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South Asian Survey

DOI: 10.1177/0971523105013001042006; 13; 51South Asian Survey

Sangeeta ThapliyalNepal at the Political Crossroads: Options for India

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Nepal at the Political Crossroads/51

Sangeeta Thapliyal is Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu,Jammu, India.

SOUTH ASIAN SURVEY 13 : 1 (2006)

Sage Publications New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/LondonDOI: 10.1177/097152310501300104

NEPALATTHE POLITICAL CROSSROADS:OPTIONSFORINDIA

SANGEETA THAPLIYAL

This article critically examines the Government of Indias policy of twin pillars (constitutional

monarchy and multi-party democracy) in Nepal. It asserts that these two forces have not co-existed harmoniously: the inherent contradiction between them is one of the reasons for thepolitical instability in Nepal. Other actors have emerged due to political instability andsocio-economic alienation, including protest movements by thejanjatis(ethnic nationalities),women, dalits and terains (people from the foothills and plains of Nepal). The Maoistarmed movement, by challenging both the monarchy and political parties, has furtherworsened the situation. This article analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the three mainpolitical actors and advocates the adoption of an inclusive political formula for resolvingthe conflict. Political instability in Nepal has a direct impact upon India, which must

therefore proactively use whatever leverage it has in Nepal to help resolve the conflict there.

THEMONARCHYCAME to centre stage in Nepals politics after dismissing the nominatedgovernment of Sher Bahadur Deuba on 1 February 2005. King Gyanendra pro-claimed that there would be no parliamentary elections for the next three years andconstituted a cabinet of nominated people under his chairmanship. This incidentchanged the political character of monarchy from constitutional to an active, rulingforce.

The characteristics of an active monarchy had become visible after the dismissal ofthe Deuba government for the first time in October 2002. The international reactionwas for supporting peace and stability in Nepal without too much concern overdomestic political dynamics. However, the royal takeover elicited medium to sharpreaction from the international community. While China considered it to be an inter-nal affair of Nepal, India, the United States of America (US), the United Kingdom

(UK), Germany and France were vocal in deriding the Kings action, describing it asa regressive move against the interests of multi-party democracy. A few countriescalled their ambassadors back for consultations. The message to Nepal was to rollback an active monarchy and bring back multi-party democracy. This reaction gives

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52/SANGEETA THAPLIYAL

recognition to only two political forces in Nepalconstitutional monarchy and multi-party democracythat existed prior to the royal takeover. The emphasis is more ongiving the parties a place in Nepali politics rather than in resolving the political crisis,

which has many more variables than political confrontation and clash of interestsbetween the two forces.This article argues that there are more than two players in Nepali politics and

giving recognition to only two would not resolve the crisis. Prominent amongst theother forces are the protest movements that emerged after 1990 with varying intensitysuch as peaceful movements by thejanjatis (ethnic minorities), dalits (traditionallyoppressed lower caste groups), terains (people from the foothills and plains) andwomen and the armed movement by Maoists. Excluding these movements from cri-

sis resolution would further pave the way for greater instability.The present article seeks to understand the dynamics of politics in Nepal leading

to the emergence of these movements and their impact on Nepali polity. Do theyindicate that the democratic transition is not yet complete and that the peoples as-pirations and demands are not fulfilled in the changed political order? Was it merelya change of elites from one political system (party-less panchayat rule) to another(multi-party democracy) without taking the people into consideration? Did democracyopen up more space for competition that clashed with the traditional elites (royalists)?

Was it the case of traditional elite not conceding adequate political, economic andsocial space to the newly emerging leadership and groups? To understand the dynamicsof political resolution it is important to understand Nepali politics after the introduc-tion of democracy in 1990 and the characteristics of the actors involved. With thisbackground, the article tries to understand Indian responses to the political instabilityin Nepal.

II POLITICSIN DEMOCRATIC NEPAL

MONARCHYVERSUS MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY

The 1990 pro-democratic movement was aimed at removing the ban on politicalparties, establishing multi-party democracy and reducing the power of the King ratherthan overthrowing him. As a result, King Birendra gave recognition and legitimacyto multi-party democracy. When the time came to translate the movements results

into political reality, it was not surprising that the political parties retained monarchy,although keeping the Palace within the confines of the Constitution. G.P. Koirala,general secretary of Nepali Congress (NC), remarked in a mass gathering at Tundikhel,Kathmandu soon after the King agreed to dismiss the Chand government in 1990:

Our goals are the establishment of constitutional monarchy and a constitutionbased on the will of the people. Our history is full of broken promises from theKing, therefore, we will now make sure the promises are fully implemented. Only

through continued unity may we reach these goals (Hoftun, Raeper and Whelpton1999: 134).

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Nepal was at a similar political crossroads in 1950 when pro-democratic parties over-threw the Ranas but showed flexibility in working with King Tribhuvan. The decisionarrived atoffhandedly called the Delhi Compromise because of Indias role in the

negotiationswas to consider constitutional monarchy and multi-party system astwo forces of democracy. This proved fatal to democracy as monarchists took controlof power and relegated the political parties to the background. King Tribhuvansupported M.P. Koirala over B.P. Koirala as Prime Minister, thereby creating factional-ism within the Congress party leading to its split in May 1952. On that occasion,Tribhuvan had threatened to impose direct rule with the help of General KesarShumsher had the Nepali Congress rejected M.P. Koiralas candidature for primeminister (Gupta 1993: 67). In 1960, King Mahendra dismissed an elected government

of the Nepali Congress led by B.P. Koirala from power on the grounds of misuse ofpower to fulfil partys interests, incapacity and imperilling national unity. For thenext 30 years, a one party Panchayat regime ruled the country and other politicalparties were banned. Thus, monarchy and political parties have never co-existed har-moniously in the past.

Despite this history, the political parties agreed in 1990 not to overthrow monarchyapprehending that it might disturb the organised movement. This was, perhaps, due

to uncertainty among the political leaders about popular sentiments regarding trad-itional monarchy, as also a lack of self-confidence in their own ability to keep thecountry united in the absence of the King, a symbol of national unity. Hence, in1990, the pro-democratic forces were satisfied with changing the political status ofthe King from an active to a constitutional monarch deriving his power and authorityfrom the people. The Preamble to the Constitution states: I, King Birendra Bir BikramShah Deva, by virtue to the state authority as exercised by us, do hereby promulgateand enforce this Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal on the recommendation and

advice, and with the consent of the Council of Ministers. This has been interpretedby the advocates of constituent assembly such as extreme left parties as implying thatthe King gave the present Constitution of Nepal to its people.

