of violence and armed conflict has been debated among researchers

for a long time. A wide range of definitions of armed conflicts reflects this. At the political leveland in practice, the intensity and type of violence that amounts to armed conflict is e8ually

debated. The ambiguity of international law in distinguishing between acts of crime and armed

conflict results in distinctions based on policy rather than the law. 9

>nder the > Charter, only states can take aggressive actions that result in

international armed conflict. According to Article 1 of the Additional rotocol , non0state

armed groups in non0international conflicts must:

1. 6e under responsible command.

$. !#ercise control of part of the state(s territory.

. 6e capable of carrying out sustained and concerted military action.

. 6e capable of implementing the rotocol.
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The purpose of the violence, as alluded to in the definition of aggression, must be to

threaten the sovereignty or integrity of the state. n many of today(s armed conflicts, forms of

violence are used that don(t threaten the integrity or sovereignty of the state:

-ape, torture, the burning of houses and fields, theft and other forms of violence are

crimes often committed in times of war.

Criminal activities, such as drug and weapons trafficking, are necessary to sustain

conflict.

!#tra5udicial killings, political assassinations and kidnappings are used to protect the

flow of resources generated by those criminal undertakings.

n Colombia, the initial ideological struggle between the government and the rebel

groups, ational @iberation Army )!@+ and -evolutionary Armed 3orces of Columbia)3A-C+, has been replaced by a turf war about the lucrative drug market.

The 'lobal %ar on Terrorism )'%*T+ illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing

between crimes and armed conflict. 4any commentators argue that the terrorist attacks of

2eptember 11, $1 did not constitute an act of war but were simply a crime. ;Their argument is

based on the following assertions:

Al Daeda is not a state, and as a result there can be no international conflict.

Al Daeda(s attacks were isolated and sporadic and therefore the laws of war do not

apply.

Al Daeda holds no defined territory and controls no population, certainly not in the

>.2. *ne cannot speak of a non0international conflict.

Al Daeda is best described, so it is argued, as a criminal network similar to weapons

and drug traffickers. Criminal law, then, is the best way to deal with the terrorist organi"ation.

*pponents of this view, including the >nited 2tates government, argue that the violenceused by al Daeda is of a magnitude amounting to an act of war. n addition, the al Daeda

leadership stated that it is in a state of war with the >.2. and that the organi"ation intends to

conduct more attacks against >.2. interests. 3inally, terrorist attacks are far from sporadic and

isolated and point to a pattern of hostile action against >.2. interests that began with the 1BB

bombing of the %orld Trade Center and continue until today.


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The options available in responding to crimes and armed conflicts differ drastically.

>nder the criminal law perspective, there is no immunity for acts that are normally allowed

during war times and humanitarian law does not apply. 4ilitary responses, self0defense and

preemptive measures at home or abroad are not allowed. nstead, the government must engage

in a process of national and international legal investigation and is dependant on cooperation,

warrants and the demonstration of probable cause.

The >.2. approach has been to treat the 2eptember 11 terrorist attacks as an act of war

warranting a military response. n contrast, 6ritain has always regarded the terrorist activities in

orthern reland as a criminal matter outside the scope of the law of armed conflict. This

difference has had a significant impact on the manner in which each country has responded to

the terrorist threat.

.lurring Geographic .oundariesThe traditional paradigm of armed conflict assumes that there are clear spatial

boundaries between "ones of war and "ones of peace. n other words, one can clearly distinguish

between those places where the laws of war apply, and those places where regular domestic laws

and international agreements govern.

As mentioned at the beginning of this unit, asymmetric warfare has resulted in

fragmented and dispersed pockets of fighting, ambushes, and hit0and0run attacks. *ften the war

"one only encompasses parts of a country, as in 2udan, where the fighting occurs in the arfurregion. 2ometimes, attacks are staged from areas across international borders, as is the case in

the emocratic -epublic of Congo and -wanda. %ith the advent of international terrorism, the

distinction has become even more blurred. t is not clear where the ne#t attack is going to occur,

nor is it clear where the highly mobile terrorist cells operate.

The implications of the >.2. approach are that any terrorist, regardless of his

whereabouts, can be the target of a military strike sanctioned by international law and the

principle of self0defense. 3ollowing the same line of reasoning, 6ritain could order the targeted

killing of an -A terrorist on vacation in taly, and this right would e#tend to all other states.

%hether this interpretation should and will prevail is the sub5ect of a heated debate among legal

scholars, diplomats and international affairs specialists. At a minimum, it challenges the

principle of territorial sovereignty.


