342 ISOL.LTIOAT OF RABAUI,

LCTS at a time, and other ships in eachechelon had to stand by under threat ofenemy air attack while waiting their turnto unload. Under the circumstances, LCTcommanders were unwilling to remain atArawe any longer than their movementorders stated, and, on occasion, cargo holdswere only partially cleared before theships headed back for Finschhafen. Theproblem grew steadily less acute as Japa-nese air raids dwindled in number andstrength and the reserve supplies of thelanding forces reached planned levels.

General Cunningham lost no time inmaking his position on Arawe Peninsulasecure behind a well-dug-in defense lineclosing off the narrow neck. Engineerlanding craft gave the general protectionon his open sea flanks, and a series of com-bat out posts stretching up the coastal trailbeyond Lupin airstrip promised adequatewarning of any attempt to force his maindefenses. The l12th was brought up tostrength; Troop A was re-equipped by airdrop on the 16th, and, two days later,APDs from Goodenough brought in the 3dSquadron. The cavalry regiment actingas infantry and a reinforcing field artil-lery battalion seemed quite capable of han-dling any Japanese units that might comeagainst them.

Pursuing his mission of finding out allthmt he COU1d about Japanese forces inwestern h’ew Britain before the BACK-HANDED Force landed, Cunninghamdispatched an amphibious patrol towardthe Itni River on the 17th. Moving intwo LCVPS, the cavalry scouts reached apoint near Cape Peiho, 20 miles west of.%rawe, by dawn on the 18th. There, ap-pearing suddenly from amidst the offshoreislets, seven enemy barges attacked theAmerican craft and forced them intoshore. Abandoning the boats, the scout-

ing party struggled inland through a man-grove swamp, finally reaching a native vil-lage where they were warmly received.

An Australian with the scouts was ableto get hold of a canoe and report back to.4rawe by the 22d to tell Cunningham thatthe waters between Cape Merkus and theItni were alive with enemy barges. Thenatives confirmed this finding and alsosaid that large concentrations of Japanesetroops were located at the mouth of theItni, .kisega, and Sag-Sag. Special effortswere made to insure that this intelligencereached General Rupertus, and Cunning-ham sent it out both by radio and an officermessenger who used a torpedo boat return-ing to Dreger Harbor.

The barges that the 112th’s scouts ranup against on the 18th were transportingenemy troops from Cape Bushing to thescene of action at Arawe. As soon as heheard of the Allied landing, General Sakaiof the 27th Division had ordered GeneralMatsuda to dispatch one of his battalionsto Cape Merkus by sea. The unit Matsudaselected, the 1st Battalion, L$lst Infantry(less its Ist (70nzpany), landed at the vil-lage of Omoi on the night of 18 December,bivouacked, and started overland in themorning, heading for a junction with the<Japanese at Didmop. Getting lost re-peated] y in the trackless jungle, pausingwhenever cent act with the Americansseemed imminent, the battalion took eightdays to rnfirch a straight-line distance ofseven miles.

Major Komori, who was designatedoverall commander of enemy troops in thearea, reached Didmop on the 19th, havinggathered in the ret resting sailors fromITmtingalu on his way. For a few dayshe paused there, organizing his forces, andwaiting for 1,/141 to arrive. Finally de-ciding to delay no longer, Komori crossed

DEXTERITY LANDINGS 343

the Pulie with his main strength on Christ-mas Eve and arrived on the edge of theairstrip at dawn. The ll$%h outposts andpat rols were forced back on Umt ingaluand, with the troop stationed there, retiredinto the perimeter. A determined prob-ing Nttack in company strength was madeon the American main line of resist ante onthe night, of the 25th; 12 infiltrators werekilled within the cavalrymen% positionsbefore the ,Japanese were repulsed.

Komori’s attack emphasized one of themOSt SLl~CeSSfLl~aSpeCtS Of the DIREC-TOR operation. By the dawn of D-Dayfor the main DEXTERITY landings, two,Japanese infantry battalions that mightlmve fought, at the main Allied objectivewere tied up defending a secondary target.What effect this shift of a thousand enemytroops, most of them combat veterans ofthe Philippines or China fightin~, had on

the Cape Gloucester operation is impos-sible to say with any certainty. It seemsprobnble, however, that the casualties suf-fered by the 1st Marine Division wouldhave mount ed and the seizure of controlof western New Britain would have beendelayed had the enemy not changed histroop dispositions.

PRELANDING PREPARATI(2N87

While action at Arawe drew the atten-tion of the Japanese, the BACK-HANDED Force made its final prepara-tions for the landings at Cape Gloucester.Rehearsals following the pattern of theYellow Beach landings, with all assaultelements of Combat Team C embarked,

7Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : ALAMO C&3 Jnl; T71ZP7tiI)For AR.; CTF 76 Decj3 Jt7arD; l.st .lIurDiI;J’SAR, Anx C, Logistics and Supply,

took place at Cape Sudest on 20-21 De-cember. The long months of training borefruit, and the first waves moved from shipto shore wit bout incident and weresmoothly followed to the practice beachesby landing ships carrying supplies andreserve forces.

At Cape Gloucester, Admiral l%rbeywould again control elements of his am-phibious force as Commander, Task Force76 and fly his flag on the Conyngharnas headquarters ship for the operation.From Seventh Fleet and Allied NavalForces, now nnder Vice Admiral ThomasC. Kinkaid who had relieved AdmiralCarpender on 26 November, would comethe escort, covering, and bombardmentvessels to support the landings. GeneralKenney’s Fifth Air Force would handleall air support missions except those thatcould be undertaken by the 1st Division’sown squadron of light planes.

The preliminary softening-up of thetarget was exclusively the province ofKenney’s planes and pilots. Air raidswere so frequent through the late fall that,Japanese soldiers’ diaries show little rec-ognit ion of the fact that air strikes inten-sified after 18 December, for the conditionof the men being attacked was so con-sistently miserable that the step-up escapedtheir notice. One ground crewman at theknocked-out airfields noted unhappily

that “enemy airplanes flew over our areaat will and it seemed as though they werecarrying out bombing training. ” 8 Japa-nese interceptors and antiaircraft firenever seriously challenged the daily runsof strafers and bombers.

*ATIS CurrTranslation No. 1324, Diary of aground crewman at Ral)aul and Tsurubu, 5Nov–171)ee4?, in ATIS CurrTranslatilons XO. 122,dtd 31k1aY44(.4CSI Recs, FRG Alex).

691–360 O—63—23

344 ISOLATIOYT OF RA13AI’1,

The weight of bombs clroppecl on tar-gets in the Cape Gloucester vicinity be-tween 1 December and D-Day exceeded3,200 tons. Over 1,500 individual sortieswere flown to deliver the explosives andto search out enemy targets with cannonand machine gun fire. TTp until 19 De-cember> the bombers concentrated their at-tacks on the airfields and their defenses,but then target priority shifted to objec-tives that might impede the lzndings andsubsequent advance of the Marines. Theattacks resulted in substantial destructionof prepared positions spotted by aerialreconnaissance and in the death of scoresof ,Japnnese soldiers. The judgment ofair historians viewing the campaign wasthat mass bombing of the invnsion areasat Cape ~~loucester by the Fifth Air Forcevirtlmlly eliminated the combat effective-ness of the Japanese defenses. g Hiddenby the jlmgle’s impenetrable cover fromthe probing aerial camera, most of theMutsudo F’ome survived the protractedaerial assault. The damage to defenders’nerves ancl morale is apparent from con-temporary records, however, and the wide-spread destrllct ion of defensive positionsundoubted eased the task of Marine at-

tacking forces.Behind the screen of air activity, the

assembly of Barbey ’s attack force pro-

ceeded witl]out nlajor hitch. A conlp]i-cated scheclnle of loaclings and sailings

had to be met tl~at would enable the vm-ious e~helons to reach the target, on time.on the afternoon of the 24th, two I.STS~vith headquarters and service cletach-ments opernt ing direct 1y under General

‘ Craven and Cate, 0aadalcana7 to S’aipan, p.311 ; Dr. Robert F. I’atrell, USAF HistDiv, Itrto Head, HistBr, G–3, HQMC, dtd 19Jan62,

Itupertus’ command and reserve elementsof Combat Team C embarked, left CapeSudest for Cape Cretin near Finschhafen.At Cretin, the two ships were joined byfive others loaded with troops of CombatTeam B due to land on D-Day afternoon.At 0100 on Christmas morning, six LSTsof the third echelon sailed from Sudestwith men of Combat Teams B and C andBACKFDANDER Force supporting ele-ments; at Cape Cretin, an LST cm-ryingmen and equipment of 3/1 joined the shipswhich were sc]leduled to nose into the Yel-low Beaches as soon as the infantry-car-rying LCIS of the second echelon landedtheir cargos.

The main convoy of 9 A PDs ancl 11L(71s got. underway from Cape Sudest at0600, 25 December. .4ccompanying theships and their six escort, destroyers was

the Conyn,~ham w’ith Barbey and Ruper-tus on board. Not long after the assall]t

troops departed, transports carrying re-serve Combat Tezm A arrivecl in Oro Bayfrom Milne, and the 5th Marines and itsattached units landed at Cape Suclest toawait the call for employment. at CapeGlol~cester. Tl~e 14 LSTS which were toland on D plus one (27 December), bring-

ing in engineer, antiairmwft, and meclicalLUlitS :UId SILPP1ieS f Or ]]:kCKHi~~’~ER

Force, loaded out, on Christmas and sailedduring the n igl~t in trzce of the D-Dayconvoys. Erich LST bound for Cape

Gloucester was fully loaded witl~ truckscamying blllk cargo; those snips landing

on 26 December carried an average of 150tons of supplies apiece, znd the ones duein tl~e next day 250 tons.

To minil]~ize tl~e risk of sailil~g poorly

charted waters, the five LCIS carrying2/1’s ass~lilt troops joined the main con-

DEXTERITY LANDINGS

voy off Cape Cretin to mdce the passagethrough Vitictz Strait. A small-boat taskgroup, 12 Navy LCTS plus 2 LCVPS and14 LCMs crewed by zmphibian engineers,cut directly through Dampier Strait to-ward (h-een Beach. .iccompanyil~g thelanding crzft zs escorts for the 85-mile~,oYage f rolll Cape Cretin to TXUI1i werean engineer navigation boat, a n:t~:]l pfitrolcraft, and two SCs; four torpedo hOiltS

acted as a covering force to the east flank.While the Eastern ancl Western Assault,

Groups of Bzrbey’s force approached theirrespective beaches, one possible objectiveof DEXTERITY operations was occu-pied by a reinforced boat company of tlm592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment.

On 20 December, General Krueger xp -proved a plan to set up a long--rangeradar on Long Islandj abollt 80 miles westof Cape (Gloucester, zfter Australiancoastwatchers had reportec] the island free

of enemy troops. Acting on fin operationplan published only three days before em-barkation, the engineer boat group beganits shore-to-shore movement, from Finsch-hafen on Christmas afternoon. Precededby an aclvance party that landed fronltorpedo boats, the engineers and an Aus-tralian radar station went, ashore on the

island on the 26th. The lodgment onLong Island removed one target fronl thelist of those that might be hit by 3d Bat-talion, 5th Marines, held back from em-ployment at Cape Gloucester.]”

‘0 General Krueger noted in his comments ap-proving the Long Island operation that theMarine battalion slated for possible seiznre ofRooke Island might be the source of a detach-ment to relieve the engineers on Long. ALAMOCofS memo to Gen Krneger with Krueger’scomments. dtd 201kx43, in .1T..1.1[O G–3 ,Jn7 No.