The new Constitution (1990) removed the ban on political parties and establisheda multi-party system. The Constitution framers were cautious about the violation ofearlier constitutions by King Mahendra in 1960 and hence had made the Constitu-tion supreme by stating that this Constitution is the fundamental law of Nepal,

and all laws inconsistent with it, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void(Article 1[1]).In order to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution, Article II states that the

Sovereignty of Nepal is vested in the Nepalese people and shall be exercised in accord-ance with the provisions of this Constitution. Article 35 (1) in Part 7 of the Constitu-tion says that the executive power of the Kingdom of Nepal shall, pursuant to thisConstitution and other laws, be vested in His Majesty and the Council of Ministers.The Constitution aimed at retaining His Majesty as a royal institution with ceremonial

powers rather than as an individual. However, Article 127 gave the King the powerto remove any difficulty that arises with the implementation of this Constitution.by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 17, 2009http://sas.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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His Majesty may issue necessary orders to remove such difficulty and such Ordersshall be laid before Parliament. This power was used by King Gyanendra to dismissthe government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in 2002 thus, disturbing

equilibrium of power sharing between the political parties and the King.1

Although there were varied responses by political parties and the people to the1990 Constitution, they agreed to abide by it. The Communist Party of Nepal (UnitedMarxist Leninist) (CPN [UML]) opposed constitutional monarchy and instead sup-ported a republic. Its main objective has been to draft a constitution through a con-stituent assembly, but it agreed to the present Constitution and is a part of mainstreampolitics (Kumar 1995: 9). The United National Peoples Movement (UNPM) criticisedNC and United Left Front (ULF) for surrendering the struggle for democracy (Hoftun,

Raeper and Whelpton 1999: 134). The United Peoples Front, the political front ofUNPM, also wanted a republican form of government and a new constitution by aconstituent assembly. The left parties consider formation of a new constitution by aconstituent assembly as their long-term objective. Contrary to these views, the NChas always advocated constitutional monarchy. This uneven support to the Con-stitution of Nepal created fissures in the collective goals and actions of political parties(Dahal 2003: 15).

OPPORTUNITIES MISSEDBY POLITICAL PARTIES

Soon after the change of power from Panchayat to multi-party democracy, there wasa clash of interests between the followers and sympathisers of these two political sys-tems, along with the problems of law and order and institutional efficiency. Loyaltiesof the army, police, bureaucracy and other institutions were suspected to be pro-monarchy, since it was the King who had nurtured them for 30 years. This created

conflict between the subsequent democratic governments and these institutions. Forinstance, the role of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) has been under debate ever sinceit was deployed against the Maoists.

Since 1990, nepotism and corruption have marred the politics of Nepal. Too muchwealth in too few hands is grotesque and ugly in a country in which a majority of thepopulation lives below the poverty line. Further, inter- and intra-party feuds have af-fected the performance of governments.2 In the personalised politics of Nepal, withcrisis in leadership, there were often clashes within a party with those in the partyorganisation opposing their own party colleagues in government. For example, in1994, Koirala did not get support from the Bhattarai faction of NC on the Tanakpurissue.3

Parties in opposition tried to take advantage of factionalism in governing partiesto pull down governments rather than keeping a check on the governments policiesand performances. As a result, there were frequent changes in government with vari-ous coalitions. Party leaders turned towards the King for no-confidence motions,

special sessions of the House or dissolution of the House thus making him a stableinstitution in the country.



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The peoples expectations from democracy remained unfulfilled politically, sociallyand economically. Those who aspired for a political role were disappointed by therigid party organisation, which was wide at the base but narrow at the top and was

opened only for a few either belonging to the close family or inner party coterie butmostly from dominant communities of Brahmins, Chettris and Newars. It is not as ifany person from these communities found it easy ascending the party hierarchy, butthe neglected and marginalised social groups interpreted this as discrimination basedon ethnic identity. These missed opportunities widened the gap between communitiesor strengthened the perceptions of social discriminations already inherent in the society.

RISEOF PEOPLES MOVEMENTS

Political discrimination, coupled with social and economic inequity, led people toorganise themselves against the state, demanding a space for inclusive politics. Pressuregroups of women, janjatis and dalits have been demanding their inclusion in thepolitical and socio-economic spheres. Discontent grows when they find it difficult togain a foothold in the main political parties or rise up the economic ladder. Thesegroups are asking for systemic changes for better political, economic and social

equitability. For example, the janjatis have organised themselves under the JanjatiMahasangh, which has 48janjatis as its members, and are demanding changes withinthe Constitution.

Janjatis are the indigenous tribes of Nepal and do not consider themselves tobe Hindus. They are against the Hindu character of the country as enshrined in theConstitution of 1990 and want Nepal to be declared a secular state. They challengethe unitary structure of the country and demand federalism based on ethnic dis-tinctions. The Janjati Mahasangh proposes to carve out regions belonging to the

ethnic communities that should be ruled by them. These areas will have all admin-istrative powers except national security, currency and foreign relations. The NepalRastriya Janjati Party advocates a federal system with 12 regions in the country con-sisting of Khasaan, Jadan, Magarat, Tmaudhim, Tambasaling, Nepal, Khambuwan,Limbuwan, Kochila, Mithila, Bhojpur and Avadhi (Lawoti 2003: 7879).4 For thosecommunities that are a minority in ajanjatiarea, thejanjatis ask for non-territorialfederalism that provides the ethnic communities the right to decide on their culture,education and language by electing councils that have jurisdiction over cultural, socialand developmental spheres (Ibid.).

Like the janjatis, other protest movements spearheaded by women, terains anddalits are also demanding inclusive politics. In contrast to these protest movements isthe Maoist movement, which is apoliticalmovement that uses violence as a tactic tochange the political structure of the state.

The Maoists started Peoples War against the state in 1996, with the intention ofchanging the socio-economic and political fabric of the country through violent means.

Subscribing to an extreme left ideology, the Maoists had not joined the United LeftFront during the democratic movement of 1990. Instead they had formed their own



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United National Peoples Movement (UNPM). Four of the extreme left groups ofUNPM, viz., Fourth Convention (Nirmal Lama), Masal (Sital Kumar/BaburamBhattarai), Mashal (Prachanda) and Labour and Peasant Organisation (Rup Lal)

formed the Unity Centre (UC). The United Peoples Front of Nepal (UPFN) was theUCs political front. In its first national convention held in Chitwan, UC approvedof a new constitution that provided for the creation of a revolutionary communistparty with a revolutionary joint front and a peoples army under its leadership towage peoples revolution in the country (POLSAN 1992: 32).