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/istinguishing #imes of 0eace from #imes of "ar

2imilar to the spatial delimitations between "ones of peace and "ones of war, the

international law of armed conflict rests on the temporal distinction between times of peace and

times of war.

'lobal terrorism makes this distinction less salient. %hile the '%*T )'lobal %ar on

Terrorism+ is a political reality, a significant number of legal e#perts and specialist in

international relations 8uestion whether the >nited 2tates is in a state of war, because:

Al Daeda is not a state. nternational conflicts may only occur between states.

The attacks of 2eptember 11, as well as the fatwas issued by *sama bin @aden, do not

constitute acts of war or declarations of war. B

Al Daeda does not control territory in the >.2.F therefore this does not constitute a

situation of internal conflict.t is also unclear what would mark the end of the 'lobal %ar on Terrorism )'%*T+.

The fact that there is no clear end to the hostilities has important ramifications for detaining

risoners of %ar )*%s+. *%s are to be returned as soon as possible after the cessation of

armed conflict. n a war with no end, *%s could legally be detained indefinitely.

uring times of war, many states give the government e#tended war powers that may

conflict with domestic laws, particularly in the area of civil liberties. Those powers are normally

e#tended for a finite period of time. n reaction to 2eptember 11, the >nited 2tates Congress has

granted the president a wide array of powers with the adoption of the atriot Act. 4any of the

provisions e#pired at the end of $9. !ven though Congress renewed the provisions for si#

months, lawmakers are not prepared to curtail civil liberties at the e#pense of e#ecutive power

indefinitely.

.lurred /istinctions in the !tatus of Indi,iduals

Ci,ilians and combatants

The distinction between civilians and combatants is one of the most important

distinctions in international humanitarian law. Civilians are:

=ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces

who have laid down their arms and those placed (hors de combat( G=out of the fight=H by

sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause . . .= 1


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Article of the Additional rotocol defines a combatant as a member of the armed

forces of a party to the conflict. As important as this distinction is, there is an ongoing debate

about the definition of =civilian= and the meaning of =taking no active part in hostilities.=

The distinction is based upon the assumption that wars are fought between uniformed

armies along clearly identifiable front lines. t is increasingly difficult to distinguish between

civilians and combatants because:

Combatants deliberately seek to blend into the civilian population.

Civilians often take part in violence against each other, as 6osnia, 2omalia, -wanda

and 7osovo have shown.

Advances in technology and communications render problematic the distinction

between the operations of military systems and civilian support systems. rivate security services and armed contractors operate in conflict "ones.

Terrorists, like many guerilla fighters, wear no uniforms and blend in with the local

population. 4any actively engage in acts of violence, and can be tried for war crimes, under the

law of armed conflict paradigm, or for murder, under the criminal procedure paradigm.

?owever, 8uestions remain about the status of the many hundreds of supporters that never

actually detonate a bomb. Are members of a charitable organi"ation that funnels money to al

Daeda combatants or civiliansE

1nlawful combatants and lawful combatants

The terms =lawful combatant= and =unlawful combatant= are not mentioned in the

'eneva Conventions and the Additional rotocols. The distinction is made because combatants

who act within the parameters set forth by the laws of armed conflict are immuni"ed for their

actions, and are thus lawful. f they are captured, they must be treated as prisoners of war and

returned after the cessation of hostilities. Combatants who violate the laws of armed conflict

either by committing a war crime or by failing to comply with the formal definition of

combatant, are not protected by the 'eneva Conventions and the Additional rotocols, they are

therefore unlawful combatants and can be tried and punished by a military tribunal or a regular

court. 11


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There are two criteria that must be satisfied for the status of lawful combatant:

1. Comply with the following conditions:1$

a+ being under the command of a person responsible for his subordinatesF

b+ wearing a distinctive sign recogni"able at a distanceF

c+ carrying arms openly.

$. Conduct military operations according to the laws and customs of war.

The >.2. government has applied these criteria in its decision to deny al Daeda

operatives prisoner of war status. 2ince they do not wear uniforms, do carry concealed weapons,

and deliberately target civilians, they are violating the laws of war and are, therefore, unlawful

combatants. The same standard has been applied to the Taliban fighters.

?uman rights groups, military lawyers and diplomats have challenged this

interpretation of the law because of its blanket application to all terrorists and Taliban members.They argue that some of the detainees, specifically the members of the Taliban captured in

Afghanistan, could have worn recogni"able uniforms or signs, or could have carried arms

openly.

n addition, Article 9 of the 'eneva Convention on risoners of %ar states that:

=. . . should any doubt arise as to whether a person, having committed a belligerent act

and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, Gis a lawful combatantH, such persons shall en5oythe protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a

competent tribunal.=

The >.2. has not held any hearings pursuant to Article 9 to determine the status of

'uantanamo 6ay detainees.