10.

345

NT OiVEF’A CE TRAIL BLOCK ~~

Although they occurred simllltxneonslyas complementary operations wit]lin tl)eoverall BACKHANDER concept, thelandings at. (keen and l’ellow Reachesare seen clearer when examined sepa-rately. The primary mission of Lieuten-ant, Colonel Masters’ 2/1, reinforced, was adefensive one—to land, seize a trail block,and hold it ct~ytinstall comers. The firstmission of the rest of Cxeneral Rllpertus’force was offensive in nature-the captllreof Cape Gloucester’s airfields. Mmters7commznd, code-named the STONEFACE(h-oup, was scheduled to rejoin the rest ofthe 1st Division once the airfield objectivewas secured. (See Map 25.)

The LCIS with the STONEF.4CEGro{~p embarked broke off from tl~e con-voy headed for the Yellow Beaches at0422 on D-llty morning. Accompaniedby two escort and bombardment destroy-ers, the Reid and ~Smith, the troop -]aclenlanding craft headed for a rendezvouspoint about four miles off the h’ew ~ritaillconst opposite Txuali village. contactwith the small-boat group that had made

the voyage through Dampier Strait was

made later than had been planned, but thetransfer of assault troops to LCMS begal~

n Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from: Ist JfarDiv S.AR, PhaseII, Part II, Green Beach Landing; CTG 76.3( ComDesDiv 10) AR—130mhardment and Land-ing Ops at Tauali ( Cape Gloucester), ATewBritain

26Dec43, dtd 29 Dec43 (COA, XHD ) ; CO, Det, 2dESB Rept to CG, 2d ESB, dtd 20Jan44, Snbj:Ops CTF 76 LT 21 (Green Beach), in ALAMOG-.3 Jnl No. 19; OCE, GHQ, AIW’, AmphibianEngineer.Y 0peratio~t8—E?lgi?? rer8 in t?le S0ut7L-we.st Pacific 19.&Jj5, v. IV (Washington: GPO,1959), hereafter OCE, GHQ, AE’P, Amphibianlln~i)t ect,s; IIough and Crown, New Britoin,Campaign.

346 ISOLATION OF RABAUL

immediately, znd the lost time wasrecovered.

llngineer coxswains, moving in success-ive groups of four, brought their boatsalongside the three LCIS that carried thetwo assault companies, E and F. TheMarines were over the side and headed forthe line of departure within 10 minutes.Accompanying the four landing craft thatformed the first wave were two otherLCMS carrying rocket IXTKWS of the 2dEngineer Special 13rigxcle’s support Bat-

tery; the rockets were intended for a beach

bxrrage to silenre opposition in the few

n~inl~tes just before the lancling.

As the column of L(3Ms moved lazily

toward the line of departure, throttled

down to keep from getting ahead of the1anding schedule, the troops could hear thesound of naval gunfire at Cape Gloucester,seven miles away. Falling into formationbehind the. assault craft, two LCIS withmost of Companies G and H on boardmade up the fourth wave. Bringing upthe rear with a cargo of guns and vehiclesand 575 tons of bulk stores were 12 LCTSorganized in waves of three. The shipscarried 2t)-days’ supplies and five units offire for Masters’ 1,500-man force; the menthemselves carried one unit of fire and a

day’s rations.From his headquarters on the Reid, the

Commander, Western Assault Group,Commander Carroll D. Reynolds, orderedthe prelanding supporting fires to beginon schedule. The two destroyers cruising

5,400 yards offsbore fired 6’75 rounds of 5-inch at targets behind the beach and to itsflanks as far as Dorf Point on the northand Sag-Sag to the south. After 20 min-utes, the ships’ fire was lifted and Com-mander Reynolds radioed a waitingsquadron of B–25s to attack; for insurance

the Reid fired two star shells as a visualsignal. As the medium bombers beganmaking bombing and strafing runs alongthe long axis of the beach, the first waveof LCMS left the line of departure. Theplanes were scheduled to cease their bom-bardment when the landing craft were 500yards from Green Beach, an event calcu-lated to occur at 0743. At that moment,the engineer D17KWS began firing the firstof 240 rockets they arched ashore.lz Twostrafers made a last minute pass at. beachtargets after the DUKWS opened upbut fortunately avoided the plungingrockets.ls At 0748, the first LCMS ground-ed on the beach and dropped their ramps.

The Marines of the assault companiesmoved quickly across the volcanic sand,mounted the slight bank bordering thebeach, and then advanced cautiously intothe secondary growth that covered therising ground beyond. There had been noenemy response from the beach during thebombardment and there was none now thatthe Americans were ashore. Well-dugtrenches and gun pits commanding the sea-ward approaches had been abandoned, andthere was no sign of active Japanese op-position. The second and third waves ofLCMS landed five minutes apart, adding

their men to the swelling force ashore. At

“ Oddly enough, this barrage of rockets madelittle impression cm some of the troops it sup-ported ; it goes unmentioned in the division actionreport and escaped the notice completely of atleast one ofiker who witnessed the landing. MajTheodore R. (+alysh ltr to CMC, dtd 16Feb52.

‘3 The engineer brigade commander had sug-gested to Admiral 13arbey “that the last planein the final strafing run drop a flare to indicatethe way was clear for the rocket barrage to start.The reply was that the airmen ‘preferred to workon a strictly time basis,’ accordingly no signalwas given,” OCE, GHQ, AFP, Amphitiian Engi-

Hecrs, p, 170, n. 96(2).

348 ISOLATION OF RABAUL

0754, an amber star cluster was fired tosignal a successful landing to the waitingships.

The engineer L(3Ms retracted after de-1ivering the msault troops and headed outto a rendezvous point a mile and a halffrom shore. When the beach was clear,the L(3Is landed, dropped their twin bowramps, and the Marines of Companies Gand H filed clown into shallow water. At0830, the first of the I.(3Ts hit, and theothers followed in rapid succession as gen-eral unloading began.

The shore party was composed of a head-quarters uncler 2/1’s operations officer, alabor platoon of 130 men clralvn from alltbe major elements of the STONEFACEGroup, and a beach party of an~phibian en-giueers.1~ Supplies were channeledtln-ough four predesignated unloadiugpoints into as many clumps set up in thearea just off the beach. In each dump, sim-ilar amounts of rrrtions, fuel, ammunition,and organizational equipment were furthersegregated to cut down possible losses toenemy zir action. The absence of Japa-nese planes on D-Day, combined with un-seasonably fine weather and a light surf,did much to ease the task of the inexperi-enced shore party. By l’i15 the last LCThad been emptiecl and was assembled in therendezvous mea for the, vo~ilg(j back tohTe-w Guinea.

The convoy departed at 1900, lezving be-hind two LCVPS and four LCMS for off-

“ General Rupertus asked that an Army en-gineer shore company be assigned to supportthe Green Reach l:indirlg, and 2/1’s operation or-der Tvas anlen(le(l on 23 I>ecember to inclu(ie onein the shore Imrty, but the teritative assignment!V8S never con]l)letetl. CG, B.lCKIL\A”I)ER Formsg to CG, .%1,. +310l’or, (lt(l 201)ec43, in AL.i.1[0G–3 .JI12 No, 7 ; .inx C, 2/1 01)0 343, dtd,23Dec43, in l.’+t JIarDir S:IJ7. Phase II, Anx 1),

shore defense. The engineer boats an-chored inside a reef outcrop about 200yards from the beach with their stern gunspointing seaward. Lieutenant ColonelMasters gave the job of organizing theheath clefenses to the .4rnly engineer de-tachment commrrncler, Major Rex K.Shaul, ancl assigned a platoon of LVTSan{l a platoon of the 1st Marines WeaponsCompany to his command. Inland, theSTONEFACE con~mander disposed histhree rifle companies zlong a l,200-yard-long perimeter that ran along the ridgesoverlooking the beach. At its deepestpoint, a sal ieut where a causeway led intothe Marine lines, the perimeter was 500yards from shore. The riflemen were care-fLlll~ c]ug in by nightfall, ancl CompanyH’s heavy machine guns were emplacednmidst the foxholes where their tire couldbe most effective. The battalion weaponscomprrny’s 81mm mortars were set up tofire in front of any part of the defensiveposition. In reserve behind each rifle com-prrny was z platoon of artillerymen, Theseprovisional units had been formed on Mas-ters’ order as soon as it became apparent,that Battery H of 3/11 could not find afiring position that was not masked by pre-cipitous ridges.

By nightfall on D-Day, the STONE-NACE Group had established a tight pe-rimeter clefense encompassing all the objec-tives assigned it. The main coastal tracklrry within the Marine lines, denied to ene-my use. Probing patrols into the jungleand along the coast did not discover any,Japanese troops until dusk, when there wasa brief brush with a small enemy groupnear the village of Sumeru, just north ofthe beachhead. The Japanese faded awayinto the jungle when the Marine patrolopened fire.

DEXTERITY LANDINGS 349

Lieutenant Colonel Masters was unableto contact General Rupertns directly to re-port his situation. Mt. ‘Talawe, loomingbetween the two Marine beachheads,proved an impenetrable barrier to the bat-talion’s radios. Since the set of the am-phibian engineers was intermittently ableto reach ALAMO Force, word of theSTO~EFACE Group’s dispositions even-tually reached the division CP on themorning of the 27th. Except for the factthat his force was located in a radio “deadspot” for overland comn~unication,15 Mas-ters was in excellent shape to accomplishhis mission.

AN220RE .4 T THEYELL(7 W BE.4 OHES “

On Christmas morning, a Japanesecoastwatcher hiding out in the hills aboveCape Ward Hunt on New Guinea spottedthe Eastern Assault Group en route to itstarget. This enemy observer’s report ofthe ships’ passage, sightings by a Japanesesubmarine scouting the. area, or, perhaps,the last frantic message from a reconnais-sance plane that was shot down shortlyafter noon while it was skirting the con-voy, may one or xII have been responsiblefor Rabaul’s deduction that the msau]tgroup was headed for Cape Merkus. Onthe strength of this faulty judgment, theEleventh Air F’ket and Fourth Air Awny

“ LtCol Robert Hall ltr to CMC, dtd 4Mar52.“ IJnless otherwise noted, the material in this

section is derived from : A L.4M0 0–9 J??!; T’11Ph. ibFor Comdl Ti.8t; VII Pl)ibFor AR; CTF 76

II Qc.&? WarD; 1st MarI)iu S.4R, Phase II, PartI, Yellow Beach Landings and Plan Annexes ; IstMarDiv r)–s Jnl, 24Der43-29Peb44, hereafter 1stMarI)iv I)-,? Jnl—I; 17’th DivOps; craven and~ate, G!ladatcanal to &’a@an; Hough and Crown,N(,w Britoln, C7ampaif7n; Morison, Breaking tllf

Bi.wnarc7is Barrier,

planned a hot reception for the ships atArawe on the 26th.”

The path of the invasion convoy duringdaylight hours had been plotted to mis-lead the Japanese. Once night fell, themoonless dark that ALAMO planners hadwaited for, the ships shifted their courseto a more direct route through VitiazStrait. The destroyers, transports, land-ing ships, and escorts steamed along at 12knots while Admiral Crutchley’s cruiserforce ranged ahead to take position in gun-fire support areas lying off the Cape Glou-cester airfields.

