The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil

THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Edited by

Justin P. McBrayer and

Daniel Howard-Snyder

This edition first published 2013© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Blackwell companion to the problem of evil / edited by Justin P. McBrayer, Daniel Howard-Snyder. pages cm Includes index. ISBN 978-0-470-67184-9 (cloth) 1. Theodicy. 2. Good and evil. I. McBrayer, Justin P., editor of compilation. BL216.C66 2013 214–dc23 2013016697

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Cover image: Woodcut by Claire Van Vliet for The Tragedie of King Lear, Theodore Press, Bangor, Maine, USA 1986. Cover design by RBDA.

Set in 10/12.5 pt Minion by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited

1 2013

This volume is dedicated to our respective mentors in philosophy, Peter J. Markie and William P. Alston.

Contents

Notes on contributors ixPreface xiAcknowledgments xiv

Part I Problems of Evil 1

1 Abriefhistoryofproblemsofevil 3MichaelW.Hickson

2 Thelogicalproblemofevil:mackieandplantinga 19DanielHoward-Snyder

3 Anewlogicalproblemofevil 34J.L.Schellenberg

4 Rowe’sevidentialargumentsfromevil 49GrahamOppy

5 Explanationandtheproblemofevil 67PaulDraperandTrentDougherty

6 Acarnapianargumentfromevil 83RichardOtte

7 Theexperienceofevilandsupportforatheism 98JeromeGellman

8 Theproblemofanimalpainandsuffering 113RobertFrancescotti

9 Hellandtheproblemofevil 128AndreiA.BuckareffandAllenPlug

10 Theproblemofapparentlymorallyabhorrentdivinecommands 144WesleyMorriston

11 Godbecauseofevil:ApragmaticargumentfromevilforbeliefinGod 160MarilynMcCordAdams

Part II Theodicies 175

12 Abriefhistoryoftheodicy 177RenévanWoudenberg

viii COnTEnTS

13 Counterpartandappreciationtheodicies 192JustinP.McBrayer

14 Freewillandsoul-makingtheodicies 205DanielSpeak

15 Theconnection-buildingtheodicy 222RobinCollins

16 Bestpossibleworldtheodicy 236HudHudson

17 Providenceandtheodicy 251ThomasP.Flint

18 Achristiantheodicy 266LauraW.Ekstrom

19 TowardanIndiantheodicy 281PurushottamaBilimoria

20 Earth’sepistemicfruitsforharmonywithGod:anIslamictheodicy 296MohammadAliMobini

21 OnconstructingaJewishtheodicy 309DavidShatz

22 Feminismandtheproblemofevil 326BeverleyClack

23 Processtheismandtheodiciesforproblemsofevil 340JamesA.Keller

24 Theodicyinavaleoftears 349EvanFales

25 Antitheodicy 363n.n.Trakakis

Part III Skeptical Responses 377

26 Abriefhistoryofskepticalresponsestoevil 379T.M.Rudavsky

27 PetervanInwagen’sdefense 396MeghanSullivan

28 Adefensewithoutfreewill 411DerkPereboom

29 Skepticaltheism,CORnEA,andcommonsenseepistemology 426ThomasD.Senor

30 Themoralskepticismobjectiontoskepticaltheism 444StephenMaitzen

31 Theglobalskepticismobjectiontoskepticaltheism 458IanWilks

32 Theisticobjectionstoskepticaltheism 468DavidO’Connor

33 Skepticaltheismandthe“toomuchskepticism”objection 482MichaelC.Rea

Index 507

Notes on Contributors

Marilyn McCord Adams was formerly Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford University and is currently Honorary Professor at the Australian Catholic University, Australia.

Purushottama Bilimoria is Honorary Associate Professor and Research Fellow in Philoso-phy at Deakin University and Honorary Fellow at University of Melbourne, Australia.

Andrei A. Buckareff is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Marist College, USA.

Beverley Clack is Professor in the Philosophy of Religion at Oxford Brookes University, UK.

Robin Collins is Distinguished Research Professor and Chair of the Department of Phi-losophy at Messiah College, USA.