The reality of today(s conflicts, in which impoverished regimes and militias may lack

the resources to get uniforms, which identify them as soldiers, makes the determination between

lawful and unlawful combatants problematic to some I

Aggregater /ata on Armed Conflicts

Armed Conflicts: &((2)322%1


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As a general trend, the number of armed conflicts in the aggregate has declined since

the end of the Cold %ar and was at the level of the 1B9s at the end of $. nterstate wars

have become increasingly uncommon and since 1BB there have been only a few international

armed conflicts: the invasion of 7uwait by ra8 )1BB+, the 'ulf %ar )1BB1+, the border war

between !ritrea and !thiopia, the >.2.0led intervention in Afghanistan )$1+ and ra8 )$+,

and the military clashes between ndia and akistan )$$+. n addition to these more clear0cut

armed interstate conflicts, the following cases also fall within this category: >.2. led

intervention in 6osnia )1BB9+, against ra8 )1BB: enforcing protection "ones over 7urd and

2hi(a Arab regions+, and in Jugoslavia )1BBB: ending the repression of 7osovar Albanians+. The

>nited 2tates and others argue that the al0Daeda attacks on >.2. soil on 2eptember 11, $1,

amounted to an act of international war as defined by the > Charter.

arallel to the decline in international wars there has been a steady rise in intrastatearmed conflicts in the years before the end of the Cold %ar and shortly thereafter. 2ince the year

$, most intrastate conflicts have occurred in Africa and Central Asia, and a trend has

emerged indicating increased armed conflicts in the 4iddle !ast and the predominantly 4uslim

countries in Africa and Central Asia. This trend may be related to >.2. activities in connection

with the '%*T. ntra0state armed conflicts often have regional and/or international dimensions,

thus challenging the traditional distinction between the two. At the same time, Afghanistan and

ra8 have shown that international intervention may significantly raise the possibility of civilwar.

n early $9, twenty ma5or armed conflicts were being fought of which eight were of

medium or high intensity: Colombia, -ussia )Chechnya+, ndia, 4yanmar, epal, ra8, 2udan

and the emocratic -epublic of Congo.

@ow intensity conflicts include Afghanistan, ortheast ndia, ndonesia, and the

hilippines, as well as Algeria, srael, 6urundi, vory Coast, igeria, 2omalia, and >ganda.

99 of 1;1 countries were affected by intrastate armed conflict since 1BB and of those

nearly two0thirds )9+ witnessed conflict lasting seven or more years.

n the year $9, only eight of these protracted conflicts were highly active and

resistant to settlement and international pressure: Algeria, 6urundi, Colombia, emocratic

-epublic of Congo, ndia, 4yanmar, epal, and -ussia.


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Conflicts in ndia, the hilippines and 2omalia continue at low levels with

negotiations for peace ongoing.

Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict !ince 3222 4&*5

Angola

The year $$ marked a turning point in the civil war between the ational >nion for

the Total ndependence of Angola and the 'overnment of Angola. After the death of >TA(s

leader Konas 2avimbi in 3ebruary $$ fighting stopped in 4arch and a peace agreement based

on the 1BB @usaka protocol was signed in August. !ven though >TA has been transformed

into the opposition party holding about 1/ of the seats in parliament, integration and

demobili"ation efforts for >TA fighters have been slow. overty, the absence of rule0of0law

and the integration of a large number of returning refugees continue to pose problems for thegovernment.

Liberia

n the year $, a two0pronged insurgency led by the @iberians >nited for

-econciliation and emocracy )@>-+ and the 4ovement for emocracy in @iberia )4*!@+

against the regime of Charles Taylor mobili"ed international pressure and culminated in the

approach of >.2. warships. As a result, Taylor resigned in $ and left the country. A peace

agreement between the insurgents and the remnants of Charles Taylor(s ational atriotic artywas signed shortly thereafter, followed by the deployment of a >nited ations peacekeeping

mission )>4@+ to provide security. n ovember $, the three factions agreed to disband

their militias and >4@ has confirmed the completion of their disarmament. !lections were

held in *ctober $9.

6wanda

n 4ay $1, the ?utu0led Army for the @iberation of -wanda, since 1BB based in the

emocratic -epublic of Congo, launched incursions into -wanda. The Tutsi0dominated

-wandan atriotic Army )-A+ repelled the attacks and forced the ?utus to retreat. The Army

for the @iberation of -wanda maintains a strong presence in the 7ivu region of the -C,

threatening the -wandan government, which periodically crosses into the -C in pursuit of

?utu militants.


