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8/17/2019 A Contrast of the Sociological Systems of Merton, Parsons and Marx (Szymanski, 1975)
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Department of Sociology, Humboldt State University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
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Department of Sociology Humboldt State University
COMPETING SOCIOLOGICAL PARADIGMS: A Contrast of the Sociological Systems of Merton,Parsons, and MarxAuthor(s): Albert SzymanskiSource: Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (SPRING/SUMMER 1975), pp. 57-65Published by: Department of Sociology, Humboldt State University
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8/17/2019 A Contrast of the Sociological Systems of Merton, Parsons and Marx (Szymanski, 1975)
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COMPETING SOCIOLOGICAL PARADIGMS:
A Contrast
of the
Sociological
Systems
of
Merton,
Parsons,
and Marx*
Albert
Szymanski
UNTIL
recently
two modes of
sociology
were
hegemonic
in the United States.
These were what C.
Wright
Mills
called
Grand
Theory
and Abstracted
Empiricism
(1959).
The
major proponent
of
the first has been Talcott
Parsons,
and the
major
theorist of the
second,
Robert
King
Merton. The
leading
social
science
perspective
outside
of the
United States in the
last
generation,
however,
has been
that
originally developed by
Karl Marx.
Each
of these
three men
articulated systematic approaches to doing sociology, which,
following
Thomas
Kuhn
(1964),
can
justly
be
referred
to as
scientific
paradigms. Although
the relative
pre-eminence
within
non-Marxist American
sociology
of the
perspectives
articulated
by
Parsons
and
Merton
has,
in recent
years,
diminished
considerably
in
favor of formal
mathematical
sociology
in
some
circles,
and numerous versions of
voluntarist
and idealist
modes of
sociology
such
as
ethnomethodology,
critical
theory,
phenomenology,
and
symbolic
interactionism
in
others,
the
paradigms
of
Merton and Parsons remain
important.
Further,
the
systematic
examination of these two
paradigms
and their
contrasting
to Marxism can throw
considerable
light
on the more
general
question
of the role of
sociological paradigms.
The
central thesis of this
paper
is that
sociology
is not
a
theoretically
unified
discipline,
and
further,
that its
development
is not
cumulative.
Instead,
the
position
I
hold is
that
sociology
involves a
struggle
between
competing
paradigms,
and
that
the
development
of
sociology
consists of a
discontinuous
replacement
of some
paradigms by
others.1
In this
paper,
I
will first
develop
a
modified version of
Thomas Kuhn's notion of a
scientific
paradigm,
adapting
his
original
schema
(which
was
developed
to describe the natural
Volume 2 Number 2
Spring/Summer
1975
sciences)
to the social
sciences.
One of the most
important
innovations in
his
schema
is the introduction
of the notion
of
the inherent values
of each
paradigm.
The natural
sciences,
far
more removed
from social
relations,
do not involve values
in
anything
like
the
degree
to which
they
are imbedded
in
the
social sciences.
Social
science,
because
its
subject
matter
is
social
relations,
cannot
avoid
taking positions
on the nature
of
social
relations.
These existential
positions
will
necessarily
either conflict with, or confirm, the existential assertions of
the various
political
and moral
ideologies
in contention
in
society.
It is
probably
the different value
resonances
of the
various
competing
sociological paradigms
that account for
the
relative
predominance
of
sociological
systems
at
any given
time.
A
paradigm provides
its adherents
with
categories
in
which
to
comprehend
the
flow of social
experience.
It
provides
the
structural
units in
which social
reality
is
perceived
(similar
to
the
linguistic
category
of
semantics),
and the mode of
relating
these structural units
to each other
(similar
to the
linguistic
category
of
syntax).
Each
paradigm represents
an alternative
way
of
looking
at the
social world.
Paradigms
cannot
be
easily
judged
by
criteria taken
from
any paradigm except
the
one
under
consideration,
since each offers its
own rules of
verification.
The
idea of
scientific
paradigms
is
opposed
to
the naive
view of
science in which it is
implicitly
assumed that
there is
agreement
of
what the
key
problems
are
and
how
to test
hypotheses.
According
to
this naive
view,
if
two observers
disagree,
it is
either because the test
was
inadequate,
or
because
at
least
one
of
the observers
was biased. But in
reality,
two observers
will
necessarily
agree only
if
they
subscribe to
57
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8/17/2019 A Contrast of the Sociological Systems of Merton, Parsons and Marx (Szymanski, 1975)
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the
same
paradigm.
The
notion of a cumulative and
integrated
social science
is a
myth perpetuated
in
good part through
textbooks and basic
sociology
courses
which,
through
a
process
of
selection
and
distortion,
represent
the
previous thinking
and
research
in the
general
idea
of
sociology
as
building up
to the
present.
