Pepsi Colar v Gal-Ang

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/sep1991/gr_89621_1991.html

Facts

Private respondents were employees of petitioner who were suspected of complicity in the

irregular disposition of empty bottles.

A complain for theft was filed but was withdrawn and instead a complaint for falsification

of private documents was filed. These were later dismissed.

Respondents filed a case of illegal dismissal and petitioner was ordered to reinstate them.

Respondents likewise filed separate civil suit for damages.

The petitioners moved to dismiss contending that the labor arbiter cannot try the civil suit.

Respondent judge on MR reinstated the complaint.

Respondents cited article 217 to support their claim that a claim for damages is under the

jurisdiction of the LA.

Issue: Does the labor arbiter have jurisdiction of the case?

Ruling No.

It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and their employers can

be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so only if there is a "reasonable causal

connection" between the claim asserted and employee-employer relations to put the

case under the provisions of Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be

cognizable by the regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal

jurisdiction.

In San Miguel Corporation v NLRC - It is the character of the principal relief sought that

appears essential, in this connection. Where such principal relief is to be granted under

labor legislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall within the

jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a claim for damages might

be asserted as an incident to such claim.

Where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the

Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but

by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts

of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

As it is in this case, the complaint arose when petitioner filed a complaint, with bad faith

for theft which was later dismissed by the prosecutor. There was no relationship or ULP

asserted. Hence, the matter is not with the labor arbiter but with the regular courts

since the law applicable is the revised penal code.

San Miguel Corporation V Etcuban Et al

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/dec99/127639.htm

Facts

Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC to declare the retrenchment program

executed by petitioner a nullity. They alleged that they, former employees of SMC, where

deceived in severing their employment with SMC who concocted a financial distress

story to effectuate a retrenchment program.

Respondents pray for reinstatement, back wages and damages

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case based on Article 291, their cause of action having

prescribed. Even if it was under Article 1146 as in the New Civil Code, the dismissal

was an injury upon the rights of the person, the same cannot stand because the cause

of action has prescribed.

Respondents appealed before the NLRC but was dismissed after SMC filed a motion to

dismiss.

The respondents appealed to the CA which reversed the NLRC decision. The court said

that the controversy is not exactly based on an ER-EE relationship. IT is a civil dispute

arising from the contract of termination of their services which is inexistent for being null

and void.

The CA added citing Article 1410 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 1409 as herein

before quoted, specifically provides that the action for the declaration of the inexistence of

a contract on ground (3) above does not prescribe.

The CA denied the MR of SMC hence this petition.

Issue: Is the cause of action of respondents actually based on an ER-EE relationship?

Ruling: Yes

If there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the

employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of our labor

courts.[9] In the absence of such nexus, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.

Article 217 paragraph 4 provides Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of

damages arising from employer-employee relations; to be cognizable by the Labor

Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided

for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the claim

for the damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.

In the present case, while respondents insist that their action is for the declaration of nullity

of their contract of termination, what is inescapable is the fact that it is, in reality, an

action for damages emanating from employer employee relations.

First, it is clear that their claim is grounded on their illegal dismissal, the prayer and

allegations it submitted originally to the LA is almost identical with those submitted

before the court.

Even the term used for designating the contract, i.e. contract of termination, was

formulated in a shrewd manner so as to avoid a semblance of employer-employee

relations. This observation is bolstered by the fact that if respondents designation for the

contract were to be made complete and reflective of its nature, its proper designation would

be a contract of termination of employment

The Court is aware that the Civil Code provisions on contracts and damages may be used

as bases for addressing the claim of respondents. However, the fact remains that the

present action primarily involves an employer-employee relationship. The damages

incurred by respondents as a result of the alleged fraudulent retrenchment program

and the allegedly defective contract of termination are merely the civil aspect of the

injury brought about by their illegal dismissal.[14] The civil ramifications of their actual

claim cannot alter the reality that it is primordially a labor matter and, as such, is cognizable

by labor courts.

Banez v Valdevilla

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2000maydecisions.php?id=567

Facts

Petitioner was the sales operations manager of private respondent who was indefinitely

suspended due to a certain installment scheme he allegedly has been doing.

Petitioner filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC who found him illegally

dismissed.

Private respondent then filed a complaint for damages before the RTC. Petitioner

respondent contending that the action is based on an ER EE relationship the court

doesnt have the jurisdiction. But the judge ruled contending that the complaint for

damages is grounded on the nefarious activities of defendant that caused damage and

prejudice to the plaintiff (private respondent).

The court believes that it was a breach of contractual duty, a civil dispute.

Issue: Did the judge err in taking cognizance of the complaint for damages filed before the

court? Is the complaint filed before the judge one arising from ER-EE?

Ruling Yes.

There is no mistaking the fact that in the case before us, private respondents claim against

petitioner for actual damages arose from a prior employer-employee relationship. In the

first place, private respondent would not have taken issue with petitioners "doing

business of his own" had the latter not been concurrently its employee.

Thus, the damages alleged in the complaint below are: first, those amounting to lost profits

and earnings due to petitioners abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager,

having been otherwise preoccupied by his unauthorized installment sale scheme; and

second, those equivalent to the value of private respondents property and supplies which

petitioner used in conducting his "business" .

Second, and more importantly, to allow respondent court to proceed with the instant

action for damages would be to open anew the factual issue of whether petitioners

installment sale scheme resulted in business losses and the dissipation of private

respondents property. This issue has been duly raised and ruled upon in the illegal

dismissal case,

To distinguish from cases of actions for damages where the employer-employee

relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different

source of obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld where the

damages, claimed for were based on tort 14 , malicious prosecution 15 , or breach of

contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee 16 or seeks

liquidated damages in enforcement of a prior employment contract.

Neither can we uphold the reasoning of respondent court that because the resolution of

the issues presented by the complaint does not entail application of the Labor Code

or other labor laws, the dispute is intrinsically civil. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code,

as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive

jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations in

other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by

labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.

Eduardo Eviota v CA

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/152121.htm

Facts:

Respondent bank engaged petitioner as its compensation and benefits manager.

However, he abruptly resigned from his position to rejoin his former employer which is

the basis for the complaint for damages filed by respondent before the RTC.

Petitioner showed promise as an employee that private respondent bank was eager to

supplement him with all the benefits he needed so he can discharge his duties properly.

His sudden resignation however caused disruption in respondent banks operations

which is the basis of the claim for damages.

According to Private respondent, he (petitioner) violated Article 19, 200, 21 of the new

Civil code. His manner in terminating his employment was abusive and did not take

into account the 30 day notice in employee termination.

He also had the bank incur considerable expenses for his supposed projects.

It is also alleged that petitioner left respondent bank with a diskette containing confidential

information.