As a part of mainstream politics, the Maoists had secured 4.83 per cent of the totalvotes with nine seats in the 1991 general elections. But these seats were not sufficientfor their political survival in parliament, given the deep hostility between CPN (UML)

and the extreme left. The Maoists got disillusioned when the left forces sidelinedthem in the government under Man Mohan Adhikari in 1994. In November 1994,intra-party factionalism split the UPFN into two factions, one led by Baburam Bhattaraiand the other by Lilamani Pokhrel. A power struggle ensued, with each wanting tolegitimise its faction as the national party.5 The Election Commission gave recognitionto the Pokhrel faction. Consequently, Baburam appealed to the Supreme Court andreceived a favourable verdict. However, due to the delayed verdict of the Court, theBaburam faction could not qualify to contest in the mid-term elections of 1994

(Mahajan 2000: 168). This event proved to be a turning point in Nepali politics.Not being able to survive in mainstream politics, Baburam rejoined UC. This

time, UC came back with a new strategy to gain power. The central committee meetingof the party in September 1995 adopted a Plan for the Historical Initiation of thePeoples War that defined the theoretical basis for an armed struggle and outlined adetailed programme to initiate the peoples war. (CPNM 1995). The CommunistParty of Nepal (Maoists) declares its main objective as establishing a peoples govern-ment through the peoples war that is inspired by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Theplan of action adopted to achieve peoples war is based on the strategy of surroundingthe city from country side (Ibid.).

The Maoist cadres consist of its party workers and the underground cadres of theUnity Centre. Cadres of a breakaway faction of CPN (UML) also joined the Maoistsafter internal strife between Madhav Nepal and Bam Dev Gautam split the party in1996. The Maoists identified proletarian workers in modern industries, farm workers,bonded labourers, landless peasants, middle peasants, rich peasants, petty bourgeoisie,

and national bourgeoisie as the motivating force for their revolution (Ibid.).In the initial years, the Nepalese people considered the Maoists to be an alternativeto inefficient governments. The Maoists formed village development programmesand peoples cooperative schemes for the welfare of the people. Immediate justicewas imparted on local issues in the areas of Maoist dominance. The economicallydisadvantaged people and communities support the Maoists because of their concernfor the economic betterment of society. This is evident from the Maoist presence inthe poverty stricken, backward areas of Nepal (Gurung 2003: 34).6

Women, dalits andjanjatis are also supporting the Maoists. For example, the AllNepal Womens Association (Revolutionary) has been actively supporting the peoples



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war and considers it as the only option available to end oppression against women(Onesto 1999). Certain discriminatory practices against women, such as customs ofpolygamy and arranged marriages, are done away within the Maoist areas, thereby

leading to the empowerment of women. As Maoist cadre, women hailing from patheticconditions are given responsibility, thereby enhancing their esteem and status (Acharya2004; Gautam 2004). Although the Maoists have increased the number of war widows,they have also provided an opportunity to women belonging to the socio-economicallyrepressed communities to rise in the organisational hierarchy (Pokhrel 2004a).

The Maoist attempt to increase their support base by including the concerns ofthejanjatis has paid rich dividends. Most of their cadres belong to Rai, Limbu, Gurung,Magar and Tamang communities. This has led many scholars to describe the Maoist

movement as an ethnic movement.However, it is best characterised as a politicalmovement with economic and ethnic elements. The Maoist image of being represen-tative ofjanjatis is a political ploy to gain more cadres.

On 4 February 1996, the Maoists submitted a 40-point memorandum to the NCgovernment of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, consisting of demands rangingfrom nationalist concerns to peoples democracy and livelihood. Of the 40 demands,nine nationalist demands are essentially targeted against India. They demand abro-

gation of unequal treaties such as the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Mahakali Treaty,regulation of the open border, abrogation of Gorkha recruitment in the Indian Armyand banning of Hindi films and magazines. The socio-economic demands rangefrom economic concerns (land distribution and employment for all) to ending socialdiscrimination (ending untouchability and racial exploitation) to welfare measure(free health services, drinking water, roads and electricity for all). However, the mostsensitive demands are related to the abolition of royal privileges, declaring Nepal tobe a secular state and the formation of a new constitution through a constituent

assembly.The Deuba government did not pay attention to the Maoist demands and received

a shock when the Maoists started the peoples war in 1996. Starting from six districtsRukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Salyan and Gorkha in western Nepal and Sindhuli in theeastin 1996, the influence of the Maoists has spread wide in Nepal. It is estimatedthat the Maoists operate in 66 out of the 75 districts of Nepal, with differing levels ofinfluence from moderate to extreme. They have set up their own administration. By

December 2000, they had even set up the peoples government in five districts inwestern Nepal (Thapa 2001: 2;the Times of India2001). In areas under their control,the Maoists do local policing, impart immediate justice to local disputes, set up banksand collect levies from households. The Maoists control the geographical territory ofNepal while the government controls the district headquarters with a dense population.

THE GOVERNMENTS RESPONSETOTHE MAOISTS

The governments response to the Maoists has ranged from force to negotiations. Useof the armed forces proved ineffective against the peoples war. Economic development



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programmes, such as the Integrated Development Programme, were launched butdid not succeed due to lack of funds. Socio-economic reforms will take time to showresults.

The Maoist issue is a political problem and the government too seeks to resolve itpolitically. Hence, the government has invited the rebels for negotiations. In thebackdrop of a ceasefire, three rounds of talks between the government and the Maoistswere held in August, September and November 2001.7 The government was notwilling to discuss the core political demands of the Maoists that were (1) abolition ofthe present Constitution and power to be given to people, (2) dissolution of parliamentand formation of an interim government, and (3) introduction of a republican system.In the third round of talks, the demand for a republic was dropped but the Maoists

stuck to their other two demands. It was a tactical ploy, perhaps done to send accom-modative signals to the government and simultaneously to gain the sympathy of thePalace. The demand could however be revived at a later date as the Maoists hadinsisted on an interim government and elections for a new constituent assembly(Muni 2003: 50).

The government of Nepal declared Maoists as terrorists in 2001. His Majesty onthe recommendation of the Council of Ministers declared the Terrorist and Destructive

Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordnance in order to contain terrorism andviolence in the country (nepalnews.com 2001). Emergency was declared in Nepaland the Army was deployed.

