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7 November 2019

ISSN: 2560-1628

2019 No. 8

WORKING PAPER

Sino-Albanian Relations: 70 years of diplomatic ties in

retrospect

Marsela Musabelliu

Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft.

Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin

Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping

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Sino-Albanian Relations: 70 years of diplomatic ties in retrospect

Abstract

People’s Republic of China and Albania are two countries with a long history and unique

cultures. Currently, the two nations have bilateral cooperation on politics, trade, investments,

culture, people-to-people exchange and plenty other areas. The core principles to this

cooperation are mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, and mutual benefit. There still persists a

common desire and fundamental interests of two peoples to continuously deepen the traditional

friendship and push ahead the cooperation on the grounds of mutual understanding. Yet, there

exists plenty of untapped potential.

This paper is an overview of Sino-Albanian cooperation aiming to illustrate the path of

unified ideology and actions under the Marxist line at the height of the Cold War., and the good

relations that continued in the aftermath of China’s opening-up policy to this day. Another

channel of relations, which can be highly credited, is the Chinese economic assistance to

Albania in the 1960s and 1970s and the impact it had on the entire Albanian society. It tries to

trace the motifs of the political disruption of the cooperation between the two countries in the

late 70s and describes the mutual “obliviousness” of almost two decades. The last part observes

the bilateral attitude in the beginning of the 21st century with the revival of trade, the economic

cooperation after the 2008 financial crisis, and the rekindled ties with the ‘17+1’ cooperation

platform.

Key words: Sino-Albanian Relations, Peculiar Alliance, Political Cooperation.

Introduction

People’s Republic of China and Albania established diplomatic relations on November

23rd, 1949. The Albanian government welcomed and applauded the victory of 1949 (October

1st) and they were among the first countries to recognize the new Chinese state and establish

friendly relations.1 The first approach of an Albanian high level delegation in Chinese territory

was in 1956, on which occasion Enver Hoxha headed a delegation at the Eighth Congress of

the Communist Party of China. This Albanian delegation did not have any personal knowledge

1PRIFTI, PETER R. Socialist Albania since 1944: domestic and foreign developments. Vol. 23. Mit Press, 1978.

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on China and Chinese politics, besides the ones given to them from the soviet comrades.2 After

arriving in Beijing on September 13, 1956, Hoxha held his first (and only) meeting with Mao

Zedong in between sessions of the Party's Congress.

The relations between China and Albania, two countries that established a unique alliance

during the Cold War, remain to this day somehow underexplored by scholars. However, in light

of new documents in the past decades new attempts have been made to shed light on the

dynamics of the relations between China and Albania, covering both the Cold War period, and

more recent developments.3 Based on primary and secondary sources, the aim of this

contribution is to have an historical overview of the relations between China and Albania on

the occasion of the seventy years of the establishment of the diplomatic relations. Since the

beginning of the relations between Beijing and Tirana, there have been drastic fluctuations of

attitude, policies, cooperation agenda and diplomatic approach. Yet, both countries have

managed to maintain friendly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation regardless of the

political and economic changes that both China and Albania underwent throughout these

seventy years. This paper is descriptive in nature and relies mainly on secondary sources (such

as books, journal articles, and various other publications), and some primary sources (such as

archival documentation, memoirs of main actors of the events), few interviews personally

conducted, and public speeches. The fundamental works of Lisen Bashkurti, Elez Biberaj,

Ylber Marku, Elidor Mëhilli, Ana Lalaj, Miranda Vickers, Peter Prifti and the memoirs of

former Albanian leader Enver Hoxha constitute the basis literature of the historical part of this

paper. For the more recent events on Sino-Albanian relations, given the lack of academic

studies, the analysis is based on the survey of media platforms, news outlets, commentaries and

governmental press releases.

1- Ideology that defeats geography

The political and ideological common backgrounds of China and Albania set the very

startup of their close relations in the mid-50s. The origin and further strengthening of political

relations between China and Albania are to be found in the common interests and understanding

2 HOXHA, ENVER. Reflections on China, vol. I: 1962–1972, Extracts from the Political Diary, (Tirana: 8 Nentori Publishing House, 1979). 3 For the Cold War period see Elez Biberaj, Albania and China. A Study of an Unequal Alliance (Boulder, Co, and London: Westview Press, 1986); Elidor Mëhilli, From Stalin to Mao. Albania and the Socialist World (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), 211-225; Elidor Mëhilli, ‘Mao and the Albanians’, in Mao’s Little Red Book. A Global History, Alexander C. Cook ed., (Berkeley, CA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 165-184.

3

of the two ruling parties in the respective countries, the Communist Party of China (CCP) and

the Party of Labor of Albania (PLA). Following the death of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, in

Moscow – the very center of the Communist world – winds of change was fleeing and cardinal

political twists were taking place.4 Both the Chinese party and the Albanian party followed an

independent policy from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The causes of

Albania’s estrangement from the Soviet Union and its quick orientation towards the People’s

Republic of China, have been subject of important studies.5 The rise to power in Soviet Union

of Nikita Khrushchev initiated the Albanian-Soviet split. Albania was the first country from the

East European Moscow’s “Satellites” to openly challenge the leadership of the communist

camp of the Soviet Union. This split from Moscow represented a real difficult struggle for

Albania, since the country was small in territory, population and the size of economy. Albania’s

estrangement from Moscow was difficult also because of the Albanian membership in the

Warsaw Pact. Albanian leaders feared Soviet military intervention, though eventually the split

with Moscow had no serious consequences on the stability of the country. Consequently from