The private respondent bank also contend that petitioner made derogatory remarks against

the bank and has besmirched the banks reputation, affecting its capacity to recruit the best

personnel.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. He contends that the controversy is in the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Labor arbiter as it has arisen from an ER-EE relationship.

The court ruled in favor of respondent and on MR, the CA ruled in affirmed, hence, this

petition

Issue: Does the Labor Arbiter have jurisdiction of the case?

Ruling: No.

A money claim by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a reasonable causal connection

between the claim asserted and employee-employer relation. Absent such a link, the

complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice.

Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship

is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of

obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court.

The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended, is

limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be

resolved by reference to the Labor Code of the Philippines, other labor laws or their

collective bargaining agreements.

The claims were the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation,

intrinsically civil in nature. regular courts.

In this case, the private respondents first cause of action for damages is anchored on

the petitioners employment of deceit and of making the private respondent believe

that he would fulfill his obligation under the employment contract with assiduousness

and earnestness. The petitioner volte face (complete turn around) when, without the

requisite thirty-day notice under the contract and the Labor Code of the Philippines, as

amended, he abandoned his office and rejoined his former employer; thus, forcing the

private respondent to hire a replacement.

It is evident that the causes of action of the private respondent against the petitioner

do not involve the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines and other labor

laws but the New Civil Code. Thus, the said causes of action are intrinsically civil. There

is no causal relationship between the causes of action of the private respondents causes of

action against the petitioner and their employer-employee relationship. The fact that the

private respondent was the erstwhile employer of the petitioner under an existing

employment contract before the latter abandoned his employment is merely incidental.

Perpetual Help Credit Coop V Faburada

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/oct2001/121948.htm

Facts

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PHCCI.

PHCCI moved to have the complaint dismissed on the ground that no ER-EE contending

that private respondents are also members and co-owners of the cooperative. PHCCI also

contend that remedies provided under its bylaws were never exhausted. Likewise the

Cooperative dev authority law, its laws require conciliation and mediation before a judicial

action is pursued.

The LA denied the motion to dismiss and ruled they were illegally dismissed. The NLRC

affirmed hence the petition.

Petitioner PHCCI contends that the respondents were working as volunteers. But the court

find the presence of ER EE hence the court upheld the finding of illegal dismissal. As to

the basis of the dismissal, it is not within the ones enumerated under just and authorized

cause of the labor code. Petitioner also failed to observe procedural due process.

Petitioners also contend that the LA has no jurisdiction of the complaint considering that

PD 175 mandates that disputes must first be submitted to the grievance machinery and its

implementing rules and regulations applied .

Issue: Does the LA have jurisdiction over the complaint?

Ruling: Yes

The main contention of Petitioner is anchored on Article 121 of Republic Act No. 6938

(Cooperative Code of the Philippines) which provides

o the procedure how cooperative disputes are to be resolved, thus:

o ART. 121. Settlement of Disputes.- Disputes among members, officers, directors, and committee members, and intra-cooperative disputes shall, as far as practicable,

be settled amicably in accordance with the conciliation or mediation mechanisms

embodied in the bylaws of the cooperative, and in applicable laws.

o Should such a conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall be settled in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Complementing this Article is Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939 (Cooperative Development Authority Law) which reads:

o SEC. 8 Mediation and Conciliation.- Upon request of either or both parties, the Authority shall mediate and conciliate disputes within a cooperative or between

cooperatives: Provided, That if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within three

(3) months from request thereof, a certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the

Commission prior to the filing of appropriate action before the proper courts.

The above provisions apply to members, officers and directors of the cooperative involved in disputes within a cooperative or between cooperatives.

There is no evidence that private respondents are members of petitioner PHCCI and even if they are, the dispute is about payment of wages, overtime pay, rest day and

termination of employment. Under Art. 217 of the Labor Code, these disputes are

within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

Austria V NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/124382.htm

Facts

Petitioner was a pastor of the SDA (Seventh Day Adventists) who was terminated by

reason of misappropriation of funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross

and habitual neglect of duties and a commission of a crime against the person of the

employers of duly authorized representatives. He worked with SDA for 28 years.

Reacting to the decision, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal

dismissal praying for reinstatement plus back wages and benefits, who ruled in his favor.

On Appeal, the NLRC ruled in private respondents favor but later on reversed its decision

upon petitioners MR.

SDA filed another MR contending that the LA did not have jurisdiction to try the case

originally. The court ruled in their favor without ruling on the merits of the case hence, the

petition.

Respondents claim that the Labor Arbiters doesnt have jurisdiction since the matter

involves the discipline of a religious minister, and is purely an ecclesiastical affair

which the state has not right to interfere.

Issue: Does the labor arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case?

Ruling: Yes.

The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case. The

idea advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions

and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of

the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. While the State is prohibited from

interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the Church is likewise barred from meddling in

purely secular matters

an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members

and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the

congregation. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the above cited

examples. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it does

not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved here

is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is

purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or

doctrines of the church.

There is no question that the grounds invoked by respondent for the dismissal of petitioner

are grounds found in Article 282 of the labor code. This alone is reason to believe that the

nature of his dismissal is not religious. (why cite the labor code as groundsfor temrination

whenyouwould later say that its purely an ecclesiastical affair?)

The fact that the private respondent furnished the NLRC of copy of his termination

and submitting as evidence the SSS registration of petitioner by respondent and the

ultimate fact that it participated in the case without raising an objection regarding

the jurisdiction of the court is tantamount ot the invocation of that jurisdiction and

the willingness to abide by the resolution of the case.

Article 278 of the Labor Code on post-employment states that the provisions of this Title shall apply to all establishments or undertakings, whether for profit or not. Obviously,

the cited article does not make any exception in favor of a religious corporation. This is

made more evident by the fact that the Rules Implementing the Labor Code,

particularly, Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI on the Termination of Employment and

Retirement, categorically includes religious institutions in the coverage of the law, to

wit:

o Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall apply to all establishments and undertakings, whether operated for profit or not, including educational, medical, charitable

and religious institutions and organizations, in cases of regular employment with

the exception of the Government and its political subdivisions including

government-owned or controlled corporations.

G Holdings Inc. v National mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU)

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_160236_2009.html

Facts

NAMAWU was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC), an entity operating a copper mine and

mill complex.

MMC was incorporated by the DBP and PNB on account of their foreclosure of MMCs assets.

Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National Government for disposition or privatization because it had become an on-performing asset.

On October 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) executed between petitioner and APT, petitioner brought 90% of MMCs shares and financial claims.

Upon signing of PSA and full satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, petitioner immediately took physical possession of the mine and its facilities

and took full control of the management and operation of MMC.

Four years after, a labor dispute arose between MMC and NAMAWU with the latter filing with the NCMB of a notice of strike.

LA ruled in favor of NAMAWU. It ruled that the lay-off implement by MMC is illegal and it committed ULP.