Trent Dougherty is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University, USA.

Paul Draper is Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University, USA.

Laura W. Ekstrom is Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the College of William & Mary, USA.

Evan Fales is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa, USA.

Thomas P. Flint is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, USA.

Robert Francescotti is Professor of Philosophy at San Diego State University, USA.

Jerome Gellman is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Ben-Gurion University, Israel.

Michael W. Hickson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Santa Clara University, USA.

Daniel Howard-Snyder is Professor of Philosophy at Western Washington University, USA.

x NOtES ON CONtRIBUtORS

Hud Hudson is Professor of Philosophy at Western Washington University, USA.

James A. Keller is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Wofford College, USA.

Stephen Maitzen is W.G. Clark Professor of Philosophy at Acadia University, Canada.

Justin P. McBrayer is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Fort Lewis College, USA.

Mohammad Ali Mobini is Assistant Professor at the Academy of Islamic Sciences and Culture, Qom, Iran.

Wesley Morriston is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder, USA.

David O’Connor is Professor of Philosophy at Seton Hall University, USA.

Graham Oppy is Professor of Philosophy and Head of the School of Philosophical, Histori-cal and International Studies at Monash University, Australia.

Richard Otte is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz, USA.

Derk Pereboom is Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University, USA.

Allen Plug is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Malone University, USA.

Michael C. Rea is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame, USA.

T.M. Rudavsky is Professor of Philosophy at the Ohio State University, USA.

J.L. Schellenberg is Professor of Philosophy at Mount Saint Vincent University, Canada.

Thomas D. Senor is Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Arkansas, USA.

David Shatz is Professor and Co-chair of the Department of Philosophy, Yeshiva Univer-sity, USA.

Daniel Speak is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Loyola Marymount University, USA.

Meghan Sullivan is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, USA.

N.N. Trakakis is Research Fellow in Philosophy and Assistant Director of the Centre for the Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion at the Australian Catholic University, Australia.

Ian Wilks is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Acadia University, Canada.

René van Woudenberg is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Abraham Kuyper Center for Science and Religion at VU University, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Preface

This volume has a twofold purpose: reference and research. As a work of reference, it is designed to provide accessible, objective, and accurate summaries of contemporary devel-opments concerning the problem of evil. As a work of research, it is designed to advance the dialectic concerning the problem of evil by offering novel insights, criticisms, and responses from top scholars in the field. As such, the volume will serve as a guide to both specialists and nonspecialists alike. Each part of the book opens with an essay that frames the chapters that follow in a rich historical context.

The volume is subdivided into three parts. Part one is entitled “Problems of Evil.” To speak of the problem of evil is a mistake – there is no such thing as the problem of evil. Instead, there are many different problems, some more pressing than others. Not all prob-lems of evil are best interpreted as arguments from evil for atheism. For example, medieval thinkers were certainly aware of a tension between theism and the existence of evil, though they rarely construe the latter as evidence against the former. God’s existence was beyond doubt; the only question left was how to accommodate an apparent anomaly. This sort of problem of evil has been labeled the “aporetic problem of evil” by Marilyn and Robert Adams in The Problem of Evil (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). The problem of hell is an aporetic problem of evil of this sort. No one takes the existence of hell to be evidence against the existence of God (since one likely only believes in hell only if one believes in God), but there is still a problem of evil here. The same sort of problem crops up in the problem of apparently morally abhorrent divine commands in Holy Scriptures. The puzzle here is to think more carefully about how we understand evil, omnibeneficience, and divine revelation in order to resolve a philosophical tension.

Other problems of evil are atheological in nature. These sorts of problems of evil suggest that evil provides some sort of evidence against the existence of God. Perhaps the existence of God and evil are logically incompatible. Or perhaps even if they are strictly speaking compatible, the latter provides strong evidence against the former. Or perhaps what really matters is how we might best explain the amount, type, and distribution of evil on earth. Does theism provide a better explanation than naturalism on this score? If not, it looks like the existence of evil is data that supports a naturalistic worldview over a theistic one. Of course, even if it turns out that evil is some evidence against theism, it does not follow that theism is unsupported or irrational. Some theistic philosophers grant that evil

xii PREFAcE

provides prima facie evidence for atheism, but insist that this prima facie evidence is over-ridden by more powerful evidence for theism. Finally, not all problems of evil are either aporetic or atheological. For example, perhaps there are problems of evil for atheists, too; after all, they must make sense out of a world of good and evil without the assurances and foundation provided by theism.

