6.40 Offshore Platform Hazid Envid Report

KCP-GNS-IFS-HAZ-0001

Revision: 03

Project Title: Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project Page 1 of 26

Document Title: Offshore Platform HAZID/ENVID Report

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

The information contained in this document (the Information) is provided in good faith.

E.ON UK plc, its subcontractors, subsidiaries, aff i l iates, employees, advisers, and the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) make no representation or warranty as to the accuracy, reliabil ity or completeness of the Information and neither E.ON UK plc nor any of its subcontractors, subsidiaries, aff i l iates, employees, advisers or DECC shall have any l iabi l ity whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss howsoever arising from the use of the Information by any party.

Offshore Platform HAZID/ENVID Report Table of Contents 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2

1.1. Document Purpose and Scope ................................................................................. 2 1.2. Objective ................................................................................................................... 2 1.3. Scope ........................................................................................................................ 3 1.4. Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ 3

2. Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 4 2.1. Overview ................................................................................................................... 4 2.2. HAZID/ENVID Nodes ................................................................................................ 4 2.3. HAZID/ENVID Process ............................................................................................. 4 2.4. Reference Materials .................................................................................................. 5 2.5. Meeting Attendees .................................................................................................... 5

3. Main Findings and Actions Arising ..................................................................................... 6 4. Supporting References ....................................................................................................... 7 Appendix List of Appendices ................................................................................................... 8 Appendix A: HAZID/ENVID Guidewords ................................................................................. 9 Appendix B: HAZID/ENVID Reference Materials .................................................................. 13 Appendix C: Completed HAZID/ENVID Worksheets ............................................................ 21 Table of Tables Table 2.1 List of HAZID/ENVID Reference Materials ............................................................. 5 Table 2.2 List of HAZID/ENVID Attendees ............................................................................. 5 Table 3.1 HAZID/ENVID Actions ............................................................................................ 6 Table of Figures Figure 1-1: Outline System Schematic ................................................................................... 2


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1. Introduction

1.1. Document Purpose and Scope E.ON UK has commissioned Genesis Oil and Gas Consultants Ltd. (GOGC) to perform the Front End Engineering Design (FEED 1a) for the pipeline and offshore facility associated with the E.ON Kingsnorth Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) development project. An outline system schematic of the development is presented in Figure 1-1.

Kingsnorth Power Station

CCS Pig Launcher

ESDV

Meter

Compressor

Kingsnorth Platform

CCS Pig Receiver

ESDV

Landfall Valve

Onshore Pipeline

Landfall Offshore Pipeline

Figure 1-1: Outline System Schematic

As required by both E.ON UK and GOGC risk management processes, the potential hazards associated with the system require identification by a hazard and environmental identification (HAZID/ENVID) process.

This document details the output from a HAZID/ENVID meeting that took place on the 21st September at GOGC Aberdeen Offices.

1.2. Objective

The purpose of the meeting was to identify key safety, health and environmental (SHE) hazards that have the potential to significantly impact upon or influence the subsequent project design phases. Where such hazards were identified, the proposed measures to prevent, control or mitigate them were reviewed. Where necessary, further or alternative measures were actioned.


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The overall objective of the HAZID/ENVID was to, wherever possible; ensure that the inherent safety, health and environmental principles are applied to the project design and to prescribe philosophies or controls to manage residual risks.

1.3. Scope

The HAZID/ENVID meeting covered both the Kingsnorth Platform structure as well as the process equipment. The scope of the process equipment review started at the riser base connection, through the filters, meters and heaters and ended at the CO2 injection master well valve.

Due to the lack of detail design definition at the time of the meeting, decommissioning of the platform was outside of the HAZID/ENVID review scope.

SHE issues not impacting upon or influencing the FEED 1a design or its operating philosophy were outside the scope of the HAZID/ENVID meeting.