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!ierra Leone

n 4ay $1, the government and the -evolutionary >nited 3ront signed a peace

agreement under the auspices of the >nited ations and initially enforced by 6ritish troops. A

>nited ations peacekeeping mission )>A42@+ was established and its mandate

subse8uently e#tended through Kuly $9. 3ree and fair elections were held in $$ endorsing

the 2ierra @eone eople(s arty )2@+ and installing its leader, Ahmad Te5an 7abbah, as

resident. isarmament was completed at the beginning of $, and the >nited ations ?igh

Commissioner for -efugees announced in Kuly of $9 the completion of its operation to

repatriate $nited ational arty )>+ took control

of the government after violent elections. The coalition started talks with the @iberation Tigers

of Tamil !elam )@TT!+ in an effort to negotiate and implement a conciliatory agenda with the

rebels. A cease0fire agreement was struck under international auspices in 3ebruary $$.

orway0lead negotiations between the parties continued and at the end of $$ they committed

to ending the war and instituting a federal system in 2ri @anka. eep divisions still e#ist within

the @TT!, the > and the former ruling coalition, the eople(s Alliance. 3urther peace talkswere suspended in $ and have not yet resumed because the government views the @TT!(s

demand for an nterim 2elf0'overning Authority )2'A+ in the Tamil region as a move toward

independence. n addition, factional fighting continues within the @TT! and a mutiny led by

Colonel 7aruna was put down by force in $. The lack of cooperation between the

government and the @TT! in the aftermath of the $ Tsunami was indicative of the fro"en

nature of the peace talks. ?owever, at the beginning of $;, the parties agreed to meet in

2wit"erland under the aegis of orway to revive the process.

1nited !tates

*n 2eptember 11, $1, a concerted terrorist attack on the %orld Trade Center in ew

Jork and the entagon in %ashington C caused the collapse of the skyscrapers, badly


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damaged the entagon and killed and in5ured thousands of people when two hi5acked

commercial airplanes were crashed into the sites. Jet another target was spared when civilian

passengers of a third flight resisted the terrorist attackers causing the plane to crash into a

ennsylvania field. The attack by Al Daeda is widely regarded as an act of war and has led to

>.2. military action in Afghanistan and ra8. %hile Al Daeda continues to attack >.2. targets

abroad, mainly in 4uslim countries, there have been no further incidents on >.2. territory since

the B/11 attacks.

Countries with on)going ma8or armed conflict through 322%

Afghanistan

As a result of the B/11 attacks, a >.2. led coalition ousted the ashtun0dominated

Taliban regime in late $1. n $$, a @oya Kirga established the Transitional Authority andelected ?amid 7ar"ai as interim president. A new constitution was approved in $.

residential elections marked by violence were held in *ctober $ giving victory to ?amad

7ar"ai. The provinces of Afghanistan remain largely outside the control of the central

government and violence persists. -ecent attempts to prohibit opium production have further

aggravated the relationship between 7abul and the warlords in the provinces.

AlgeriaThe Armed slamic 'roup )'A+ and a splinter faction, the 2alafist 'roup for

reaching and Combat )'2C+, continue their violence to undermine the secular government of

resident 6outeflika. They re5ected the president(s offer of negotiations toward a peace

agreement as well as his offer of amnesty for all slamic guerillas who would lay down their

weapons. At the beginning of $9, the government announced that it broke the resistance of

'A and that the '2C was severely weakened due to the loss of much of its leadership and

internal dissension.

.urundi

The arty for the @iberation of the ?utu eople03orces for ational @iberation

)alipehutu03@+ remained the only rebel group in armed opposition to the government in early

$9. The principal ?utu rebel group, the ational Council for the efence of emocracy 0


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3orces for the efence of emocracy )C03+, agreed to a comprehensive peace

agreement with the government in $, after a power transfer within the transitional

government from resident 6uyoya, a Tutsi to ?utu resident dayi"eye. An interim

constitution was approved in $. The transitional government is scheduled to end in

ovember $9.

