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DevelopmentJournal of South Asian

DOI: 10.1177/0973174106002001032007; 2; 51JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN DEVELOPMENT

Hugo GorringeTaming the Dalit Panthers: Dalit Politics in Tamil Nadu

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Journal of South Asian Development2:1 (2007): 5173

Sage Publications Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore

DOI: 10.1177/097317410600200103

Taming the Dalit Panthers:

Dalit Politics in Tamil Nadu

HUGO GORRINGE

Department of Sociology

University of Edinburgh

UK

Abstract

Although Dalit orators and slogans threaten (or promise) to turn Tamil Nadu on its head,

the 2006 state elections offer Dalit analysts pause for thought. In compromising its prin-

ciples and allying with established parties, the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam (Movement),

the largest Dalit movement in the state, has come full circle since 1999. In alternately

backing the two dominant parties in the state (the DMK and the AIADMK), the DPIappears to be increasingly institutionalised. Excavating the future of Dalit action from

past trends and contemporary politics, I suggest that Dalit parties are following an estab-

lished political repertoire in which a phase of militant activism gives way to politics as

normal. In the face of this analysis the paper asks whether such an approach is sustainable

or can carry the majority of Dalits with it. If Dalit politics is a continuation of hegemonic

politics, it argues, the liberatory promises of Dalit activism will have been betrayed.

INTRODUCTION: TAMIL POLITICSANDTHE DALIT CHALLENGE

In the seemingly surreal world of Tamil politics, the southernmost Indian state,anything is possible: sworn enemies are reconciled before clashing again; filmstars become politicians, turning fanclubs into party organisations; a convictedpolitician became chief minister before securing an appeal verdict; the leader ofthe opposition assured party activists that she would notattend the Assembly unless

absolutely necessary (Hindu 2006a); and a key manifesto pledge of a winningalliance offered a colour TV to households meeting certain criteria. Parties routinelysplit, merge and reform in an endless kaleidoscope; arch-secularists ally with Hinduchauvinists; and people (claim to) vote 17 times for their candidates despite the

This paper was presented at the 2006 SAAG conference. I am indebted to respondents

and especially to Chris Fuller for detailed comments. I am also immensely grateful to two

anonymous reviewers of the JSAD for perceptive and constructive insights.

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52 Hugo Gorringe

Journal of South Asian Development 2:1 (2007): 5173

indelible ink used to mark the thumbs of those cast their votes (cf. Subramani2006). An insult (perceived or intended) to one leader can reshape political coali-tions overnight, resulting in contingency and compromise. As the political stability

accorded by the predominance of two main parties has been challenged, the shiftingpanoply of electoral alliances and the colourful jostling for position have addedfurther complexity.

Until recently, however, one feature remained constant (albeit unacknowledged)in post-independence Tamil politics: the dominance of Backward Caste (BC) partiesand interests.1 Despite recognising this Subramanian (1999) claims that Dravidianparties have created an open, democratic and plural society. This paper converselyargues that egalitarian rhetoric has not translated into practice, and the incorpor-

ation of marginal groups into a system of state patronage does not equate to anextension of democratic participation (cf. Harriss 2002). T. Subramanian (2001a)notes the irony that such a large number of caste parties should sprout in Tamilnadu,the cradle of the Dravidian movement, but it is because the interests of marginalsocial groups were not served by established politics that they have mobilisedfor a share of political power. The Dalit (formerly Untouchable) and caste partiesemerging over the past decade have attempted to extend or, in the case of partiesinimical to Dalit assertion, limit the scope of Tamil politics.

Subramani (interview)2

summed up this process: Without protest we cannotachieve anything. One cannot claim anything from the government without protest.Only if we protest is there an opportunity for our community to do anything.When the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam(DPI) Movement, the largest Dalit movementin Tamil Nadu (TN), abandoned its electoral boycott in 1999, it promised to redrawthe political map of Tamilnadu (Gorringe 2005: 301). Seven years and two stateelections later, the DPIs radical rhetoric looks as tattered as old election posters,clinging torn and dishevelled to walls and billboards.

This paper charts the changing face of Tamil politics, focusing on the subalternchallenge. Drawing on fieldwork with Dalit movements and analysis of subsequentstate elections, it assesses the entry of autonomous Dalit parties into the body-politic.3 Having charted the rationale behind political participation and the oppor-tunities this offers, I argue that the radical possibilities suggested by the initial forayinto electoral competition have evaporated. Rather than reforming the institutionsthey entered, Dalit movements have been institutionalised. In closing, therefore,I will consider where Dalit politics goes from here. First, however, a brief intro-

duction to the intricacies of Tamil politics is required to contextualise the ensuingdiscussion.

DRAVIDIANISMAND DALITS: MARGINALISATIONAND EMERGENCE

Tamil politics is bewildering to those familiar with its ideologies, parties and char-acters; for the uninitiated, it is a welter of nigh-identical acronyms and politicalfluidity. Any comprehension of current trends, therefore, requires the historical

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Taming the Dalit Panthers 53


background without which Tamil politics is confusing.4 The starting point mustbe the non-Brahmin movement that dominated state politics in the 1920s and, ininteraction with the colonial powers, set the template for subsequent engagements

in the political sphere (Irschick 1986). In the protracted exchanges between Brahminswho monopolised administrative power under the British, and a rising BackwardCaste elite, caste was established as the mobilising strategy par excellence and elec-tions as the vehicle for its expression. Into this heady mix, the Self-Respect andDravidian parties introduced the emotive issues of Tamil nationalism and auton-omy from the expansionist ambitions of Hindi-speaking northern politicians, whichcontinue to inform contemporary politics (cf. Subramanian 1999).

Though the Congress Party dominated post-independence Tamil politics, each

election saw their vote share eroded by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DravidianProgressive Federation; DMK), a regional party that played on language national-ism and espoused populist/socialist policies that were successfully mediated to theelectorate through cinema and an efficient party machine. In 1967 TN became thefirst Indian state to elect a regionalist party, heralding the decline of Congress pre-eminence and the rise of the region (Kohli 1990; Pandian 1992). Indeed, the DMKvictory was hailed as ending Brahmin rule and forging a nation of Tamils.

Under its founder, Annadurai, and his successor, Karunanidhi, the DMK ruled

until 1976. The party became increasingly conservative and personalised, however,and the DMK split in 1972 with M.G. Ramachandran (MGR), a Tamil screen legend,founding the All India Anna DMK (AIADMK; Anna referring to Annadurai),which claimed to be closer to Annadurais ideals. The AIADMK gained power in1977 due to MGRs popularity and populism (as typified by his provision of freeschool meals for children), and dominated Tamil politics until his death in 1987.Since then both parties have alternated in office. Corruption and a personalisationof politics in the personages of MGR (or his successor Jayalalitha) and Karunanidhi,have pervaded the Tamil government in this period, and populist politics (to main-tain power) have prevailed over ideological or fiscal concerns (Kohli 1990; Pandian1992).