On petition with this Court, we sustained the decision of LA. A partial writ of execution was issued. The writ was not fully satisfied because of MMCs resisted its enforcement.

On October 2002, GHI filed with RTC a Special Civil Action for Contempt with issuance of TRO.

GHI contented that the property were subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage executed MMC in favor of petitioner.

RTC issued a TRO. On appeal to CA, CA set aside the RTC issuance of writ. Hence, this petition.

Issue:Whether RTC can validly issue TRO to prevent the execution issued by labor tribunal.

Ruling:

It is settled that a RTC can validly issue a TRO and, later, a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of a writ of execution raised by a labor tribunal on the

basis of a third-partysclaim of ownership over the properties levied upon.

While, as a rule, no temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall be issued by any court where the writ of execution issued by a labor tribunal is sought to be enforced upon the property of

a stranger to the labor dispute, even upon a mere

prima facie showing of ownership of such claimant a separate action for injunctive relief against such levy may be maintained in court, since said action neither involves nor

grows out of labor disputes insofar as the third party is concerned.

Petition is granted.

Alberto Silva v NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jun1997/110226.htm

Facts:

Petitioners in this case filed a complaint before the NLRC for ULP and damages. The

complaint stemmed from a previous understanding involving a retrenchment program that

Philtread effected with the promise those who were terminated will be given priority

employment when conditions get better, financially.

When financial conditions of respondent got better, petitioners submitted their

employment applications but they were refused employment. Respondent asserts that

they will be considered for future vacancies.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending the NLRC did not have

jurisdiction since no ER-EE existed and the issue is about the interpretation of the CBA

cognizable before the regular courts. Jurisdiction lies with the voluntary arbitrator.

The petitioners stressed the complaint is one of ULP, with respondents refusal to re-

employ them as mandated by their CBA.

The LA dismissed the complaint, not ruling on the jurisdictional matter but mandated that

respondent prioritize the employees for employment.

The NLRC reversed the decision but stated nonetheless to re-employ petitioners subject to

available vacancies.

Acting on an MR, the NLRC reversed again its decision and specified that the complaint

should have been filed with the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor

Code since the issue is one of implementation of the CBA.

Petitioners also challenged the fact NLRC issued a new resolution after the preceding one

attained finality when Philtread did not interpose a motion for reconsideration. Since

Philtread indisputably failed to file any such motion within said period, petitioners deemed

it highly irregular and capricious for the NLRC to still allow reconsideration of its April

15, 1992 resolution.

Issue: Did the NLRC err in issuing the resolution when the preceding one already attained

finality?

Ruling: Yes.

In the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that Philtreads counsel filed a motion for

reconsideration of the April 15, 1992 resolution only on June 5, 1992,[8] or 31 days after

receipt of said resolution.[9] It was thus incumbent upon the NLRC to have dismissed

outright Philtreads late motion for reconsideration. By doing exactly the opposite, its

actuation was not only whimsical and capricious but also a demonstration of its utter

disregard for its very own rules. Certiorari, therefore, lies.

Issue: Does the LA or the NLRC have jurisdiction ?

Ruling: Yes.

When the issue concerns an interpretation or implementation of the CBA, one cannot

immediately jump to the conclusion that jurisdiction is with the voluntary arbitrator. There

is an equally important need to inquire further if the disputants involved are the

union and the employer; otherwise, the voluntary arbitrator cannot assume

jurisdiction.

It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the

company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred

to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

Since the contending parties in the instant case are not the union and Philtread, then

pursuant to the Sanyo doctrine, it is not the voluntary arbitrator who can take

cognizance of the complaint, notwithstanding Philtreads claim that the real issue is

the interpretation of the CBA provision on re-employment.

Corazon Sim v NLRC

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_157376_2007.html

Facts

Petitioner worked for private respondent Equitable Bank as its Italian remittance

marketing consultant to the Frankfurt Representative office. She was promoted to a

managerial position up until her termination.

She was terminated by respondent for loss of trust and confidence based on the alleged

mismanagement and misappropriation. Respondent denies an ER-EE relationship

existed.

The LA dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The LA said that the court of

labor relations do not have extra-territorial jurisdiction and is limited only to labor

disputes within the Philippines.

The NLRC affirmed. Instead of filing an MR, petitioner appealed to the CA but was

dismissed hence this recourse under rule 45 of the RoC before the SC

Issue: Is the Labor Arbiter correct in dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction?

Ruling: No.

A palpable error in the Labor Arbiter's disposition of the case, which was affirmed by the

NLRC, with regard to the issue on jurisdiction. It was wrong for the Labor Arbiter to

rule that "labor relations system in the Philippines has no extra-territorial

jurisdiction."

o ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as

otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and

exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the

submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the

absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether

agricultural or non-agricultural:

Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,18 provides:

o SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising

out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract

involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,

moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 804219 provides

that the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction

to hear and decide all claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by

virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment

including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to the

rules and procedures of the NLRC.

Under these provisions, it is clear that labor arbiters have original and exclusive

jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including

termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers.

HSBC v Broqueza

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/nov2010/gr_178610_2010.html

Facts:

Respondents in this case were employees of HSBC. Respondent acquired loans from the

bank which were deductible from their payroll.

A labor dispute arose between HSBC and employees wherein most of its employees

including respondents were dismissed. They then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Because of their termination, and unable to pay their loans petitioner filed a civil case

against them, a separate suit with no connection to the ongoing labor dispute.

The MeTC ruled in HSBCs favor and when respondents appealed, the RTC likewise

affirmed. Citing the applicability of Article 1179

The court of appeals disagreed however. Saying that the loan obligations have not matured

yet.

Issue: did the court of appeals commit grave abuse of discretion?

Ruling: Yes.

Art. 1179. Every obligation whose performance does not depend upon a future or uncertain

event, or upon a past event unknown to the parties, is demandable at once.

No date of payment indicated in the Promissory Notes. Hence the contention that obligation

has not ripened cannot stand. The RTC is correct in ruling that since the Promissory Notes

do not contain a period, HSBCL-SRP has the right to demand immediate payment. Article

1179 of the Civil Code applies.

The payroll deduction is merely a convenient mode of payment and not the sole source of

payment for the loans. HSBCL-SRP never agreed that the loans will be paid only through

salary deductions. Neither did HSBCL-SRP agree that if Editha Broqueza ceases to be an

employee of HSBC, her obligation to pay the loans will be suspended.

Halaguea v PAL

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/october2009/172013.htm

Facts

Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of respondent PAL and are

governed by the Pal FASAP CBA.

The petitioners assail section 144 part A of the CBA as being discriminatory to their

female cabin crews. The section provides the compulsory age of retirement for

employees for females at 55 years of age and 60 for males.

Petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for declaratory relief with TRO and Writ of

preliminary injunction with the RTC of Makati for the invalidity of the PAL FASAP

CBA section in question. The court granted the order upholding its jurisdiction stating

that no ER-EE question is present in the current controversy nor does it involve a claim

against respondent.

The CA however ruled in favor of PAL stating that the court (RTC) doesnt have

jurisdiction of the case. Hence the petition.

Petitioners submit that the RTC has jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject

of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and in all cases not within the

exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-

judicial functions.

Accordingly, it has the power to decide issues of constitutionality or legality of the

provisions of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. As the issue involved is

constitutional in character, the labor arbiter or the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) has no jurisdiction over the case and, thus, the petitioners pray

that judgment be rendered on the merits declaring Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP

CBA null and void.

Respondent, on the other hand, alleges that the labor tribunals have jurisdiction over

the present case, as the controversy partakes of a labor dispute. The dispute concerns

the terms and conditions of petitioners' employment in PAL, specifically their retirement

age.

Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction of the case?

Ruling: Yes.

The allegations in the petition for declaratory relief plainly show that petitioners'

cause of action is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA.

It is clear that the issue raised is whether Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA

is unlawful and unconstitutional.

The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by

the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.[15] Being an

ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.

The employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the

cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution

and CEDAW.

Where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code

or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the

general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of

justice and not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC.

Leslie Okol v World International

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/160146.htm

Facts

Petitioner worked for respondent as its head office manager but she rose through the

ranks and became the Vice president until her dismissal.

She was preventively suspended initially. The cause was due to certain machines that

were seized by the customs office for being undervalued.

She received a memo asking her to explain but management proved her answer was

unsatisfactory, hence her termination.

Okol filed a complaint with the arbitration branch of the NLRC citing illegal suspension,

dismissal, unpaid commissions, damages, etc.

Respondent contends that the NLRC doesnt have jurisdiction of the complaint. Which the

LA granted. Since it involved a corporate officer, the dispute was an intra-corporate

controversy falling outside the jurisdiction of the Arbitration branch.

The CA likewise ruled the same being an intra-corporate dispute, falls within the

jurisdiction of the regular courts pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799.

Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that she was a corporate officer

and that the case is an intra-corporate dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the regular

courts. Petitioner asserts that even as vice-president, the work that she performed conforms

to that of an employee rather than a corporate officer. The four fold test applies. Petitioner

likewise enumerated the acts of respondent that is indicating of control (salary payment),

deduction in medicare, ss, etc.

Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that petitioner was a corporate officer at the time

of her dismissal from Slimmers World as supported by the General Information Sheet and

Directors Affidavit attesting that petitioner was an officer.

Issue: does the NLRC have jurisdiction of the case?

Ruling: No.

The GIS and minutes of the meeting of the board of directors indicated that petitioner

was a member of the board of directors, holding one subscribed share of the capital

stock, and an elected corporate officer.

Section 25 of the Corporation Code enumerates corporate officers as the president,

secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws

Clearly, from the documents submitted by respondents, petitioner was a director and

officer of Slimmers World. The charges of illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid

commissions, reinstatement and back wages imputed by petitioner against respondents fall

squarely within the ambit of intra-corporate disputes.

We have held that a corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-

corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation. The question

of remuneration involving a stockholder and officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple

labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and

management and is a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation

Code.

The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his

employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intra-

corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

EDI STAFF builders v. NLRC

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_145587_2007.html

Facts

Petitioner corporation is engaged in the recruitment and placement of OFWS. Gran was

one of those OFWs who was placed in Riyadh as a Computer specialist. Petitioner

received a faxed letter that if he accepts he would be paid a salary of 600USD but the

employment contract of gran suggested 850USD. He questioned the discrepancy when he

arrived in Riyadh and the employer agreed to pay him 850USD.

He was terminated 5 months later for non-compliance of contract requirements and

non compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment agency and for

insubordination or disobedience.

He instituted a complaint before the NLRC when he arrived in the Philippines. Prior to

that, he received his final pay and signed a declaration releasing the employer from any

financial obligation towards him.

The LA ruled that he doesnt have a claim nor was there illegal dismissal or he was

underpaid. Regarding his qualifications, the LA ruled that indeed he was not qualified and

he did not follow company rule, his dismissal valid.

Gran appealed to the NLRC without furnishing a copy of the appeal memo to EDI

The NLRC ruled that the act of EDI to transfer to ESI his contract is actually reprocessing,

a prohibited act under the labor code. He was not afforded due process as well regarding

his termination.

Gran filed a motion for execution but EDI opposed contending that they were not

notified of the appellate proceedings. Which it assailed before the CA.

The CA said that it was only a formal lapse and not a jurisdictional defect that would

justify the dismissal of the appeal.

Hence this petition.

Issue: failure to file a notice of appeal fatal? Should it be given due course?

Ruling: No. No.

In a catena of cases, it was ruled that failure of appellant to furnish a copy of the appeal

to the adverse party is not fatal to the appeal.

The failure to give a copy of the appeal to the adverse party was a mere formal lapse, an

excusable neglect. Time and again we have acted on petitions to review decisions of the

Court of Appeals even in the absence of proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of

Appeals as required by Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court. We act on the petitions and

simply require the petitioners to comply with the rule.

But nonetheless, the observance of the proper service of notices under Section 13, Rule

13 of the Rules of court must be observed.

ATCI Oversease Corporation v Josefa Echin

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/october2010/178551.htm

Facts

Respondent was hired by petitioner in behalf of its co-principal, the ministry of public

health in Kuwait for the position of medical technologist. Newly hired, she was under a

probationary period of 1 year. She was terminated for failing the probationary period.

When she returned home, she filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal

against her local recruitment agency and the foreign principal.

The LA ruled that her dismissal was illegal since there was not just cause to justify it.

On appeal, petitioner contends that the ministry (employer principal) a govt agency is

immune from suit. The NLRC affirmed the LAs decision.

In brushing aside petitioners contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry

and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court

noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all

responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas

worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any

violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.

Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents employment

contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service

Law and Regulations of Kuwait.

They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court

to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the

present case.

Issue: Is the principal immune from being sued?

Ruling: No.

In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their

foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and

assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.

Issue: are Philippine labor laws controlling as in this case?

Ruling: Yes

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can

establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,

including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they

are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law

has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in

this case, petitioners failed to discharge.

Processual Presumption - Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is

not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply

Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only

be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must

present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised

Rules of Court which reads

Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and

translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners

submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of

the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service

laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly

terminated.

MonteDeramos v Tri-Union International Corp

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/176700.htm

Facts

Petitioner was hired as stockman by Respondent Corporation in its outlet in Metro

Ayala Dept. Store, Cebu. The company is engaged in marketing and distributing company

b products.