Colombia

eace talks initiated by resident astrana collapsed at the beginning of $$ after four

years of negotiations that failed to end the 0year civil war. The government recaptured the

demilitari"ed "one that had been granted to the -evolutionary Armed 3orces of Colombia

)3A-C+. n response to the government offensive the 3A-C attempted to disrupt the $$

elections and mounted a counter0attack. ewly0elected resident >ribe declared a state ofemergency, backed by the >.2., and abandoned all prospect for negotiations in favor of counter0

insurgency measures. The >.2. provided L billion in military aid under &lan Colombia( to

support the government in Colombia. 6y attacking 3A-C strongholds and destroying coca

fields the government plans to weaken 3A-C forces and undermine the rebel(s financial base.

The ational @iberation Army )!@+, the smaller rebel faction, has kept a low profile since

$$. Talks between the government of Colombia and the !@ were agreed upon at the end of

$9, signaling a breakthrough in negotiations. The ma5or right wing paramilitary group, the>nited 2elf0efense 3orces )A>C+, signed the 2anta 3e de -alito Agreement to demobili"e in

$ after serious human rights violations put pressure on its leadership. ?owever, the group is

slow in implementing the terms of the agreement.

/emocratic 6epublic of Congo

The emocratic -epublic of Congo )formerly Maire+ has been fractured into four

distinct regions since armed rebellion first flared in 2eptember 1BB;, forcing the fall of the long0

standing and corrupt 4obutu regime in 4ay 1BB


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involvement of troops from several regional states has further complicated the situation. 2trong

international pressure on the warring parties has led to a string of ceasefire and peace

agreements including the @usaka peace accord in August 1BBB, negotiated withdrawals of

foreign troops, and the ecember $$ power0sharing agreement signed in retoria.

egotiations between the government and the two main rebel groups begun in 3ebruary $$

ended in early $, resulting in a draft constitution calling for an all0party transitional

government and the signing of a peace agreement. Koseph 7abila was sworn in as president of

the transitional government in April $. n $, 7abila(s transitional government faced failed

coup attempts in 4arch and Kune, a military rebellion in Kune, and increasing tension with

-wanda in ecember. The transition to a permanent government was scheduled for Kune $9.

?owever, the parliament e#tended the process to ecember $9. 2imilarly, national elections

were also postponed from Kune $9 to 4arch $;. Niolence continued in the more remoteregions, especially in the provinces of turi and 7atanga.

n $, The >nited 2tates has sponsored a tripartite Commission bringing together

officials from -wanda, Congo and >ganda in an effort to foster regional cooperation and build

confidence. 6urundi 5oined the commission in $9.

India

ndia(s strategy of creating peace and stability in the disputed 7ashmir territory fromwithin )i.e., attempting to legitimi"e its administration over the territory by holding democratic

elections and engaging in dialogue with the local authorities over self0rule and governance

issues+ continued to be undermined by 4uslim militant groups that seek to either establish an

independent 7ashmiri state or bring it under rule by akistan. Attacks by slamist militants on

the 7ashmiri legislative assembly in late 2eptember $1 and on ndia(s parliament building in

ecember $1 drastically raised tensions between ndia and akistan. ersistent infiltration

from akistan and attacks by 7ashmiri separatists brought the two countries to the brink of

interstate war in 4ay0Kune $$. %hile the ndian and akistani armies instituted a

comprehensive ceasefire agreement for the @ine of Control in ovember $ and began

bilateral talks in early $, separatist violence continues to flare in 7ashmir.


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Indonesia

3ollowing the failed implementation of a Kanuary $1 regional autonomy agreement,

3ree Aceh 4ovement )'A4+ militants and ndonesian armed forces engaged in renewed

violence. Although resident 4egawati 2ukarnoputri had pledged, as recently as August $$,

to crush the 'A4 rebellion, the ndonesian government responded to intense international

pressure and signed a new regional peace and autonomy measure with the 'A4 leadership in

'eneva in ecember $$. n 4ay $, the government imposed martial law in Aceh

following the breakdown of the ceasefire and the failure of peace talks in Kapan. n ovember

$, newly0elected resident Judhoyono e#tended the state of civil emergency for si# months.

Coastal and lowland areas of Aceh were devastated by the ecember $ tsunamiF the

provincial capital, 6anda Aceh, was destroyed. espite offers of a ceasefire by 'A4 rebels

during relief operations in the province, ndonesian forces claimed to have killed 1$ rebelsduring offensive operations in Kanuary $9. eace talks resumed in late Kanuary although the

main hurdle continues to be 'A4(s insistence on, and the government(s re5ection of, an

independence referendum.