Dravidian social radicalism, thus, was strictly curtailed. Rather than envisaginginequality in class or caste terms, both Dravidian parties used the Brahmin/non-Brahmin divide to suggest a commitment to social change whilst drawing theirleadership and core constituents from dominant, landowning BCs (Subramanian

1999). Stressing language rather than inequality, the DMK (and later the AIADMK)attempted to foster Tamilness and avoid politically sensitive election pledges onland reform, dowry and caste. Over time both parties abandoned their anti-centreand anti-Hindi positions, softened their anti-Brahminism (to the point where aBrahmin could succeed MGR), and failed to implement meaningful redistributivepolicies. The DMKs progressive reforms resembled charity from above, and theAIADMK disproportionately taxed the poor to finance populist programmes (Harriss2002; Pandian 1992).



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Subramanians admiration for Dravidian pluralism, therefore, seems misplaced.Indeed, he shows (1999: 58) that state politics are dominated by BCs who have be-come jealous of their power as new entrants to Tamil politics have eroded their

authority. This is evident in the increasingly overt conflict between lower-casteHindus and Dalits (Harriss 2002: 97).5 Faced with frequent violence, Dalit movementsvoiced grievances and highlighted atrocities rather than campaigning proactivelyfor social change. Their protests demanded the enforcement of the constitution,and sought to de-legitimise a polity that did not adequately represent or serve them.

The subsidiary position of Dalits is evident in that 84 per cent of Dalit land-holdings are marginal (under 1 hectare) and only 4 per cent are over 4 hectares, asopposed to over 10 per cent for others (Government of Tamil Nadu 2005).6 Dalit

land is seldom irrigated (Gorringe 2005). Thus, while 80 per cent of Tamil Dalitworkers are in the agrarian sector, 64 per cent are agricultural labourers (Rath andKonlade 2000; 1991 figures). The failure to implement effective land reform hascurtailed Dalit autonomy by rendering them dependent upon others for work.This deprivation is compounded, and alternate opportunities limited, by pooreducation. Literacy, as Mendelsohn and Vicziany (1998: 35) observe, lends con-fidence and expands mental horizons. It leads to a more assertive, less compliant,community. In 1991 the 58 per cent literacy rate for Scheduled Caste (SC)7 men

compared to 74 per cent for Tamil males. Thirty-five per cent of SC women wereliterate opposed to 51 per cent overall.8 These inequalities render Dalits vulnerableto social boycott (denied work, access to shops and common resources), intimi-dation, assault and murder if they resist caste norms.

Faced by socio-political marginalisation, Dalit movements in the 1990s mobil-ised extra-institutionally before entering mainstream politics. Puthiya Tamizhagam(New Tamil Nadu; PT)the second largest Dalit Party in TNrose as a Pallarmovement and remains strongest in Pallar strongholds in the south and west.9 Itsleader, Krishnasamy, battled discrimination to qualify as a doctor and came toDalit activism via Marxist-Leninism (Warrier 1998). Despite this, he is portrayedas Westernisedappearing in jeans and trainersand removed from ordinaryDalits (Gorringe 2005: 254). Krishnasamy was the first autonomous Dalit leaderto win a Legislative Assembly seat in 1996. This was subsequently lost, but the PTconsolidated its vote base in the 1998 national elections polling more votes thanthe victory margins in several seats (Wyatt 2002). Although the PT remains a sig-

nificant force, and preceded the DPI into electoral competition, this paper focuseson the Panthers for two reasons. First, the DPI is the largest Dalit party in TN, and,second, it contested elections during my fieldwork, enabling analysis of the dynam-ics of institutionalisation.

The DPI was formed in 1982, inspired by the Maharashtrian movement of thesame name. Although billed as a Dalit movement, it is preponderantly Paraiyarand flourishes in the northern districts. Thirumavalavan, its leader, came from apoor family to gain a law degree and a government job, and entered Dalit politics



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through social networks (Gorringe 2005). He is famed for his oratory and forpopularising the assertive slogan: A hit for a hit. Thirumavalavan lived in humblesurroundings and frequently visited Dalit villages. Whilst Krishnasamy faced ques-

tions about staying in luxury hotels in one interview (Warrier 1998), Thirumavalavancited his life situation as evidence that the DPI had no resources (Illangovan 1998).Lacking resources, the DPI relied on grassroots mobilisation to succeed. A decadeof poll boycotts emphasised the movements radicalism and denied legitimacy tothe Legislative Assembly, but in 1999 the DPI completed a tactical volte-faceandcontested the polls on the slogan: We are voting for ourselves. Why, however, didthey choose the electoral route and what did they hope to achieve?

ENTERING POLITICS: RATIONALES, OPPORTUNITIESAND PITFALLS

The Panthers reliance on exclusive identity categories constituted a defensive re-sponse to caste repression, but effectively legitimised caste actors. Contesting elec-tions, by contrast, raised the question of citizenship and the prospect of reform.Indias institutions are not only the bedrock of its democracy, providing an orderedprocess for the politicisation of previously marginalised groups, Jenkins (1999: 224)notes, but also the means by which democracys change-resistant tendenciesare overcome. Whilst Dravidian dominance narrowed the political agenda, recentelections confirmed the fragmentation of Tamil politics (Yadav 2001), and thiserosion of political fealty offered opportunities for Dalit movements.

In 1998, Thirumavalavan averred that elections achieve little, and refused totake part in something which upholds the status quo (Illangovan 1998). The fol-lowing year, therefore, Nandan (1999) pressed him on the abandoned boycott:Will you not be tainted? they asked, and Is your decision a victory for govern-

ment repression? Contradictory responses insisted that this was a change in tactics,not policy; that the boycott harmed the movement; and that if Dalits are to gainofficial power, we have to vote. He maintained that the DPI would not put forwarda representative, but that if we gain seats in the Centre [Delhi] we will be able toact against abuses.... We are not going to support opportunist or self-serving pol-itical parties (ibid.).

These quotes reveal the contingency of the move to politics. Key issues andlonger-term prospects were not thought through. The attractions of politics are

seen in vague references to using Dalit votes and gaining Dalit power. The obviousforerunner here is the Bahujan Samaj Party (Majority Peoples Party, or BSP, themost successful Dalit-based party) in Uttar Pradesh (UP). The BSP was referredto in movement speeches as epitomising the possibilities of Dalit politics, becauseit united the Dalit vote in UP and forged pragmatic coalitions that enabled it totake power (Pai 2002). In brief periods of office, furthermore, the BSP expeditedthe employment of Dalits to positions of responsibility and instituted programmesof Dalit uplift (ibid.: 178).



