49. Paris vs. Alfeche 364 Scra 110

7/28/2019 49. Paris vs. Alfeche 364 Scra 110

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139083. August 30, 2001]

FLORENCIA PARIS, petitioner, vs. DIONISIO A. ALFECHE, JUAN L.

ALFECHE, MAXIMO N. PADILLA, DIONISIO Q. MATILOS, Heirs

of GREG A. ALFECHE, DIONISIO W. MATILO, SIMPLICIO L.

ADAYA, TEOFILO M. DE GUZMAN, FRANCISCO B. DINGLE and

MARIFE NAVARO,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Homesteads are not exempt from the operation of the Land Reform Law. The right to retainseven hectares of land is subject to the condition that the landowner is actually cultivating that

area or will cultivate it upon the effectivity of the said law.

The Case

The Petition for Review before us assails the June 4, 1999 Decision of the Court of

Appeals[1](CA), in CA-GR SP No. 45738, which affirmed the ruling of the Department ofAgrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, [there being] no grave abuse of discretion x x x committed by

DARAB, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE

COURSE and DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.[2]

The Decision of the DARAB, which was affirmed by the CA, had disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated March 19, 1992 is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered:

1. Declaring the private respondents to be full owners of the land they till

pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228;

2. Declaring the validity of the Emancipation Patents issued to private

respondents; and
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3. Dismissing the case.[3]

The Facts

The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Paitan, Quezon,

Bukidnon with an area of 10.6146 hectares, more or less, covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. T-8275 and another property with an area of 13.2614 hectares

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-4985, also located at Paitan, Quezon,

Bukidnon; the said parcels are fully tenanted by private respondents herein who are

recipients of Emancipation Patents in their names pursuant to Operation Land

Transfer under P.D. 27 (Annexes A, A-1 to A-18) notwithstanding the fact that

neither the tenants nor the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) [has] paid a single

centavo for the said land. Petitioner and the tenants have not signed any Land

Transfer Production Agreement. Petitioner and her children have been deprived of

their property without due process of law and without just compensation, especially so

that the tenants have already stopped paying rentals as of December 1988 to the

damage and prejudice of petitioner.

Petitioner contends that since she is entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under

P.D. 27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her children under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the tenants are not supposed to

acquire the subject land and the Emancipation Patents precipitately issued to them are

null and void for being contrary to law. Petitioner further alleged that she owns the

subject property covered by OCT No. P-4985 as original homestead grantee who still

owned the same when Republic Act No. 6657 was approved, thus she is entitled to

retain the area to the exclusion of her tenants. As regards TCT No. 8275, petitioner

has applied for retention of seven hectares per Letter of Retention attached as Annex

B, that the lands subject of the instant petition are covered by Homestead Patents,

and as decided by the Supreme Court in the cases of Patricio vs. Bayug (112 SCRA

41) and Alita vs. Court of Appeals (170 SCRA 706), the homesteaders and their heirs

have the right to cultivate their homesteads personally, which is a superior right over

that of tenant-farmers.

Petitioner moved for the cancellation and recall of the Emancipation Patents issued

to private respondents-farmers and to restore to petitioner and her children the

ownership and cultivation of the subject lots plus payment of back rentals from the

time they stopped paying the same until ejected therefrom.
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The CA rejected the claim of petitioner. It ruled that she could not retain her homesteads,

since she was not the actual cultivator thereof. It also held that she and her heirs had not been

deprived of their right to retain the area mandated by law, because the records showed that theyhad other agricultural landholdings. Finally, it ruled that she had not been deprived of her

properties without just compensation, since Section 2 of Executive Order 228 declared that

tenant-farmers of agricultural lands under P.D. 27 are deemed owners of the land they till and thelease rentals paid by them shall be considered as amortization payments.[5]

Hence, this Petition.[6]

The Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

I. Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act [are]

exempted from the operation of land reform.

II. Granting arguendo that homesteads are not exempt, whether or not the

Emancipation Patents issued to the respondents are valid notwithstanding lack of

payment of just compensation.

III. On the assumption that homesteads are exempt from land reform and/or

the emancipation patents are illegally issued hence, void, can the respondents be

ejected from the premises in question?[7]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious. Respondents are entitled to the lands they till, subject to

the determination and payment of just compensation to petitioner.