The
book which has
perhaps
had the
greatest impact
in this
regard
has been Parsons' The Structure
of
Social Action
(1937).
The
Basic
Components
of
a
Sociological
Paradigm
A
sociological paradigm
can be
usefully
considered
to
consist of a
system
of
concepts,
data
ranges,
central
problems,
methods of
verification,
modes
of
thinking,
and values.
We will
discuss each in turn.
A
concept
is the
crystallization
or
reification of
an
aspect
of
the flow of
experience.
It
is
the
smallest unit
in a
paradigmatic
definition of
social
reality.
It
specifies
not
only
what entities the universe
does and does not contain
and the
meanings
attached to
them,
it further
mplicitly
or
explicitly
contains its
relationships
to other
concepts
and
to th
e
paradigmatic system
as a whole.
A
data
range
refers
to the area of
experience
that a
paradigm
defines as
relevant;
that
is,
those
places
that
one
should
look
for
data.
It
should
be
noted that different
paradigms
see
quite
different
things
in the same
places.
For
example,
the
Marxist
problem
of
the source
of
primitive
accumulation
and
the
Parsonian
problem
of what values
motivated the
early
capitalists
are
concerned
with the same
general
data
range.
But bo th of these theories are
counterposed
to the
entirely
different data
range
of small
group
sociology.
The
relationship
of a data
range
to the rest of
a
paradigm
is a
two-way
process.
While the
concepts
and mode
of
thinking
define what is to be
considered relevant kinds
of
data,
the
type
of data considered also effects the kinds of
concepts,
theories,
methods,
and mode of
thinking
to be
applied
to it. For
example,
the
expert
of Latin America tends
to
apply
the
categories
and
theories
developed
from
dealing
with Latin
American material
to
other areas.
The concept problem can only have meaning within a
paradigmatic
framework. A
problem
exists
because
(a)
a
given
paradigm
specifies
it
as
a
meaningful
and
important question,
and
(b)
because
the
given
state
of
a
paradigm
has not
yet
been
able to
explain
satisfactorily
the
phenomena
that it defines as
relevant. For a
problem
to
be selected
as
relevant is must be
both
stateable and
potentially
solvable in terms
of.
the
conceptual
and
instrumental
tools the
paradigm supplies.
For
example,
a
central
problem
for
any
Marxist
is
the cause
of
proletarian
consciousness,
or
false-consciousness. For the
Mertonian
or
Parsonian a central
problem
is the
source of
deviance. Neither
paradigm specifies
the
problem
that
the
other
is
concerned with as an
important
question.
Every
paradigm specifies
what it considers to be
the
relevant
methods.
Research within
normal science
is
based
on
a shared
paradigm
and on a commitment to
similar rules
and
standards of
procedure.
Similar
methods reflect
agreement
on
a
way
of
looking
at the flow of
experience.
The decision to
employ
a
particular
method and to use it in a
particular way
carries with it an
assurance that
only
certain
sorts of
circumstances will occur. For
example,
consider the
consequences
of
accepting only
experimental
methods or
only
survey
research,
or
only
historiography,
on the
range
and
types
of
concepts, problems,
and theories that could
arise.
The modes
of
thinking
are
the
general
and
specific
orientations toward
the
organization
of the
interrelationships
of the flow of
experience. They
consist of such elements as the
focus of
observation
and frame of
analysis,
the
key categories
of
explanation,
the fundamental
organizing
and
dynamic
elements,
the mode of
conceptualization
and
analysis,
the
interrelations
of
elements,
the view
of
change,
the nature of
change,
and the
categorization
of
social
experience.
These
categories
are all
vague
and ill-defined because
of
the
great
difficulty
of
dealing
on
such a
high
level of abstraction with
comparisons among paradigms. It is extremely difficult to
formulate
categories
in
which to
classify
sub-divisions of
paradigms
since
one must
employ
a
paradigm
to
generate
a
relevant
set of
classificatory
concepts.
In the discussion that
follows we have tried to overcome this
problem
by
using
all
the
paradigms
which we will discuss to
generate categories.
This
has
the
advantage
not
only
of
being relatively
objective,
but of
calling
attention to those areas in
opposing paradigms
that are
empty.
In
any
event,
the best
way
to understand what
exactly
is meant
by
our
categories
of modes of
thinking
is
through
illustration.
However,
before
discussing
concrete
paradigms,
we would
like to discuss the standard kinds
of
mechanisms used
by
paradigms
to
account
for alternative
paradigms (alternative
definitions of social
reality).
We will
suggest
three basic kinds
of such defense-mechanisms:
Nihilation:
The denial that
whatever
phenomena
or
interpretations
of
phenomena
that don't fit into a
paradigm
exist or the claim that
they
are
metaphysical
problems.
For
example,
the
Parsonian
view of the
Marxist
problems
of
false-con sciousness and class interest.