Petitioner was suspended which is the basis for his complaint herein. He contends that he

was asked to sign a 5 month control but he refused because he knew he was a regular

employee

Respondent countered that he was served memoranda warning him of is tardiness

and after failing to answer the memo filed to him. Following his 3rd memo, he did not

report to work anymore.

The LA ruled in favor of his reinstatement since there was no dismissal nor abandonment.

On appeal the NLRC ruled the was illegally dismissed but did not award reinstatement but

favored separation pay instead.

The CA reversed the NLRCs decision. It went on to hold that petitioners infractions

resulting in his suspension tardiness and refusal to attend company meetings

because he was not allegedly paid remuneration were of his own wrongdoings.

He particularly highlights the fact that his one month suspension ended on July 31, 2003

but he was given a chance to report on August 9(sic), 2003 as amounting to constructive

dismissal.

Issue: Was petitioner illegally dismissed?

Ruling: No.

This petitioner failed to discharge. He, in fact, failed to refute respondents claim that it sent

him a Violation Memorandum, which was duly received by him on April 15, 2003, and a

subsequent Memorandum via registered mail,[20] requiring him to explain his habitual

tardiness on the therein indicated dates but that he failed to comply therewith.

That respondent advised petitioner on July 31, 2003 that he was supposed to report . . . [the

following day], August 1, 2003 but that he was given a chance to report on August 11,

2003 does not, in itself, amount to constructive dismissal. Bare allegations

of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given

credence.[21]

Constructive dismissal contemplates, among other things, quitting because continued

employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, or a demotion in rank or a

diminution of pay. It clearly exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or

disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee, leaving him with no option

but to forego his continued employment.[22] Not any of these circumstances exists to call

for a ruling that petitioner was constructively dismissed.

National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries V NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/september2008/179402.htm

Facts

Petitioner NUWHRAIN is a legitimate labor organization composed of rank-and-

file employees of the Hotel,[3] while respondent Acesite Philippines Hotel

Corporation is the owner and operator of said Hotel.

The Hotel entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with HI-MANILA

PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION (), the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-

file employees of the Hotel.

NUWHRAIN was accorded by the Labor Relations Division of the Department of Labor

and Employment (DOLE) the status of a legitimate labor organization.[7] Thereafter,

NUWHRAIN exercised the right to challenge the majority status of the incumbent union,

HIMPHLU, by filing a Petition for Certification Election on 28 June 2005.

HIMPHLU then demanded the hotel to dismiss 36 of its employees for alleged

disloyalty and violation of its CBA. The union contends that they left HIMPHLU to

join NUWHRAIN, a violiation of the CBA union security clause.

The hotel issued notices to the 36 members imploring them to explain their side. The hotel

also effected reconciliatory efforts to prevent the dismissal of the employees.

NUWHRAIN filed a notice to strike before the NCMB for ULP against the hotel. The Sec

of labor intervened and certified the case for compulsory arbitration with the NLRC.

The NLRC and the CA ruled that the hotel did not commit any ULP. That it was prudent

for the hotel to carry out any reconciliatory measures that lead to the non-dismissal of the

employees.

Issue: Did the hotel commit ULP?

Ruling: No.

The Collective Bargaining Agreement includes a union security provision.[28] To avoid the

clear possibility of liability for breaching the union security clause of the Collective

Bargaining Agreement and to protect its own interests, the only sensible option left to the

Hotel, upon its receipt of the demand of HIMPHLU for the dismissal of the 36 employees,

was to conduct its own inquiry so as to make its own findings on whether there was

sufficient ground to dismiss the said employees who defected from HIMPHLU.

The issuance by the respondent of the Notices requiring the 36 employees to submit their

explanations to the charges against them was the reasonable and logical first step in a fair

investigation. It is important to note that the Hotel did not take further steps to terminate

the 36 employees. Instead, it arranged for reconciliatory conferences between the

contending unions in order to avert the possibility of dismissing the 36 employees for

violation of the union security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Had the Hotel totally ignored this demand, as NUWHRAIN suggests it should have

done, the Hotel would have been subjected to a suit for its failure to comply with the

terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

In the case at bar, there is even less possibility of sustaining a finding of guilt for unfair

labor practice where respondent did not dismiss the 36 employees, despite the insistence

of HIMPHLU, the sole bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of the Hotel, on

the basis of the union security clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The only

act attributed to the respondent is its issuance of the Notices which, contrary to being an

unfair labor practice, even afforded the employees involved a chance to be heard.

Pentagon Steel Corp v CA and NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/174141.htm

Facts:

Petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing G.I. wire and nails wherein

respondent worked in its wire department. Respondent was declared AWOL after he

failed to report to work for a few days. Petitioner made sure to have sent notices to him

by registered mail demanding him to explain why.

Respondent filed a complaint before the NLRC for underpayment/nonpayment of salaries

and wages, OP, HP, SIL, 13th money pay, sep pay and ecola. He contends that is absence

was due to infection resulting in diarrhea and loose bowel movement and said illness

prevented him from work.

He contends that petitioner wont admit him back even with a medical certificate.

Because of petitioner not letting him work, hence the complaint. He later amended his

complaint to include illegal dismissal

The LA dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint. The LA contends that no Illegal

dismissal took place and that his (respondent) allegations lack corroborating

evidence.

The NLRC reversed. The court reason that the defense of abandonment of work cannot

be accepted since there was no intention of respondent to sever the er-ee relationshiop.

Separation pay was awarded.

The CA affirmed the NLRCs finding but favored reinstatement.

The CA held that the respondent was constructively dismissed when the petitioner

repeatedly refused to accept the respondent back to work despite the valid medical

reason that justified his absence from work.

The appellate court ruled that the petitioner failed to prove a clear and deliberate intent

on the respondents part to discontinue working with no intention of returning. The

CA took note of the respondents eagerness to return to work when he obtained a note from

his doctor about his fitness to return to work.

Issue: was respondent constructively dismissed?

Ruling: Yes.

We significantly note that by reporting for work repeatedly, the respondent

manifested his willingness to comply with the petitioners rules and regulations and

his desire to continue working for the latter. The petitioner, however, barred him from

resuming his work under the pretext that he had violated a company directive. This is a

clear manifestation of the petitioners lack of respect and consideration for the respondent

who had long served the company without blemish, but who had to absent himself because

of illness. The petitioners actions, under these circumstances, constitute constructive

dismissal.

the illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights

and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits

or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time his compensation was withheld from

him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

Plantation Bay Resort and Spa & Belarmino v Dubrico

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/182216.htm

Facts

Respondents are former employees of Plantation Bay located in Cebu, of which Belarmino

is the Manager. On several dates in September 2004, after Plantation Bay issued a series

of memoranda and conducted seminars[5] relative to its drug-free workplace policy.

The carried out the random drug test with the assistance of SOCO and the Philipping druge

screening lab inc.

Respondent failed to TAKE the drug test. A memorandum was sent to him asking him

to explain why. He averred he was not informed about his selection .