Maintaining the convoy’s pace provedto be too much of a strain on the enginesof a harbor mine sweeper ( YMS ) whichwas scheduled to clear the waters off theYellow Beaches. The ship broke downfimdly and fell out at 2120, returning toCape Cretin; earlier, another YMS hadbeen tnken in tow by an APD to keep it inthe convoy. .4s Admiral Barbey’s shipsbegan to move into the transport area, thetwo YMSS that had completed the voyage;two destroyers, and two SCS operated to-gether to locate, clear, and buoy the chan-nel leading to the Yellow Beaches. (SeeMap IV, Map Section.)

The destroyers, taking a radar fix onthe wreck of a Japanese destroyer that was

hung up on the reef 7,000 yards offshore,found the entrance to the channel in thedarkness. Llsing their sound gear to locate

shoals along the passage, the destroyersgave their bearing and distance to theYMSS which woldd then “strike off for theshoal as a dog after a bone.” 18 The mine

“ SE A rec Na.vOpt~-111, pp. 4748; SE Area

4irOp8, pp. 2%30.

“ C!TU 76.1.42 (CO, CSS FZtls8er) AR of CapeGloucester Op on 26Dec43, dtd 29Dec43 (COA,N-Hr) ) .

350 ISOLATION OF R.4BAUL

sweepers and a destroyer’s whaleboatbuoyed the three principnl reef obstacleson schedule, and one of the YMSS swept,the channel which proved to be free ofmines. Immediately, the destroyersmoved inside the outlying reefs to deliverclose-in fire on the eastern flank of Yellow2. The SCS, which had also controlled theArawe landing, proceeded to line of de-parture and standby stations to handle thewaves of landing craft.

Throughout the clearance and markingof the channel, a mounting drumfire ofnaval bombardment marked the approachof H-Hour (0745). At 0600, the two

Allstralian heavy cruisers of Task Force74 opened Llp on targets in the vicinity ofthe airfields with the first of 730 rounds of8-inch high explosive fired during the next90 minutes. The 6-inch guns on the Amer-ican light cruisers sounded next, firing2,000 rounds between 0625 and 0727 at Tar-get Hill and the Yellow Beach area.Escort destroyers with the cruiser forceand those that had worked with the harborcontrol unit exploded 875 5-inch shellsashore while the larger ships were firingancl, later, in the few moments immedi-ately preceding H-Hour. The groundjust inland from the benches and the hil Isto the southeast drew most of the destroyerfire. Targets of opportunity were fewsince no evidence of enemy movement oropposition developed ashore during theAllied bombardment.

From 0700 to 0720, while naval gunfirewas concentrated on the beaches and air-fields, five squadrons of B-24s dropped500-pound bombs on the Target Hill area.Then, on schedule, at the call of a command

plane aloft, naval gunfire on the beacheslifted and a squadron of B–25s streaked inover Target Hill to let go eight tons of

whit e phosphorous bombs on its nakedcrest. Smoke soon obscured the vision ofany enemy who might still have been usingthe hill as an observation post, and threemedium bomber squadrons began workingover the beaches.

As General Rupertus had feared whenhe argued against its use:’ smoke fromTarget Hill drifted down across the land-ing beaches pushed on by a gentle south-east breeze. By H-I~our the shoreline haddisappeared in a heavy haze, and withinanother half hour the approach lanes wereobscured as far as the line of departure,3,000 yards out. Coxswains of the lead-ing boat wa~”es handled their craft bold-ly, however, and the smoke posed no severeproblem of control or orientation.

The first four waves of LCWPS assem-bled in succession. as the APDs carryingthe assault troops sailed into the trans-port area, two znd three ships at a time.Once the Marines of 1/7 and 3/7 were overthe side, the APDs left for positions out-side the reef to await the return of theirboats. The 12 landing craft in the firstwave, 6 for each beach, moved from col-umn into line at the control boat centeredon the line of departure. At about 0730,the SC-$81 dropped the wave number flagit was flying, and the assault platoonsheaded for the smoke-shrouded beaches.Following waves were dispatched at five-minute intervals.

Taking station on the flanks of the firstwave as it moved shoreward, two rocketLCIS made ready to fire a stunning bar-rage onto possible beach defenses to wver

‘oThe 1st Division commander was convincedthat smoke and dust from exploding fragmenta-tion bombs, rockets, and shells would provideenough concealment for approaching landingcraft. Potlock cowwnents.

352

the interval between the last B–25 strafingrun and the wave’s landing. When theboats were 500 yards out, the 1.(31 rocketsbegan dropping ashore and worked inlandas the Marines approached the beach. .kt0746 on Yellow 1 and 0748 on Yellow 2,the LCVPS grounded and dropped theirramps.

Charging ashore to the sound of theirown shouts, the Marines splashed throughknee-deep water onto narrow strands ofblack sand. There was no enemy re-sponse-no sign of human opposition—just a dense wall of jungle veget ztion. onmany stretches of Yellow 1, the overhang-ing brush and vines touched the water:there was only a hint of beach. Led byscouts forced to travel machete in onehand, rifle in the other, the assnult pla-toons hacked their way through the ti-ngled mass, won through to the coastaltrail, mnd crossed it into the jungle again.Once they had passed over the thin stripof raised ground back of the beaches, themen encountered the area marked “dnmpflat” on their maps. It was, as one dis-gusted Marine remarked, “damp lLp toyour neck.” ‘0

Under the swamp’s waters was a pro-fusion of shell and bomb craters and pot-holes, places where a misstep could endin painful injury. An extra obstacle tothe terrain’s natural difficuky were thehundreds of trees knocked down by theair and naval gunfire bombardment. Theroots of many of the trees that remainedstanding were so weakened that it tookonly a slight, jar to send them crashing.The swamp took its own toll of casualties,dead and injured, before the campaignended.

~ Hough and Crown, New Britdn Campaign,p, 48.

ISOLATIOA- OF RABAUL

Enemy firing first broke out to the westof Yellow 1 where Company I of 3/7 hadlanded. Confused by the smoke, theLCVPS carrying the company’s assaultplatoons reached shore about 300 yardsnorthwest of the beach’s boundary. Oncethe Marines had chopped through thejungle to reach the coastal trail, they cameunder long-range machine gun fire issuingfrom a series of bunkers lying hidden inthe brush. The company deployed to takeon the ,Japanese and gauge the extent ofthe enemy position.

The task of reducing the bunkers fell to3/1 which was charged with leading theaclvance up the trail toward the airfields.The men of the 1st Marines’ battalion beg-an landing from I.CIS on Yellow 1 at0815, and the last elements were ashoreand forming for the advance west by 0847.Lieutenant Colonel ,Joseph F. Hankinsstarted his men forward on a two-com-pany front 500 yards wide, passingthrough 3/7, which temporarily held upits advance to the beachhead line. Theswamp on his left flank soon forced Hank-ins to narrow his assault formation to acolumn of companies. At 1010, the Japa-nese opened up on Company K in the lead,soon after it had passed through the fir-ing line set up by Company I of 3/7. Theensuing fight was the bitterest struggle

on D-Day.For a short while the course of the battle

seemed to turn against the Marines—boththe commander and executive officer of

Company K were killed; bazooka rocketsfailed to detonate in the soft sand cover-ing the enemy bunkers; flame throwersmalfunctioned when they were broughtinto play; and antitank and canister shotfrom 37mm cannon proved ineffectiveagainst the log-reinforced dugouts. The

DEXTERITY LANDINGS

break of fortune came when an LVT whichhad come up from the beachhead withammunition tried to crash into the enemyposition. The vehicle got hung up be-tween two trees, and the well-protectedJapanese broke from cover to attack thecripple, killing its two machine gunners.The driver managed to work the tractorloose and caved in the nearest bunker byrunning over it. The Marine riflemen tookadvantage of the LVT’S success andcracked the defensive system, killing orscattering the defenders of the four bunk-ers that had held up the. advance.

Medium tanks had been requested forsupport as soon M it became apparent that3/1 w-as up against a fortified position.A platoon of Shermans arrived shortlyafter Company K won its fight,” and ledCompany I forward through the ruinedemplacements. Only a few snipers wereencountered on the way to the I–1 Line,the’ first objective on the coastal route tothe airfields. Lieutenant Colonel Hankinsreported 1–1 secure at 1325 and receivedorders to hold up there and dig in for thenight. The brief but bitter fight. for thebunkers cost 3/1 seven Marines killed andseven wounded. The bodies of 25 Japa-nese lay in and around their shattereddefenses.

On the opposite flank of the beachhead,the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant

Colonel John E. Weber), making CombatTeam C’s main effort, had driven to TargetHill by noon and seized the left sector of

the beachhead line. A platoon of Com-pany A flushed and finished off the only

‘1 hfaj Hoyt C. Duncan ltr to CMC, dtd 14Mar52.The tank company commander recalls that thetank took part in the last stages of the actionagainst the bunkers. Col Donald ,J. Robinsonltr to Head, HistBr, G–3, HQMC, dtd 5,Jun62.

353

opposition, the few dazed defenders of twogun positions on Silimati Point. Com-pany B’s men, picking their way throughthe swamp in an area where two feet ofmud underlay a like cover of water,2Z tookthe day’s prime objective and found ampleevidence that the ,Japanese had used Tar-get Hill as an observation post.

The task of seizing the center of thebeachhead was assigned to Lieutenant Col-onel Odell M. Conoley’s 2d Battalion ofthe 7th. The unit was ashore and assem-bled by 0845, though the men on two LCISthat had eased their way into the beachhad to wade through neck-deep surf. Thesodden condition of the unfortunate Ma-rines that had to breast the water to shorewas soon matched by that of many otherswhen 2/7 had its bout with the swamp.The battalion passed through a Japanesesupply depot south of the coastal trail andran into scattered opposition as it ad-vanced into the jungle again. A scout inCompany G was the first Marine killedand other casualties occurred as the lead-ing companies struggled through the 900-yard width of the swamp to risingground. By late afternoon, Conoley couldreport his battalion had reached dry landand was digging in. LVTS brought upammunition, and 2/’7 got set for counter-attacks that irregular but hot enemy firepromised. Both flanks hung open untilthey were dropped back to the swamp’sedge.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, led byLieutenant Colonel William R. Williams,reached its assi-~ed portion of the beach-head line after threading its way throughthe swamp barrier and crossing the only

“ CWO Sidney J. I’ishel comments on draft ofHough and Crown, Nelu Britain Campaign, dtd14Feb52.

354 ISOLATION OF RABAUL

large patch of kunai grass within theplanned perimeter. ~~~illiams~unit met nO

serious opposition during its advance, butlate in the afternoon, when division or-dered a shift to the west to link up withCombat Team B, a small group of enemytroops attempted to infiltrate through thegap that, opened. The battalion was re-called to its original positions and dug inalong the edge of the kunai grass for nightde fen w.

When the second echelon of LSTS ar-rived and began unloading on D-Daynfternoon, the remaining rifle battalion as-signed to the BA CKH.4NDER assault

force landed and moved into position. The1st Battalion, 1st Marines (LieutenantColonel Walker A. Reaves) filed up thecoastal trail past long lines of trucks wait-ing to move into the Iimitecl dump areas

nvailable. The unit’s own equipment and

combat team supplies, mobile. londed in

organic vehicles, followed when traffic

would allow. Accompanying the infan-

trymen when the? moved out of the beach-

head to the 1–1 Line was the 2d Battalion,

llth Marines (Major Noah P. Wood, Jr.),Combat Team B’s direct support packhowitzer battalion. The artillery batteriesset up along the coastal trail within theperimeter established by 1/1 and 3/1.General Shepherd and Colonel Pollockvisited Colonel Whaling’s CP at 1800 topass on a division attack order for 0700,27T)ecember.