After completing three months of emergency, the proclamation was brought tothe House of Representatives for approval by a two-thirds majority of the memberspresent and voting. Emergency was approved in the 205 members House of Represen-tatives with 194 legislators voting in favour of the motion and seven against it(nepalnews.com 2002). However, the parties including the ruling party president,

G.P. Koirala, refused to support Prime Minister Deuba in further extension of emer-gency for the second term. The difference of views in the NC over an issue of nationalimportance led to the ouster of the Prime Minister from the party. Consequently,Deuba dismissed the House and ordered fresh elections to take place on 13 November.Due to heightened tension from Maoist attacks, all parties jointly urged Deuba topostpone the elections and form an all-party interim government. King Gyanendrarejected Deubas request and dismissed the government on charges of incompetence

on 4 October 2002.

THREE PARTYCONFRONTATION: MONARCHY, POLITICAL PARTIESAND MAOISTS

Even though the Maoists demands have specifically targeted the monarchy, initiallythe confrontation was between democratic governments and the Maoists. Democraticgovernments through the power of the Constitution were responsible for governance,law and order in the country. Dismissal of the Deuba government in 2002 made the

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For the first time since 1990, it was realised that the King could take power in hishands by using the Constitution. Political parties called the Kings action unconstitu-tional and regressive. It brought alive the fear of an active monarch ready to take over

power. For the first time five major parties that had members in the dissolved Houseof RepresentativesNepali Congress, Communist Party of Nepal (United MarxistLeninist), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Nepal Sadbhavna Party and the PeoplesFront of Nepalcame together against the King and released an 18-point agenda.CPN (Maoist) called the Kings move a retrogressive coup but later on called for apolitical exit through dialogue between the political forces and the King (Thapa2001: 175).

King Gyanendra invited the political parties to suggest names for a Prime Minister

with a clean image.8 The parties were unable to agree on a name and Lokendra BahadurChand was appointed Prime Minister with the responsibility of holding electionsand resolving the Maoist problem. The Chand government prepared grounds fortalks with the Maoists by removing the tag of terrorists from them. The Maoists andthe government declared ceasefire on 29 January 2003. A code of conduct was signedwith the Maoists to guide both the parties during negotiations. The government wasclear that no discussion would be held on constitutional monarchy, peoples sover-eignty, multi-party democracy and national freedom and integrity. The government

acceded to the Maoist demand of a round table conference inclusive of the rebels andpolitical parties, formation of an interim government and holding of elections forthe House of Representatives (nepalnews.com 2003).9 The Maoists had agreed notto discuss the issue of a republic but had asked for a round table conference to formulatean interim constitution. They wanted an interim government to hold elections forthe constituent assembly that was required to draft a new constitution. After threerounds the talks broke down. In the words of Chand:

In the second round of talks the Maoists were serious but a few politicians likePun were enthusiastic and wanted to take all the credit. They promised certainthings that were impossible such as withdrawal of Army to 5 miles away. In ameeting Baburam and Mahara had agreed for constitutional monarchy and wereready to leave the demand of constituent assembly. The only issue in hand was todiscuss matters related to holding elections. But the parties were suspicious thatsome kind of alliance existed between the King and the Maoists (Chand 2004).

Narayan Man Singh Pun, the facilitator of the talks was very close to negotiating anagreement, but he made the mistake of taking personal credit in resolving the problemrather than giving credit to the King.10 This cost him dearly because the talks werecalled off. It is alleged that whoever resolves the Maoist issue will ensure that hisname endures in the political history of Nepal. Hence, the person taking an initiativeto resolve the Maoist problem becomes an object of envy and intrigues. Pun howeverfeels otherwise, and says that a few politicians might have been jealous of his success,

but not His Majesty (Pun 2004). Nevertheless, the talks failed.by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 17, 2009http://sas.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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The talks were doomed to fail from the moment they were set up because thenegotiations included only nominated government and Maoists representatives anddid not represent political parties or civil society. Understandably, from the beginning

the Chand government did not get a favourable response from the political partieswho questioned the authority of the government. Chands repeated pleas to hold dis-cussions with the parties on the Maoist problem were rejected by the Palace.

Surya Bahadur Thapa replaced Chand as the Prime Minister in June 2003. Hisgovernment set out to hold elections by April 2005. Thapa was confident of holdingelections with the help of security forces, after successfully conducting student electionsin February 2004. However, the political parties were united in not accepting thegovernments proposal: they assessed the situation in the country to be unstable and

therefore not suitable for their cadres to visit their constituencies. Instead, they de-manded the dismissal of the Thapa government and the formation of an all-partygovernment. The political parties took their demands to the streets in April 2004, tostir a peoples movement akin to that of 1990. The presence of party leaders in thesedemonstrations energised the cadres and student wings of the parties to pressurisethe monarchy for allowing multi-party democracy. Journalists, lawyers and humanrights activists have also extended support to the agitation. The Maoists also startedtheir strategy ofbandhs against the regressive act of the King from February 2004.

The King agreed to dismiss the Thapa government and placed emphasis upon theformation of a government with representatives of all parties that could restore peacein the country and begin the process of parliamentary elections before mid-April.The King emphasised a clean image as a prerequisite for the next Prime Minister(Himalayan Times2004). In May 2004, Sher Bahadur Deuba was sworn in as thePrime Minister. This act of the King took the steam out of the agitation, with theCPM (UML), a major party in the agitation, sending representatives to the Deubagovernment. The NC was left in the cold, and was forced to continue the agitation inpartnership with minor parties.

With the King taking over power in his hands on 1 February 2005 and arrestingprominent political leaders, the movement for democracy received a jolt. Politicalparties were sidelined and the King took on the responsibility of restoring law andorder followed by democracy. Democracy has become a propaganda slogan withoutany of the political actors ever committing themselves to it. Political parties were notresponsible actors under democracy, the Maoists brought further instability and the

King took advantage of the chaos to take over the reins of powerall in order torestore democracy. The actors have been struggling against each other to gain powerand restore democracy, simultaneously consolidating their own power. These are thecharacteristics of a transitional democracy in which actors keep contesting each othertill equilibrium is reached.

Transitional democracies emerge due to regime change from authoritarianism todemocracy. Nepal experienced a change of regime from authoritarian monarchy tomulti-party democracy. A democratic transition is said to be complete when sufficient

agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected gov-ernment, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and



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popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies,and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracydoes not have to share power with other bodies de jure (Linz and Stepan 1996). As

per this definition, the democratic process had taken root in Nepal. The Constitutionprovided for a constitutional monarchy and the system of multi-party democracy.For the first time in the political history of Nepal multi-party democracy found aplace in the Constitution. The separation of powers was clearly mentioned. However,in practice the multi-party system had not been established in Nepal. Democraticforms were imposed by the Constitution on a political system that was not democraticin practice.