First Issue:Petitioners Homesteads Not Exempt f rom Land Reform

Petitioner contends that because the subject properties are covered by homestead patents,

they are exempt from the operation of land reform. In support of her position, she cites thecasesAlita v. CA[8]andPatricio v. Bayug,[9]in which the Court ruled that homesteaders had a

superior right to cultivate their homesteads as against their tenants.

Petitioners contention is without legal basis. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under whichthe Emancipation Patents sought to be cancelled here were issued to respondents, applies to all

tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share-

crop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not.[10]The law makes no exceptions
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whatsoever in its coverage. Nowhere therein does it appear that lots obtained by homestead

patents are exempt from its operation.

The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of

1978, which states: Tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or cornwhich have been acquired under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, shall

also be covered by Operation Land Transfer. Unquestionably, petitioners parcels of land,though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by landreform under PD 27.

Petitioners claimed entitlement to retain seven (7) hectares is also untenable. PD 27, which

provides the retention limit, states:

In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if

such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it.

Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the

condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivateit upon effectivity of the law.

In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present. As admitted by

petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not cultivating them,nor will she personally cultivate any part thereof. Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to

retain any portion of her landholdings.

Even under the current primary law on agrarian reform, Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, towhich the application of PD 27 is suppletory, petitioners lands are subject to land reform. The

said Act lays down the rights of homestead grantees as follows:

SEC. 6.Retention Limits.Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person mayown or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of

which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as

commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the

Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall

retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be

awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1)

that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or

directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been

covered by PD 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them

thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their directcompulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of

this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said

homestead.(italics supplied)

Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain theoriginal homesteads, only foras long as they continue to cultivatethem. That parcels of land


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are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the operation of land

reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory

heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.

In the present case, as previously pointed out, neither petitioner nor her heirs are personallycultivating the subject homesteads. The DAR and the CA found that respondents were the ones

who had been cultivating their respective portions of the disputed properties.

However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in accordance with Section 6 of RA 6657,which requires no qualifying condition for the landowner to be entitled to retain such area. This

ruling is in line withAssociation of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform, from which we quote:

x x x. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their

retention rights, if any, under PD No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the

new retention rights provided for by RA No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole

more liberal than those granted by the decree.

Petitioners heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of three (3) hectares each, since theyare not actually tilling the parcels or directly managing the farm.

Patricio v. Bayug and Alita v. CA

Not Applicable

Petitioner insists that the appellate court ignored the ruling of the Court inPatricio v.Bayug[11]andAlita v. CA.[12]She relies on the following pronouncement inPatricio: We hold that

the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right of the homesteader

and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired from the State without being

encumbered by tenancy relations.[13]She also cites the statement inAlitathat the inapplicability

of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question findssupport in the aforecited Section 6 of RA 6657.[14]A closer look at these cases shows that they are

not applicable to the issues in the present case.

InPatricio, the owner and his heirs had previously cultivated the homestead, which was

later sold but subsequently reconveyed to the former. After the reconveyance, the owners heirs

wanted to resume their cultivation of the homestead, but the previous buyers tenants did not

want to leave it. InAlita, the owner was also desirous of personally cultivating the homestead;but the tenants, not wanting to relinquish it, were asserting their own right to continue cultivating

it. Thus, under these circumstances, the Court upheld the right of the homestead owners over

that of the tenants.

In the case at bar, petitioner herself has not personally cultivated the parcels of land. Neitherhas she or her heirs expressed, at any time, any desire to cultivate them personally. She is

invoking, yet is clearly not intending to ever actually exercise, her alleged right as homesteader

to own and personally cultivate them.

Thus, the rulings in bothPatricio andAlita, which are in line with the state objective offostering owner cultivatorship[15]and of abolishing tenancy,[16]would be inapplicable to the present

case. Since petitioner and her heirs have evinced no intention of actually cultivating the lands or
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even directly managing the farm, they will undoubtedly continue to be absentee

landlords. Therefore, to blindly and indiscriminately apply the ruling in the cited cases would be

tantamount to encouraging feudalistic practices and going against the very essence of agrarianreform. This we cannot sanction.

Second Issue: Just Compensation

It is undisputed that the subject parcels were covered by Operation Land Transfer under PD

27, and that private respondents were identified as beneficiaries. In fact, Emancipation Patents

have already been issued to them.