In contrast to the relative ease withwhich 2/11 reached its firing site., the twoartillery battalions assigned to CombatTeam C spent most of the day getting theirguns into effective supporting positions.The lighter 75mm howitzers of 1/11 hadbeen loaded in LITTs in anticipation of thedifficulties that would be met in the “dampflat.” This forethought paid dividends,

since the amphibian tractors were able tomove the ~gunsdirectly from the LVTS tothe battery locations which had beenpicked from maps and aerial photographs.The battalion’s preselected positionsproved to be in the midst of the swamp, butLieutenant Colonel Lewis J. Fields di-rected his commanders to set up their gunsaround the edges wherever a rise of groundgave firm footing. The LVTS knockeddown trees to clear fields of fire, hauledloads of ammunition and equipment to theguns, and helped the tractor prime moversand trucks g-et across the swamp. Fields’howitzers be~qn registering at 1400,’3 fiveand a half hours after they landed, and1/1 1 was ready to fire in direct support ofthe 7th Marines all along the perimeter bynight fall.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Hughes’4th 13at.talion’s 105mm howitzers neededevery bit of assistance they could get toreach the kunai grass patch. LVTS brokea path through the swamp’s tangle of treesand undergrowth for the tractors and gunsand provided extra pulling power whereit was needed. And the need was constant.The progress of each howitzer through theswamp was a.major operation which oftenfound the men of the firing section chestdeep in water hauling on drag ropes orpushing mired wheels while tractor winch-es and LVTS in tandem applied full powerto keep the guns moving. All supplies andammunition had to be carried in amphib-ian tractors, since no truck could negotiatethe tortuous trail through the swamp.

Despite the incredible difficulties, the firstbattery was in position and ready to fireat 1330, the second was registered by 1~00,

“ Arty I.iaisonO msg to ArtyO, ALAMO For,dtd 22Jan44, Subj : Rept on Arty in BACK-HAXD13R OP, in .4LAM0 G-3 Jnt No. 17.

DEXTERITY LANDINGS 355

and the third was pulling into the clearingaS darkness fell.24

TVhile the division assault troops wereconsolidating their hold on the beachhead,Lieutenant, Colonel 13allance’s shore partywas coping with the confusion of problemsarising from the unloading of equipment,vehicles, and bulk stores brought in by theLSTS. The carefully-thought-out plan ofoverlapping dumps to be used by eachlanding ship was adapted to meet the situa-tion posed by the swamp. All supplies hadto be crowded on the narrow strip of dryland between beach and swamp, nowheremore than a couple of hundred yards wide.The coastal track was crammed with vehi-cles almost as soon as the first seven lJSTsbeached at 0840, and the jam never easedduring the rest of the day.

On the beaches thenlselves, the shoreparty constructed] sandbag causeways outto the LSTS that grounded and droppedtheir ramps in the water. Although VIIAmphibious Force reported that D-Day’s“four foot sllrf arou]lcl the romps was ofno consequence,?’ and that “thick growthand soft ground behind the beach wzs theretarding factor” ‘s in unloading opera-tions, the men that wrestled sandbags inthe water had a {li fferent opinion.Actually, the, slowness of unloading wasdue to a combination of factors, ]lot theleast of which was the reluctance of theclrivers of the mobile loaded trucks bor-rowecl from AL.\MO Force to chance be-ing left behind on New Britain ~Y]lelltheLSTS pulled out. h~umerous trucks wereabandoned nnd “stranded on tl~e benchexits for quite some time>’ 2’; before Ma-rines could move them to the dlm]ps andget them unloadecl.

“ Ib~d. ; LtCol Dale H. Heely ltr to CMC, dtdlMar52.

‘s C’TF 76 Dec& WarD, p. 35.

The first echelon of LSTS retracted at1330. with about 100 tons of bulk storesstill on boarcl in order that the D-Daylanding schedule could be kept. As theseven ships in the second echelon beachedand started unloading about, an hour later,the long-expected Japanese aerial counter-attack materialized. AS the enemy planes(love through tile gunfire of Americanfighters covering tl~e beachheacl, a squad-ron of B–Ms hound for a routine bombingand strafing mission in the Bergen Bayarea flew lo~v over the LSTS. In a tragiclniSt.ilke of identity, tile ships’ gunnersshot, down two of the .4merican planesand badly damaged two others. Con~-pounding the original error, the B–25sthat had weathered the LSTS’ fire bombedand strafed 1/1 1’s position on SilirnatiPoint, killing one officer and wolmding 14enlistecl men.

The enemy planes that hit the beachh-ead were only a small portion of anattack group of 88 naval fighters and divebombers dispatched from Rabaul afterthey had returned from a morning’s fruit-less raid on Arawe. Most of the Japanesepilots concentrated on the ships offshoreand the damage they did was severe,although they suffered heavily in the proc-ess. The radar on the fighter directorship, the destroyer .9?wv)> had picked upthe enemy when they were about 60 milesaway and vectored two P—38 squadronsto intercept, while the escort vesselsclearecl the reef-restricted waters off thecoast and steamed out to sea to get maneu-ver room. The interceptor missed contactbut wheeled quickly to get on the enemytails, and a vicious dog fight took placeall over the sky as the American and Jap-

“ Maj George J. DeBell comment on draft ofHough and Crown, New Britain Campaign, cu.

Feb52.

356 ISOLATION OF RABACL

a]lese fig]lte~st~ngled. som~Of t],e diveboxlll~ersel’acledtlle clefell[lillg figllterstostrike at the destroyers. Tl~e ,~}~ar(~wasbadly crippled by near misses, two otl~erships were damaged, and the Brotonson,which ttrok two bombs directly bac]i of itsstack, sank within a few n~inntes. Chehundred and eight officers al]d nlen wentdown with their ship, but the rest of thecrew was rescued while the enemy planeswere being drilrell off.

The toll of lost planes, pilots, ancl crewswas still enough so that the ,Jzpanesenever agzin attempted a dzylight raid o]]Cape Gloucester in comparable strel~gth.,Tust w]lat the exact enemy ]OSSwas in theseveral attacks mounted by Army andl?’avy pilots on 26 Decenlber cannot be clis-covered. The total was prObably morethan the 18 plnnes recalled by the Japa-nese in postwar years,z7 ancl a good dealless than the 57 planes claimed by Amer-ican pilots while the heat of battle was onthem.2* From 27 December on, Allied airstrikes mounted from South Pacific baseskept Rabaul’s air garrison too busy flyingdefensive missions to devote much effortto Cape Gloucester.

By nightfall on D-Day, it was evidentthat the BACKHANDED Forces’ mainbeachhead on New Britain was secure.General Rupertus had left the Conyn.ghamat 0800 and was on the beach before theadvance echelon of his comn~and post setL~pat 1030. The CP location, like so manypositions chosen prior tQ the landing,proved to be too “damp” for effectivenessand wtts moved to dry land by noonTroops landed according to plan, and11,000 men were as]lore when the second

~’.~~ ..trca .+irO~).Y, p. 30 ; SE .1 rcu iVav Ops—III, p. 48.

= 1st MarDiv D–2 Jnl., 26Dec43–26Jan44,entry of 1035 on 27 Dec43.

LST echelon retracted at 1800. Although200 tons of bulk stores returned in theseships to New Guinea, they were sent backon turn-around voyages and the temporaryloss was not a vital one. All guns and Ve-

hicles on the LSTS had landed. Duringthe day’s spoladic fighting, the 1st Divi-sion had lost 21 killed and 23 wounded andcounted in return 50 enemy dead and a bagof 2 prisoners.

At 1700, after it became evident that theJapanese were warming up to somethingmore effective than harassing fire, particu-1arly on the f rent of 2/7, Rupertus dis-patched a request to ALAMO Force thatCombat Team A be sent forward inlme-diately to Cape Gloucester. While itseemed obvious that the troops alreadyashore could hold the Yellow Beachesperimeter, the task was going to require allof Colonel Frisbie’s combat team. Theplanned employment of 3/7 as CombatTeam B reserve could not be made, andRupertus considered that the 5th Marineswas needed to add strength to the airfielddrive and to give him a reserve to meet anycontingency.

All along the front in both perimeters,the Marines were busy tying in their posi-tions as darkness fell, cutting fire lanesthrough jungle growth, and laying out tripwires to warn of infiltrators, For a goodpart of the men in the foxholes and ma-chine gun emplacements, the situation wasfamiliar: Guadalcanal all over again,Americans waiting in the jungles for aJapanese night attack. The thick overheadcover was dripping as the result of anafternoon rain that drenched the beach-head and all that were in it. The dankswamp forest stank, the night air was hu-mid and thick, and the ever present junglenoises mingled with the actual and theimagined sounds of enemy troops readyingan assault.

CHAPTER 4

Capture of the Airfields

ENEMY REACTION ‘

The D-’Day landings on the YellowBeaches came as a surprise to the ,Japa-nese.’ To the enemy, the extensive swampalong the north coast between the airfieldsand Bergen Bay seemed an effective bm--rier to a large-scale amphibious wssault.Generals Sakai and Matsuda hoped andprepared for landings aimed direct] y atCape Gloucester’s beaches, but actuallyexpected the blow to come elsewhere. In-stead of hitting these prepared defenses,the .Japanese leaders saw the principal Al-lied thrust being made against Cape Bnsh-ing, to be followed by overland and sbore-to-shore advance to the airfields.

As soon as he received word of the ac-tual B.4CKHANDER landing scheme,the f?’t]~ Division commander orderedGeneral Matsuda to counterattack andannihilate the Allied assault forces “at thewater’s edge. ” 3 Colonel Kouki Sumiyaof the 53d Infantry, who commanded the1,400-man airfield defense force.,’ was

‘ Unless otherwise notecl, the material in thissection is derived from : .4DC Intelllocument8;

ATIS Item No. 9115, Matsuda For and 141stInfRegt OpOs, 26Dec43–8Jan44, in ATIS BulNo. 721, dtd 14Feb44 ( ACSI Rem, I?RC Alex) ;17tib Div OIB.

‘ Docu No. 52399, Statement of ex-LtGen Ya-sushi Sakai in HistDiv, MilIntelSect, GHQ, FEC,Statements of Japanese Officials on WW II, V.III, p. 190 (OCMH) .

317th Div Ops, p. 15.4ATIS Item No. 9657, MatsudaFor IntelRept

No. 3, dtd 23Dec<J, in ATIS Bu1 No. 788, dtd

directed to concentrate his troops againstthe main beachhead, leaving the Taualitrailblock to the attention of minor ele-ments of his regiment’s Ist Battalion.Matsuda’s reserve; the 53d’s gd Battalionunder Major Shinichi Takabe, startedmoving down the trail from Nakarop toTarget Hill shortly after General Sakai’sorder was received. The leading elementsof Takabe’s battalion reached the ridgesin front of the Marine line late in theafternoon of D-Day. The shipping en-gineer and antiaircraft units defending130rgen Bay and Hill 660 were directed tohold their positions and support Takabe’scounterattack. (See Map 23.)

The strongest combat force available toGeneral Matsudz was Colonel KenshiroKatayama’s l~lst [n fantry and its rein-forcing units defending the Cape Bush-ing sector. After the dispatch of the majorpart of the regiment’s Ist Battalion to

Arawe, Colonel Katayama’s commandxmonnted to some 1,700 troops,5 the ma-jority veteran infantrymen and artillery-men. The Iyth lXvLsion operation orderof 26 December that directed Matsuda tocommit his reserve also called for thel~lst Inf on.try to move overland fromCape Bushing to help wipe out the Alliedbeachhead. The elements of the 51st Re-con.ruukwnce li?eghn.ent on Rooke Islandwere ordered to sail for Aisega and march

llMar44 (ACSI Recs, FRC Alex) ; JapaneseCol)ll?tc)lt8.