Ira9

The >nited 2tates, with the support of the >7, invaded ra8 on 4arch $, $, with

the stated goal of deposing the 6a(athist regime of 2addam ?ussein, as it was allegedlydeveloping %4 capability in contravention of > -esolutions and was refusing to allow

mandated weapons inspections. The 6a(athist regime was 8uickly deposed and a rovisional

Authority was established on April $ and an ra8i 'overning Council was established in Kuly

$. espite concerted efforts to locate them, no weapons of mass destruction or evidence of

their development were found. @ocal armed resistance to the >.2.0led occupation increased

through the year, particularly among 2unni0Arab communities and former0supporters of the

6a(athist regime. !8ually disruptive has been an influ# of 4uslim =5ihadists= from across the

4iddle !ast. 4a5or armed resistance by a 2hi(a militia based in a5af erupted in April $ and

again in August $ before it was effectively repressed. nsurgency in the so0called =2unni

triangle= north and west of 6aghdad continued to grow through $ and early $9, despite

ma5or offensives against the rebel stronghold of 3allu5ah in April $ and, again, in ovember


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$. An interim ra8i government was installed in Kune $ and general elections were held,

as planned, on Kanuary , $9F the elections were boycotted by most 2unni0Arabs. As

e#pected, the ma5ority 2hi(a community captured the largest number of seats in the new ational

Assembly, with the >.2.0favored secularists gaining only a small percentage of the vote. At this

writing, efforts were ongoing to forge a ruling coalition between the two largest factions: the

religious 2hi(a and ethnic07urds. The conflict inside ra8 shows no sign of abating.

Israel

Niolent confrontations between alestinians and sraelis have continued with only short

spells of relative calm since the latest outbreak of the alestinian =ntifada= )uprising+ in

2eptember $. 6oth sides have escalated their tactics, with alestinians using suicide0

bombings of mainly civilian targets and sraelis enforcing containment, mounting militaryinvasions of alestinian enclaves )with massive military invasions carried out in the 'a"a 2trip+,

and launching preemptive attacks on alestinian militants. articularly controversial has been

srael(s construction of a security wall outside its internationally recogni"ed border. The conflict

continues despite a =road map= peace plan devised by the >.2. and announced in April $,

and Ariel 2haron(s proposed plan for sraeli disengagement from the 'a"a 2trip approved by the

7nesset in *ctober $. ?opes for a breakthrough in the stalemated situation have risen

following the death of the long0time leader of the alestinian @iberation *rgani"ation, JasserArafat, in ovember $ and the Kanuary $9 election of moderate reformer 4ahmoud Abbas

as the new alestinian leader. ?owever, ?amas( victory at the polls in Kanuary $; may slow

the peace process down considerably. The >.2. has already cancelled funds to the alestinian

Authority )A+ because ?amas is considered a terrorist organi"ation. The !uropean >nion, for

now, is still providing much needed funding, but will decide later whether the funds will

continue to flow once ?amas has formed a new government. %hether and to what e#tent srael

is willing to negotiate with the new ?amas led A will further depend on the results of the

parliamentary elections in 4arch $;.

I,ory Coast

The situation in vory Coast first began to unravel in ecember 1BBB with a military

coup that ousted resident 6edie,widely accused of corruption. %hen coup leader 'eneral 'uei


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attempted to thwart the *ctober $ presidential elections by first dis8ualifying the most

popular candidates and then nullifying the results, massive demonstrations ensued and a little

known politician, @aurent 'bagbo, was sworn in as the elected president. A second, violent

confrontation occurred in ecember $ when legislative elections were marred by political

maneuvering. After a failed coup attempt in Kanuary $1, all parties pledged to work toward

reconciliation. The reconciliation ended with an apparent coup attempt in 2eptember $$,

which was 8uickly followed by the killing of 'eneral 'uei. These events triggered an eruption

of open warfare. A rebel group, calling itself the atriotic 4ovement of vory Coast )4C+,

sei"ed control of several areas in the north. n ovember $$, two new groups emerged and

took control of territory in the west: 4ovement for eace and Kustice )4K+ and the opular

vorian 4ovement for the 'reat %est )4'*+. The @inas04arcoussis peace accords,

providing for a power0sharing government, were signed in Kanuary $ and a ceasefire betweenthe northern0based rebels and the southern government was brokered in 4ay $. 3rench

forces were deployed to enforce the accords. All sides in the conflict have decried lack of

commitment to the peace process and have continued to threaten violence, leading to stalled

implementation of the accords. n 3ebruary $, the > sent a peacekeeping mission )>*C+

to the country. n 4arch $, the government violently suppressed an opposition

demonstration. -ebel forces failed to disarm by the *ctober $ deadline and the government

launched air strikes on rebel positions in the north, killing a number of 3rench peacekeepers inthe process. 3rance retaliated by destroying the vorian air force, sparking anti03rench and anti0

foreigner attacks throughout the country. The human rights situation in the country continues to

deteriorate and authority is fragmented among government0 and rebel0controlled enclaves.