1.4. Abbreviations

CCS Carbon Capture and Storage ENVID Environmental Hazard Identification GOGC Genesis Oil and Gas Consultants Ltd HAZID Hazard Identification SHE Safety, Health and Environmental TOR Terms of Reference


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2. Methodology

2.1. Overview The HAZID/ENVID Terms of Reference (TOR) [Ref. S1] was used as the methodology basis for the meeting.

2.2. HAZID/ENVID Nodes The study scope was divided into the following nodes to facilitate appropriate examination:

Node 1: The Kingsnorth Platform including the civil structure, process equipment, riser and CO2 injection lines.

Node 1.1: Construction;

Node 1.2: Commissioning and Operation, including drilling activities.

The TOR detailed Node 2 as the onshore and offshore pipeline. Node 2 was not examined during the HAZID/ENVID due to insufficient time remaining after studying the aforementioned nodes.

2.3. HAZID/ENVID Process The HAZID/ENVID guidewords were systematically applied to each of the study nodes to identify hazards that have the potential to give rise to safety, health or environmental consequences of concern.

The proposed prevention, control and associated mitigation measures were explored for each hazard that has the potential to give rise to consequences of concern. Further or alternative measures were proposed where the team were of the opinion that the proposed prevention, control or mitigation measures are not sufficient to reduce the associated risks to as low as is reasonably practicable levels.

Meeting attendees were reminded that the project was in FEED 1A. The focus of the meeting was therefore upon the identification of key safety, health and environmental hazards that had the potential to significantly impact upon or influence the subsequent design phases.

An E.ON UK provided HAZID/ENVID worksheet was used to record the minutes of the meeting. The worksheet was projected on a screen such that all participants could see its development during the meeting. Worksheet entries were made by exception, i.e. only HAZID/ENVID guidewords that gave rise to consequence of concern were recorded.

Several drawings were referenced during the meeting and are listed in Table 2.1.


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2.4. Reference Materials The materials referenced during the meeting are summarised in Table 2.1 and presented in Appendix B.

Document /Drawing Title Document Reference Rev

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture And Storage Project Hewitt Offshore Platform Level 1 Layout

J71584-A/ L-DW-sk1 A1


J71584-A/ L-DW-sk2 A1


J71584-A/ L-DW-sk3 A1


J71584-A/ L-DW-sk4 A1

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture And Storage Project Hewitt Offshore Platform Weather Deck Layout

J71584-A/ L-DW-sk5 A1

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture And Storage Project Hewitt Offshore Platform Elevation Looking East

J71584-A/ L-DW-sk6 A1

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture And Storage – PFD Platform & Pipeline Material Selection Diagram (Gaseous Phase)

KCP-GNS-PCD-PFD-0010 01

Table 2.1 List of HAZID/ENVID Reference Materials

2.5. Meeting Attendees Table 2.2 details the meeting attendees. The range of personnel ensured that the necessary skills, knowledge and experience were available to perform a thorough and accurate HAZID/ ENVID.

Name Role Company

Name Deleted HAZID/ ENVID Meeting Chairman GOGC

Name Deleted Safety Lead and Meeting Secretary GOGC

Name Deleted Safety Consultant E.ON UK

Name Deleted Process Lead GOGC

Name Deleted Facilities Lead Civil and Structural GOGC

Name Deleted Environmental Lead GOGC

Name Deleted Environmental Consultant E.ON NT

Name Deleted Production Technologist Baker RDS

Name Deleted Completion Engineer Baker RDS

Name Deleted Client Representative E.ON

Table 2.2 List of HAZID/ENVID Attendees # Part time.


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3. Main Findings and Actions Arising

The completed HAZID/ENVID worksheets are presented in Appendix C.

The HAZID/ENVID did not raise any issues that were likely to significantly affect the design of the Kingsnorth topsides process or structure. The six actions that arose during the HAZID/ENVID are detailed in Table 3.1.

Action No.