1961, year of interruption of the diplomatic relations between Albania and the Soviet Union,

China became Albania’s new strategic ally. Most definitively this curious occurrence attracted

the attention of all communist camp as well as of NATO members. From a geostrategic point

of view, the Albanian leadership was already prepared to aim at long-term priorities especially

by having a strong international ally. Both parties, at a certain extent, needed one-another: the

Chinese leadership wanted to demonstrate to its own people and to the International Communist

Movement that Chinese socialism was sustained also from European countries; the Albanian

leadership wanted to demonstrate its people that they were still on the right side of the Marxist

movement, against Soviet revisionism, and still had a powerful ally to rely on. Furthermore,

Albania would open a window to Chinese propaganda in European territory by encouraging the

orientation towards Beijing for the Eastern European establishments and China would do the

same in Asia by proclaiming Albania the only true country in Europe that beholds the

communist principles.

The Albanian orientation toward China had obviously also a pragmatic element. The

complete interruption of all relations with the Soviet Union caused enormous difficulties to the

4 BYTYÇI, ENVER. Shqipëri-Kinë, Dështimi i një Bashkëjetese [China-Albania. The Failure of a Cohabitation]. ISB, Tiranë, 2014. 5 WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963), 35-59; Lorenz

Lüthi, ‘China and East Europe, 1956-1960’, Modern China Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, (2015): 233-257, 255-256;

Lorenz Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split. Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton

University Press, 2008), 167-174, 201-205; Mehilli, From Stalin to Mao, 198-207.

4

Albanian economy which was heavily dependent on the Soviet and Eastern European economic

assistance. Hence China offered to replace Soviet assistance, with benefit for the Albanian

leaders whom shared common political and ideological principles with the Chinese leaders. The

other crucial point was the security dilemma: Albania needed a strong ally to face the Eastern

Camp and Moscow. Formally Albania was still part of the Warsaw Pact but it had no more

relations with the Soviet Union, the leading country of the communist camp in Europe; the

presence in this organization was merely formal and the presence of the NATO forces in the

Mediterranean were perceived as a threat. The antirevisionist/communist Albania was

surrounded by antagonist powers in the East and the West.

The cooperation for the Sino-Albanian relationship was sanctioned by two main

documents: “The Sino-Albanian Declaration” of January 1964 and the “The Sino-Albanian

Declaration” of May 1966.6 Both these documents expressed the determination of both

countries to undertake a path of strong bilateral cooperation.

Thereafter, both the PLA and the CCP made fruitful efforts to reach a high-level of

collaboration. For the domestic policy and the internal propaganda, Albania was presented to

Chinese people as a European communist country who supported Chairman Mao’s actions

while PLA was introduced from the propaganda as one of the eldest in Europe and her leader,

Enver Hoxha, as a world-class communist leader. On the international stage China needed as

much support as possible from as many countries as possible, regardless of their size, for its

efforts of trying to be a member of the United Nations (UN). To this aim, with direct supervision

of Hoxha, the entire Albanian diplomacy was put at China’s disposal in order to promote

Chinese admission in the UN. Albania condemned the policy of ‘two Chinas’ and opposed it

by all propagandist and diplomatic means, on any international forum where Albania was

present.

In international relations, the role and the impact of smaller nations in relation to Great

Powers sometimes gains incredible historical dimensions. This happens mainly because the

small nations could have two important functions; first, serve as regulators, balancers and

compensators of Great Powers in geopolitics and geostrategic intentions, second, they

contribute with their vote as sovereign nations in the International Organizations. This second

feature was used from the Albanian diplomacy in every meeting and session of the UN.7

6 LALAJ, AN, CHRISTIAN F. OSTERMANN, & RYAN GAGE. Albania is Not Cuba: Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No.16 7 BASHKURTI, LISIEN. Diplomacia e vetëizolimit: rasti i Shqipërisë 1961-1989. GEER 2004, p. 630

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It is in this context many agreements and protocols were signed for the cooperation of the

two countries in economy, trade, culture, science, education, art, culture, and military and

maritime transportation. During the second half of the 1960s the cooperation between China

and Albania reached its peak. In this period Albania exported to China, among many others,

chrome minerals, oil fuel, bitumen, copper, tobacco; meanwhile China was exporting to

Albania machineries, tools, technology for the industry, energy, etc. 8 This stage of great

cooperation and fruitful policies was not totally free from discrepancies; sometime also deep

disagreements, especially in the international positions taken from each party. The main

problematic in the beginning of the cooperation concerned Chinese foreign policy in the Balkan

Peninsula. The Chinese foreign affairs at the time were characterized by dynamism,

pragmatism, flexibility and long-term vision; meanwhile the Albanian foreign affairs were

mainly characterized by ideological dogmatism.9

The first disagreements started when Chinese intentions towards the Balkans differed

form Albania’s standing. In order to better face the Soviet Union’s hegemony in the communist

camp, China saw as paramount the cooperation in the Balkans between countries that had

promoted independent policies from Moscow, such as Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania. The

Chinese policy makers intended to create a strong regional fulcrum under Beijing influence for

their future interest in Europe.10 This contrasted with Albania’s position which saw Yugoslavia

as a great threat to its national security, therefore excluding any possible cooperation. Moreover,

Albanian leaders wanted an exclusive privileged relation with China, which excluded such

option for the other countries in Eastern Europe who were seen by Albanian leaders as

revisionists of the communist line.

The first step for the Balkan alliance between Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania, was

made by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in 1968. Premier Zhou knew that would be hard to convince

Albania to cooperate with the abovementioned countries. Given the past problematic relations

between Tito and Hoxha, an alliance between Belgrade and Tirana was almost impossible.