Myanmar 4.urma5

The ruling military 5unta, the 2tate eace and evelopment Council )2C, formerly

the 2tate @aw and *rder -estoration Council+, maintains its repressive hold on power, however,

the 2C has moved haltingly toward political pluralism by opening up dialogue with the main

opposition movement, the ational @eague for emocracy )@+ under pressure from

international donors. 2poradic clashes with ethnic militias continue, particularly with the 2han,


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7aren, and 7arenni groups, which have established de facto autonomy over traditional lands.

The rime 4inister announced in August $ that the government would convene a ational

Convention to draft a new constitution, the first phase of its seven0step =road map= to

democracyF ethnic groups meeting in 3ebruary $ at the Third !thnic ationalities 2eminar

re5ected the =road map= and instead called for a =tripartite dialogue= between the 2C, the

@ and other political parties, and the ethnic minorities. The 7aren ational >nion held peace

talks with the military government in Kanuary $F a second round of talks was held in

3ebruary. t was reported in August $ that the 2C had launched a military offensive

against rebels of the 7arenni ational rogressive arty )7+, the 7>, and the 2han 2tate

Army )22A+. 3resh assaults against rebel bases of the 7 and the 7> were carried out in

Kanuary $9.

-igeria

2ince the movement to impose 2hari(a law in the northern 4uslim states gained

momentum in 1BBB, tens of thousands have died in communal clashes in the central plains

region of igeria. The clashes, mainly involving ethnic0?ausa )4uslim+ and ethnic0Jorubas

)Christian+ but also 3ulani )4uslim+ and Tarok )Christian+, generally diminished in $$ but

broke out once again in 7aduna in ovember $$ and 8uickly spread. 2erious communal

violence between Christians and 4uslims continued unabated through mid0$ but haddecreased considerably in the latter monthsF resident *basan5o lifted the state of emergency in

ovember $.

2ince the movement to impose 2hari(a law in the northern 4uslim states gained

momentum in 1BBB, tens of thousands have died in communal clashes in the central plains

region of igeria.

Throughout the conflict in igeria, the distribution of oil revenues from the iger delta

has been a central element of disagreement between conflict parties. At the beginning of $;,

rebel groups have kidnapped oil workers, stolen tankers and attacked oil fields claiming to

support impoverished communities in the delta and beyond with the proceeds of their activities.


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Corruption among oil workers and government officials tied to the oil business is high and adds

fuel to the conflict. n addition, foreign oil companies are blamed for e#porting the profits

without investing in local communities.

0hilippines

The transition of power from resident !strada to his vice0president 'loria 4acapagal

Arroyo prompted a significant change in the government(s policy toward the 4oro slamic

@iberation 3ront )4@3+, which broke from the main 4oro ational @iberation 3ront )4@3+

following the latter group(s signing of a peace agreement and continued to seek an independent

4uslim state in 4indanao. n $ !strada had adopted a hard0line policy against the 4@3 and

launched a military offensive against them. Arroyo, however, initiated a more conciliatory path.

eace talks between the government and 4@3 began in 4ay $1 and a cease0fire was signedin August $1. The peace process stalled, however, in early $$ as a splinter, e#tremist group,

Abu 2ayyaf, staged high profile attacks on civilian targets and the >nited 2tates e#tended its

global war on terrorism to the hilippines. 4alaysia acted as broker for talks between the

government and the 4@3 leadership and, in 2eptember $, sent a monitoring team to

monitor a ceasefire between the two sides. The government and the 4@3 had in Kuly $

agreed to cooperate against kidnapping gangs and the slamic terrorist group Kemaah slamiah

)K+. 3ighting continues with the e#tremist Abu 2ayyaf faction.resident Arroyo(s position within the government remains unstable in $;. n

2eptember $9, she escaped impeachment on the grounds of corruption and fraud after the

opposition in parliament was not able to garner the necessary votes. As a result of a thwarted

coup d(etat by senior military official, resident Arroyo has for the first time since the demise of

the 4arcos -egime, declared an emergency status.