Dubrico was later tested and found positive for use of methamphetamine

hydrochloride. Twenty other employees were found positive for use

of shabu including herein respondents Godfrey Ngujo (Ngujo) and Julius Villaflor

(Villaflor).

The employees then were dismissed after the hotel found their reasons unsatisfactory. The

basis the hotel raised was serious misconduct. Hence the complaint for illegal dismissal,

questioning the conduct of the drug test without the presences of the DOLE regional

director or rep.

The LA dismissed the complaint. He discredited the drug test results seeing that it was

conducted AFTER the random drug tests schedule. The NLRC affirmed but on MR, the

NLRC reversed its decision ruling that they were illegally dismissed.

In finding for respondents, the NLRC held that the results of the confirmatory drug

tests cannot be given credence since they were conducted prior to the conduct by the

employer of the drug tests.

The veracity of the confirmatory tests was raised by respondents only when they filed a

belated Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision, hence, the NLRC gravely

abused its discretion when it reversed its findings based on such new issue.

They maintain that in terminating the services of respondents, they relied on the results of

the random drug tests undertaken by an accredited and licensed drug testing facility, and if

the results turned out to be questionable or erroneous, they should not be made liable

therefor.

Issue: did the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion?

Ruling: No.

The NLRC did not err in considering the issue of the veracity of the confirmatory

tests even if the same was raised only in respondents Motion for Reconsideration of

its Decision, it being crucial in determining the validity of respondents dismissal from

their employment.

In the interest of substantial justice, new or additional evidence may be introduced on

appeal before the NLRC.

The Constitution no less directs the State to afford full protection to labor. To achieve this

goal, technical rules of procedure shall be liberally construed in favor of the working class

in accordance with the demands of substantial justice.

Issue: Is the drug testing credible? Were the employees ILLEGALLY Dismissed?

Ruling: No and Yes.

The confirmatory test results were released earlier than those of the drug test, thereby

casting doubts on the veracity of the confirmatory results.

Indeed, how can the presence of shabu be confirmed when the results of the initial

screening were not yet out? Plantation Bays arguments that it should not be made liable

thereof and that the doubt arising from the time of the conduct of the drug and confirmatory

tests was the result of the big volume of printouts being handled by Martell do not thus

lie. It was Plantation Bays responsibility to ensure that the tests would be properly

administered, the results thereof being the bases in terminating the employees

services.

In fine, as petitioners failed to indubitably prove that respondents were guilty of drug

use in contravention of its drug-free workplace policy amounting to serious

misconduct, respondents are deemed to have been illegally dismissed.

Hilario Ramirez V CA

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/december2009/182626.htm

Facts

Respondent worked for petitioner as one of its emergency/rescuer mechanic. He was

initially hired as construction worker, then promoted to mechanic. They were said to

have been paid in a packyao basis.

Respondent contends that he was not allowed to work because he refused to be paid on

a pakyaw basis, hence the complaint for illegal dismissal.

For petitioner, respondent abandoned his job. He did not follow a lawful order it

(petitioner) made. He also failed to report to work the next day when the order was given

hence abandonment of work. HE did not in any way presented an answer for not

answering an emergency call and or filing a leave of absence.

The LA ruled that neither was there illegal dismissal nor abandonment in the case since

the allegations lack supporting evidence. Nevertheless it ordered petitioner to pay

respondent his money claims amounting to over 45,000.00

Petitioner filed an MR with urgent motion to reduce the appeal bond on the 9th day of the

reglementary period before the NLRC. the NLRC ruled that the ground to reduce the

bond was not sufficient (bond posted was 10,000). The court added that petitioner failed

to substantially comply with the rules hence he failed to perfect his appeal.

The order of the LA became final and executory hence the petitioner before the SC.

Issue: Did petitioner substantially comply with the requirements in Article 223 regarding the

appeal bond?

Ruling: No.

The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving

monetary awards from the decision of the labor arbiter. The word only in Articles 223

of the Labor Code makes it unmistakably plain that the lawmakers intended the posting of

a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the essential and exclusive means by which an

employer's appeal may be perfected.

Clearly, the filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional

requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the

NLRC.

In this case, although Ramirez posted an appeal bond, the same was insufficient, as it was

not equivalent to the monetary award of the Labor Arbiter. Moreover, when Ramirez

sought a reduction of the bond, he merely said that the bond was excessive and

baseless without amplifying why he considered it as such.

It is daylight-clear from the foregoing that while the bond may be reduced upon motion by

the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall

be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the

monetary award is posted by the appellant; otherwise, the filing of the motion to reduce

bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The qualification

effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within the

10-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety

bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period.

We have always stressed that Article 223, which prescribes the appeal bond requirement,

is a rule of jurisdiction and not of procedure.

Jarvin Davies V NLRC

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/aug1993/gr_106915_1993.html

Facts:

Respondent salutin worked for petitioner Jardine Davies as its agronomist, a job that

involves the promotion and use of JDI (petitioner) pesticides and products.

Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal plus money claims; the Labor arbiter

ruled in favor of his reinstatement and payment of his claims.

Petitioner appealed posting a supersedeas bond to answer the money claims. But the

cases was dismissed by NLRC and likewise Its MR was denied for the order has become

final and executory.

During the events narrated above, certain material facts occurred involving the

reinstatement of Salutin. He was directed to work in its Bacolod branch but did not last

long and since have left his work. This prompted petitioner to stop paying his salary.

Hence petitioner filed a manifestation and motion that saluting has abandoned his work

for being absent for 3 weeks without explanation; the award of reinstatement have been

waived. Salutin opposed the motion. He contends he was suffering a serious ailment. He

presented a med certificate to corroborate his claim.

Petitioner claims he was employed elsewhere.

The motion and subsequent MR denied, hence the certiorari petition. Petitioner also filed

a writ of Prelim injunction and or TRO to prevent the enforcement of Salutins

reinstatement.

Issue: Did the Commission (NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that

respondent did not abandon his work?

Ruling: No.

Abandonment of position is a matter of intention expressed in clearly certain and unequivocal acts. In this instance, however, certain uncontroverted facts show just

exactly the opposite. Hence, Salutin did report, as directed, on 24 September 1991, but

that he could not stay long because he was ailing at that time; he, although perhaps

belatedly made, did seek medical consultation on 7 November 1991, at the Corazon

Locsin Montelibano Memorial Regional Hospital, for "peptic ulcer"; and on 11

December 1991, he did, in fact, manifest his desire to assume his work with the

petitioner.