Premier Zhou tried to convince the Albanian leadership that a stabilization of relations with

Yugoslavia and the involvement of Tirana in a larger cooperation with other Balkan countries

such as Romania would increase Albania’s security. Albania on the other rather than increasing

its security perceived such initiative as dangerous for the country.

8BIBERAJ, ELEZ. Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, p. 113. 9 VICKERS, MIRANDA. The Albanians: a modern history. IB Tauris, 2011. 10 BORICI, KUJTIM. Jugosllavet ankese Hrushovit; Enveri eshte kunder paktit Ballkaniak, Gazeta Dita.

Availble at: http://www.gazetadita.al/jugosllavet-ankese-hrushovit-enveri-eshte-kunder-paktit-

ballkanik/

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Further, to strengthen the relationship between the countries, Chinese Premier

Zhou Enlai visited Albania in January 1964. This visit attracted a lot of attention in the public

opinion of both countries and not only. Western European countries, all Balkan countries and

Moscow were somehow astonished from this move. It was the first time in Albanian history

that a Chinese Prime minister was visiting Albania. Albania’s importance for China was

demonstrated also by the lengthy visit of Zhou Enlai, who stayed in Albania for ten days and

had many meetings with the Albanian leaders. These meetings were intended to further

strengthen the relations between the two countries. This can be easily considered the stepping

stone of what further would have been the Chinese promise to the people for a serious and

determined commitment to help and guide Albania in all possible aspects. To some degree, this

visit was the Sino-Albanian coordinated answer to Khrushchev for his demand to cease the

controversies and polemics within the International Communist Movement. The intense talks

between the delegation headed by Premier Zhou Enlai and Premier Mehmet Shehu were

concluded with a common declaration which contained respective points of view and intentions

and expressed the common values of Marxism that both countries shared to the same extent.

This Sino-Albanian cooperation was seen with high concern in Moscow. During the 22nd

CPSU Congress the notes were openly and clearly against this new alliance within the socialist

camp. In March 1965 Premier Zhou Enlai visited Albania again. This visit highlighted once

more the high level of gratification that both governments had for each-other and the Chinese

Premier expressed repeatedly the unsparing support of China to Albania. In the ideological and

domestic affairs all declarations and points of view were on the same line but in the international

issues some differences emerged. In this visit Premier Zhou met Chairman Hoxha and they both

expressed their positions on the socio-political circumstances of the time. Again, the main

enemy was the ‘American Imperialism’ but this time, the behavior towards the Soviet Union

was of softer tones form the Chinese side. They both agreed in considering the American

Imperialism as the principal threat to peace and both parties condemned every move of Moscow

towards talks with Washington, since those were all considered as obvious attempts to separate

the world in two main areas of influence. By stating so, China and Albania criticized the bipolar

system of the Cold War. Even in the peak of good and healthy relationship between the two

countries, there existed political and ideological differences between the two.

However, even in the good spirit of communist loyalty and fruitful cooperation, China’s

intentions regarding Southeastern Europe China’s were deeper and more forward-thinking. The

Chinese government had a positive attitude towards Romania then ruled by Nicolae Ceausescu

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who proclaimed himself anti-Soviet11, on the other hand, Yugoslavia had a favorable political

position, since it was the leader of the so called ‘The Non-Aligned Movement’. 12 China

expressed special interest toward these countries, in particular during the late 1960s.

These were not easy years for the satellite countries of the Soviet Union since the events

in Prague (January the 5th to August 21st, 1968) would shake the bases of the International

Communist Movement. For the first time a country member of the Warsaw Pact was being

attacked from the common armed forces of the same Pact. The reaction of Romania, Yugoslavia

and Albania was the immediate: condemn of the aggression. The Chinese foreign policy

decision makers in this time proposed a military alliance between these three countries so that

the safeguard of their territory could be secured. Once again, the Albanians did not agree on

this plan.

According to some Albanian scholars, the Chinese intentions at the time were to extend

their power in the countries where the main actors of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and USA,

had no influence any more, or never had for different reasons. A few of them go even further

by stating that Romania was the “favorite” one for these Chinese intentions. Although Romania,

led in the 1970s by Nicolae Ceausescu, was formally an ally of the Soviet Union, Bucharest

promoted both: independent policy towards other nations, even Western European, and

autonomy from Moscow. The interchange of high rank delegation between Romania and China

went intensifying in those years and culminated with the visit of Ceausescu in Beijing in 1971.

Nevertheless, the agitation that Albanians had towards the Chinese approach to the Romanians

was incomparable to the turbulence they had while China approached Yugoslavia. Albanian

high rank officials asked that the relations between Beijing and Belgrade should pass through

their channels. 13

2- People’s Republic of China supporting Albania

The period with more economic support was highly intense from 1954 to 1978. As Ylber

Marku has argued, “China prioritized Albania as a recipient of foreign aid, and no other country

in times of peace received from China such economic and military assistance, proportionate to

population,

11 WATTS, LARRY. The Soviet-Romanian Clash over History, Identity and Dominion. Cold War International

History Project, Working Papers Series 29,2010. 12 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a group of states which are not formally aligned with or against any

major power bloc. As of 2012, the movement has 120 members. The organization was founded in Belgrade in

1961. Info available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Non-Aligned-Movement 13 HOXHA, ENVER. Reflections on China, vol. I: 1962–1972, Extracts from the Political Diary, 1979.