Petitioner, however, claims that she was not paid just compensation and, thus, prays for the

cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to respondents under PD 27. She contends that

it is illegal for the DAR to take property without full payment of just compensation[;] until full

payment is done the title and ownership remain with the landholder.[17]

Petitioners contention has merit. Section 2 of PD 266 states:

After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of

title under Presidential Decree No. 27, an Emancipation Patent and/or Grant shall be

issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform on the basis of a duly approved survey

plan.

On the other hand, paragraphs 8 and 9 of PD 27 reads as follows:

For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenant-

farmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of the land shall be equivalent to two andone-half (2 ) times the average harvest of three normal crop years immediately

preceding the promulgation of this Decree;

The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of six (6) per centum per

annum, shall be paid by the tenant in fifteen (15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual

amortizations[.]

Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till,

they are still required to pay the cost of the land, including interest, within fifteen years before

the title is transferred to them. Thus, the Court held in Association of Small Landowners in thePhilippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform:[18]

It is true that PD 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmers as of

October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of

land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him

was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged

member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative.It was understood, however, that
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full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the

constitutional requirement.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondents complied with the requirement of full

payment of the cost of the parcels of land. As they themselves admitted,[19]their value had not

even been determined yet. In the absence of such determination, the Court cannot rule that justcompensation has already been fully paid.

Presidential Decree 27 and subsequently Executive Order (EO) 228, which recognized the

rights acquired by tenant-farmers under PD 27, provide in detail the computation to be used inarriving at the exact total cost of the parcels of land. Evidently, therefore, the law recognizes that

their exact value, or the just compensation to be given to the landowner, cannot just be assumed;

it must be determined with certainty before the land titles are transferred.

Although EO 228 provides that the total lease rentals paid for the lands from October 21,1972 shall be considered as advance payment, it does not sanction the assumption that such

rentals are automatically considered as equivalent to just compensation for the land. The

provision significantly designates the lease rentals as advance, not full, payment. Thedetermination of the exact value of the lands cannot simply be brushed aside, as it is fundamental

to the determination of whether full payment has been made.

Necessarily, the lease rentals admittedly paid by respondents until December 1988 cannot, at

this point, be considered as full settlement of the value of the lands or as just compensation forthem. The value of the subject lands was never determined; thus, there is no amount that can be

used as basis for applying the lease rentals.

Under the circumstances, actual title to the subject lands remains with petitioner. Clearly

then, under PD 27 and EO 228, the application of the process of agrarian reform to the subjectlands is still incomplete.

Considering the passage of RA 6657 before the completion of the application of the agrarian

reform process to the subject lands, the same should now be completed under the said law, withPD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect. This ruling finds support inLand Bank of the

Philippines v. CA,[20]wherein the Court stated:

We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA 6657 should not apply to rice and corn lands under

PD 27. Section 75 of RA 6657 clearly states that the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228

shall only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the Act also provides ---

Sec. 7. Priorities.The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program

the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of (10) yearsfrom the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:

Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all

private lands voluntarily offered by the owners for agrarian reform; x x x and all other

lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be

acquired and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the
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implementation to be completed within a period of not more than four (4) years

emphasis supplied).

This eloquently demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the

properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless. And to

facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Actshould be adhered to. InAssociation of Small Landowners of the Philippines v.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform this Court applied the provisions (of) RA 6657 to rice

and corn lands when it upheld the constitutionality of the payment of just

compensation for PD 27 lands through the different modes stated in Sec. 18.

In determining the amount to be paid petitioner, all lease rentals paid by respondents to her

after October 21, 1972 should be deducted therefrom. This formula is intended to put into effectthe provision of Section 2 of EO 228.

Third Issue: Tenants Cannot Be Ejected

Petitioner submits that aside from cancelling the Emancipation Patents issued to

respondents, the ejectment of the latter from the premises should be ordered by the Court, inaccordance with the doctrine inPatricio.

Petitioners position is unfounded. As earlier explained,Patricio finds no application to the

case at bar. Thus, there is no justification for ejecting respondents. Besides, Section 22 of RA

6657 expressly states that actual tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not be ejected or removedtherefrom. Furthermore, there is no reason for ejecting the tillers with respect to the area of

five hectares, which petitioner may choose to retain. Section 6 of RA 6657 further states:

The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous,

shall pertain to the landowner; Provided, however, That in case the area selected for

retention by the land owner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose

whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land

with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the

retained area, he shall be considered a lease holder and shall lose his right to be a

beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another

agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the land retained by the

landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year fromthe time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.