In a transitional democracy the rules of the political game remain in a state of flux

and are regularly contested till such time as equilibrium, supported by both winnersand losers, is reached. In Nepal, the old system of monarchy and the new order ofmulti-party democracy have looked at each other with suspicion verging on conflict.To understand the political dynamics within Nepal it is imperative to understand thecharacteristics, strengths and weaknesses of the political players in the country.

III TROUBLED ACTORS, TURBULENT POLITICS

MONARCHY

The monarchy derives its power from traditions. The Kings position as the onlyHindu king in the world gives him enough supporters within and outside Nepal.Hindu organisations all over the world are members of the World Hindu Federation(WHF), of which the Nepali King is patron. For WHF, the King represents the en-tire Hindu community, not just the Kingdom of Nepal. WHF runs nearly 472 ekalvidhyalas (one man schools) in Nepal. They demand religious teaching in schools asa protection against proselytising by non-Hindu groups. Making a dent in the trad-itional authority of the monarchy are the demands by thejanjatis and Maoists.Janjatishave challenged the Hindu character of the Constitution and want it to be replacedby a secular character. These demands make the organised Hindus more rigid in theirallegiance to the King.

The traditional power circle within the countryconsisting of the Army and thebureaucracy, that was nurtured by Panchayat rule, and others with familial links with

the Palaceare solidly behind the King and give him much strength and comfort inthese turbulent times. The King, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, wields alot of power. To reach the higher positions in the Army, officers must either be closeto the King personally, or belong to certain traditional communities, such as Thapasor Chettris, that have a history of serving the King. Thus the loyalty of the Army tothe Palace is ensured, with both institutions serving each others interests. However,some discontent is to be found among Army officers belonging to thejanjatis, whoare not able to reach higher positions. Even people from Nepals terai (foothills and

plains) have not found a footing in the RNA. Having said this, it must be emphasisedthat the Army supports the King.



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Interestingly, with the frequent changes in the government since 1990, politicalleaders have looked towards the King for support and patronage. This has also indir-ectly consolidated the position of the King and established monarchy as the only

stable institution.The personality of King Gyanendra is also under constant scrutiny. Somewhere inpublic memory resentment lingers against him as the sole survivor of the royal massacreof 2002. The Kings accession to the throne was not peaceful. He not only inheritedthe burden of King Birendras sudden demise but also the socio-political instabilitywithin the country. A few called him a power-seeker who had tasted power as achild. Others called him a decisive man with a sharp mind, recognising his businessbackground and acumen. There are palaces within the Palace. Supporters of Birendra

do not find favour with Gyanendra, and they in turn do not support his takeover ofpower from multi-party democracy.

The seeds of an active monarchy were sown in October 2002 with the dissolutionof the Deuba government. This event changed the tone and tenor of political debate.The focus shifted to confrontation between the monarchy and the Maoists whilemarginalising democratic political parties.

Amongst the three forces, the monarchy, with the help of the armed forces, seemsa stabilising force because it was the political parties that were the target of public

criticism for not resolving the political crisis. The monarchy used the parties as ashield from public criticism and simultaneously gained international support formilitary and financial aid to counter the Maoists. However, by removing the politicalparties from the political manoeuvring, the monarchy has taken over the responsibil-ity of resolving the crisis. Probably the King has tried to win international sympathyduring the war against terrorism to gain support and legitimacy. He has carefullycrafted an image of being the only stable political institution that can counter Maoists.

If the King succeeds in stabilising the political situation, the monarchy would earna place in Nepali politics forever. But with diminishing support amongst the people,especially the marginalised groups, and with his own personal image tarnished afterKing Birendras demise, King Gyanendra would increasingly find it difficult to achievehis goals. With the neighbouring Kingdom of Bhutan trying to open up and demo-cratise itself gradually, Nepal will find it difficult to regress from democracy to author-itarianism. Second, the international community, especially India, has not officiallysupported the Kings move, and military aid to Nepal was stopped by India following

1 February.There has not been much fierce opposition from the Maoists and political partiesagainst the Kings move of imposing emergency. Perhaps the King, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, has proven to be a strong force and the other actors are findingit difficult to counter him. There is also a ban on political activities and major politicalleaders have been arrested. In April 2005, the King lifted the emergency and promisedlocal elections for the democratic process to begin. India, US and the United Nationshave officially hailed the Kings move, assuming that this would pave the way for the

democratisation of Nepali polity. The reality is not so. The removal of emergency hasnot made much dent on the Kings power as the nominated government continues.



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Also he has not reacted to the demands of the political parties for the restoration ofparliament that was dissolved in 2002. Thus King continues to remain in the centrestage of Nepali politics.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The political parties are largely responsible for the present mayhem in the country.They have not only failed in safeguarding their interests from traditional forces buthave also failed in governance. Their lack of vision coupled with political bickeringsbrought instability within the country and opened doors for forces that were inimicalto their interests such as the Maoists. The parties could not present a common front

in countering these forces. For example, after Deubas dismissal in 2002, the politicalparties were united in criticising the Kings action, but they nevertheless could notdevise a consensual strategy. Nepali Congress (NC) wanted the King to revive theparliament, the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) (CPN-UML)wanted a government of national consensus and Deuba described the Kings move asunconstitutional. Apart from condemnation and agitation against the Kings act as aregressive move, the parties have not evolved strategies to deal with monarchy, bringthe Maoists to the negotiating table, or address the aspirations of marginalised com-

munities. In unison, the parties felt that the political environment was not conducivefor holding elections by April 2005, as had been indicated by the King. However dueto their inability to stand up against monarchy and to provide an alternative to Maoiststhe political parties have been sidelined by other forces.

The political parties are against the King for upstaging them from the centre stageof power and hence have no reason to trust him. They criticise the King for splittingthe parties. They do not take the Kings efforts for restoration of democracy seriously.

Second, the Kings choice of Prime Ministers, such as Chand or Thapa, were fromthe Rashtriya Prajatantra Party that ruled the country for 30 years under the Panchayatrule. Deuba, although he has a Nepali Congress past, is alleged to be closer to thePalace. Hence, Gyanendras efforts in resolving the crisis through political consensuswere not taken seriously by the democrats.

The parties are convinced that an alliance exists between the King and the Maoists.Baburam Bhattarais statement following King Birendra and his familys assassinationis quoted as evidence. Baburam said, King Birendrahad similar views on many

national issues and this had created in fact an informal alliance between us (Bhattarain.d.). This has been interpreted as indicating a working alliance between the extremeright and extreme left (Singh 2003: 324). Violence and terror by the Maoists wouldderail democracy and the multi-party system and it would help the King to takepower in his hands. Interestingly, the parties suspected each other of having contactswith the Maoists as well. They have been vying with each other in resolving theMaoist issue and simultaneously criticising the other for having contacts with theMaoists.