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as did Albania. 14

During this period the Albanian Five Years Plans (FYP) on construction of industrial sites

were entirely based on Chinese aid. For almost two decades the needs of the country and its’

entire development were based on this support. The total Chinese aid to Albania accounts for

132 different projects stretched in 24 years. 15 The Chinese leaders applied Chairman Mao’s

instruction: everything the Albanian leaders would ask, it should be given. Such as:

- The investments for the construction of industrial sites and energy points

- The financial support for the needs of basic food and items for the citizens

- Meeting the request coming from Tirana on transport needs, telecommunication

and technology

- Supporting the qualification for specialist of different areas of expertise in

Chinese territory

- Financing the scientific research

- Financing the Albanian Army

Three were the principles at the base of China’s economic aid to Albania. First, according

to Premier Zhou Enlai, since Albania was far from Asia, in Southeast Europe, surrounded by

enemies and not able to accept help from West European countries, it was vital for the country

the need for protection and reinforcement of the state. Second, even though Albania was

proclaiming itself as the nation that “wants to construct everything by their own strength”, the

natural and financial resources were not enough at the time. Under these circumstances, the

PRC would help Albania in order for the country to develop a modern industry and start an

economic growth, without requiring any political dependence of Tirana on Beijing.

The first Chinese loan granted to Albania is documented in 1956. Unlike Soviet Union,

that had treated Albania as its satellite state in Southeastern Europe, China’s attitude was since

the very beginning different, in that affirmed to seek an alliance with Albania based on the

principle of equality and mutual benefit. PRC initially provided considerable shipments of

primary goods such as corns, rice and oils, which Albania had requested. Subsequently, China’s

economic assistance upgraded to accepting hundreds of Albanian specialists for training in the

Chinese universities, factories, and various research centers - most of these groups of specialists

were pursuing universities in China.

14 MARKU, YLBER. Sino-Albanian relations during the Cold War, 1949-1978: an Albanian perspective. Doctoral

thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, 2017; p. 4. Retrieved from: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/his_etd/11/ 15 Interview of Fan Chengzuo, 10th Ambassador of PRC to Albania. Let’s remember to not forget. Available at: http://albanian.cri.cn/1301/2014/12/24/302s137781.htm

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During the 1960s China’s support made possible the highest industrial development that

Albania had ever experienced. Corresponding to the peak of the Sino-Albanian alliance, during

the period from the early 1960s to mid-1970s, China’s aid enabled a great leap forward in the

development of heavy industry, which for the first time in Albania’s history resulted in the

building of huge industrial plants. The Albanian government asked and later was granted long-

term loans for the construction of such sites and productions lines. Among these, the most

important ones were the Metallurgical Plant in the city of Elbasan, the Tractors Plant in Tirana,

the Textile Production Plant in Berat, the Oil Refining Plant in Ballsh, two out of three

Hydropower Plants along the stream of Drini River, the Chemical Plant in Fier. But, the Chinese

most serious undertakings and serious support started after Premier Zhou visited Albania. This

was the milestone of the most intense cooperation between Beijing and Tirana. The Chinese

side promised to finish within two years all the industrial plants that had already installed

machineries and procured the specialists staff for one of the biggest plants to be built in the city

of Elbasan. Beside the above-mentioned big deeds, other help came from the Chinese side in

machineries for agricultural use, drilling probes, drilling turbines, tractors, combine harvesters,

trucks, etc. In the timeframe under analysis Albania was a rural country and since 70% of the

GDP was inputted from agriculture, the Chinese side came to help constructing a better

infrastructure for agriculture while also investing for immense industrial plants, in this way the

development of Albanian economy would be more diversified. It was custom that the Albanian

authorities would send their plan of investments in Beijing and wait for their approval.16 The

Chinese side was always giving recommendations and support according to their own experts

and background.

In 1970 an Albanian delegation headed by Abdyl Kellezi, visited Beijing in order to

discuss the next Albania’s FYP, 1970-75. This delegation stayed in Beijing for more than two

months. The longitude of this visit was due to the high demands of the Albanian side which

pressed China to grant higher credits than it had done before. This required long negotiations

during which the Albanian delegation insisted in using the Chinese economic assistance for

investments in the heavy industry and the military, whereas China suggested that Albania

should prioritize investments in agriculture and light industry. Eventually the negotiations

resulted in the Sino-Albanian protocols for economic cooperation of 1970. 17 Most of the

economic agreements between China and Albania consisted of barter agreements. This

16 HOXHA, ENVER. Vepra 37, Instituti I Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste prane KQ te PPSH, 1968; p.415. 17 STAVROU, NIKOLAOS A. The Sino-Albanian Friendship. World Affairs 134, no. 3 1971: pp.234-242.

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agreement included a loan of 1.8 billion Yuan for the finishing of the ongoing industrial plants

and the construction of several other ones such as: a plant for nickel and cobalt extrusion with

a capacity of 250 thousand tons a year, a factory for bricks production with capacity of 35

thousand tons a year, a plant of raw materials processing, a rubber production plant with the

capacity of 200 thousand tons a year, the enlargement of the cement factory in Elbasan taking

it from a capacity of 100 thousand to 400 thousand tons a year, the building of the TV center in

Tirana and the construction of the televisual net for all the country. On the other side Albania

would export in China 6 to 7% of the total value of the loan granted in goods like tobacco, fuel,

nickel, chrome and other items. The total amount of the loan would start the payoff in 1986 and

end by year 2000. Almost all the Albanian industry and the majority of its trade volume was

totally dependent on the Chinese aid and loans - experts estimate that almost 80% of Albanian

economy was supported form the Chinese government. Regardless of the marginal

controversies on how to use the Chinese loans, during these five years (1970-1975), the political

exchange atmosphere was fruitful and frequent.