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56 Hugo Gorringe


Chandra (2004) and Pai (2002) argue that the BSP successfully altered its repre-sentational profileallocating seats to higher castes for exampleto widen itsappeal beyond its caste base. Pai (ibid.) shows that the Dalit vote remained fairly

constant, but politically astute seat allocations and pragmatic alliances carried theparty to power. Puthiya Tamizhagamechoed these tactics in Tamil Nadu, fieldingnon-Dalit candidates in 1999 and 2001 (Illangovan 2001), and both the DPI and PThave attempted to broaden their social base by appealing to Tamils and droppingcaste terminology from their titles (the DPI renamed itself the Liberation Panthersin 1999).

The BSPs experience, however, is of limited relevance in TN. Elections in UPare often contested between four strong parties (Pai 2002), but though Ananth

(2006) notes that the Congress, communists and caste parties retain strong support,they have failed to establish autonomous alternatives and Tamil elections are dom-inated by Dravidian coalitions. Non-aligned alliances have occasionally secured arespectable vote share, but this has failed to translate into seats. Chandras (2004)account of ethnic headcounts also seems simplistic in this context where 50 yearsof Dravidian discourse has fostered a Tamilian identity and shattered the auto-matic assumption that Dalits (for instance) will vote for a Dalit party. Furthermore,Tamil Dalits are divided amongst themselves. Following the fragmentation of the

Dravidian vote, therefore, Dalit parties in the 1990s attempted to create an ethnicconstituency.

Given the absence of strong pull factors,Nandan is right to question whetherpolitical participation is a victory for government repression. In considering DPIactions, the compulsions of politics are more obvious than its attractions. Theboycott enabled the government to cast the Panthers as undemocratic extremists,thereby justifying repressive measures that alienated the movement from the people(Gorringe 2005). Thirumavalavan concedes that political engagement is importantto show our strength in and commitment to democratic means (Nandan 1999).Second, despite the DPI boycott, most Dalits continued to vote. Elections are excit-ing times, politicians canvass support and party activists distribute largesse andpromises of more if they come to power (De Wit 1996). The boycott withheld thevotes of activists and offered sympathisers no electoral alternative, so they votedfor established parties, including those antithetical to Dalit empowerment.

Relying on negatives to justify political participation, the DPI was in a tumult

preceding the 1999 Indian elections; internally they faced discontented activists,externally they confronted a casteist social environment and a political scenario inwhich they were isolated. Many dedicated activists were distraught: [The] govern-ment is a sewer, Subramani observed (interview). We do not want to fall in. Noteveryone, he insisted, would follow Thirumavalavan into politics. The DPI emergedas a radical grassroots movement that countered caste oppression, and parliamen-tary parties were castigated for failing to advance social justice and conniving incontinuing caste discrimination.



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Such concerns were unavoidable in 1999 because Dalits in one village werehounded from their homes by a casteist mob in March, and on the eve of the elec-tions the police violently dispersed a Dalit demonstration in Tirunelveli killing 17

people (Gorringe 2005: 297, 350). In the light of these incidents the DPI could notignore the records of political parties or downplay the realities of caste. The decisionto contest the elections was unpopular, and these events rendered an alliance withDravidian parties untenable. A dalliance with the (opposition) AIADMK raisedsuch a storm that rebuttals were issued with alacrity. The identities of social activists,Jasper (1997) astutely notes, frame how they view both the world and themselves.Having invested significance in the concept of radical action, forging links with anenemy was unbearable.

The electoral system, however, is based on constituencies rather than propor-tional representation. The practice of electing representatives according to geo-graphical constituencies, [implies] that interests are relatively homogenouswithin localities (Philips 1991: 63). The polarisation of caste-based parties illus-trates the naivety of such assumptions and reveals the universal citizen to be amyth. There are no geographical concentrations of Dalits sufficient to guaranteevictory in any constituency, and although certain seats are reserved for Dalits (aspart of affirmative action to offset inequality), such candidates are dependent on

the votes of others. Whilst voting is tied to localities, therefore, Dalits cannot neglectother castes.

DPI leaders, thus, were torn: to appease activists they needed to suggest radical-ism, but to stand any chance of winning they needed cross-caste alliances. Thislatter point was particularly contentious given the problematic of representation.As Kamaraj, a DPI adherent, put it:

Yes there are hundreds of Dalit MPs in India, but they do not win alone. They

win as party people, as politicians. There is no opportunity for Dalit MPs tospeak out about Dalit society and problems so we do not need them. We needour own MP who will speak for us. (interview)

This context explains why the DPI decision seemed so momentous. Dalit pol-iticians are commonly portrayed as political pawns or self-interested careerists(Roy and Sisson 1990). Suitcase politics was the contemptuous phrase used byrespondents to denote unprincipled and self-aggrandising leaders who sell out

in return for resources. Against this backdrop, DPI leaders had to persuade followersof their continuing autonomy and to justify electoral participation and allianceformation.

The exoneration of the police for the violence in Tirunelveli at this point encap-sulated Dalit distrust of institutions, but also facilitated a realignment of politicalaffiliations. The protests surrounding the incident brought disparate Dalit move-ments on to a common platform. They were joined by the Tamil Maanila Congress(Tamil State Congress; TMC), which had been frozen out of the main coalitions.



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58 Hugo Gorringe


Contingency, thus, dictated the DPIs decision to join the (non-Dravidian) ThirdFront in 1999. As Viswanathan (1999) argued, the consolidation of the oppressedsectors, particularly Dalits, in Tamil Nadu constituted a significant fallout of the

massacre. This solution to the DPIs political dilemma was welcomed in the media,but distrusted in the movement. The TMC, when allied to the DMK government,had overlooked anti-Dalit violence, and so the DPI cadre were sceptical of the al-liance. Faced by such disaffection, Thirumavalavan belatedly insisted that the DPIspolitical engagement was conditional on four key demands: a share of power; pol-itical recognition; the consolidation of Dalit forces; and the attempt to force theDravidian parties out of office. (speeches and interview)

These conditions refuted prevalent projections of Dalits as a compliant vote bank

and, as Viswanathan (ibid.) opined, were seen as having the potential to bringabout substantial changes, not only of electoral politics in the state, but in the na-ture of political activism in general and the approach of mainstream political partiesto organisations that represent Dalits aspirations. Dalit engagement in electionsnot only promised an expansion of the political sphere to include marginalisedsectors of society, but also reflected the growing strength of caste-based groups andthe declining appeal of Dravidian parties. Wyatt (2002) subsequently argued thata coalition government requiring Dravidian parties to share power was no longer

a chimera. The DPI had abandoned revolutionary struggle, but looked set torevolutionise Tamil politics. We turn now to the impact of this move and the DPIsgradual integration into the political system.