In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farm workers on the land prior to

the approval of this Act shall be respected.

The current provision on retention removes the necessity, present under PD 27, of ejecting

actual tillers. Under the current law, landowners who do not personally cultivate their lands are


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no longer required to do so in order to qualify for the retention of an area not exceeding

five hectares. Instead, they are now required to maintain the actual tiller of the area retained,

should the latter choose to remain therein.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court ofAppeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the provincial agrarian reform adjudicator

isREINSTATED with the modification that the lease rentals, which respondents have alreadypaid to petitioner after October 21, 1972, are to be considered part of the purchase price for thesubject parcels of land.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

[1]Fourteenth Division. The Decision was written byJ. Demetrio G. Demetria with the concurrence ofJJRamon A.

Barcelona (Division chairman) and Mariano M. Umali (member).[2]CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 22.

[3]Rollo, p. 38.

[4]CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 18-20.

[5]CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 22.

[6]The case was deemed submitted for resolution on November 17, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of the Office of

Solicitor Generals Memorandum/Comment signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Roman G. Del

Rosario and Sol. Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta. Respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty. Francisco

H. Albarracin Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform Legal Services Division, was received on February 7, 2000.

[7]Petitioners Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 41.

[8]170 SCRA 706, February 27, 1989.

[9]112 SCRA 41, February 16, 1982.

[10]Ministry Memorandum Circular No. 18-81.

[11]112 SCRA 41, February 16, 1982.

[12]170 SCRA 706, February 27, 1989.

[13]Supra, p. 45, per Aquino,J.

[14]Supra, p. 710; per Paras,J.

[15]RA 6657.

[16]PD 152.

[17]Petitioners Memorandum, p. 9;rollo, p. 44.

[18]175 SCRA 343,390, July 14, 1989; per Cruz,J.

[19]Comment, p. 5; rollo, p. 31.

[20]321 SCRA 629, 641, December 29, 1999; per Bellosillo,J.
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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146587. July 2, 2002]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the GeneralManager of the PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY(PIA), peti t ioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALSand the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as herein represented by DR.SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION SANTOSIMPERIAL, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J.:

Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before theRegional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No. 3841-M and No. 3842-M, covering a total of 544,980 square meters ofcontiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized forthe continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice ofthe Philippines project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA),took over the premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased itsoperations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionallyfixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more thannine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued thisorder -

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

"Condemning the properties of the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 3839-M to3842-M located at KM 43, MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan and coveredby several transfer certificates of title appearing in the Commissioners

Appraisal Report consisting of the total area of 544,980 square meters, asindicated in plan, Exhibit A, for plaintiff, also marked as Exhibit I for the

defendants, and as Appendix A attachedto the Commissioners AppraisalReport, for the purpose stated by the plaintiff in its complaint;

"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for saidproperty which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed atthe rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest fromSeptember 19, 1969, until fully paid; and


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"Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of suit, which includes the aforesaidfees of commissioners, Atty. Victorino P. Evangelista and Mr. PabloDomingo."[1]

The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter

property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of hereinrespondents, which forms part of the expropriated area.

It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents thecompensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later,or on 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking paymentfor the expropriated property. On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertainingthat the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of executionserved on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementationthereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a motion urgingthe trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amountof P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of theexpropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trialcourt, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted the motion.

In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No.22,[2]transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan StateUniversity for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be usedexclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion wasretained by the PIA. This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, theSantos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the depositin court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the

expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as mightbe approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation andmotion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per squaremeter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged atP5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of theexpropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor ofrespondents and issued the assailed order, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979and declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription -

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby:

"1) declares the decision rendered by this Court on February 26, 1979 nolonger enforceable, execution of the same by either a motion or anindependent action having already prescribed in accordance with Section 6,Rule 39 of both the 1964 Revised Rules of Court and the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure;
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"2) denies the plaintiffs Manifestation and Motion to Permit Plaintiff toDeposit in Court Payment for Expropriated Properties dated September 16,1999 for the reason stated in the next preceding paragraph hereof; and

"3) orders the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis

Santos to his heirs conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court inGovernment of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291, withoutprejudice to any case which the parties may deem appropriate to institute inrelation with the amount already paid to herein oppositors and the purportedtransfer of a portion of the said realty to the Bulacan State University pursuantto Proclamation No. 22 issued by President Joseph Ejercito."[3]

Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition wasoutrightly denied. It would appear that the denial was based on Section 4, Rule 65, ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provided that the filing of a motion for

reconsideration in due time after filing of the judgment, order or resolution interruptedthe running of the sixty-day period within which to file a petition forcertiorari; and that ifa motion for reconsideration was denied, the aggrieved party could file the petition onlywithin the remaining period, but which should not be less than five days in any event,reckoned from the notice of such denial. The reglementary period, however, was latermodified by A.M. No. 00-2-03 S.C., now reading thusly:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. --- The petition shall be filed not laterthan sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case amotion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion isrequired or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of thedenial of said motion.

The amendatory provision, being curative in nature, should be made applicable to allcases still pending with the courts at the time of its effectivity.

In Narzoles vs. NLRC,[4]the Court has said:

The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendousconfusion resulting in the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. Thismay have been because, historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to theRules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the orderdenying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were itnot for the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases sodismissed would have been resolved on the merits. Hence, the Court deemedit wise to revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period fromnotice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition forcertiorari. x x x
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The latest amendments took effect on September 1, 2000, following itspublication in the Manila Bulletin on August 4, 2000 and in the Philippine DailyInquirer on August 7, 2000, two newspapers of general circulation.

In view of its purpose, the Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65,

can only be described as curative in nature, and the principles governingcurative statutes are applicable.

Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legalproceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certainlegal requirements. (Erectors, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,256 SCRA 629 [1996].) They are intended to supply defects, abridgesuperfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons tocarry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed ofexpected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or

irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before theenactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to actsdone that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing lawshave been complied with. (Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. vs. Dela Serna,312 SCRA 22 [1999].) Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, areretroactive. (Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA11 [1994].)[5]

At all events, petitioner has a valid point in emphasizing the "public nature" of theexpropriated property. The petition being imbued with public interest, the Court has

resolved to give it due course and to decide the case on its merits.

Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that amotion which respondents had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other motionssubsequent thereto, was made within the reglementary period that thereby interruptedthe 5-year prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979 judgment. Furthermore,petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents of partial compensation in the sum ofP72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of petitioners andeffectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6,Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.[6]

In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6,

Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated26 February 1979, within five years after it had become final and executory, rendered itunenforceable by mere motion. The motion for payment, dated 09 May 1984, as well asthe subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72,683.55 by the provincialtreasurer of Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted the five-year period,since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailingparty, in this case by petitioner. Respondents maintained that the P72,683.55 paid tothem by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court
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was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner when it first entered possession of theproperty in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial payment. Respondentsfurther questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of the property tothe Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet tobe finally settled.

The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of thesovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a publicpurpose.[7]Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires norecognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merelyconfirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of thepower. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that oftaxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form ofproperty the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separateinterests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or impliedreservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of theproperty whenever the public interest so requires it.[8]

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of theexpropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in theconventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert anyconflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effectmerely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and thedefendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, butto prove a right to compensation for the taking.[9]

Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be forpublic use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner ofthe property.[10]These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the

necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, andprivate rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affordingprotection to the latter.[11]In determining public use, two approaches are utilized -the firstis public employment or the actual use by the public, and thesecondis publicadvantage or benefit.[12]It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constantgrowth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual soincreases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual maybe devoted.[13]

The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by thePIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the

Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselvesin line with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public natureof the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its presentuse differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriationproceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a publiccharacter upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the ownerof the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, theonly limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is.
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In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort onthe pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya [14]wherethe unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the propertythere in question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipalgovernment of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but

merely delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent domainto local governments under Republic Act No. 7160 [15]cannot be understood as being thepervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government.For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, bedelegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power ofeminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domainor only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.[16]

Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic[17]where the private landowners had remainedunpaid ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled-

The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so,in what amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriationproceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they werecondemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to thegovernment. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, inthe expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates,plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots -which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - butonly to demand the fair market value of the same.

"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies,which may be deemed just and equitable under the premises'."[18]

The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City[19]wherethe recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaidlandowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were firstinstituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for hisproperty computed at its market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by theState.