This evidential focus of problems of evil makes it apparent that just as there is not just one problem of evil, there is not just one evil, either. In thinking about the problem of evil, one might worry about the general fact that there is evil in the world. Or one might worry about a specific instance of evil, for example, the suffering of a childhood friend. Notice that showing that God’s existence is compatible with evil in general will not suffice to show that God’s existence is compatible with any given specific instance of evil. Or perhaps the worry is not just that our world has evil in it, but that there are certain types of evil in our world (e.g., the suffering of nonhuman animals) or certain distributions of evil in it (e.g., the suffering of innocents). Part I of the volume offers clear access points to each of these various ways of thinking about problems of evil.

The remaining two parts of the book provide various responses to problems of evil with a focus on atheological problems of evil. Part II includes responses to problems of evil that go some way towards explaining why our world would have certain evils in it on the assumption that it was created by God. Part III includes responses to evil that admit of no explanation for the evils in our world but insist that the problem of evil is not an evidential problem for theists nonetheless. In other words, Part II includes theodicies, and Part III includes various skeptical replies, including defenses and skeptical theism.

The theodicist must, in Milton’s terms, “justify the ways of God to men.” A theodicy might argue that the evil in our world is necessary for the instantiation of anything good (good/evil dualism), or it might make the more limited claim that the permission of evil in our world is necessary for some particular types of goods, like significant free will, the development of character/virtue, just punishment, and so on. Or perhaps the evil in our world is best explained by appealing to fundamental metaphysical features of reality, including the set of possible worlds that was open to God to actualize. Or perhaps the evil in our world is best explained by a proper understanding of the divine nature itself as sug-gested by process theologians or some feminist philosophers of religion.

Theodicies are important not just as a possible rejoinder to arguments for atheism, but also as evidence for various species of theism. Almost no one is a “vanilla theist.” People who believe in God are typically adherents of major world religions. Religion-specific theodicies might show that certain religions will have an easier time explaining the exist-ence of evil over others. For example, perhaps Hindu theists can invoke karma to explain the existence and distribution of evil better than Judaism. If so, that is a ceteris paribus reason for a theist to prefer Hinduism over Judaism. Or perhaps certain views of divine providence have an easier time explaining the existence of evil over others. For example, perhaps open theists can invoke God’s ignorance about the future to explain the existence and distribution of evil better than Molinism. If so, that is a ceteris paribus reason for a theist to prefer open theism over Molinism. These issues are explored in Part II of this volume.

Skeptical replies to problems of evil in Part III attempt to chart a middle course between the mostly atheological problems of evil sketched in Part I and the theodicies of Part II. Many philosophers grant that we cannot explain why a good God would allow our world to be populated with evil, but they also think that the mere fact that we are unable to

PREFAcE xiii

explain the existence of the evil neither poses a threat to rational theistic belief nor supports atheistic belief. Some of these skeptics endorse a response to arguments of evil called a defense. A defense is like a theodicy in structure, but instead of being offered as an explana-tion for what is the case, it is offered as what might be the case for all we know. The defender suggests that unless we can rule out other live hypotheses for how the evils in our world might be justified, we should not conclude that they are pointless. Another family of views is called skeptical theism. Skeptical theists are theists who are skeptical of our abilities to determine whether the evils in our world are actually pointless. If they are right, then no one is in a position to determine whether certain arguments from evil are sound. Of course, both of these approaches are plagued by a determined set of critics who argue, among other things, that the skeptical responses cannot be consistently maintained by theists who are not moral or global skeptics. These positions and challenges are detailed in Part III of the text.

Justin P. McBrayerDaniel Howard-Snyder