This Court's resolution of 26 February 1992, denying the petition in G.R. No. 103720, became final and executory on 19 June 1992. Respondent Salutin's interim employment,

stressed by the petitioner, did not stain the picture at all. Here, we second the well-

considered view of NLRC, thus

The order of immediate reinstatement pending appeal, in cases of illegal dismissal

is an ancillary relief under R.A. 6715 granted to a dismissed employee to cushion

him and his family against the impact of economic dislocation or abrupt loss of

earnings. If the employee chooses not to report for work pending resolution of the

case appeal, he foregoes such a temporary relief and is not paid of his salary. The

final determination of the rights and obligations respectively of the parties is the

ultimate and final resolution of this Commission.

Pioneering Texturing Corp v NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/oct1997/118651.htm

Facts

Private respondent Lourdes A. de Jesus is petitioners reviser/trimmer since 1980 (12

years worked).

She was dismissed for allegedly dishonesty and tampering official records with the

intention of cheating. In her defense, respondent contends that she may have been

negligent for trimming the ribs of PO No. 3853 since they look like the ones in PO no

3824. She was not dishonest nor did she tampered any documents.

The LA ruled that her dismissal was not justified and ordered reinstatement. On appeal,

the NLRC ruled that she was negligent but nevertheless ruled to have her reinstatement

without backwages.

Also Petitioners theory is that an order for reinstatement is not self-executory. They

stress that there must be a writ of execution which may be issued by the NLRC or

by the Labor Arbiter motu proprio or on motion of an interested party. They further

maintain that even if a writ of execution was issued, a timely appeal coupled by the

posting of appropriate supersedeas bond, which they did in this case, effectively

forestalled and stayed execution of the reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue: Was she illegally dismissed?

Ruling: Yes.

Gleaned either from the Labor Arbiters observations or from the NLRCs assessment, it

distinctly appears that petitioners accusation of dishonesty and tampering of official

records and documents with intention of cheating against de Jesus was not

substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioners simply failed, both before

the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, to discharge the burden of proof and to validly justify

de Jesus dismissal from service.

We also find the imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal against de Jesus as

certainly harsh and grossly disproportionate to the negligence committed, especially

where said employee holds a faithful and an untarnished twelve-year service

record.

Equally unmeritorious is petitioners assertion that the dismissal is justified on the basis

of loss of confidence. In this case, petitioners were unsuccessful in establishing their

accusations of dishonesty and tampering of records with intention of cheating. Indeed,

even if petitioners allegations against de Jesus were true, they just the same failed to

prove that her position needs the continued and unceasing trust of her employees

functions.

Issue: Is reinstatement immediately executory, even pending appeal?

Ruling: Yes

Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5) years

from the date a decision, an order or awards becomes final and executory. It cannot

relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which

Article 223 contemplates.

The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately

executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay

the execution for reinstatement. The legislative content is quite obvious, i.e., to make an

award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal.

Buenviaje v NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/nov2002/147806.htm

Facts

Petitioners worked for respondent Cotton way as their promo girls for their garment

products. Their services were terminated for respondent was allegedly suffering business

losses.

Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and the LA ruled that petitioners

retrenchment program was valid.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LAs decision and ordered their reinstatement.

The respondent made a manifestation before the NLRC that it complied with the orders

of reinstatement but the petitioners did not return to work and due to such, they have lost

their employment.

Petitioners filed a motion for execution of the decision on the ground that it was already

final and executory. Respondent also filed a manifestation reiterating that the petitioners

already found employment somewhere.

Labor Arbiter Romulus S. Protasio issued an Order declaring that the award of

backwages and proportionate thirteenth month pay to petitioners should be limited from

the time of their illegal dismissal up to the time they received the notice of termination

sent by the company upon their refusal to report for work despite the order of

reinstatement. He cited the fact that petitioners failed to report to their posts without

justifiable reason despite respondent's order requiring them to return to work

immediately.

The CA favored respondent. Reinstatement not possible because of the deliberate refusal

of petitioners to go back to work . The Court of Appeals thus held that the amount of

backwages due them should be computed only up to the time they received their notice of

termination.

Issue: WON back wages should be limited from the time they were illegally dismissed until

they received their notice of termination?

Ruling:

Under R.A. 6715, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages,

inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from

the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual

reinstatement. If reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed

from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.

closer adherence to the legislative policy behind Rep. Act No. 6715 points to "full

backwages" as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages the earnings

derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal.

Issue: did petitioner abandon their work? Was their dismissal valid then?

Ruling: No.

Petitioners' alleged failure to return to work cannot be made the basis for their

termination.Such failure does not amount to abandonment which would justify the

severance of their employment.

The facts of this case do not support the claim of Cottonway that petitioners have

abandoned their desire to return to their previous work at said company. It appears that

three months after the NLRC had rendered its decision ordering petitioners reinstatement

to their former positions, Cottonway sent individual notices to petitioners mandating

them to immediately report to work.

We note that Cottonway, before finally deciding to dispense with their services, did not

give the petitioners the opportunity to explain why they were not able to report to work.

The records also do not bear any proof that all the petitioners received a copy of the

letters.

It appears that the supposed notice sent by Cottonway to the petitioners demanding that

they report back to work immediately was only a scheme to remove the petitioners for

good. Petitioners failure to instantaneously abide by the directive gave them a convenient

reason to dispense with their services.

Roquero v PAL

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/apr2003/152329.htm

Facts

Roquero and Rene Pabayo were employees (mechanics) respondent PAL. They were

caught possessing shabu n a raid conducted by PAL security.

They alleged that they were instigated by a certain Alipato wo was introdocued to them by

the Airport division manager of PAL. Alipato bragged about being able to smuggle the

drugs in the airport. They were bought to the security office of PAL where written

confessions were taken from them without the benefit of a counsel.

They then received a notice for administrative charge for violating the PALcode of

discipline and subsequently put in preventive suspension.

In their reply agains the admin charge against them, they alleged that Alipato instigated

them to commit the crime. No record of employment was found regarding Alipato inside

PAL.

The LA ruled that the illegal dismissal was valid. But ruled in favor of giving them

separation pay. Whiel the case was on appeal before the NLRC, they were acquitted by the

RTC for the crime.

The NLRC ruled to have them reinstated and petitioners subsequently asked the court to

issue a writ of execution which PAL refused contending that it has a petition for review

before the CA.

The CA ruled to have them reinstated but without the award of separation pay on the ground

that they were not deserving of the said benefits.

There is no question that petitioner Roquero is guilty of serious misconduct for possessing and using shabu. He violated Chapter 2, Article VII, section 4 of the PAL Code of

Discipline which states:

Any employee who, while on company premises or on duty, takes or is under the influence of prohibited or controlled drugs, or hallucinogenic substances or narcotics

shall be dismissed.

Issue: Is reinstatement immediately executory?

Ruling: Yes.

The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the

employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective

from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of

execution.[24] Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor

Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was

granted. Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in

the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as

if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the

decision of this Court.

Juanito Garcia v PAL

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/jan2009/164856.htm

Facts

The case stemmed from the admin charge filed by PAL against herein petitioners when they are

allegedly caught sniffing shabu.