NEGOTIATING PARLIAMENTARY PROCESSES:THE 19992006 ELECTIONS

If, after Thirumavalavan has spoken and left, you listen to what the DMK lotor the AIADMK lot or any other political party people are saying and are scat-tered, then the Dalit Panthers cannot protect you. It is necessary for us all tounite. It is necessary for us to cast our votes for our own sake. We need to showour opponents that we are a united political force. (Thirumavalavan, speech,16 June 1999)

After all the posturing accompanying the move to politics, how have the Panthers

fared at the ballot box? To what extent have they maintained the united front thatThirumavalavan extols? As accounts of earlier elections are provided elsewhere(Gorringe 2005; Wyatt 2002), I focus on processes rather than results before analys-ing more recent developments. The TMC-led Third Front (mentioned earlier)fared poorly in the 1999 elections. Despite polling heavily in several constituencies,it failed to win a seat, thus emphasising the electoral pre-eminence of the Dravidianparties. Significantly, the Front was not humiliated and Thirumavalavan came se-cond in Chidambaram constituency, forcing the AIADMK candidate into third



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place. The ability of a non-Dravidian Dalit-based coalition to mobilise significantvotes was established and the easy assumption of Dalit loyalty to the status quowas shattered.

Despite intimidation and violence, thousands of Dalits voted for Thirumavalavan.Press coverage increased noticeably, as did the political recognition accordedto the party. In playing on the issue of representation, the DPI persuaded manyDalits that it was their duty to support them. Sakthidasan from a remote villagein Chidambaram constituency was typical, insisting that the political process wasthe only means for leaders to gain more respect, attention and power. Dalits hereprimarily depend on other castes for work as agricultural labourers, and Sakthidasanwas forthright in his analysis:

We do not have that much faith in democracy, but for the first time a Dalit hasstood as a Dalit and we have done our duty by voting for him. Whether he doesanything for us or not is the next question, but our votes are for ourselves.(interview)

Sakthidasans assertion reveals both the cynicism that characterises Dalit viewsof politics, and the fact that the proactive election campaign succeeded in raising

consciousness even if it failed in the polls. The quote also adds complexity to Chandras(2004) notion of ethnic headcounts in emphasising that material concerns neednot determine electoral choices. The symbolic and emotive reasons of pride andduty can outweigh expectations of reward.

The publicity and votes gained by the DPI (especially in northern districts)persuaded leaders that the electoral process was worth pursuing. The fluid natureof Tamil alliances, however, meant that the Third Front was precarious. There wasno guarantee that the TMC would remain independent and without the resources

and credibility of an established party the Front would be undermined. Further-more, the question of what the DPI hoped to achieve came to the fore. Persistingwith a non-Dravidian front would radicalise voters and offer a critical alternative:pursuing the same ends using institutional rather than radical (often criminal)means. Contesting elections, however, proffered new opportunities (cf. Coy andHedeen 2005): strategic alliance building, for example, could lead to financial re-sources, extensive networks, a wider pool of voters, and Member of the LegislativeAssembly (MLA) status. To be most effective, though, this path required a Dravidian

alliance, which seemed impossible since neither was trusted:

Yesterday the AIADMK fostered the BJP, now it is the turn of the DMK. YesterdayJayalalitha, today Karunanidhi. We need to question which is the scoundrel andwhich is the rogue. (Thirumavalavan, speech, 16 June 1999)

The implication was of a Hobsons choice, since both had betrayed their idealsand fostered the Hindu nationalist BJP, which is antithetical to Dalit interests.



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60 Hugo Gorringe


Furthermore, Krishnasamy reiterated the concern for autonomy: Dalit leadersshould retain the leadership of Dalit campaigns and that mainstream politicalparties should not derive undue political mileage from the struggles of Dalits against

caste oppression (Nambath 1999). Despite the compelling logic of Dalit assertion,Krishnasamys principled but unrewarding call for autonomous action was rejectedby the TMC and DPI who allied to the AIADMK for several bye-elections in 2000.

The DPIs dramatic volte-face invited accusations of suitcase politics and out-raged activists felt betrayed, but it is worth considering the decision more dispas-sionately. First, the performance of the Third Front highlighted that shifting frommovement to party entailed more than a tactical shift: it altered the constituencyto whom the DPI appealed. The 225,000 who voted for Thirumavalavan far ex-

ceeded those prepared to engage in social protest. This wider constituency was lessradical and more interested in the bread-and-butter issues of political participation.Activists spoke of Thirumavalavan turning Parliament on its head, but most voterswanted him in office as a symbol of Dalit assertion and as a source of patronage.Second, election campaigns require resources and organisational infrastructurethat Dalit movements lack and established allies can provide.

Finally, Pandian (1992) notes how Dravidian parties (the AIADMK in par-ticular) have successfully mediated subaltern consciousness and secured active

consent despite neglecting their interests. Whilst autonomous Dalit movementsincreasingly counter Dravidianism, interviews and observations confirmed his an-alysis. Allying with the AIADMK, therefore, was a pragmatic recognition of Dravidianhegemony. Thirumavalavan continued to critique Dravidian policy and his exhaust-ing schedule of engagements and relatively obscure accommodation suggested thathe had not profited personally from the new strategy. The AIADMK alliance wasalso the lesser of two evils since the DMK was portrayed as inimical to Dalit lib-eration and the AIADMK is traditionally more popular with Dalits and women.

The main drawback was that the coalition isolated the PT (which was at loggerheadswith the AIADMK) and splintered the Dalit vote.

The results of the 2000 bye-elections questioned the wisdom of pragmatism,however, when the DMK gained from Dalits apathy to the AIADMK (Nambath2000), suggesting that realpolitik could alienate principled actors and blur thedistinction between a Dalit party and an established one. The DPIs political partici-pation challenged parties that saw Dalits as pawns to be bought off before eachelection, and the 1999 campaign slogan (Our votes are for ourselves) resonated

with many Dalits encouraging them to vote for the first time or to back an auton-omous Dalit candidate. In 2000 Dalit voters showed that they would not automat-ically follow their own leaders either, and rejected the AIADMKDPI combinethat leaders had too little time to sell.