While the economic assistance from the Chinese side started earlier, the military support

came some years after. This started in 1963, following Albania’s de facto expulsion from the

Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet refusal to provide military assistance. After the Albanian

authorities definitely got rid in 1961 of the last Soviet base in Vlore, the total focus for military

support went to Beijing. Beqir Balluku, Albania’s Minister of Defense travelled several times

to China to request Chinese military aid for Albania. Members of the delegation would recall

that the Chinese hospitality was outstanding. As Edip Ohiri recalls: “Mr. Deng Xiaoping was

present in the meeting among other high officials. After Chairman Mao joined our meeting, he

was extraordinarily polite and friendly with us. He instructed all his officials to take special

care of us and when the meeting was finished, he accompanied us to our car. And this was

something that had never happened for none of the foreign delegation in Chinese territory.” 18

In 1968, Albania proclaimed the ousting from the Warsaw Pact. At this point with Chinese aid,

Albania started a massive campaign of construction of military underground fortifications such

as bunkers and various anti-bombing shelters

3 - First conflicts and the end of an Era

One of the main problems for the Albanian historiography during the communist regime

was its politicization. As result of this politicization the truth of Sino-Albanian relations cannot

be understood by only the documents of the time because those same documents, at least on the

18Interview of EDIP OHIRI. In 1964 I met Chairman Mao Zedong. Gazeta Shqiptare, March 2013. Available at:

https://www.pressreader.com/gazetashqiptare-mars2013

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Albanian side, were many times changed, erased, reformulated for after reappear with totally

different content and being interpreted as the political situation requested.19 When analyzing

the documents from 1971-1975 it appears that relations were at their best shape in the

ideological, economic, military and political aspects. But, when documents of latter years are

consulted, regarding the same topic, different positions are displayed, often contradictory on

the Sino-Albanian relations and reflections. According to these later documents the relations

had never been excellent and totally functional.

From 1971 to 1975 the figures of the trade exchange between the countries went

decreasing, while the propaganda and the media of the time it was written that the relations had

never been better and a glory future was ahead of this collaboration.20 According to Lisien

Bashkurti, four were the points that deteriorated the political collaboration between the two

governments. First, the Albanian establishment was embittered by the Chinese soft policy

towards post-Khrushchev era and the advent of Brezhnev on power. Second, and most

important, was the Chinese approach towards the USA and the normalization of the relations

among the above. The historic visit of President Nixon in China and the start of the ‘Ping-Pong

Diplomacy’ seriously shook the Albanian establishment. This strategic move of PRC was seen

as outrageous by the Albanian leadership who saw it as a betrayal of the Marxist line. In fact,

with a special letter from the Central Committee of PLA and the Albanian government,

addressed to the Central Committee of CCP in 1970, the Albanian leadership severely contested

the Chinese approach to the USA. The Chinese leadership did not react to this letter, preferring

to ignore it. However, Beijing reacted by refusing to send any delegation at the next Albanian

party congress. Third, Chinese leadership decided to improve the relations with Yugoslavia – a

move which seriously undermined the privileged relation between China and Albania. Fourth,

the next Chinese move that caused the Albanian discontent was the overrating of Romania

within the Balkan region. It was very visible in the 1970s that China was prioritizing the

Balkans and the political presence in the region beyond simply Albania. Romania, given its

independence from Moscow in its initiatives in foreign affairs, and its position together with its

average size, offered immense opportunities of cooperation for China. For this prioritization of

Chinese foreign policy in the Balkans, the Albanian side did not react publicly; this was because

the leadership was very careful on the statement towards her neighbors. The Albanian

19 BIBERAJ, ELEZ. Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, p. 99. 20 BAKI, GAZMEND. Sino-Albanian Friendship. Miqesia Shqiptaro-Kineze, Gazeta Shekulli, Editorial 2005. Available at: http://arkivi2.peshkupauje.com/2009/05/miqesia-shqiptaro-kineze.html

12

documents of the 1970s compiled in the high forums of the leadership were mainly reflective

of the crises in the relations with China. From the most important we can highlight: the Second

Plenum of Central Committee of PLA, on June 1977; the Third Plenum of Central Committee

of PLA, on November 1977; the Fourth Plenum of Central Committee of PLA, on January

1978. These high political forums were all oriented on the instruction of Chairman Hoxha.

Despite the fact that the materials of these Plenums were confidential and would have been used

only to inform the high rank officials of the Party, the content of these meetings and

‘confidential’ Plenums became, through various channels, known to Chinese leaders.

Subsequently, in July 1978, the Chinese government decided to interrupt the economic and

military aid to Albania, though is reaffirmed China’s intention to continue normal cooperation.

While the Chinese side was very silent in this breach of relations, Albanian leaders decided to

go public. The Albanian side reacted negatively on the Chinese international moves, and in the

beginning of the seventies Chairman Hoxha started a real hunt on the eventual ‘enemies of the

regime’ by first eliminating the people that were master builders of the Sino-Albanian relations.

Regarding the Chinese loans and the financial support, since ther were not placed at the best

possible use, the outcome of this aid was not as it was expected. The fact that the loans were

used in investing in heavy industry did not give the country’s economy what was predicted. In

order to find an excuse for this misplace of the loans into almost useless areas it was necessary

to address the defeat to some certain group of people. Albanian leadership used as an excuse

for purges the many technical difficulties that the investments in the heavy industries

encountered. This gave Hoxha the opportunity to interpret such difficulties as sabotages by key

officials who had negotiated the Chinese loans. These were mainly the chief of the delegations

that conducted the negotiation with Beijing. First the cultural officials, then the economic

advisors and last the military officials, including here the Minister of Defense who was purged

in 1974.