‘ ATIS Item No. 9657, op. cit.

357

358

from there to the north coast to join in thefight,ing.

Abandoning their positions at CapeBushing, Aisega, and Nigol, most of Ka-tayama’s units were lmderway for an as-sembly area near Nakarop by the eveningof D-Day. After $27December, only a re-inforced rifle platoon remained at Aise~~to man the defenses once occupied by abattalion, and a scattering of servicetroops was all that was left in the lllst’sposts along the Itni. The commander ofthe token defense force at i~keg~ gloomilypredicted in his diary that “we shall sure-ly make Aisega our .grzveyard,” but, hisguess proved wrong, at least in Iocation.ti

In a week’s time, this platoon, too, wasordered into the battle to contain the ad-vancing Marines.

In the immediate area of the YellowBeaches on D-Day, most of the Japanesetroops that tried to stem the Marine ad-vance came from small detachments of theIstA’hippin.g Engineers ancl Ist Dehvrka-tio n Unit. These enemy soldiers, who hacloperated the supply depot overrun by 2/7,fel 1 back before Combat Team C’S assaultplztoons until they ran into Major Ta-kzbe”s battalion moving up to launch acounterattack. By late afternoon of 26

December, enol~gh of Takabe’s unit hadfiled down the trzil from h’akarop to thearea opposite the center of the Marine pe-rimeter to man a strong firing line.

Just why the position of 2{7 was chostmas the point of attack is not known, al-though it is logical to assume that GeneralIllatswda considered this segment of the 1stDivision’s beachhead wou]d be li~htly

‘ Diary of 2dLt Taknshiro Sate, 1st Plat, 6thCo, 141st InfRegt in .4Ttt7 In trlDor/f Mcnts. Thediary was fonnd in front of the positions of 3/5during the fighting around .40giri Ridge.

ISOLATION OF RABAUL

held. ‘1’he swamp to the rear of the thinband of Marine foxholes appeared to iso-late the defenders from the beach. Dark-ness veiled the American position beforeenemy scouts discovered that both flanksof 2/7 were open.

HOLDING THE PERIMETER ‘

The night of D-Day was moonless, andno trace of light penetrated the junglecanopy to reach the men of the 2d Batta-lion, 7th Marines or the Japanese of the%d Bdtdion, ,53d Infantry who facedthem. Occasionally the adversaries caughta glimpse of the flash of fire at. a rifle ormachine gun muzzle or the momentaryflare when a mortar or artillery shell ex-ploded, but, in the main, the battle wasfought by sound. One man, one gun, onegroup firecl and drew a response from theother side aimed at the sound of the firing;then the tempo would pick up sharply andfiring would break out all along the frontto die away slowly and crop out again atanother point. Despite the handicaps offighting in the pitch-black gloom, Marine

fire discipline was good, and Lieutenant

Colonel Conoley repeatedly cautioned hiscompany commanders to keep a tight reinon ammunition expenditure. Experiencein fighting the ,Japanese indicated that aheadlong assault would be launched %tthe height of the fire fight.

‘ I-nless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : .4L.IMO For G–3 J?ILXO.11; Maj Harry A, Stella memo to ALAMO ForG–3, dtd 5Jan44, Subj : Rept of Observer withCT C, in .4LAM0 +3 Jnl Xo. lJ$; 18t MarDivSAR, Phase II, Part I, I’ellow Beach Landing;1st MarDiv D-2 Daily Bnls Nos. 1–6, dtd 27–31-Dec43; 1stNarlliv D–3 Jn-1; I~tCol William,J. Dickinson ltr to CMC, dtd 14Mar52 ; Houghand (’rown. .A’ew BritainCampai@.

CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS 359

Keeping an adequate reserve of ammu-nition on 2/7’s side of the swamp was aproblem handjed by the regimental execu-tive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B.Puller, and his solution for it was carryingparties. LVTS could not be used to haulcargo until daybreak ~~ve the drivers achance to see the obstacles in their path.In the early evening, files of men from theRegimental Headquarters and ServiceCompany snaked their way through theswamp to Conoley’s CP with belted ammu-nit ion, bandoleers of rifle c1ips, and loadsof 60mm and 81mm mortar shells. Atabout 2000, Colonel Frisbie decided tocommit Battery D, 1st Special llTeaponsBattalion as infantry to reinforce 2/7, andLieutenant Colonel Puller told the batterycommander to leave his 37mm guns behind~have each man pick LIp a load of ammuni-

t ion at the regimental dump, and then set

out, across tile swamp.

Soon after an officer guide from 2/7 met

the ammunition-laden column, a violent

storm lashed the beachhead area and all

trace of landmarks and trail signs van-

ished in a solid downpour of wind-driven

rain. The men of the antitank battery,each holding to the belt of the Marineahead of him, spent the night strugglingto get through the morass and deliver therital ammunition. It was 0805 before theguide was able to lead Battery D into 2/7’scommand post. Lieutenant Colonel Co-noley immediate] y sent the reinforcementsto his right flank to plug the gttp betweenthe 2d and 3d Battalions.

The Marines of 2/7 had fought with the<Japanese all through the wild night-longstorm. The drenching rain. filled foxholesand emplacements and forced the men toscramble for cover on top of the ground.Rifles and machine guns fouled by mud

691–360&63—Z’l

and water refused to work, and the fire ofbattalion and company mortars “layed byguess and by God” 8 was invaluable inbeat ing back repeated Japanese attacks.When the storm subsided and daylightbegan to filter through the tree tops, thetempo of battle increased and the weightof the enemy thrusts shifted west toward2/7’s open right flank.

As they arrived at their designated posi-tion, the special weapons men of BatteryD tangled with the Japanese that had in-filtrated the gap between the 7th’s bat-talions. The Marines counterattacked,threw back the enemy troops, :md built upa hasty defense line. Company F on thebattery’s left flank took the brunt ofMajor Takabe’s attack and in a violent,seesaw battle, during which two of its ma-chine guns were lost and recaptured, final-ly forced the ,Tapanese to withdraw. ‘Theestimate of enem~Tdead in and around theMarine lines was 200–235, but the oppor-tunity to make an accurate count was lostwhen the action opened anew during theafternoon of 27 December.

The W Z3attdwn, 5.5’d Infantry, rein-forced by small engineer and service units,attacked Combat Team C’s perimeter re-peatedly during the next few days losingmore and more of its strength in every fu-tile attempt to penetrate the Marine lines.The gaps that existed on the night ofD-Day were closed by dark on the 27th.The 7th Marines’ Regimental Weapons(lompany took over that part of 1/7’s de-fensive sector closest to the beach to enableLieutenant Colonel Weber to stretch hismen thinly around Target Hill and makecontact with the 2d Battalion. On theright flank, Company F was relieved in po-sition by Company I of 3/7 and Battery

‘ Col Odell M. Conoley ltr to CMC, dtd 7Mar52.

360 ISOI,ATION OF R.4BAUL

D was attached to Lieutenant Colonel Wil-1iams’ command.

The center of the perimeter continuedto be the focus of enemy attacks, andColonel Frisbie was able to concentratewhat few reserves he had in the area ofgremtest threat. Wherever the fightingreached a peak, z regimental casual detach-ment of 30-odd men was committed, thenpulled out and used again to meet the next,emergency.~ Pioneers from the shoreparty manned strong points in the rear of2/7>s lines to provide defense in depth.The ,Japanese did not, discover howsparsely nmnned the perimeter was toeither flank and persisted in their attackson what, became. its strongest sector.

In three days of intermittent but intensefightiIlg, the 7th ~farines ]Ost 18 meIl kil]ed,58 wounded, and 3 missing in action. Sur-viving records indicate th~t in the sameperiod the attacking Japanese suffered atleast five times as many casualties and that2/53 was badly crippled, remaining a bat-talion in name only.

With Combat Team C fully committedjust to hold the beachhead it had seizedon D-Day, General Rupertus was unable touse 3/7 as he had intended, as a reserve forthe 1st Marines advance on the airfields.Neither was Colonel Frisbie in z positionto mount an offensive and drive back the,Japanese troops attacking his lines. Thissituztion reinforced the opinion that the1st Division staff had held throughout the

latter stages of BACKHANDED plan-

ning-the 5th Marines were needed on New‘Britain. At 2314 on D-Day, Rupertussent a reqllest to Krueger asking that Com-bat Tezm A be sent forward to CapeGloucester with the advance echelon trans-

‘ LtCol Charles S. Nichols, Jr., interviews withHistBr, G–3, HQMC, .ca. Jan55.

ported in nine APDs. The request was re-peated several times and sent by differentmeans to insure its receipt at ALAMOForce adwmce headquarters at CapeCretin.

Krueger had agreed to release two bat-talions of the 5th Mlrines to Rupertus ifthe Marine general asked for them after hehad landed it the objective.’” At 0751 on27 December, Krueger sent a liaison officerto Cape Sudest with orders for CombatTeam A (less 3/5) to get underway forthe Yellow Beaches. At the same time, theALAMO Force commander sent a radiodispatch to Admiral Barbey informinghim of the decision. Bad weather delayedthe plane carrying the messenger andplayed havoc with radio reception so thatIkwbey received word too late in the after-noon for the APPs to load Marines of 1/5and 2/5 and still reach the beachhead bydawn on the 28th. Accordingly, the ad-miral, who did not wish to expose theloaded transports to the chance of daylightair attack, delayed the whole movement 24

hours.

Colonel Selden and his entire combatteam stood by all through the morning of27 December ready to load out. The firsttroops were already embarked in DUKWSand headed for the APDs offshore whenword of the change in orders was passed.

On the 28th, while LSTS loaded rear ele-ments of the combat team and all its sup-plies and equipment, the 1st and 2d Bat-talions boarded their fast transports andleft for the target. At 2100, after a day of

hard work, the landing ships followed,setting a course by Cape Cretin to drop offLieutenant Colonel David S. McDougal’s3d Battalion.

‘0Pollock comments.

CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS

While Combat Team A was en route,Rupertus sent Krueger “an earnest plea””that no part of the 5th Marines be heldback from employment at Cape Glou-cester. The Marine general stated that in-creasing pressure on the perimeter re-quired a landing team reserve in that area,while the remainder of the combat teamwas used in the airfield attack. Kruegerresponded almost immediately that he“had no intention to deprive you of itsuse”’2 should the battalion be needed andthat 3/5 would be sent forward with theremainder of Combat Team A.

On 28 December, while the reinforce-ments he had requested were loading atCape Sudest, the 1st Division commandermoved his CP to a position behind CombatTeam B’s front line where he could betterdirect the advance west. Control of thebeachhead defenses was turned over toGeneral Shepherd, whose .4DC commandgroup paralleled the organization of thedivision staff. The 3d Battalion, 5thMarines was slated to report to Shepherdfor orders when Combat Team A’s LST-borne echelon arrived. With the additionof a sorely-needed maneuver element, theADC planned an attack toward BergenBay to eliminate the Japanese menacingthe perimeter.

The steady influx of supplies plannedfor 13ACKHANI)ER operations went onwithout wmajor hitch while Combat TeamC fought to hold the beachhead and Com-bat Team B drove forward toward the air-fields. Through hard, demanding work,Lieutenant Colonel 13allance’s shore partyW:IS able to overcome the considerable

handicap to its operations posed by the

II l~t JfaYDi~ 1)–3 Jn l—I, entry NO. 20 of

28Dec43.