Despite failing to persuade their supporters, the Panthers remained allied tothe AIADMK preceding the 2001 Legislative Assembly elections. The PT mooteda principled alternative before succumbing to the politics of pragmatism them-selves when their attempt to initiate a Congress-led front failed. Unwilling to contest



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without a mainstream partner, the PT sought an electoral pact with the DMK. Thefragility of alliances and electoral understandings, however, came to the fore in2001 when disputes over seat sharing (how many seats each alliance partner was

allocated) disrupted both coalitions. The DMK was not accommodating (retainingmost seats for itself) and alienated its main electoral allies, who swapped sides.The major party to defect was the Vanniyar-dominated10 Paatali Makkal Katchi(Toiling Peoples Party; PMK), which holds sway in northern TN. The DPI wasformed partly as a defensive reaction against Vanniyar assertion, so when the PMK

joined the AIADMK, the Panthers jumped ship.Bereft of other allies, the DPI allied to the DMK, thus abandoning a key rationale

for electoral contestation. In 1999 Thirumavalavan pilloried the PMK leader for

rejoining the DMK despite being insulted. He also insisted that: Karunanidhiscomplete government has been against the downtrodden and remains so. He isonly concerned in nurturing the dominant castes (speech, 1 November 1999).Previously (Gorringe 2006a) I saw the acceptance of Dalit parties into the DMKfront as significant for two principal reasons. First, Karunanidhi had been the sub-

ject of personal attacks by movement orators: Karunanidhi is a scoundrel and weneed to oppose him first, Thirumavalavan maintained. Granting 18 seats to theDPI and PT, therefore, constituted a loss of face for the party. Defections and splits

are endemic in Indian politics, and the colourful language used at the point ofdeparture has rarely precluded reconciliation, but swallowing the insults of an un-tested group is uncommon. Second, the Dalit organisations were given more seatsthan established parties (Hindu 2001). In retrospect, this significance was over-stated. The bargaining for seats suggested the DPI would only enter alliances onthe basis of a share of political power, and wresting so many constituencies fromthe DMK signalled that Dalit parties were considered capable of delivering votes.Beyond this, however, the import is limited.

The accommodation of the Dalit parties must be viewed in context: as a des-perate attempt by the DMK to attract more votes after the departure of otherallies. Dalit parties have become vote banks to be won over at election time, andthe asymmetry of power was emphasised by seat allocations. Though the PuthiyaTamizhagamhad proved itself in previous elections, the Panthers were grantedseats more readily because they opted to campaign under the DMKs rising sunsymbol. The PT, which demanded its own flag, was engaged in protracted nego-tiations (Nambath 2001). The DPI, thus, acted as a pawn and did not gain auton-

omous political recognition. Its allocation of eight seats testifies to the caste-basedlogic of electoral competition rather than its strength. Caste informs the electoraloutcomes of many constituencies, and five decades of rhetoric on Tamilness hasnot constrained its salience. If anything, caste figures more prominently in contem-porary elections due to the emergence of caste-based parties in the past two decades.The Panthers were welcomed by the DMK as a possible counterweight to the PMK.

The rise of minor parties has meant that neither Dravidian party can win un-aided in several constituencies. The PMK, for instance, is seen to dominate the



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north-east and though, like Communist and Congress Parties, it has not brokenthe Dravidian duopoly completely, it determines which alliance wins. The Panthersheartlands are here, where they campaigned against Vanniyar caste domination.

Sure enough, the DPIs lone success in 2001 was in Mangalore where Thirumavalavanemerged victorious although the DMK coalition was routed in the polls. The PT didnot win a seat, but their strongholds in the south are where the DMK has struggledto make inroads. Paradoxically, far from furthering their ultimate objective of eradi-cating caste, the DPI victory emphasised the importance of caste considerations.

This was most apparent as, with the objective of defeating the PMK, Dalits voteden masse for DMK candidates (Subramanian 2001b; Yadav 2001), whilst othercaste voters shunned the Dalit-friendly parties. Even the DMK cadres neither

campaigned nor voted effectively for their Dalit allies (Subramanian 2001b; Venkatesh2001). Kamaraj (interview) insisted that BCs have an allergy to Dalit mobilisation,and his crude analysis gained credence here. The social aversion on the part ofDMK candidates, mostly belonging to Mukkulathors and other OBCs, to beidentified with Dalit leaders and cadres, Illangovan (2001) reported, has madethe DMK an untouchable among its own rank and file.11 As Dalit organisationshave entered politics, the social ostracism associated with untouchability has in-formed the electoral process. Indeed, caste sentiment has been exacerbated as Dalit

movements have confronted BC dominance (Pandian 2000). The DMKs gamblewith the Dalit card failed, Illangovan concluded, thanks to the sharp polarisationof Dalits and non-Dalits, where the party affiliations became irrelevant. Untouch-ability at the ballot box is part of a backlash resisting Dalit efforts at claiming theirhuman rights and dues (Rajadurai and Geetha 2002: 119).

The heightening of caste sentiment helps explain why, despite entering politicslater, the Panthers have surpassed the Puthiya Tamizhagam. The social antipathyto Dalit interests dictates that Dalit parties are a default option to mitigate the lossof key allies. The Panthers have an advantage since they offset the PMK vote bank,whilst PT has no equivalent opponent. Poll results have established a pecking orderbased on electoral arithmetic. The DPI is a natural secondchoice if an alliancewith the PMK fails. This secondary status became apparent when their Dravidianally canvassed their support for the 2004 Lok Sabha elections, but denied themany representatives. The Legislative Assembly has 234 members, whereas Tamil Naduonly has 39 representatives in the Lok Sabha, but denying the Panthers even one

seat was telling. Thirumavalavan resigned from Mangalur (which he won on a DMKticket) on principle and joined an alliance of Dalit and non-Dravidian parties.He said:

[In 2001] a majority of the mainstream parties in the State, such as the TMC,the Congress(I), the PMK and the two Left parties had already allied with theAIADMK. The DMK then had only the BJP with it. Karunanidhi was left withno option but to accommodate the DPI and the PT along with some small



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caste-based parties. But now, because Karunanidhi has had the support of some

much bigger parties, he has ditched Dalit parties.(Viswanathan 2004)

The message is clear: Dravidian parties use the DPI as a vote bank when necessary,and abandon them when more tested alliances appear. Karunanidhis call for the

DPI to support the DMK from the outside was rightly perceived as an insult, but

the hastily assembled Dalit alliance only managed third place in most seats except

for Chidambaram where Thirumavalavan again came second.

Given the repeated ability to secure 30 per cent of the vote withoutDravidian

support, it cannot be long before the DPI contests national polls in a Dravidian

front. The reticence of the main parties to offer the Chidambaram constituency to

the DPI supports the argument (earlier) that this would alienate Dravidian cadre.Until they contest national constituencies, however, the Panthers will retain a

Cinderella status and lack adequate political recognition. This was emphasised in

2006 when the DMK compounded its earlier insult by requesting unconditional

DPI backing for Assembly elections. The DPIs actions at this point are noteworthy.

Rather than reviving the Dalit alliance that unsuccessfully contested the 2004 polls,

Thirumavalavan led the DPI back into the AIADMK fold.