Action Actionee Action Due Date

1 Take cognisance of environmental report KCP-GNS-SHE-REP-0007 when determining the pile size

Name Deleted

End FEED 1B

2 Devise security philosophy for construction and NUI operation

Name Deleted

End FEED 2

3 Provide justification of a temperature lower than -50C will not be experienced at the wellhead during depressurisation of the topsides facilities

Name Deleted

31 Oct 2010

4 Confirm onshore compression has pressure protection to prevent exceeding 60 barg during gas phase operation

Name Deleted

30 Sept 2010

5 Reconfigure well arrangement to minimise distance between tree and wellhead valves and provide ready access to both

Name Deleted

30 Sept 2010

6 Produce integrated plan, to ensure drilling schedule identifies this hazard [drilling after pressurisation of topsides] and safeguard to manage risks

Name Deleted

End FEED 2

Table 3.1 HAZID/ENVID Actions


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4. Supporting References

[S1] Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project - Kingsnorth Platform and Pipeline HAZID/ENVID Meeting Terms of Reference - KCP-GNS-SHE-TOR-0001 Draft.


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Appendix List of Appendices

Appendix A HAZID/ENVID Guidewords

Appendix B HAZID/ENVID Reference Materials

Appendix C Completed HAZID/ENVID Worksheets

Appendix D HAZID/ENVID Action Sheets


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Appendix A: HAZID/ENVID Guidewords

1 Process Parameters

Temperature Pressure Flow

Level Inventory Compositions

Flash point Toxicity Corrosivity

Solid deposition Wax / hydrates Chemical reaction

Materials of construction/compatibility

Kinetic Energy Potential Energy

2 Operating methods

Black start Start up Shutdown

Normal operation SIMOPS Sampling

Calibrating Testing Service failure (air, water, etc)

Emergency shutdown Blowdown Isolation

Draining / venting Purging / filling Winterisation

Maintenance

3 Access / egress

Operational access Maintenance access Confined spaces

Means of escape Means of evacuation Life saving appliances

4 Environment

Liquid effluent Solid effluent Venting

Noise level Flaring Air intakes / exhausts

Ventilation Pressurisation Gas / Oxygen enrichment

Extreme weather Humidity Illumination

Discharges to Air Discharges to Water Odour

Environmental Receptors (including Population).

Energy Efficiency Lightening

5 Loss prevention

Fire / head detection Smoke / gas detection Active fire protection


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Fire areas Area classification Passive fire protection