After the imposition of emergency prominent party leaders were arrested. Manycame to India to garner support for the democratic cause. Even though seven parties



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are trying to coordinate their political activities after the removal of emergency, nomass leader who could steer the movement has emerged yet. People do not havemuch faith in either Koirala or Madhav Nepal. These two in turn would not let other

leaders takeover their respective partys mantle. No new personality who could steerthe pro-democracy movement is emerging on the horizon. However, if party andpersonal differences were to be set aside, collective action could become successfulprovided the parties are able to get confidence and support from the people, akin tothe 1990 movement. It is yet to be seen if this time the parties would be successful inchallenging the other forces to bring back multi-party democracy.

The Nepalese are surely disappointed by their political leaders, but they still believein democracy and the multi-party system. Herein lies the strength of the democrats.

For the moment, people look towards those who can provide peace and stability.Presently, it is the King and the armed forces. The latterArmy, Unified Commandand the policehave been deployed to counter violence perpetrated by the Maoists.However, it will lose its relevance if the people do not get enough space for their ownrepresentation. The pulse of the people is for peace and stability followed by democracy.

The King and the parties were unable to come together against Maoist insurgencydue to innate distrust and inherent weaknesses. International recognition to only twopolitical forces in Nepalthe King and the partiesimplies bringing together forces

that have never cooperated with each other and have no reason to do so. The monarchyhas been able to take power in its hands and has not faced strong public criticism,political opposition or threat of destabilisation. The political leadership is under arrestand political activities have been restricted. At the moment one witnesses sporadicpolitical activity that is not strong enough to destabilise the monarchy. India couldeither accept the reality and accept the person in political commandthe Kingand give up the policy of twin pillars, or it could use the levers it has against the mon-archy to bring in multi-party democracy. The other force, the Maoists, are still excludedfrom the resolution formula.

MAOISTS

The Maoists have challenged the King and the political parties. Their most sensitivedemands are related to the abolition of royal privileges and of placing the army,police and bureaucracy totally under peoples control. Their core demands envisage a

change in the Constitution through a constituent assembly, republican form of govern-ment and a round table conference that are targeted towards undermining the authorityof the monarchy. However, the Maoists had toned down their demands during thepeace talks in 2001 and 2003 and had agreed to accept the role of monarchy in thecountry. On other occasions they have demanded an end to monarchy. Hence theirattitude towards the King has oscillated.

The Maoists have also been able to sideline the parties from mainstream politicssince 2000. Thus, the political debate in Nepal is focused on monarchy versus the

Maoists. With their organised movement, widespread influence and terror tactics,the Maoists are able to strongly influence the politics of Nepal.



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It is also alleged that Maoist influence is diminishing in Nepal. In the initial years,the Nepali people considered the Maoists to be an alternative to inefficient govern-ments. By now, the Maoist tactics of loot, kidnappings and killings has affected the

common man. The people are asked to part with their agricultural yield and earnings.The salaried class, such as college and school teachers, doctors, engineers and business-men, have to pay 10 per cent of their monthly income to the Maoists. Second, theMaoist strategy of bandhs has affected businesses, small shopkeepers, office goers,students and taxi drivers. It must be mentioned that tourists and cabs belonging tohotels are not targeted duringbandhs.

Third, people, especially the youth, belonging to the areas affected by the Maoistsstarted moving towards India and other areas to avoid being forced to join them.

This led the Maoists to induct many people forcibly, who were not ideologicallycommitted. Allegedly, local goons and thugs also found place as cadres. Many familiesin the rural areas were forced to send one member to the Maoist force. Many werekidnapped and kept in camps for a few days for ideological orientation. The unedu-cated, unemployed youth were lured by monthly salaries ranging from Rs 1,500 toRs 7,000. Child recruits between the ages of 15 to 18 years are reported to be utilisedfor collection and exchange of information (CSGAR 2004). Amnesty Internationaland other human rights organisations within Nepal have also criticised the Maoists

for this. Gradually, the peoples war has become anti-people.11 The most surprisingelement in the Maoist movement has been the emergence of personality clashes andinternal contradictions after the imposition of emergency. Instead of challenging themonarchy, which had been totally sidelined and weakened by the royal takeover,the Maoist leadership busied itself in settling scores with each other. Though therewere sporadic clashes with the armed forces, the Maoists proved ineffective in makinga dent on the state machinery. Nevertheless, there is a possibility of the emergence ofthe Maoists as a strong force provided they are able to gather peoples support andorganise. They have already expressed their desire to support political parties againstthe monarchy. Hence, the Maoists cannot be ignored in the political calculationsof Nepal.

Other groups raising their demands include women, dalits and terains. Nepal has astrong and active civil society that has discussed and debated the issues confrontingthe country. All these forces represent the voices of the discontented people. However,overlapping political interests cannot be ruled out. The non-inclusiveness of these

diverse interests has already proven dangerous for the country, affecting its securityand stability. This has had a spillover effect on India as well. Hence, any effort to re-solve the political crisis should not be confined to the two pillars of democracy.

IV IMPACTON INDIA

Political instability in Nepal does have an impact on Indias policies towards its northernneighbour. Indias support to the twin pillars of democracy that includes monarchy

and multi-party democracy was shaped by the internal political dynamics of Nepal.Since the 1950s, Nepali democrats did not want to do away with monarchy but



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wanted to share power with it. Second, after the political movement against theRanas, the democrats were themselves fractured and a few amongst them favouredmonarchy. Hence the compromise between the three forces, done in Delhi, was to

bring them together. Even in 1990, the parties were more inclined in sharing powerwith the King rather than overthrowing the institution. Unless the voices of changecome from within Nepal, it would be difficult for India to change the twin pillarapproach. At present, the biggest dilemma is to ensure a place for the political partiesthat are getting marginalised from Nepali politics but are not irrelevant.

Nevertheless, with the emergence of Maoists as the third force India has to rethinkits policies. India need not be too concerned about the Maoists demands on treatiesand open border. Previous experience shows that monarchy and democrats alike have

termed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950) or the water agreements as unequal.Left parties including CPN (UML) have asked for the abrogation of Gorkha recruit-ment in their party manifesto.