They were dismissed by PAL for violation of the PAL Code of Discipline after due notice that

led to the filing of herein complaint.

The LA ruled infavor of their immediatereinstatement. Prior to the decision, PAL was suffering

from losses that it was put under an Interim Rehab receiver by the SEC and later on, on

permanent rehab receiver.

PAL appealed to the NLRC but it dismissed the complain.

INCOMPLETE INCOMPLETE INCOMPLETE INCMPLETE INCOMPLETE

King Integrated Security Inc v Gatan

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/143813.htm

Facts

Galo S. Gatan, respondent, filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal deduction

and underpayment of wages against King Integrated Security Services, Inc. and/or Mina

King

The Labor arbiter ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay the wage

differential. On appeal, te NLRC deleted the wage differential between nov 2 1990 and

feb 10 1992 contending that it is in accord with Article 291 of the Labor Code which

provides that all money claims arising from an ER-EE relations shall be filed with 3 years

from the time the cause of action accrued.

The NLRC resolution became final and executory; the LA ordered for the execution of

the order. The CA affirmed the NLRC order on appeal hence, this petition.

According to petitioner a) in disregarding their documentary evidence showing that

respondent received in full his monthly salary; and, b) in failing to consider his admission

that his monthly salary rates effective December 16, 1993 and April 1, 1994 were

P5,029.16 and P5,397.97, respectively.

Issue: Is a decision that becomes final and executory appealable?

Ruling: No.

We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment is not

appealable, otherwise, there would be no end to a case.

Settled is the rule that after a judgment has become final, no additions can be made

thereto, and nothing can be done therewith except its execution; otherwise, there would

be no end to litigations, thus setting at naught the main role of courts of justice, which is

to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order, by

setting justiceable controversies with finality.

Issue: did the CA erred in giving attention to the MR petitioner filed?

Ruling: Yes

Yet, despite the fact that what is being assailed is the NLRC Resolution ordering the

issuance of a writ of execution, still the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition

for certiorari and evaluated the parties evidence. Clearly, the Court of Appeals

overstepped its jurisdiction.

Once a decision or resolution becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty

of the court or tribunal to order its execution. Such order, we repeat, is not

appealable.

St. Martin Funeral Home v NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/sep1998/130866.htm

Facts

PCI Travel Corp v NLRC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/october2008/154379.htm

Facts

NUBE-AMEXPEA/PCI travel Employees union filed a complaint for ULP against

petitioner. They contend that petitioner were filling up regular positions with

contractual employees who were performing necessary and desirable work in the

usual business of petitioner.

They prayed that the contractual be paid their differentials and their (union

employees) actual wages and benefits to them plus damages.

The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. It averred that the contractuals were

sourced legitimately from an independent contractor.

The LA ruled contending that the motion to dismiss was a PROHIBITED PLEADING.

Hence it rendered the judgement in favor of the union.

The NLRC affirmed and likewise the CA outright dismissed the complaint for lack of

necessary documents, and lack of a verification and certification of non- forum

shopping. The CA also ruled that the president of PCI travel has no authority to sign

the papers submitted and cannot bind petitioner to the proceedings.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the Rules of Court does not

require the submission of proof of due authorization to sign the verification and

certification of non-forum shopping for a petition to prosper. Nonetheless, petitioner

subsequently filed a manifestation stating that earnest efforts and diligence have been

exerted in searching for said board resolution, but to no avail.

The MR was denied hence petition.

Issue: WON President of a corporation is authorized to sign the verification and certification

against forum shopping, without need of a board resolution.

Ruling: Yes.

In the recent case of Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can

sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the

Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the

General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an

Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the

verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of

the authority was done on a case-to-case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing

cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation

to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being in a position to verify

the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.

Laguna Metts Corporation v CA

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/185220.htm

Facts

A labor case was file by respondents against petitioner. The LA and the NLRC ruled

for respondent.

Petitioner filed before the CA a motion for extension of the prescribed period for filing a

petitioner for certiorari under Rule 65 of the RoC. A 15 day extension was prayed. Said

extension was granted by the court.

Respondent moved to have the extension reconsidered since according to A.M. No. 07-7-

12-SC which amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of the RoC, the extension is not allowed.

The MR was denied. The CA opined that although the amendment calls for the stricter

observance of the periods, it did not strip the CA of power to grant the motion for

exceptional cases

Hence this petitioner for certiorari before the SC contending that the CA gravely abused

its discretion when it granted the extension

Issue: Did the CA err in granting the 15 day extension?

Ruling: Yes

The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to

prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case

or even defeat the ends of justice.

Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did

away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari

must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order

denying a motion for reconsideration.

While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for filing a petition

for certiorari beyond the 60-day period,[11] the amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No.

07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion

of the paragraph that previously permitted such extensions.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals retained the discretion to grant extensions of

time to file a petition for certiorari for compelling reasons, the reasons proffered by

private respondents counsel did not qualify as compelling. Heavy workload is relative

and often self-serving.[15] Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from

the 60-day rule.

Agustillo v CA and SMC

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/sep2001/142875.htm

Facts

Petitioner is an employee of respondent SMC who worked initially as a temporary

employee but later on was regularized as a safety clerk. His position was later

abolished wherein he was transferred to a different position.

SMC carried out a retrenchment program in favor of modernizing its facilities.

Petitioner was dismissed from the service.

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for ULP, illegal dismissal and

payment of money claims.

He alleged that he was a regular employee and he was terminated because of his union

activities; he wanted to create a union and or join later on BMP (buklod mangagagawang

Pilipino)

He averred that he was deceived by SMC about its program of modernizing its

production when after 3 years, the machineries pursuant to its labor cutting

program hasnt been operational.

The LA ruled that his dismissal was valid as is the retrenchment program. Likewise

it found the receipt and release signed by petitioner to be valid and technically he

was barred from contesting since his ULP complaint was prescribed (article 290 Par

2).

The NLRC vacated the ruling however. It declared his dismissal illegal and ordered SMC

to pay.

MR denied, respondent filed a petitioner for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a

TRO. At the same time petitioner sough a writ of execution of the order. The TRO was

granted. After the TRO expired (60 days) the LA refused to enforce the writ .

The CA then ruled reversing the NLRC and favored the view of the LA hence this

petition.

Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it

refused to dismiss the original special civil action of certiorari filed by private

respondents before it. Petitioner argues that whatever error of judgment the NLRC may

have committed in this case is not correctible through an original special civil action for

certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

Issue: WON a SCA for certiorari is the correct mode in assailing the judgements of the NLRC

Ruling: In St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC,[14] it was held that the special civil action of

certiorari is the mode of judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC either by this Court and

the Court of Appeals, although the latter court is the appropriate forum for seeking the relief

desired in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts and that, in the exercise of

its power, the Court of