6ussia

The armed conflict between the -ussian government and separatist rebels in the

republic of Chechnya that had originally begun in 1BB and ended with de facto autonomy for

the enclave in 1BB; resumed in autumn 1BBB when rebels staged attacks in neighboring

agestan. The continuing war has defied -ussia(s concerted attempts to crush the resistance and


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contain the fighting. 3ailure to contain the rebels has led to increased friction with neighboring

'eorgia, which has been accused of harboring rebel forces, and periodic attacks by militants in

neighboring regions, the most serious incident being an attack on a school in 6eslan, orth

*ssetia on 2eptember 1, $, that resulted in over deaths )official countF actual numbers

may be much higher+. Chechen militants have mounted several deadly terrorist attacks as far

away as 4oscow over the course of the conflict, including the sei"ure of hostages in a

4oscow theater in *ctober $$ )that ended with -ussian troops storming the theater and

resulted in over 19 dead, including all the militants+, a metro train bombing that killed in

3ebruary $, and simultaneous commercial airliner bombings in August $ that killed B

persons. Chechen rebels launched attacks into the -ussian republic of ngushetia in Kune $,

raiding arms depots and briefly occupying the ngush nterior 4inistry, killing the acting ngush

nterior 4inister and nearly 1 others )mostly police and security forces+.n 3ebruary $9, Aslan 4askhadov, the Chechen rebel leader, was killed during a

-ussian special military operation, shortly after calling for peace talks with -ussia, a move not

supported by the entire Chechen leadership. The new leader, Abdul07halim 2aydullayev,

signaled the end of peace talks with -ussia. n an attempt to widen the conflict, 2aydullayev

formed the Caucasus 3ront. Chechen rebels continue to attack -ussian military installations and

government buildings in Chechnya. -egional elections were held under tight security in

ovember $9. The -ussian0backed >nited 3ront won more than 9O of the seats, a result thatwas decried by the separatist forces.

!omalia

2poradic armed clashes continued to plague 2omalia in $F many of the more serious

factional clashes continue to occur in the capital city, 4ogadishu, which has been carved up

among rival warlords since the ouster of the 6arre regime in 1BB1. Narious regions of 2omalia

have emerged with fairly stable regional administrations, including 2omaliland )1BB1+, untland

)1BB+, and 2outhwestern 2omalia )$$+. A Transitional ational 'overnment )T'+ was

formed in 2eptember $ but it failed to establish any effective authority inside 2omalia. n the

most recent attempt to reestablish a central authority, a peace agreement including all the main

warlords and feuding factions, was signed in airobi, 7enya on Kanuary $B, $, providing for


23/25

a $


24/25

referendum for southern 2udan after a si#0year interim period. umerous rounds of peace talks

held throughout $ and $ finally resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement signed on

Kanuary B, $9, establishing a permanent ceasefire between the rebels and the 2udanese

government. t was hoped the agreement, characteri"ed as =one of the most comple# peace deals

in history,= would bring an end to the twenty0year civil war.

1ganda

The conflict in north >ganda defies conventional analysis as the main rebel group, the

@ord(s -esistance Army )@-A+, has established a fairly secure base of operations in the troubled

area across the border in the 2udan. The @-A has been preying mainly on the very large refugee

and internally displaced populations in the region. A ecember 1BBB agreement between 2udan

and >ganda to cooperate in lessening the strength of armed rebel factions in the border regionsled to a 4arch $$ agreement allowing >ganda armed forces to attack @-A bases in south

2udan. *ne immediate result of the >gandan offensive in 2udan was an increase in @-A attacks

in north >ganda. The 4arch $$ agreement was e#tended in ecember $$ to allow >gandan

forces access to 2udan territory until the end of Kanuary $. espite a ;0day ceasefire and

high0level peace talks in late $, the government and the @-A failed to reach agreement on a

long0term ceasefire and e#tended peace negotiations. @-A rebels ambushed an army unit in

northern >ganda in Kanuary $9, prompting resident 4useveni to order the resumption offull0scale operations against the rebels.

!ummary

The international system is in the midst of substantial change. This may be partially due

to the end of the Cold %ar and the conse8uent break up of the eastern and western blocs as well

as the severing of relationships with states on the periphery that were once deemed strategically

significant by the superpowers. The last $ years have seen a rise in internal conflicts and the

proliferation of non0state actors. The nature of contemporary conflicts has changed in many

respects. This lesson has identified seven changes:

1. olitical goals related to foreign policy have been replaced by the consolidation of

new forms of powerF


25/25

$. The underlying values are based on identities at the communal level and no longer

on universal principlesF

. 4obili"ation is achieved through fear and coercion rather than a sense of

nationalismF

. The sources of e#ternal support have shifted from superpowers to iasporas,

mercenaries and bad neighborsF

9. Asymmetrical warfareF

;. Civilians have increasingly become the target of violenceF andF

Documents

3. Armed Conflict and International Law.doc