Blast overpressure HP / LP interfaces Deluge drains

Ignition sources Leak sources

6 Plant and equipment

Design pressure Design temperature Materials of construction

Vibration Thermal stress Pressure cycling

Hydraulic shock Static electricity Ionising radiation

Mechanical seals Liquid seals Vacuum protection

Galvanic corrosion By-pass valves Hazardous areas

7 Structures

Loads on / strength of Structure / foundations / equipment supports

Type of loads Static / dynamic / environmental

Creep Scour Fire / blast walls

Impact protection Weights limits Platforms

Handrails Bunds / Drains Stairs / Ladders

Walkways Airlocks / doors Floors / Hatches

8 Control systems

ESD, F+G logic Control software DCS failure

Failure modes System reliability Alarms and trips

High integrity systems Overrides and resets Control room ergonomics

9 Electrical systems

Power supplies DC supplies Battery supplies / UPS

Distribution boards Cable routes Inductive effects

Load shedding Overload protection Heat tracing

Motor start frequency Emergency lighting EMC

10 Communication

Radios PA system Signs


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Beacons / klaxons Nav Aids

11 Installation

Temporary supports Sequence of events Rigging

Lifting points Scaffolding Hot work

Hot tap / line freeze Specialist welding Tie-in points

12 Personnel / Occupational Hazards

Slips / trips / falls Electrocution Hot / cold environment

Hand tools Manual handling Equipment failure

Hazardous chemicals Machine tools High level working

Rigging lines Ionising radiation Toxic gases / fume

Inert gases Smoke Steam

Asbestos Crew change Roles and responsibilities

Overboard working Human Factors

13 Dropped objects

Containers Gas bottle Swinging loads

Small overhead objects Drill pipe / casing Drill collars

Scaffolding Anchors Special lifts

14 Marine

Shuttle tanker Supply vessel Standby boat

Shipping lanes Drilling rig Diving support vessel

Anchor handling vessel Helicopter Fishing vessel

DP System Anchors Pipelines

Chains / cables Work < 500 m Buoys

15 Emergency Response

Temporary Refuge Command Structure Special procedures

Fire and Explosion H2S Gas TEMPSC

EER Helicopters Vessels


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Isolation

16 Drilling

Drilling Workover Wirelining

Mechanical problems Well control problems Drillstring problems

Formation problems Shallow gas Mud weight

17 Diving

Dropped objects Life support DSV

Breaking containment Process operation Maintenance

18 Site operations

Security access Vehicles Drains

Cranes Excavations Earth moving

Temporary facilities Third party contractors


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Appendix B: HAZID/ENVID Reference Materials

Appendix Document /Drawing Title Document Reference Rev

B1 Kingsnorth Offshore Platform Level 1 Layout J71584-A/ L-DW-sk1 A1

B2 Kingsnorth Hewitt Offshore Platform Level 2 Layout

J71584-A/ L-DW-sk2 A1



B5 Kingsnorth Platform Weather Deck Layout J71584-A/ L-DW-sk5 A1

B6 Kingsnorth Offshore Platform Elevation Looking East

J71584-A/ L-DW-sk6 A1

B7 Kingsnorth Platform & Pipeline Material Selection Diagram (Gaseous Phase)

KCP-GNS-PCD-PFD-0010 01

KCP-GNS-IFS-HAZ-0001 Revision: 03

Projec 6 t Title: Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project Page 14 of 2


KCP-GNS-IFS-HAZ-0001_03-ktKKDoc1--Offshore Platform HAZ D-ENVID Report doc

Print Date: 25 March 2011

Appendix B1 - Kingsnorth Offshore Platform Level 1 Layout


Project Title: 6 Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project Page 15 of 2




























Appendix B6 - Kingsnorth Offshore Platform Elevation Looking East


Project Title: Kingsno Page 20 of 26 rth Carbon Capture & Storage Project


KCP-GNS-IFS-HAZ-0001_03-ktKKDoc1--Offshore Platform HAZID-ENV D Report.doc Print Date: 25 March 2011

Appendix B7 - Kingsnorth PFD Platform & Pipeline Material Selection Diagram (Gaseous Phase)




KCP-GNS- FS-HAZ-0001_03-ktKKDoc1--Offshore Platform HAZ D-ENVID Report doc Print Date: 25 March 2011

Appendix C: Completed HAZID/ENVID Worksheets

HAZARD SCENARIO CAUSES CONSEQUENCES POTENTIAL IMPACT TO PEOPLE ON AND

OFFSITE

POTENTIAL IMPACT TO THE ENVIRONMENT

RECOMMENDED SAFEGUARDS ACTIONS/ COMMENTS (No)

Node 1.1: Kingsnorth Platform (construction) – including civil structures, process equipment, riser and CO2 injection

1 Operational access – potential diver access required during installation

Design requires diver intervention

Potential for diver injury/incident

Diver injury Design jacket for installation without diver intervention (pipeline connection to riser to be considered as part of pipeline HAZID)

2 Construction access – working at height and overside working.

Necessity to complete jacket-topsides connection

Requirement for access to potentially elevated or difficult to reach areas including overside working

Potential for personnel injury Provision of temporary access structures for completion of jacket- topsides connection, Access from ESDV deck may be considered as an option..

3 Noise/v bration Piliing activities Potential requirement for Disturbance Licence.

Occupational noise in excess of first action limit

Potential effect on protected species – possible damage or hearing loss.