The Chinese side too during the 1970s expressed discontent and acted in different line

with Tirana. The most important issues that heated the most the negotiation rooms and

declaration were mainly about the following issues: the aborted attempts of Premier Zhou Enlai

for the re-establishment of relations between Albania and Soviet Union; the unsuccessful

attempt of the Chinese intention of creation the Balkan alliance between Romania, Yugoslavia

and Albania, the problematic negotiations on the Albanian military and strategic plans; the

unconventional debates on the PLAs plan on the economic development of the country; the

total ignoring from the Chinese side of the Sixth Congress of PLA; the non-consideration of

any Albanian suggestion on the Chinese Foreign policy; the Chinese approach and acceptance

of the USA policy; the precedence on Chinese Foreign affair to the other Balkan states and

13

many more. The political lines of the two governments, once very aligned in every position,

were not only traveling on the same path, but totally in two different directions. Chinese

behavior was visible only in the high ranks of international relations organizations and meeting

of confidential nature. In reality the Chinese leadership did not ever make public for the Chinese

people and never actually broadcasted the breach of relations with Albania.

The collective memory though is different from the documents of the time, so is the

thought of important Albanian scholars in their perception on China. As it is visible in the

above analyzes, that the Sino-Albanian relations abruption was extremely complex but the

substrate of this behavior was deeply ideological and political, and most of the time it was as a

result of the dogmatic attitude of the Albanian leadership. With this kind of declaration, the

Albanian leadership directly confronted the Chinese policy and its strategic interests. During

the Seventh PLA Congress, held in November 1976, Hoxha indicated his opposition to the New

Chinese leadership that had taken over with the death of Chairman Mao by refusing to mention

Hua Guofeng and openly denouncing Deng Xiaoping.21 Deng Xiaoping marked a new era in

China’s foreign and domestic policies. Based on pragmatic principles rather than only and

strictly ideological considerations, Deng Xiaoping’s policies were aimed at the integration of

China in the international community. Therefore, he promoted domestic policies centered on

the economic development, and international cooperation that opened China to the world.

Albania, by contrast, further isolated itself, promoted economic self-reliance, which had

dramatic consequences on the economy and which eventually resulted in the fall of the regime

in 1991. 22

4 - After the “winds of Change” - the legacy of the pasts and two decades of almost

mutual obliviousness

‘Even though China and Albania are distant from each other, the friendship between our

two peoples has been passed on from generation to generation. Albania was one of the first

countries that recognized the People's Republic of China. Our two countries established

diplomatic relations on November 23rd, 1949. Since then, we have witnessed fast development

of exchanges and cooperation in all fields between our two countries. China rendered a great

amount of assistance to Albania. We sent nearly 6000 experts to Albania and trained a large

number of economic and technical experts for Albania. Albania also gave China precious

21 BIBERAJ, ELEZ. Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986, pp.122-123. 22 BASHKURTI, LISIEN. Diplomacia e vetëizolimit: rasti i Shqipërisë 1961-1989. GEER 2004.

14

support and made important contribution to the restoration of the legitimate rights of the

People's Republic of China in the United Nations, which the Chinese people will never forget.’23

The end to of the Cold War, signed a new era for Albanian history. After the fall of the

communist regime, the reproach of the new government toward almost all the nations of the

world came in a very short period of time. The normalisation of the relations with the great

powers of the international arena was the first aim of the new government established in 1992.

Since with PRC the diplomatic relations were never interrupted it was easier for the Albanian

new government to re-establish the ties. The 1990s has been a harsh decade for Albania and

Albanians.

Transitional societies have difficulties re-adjusting the social, economic and political

structures. The Albanian transition was accompanied by mass migration in the first half of the

decade and by social conflicts in the second one. The investments in the country were few, and

mainly by neighbouring countries like Italy and Greece. Chinese presence in Albania during

this decade and the first five years of the new millennium was almost inexistent. The only

reminiscences Albanian people had were the “tales” of the elderly about the Chinese support

and the propaganda of the seventies. The Albanian officials and specialists that visited China

during the “Golden Age” of the Sino-Albanian relations could now speak freely and share their

experience. And so they did - the books of history were re-written and the aspects of this

peculiar international cooperation that attracted so much attention in the midst of the Cold War

were made public on their real version.

5 –Old Allies, New Ties: cooperation in figures of the past decade

The “17+1” cooperation mechanism has injected new impetus into the Sino-Albanian

relations, this time with an ever-growing economic presence of trade and investments. In

Albania the China-CEEC cooperation platform is mostly associated with investments and trade.

The cases that attracted more attention in the public opinion and mass media were two: the

acquisition for the controlling rights into two Albanian oilfields, from Geo Gade Petroleum (a

Shanghai based company) specifically Patos-Marinza and Kucova, which in total produces

around 13.000 barrels of crude oil per day. The total amount that the Chinese company declared

23 Interview of Chinese Ambassador to Albania Wang Junling on Sino-Albanian Relations, China's Regional and International Role. TiranaTimes, 2009. Available at: http://al.china-embassy.org/eng/zagx/kjwt/t628307.htm

15

from the purchase of the previous Bankers Petroleum is 438.17 million US$ 24; the second,

was the taking over of the only Albanian airport, Mother Teresa, from a consortium of China

Everbright (a Hong Kong based company) which will have management rights until 2025.