“ Ibid., entry No. 20 of 29Dec43.

361

limited stretch of dry land between sea andswamp. The LST unloading rate im-proved considerably after 2’7 December,when it was no longer-necessary to handletwo echelons daily. As many as 300 dead-weight tons of stores and a full shiploadof vehicles were unloaded in under sixhours. Ballance’s 1,400-man force was ableto do its job well despite the fact that thereplacement companies and pioneers thatmade up the bulk of its strength were oftincommitted to hold reserve positions back-ing up Combat Team C’s lines.

Aside from the human workhorses ofthe beachhead, the shore party Marines,the most important logistical elementswere the amphibian tractors. The ver-satile LVT was the only vehicle capable ofnegotiating the swamp unaided, and it wasused to solve every conceivable cargo andpersonnel-carrying problem that arose.When it nppeared that the tractors usedIt Arawe might be a maintenance liabilityat Cape Gloucester, a provisional companyusing reserve LVTS and crews from bothCompany A and the tractor battalion’sHeadquarters and Service Company wasorg~nized and loaded out to arfive with

Combat Team A.13Almost as useful in their way as the

LVTS were the boats of the amphibianengineers, particularly the LCMS which

could stand the buffeting of heavy surf

more easily than the lighter and smaller

LCVPS. The 592d Engineer Boat and

Shore Regiment’s detachment at the Yel-

low Beaches, including LCVPS that were

carried in on ships’ davits on D-Day and

LCMS that arrived in tow behind LSTS on

the 27th, were used mainly to transport

supplies to Combat Team B. The coastal

“ l.st JIarI)i?] S.4R, Anx D, Amphibian Trac-tors, pp. 1–2.

362 ISOLATION OF RABAUL

road used as the axis of advance. by the 1stMarines quickly became a quagmire as theresult of frequent rain and the damagecaused by traffic far heavier than its bedcould stand. Moving directly behind theassault troops, Marine engineers with Sea-bees following close in their trace attempt-ed to keep the supply route in operation.When road maintenance efforts failed, theArmy boatmen gave General Rupertus theassurance of adequate supplies he neededto keep the offensive rolling forward.

CAPTURE OF HELL’8 POINT “

Colonel Whaling’s combat team spent aquiet first night ashore, its position un-challenged by the Japanese. While therifle companies of the 7th Marines werehotly engaged repelling counterattacks on27 December, assault companies of the Istadvanced cautiously but steadily towardCape Gloucester. A series of phase lines,1/2 t,. 3A of a mile apart, marking terrain

objectives in the zone of attack, werereached and passed without opposition.(See Map IV, Map Section.)

The narrow coastal corridor forced

Whaling to confine his attack formation toa column of companies with 3/1’s Com-

pany I in the lead. A squad of scouts act-ing as point was followed by a section ofthree medium tanks, each machine trailedin turn by a rifle squad to give it covering

fire in the event of attack. Support tothis advance party was furnished by an-

‘4 Unless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : 1st MarDiv EAR, PhaseII, Part I, Yellow Beach Landing; 18t Marl)iv

D–9 Jnt—I; LtCol Donald J. Robinson ltr to Dir,HistDiv, HQMG, dtd 7Aug52, enclosing OpLog ofCO A, 1st TkBn; Hough and Crown, New BritainSampaign.

other section of tanks and a rifle platoonwhich preceded the rest of the 3d 13attal-ion. Peeling off the head of 3/1’s column,a succession of small combat patrols tookposition in the swamp to guard the leftflank and then fell in to the rear whenthe main body had passed.

During the day’s advance, two belts ofenemy defensive positions were overrunand destroyed. When the scouts spotteda pillbox or bunker, they signaled to thetank platoon commander who came for-ward on foot, located the targets, and thendirected the tanks’ fire to knock them out.Despite day-long rain that slowed the for-ward movement, the lack of opposition en-abled 3/1 to reach the +4 Line, 5,000 yardsfrom the morning’s line of departure, by1350. Division ordered Combat Team Bto remain at 4-4 for the night and set up aperimeter defense.

The next day’s objective was the finalphase line designated before the landingto control the advance on the airfield. ThisO–OLine was plotted along a low, grass-covered ridge leading northeast throughthe jungle to a promontory, soon dubbedHell’s Point by the Marines, which formeclone arm of a crescent-shaped beach. FifthAir Force pilots had located an extensivesystem of bunkers and trenches in back ofthis beach with the heaviest concentrationon Hell’s Point. Although the enemy posi-tions were obviously sited to oppose a land-ing, they stretched along 300 yards of thelong axis of the coastal corridor and prom-ised to be a formidable obstacle if theywere defended.

At the time the Ist Division attack planfor 28 December was laid out, the

arrival of the advance echelon of the 5thMarines was expected in the early morning.H-Hour was consequently moved up to

CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS 363

permit the reinforcements to get ashoreand started into position to exploit any suc-cesses won by 1st Marines assault troops.The starting time and span of xir and ar-tillery preparations for the attack wereadjusted accordingly. General Kruegersent General Rupertus a dispatch explain-ing the 24-hour delay of Combat Team .4as soon as he knew of it, but the messagewas received in garbled form and could.not. be decoded until numerous transmis-sions regarding corrections had passed be-tween the two headquarters.=’ Confirma-tion of the 5th Marines arrival finallycame in a message received at 0040 on 29December.

On the 28th, 2/11 culminated a night ofharassing and interdiction fire with an

hour’s heavy shelling of suspected enemypositions immediately to the front of the4-4 Line. Then at 0900, American A–20sbegan strafing and bombing targets fromthe O–OLine to the airfields, observing O–Oas a bomb line beyond which they couldattack with no danger to friendly troops.At 1000, when the last of the planes drewoff, a further delay in jump-off time wasauthorized to get additional tanks into

position to support the assault.J3rhen the order t.o attack was finally is-

sued at 1100, the ~3dBattalion, 1st Marines

moved out in the same formation it hadused during the previous day’s advance.

Company I was again at the head of thebattalion column, working this time with

a fresh platoon of medium tanks. In an

m The last correction needed to enable BACK-HAN’DER Force to break the original messagewas reeeived at 1133 on 29 Deeember well afterCombat Team A’s advance echelon had landed.Ist MarDiv G–3 Jnl-1, entry No. 17, dtd29Dec43.

effort to broaden the regimental frontage,

Colonel Whaling had 1/1 simultaneouslystart a company through the jungle onthe left flank in an attempt to reach theopen ground along the O-O ridge.

The importance of the Marine attackobjective was evident to the Japanese, andColonel Sumiya had no intention of let-ting it fall without a fight. During the

night of 27–28 December, the airfield de-fense troops who had been held undercover of the jungle on the mountain slopesmoved into posit ions that ran roughlyalong the O–OLine. Waiting for the ad-vancing men of Combat Team B was the

major ~art of the 1st Battalion, 53’d In-fcmtny and elements of the ,Japanese regi-ment’s 75mm gun company.

Company A of 1/1, which drew the rug-ged assignment of cutting through theswamp forest, hit Surniya’s defenses first.At about, 1145, the Marine unit reachedthe edge of an extensive clearing in thejungle about 500 yards from the coast. ..4sthe scouts and leading squads started tomove through the chest-high kunai grass,a fusillade of rifle, machine gun, andmortar fire broke out from enemy posi-tions hidden in the dense undergrowthacross the open .ggound. Falling back

quickly to the cover of the jungle on theirown side, the Marines replied in kind, andthe grass was whipped by a killing cross-fire. It was soon apparent that, the Japa-nese strength was at least equal to Com-

pany A’s and neither side could gain anadvantage.

For four hours the fire fight dragged on.The enemy force, mainly from the 1ACompany, 5.3d Infantry, held its groundbut could not drive the Marines back.

364 ISOLATION OF RABAUL

Company A easily beat off two Japanesecounterattacks and an attempt to turn itsflank. At 1545, the Marines, who wererunning low on ammunition, began to dis-engage and pull back to the 1st Battalion’sposition for the night. Fire from 2/11covered the withdrawal and discouragedany Japanese attempt to follow. Clearlythe task of overcoming the enemy defensesrequired an attacking force of greaterstrength. Next morning when this posi-tion was found abandoned by advancingMarines, it contained 41 dead enemy so}-diers. The cost to Company .4 of thishard-fought action was 8 men killed and16 wounded.

In a sense, the skirmish in the junglewas a grim side show to the main event,

the battle for Hell’s Point. This Japa-nese strongpoint of mutually supportingbunkers and trenches was covered by beltsof barbed wire and land mines. Hastilycut gun ports enabled enemy crews totrain their weapons alol~g the coastal trailto meet the attack. At least three 75mmregimental guns, a 70mm gun, a 20mmmachine cannon, and a dozen or moreheavy and light machine guns and mor-tars were brought into play against the

Marines. Steady rain and thick foliagecut visibility to 10–20 yards, and Marineriflemen all too frequently stepped intothe fire lanes of enemy bunkers beforethey spotted the Japanese positions. In

this kind of blind fighting, tanks provedinvaluable and helped hold down infantrycasualties that might have soared had theattack been made without the assistanceof armor. The support was mutual, how-ever, and each tank% protective riflesquad kept its sides and rear free fromsuicide attackers.

The fight to capture the beach defensepositions was joined about noon whenJapanese troops opened fire on the lead-ing platoon of Company I and its spear-head section of tanks. The tanks crushedtrenches and bunkers and blasted guns andcrews alike, while the infantry shot downthe Japanese who tried to flee. When the75mm guns on two tanks malfunctioned,the advance was halted while tank ma-chine guns poured out covering fire and,

fresh armor was ordered into the fight.In its advance and systematic destruc-

tion of the enemy positions in its path,

Company I had veered to the left of thecoastal road. As a new tank platoon lum-bered up to the front lines, Lieutenant

Colonel Hankins decided to use CompanyK on a platoon-wide front to cover the 50-yard stretch between beach and road. Onesection of mediums fought with CompanyI and another with K. The reduction ofHell’s Point was the job of Company K,whose commanding officer later recountedthe fight that eliminated the defenses;

I put one squad of the Second Platoonbehind each tank and deployed the ThirdPlatoon to set up a skirmish line behind thetanks. We encountered twelve huge bunkerswith a minimum of twenty Japs in each.The tanks would fire point blank into thebunkers; if the ,Taps stayed in the bunkersthey were annihilated, if they escaped outthe back entrance (actually the front as theywere built to defend the beach) the infantrywould swarm over the bunker and kill themwith rifle fire and grenades. By the time wehad knocked out twelve bunkers the SecondPlatoon, which had originally been behindthe tanks, were out of ammunition and hadbeen replaced by the Third Platoon and theytoo were out or down to a clip of ammunitionper man. I called a halt and sent for theFirst Platoon. By the time the First Pla-toon arrived and ammunition was resupplied forty-five minutes had elapsed. We

CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS 365

continued the attack and found two morebunkers but the enemy had escaped~n

The third platoon of Company A, 1st

Tank Battalion, to be committed during

the day’s action was called up and reached

Hell’s Point about 1630 in time to destroy

the last enemy bunker on the point. It

was undefended. Apparently, Colonel

Sumiya had ordered a general withdrawal

of the survivors of the force which had

fought the 1st Marines. combat Team B

was able to occupy the entire defensive po-

sition and dig in for the night without any

harassment from the Japanese. The

night’s only excitement was furnished by

a false alarm of the approach of enemy

tanks, which was countered by positioning

two platoons of Marine mediums along

possible approach rout= with mortars

ready to fire illuminating shells to help

them locate targets.