Minimise size of pile consistent with platform structural integrity and stability. See KCP-GNS-SHE-REP-0007

(1) Take cognisance of environmental report KCP-GNS-SHE-REP-0007 when determining the pile size – ?? - FEED 1B

4 Nav Aids – vessel collision due to absence of navigational aids

Marine obstruction – unmarked by Nav Aids

Increased risk of passing vessel collision

Potential for personnel injury on both vessel and platform

Potential loss of containment of vessel cargo or fuel.

Nav Aids to be installed in accordance with regulatory requirements – at the installation stage of jacket and topsides. Note that temporary support for Nav Aids on the jacket will be required if it is to be left without topsides after installation.






OFFSITE


RECOMMENDED SAFEGUARDS ACTIONS/ COMMENTS (No)

5 Third Party intervention

Unauthorised third party gaining access to platform (possibly when unattended)

Potential project delay Potential personnel injury (to third parties or any personnel onboard)

Consideration of standby vessel during construction phase and CCTV on topsides.

(2) Devise security philosophy for construction and NUI operation – ?? – FEED 2.

6 Decommissioning Inability to remove completely the facility during decommissioning

Delay to project due to rejection of FDP because of inadequate decommissioning plans. Risk to shipping as a result of structures left subsea.

Potential;impact to vessel crew

Potential loss of containment of vessel cargo or fuel.

Installation is designed to be removed, as a reversal of installation.

All guidewords checked: Y

Base case and variation considered: N






OFFSITE


RECOMMENDED SAFEGUARDS ACTIONS/ COMMENTS

Node 1.2: Kingsnorth Platform (Commissioning and operation) – including drilling activities, operational process equipment, riser and CO2 injection

1 Low Temperature Heater failure during early dense phase operations (low reservoir pressure)

Potential Xmas tree failure causing loss of containment. Loss of tubing integrity

Toxic/asphyxiation impact of CO2

Wellhead specification (-50 C) is adequate to deal with heater failure and JT effect with maximum upstream pressure – during dense phase Ref KCP-GNS-PCD-REP-0007. Low temperature trip downstream of heaters isolates the well stream. Isolation of loss of containment – DHSV and flowline SDV.

Gaseous operation to continue long enough for wellhead pressure to be sufficiently high to obviate this scenario.

2 Low Temperature Blowdown of topsides results in low temperature in topsides pipework, up to Xmas trees – minimum achievable temperature is -79C.

Brittle failure to pipework due low temperature, leading to loss of containment


Material specification is rated for the lowest temperature likely to occur.

(3) Provide justification of a temperature lower than -50C will not be experienced at the wellhead during depressurisation of the topsides facilities – ?? – Oct 10






OFFSITE



3 Low Temperature Pipework failure on topsides

Low temperature CO2 release (gas and dry ice), ultimately causing structural failure and large temperatures gradients leading to buckling and failure.

Toxic/asphyxiation impact of CO2 plus personnel injury resulting from structural failure.

Material specification is rated for the lowest temperature likely to occur. Construction to reduce flanges and use all welded design where possible. Orientation of tappings, flanges etc . to minimise the effects of LOC incidents. Shielding (for structure and escapeways) to be provided where needed. Covered in layout review report.

4 High temperature Continued heating of trapped inventory (gaseous and dense phases)

Exceedence of pressure/temperature rating of pipework.


Multiple high temperature trips – gaseous phase.

Dense phase includes pressure relief to provide adequate protection.

5 High Pressure Pipeline/topsides packing due to continued CO2 compression with wells closed in (no other topsides isolations closed)

Topsides heaters rated at 60 barg, so will fail when pressure exceeds this. Other equipment is rated to 150 barg.


CO2 leak detection to be installed and executive action to isolate topsides and curtail leak.

(4) Confirm onshore compression has pressure protection to prevent exceeding 60 barg during gas phase operation – ?? 30 Sept 10.