According to the Albanian National Registration Data Center, the number of Chinese

companies operating in Albania is 149, as of April, 2018.

Figures of bilateral trade between China and Albania, in million US$

Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2017

Bilateral trade between China and Albania has had a steady increase since the start of the

global financial crisis, with a total value of 284 million US$ in 2008 going to 635 million in

2016. This is a threefold increase in less than one decade, which means that accelerated trade

practices have been put in place and more and more Chinese commodities are present in the

Albanian market.

Chinese FDI stock in Albania, in million US$

24Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/03/10/albania-china-ilir-meta-washington-reforms-politics/#46dea71517ed

-

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Tota

l

Exp

ort

s

Imp

ort

s

Tota

l

Exp

ort

s

Imp

ort

s

Tota

l

Exp

ort

s

Imp

ort

s

Tota

l

Exp

ort

s

Imp

ort

s

Tota

l

Exp

ort

s

Imp

ort

s

Tota

l

Exp

ort

s

Imp

ort

s

Tota

l

Exp

ort

s

Imp

ort

s

Tota

l

Exp

ort

s

Imp

ort

s

Tota

l

Exp

ort

s

Imp

ort

s

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

284

196

88

271

207

64

347

199 148

436

281

155

487

344

143

559

325

235

568

378

189

558

430

128

635

507

129

16

Source: China Bulletin of Outward Direct Investments, 2017

As seen from the above chart, Chinese investments in the country are almost inexistent.

However, the trend of the past decade is increasing. Given the small market share of the country,

it is normal that the attractiveness is quite opaque, but this didn’t stop Chinese investments to

increase 14 folds in less than 10 years.

Conclusions

If there is a country in Europe that better has experienced first-hand what People’s

Republic of China is capable of accomplishing in a distant/foreign land, it’s Albania.

Decades of ideological, economic, international and logistic supports from China to

Albania can be taken into account for future research as a substantial pattern of China’s modus

operandi abroad and can be a steady pillar of analysis for the present and future. The traditional

Sino-Albania friendship is now rekindled via the “17+1” cooperation mechanism and the

China-CEE high level Summits have witnessed intensified interaction form both sides with

promising developments year by year. While in the heist of the Cold War it was ideology that

brought the two countries close, after the regime change in Albania it was globalization and an

ever-growing interdependent world economy. While politics has been reluctant and sometimes

sluggish, the business and investment environment has built new bridges of cooperation

between China and Albania in the 21st Century.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is now the main framework and platform of

cooperation with which Beijing is approaching Tirana. Yet again, as in the past, it is China the

proactive actor. Intensification of relations, deepening cooperation, enhanced synergy and more

are promoted from Beijing at an exuberant pace. It is up to the Albanian leadership to find the

common grounds of collaboration and not be estranged to global opportunity offered to them.

0.51

4.35 4.43 4.43 4.43

7.03 7.03 6.957.27

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

17

The trajectory of bilateral exchange, in all fields of cooperation, between China and

Albania has witnessed simple and smooth existence as well as vortexes of absurdness; however,

the two peoples managed to cherish, appreciate and welcome each-other and the deeply-rooted,

long-established bilateral ties.

Annex I

A timeline summary of high-level meetings

1956: the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of PLA, headed a delegation

including Mehmet Shehu, Prime Minister; members of the Politburo such as Ramiz Alia and

Behar Shtylla; as well as the Delo Bilali, Ambassador of Albania to Beijing and Fiqiri Vogli,

Vice Editor of the “Zeri i Popullit”. 25 The exact dates of these visits are not made public,

however given the few documents of the meetings available it is estimated that it occurred form

mid to end of September.

1959: Hysni Kapo visits PRC for almost one month and and met with Chairman Mao on

May 13th. 26

1961: Abdyl Kellezi, Head of the State Planning Commission visits China and meets with

Premier Zhou Enlai on decembre 23rd.

1962: Hysni Kapo, Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the

Workers' Party of Albania stayed in PRC for 14th to June 29th. He in this time frame meets

Chairman Mao on June 29th, with Premier Zhou Enlai on June 27th and many times with Deng

Xiaoping. 27

1963: from December 31st to January 8th, Premier Zhou Enlai visits Albania for the first

time. 28

1965: Premier Zhou visits Albania again, having meetings with Enver Hoxha on every

single day of his stay 27, 28 and 29th of March. 29

25 National Central Archives of Albania; AQSH, F.14/AP, OU, V. 1956, D. 54; AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1954, D.

2. 26 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1959, D. 1, D. 2, D. 3, D. 4, D. 5. 27 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1962, D. 6, D. 7, D. 9. 28 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1964, D. 25-25/1. 29 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1965, D. 4.

18

1966: The Albanian Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, visits China form April 28th to May

5th and meets some of the most prominent political actors of China such as Zhou Enlai and Liu

Shaoqi,30 and on his last day of visit meets with Chairman Mao.31

1966: Third and last visit of Premier Zhou to Albania from June 24th to 28th; in this

occasion he meets Hoxha 4 times. 32

1967: Hysni Kapo and Beqir Balluku visit China meeting with Kang Sheng on 22, 26 and

29th of January33 and meet Chairman Mao on February 2nd. 34

1968: Beqir Balluku Minister of Defense visits China on the occasion of Chinese National

Day and on October 5th met with Chairman Mao.35

1969: Li Xiannian visits Albania on the occasion of the Albanian Independence day and

meets with Chairman Hoxha. 36

1970: Kadri Hazbiu, member of the Poltiburo (and one of the most mets with Zhou Enlai

in Beijing on june 16th. 37

1970: Abdyl Kellezi, Chairman of the Assambly of the Republic of Albania heads an

ecomic delegation in PRC and conduct talks on the next Five Year Plan 1971-1975. 38 His was

quite a long visit considering the stay from August 14 to october 17th.