After the action of 28 December, the

Japanese undoubtedly wished they had

tanks and plenty of them since their guns

proved no match for the American armor,

The count of enemy dead reported to divi-

sion, before darkness stopped the search,was 266.17 In return, the 3d Battalion, 1stMarines suffered casualties of 9 killed and36 wounded. With the complete reductionof Hell’s Point,lg the way was open to theBACKHANDED Force’s major objec-tive-the Cape Gloucester airdrome.

“ Maj Hoyt C. I)uncan, Jr., ltr to CMC, dtd14Mar52.

‘7 At least one participant in the day’s actionquestioned this total, and, on the basis of a per-sonal count, estimated the enemy loss at a muchlower iignrt+-&%8S. Maj William W. Wright ltrto CNC, dtd 13Feb52.

“ General Rupertus kiter renamed this spotTerzi Point after the commanding officer of Com-pany K, 3/1, who was killed on D-Day—Captain.Toseph A. Terzi.

0Bc7E(7TlVE SECURED “

A new’ landing point, Blue Beach, lo-cated about four miles northwest of thebeachhead and a few hundred yards be-hind the O-O Line was opened on 28 De-cember. General Rupertus decided to landthe assault battalions of the 5th Marinesthere. in order to have them closer to theirproposed zone of attack on the 29th. Theorder detailing the change in landing sites

reached Combat Team B while some unitswere disembarking from their APDs andothers were en route to their original des-tination, Yellow 2. As a result, ColonelSelden, his headquarters, two companiesof 1/5, and most of 2/5 reached BlueBeach about 0730, while the rest of the as-sault echelon landed within the originalperimeter. (See Map IV, Map Section.)

General Rupertus was present on Yel-low 2 when the first units came ashore,and he got them started toward BlueBeach to rejoin the rest of the combatteam.zo The march was made by truckwhere possible and by foot whenever thecondition of the river of mud called a roaddemanded. The beachmaster reported thelast elements of the 5th Marines on theirway west by 0935.

While his regiment regrouped behindthe 1st Marines’ lines, Colonel Selden con-ferred with Colonel Whaling, receiving athorough briefing on the combat situationand word that the attack on 29 December

“ Uuless otherwise noted, the material in thissection is derived from : AI,AMO G-J? Jnl. Mea.19–17; Ist MarDiu SAR, Phase II, Part I, YellowBeach Landing; Ist ,llarI)iv .!)-3 Jnl--I; BGenJohn T. Selden ltr to HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 27 Jan31 ; Hough znd Crown, New Britain Ca?nflaign.

‘“ LtCol Charles R. Baker comments on draftof Hough and Crown, New Britain Campa$gn,ra. Mar52.

366 ISOLATION OF R.4BACL

was to be delayed until both the 1st and5th Marines could join in the advance.General Rupertus and Colonel I’ollockreached Whaling>s CP shortly after thisand outlined the day’s operation plan. At1200, following an air and artillery prep-aration, Combat Team B, with 1/1 inassault, would drive forward on the rightwith the coastal road as its axis of advanceand .iirfield No. 2 as its objective. At thesame time on the left flank, Combat TeamA, with 2/5 in the lead, would attackthrough an area in Talawe’s foothills be-lieved to contain prepared enemy defensivepositions and then strike. north toward theairfields.

After the attack order was issued,Selden and Whaling went up to the frontlines to establish the left flank of the 1stMarines’ position along the O–O Line.selden then took his battalion comnland-ers, Major William H. Barba (1/5) andLieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt (2/5),up to the boundary for a brief inspectionof the terrain. Deciding to advance withhis assault battalion, Selden accompaniedWalt when 2/5 moved to its line of de-parture 1,200 yards inland. Barba’sorders called for his battalion to followthe 2d in attack, keeping contact with thetail of Walt’s column.

On its way to the line of departure, the2d Battalion, 5th found itself wadingthrough a swamp, one that the regimentalcommander had been assured containedonly a few inches of water. InsteadSelden “found “the water varying in depthfrom a few inches to 4 and 5 feet, makingit quite hard for some of the youngsterswho were not much more than 5 feet inheight.” 2’ The advancing Marines hadto move through the swamp and a thick

bordering beh of forest in single file, andprogress was unexpectedly slow. Beforethe leading company was in position tomove out from the 0–0 Line, division hadhad to put off the time of attack severaltimes. When 2/5 finally jumped off at1500, a good part of the battalion wasstill in the swamp, and Barba’s men werejust entering. At dusk, the rear elementsof 2/5 were clearing the line of departureas the leading units of 1/5 came out ofthe forest.

While Barba held llp his men to getthe companies organized in approachmarch formation, the 2d Battalion pulleclaway from the Ist and contact was lost.Patrols sent out ill the gathering darknessancl unf an~iliar terrain were unable to linkUp, and 1/5’s conlnian(lerj ~vhose radio to

regiment was out, decided to hold up

where he was for the night. The battalion

established an all-around defensive perim-

eter in the middle of the open grassy area

and spent a quiet night without enemychallenge.zz

The terrain forward of Combat TeamA’s line of departure proved to be muchmore rugged than it appeared on opera-tion maps, The 2d Battalion column, withSelden and Walt. moving close to its head,found the stretches of kunai grass in itspath were broken by ridges and borderedby gullies a]ld ravines choked with junglegrowth. .ks 2,/5 swung north to movedown to .~irfield No. 2, it passed throughan area of Ilidclen trenches and bunkers allshowing signs of recent, occupation. Therewere no enemy troops to be seen. The bat-talion ::dvanced unchecked and, by 1925,had reached the center of the airstrip andlinked up with Combat Team B.

n Selden ltr, op. cit.“ Col William H. Barba ltr to HistDiv, HQMC,

dtd 24Mar51.

CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS

The only enemy opposition met on 29December was encountered by the 1st Bat-talion, Ist Marines, shortly after it passedthrough 3/1’s positions on the 0-0 Line.A few scattered rifle shots fired at longrange by small groups of Japanese troopsdid nothing to slow the advance. Whenthe open ground along O–O N-as crossed,Lieutenant Colonel Reaves’ assault com-panies moved as skirmishers through 300-400 yards of jungle. Supporting mediumtanks, and half tracks mounting 75mmguns from the Regimental Weapons Com-pany, were forced to stick to the coastalroad and kept pace with the infantry whilefiling around the right. flank of the forestbarrier. Once they had cleared the trees,the assault troops, tanks, and half tracksjoined forces again, ready for a final pushto the airfield in sight. ahead.

Artillery of ‘2/11 and 4/11 fired on sus-pwted Japanese positions, and two rocketDUKWS of the amphibian engineerswhich had driven up to the front linesadded 50 rounds to the preparation.23 Asif in honor of the occasion, the rain evenstopped for a few brief moments. The ad-vance wm anticlimactic, and, at 1755, the1st Battalion, 1st Marines reached the edgeof Airfield No. 2.

As rain started falling and hastened theapproach of darkness, 1/1 hurriedly dugin along a perimeter that looped from thecoast inland to the east of the airfield.The 3d Battalion, lst, which had followeclthe attacking troops in echelon to the leftrear, linked up with 1/1 and extended theperimeter farther around the center of thefield. When 2/5 came down out of thehills, the battalion was directed to fill inthe remaining segment. of the night’s de-

‘3 OCE, GHQ, AFPac, Amphibian Engineers, p.177.

367

fense line which included all of AirfieldNo. 2.

Although surviving enemy records donot detail Colonel Sumiya’s orders to histroops, prisoner of war interrogations andJapanese actions on 30 December providea reasonable picture of what transpiredon the 29th when the Marines were al-lowed to seize their objective unopposed.The enemy commander and the survivingmembers of his reinforced battalion hadhidden in the rain forest that blanketedthe hills south of the airfield. Concedingto Marine tanks and infantry the owner-ship of the low, open ground of the air-drome, Sumiya planned to take advantageof the terrain, his most important defen-sive asset. Moving at night, the remnantsof the Ist Battalion, 53d In fantvy unitswhich had fought at Hell’s Point plus atleast half of the !l?dGompany that had notyet been engaged 24occupied the prepareddefenses hidden in the dense vegetation onthe hillsides and in the cuts that laced theslopes. The most significant feature ofthe defensive system was Razorback Hill,a high, narrow, north-south ridge with agrass-covered crest that overshadowedboth airstrips. To aerial observers andmapmakers, Razorback appeared to be justanother kunai patch among many; from

the ground it was clearly the key height inthe hills bordering the airdrome.

On the morning of 30 December, whiletwo assault companies of 2/5 moved outacross Airfield No. 1 to investigate thevillage area west of the night’s positions,Company F in reserve sent out a pair ofscouts to locate and guide 1/5 into the

21AII1s Item h-o.99S1, Diary of CP1 Ryoiehiro

Takano, 2d Co, 1/53, 310ct–29Dee43, in ATISBul No. 808, dtd 14Mar44 ( A(ISI Rem, FRCAlex ).

CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS ..-

perimeter. On the lower portion of Ra-zorback Hill, where the 2d Battalion hadpassed through abandoned defenses on the29th, the Marines surprised a group of 12enemy soldiers just rising from theirnight’s bivouac. The scouts withdrewafter an exchange of fire, and a platoonof Company F immediately returned towipe out what was thought to be a groupof stragglers.

As the rifle platoon nearecl the top ofa small knob in a kunai field, a heavy out-burst, of rifle and nmchine gun fire met, it,coming from positions in the edge of theforest ahead. As the Marines sought cov-er on the hilltop, the Japanese launcheda screaming charge up its sides which wasbloodily repulsed. When the enemytroops withdrew, the fires of grenadelaunchers, mortars, and an artillery piecewere added to the outpouring from theRazorback defenses. A radio message re-questing support brought prompt response,and Marine mortar fire crashed down onthe enemy position while the rest of Com-pany F moved up.

The ,Japanese soldiers broke from coverand came racing up the hill in a secondattempt to close with the Americans, justas a reinforcing platoon maneuvered toextend the firing line. Heavy fire drovethe enemy back into the jungle again andscattered more bodies over the slopes.Tanks were callecl up and, when the firstmachine arrived, Company F attacked.

Using the tank’s gunfire and armor like acrowbar, the Marines split open the firstline of the defensive system and drove onthrough, mopping up the Japanese withgrenades and automatic rifle fire. By 1130,the hillside position, which had containedover 30 bunkers, was silent and smoking:its defenders mere dead and, in many

tioY

instznces, buried in the ruins of their fox-holes, trenches, and emplacements. Acount of more than 150 Japanese bodieswas reported to division,25 while Com-pany F had lost 13 killed and 19 wounded.

Company F’s discovery that the enemyhad reoccupied his defensive positionscoincided with a similar unpleasant find-ing by the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine-s,which was marching in column towardthe airdrome. The point of the leadingcompany (A) was fired upon by Japanesewho had manned defenses located in thejumbled ridges and ravines east of Razor-back Hill. once it came under fire, Com-pany A deployed to continue the advance,and then, as the battalion commander laterrecounted the, action, it:

. . . was pinned down by heavy smallarms and machine gan fire from enemy posi-tions to the west, and enemy mortar firebegan falling within the First Battalion zoneof action. B Company was committed tothe right of A Company in order to bringmore fire to bear on the enemy and to preventthem from pushing down through to the air-field. The enemy made one sally against ACompany’s left flank and was repulsed withfire. Preparations were made to assault theenemy position following a mortar bar-rage. . . . The assault was made on theenemy position which was found to be aban-doned—the remaining enemy withdrawing tothe south into the hills. The First Battalionthen withdrew to the airfield evacuating itsdead and wounded, which I believe totaled18, 6 dead and 12 wounded.%

‘5 The Commanding Officer, Company F laterestimated the dead at a lesser figure, 60 to 70.YLajJohn B. Doyle, Jr., comments on draft ofHough and Crown, New Britain Campaign, dtd13Mar52. The battalion commander believedthat “a more accurate figure would be aboutone hundred.” BGen Lewis W. Walt ltr toHistBr, G–3, HQMG, dtd 13 Jun62, hereafterWalt ltr.