The outset of the 2006 elections, therefore, saw a complete reversal of 2001. Thistime the AIADMK was isolated and its allocation of nine seats to the DPI (one

more than it contested in 2001) must be read against this backdrop. The AIADMK

considered us a political force and invited us to join their front, Thirumavalavan

insisted, but had roles been reversed there would have been no place for them. The

incremental road to political recognition took another step, however, when the

DPI stood as the Viduthalai Ciruthaikal Katchi (Liberation Panther Party), not

under the AIADMK banner. The Electoral Commission allotted them a bell as a

campaigning symbol because the DPI has no established emblem. The politicalsignificance of visual imagery cannot be overstated in a society where most voters

identify the symbol they intend to vote for rather than the party. The emotive

force of such markers was apparent when the fledgling Desiya Morpokku Dravida

Kazhagam (National Progressive Dravidian Federation; DMDK) was assigned a

drum in 2006, leading several Dalit women to align themselves behind Vijayakant:

It is our symbol, they are quoted as sayingsince beating drums made of polluting

leather is traditionally a Dalit task (Hindu 2006b). The DPIs allocated markerrang no such bells. That a film star with no history of Dalit activism should elicit

such a response is an indictment of Dalit parties and raises questions about the

current strategy.

The 2006 results favoured the DMK-led Democratic Progressive Alliance, forcing

Jayalalitha to resign as chief minister. The DMK, with 96 out of the 234 seats, be-

came the largest single party, but remained 22 short of an overall majority neces-

sitating either a minority or coalition government. The obvious coalition partner



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64 Hugo Gorringe


(the Indian National Congress, which secured 38 seats), however, overrode the de-sires of the state wing of the party and agreed to shore up the minority govern-ment in return for a similar favour in Pondicherry. The AIADMK alliance gained

69 seats, of which two were won by the DPI. The remaining seven DPI candidatesall finished second, but the Dravidian alliance would account for this. Did thePanthers unerringly back the loser again, or did the loser back them? Whilst theyremain a secondchoice ally, they will be confined to the weaker coalition. So is thestrategy working?

INSTITUTIONALISATION: CAGINGTHE DALIT PANTHERS?

Seven years after entering the elections, the arguments, tactics and results remainstatic. While the exigencies of political competition require parties to compromiseand agree to a minimum common platform, if this exhausts the DPIs ambitionthen political participation will accomplish little whilst legitimising the politicalsystem and buttressing the politics of contingency. The repeated assurance thatelections are a tactic, not a principle (Warrier 2006), is increasingly tenuous. TheDPI now routinely gains press coverage of speeches, meetings and its manifesto,and the number of seats it has contested has risen. It has, however, become a stockplayer. Although Dalits are prevented from standing in at least four panchayats,this was not central to the partys manifesto. We may have come to the elections,Thirumavalavan insisted in 1999, when trying to persuade followers, but ourwarrior spirit has not changed we will not give up our struggle for liberty (speech,7 August 1999). Political opportunism, it seems, has tamed the Dalit Panthers.

The DPI, I contend, is becoming institutionalised and losing the mantle of rad-icalism. Institutionalisation refers to the process whereby movements develop

internal organisation, become more moderate, adopt a more institutional repertoireof action and integrate into the system of interest representation (Della Porta andDiani 1999: 148). As Coy and Hedeen (2005: 407) argue, institutionalisation maylead a movement to become bureaucratized and technique centred, losing its adap-tive vitality. They observe that assimilation into institutional practices can involvea dilution of movement critiques and tactics.

The institutionalisation of the DPI is evident in the formalisation of the party(a rule book outlining roles and responsibilities was prepared), but also in the ac-

tions and expectations of leaders and participants: First, its willingness to supportalternate Dravidian parties indicates an attenuation of ideological principles andan adaptation to the prevailing political environment. Second, the disappointmentwhen Thirumavalavan did not stand in 2006 (Hindu 2006c) suggests that activistsare increasingly focused on elections rather than sustained anti-caste activism.Third, the choice of candidates for the nine constituencies in 2006 highlighted agrowing distance between the leadership and the grassroots. Dedicated local activ-ists were passed over in the nominations (ibid.) though the party promised to bring



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the Assembly closer to the people. The four key demands on which political in-

volvement was predicated (see earlier) have disappeared. Institutionalisation, Coy

and Hedeen (2005) observe, can entail co-optation and demobilisation.

Alert to this danger, Thirumavalavan argued that if the gap between the [leadersand cadre] widens too far, the people will be alienated from the movement (inter-

view, 3 November 1999). Opportunist politics, however, will widen this rift. Already

the sympathisers inspired by the DPIs radicalism in 1999 are looking elsewhere for

a Dalit revival. Thirumavalavan is finished, Father J, a one-time supporter, opined

(personal communication). The decision to join a Third Front in 1999 breathed

air into the stultified atmosphere of Tamil politics. The failure to consolidate the

Dalit vote, and the support for Dravidian parties, has reinstated the status quo.

The bypassing of local activists, who cultivated constituencies and establishedmovement strongholds, in the selection of candidates suggests that the calculations

of a party machine are eroding the DPIs grassroots basis.

In recounting the costs and motivations for action Subramaniam, a Dalit activist,

encapsulated a problematic now confronting the DPI: None of us have saved a

penny in our activism. This movement is our asset. The liberty of the people is our

future. In that context it is unjust for someone to say: This is my movement

(interview). The top-down allocation of seats and alliances, and the move from amovement responding to ideology and social injustice to a party, renders the DPI

increasingly leader-centred. Father J noted the frustrations occasioned by this trend

and spoke of DPI youth, imprisoned due to previous radicalism, plotting revenge

against Thirumavalavan because they felt abandoned and betrayed (personal com-

munication). If the groundswell of support, evident in 1999, evaporates, then the

tactics will have backfired. Supporting the main parties has yet to ensure elections

in reserved panchayats, let alone objectives such as land reform. Were Thirumavalavan

to become an MLA or MP, then members would at least feel that they have a voice,but in 2006 the two DPI MLAs were not only on the losing side they were parachuted

into the constituencies they contested. Is political engagement a failure then?

THE SOCIAL IMPACTOF POLITICS?

Judging the decision to contest elections solely on the basis of vote share and seats

gained would be mistaken. Democracy, Lefort (1988) shows, is as much about socialpractice as political institutions, and it is arguably in social terms that the greatest

impact of DPI politics can be seen. Dialogue with political opponents since con-

testing elections, for instance, has offered the potential of more inclusive politics

under the banner of Tamil nationalism. Rajadurai and Geetha (2002: 121) claim

that Dalits have a quarrel with the very notion of Tamilness, and Nambath (2005)

regards the DPIs adoption of Tamil nationalism as a deliberate attempt to grow

beyond identity politics enabled by the low social status of the dominant castes in



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66 Hugo Gorringe


Tamil Nadu who owe no allegiance to Hindutva. What they neglect is the long-standing attachment to Tamilness occasioned by Dravidian ideology and anti-Hindi agitation. The DPI, thus, aspires to a nation of Tamils undivided by caste

(Thirumavalavan, speech, 18 July 1999).In 2000 Pandian (2000: 515) questioned the analytical utility of catch-all castecategories, arguing that the complexities of political coalitions and social mobilitycannot be captured by reference to Dalits and Backward Castes. Dalit castes, forinstance, have their own leaders, and we cannot assume Vanniyar, let alone Back-ward Caste, unity (Radhakrishnan 2002). The prevalent focus on caste categoriesobscures the multiplicity of identity claims:

A Vanniyar, however he may assert his specific caste identity, also claims a Tamilancestry, and in this, rhetorically at least, is willing to be part of a common na-tion that is transcendent of caste. (Rajadurai and Geetha 2002: 123)

The contingent nature of identity formation and the possibilities of non-casteactivism were emphasised between 2004 and 2006. Having been locked in im-placable conflict with the PMK for a decade, the DPI began 2006 in alliance withthem. The roots of this rapprochement lie in the party leaders attempt to mitigate

spiralling caste violence, and their ability to forge a common identity around thesupra-caste issue of Tamilness. Political identities can be re-imagined (Chandra 2004),and since 1999 the DPI have courted, and been courted by, various political interests.In this process a commitment to Tamil self-determination took Thirumavalavanto Sri Lanka to support the fight for a Tamil nation. The PMK shares this object-ive and both parties agreed to campaign jointly as the Tamil Protection Movement(TPI).

Tapping into an emotional political current, both parties demanded Tamil-medium education and the eradication of English titles for shops and films (My-Tamil.com 2004; Tamilinfodaily 2005). Political immediacy colours the cognitivetemplate of DPI politics and the nave expectation that communities can be re-imagined so speedily reflects this. Thirumavalavan outlined the TPIs contributionto harmonious social relationships: You will see that there is no brutal violenceagainst Dalits there now. There are no law and order issues also there. The northerndistricts are quite peaceful (Warrier 2006). Whilst the TPI has enabled DPI/PMK

(commonly seen as proxies for Paraiyars and Vanniyars) dialogue, the rosy picturepainted by Thirumavalavan is misleading. The lack of physical (brutal) violenceagainst Dalits does not mean that the structural inequalities that render Dalits de-pendent upon the dominant castes have been addressed. Rather, it bolsters argu-ments that much collective violence is politically organised.

The truce between the rival parties is welcome, but unless and until the structuresof mind, body and resources are reconstructed, Tamil Dalits will live under theshadow of caste discrimination. Caste clashes are not spontaneous eruptions of



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communal sentiment; rather, they feed on everyday processes of identity forma-

tion, misunderstanding and the cultural concepts of honour and shame (Gorringe

2006b). Establishing the humanity of Dalits in the eyes of caste superiors requires

more than a political alliance as the 2001 results testify. Even granting the reductionin caste enmity, though, there are grounds to question whether the TPI advances

Dalit objectives.

In articulating a Tamilian identity, the TPI could compound the marginalisation

of the most vulnerable Dalits. The politicisation of a linguistic ethnicity marginal-

ises Telegu-speaking Chakkiliyars further, and obscures the fact that Tamil national-

ism has done little to mitigate untouchability. Furthermore, the TPIs nationalism

has been accompanied by a moral conservatism and ethnic chauvinism that clashes

with a theoretical commitment to womens rights. The stress on chastity and thevirtues of Tamil women that greeted a film actresss comments about premarital

sex are in direct contrast to earlier critiques of patriarchy and the cultural con-

straints placed on women. All women wish to enter politics, wish to stand on the

front line of such protests, do all husbands permit that? Thirumavalavan asked at

a movement wedding. Addressing the Womens Struggle Committees protest against

poll violence he went further still: Woman is taken to mean being the handmaid

of her husband, women have yet to enter politics. Whether it be the Communist

party or the Dravidian parties they see women as objects to be kept within boxes

(speech, 1 November 1999).

In pursuing the TPI agenda, however, Thirumavalavan has joined the morality

police trying to impose an idea of virtue and rectitude onto Tamil women (cf.

Anandhi 2005). This confirms the sense that the demand for womens rights was

token. It is pertinent, here, that none of the DPI candidates in 2006 were women.

Thirumavalavan said he would sacrifice anything for the cause of Tamil (My-

Tamil.com 2004), but if the Tamilian solution to exclusive identity neglects Dalitinterests it constitutes a dramatic dilution of its [DPIs] radicalism (Anandhi 2005:

4876). There is also a question mark over the extent to which an appeal to a trans-

caste identity can be mobilised given the extent to which the political sphere has

been colonised by caste concerns. Indeed, in April 2005 the joint PMK/DPI pro-

tests against the erosion of Tamil culture faltered in the face of two bye-elections

(Venkatesh 2005). If the DPIs radicalism is confined to nationalist chauvinism,

what has political engagement gained?

CONCLUDING REMARKS: DALITSAND POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM

Our people only think: If I dont like Karunanidhi, Ill vote for Jayalalitha. If I

dont like the Two Leaves [AIADMK symbol], Ill vote for the Rising Sun [DMK].

But what we need to ask is: what have either government done for the

downtrodden? (Thirumavalavan, speech, 7 August 1999)



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68 Hugo Gorringe


Omvedt (1994: 340) argues that Dalit protest laid the basis of an alternative Indianidentity (emphasis original). In TN this alternate identity has withered as the DPIis increasingly assimilated into hegemonic politics. The centrality of caste to Tamil

politics, however, makes the revival of such a project essential and overdue. Re-stricting such an endeavour to the Tamil nation reveals a blinkered opportunismthat ignores the pan-Indian possibilities offered by the Dalit tag and the perilsattending particularist nationalism. Whilst broader in scope than a reactionaryTamil identity, however, the Dalit struggle remains limited whilst Dalit is a proxyfor untouchable. Anti-caste activism is undermined by caste-based mobilisationmirroring the hegemonic social relations it aims to transplant.

The struggle for tolerance, as Subramanian concludes (1999: 329), will attain

fuller success only if organisations less constrained by the interests of dominant orupwardly mobile groups play an important role in it. Dalit movements followedthe established repertoire of protest to establish themselves on the map of Tamilpolitics, but the existing repertoire [also] constrains collective action (Tilly 1986:390). Continuing repression and isolation raise the question of what politics asnormal can achieve. The BSPs success makes it an obvious referent here, but Pais(2002) analysis raises similar dilemmas. Noting the compromises made by theparty, she argues that it has failed to implement social change. In a question with

resonance for the Panthers, she insists that the BSP is faced with a difficult decision:is it a movement with an agenda for radical social change, or a political party drivensolely by the compulsion of achieving power? (ibid.: 1).

Athu meeru(fight back, resist) was theDPI slogan that galvanised Dalit re-sistance. The radicalism of the assertion touched a nerve in rural TN, raising theprospect of significant social transformation. Chellamma, living in a village blightedby caste violence, insisted that, It is only if we return a blow for a blow that thegrindstone [ammi kallu]will shift (interview). The assertion rests on the dubious

assumption that counter-violence will make higher castes respect their social in-feriors as equals. The empirical evidence indicates that such optimism is misplacedat best and probably counter-productive. The occasional use of violent means mayhave discouraged groups minded to attack Dalits, but it has not prevented anti-Dalit atrocities or shifted the structural inequalities that render Dalits dependentupon higher castes for land, work, water and other amenities.