The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation

proceedings provides not only for the payment of just compensation to hereinrespondents but likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner overwhich parties, as well as their privies, are bound.[20]Petitioner has occupied, utilized and,for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the

judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed hasamounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, therebypreempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing forthe return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact
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that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinarysales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding,condemnation acts upon the property.[21]After condemnation, the paramount title is in thepublic under a new and independent title;[22]thus, by giving notice to all claimants to adisputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better

title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.[23]

Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that thesame argument could likewise apply against them. Respondents first institutedproceedings for payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after the 1979

judgment had become final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compelpayment against herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rulethat one should take good care of his own concern, respondents should havecommenced the proper action upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed, resultedin a permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property. [24]

The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum

equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed bythe seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action andcompetition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one whodesires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. [25]Thus, ifproperty is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having

jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just valueto be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation isactually paid or deposited with the court.[26]In fine, between the taking of the propertyand the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a positionas good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. [27]

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the

zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner institutedcondemnation proceedings and took the property in September 1969. This allowanceof interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of thetaking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum [28]should helpeliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currencyover time.[29]Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinaryinflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of theobligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary isstipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations.[30]In other words, acontractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken intoaccount to alter the value of the currency.[31]

All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000,vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, theonly authority left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, althoughnot entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly onthe yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of theBulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest
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thereon at 12%per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July 2000, ofthe Court of Appeals dismissing the petition forcertiorari,as well as its resolution of 04January 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Bulacan, dated 01 March 2000, are SET ASIDE. Let the case be forthwithremanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper execution of its decisionpromulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez,JJ., concur.

[1]

Rollo, p. 66.[2]The Dispositive Portion of Proclamation No. 22, entitled TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP OF APORTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY TO THE BULACANSTATE UNIVERSITY, reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, President of the Republic of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby transfer to the Bulacan StateUniversity, twenty (20) hectares of the property mentioned above, and another five (5) hectares for theexclusive use of the propagation of the Philippine carabao, adjacent to the university campus, located inMalolos, Bulacan. The remaining portions of the property fronting the national highway shall be retainedby the Philippine Information Agency for its proposed development plan, including offices of the PIARegional Office, the Bulacan Provincial Information Center, the training center and the depository ofequipment and other properties of PIA.

[3]Rollo, pp. 76-77.

[4]341 SCRA 533. See also PCGG vs. Desierto, 28 December 2001, G.R. No. 140358;PCGG vs. Desierto, 19 January 2001, G.R. No. 140323;Medina Investigation vs. Court of Appeals, 20March 2001, G.R. No. 144074;Pfizervs. Galan, 25 May 2001, G.R. No. 143389;Santos vs. Court ofAppeals, 05 July 2001, G.R. No. 141947.

[5]At pp. 537-538.

[6]Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be

executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and beforeit is barred by the Statute of Limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

[7]Bernas, 1987 Edition, p. 276, quoting Justice Story in Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge.

[8]US vs. Certain Lands in Highlands (DY NY) 48 F Supp 306 .

[9]US vs. Certain Lands in Highlands (DY NY) 48 F Supp 306; San Bernardino Valley Municipal WaterDistrict vs. Gage Canal Co. (4th Dist) 226 Cal App 2d 206, 37 Cal Rptr 856.

[10]Sea vs. Manila Railroad Co., 42 Phil. 102.

[11]Visayan Refining Co., vs. Camus, 40 Phil 550.
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[12]Thornton Development Authority vs. Upah (DC Colo) 640 F Supp 1071.

[13]Visayan Refining, supra.

[14]153 SCRA 291.

[15]See Local Government Code of 1991

[16]City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil 349.[17]17 SCRA 107.

[18]At p. 112.

[19]106 Phil. 1017.

[20]Mines vs. Canal Authority of the State (Fla) 467 So2d 989, 10 FLW 230.

[21]Cadorette vs. US CCA (Mass) 988 F2d 215.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid.

[24]

17 SCRA 107, supra.[25]Manila Railway Co. vs. Fabie, 17 Phil 206.

[26]Philippine Railway Co. vs. Solon, 13 Phil 34.

[27]Commissioner of Public Highways vs. Burgos, 96 SCRA 831.

[28]Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78.

[29]US vs. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 US 119, 82 L Ed 1219, 58 S Ct 799.

[30]Commissioner of Public Highways vs. Burgos, supra.

[31]Ibid.
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