* Barba ltr, op. cit.

370

The finishing blow to the Japanese de-fenses was delivered by Lieutenant Colo-nel Hankins’ battalion. Working forwardwith medium tanks in support, 3/1 locatedthe remainder of the occupied defenses inthe area west of the strong-points encoun-tered by the 5th Marines. Attacking inthe early afternoon along a three-companyfront, Hankins’ men drove the enemy outof their positions, forced them to retreatup a ravine leading to Razorback’s sum-mit, and followed so close in pursuit thatthe ,Japanese had no chance to develop adefense. At a cost of one Marine killedand four wounded, 3/1 overwhelmed thelast effective resistance of Colonel Sumi-ya’s force. Artillery forward observerswith the attacking troops brought downfire on the fleeing enemy to speed themon their way.

A vastly enlarged perimeter, includingRazorback Hill in the center and reachingwell to the west of Airfield No. 1, markedthe Marine position on the night of 30December. The 1st Battalion, 5th Ma-rines took over a sector of the line between3/1 and 2/5. During the day’s fighting,more supporting elements of both combatteams and of the task force reached the

airfield area. On the 31st, after the LST-borne echelon of Combat ‘Team A arrivedat the Yellow Beaches, the assault bat-talions’ heavy gear and the team’s light

tank company and artillery battalion(5/11) came up. The .4merican force se-curing the airdrome, basically four in-fantry battalions, two artillery battalions,

and two tank companies, was far strongerthan anything General Matsuda couldbring against it.

.4t noon on 31 December, General Ru-pertus raised the .4merican flag over CapeGloucester to mark officially the capture

ISOL.4TION OF RABAUL

of the airdrome. At least one unscheduledflag-raising, by Company I, 3/1 on Razor-back Hill~7 preceded this event. Un-doubtedly, there were others, for combatMarines have a penchant for hoisting theColors over hard-won heights.

Once the airfields were within Marinelines, General Rupertus radioed GeneralKrueger to offer him the “early New Year

gift [of ] the complete airdrome of CapeGloucester.”’8 The ALAMO Force com-mander, in turn, made the present to Gen-

eral MacArthur as %von by the skill andgallantry of the First Marine Divisionbrilliantly supported by our air and navalforces.” 2’ Both Army generals sent Ru-pertus their congratulations; MacArthur’s~~as in eloquent-language ending with thephrase: “Your gallant clivision has nlain-tained the immortal record of the Marine

Corps and covered itself with glory.”’0Perhaps the best tribute to the men W11Ohad seized the BACKHANDED opera-

tion’s prime objective was written by anArmy officer observer attached to CombatTeam B when he reported to the ALAMOG-3 :

The front line soldier was superb. Thesemen were in splendid physical condition andspoiling for a fight. They were like hunters.boring in relentlessly and apparently with-out fear. I never heard a wounded Marinemoan. The aid men, unarmed, were right upin the front lines getting th’e wounded. Firediscipline was excellent?’

“ LtCol George E. Ilowdoin ltr to CMC, dtd10Mar52.

28Quoted in I.stMarIMv SAR, Phase II, PartI, p. 13.

‘n Quoted in C’TF 76 Dec43 WarD, p. 43.N I.st MarDiv D–3 ,Jnl—1, entry No. 9 of

31Dec43.a Maj J. B. Bonham memo to Col Eddleman,

dtd 4Jan44, in ALAMO CM Jnl No. 15.

C.4PTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS

TRAIL BLOCK ?VITHDRA WN “

TVhile the 1st Division’s attack up thenorth cozst was developing, the Marineswho were to close the back door to the air-drome had a relatively quiet time. Lieu-tenant Colonel Masters’ STC)NEFACEGroup spent the first few days after itlanded consolidating its hold on the Taualibeachhead and p~trolling vigorously to lo-cate the Japanese. Many of the small en-emy detachments encountered cared sur-prisingly 1ittle about security, and 2/1’sscouts and reconnaissance patrols wereoften able to jump the Japanese as theywere resting or marching at, ease, fire afew telling shots, nnd escape unscathed.No intelligence that the Marines uncoveredindicated that a large enemy force was inthe vicinity of the Green Beach perimeter.(See Map 25.)

The direct radio link with division thatconsistently eluded Masters on D-Daycould not be made on the 27th either. Onthe following day, two engineer LCMSwith Marine radio jeeps on board weresent north up the coast to get around thecommunication barrier posed by the moun-tains. An enemy 75mm gun firing from theDorf Point, vicinity dropped a few roundsnear the boats and prompted them to turnback. The coastzl voyage proved unneces-sary, however, since the bat tal ion’s radios“boomed in ~>33 to ~ivision receivers once

the lznding craft were 200 yards offshore,Starting on the 29th, the LCM-borne

al ~Tnless ~ther~,,ise noted, the material in this

section is derived from : 1st.MarDivLS.4R, PhaseII, Part II. Green Beach Lanolin%; Zst MarDit~D–3’ J)?7—I; CO, I)et, 2{1 ESB Rept to CG, 2dES13, dtd 20.Jan44, Subj : Ops CTF 76 LT 21(Green Beach ), in A LAM o G-3 Jnl No. 1.9; klajTheodore R. Galysh ltr to CMC, dtd 16Feb52 :OCE, GHQ, AFP, .4mphibinn 13nqinccr8; Houghand Crown, A-eic Britain Campaign.

371

radios made contact with the division on Rregular daily schedule.

The first inkling that the Japanesewould probably attack the trail block wasdiscovered on the 28th. An alert Marineon outpost duty spotted two Japanese ob-servers on the ridge opposite 2/1’s linesand dropped them both with his rifle. Apatrol checked the bodies and found themen, carrying field glasses and maps,were officers who had apparently beenreconnoitering the American position.

Toward nightfall on 29 December, scat-tered shots and then a growing volume ofsustained fire began to strike the Marinedefenses, coming from the jungle inland.A heavy downpour fell steadily, addingto the darkness and deadening the men’ssense of hearing as they strained to catchthe first sign of the attack that was clearlybuilding. Finally, at 0155, the Japanesecharged forward along the one route mostlikely to let them break through the perim-eter—a natural causeway that joined theridgeline defended by 2/1 and the higherground inland.

At the point the enemy chose to as-sault, the lines of Company G formed anarrow salient. Japanese mortars andmachine guns poured their tire ahead ofthe attackers, but in vain. The first thrustwas beaten back with the help of the bat-talion’s 60mm and 81mm mortars, andCompany G’s reserve platoon of artillery-men was rushed up to bolster the line. Asecond Japanese assault carried one ofCompany H’s machine gun positions, but acounterattack by a mixed force of heavyweapons crewmen and artillerymen won itback. After this repulse, the ardor of theenemy troops cooled perceptibly, and twofurther attacks were blunted by Marine

“ I.tCol Robert Hall ltr to CMC, dtd 4Mar52.

372

fire and stopped in front of the lines. To-ward dawn, the ,Japanese fire slacked until,by 0700, it hnd died away completely. Thecost of this victory to 2/1 and its attachedunits was 6 men killed and 17 wounded.

Mop-up patrols found 89 enemy deadsprawled amongst the Marine positionsand in the forest to the front. Five pris-oners, all of them dazed and somewounded, were seized. No other woundedJapanese were sighted, and it appearedthat the remnants of the attacking forcehad fled south. The prisoners identifiedtheir units as elements of the 5G?and 4thContpanies of 1/53, and an enemy officercandidate, who surrendered during theday, estimated the attacking strength at116 men. From intelligence gained laterin the battle for western New Britain, itappears that the few men who escaped un-hurt from the attack on 2/1 were orderedinto the fight to contain the Marines driv-ing southeast toward Borgen Bay.

On New Year’s morning, torpedo boatswhich had patrolled from Grass Point toCape Bach during the night. took 10 of themost seriously wounded Marines and theenemy prisoners back to New Guinea.34The ammunition supplies depleted duringthe fight on the 30th were replenished in an

air drop by Fifth Air Force bombers onthe 3d. Although almost all signs pointedto a rirtual abandonment of the west coastby Japanese troops, Lieutenant ColonelMasters could not chance being caught

short. Through the week following theenemy assault, there was scattered opposi-tion to Marine patrols but nothing thatindicated the presence of large units.

u ComMTBRons, SeventhFlt (CTG 70.1)WarD, Der43, dtd 27,Jan44 ( C(3A, N“HD), entryof 31Dec43.

ISOLATIOhT OF RABAIJL

An enemy artillery piece located about2,500 yards east of the Tauali beachheadbegan firing ranging shots on the 31st.While the aim of Japanese gunners wasatrocious—all of their rounds fell in thesea—Masters wasted no time getting hisown artillery in position to reply. Bat-tery H’s crews used block and tackle tomanhandle their guns to the top of aprecipitous bluff that overhung the beach.On the lst, when the Marine 75s beganfiring, the enemy gun fell silent. Thepack howitzers then furnished support tothe patrols that sought the enemy on allsides of the perimeter.

In response to an order from division,Masters sent. a small detachment to DorfPoint on 2 January to guide Company Eof 2/5 into the STONEFACE positionfor an overnight stay. The 5th Marines’company found no evidence of Japanesein any strength during its march fromthe airdrome. The enemy troops that hadretreated from the airfield defenses seizedby Combat Teams A and B had avoidedthe coastal track and used the trail thatled over the eastern shoulder of Mt.Talawe. Under the circumstances, therewas no longer any need for the trail block

at Tauali, and General Rupertus issuedorders for 2/1 to secure and rejoin.

The movement of Masters’ commandbegan on 5 ,Jannary, when four loadedLCMS, one towing an LCWP, made thetrip from Green to Blue Beach. The pas-sage was a roug,h one for both crews andpassengers. The heaving seas of the mon-soon season battered the small craft, butthe amphibian engineers proved equal tothe feat of seamanship required to bringthe boats in safely. On succeeding days,most of them equally rain- and wind-swept, LC31s from the detachment at the

CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELDS 373

Yellow Beaches and those assigned to theSTONEF.&CE Group shuttled supplies,ammunition, and equipment from the westto the north coast.. By the llth, most of2/1’s bulk stores and heal-y gear had beentransferred, and the main body of the re-inforced battalion marched north towardthe airdrome. A small rear-guardworking party loaded the last suppliesduring the early afternoon. At about1600, when several shots were fired fromthe jungle south of what had been theMarine lines, the remain;ng troops em-barked. To discourage any venturesome

Japanese who might want to fire on theboats as they withdrew, the LCMS sprayedGreen Beach with machine gun fire as aparting present,

The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines rejoinedits regiment on the 12th, after spending awet and thoroughly miserable night in abivouac area near Airfield No. 1. on 13January, Masters’ battalion occupied po-sitions near the shore within CombatTeam B’s sector of the airdrome perim-eter. With the successful completion ofits mission, the STONEFACE Group wasdissolved.