The DPIs transition to politics is an implicit acceptance of the failure of violentprotest. Politics, as Mouffe (2000: 149) argues, is about domesticating hostility,

and whilst elections have occasioned Paraiyar/Vanniyar conflict, they have alsofacilitated (an imperfect) dialogue and the interaction seen previously. The DPIcertainly cannot hope for electoral success without reaching out to other groups,but scepticism about political involvement has deepened as the Panthers compro-mised their ideals. Parliamentary politics is the deciding factor, Thirumavalavaninsisted in 1999, that is the centre of power (interview). The flaws in such analysiswere papered over in justifying the DPIs engagement in electoral politics, but theyhave since come home to roost.



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Pai (2002: 244) concludes that the BSP reflects the ambitions of a class of Dalitpower seekers and differentiates it from grassroots attempts to erode the bases ofcaste domination. Her analysis increasingly rings true for the DPI, as does her pre-

scription for the BSP to democratise itself and articulate a new ideological perspec-tive rooted in the material conditions of the disadvantaged. The Panthers maintainthat electoral participation is a tactic, but Coy and Hedeen (2005: 418) note howrarely movements return to other forms of contention. Short of the transformationoutlined by Pai, however, the DPI has institutional alternatives since, as Wyatt(2002: 753) notes: the possibility of a viable third front emerging cannot be ignored.In 2006 Vijayakants DMDK, which gained just under 10 per cent of the vote andpolled more the difference between victory and second place in many instances,

highlighted the viability of a serious, non-Dravidian alternative.This example suggests that the DPI could harness the politics of principle. TheDravidian parties have fomented casteism in Tamil Nadu, as Thirumavalavan avers.The eradication of caste discrimination, therefore, is not furthered by support-ing them. The real prospect of a coalition government in 2006 has punctured theDravidian parties aura of invincibility. The DMK and AIADMK can no longer as-sume that governing the state is their birthright. Taking steps to establish an alter-native can only further the democratisation of TN and increase the credibility of

the DPI. The enthusiasm accorded to autonomous Dalit candidates evaporateswhen our votes are for another.

Making room for dissent and foster[ing] the institutions in which it can bemanifested is vital for democracy, Mouffe (2000: 150) argues. Entering unstableand opportunistic alliances with political rivals is not a sustainable means of effect-ing social change: If a calf joins with piglets, Subramani insisted, then the twowill become one and you cannot distinguish between themboth run in the gutter(interview). In striking contrast to the promise of its political debut, the DPI now

constitutes an option, not an empowering alternative. Unless it can revitalise itsvision and mode of operation, the DPIs political participation will do nothingfor Dalit rights (Father J, personal communication). Alternately supporting therival Dravidian parties and placing a priority on Tamil rather than Dalit issues willnot shift the grindstone of caste.

POSTSCRIPT

Days after completing this paper, political developments confirmed the Pantherscontinuing marginalisation. The DPI was eased out of the AIADMK alliance andswitched to the DMK for local body elections. The DPIs reliance on Dravidianparties was captured in Thirumavalavans assertion that: we did not want to becomepolitical orphans. The limits to Dalit acceptance, however, were highlighted whenThirumavalavanostensibly an alliance partnerwas unable to contact Jayalalithato resolve issues after local AIADMK leaders [were] not willing to share seats(Hindu 2006d).



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70 Hugo Gorringe


NOTES

1. Backward Caste (BC) is the constitutional category of low-caste groups deemed to re-

quire positive discrimination due to their social status. Many BCs, however, are politically

powerful.

2. Details of respondents follow the Notes.

3. Empirical data was collected between 1998 and 1999. The multi-sited ethnography focused

on Dalit movement activists, motivations, modes of operation and ideological aspir-

ations. The data consists of 30 group discussions, 32 formal and 30 informal interviews

with activists, leaders, academics and non-participating Dalits. Interviews were comple-

mented by participant observation.

4. For detailed accounts of Tamil politics, see Kohli (1990), Subramanian (1999), and

Wyatt (2002).5. See Harriss (2002: 1078) and Gorringe (2005) for examples of mounting anti-Dalit

hostility.

6. Other groups are not disaggregated.

7. The Constitution rendered untouchability a punishable offence and reclassified Un-

touchables as Scheduled Castes (SCs) by reference to a schedule of castes entitled to

positive discrimination.

8. Literacy rates vary, with urban Dalits more literate than the average and rural Dalits,

especially in the West of the state trailing behind (Government of Tamil Nadu 2005).

9. Paraiyars, Pallars and Chakkiliyars are the largest Tamil SC groups. SCs constitute 18

per cent of the population. Paraiyars are most populous. They live throughout TN,

but are concentrated in northern districts. Pallars are fewer in number, but more affluent

and better organised partly due to their higher social status. They live mainly in the

south and west. Chakkiliyars, the lowest of the main SCs, are traditionally landless.

Many speak Telegu and are seen as outsiders. They are distributed across TN, but mainly

in central and western districts. The BC groups immediately competing against SCs

are Vanniyars and Thevars. Vanniyars gained Most Backward Caste status after agitating

in the 1980s. They are the largest single Tamil community, accounting for 12 per centof the population, concentrated in the northern districts. Thevars have an exaggerated

sense of caste pride. Though their educational and economic achievements are negli-

gible, they are a major landowning caste in south TN (Gorringe 2005: 5860).

10. See Note 9.

11. Mukkulathors are one of the most prominent Backward Caste groups. OBC (Other

Backward Castes) refers to those castes perceived to require affirmative action to offset

caste-based inequalities. They are socially backward but politically strong in Tamil Nadu.

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Cited Respondents

Thirumavalavan (interviewed 3 November 1999): Leader of the DPI. Speeches also cited.Chellamma (interviewed 20 March 1999): Landless agricultural labourer and DPI sympa-

thiser from Madurai district.



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Father J (personal communication, 27 April 2006): Jesuit priest working for Dalit welfare.

As he works closely with the DPI and other movements, he preferred not to be named.

Kamaraj (interviewed 10 September 1999): Unemployed DPI activist from Madurai district.

His family married him off in 1999 hoping he would settle down.

Sakthidasan (interviewed 26 September 1999): Landless agricultural labourer in

Chidambaram constituency.

Subramani (interviewed 27 April 1999): Bricklayer and DPI activist from Cuddalore.

Subramaniam (interviewed 11 October 1999): Office clerk and Tamil Dalit Liberation Move-

ment activist.

Documents

51.pdf7 Taming the Dalit Panthers: Dalit Politics in Tamil Nadu