6 Composition High water content in CO2

Increased rate of corrosion – topsides is stainless steel so main effect is on riser/pipelines and wellheads. Increased risk of hydrate formation


Possible CO2 release into sea

Water content monitoring at onshore dehydration. (automatic with manual back-up) PIMS and wellheads integrity management system.

Hydrate inhibition package to protect against topsides choke blockage.






OFFSITE



7 Composition Extraneous matter in pipeline

Contamination of well, leading to decreased injectivity. Filter blinding, requiring frequent filter changes.

Potential need for additional workovers, resulting in increased personnel risk exposure

Increased personnel presence on platform.

Environmental footprint due to the need to drill additional well.

Rigorous cleaning programme for pipeline during commissioning. Water content monitoring at onshore dehydration.

Filters installed topsides as final layer of protection for wells with differential pressure monitoring.

8 Flash point Methanol storage and use

Potential flammable atmosphere and fire if ignited

Potential for personnel injury – fire invisible to personnel

Hazardous area classification process and selection of appropriate ATEX equipment. Nitrogen blanket on storage. Fire detection provided and portable AFFF for firefighting.

9 Reverse flow Fractured flowline results in backflow from well, potentially containing hydrocarbons.

Potential fire if concentration of hydrocarbon above LFL.

Potential for personnel injury from fire and from release.

Head of CO2 in well column inhibits flow of hydrocarbon gas up to the wellhead. Check valve on flowline linlet. Xmas tree valve and DHSV to isolate reservoir and mitigate release.

During well completion, base of production tubing would contain completion fluid and brine, with low top hole pressure. Perforation into the reservoir would result in completion fluid flowing into the reservoir. Some hydrocarbons may flow into the production tubing, but with low pressure at the top of the tubing. Once CO2 injection commences, any fluid in the well column and in the near wellbore section of the reservoir would be displaced. Any well startup would be with a positive pressure into the welll (2.5 bar or more) thus ensuring no reverse flow case is credible during startup.

10 Reverse flow Fractured flowline results in backflow from well.

Release of CO2 from well Toxic CO2 impact on personnel

CO2 leak detection to be installed and executive action to isolate topsides and curtail leak, along with Xmas tree valves and DHSV.






OFFSITE



11 Startup Initial startup results filters requiring frequent changeout.

Personnel presence on platform increased for changeout operations, resulting in increased associated risk

Personnel injury, manual handling and potential impact of CO2 release if inadequately isolated.

Filter replacement will include positive isolation, venting and pressure confirmation, with safe system of work to control operations.

12 Well Arrangement Operational access to wellhead and tree valving with minimised conductor riser height to allow direct connection at a low a level as can be achieved. Spool piece section introduces additional leak path

Ready access to wellhead valves for pressure monitoring and for workover activities.

Additional leak path introduced by use of spool piece below tree.

Increased risk of loss of containment events

Increased risk of loss of containment events

(5) Reconfigure well arrangement to minimise distance between tree and wellhead valves and provide ready access to both- ?? – 30 Sept 10.

13 Drilling Drilling activity results in dropped object that damages process pipework

Potential loss of containment resulting in CO2 release should the topsides be pressured.

Potential harm to personnel in the event of a LOC, including impact to drilling rig and crew.

Undertake initial drilling of wells prior to pressurisation of topsides process.

(6) Integrated Plan, to ensure drilling schedule identifies this hazard and safeguard to manage risks – E.ON FEED 2.

14 Vehicles (fishing and other vessels)

Concurrent significant CO2 release and vessels within effect radii.

Build-up of cold CO2 at sea surface around platform.

Potential for harm to vessel crew.

CO2 detection with appropriate executive action maybe combined with warning of shipping in vicinity by radio and/or General Alarm.

All guidewords checked: Y

Base case and variation considered: N

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6.40 Offshore Platform Hazid Envid Report