1972: The last visit of Beqir Balluku in China; in this occassion he meets with Premier

Zhou Enlai.39

1974: Yao Wenyuan, CCP Politburo member visits Albania in November and meets with

Enver Hoxha on the 28th and 29th, respectively the Independence and the Liberation Day.40

1975: Adil Carcani, Vice Prime Minister heads an economy delegation and stays in PRC

for three weeks; on June 15th meet with Zhou Enlai.41

This is the last Albanian high-level delegation visiting China during the Cold War.

Starting from 1963 until 1976, tens of other ranks delegations were visiting both China and

Albania ranking in ranging in a multitude of spheres such as: culture, art, science, agriculture,

30 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1966, D.13. 31 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1966, D. 3. 32 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1966, D. 13. 33 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1967, D1-3. 34 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1967, D. 6. 35 National Central Archives of Albania: AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1968, D. 6. 36 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1969, D. 17. 37 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1970, D. 5. 38 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1970, D. 7. 39 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1972, D. 10, D. 11. 40 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1974, D. 14, D. 15. 41 Ibid. AQSH, F.14/AP, MPKK, V. 1975, D. 6.

19

industry, military etc. Very often the Chinese delegations were received by Chairman Hoxha

himself and the Albanian ones were sometimes received by Chairman Mao.42

1989: Albanian foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani and Foreign Trade First Deputy

Minister Kostandin Hoxha, arrived in Beijing for a five-day visit. During this visit, they hold

talks with officials from the Foreign Ministry and from the Ministry of Foreign Economic

Relations and Trade. 43

1999: Rexhep Meidani, President of Albania pays a two days visit in Beijing and meets

with Jiang Zemin and other senior Chinese officials. His arrival in Beijing was two days after

the visit of Boris Yeltsin and for many it is estimated that the main topics were the situation in

Kosovo (as well as Chechenya). 44

2000: uppn invitation of Albanian Foreign Minister Paskal Milo,Tang Jiaxuan Foreign

Minister of PRC payed a two days visit in Tirana. During the visit, President Rexhep Meidani,

Prime Minister Ilir Meta and Speaker of the Parliament Skender Gjinushi, met with Minister

Tang. 45

2002: Chinese State Councilor Wu Yi arrives in Tirana for a two days visit and met with

President Rexhep Meidani to discuss bilateral relations and cooperation. 46

2004: Fatos Nano, Prime Minster of Albania meets with Chinese President Hu Jintao at

the Great Hall of the People and discuss furterh deepening of bilateral relations in Bejing.

In this stance the Albanian Prime Minster st indicated that with the concerted efforts by

the two sides, the two governments and the two peoples have been deepening mutual

understanding and have established and developed friendship and cooperation by taking stock

of historical experience.. The Albanian government will resolutely adhere to the one-China

policy and support China's lofty cause of reunification. 47

2009: Sali Berisha, Prime Minster of Albania visits China and meets with President Hu

Jintao, on the 60th anniversary of Sino-Albanian diplomatic ties. President Hu in this stance

42 The archive files from Albania were kindly made available for the purpose of this paper from Research Fellow and Historian at Xiamen University, Dr. Ylber Marku. 43 First Albanian Delegation in Decade visits China. Associated Press AP. Available at: https://www.apn ews.com/72a54ad4d259099f9c4e1ff1747f68eb 44 Albaina President in Beijing. BBC. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/560933.stm 45 MFAPRC. Joint Communiqué between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Albania. Available

at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15781.shtml 46 Albanian President Meidani meets Chinese State Council. Available at: http://en.pe ople.cn/20 0207/1 2/eng2

0020 712_99589.shtml 47MFAPRC. Hu Jintao meets with Prime Minister of Albania.

20

noted that Sino-Albanian relations were at a new starting point, with a new opportunity for

further development and pragmatic cooperation. 48

2011: Chinese Foreig Minister Yang Jiechi visits Tirana and meets with Prime Minister

Sali Berisha, with the Speakerof teh Parliament Jozefina Topalli and President Bamir Topi. 49

2017: Zhang Gaoli, Vice Premier of PRC visits Albania for a two days visit and meets

with President Bujar Nishani and Prime Minister Edi Rama. In this occasion Vice Premier

Zhang highlighted the importance of Albania in being an integral part of the BRI and welcomed

intensification of Albania’s participation in the “16+1” cooperation. 50

It is important to notice in this stance that Edi Rama is the only Albanian Prime Minister

(or number one policy-maker of the country) that has never had a one-to-one meeting with a

Chinese President. The only meetings he has held are within the framework of the “16+1” with

Premier Li Keqiang, yet no official state visit to Beijing for Rama.

48MFAPRC. Chinese President meets with Prime Minister Berisha. Available at https://www.fmprc. gov.cn

/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/gjlb_664408/3125_664410/3127_664414/t558569.shtml 49 Chinese Foreign Minister visits Albania. Available at: http://english.sina.com/china/p/2011/0804/385780.html 50MFAPRC. Zhang Gaoli visits Albania. Available at: https://www.fmp rc.gov.cn/ mfa_e ng//zx xx_6628 05/t1455159.shtml

21

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