Second, the Maoists have projected India as an imperialist power that is trying tosubvert the interests of the people by aligning with the expansionist rightist forceswithin Nepal. By creating an enemy image of India, they have tried to heighten thepassions of the people to elicit their support. On various occasions, political actors in

Nepal like the parties or the Panchayat have used similar tactics. This has become ayardstick to measure nationalism in Nepal. The Maoists have been trying to use thesame tested formula for peoples support. Third, the Maoists flout their own demandsagainst India: they want the India-Nepal border to be closed but use the same openborder to cross over to India, a provision that is allowed by the 1950 Treaty. Thejustification for crossing over the border is that the Indian people support their causeand not the government.12 Understandably, the Indian peoples support for NepalsMaoists is limited to the Peoples War Group (PWG Maoist Communist Centre

[MCC] or the Nepalese diaspora).Similarly, one of the 40 demands of the Maoists is to stop Gorkha recruitment in

the Indian Army. A new dimension to the Gorkha recruitment was felt after the ruralareas in Nepal started getting affected by Maoist insurgency, forcing many Nepalis tomigrate to safer places, including India, for security and livelihood. In such an uneasytime, recruitment in the Indian Army provided employment and relief, especiallywhen the rural youth were under pressure from the Maoists to join their force as

cadres. It is said that the ex-Gorkha soldiers have elicited a promise from the Maoistsnot to stop Gorkha recruitment in the Indian Army.Hence, in such a scenario it would be prudent to open channels of communication

with all the political players rather than strengthening one to counter the other. Forinstance, supporting Nepal through military aid indirectly consolidates the monarchyand is counter-productive in the long run. Even though India halted military aidafter the royal takeover, there seems to be a rethinking on this after the withdrawal ofemergency. There is no denying the fact that unless there is a ceasefire from the

Maoists, it would not be feasible for India to completely stop the supply of arms tothe RNA. Also, power inimical to Indias interest in the region showed interest inby RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 17, 2009http://sas.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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filling the vacuum and supplying arms to Nepal. Nevertheless, it is a fact that in anyinsurgency the military option is not an effective solution. RNA can at best weakenthe insurgents; thereafter, political, economic and societal reforms have to be under-

taken. This is a big question: how to implement non-military options under conditionsof violence and instability?

Political instability in Nepal has been regarded as an issue affecting Indias securityinterests in more than one ways. First, Indias interests in Nepal are mainly security-related, that get compounded due to the open border. Consequently, India wouldnot want any other power to play a major role in Nepal. China, the northern neighbourof Nepal, has shown a softer approach in dealing with the monarchy. On the impositionof emergency and the royal takeover, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Kong

Quanit said that it was an internal affair of Nepal (Daily Star2005). At the sametime, Nepals closing down of the Dalai Lamas office was clearly a move to please theChinese. China has historically supported monarchy in Nepal, as was witnessed from1960 to 1990, during which China managed to get infrastructure development pro-jects in the Terai region bordering India. Pakistan is yet another country that hastried to appease the monarchy in Nepal by agreeing to give military aid after Indiaand UK halted theirs. The official Pakistani statement issued after the withdrawal of

emergency has refuted arms aid to Nepal.Second, the linkages of CPN (Maoist) with Indian insurgent groups have an im-pact on the internal security of India. The links run through the Indian states ofBihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, theroute popularly called the Revolutionary Corridor, virtually splitting the countrydown the middle. In August 2001, in a meeting of the Nepali Maoists and the Indianextreme left movements in Siliguri, West Bengal, it was decided to call the areaswithin their influence as the Compact Revolutionary Zone. In yet another meeting

in Jharkhand in December 2001, the PWG of Andhra Pradesh and the MCC ofBihar extended support to CPN (Maoists). The three forces have formed the IndoNepal Border Regional Committee to coordinate their activities in the border areas(SATP n.d.). Maoist influence in the Indian states bordering Nepal, especially UttarPradesh and Bihar, which are the worst administered states with a feudal hierarchicstructure, is a cause for concern. Reports indicate a Maoist presence in the state ofUttaranchal as well. It is also said that the CPN (M) has set up three district committees

in north Bengal in order to spread their ideology beyond Nepals borders (Ibid.).The Maoists have also tried to unify the left organisations in South Asia under theumbrella of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations ofSouth Asia (CCOMPOSA). This was done to bring the radical left forces within theregion together. Some from the Nepali diaspora within India are stated to be extendinghelp to the Maoists. The All India Nepali Unity Society, an organisation of the Nepalesemigrants within India, was supporting the Maoists from India and was banned underthe Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in 2002. However, the Nepalese National

Democratic Front of India is growing in strength and is used as a front by the CPN (M)and the Bhutan Communist Party. by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 17, 2009http://sas.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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Ideological links of the Maoists have gone beyond the region and are found withthe left groups operating under the banner of Revolutionary International Movement(RIM). Literature available on RIM describes it as the embryonic center of the worlds

genuine communist forces that is struggling for the formation of a communist inter-national of a new type based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Thus it is importantnot only to deal with Maoist activities within the country but also to cut their supplylines that are coming from external sources. To counter violence and take care of thepolitical instability in the country, India had been meeting Nepals demands for arms,ammunitions and training of the armed forces and police.

With the imposition of emergency, Nepali political leaders started moving to India.They have appealed to the Nepali diaspora and civil society at large to extend support

against the monarchy. India faced a similar situation during the Panchayat rule whenNepali democrats crossed over the border. King Mahendra had taken strong objectionto it and bilateral relations were strained. India had tried to stop violent activitiesagainst Nepal from Indian territory but found it difficult to suppress the politicalactivities of the exiled Nepalis (Gupta 1993: 252). The presence of Nepali leaders inIndia has already evoked strong objections from Nepals Minister of Foreign Affairs,Ramesh Nath Pandey that, our governments standing policy is not to allow Nepals

soil to be used against any of its neighbours. We are confident that our friendlyneighbours will reciprocate (Sarkar 2005). Only delicate balancing by India can takethe monarchy and the political forces along. This will definitely have a negative impacton Indias dealing with the monarch.

V CONCLUSION: OPTIONSFOR INDIA

India is the only country other than Nepal itself that gets directly affected by the pol-

itical instability in Nepal. India has major stakes in ensuring stability and peace inNepal. In fact, most Nepalis representing the three forces want India to play a role inbringing them together for negotiations. This is not because of their trust in India,but is a recognition of Indias influence in countering the other political forces withinNepal.13 However, Indian policy makers seem to be in a dilemma over this.

First, India is overcautious in making any recommendations, fearing it may beconsidered an interference in Nepals domestic affairs. After the royal takeover, the

Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) issued a statement that these developmentsconstitute a serious setback to the cause of democracy in Nepal and cannot but be acause of grave concern to India.14 However, Home Minister Shivraj Patil issued astatement to smoothen the sharp remarks of MEA, saying that India had no intentionsto interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal. Nepal is our close neighbour (Hindu2005). These statements reflect the dilemma faced by India on the nature of its rolein Nepali politics. Should India be practical and support the monarch, treating theroyal coup as an internal political matter of Nepal, or should it take moral responsibility

to support democracy? Back in 1960, when King Mahendra had taken power in hisby RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 17, 2009http://sas.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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hands after dismissing B.P. Koiralas government, India had described it as a setbackto democracy. Instead of focusing on Indias national interest to retain the friendshipof Nepal amidst the emerging Sino-India rift, India criticised King Mahendra. Since

then, there is consistency in Indias support to the twin pillar approach.Nepal is again at political crossroads where monarchy has sidelined democracy. Itis time for India to rethink its policy of the twin pillars of democracy because a thirdpowerful force, the Maoists, has emerged. Recognising the confrontation betweenthe two political forcesmonarchy and political partieswould serve their interestsbut would ignore the interests of the third force and its supporters and sympathisers.Second, concentrating on various political calculations would serve elite interestswithout recognising the root cause of the conflict, which lies in the societal, political

and economic concerns of the people. It is equally essential to give space to othervoices of protest within Nepal such asjanjatis, women, terains and dalits, so that thenew political formula represents the interests of all groups, interests and forces. Ignoringthe demands of the people would be tantamount to leaving space for further protestsand social cleavages.

Recognising the presence of the Maoists and helping in creating space for dialoguewithin Nepal would soften Indias own Maoists and insurgents. In the long run doing

so might prove beneficial for the countrys interests. A country is secure when itscomponents are secure. When people raise their voice against the state, their issueshave to be addressed rather than swept under the carpet. To do the latter is to risk there-emergence of fissiparous tendencies.

In such a scenario, supporting one particular force in Nepal would not be in theinterests of either Nepal or India. Rather, it would be favourable if the environmentwere created to mitigate the conflictual situation through ceasefire, followed by amultiple track negotiation involving political forces, marginalised voices and civil

society. For this, pressure has to be exerted on the monarchy to open space for dialogueand power sharing. The message has to reach Kathmandu that either there is a win-win situation for all the interested parties, or the forces opposed to democracy haveto fade.

India, the country directly affected by political instability within Nepal, has variouslevers within the country such as arms supplies to the RNA, trade and transit points,economic aid and cultural and religious linkages. Any of these could be pressed toforce a political outcome on Nepal. However, India has to be clear whether its imme-diate interests are political stability or conflict resolution. Support to monarchy canprovide immediate relief but it would not resolve the problem and would delay conflictresolution to a further date. It should also be borne in mind that monarchy as aninstitution was a difficult proposition for India during the 30 years of Panchayatrule. On the other hand, the political parties are not strong enough to challenge themonarchy. Hence they have to be strengthened from outside.

To sum up, India should take a proactive stand on Nepal and insist on multi-party

democracy inclusive of the Maoists and other protest movements and insist on theby RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 17, 2009http://sas.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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constitutional status of monarchy. If not, the chances of further conflict between theprincipal political players in Nepal is a distinct possibility, which will have deepersecurity ramifications for Nepal and India.

END NOTES

1. Even though the Deuba government was elected in a general election, its status was unclear at the

time of dismissal in 2002. Deuba had dissolved the Parliament and in turn been expelled from theNepali Congress by party president G.P. Koirala.

2. Nepali Congress experienced a leadership tussle between party supremo Ganesh Man Singh, party

president K.P. Bhattarai and party general secretary G.P. Koirala. In the early 1990s, Manmohan

Adhikaris leadership of the CPN (UML) was challenged by Madan Bhandari. After the death ofBhandari and Adhikari, the clash for leadership of CPN (UML) has been between Madhav Nepal

and Bamdev Gautam.3. During His Majestys address to the Parliament outlining the legislative programme, the treasury

benches could not pass the vote of thanks due to the absence of 36 Bhattarai supporters from Parlia-

ment. This forced Prime Minister Koirala to resign and suggest a mid-term poll to the King.4. This, it is considered, would lessen conflict between the centre and the regions because leaders with

ethnic affiliations would be more sympathetic towards their own regions. The bureaucracy, till now

reflective of the dominant communities, would also reflect the regional composition.

5. Lilamani Pokhrel denies a power struggle between the two factions and regards their differences tobe ideological in nature. First, Pokhrel does not believe in Maoism, as it is only a guiding thought,

not a principle. Second, he argues that while the Maoists wanted to start the peoples war immediately,his faction of the party wanted to first create an environment for peoples war (Pokhrel 2004b).

6. In the late 1970s, the integrated rural development project supported by the United States Agency

for International Development (USAID) banned marijuana production in the rapti zone in westernNepal. Instead, USAID spent US$ 60 million in developing the rapti zone in the areas of environment/forestry, income generation, equity and democratisation. However, the project failed, poverty and

unemployment increased and the area became the heartland of the Maoist movement.7. A three-member Maoist team was led by Krishna Bahadur Mahara, a five-member government team

was led by Chiranjibi Wagle and Daman Nath Dhungana, while Padma Ratna Tuladhar represented

civil society.8. The Kings emphasis on the clean image of a Prime Minister was not acceptable to the political

parties because it opens up space for subjectivity. On previous occasions, Palace propaganda about a

clean image had been used against those candidates not in the good books of the King; hence manyleaders would not have found place in Nepali politics if judged by this criterion. On many occasions,Prime Ministers have been removed on charges of corruption and bad governance, such as B.P.

Koirala in 1960 or Deuba in 2002.9. During the second round of talks, the government presented its political agenda.

10. Views of people on the second round of talks gathered through interviews.11. It is most common to hear this complaint regarding the Maoists. Views gathered from interviews of

politicians, businessmen and also public opinion.12. Interview with a surrendered Maoist commander, March 2004, Kathmandu.

13. During my personal interaction with the personnel from all the three forces it was clear that Indiahad a major role to play in resolving the crisis. All of them felt that India supported the other forcesand hence had authority to restrain them and also bring them on the negotiation table.

14. Even in 1960, after King Mahendra took power in his hands by dismissing the elected governmentof B.P. Koirala, India had reacted by describing it as a setback to democracy. Instead of focusing on

Indias national interest in retaining friendship with Nepal, especially in the context of the growingrift with China, India opted to criticise King Mahendra.



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Documents

51.pdf2 Nepal at the Political Crossroads: Options for India