Alternatively,
nihilation
is the claim that the adherents
of
another
paradigm
are not to
be
taken
seriously. They
are
naive,
unscientific,
ignorant,
ideological, ignoring
the
facts,
or
rationalizing
their interests at
best,
and
liars at worst. For
example,
the
Parsonian
view of
Marxists,
and the Marxist view of Parsonians.
Segregation:
The
assigning
of a
paradigm
or
part
of a
paradigm
to
another
field. For
example,
the
sociologist's assigning
of
certain
phenomena
and orientations to the
economist,
psychologist, moral philosopher, or politician.
Integration:
Through
a
friendly
selective
perception
of an
alternative
paradigm
it
is
explained
as
a
special
case
of
your
own
paradigm.
For
example,
Merton's demonstration that
Marx was a functionalist.
Or
Parson's redefinition of the
classical
categories
of
social
theory (power, prestige,
state,
religion,
etc.).
The
Application
of
the
Schema
Now let
us
begin
to
discuss concrete
paradigms
in
sociology.
We
will
treat the
two
paradigms
which
until
recently
were the
most
important
within
sociology,
those of
Robert
Merton and
Talcott
Parsons,
and also
that of
Karl
Marx.
Quite
naturally,
as we
will
present
them,
they
are ideal
types, to which few practicing social scientists would adhere
exactly.
Nevertheless,
it is our
feeling
that considerable
numbers
of
sociologists
have
subscribed to
paradigms
reasonably
close to one of
these
three
(and
hence
reasonably
distant
from the
other
two).
Of
course,
a
further
major
problem
is
that
of
interpretation
of the
three
paradigms. Many
will
no
doubt
disagree
with
specifics
of
my
presentation.
I
have,
however,
made
every
attempt
to be
as
objective
as
possible by
trying
to
submerge myself
in
each
paradigm
while
discussing
it.
By
Merton,
we mean the
Merton
of
Social
58
HUMBOLDT
JOURNAL OF
SOCIAL
RELATIONS
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Theory
and Social
Structure
(1961); by
Parsons,
we mean
the
Parsons
of Societies:
Evolutionary
and
Comparative
Perspectives
(1966),
supplemented
by
his
earlier
writings
where
they
are not
in
contradiction;
and
by
Marx,
we
mean
the
Marx
of
Capital {1961), again
supplemented
by
his
earlier
work where
it is not in contradiction.
The General
Modes of
Thinking
The
general
modes
of
thinking
are
the most abstract
and
general
orientations
applicable
to all kinds
of social
phenomena.
The most
elementary aspect
of
our
paradigms
is
their
primary
focus
of
observation
and
frame
of analysis.
Parsons focuses
on the value-orientations
of a social
system
and
analyzes
their
consequences
for social structure.
Merton
focuses
on the network of social
structural
relations
of
individuals. Marx
focuses
on
the
total
societal structure
and
dynamic,
and
analyzes
its
consequences
for the various
component
parts
of the
total
society.
For Parsons the
key
categories of
explanation,
are
value-orientations and
four universal
functions
(especially
integration
and
adaptation).
For
Merton,
they
are
individual
roles
and statuses and
to a lesser
degree
collective
goals
and
norms. For
Marx
the
key categories
of
explanation
are
class,
power,
and interest.
What these first two classifications mean, taken together, is
that in
looking
at
the
same data
range,
all
three
paradigms
see
different
things.
For
example,
let us consider an
industrial
conflict within a
factory.
Merton would tend
to see the
situation
in
terms
of role and status
strains
acting
on
the
individual workers
and
managers,
and
would
analyze
the
situation
accordingly, perhaps
prescribing
such remedial
action
as the reduction
of
conflicting
role
expectations.
Parsons
would
see the
same
phenomena
in terms
of the value
system
of
the
factory
and
the
relevant
sub-groups.
He would tend
to find
that the workers' or
managers'
values and
norms are
not
adequately
adjusted
to the
functional
needs of
industrial
organization. Perhaps
the workers
are new recruits
from rural
areas,
or
the
managers
have
an
obsolete
19th-century
managerial ideology.
Education,
understanding,
and
time
are
thus
the
natural remedies.
Marx
would tend to see
the
situation as a
specific
instance of class
struggle
within
the
whole
society,
and
analyze
it in terms of
opposing
class
interests and relative
power
positions.
Marx would
suggest
that
only
the
revolutionary
transformation of
all
society
would
eliminate
such
industrial
conflict.
The
overall
organizing
and
dynamic
element
in the
Parsonian
paradigm
is the
system
of
value-orientations
which
determine
the
general
outline
of the structure
and
change
of
all
major
social elements.
In the Marxist
paradigm
the same
role
is
played
by
the mode of
production
and
the resultant
relations
of
production
(class
structure).
The Mertonian
paradigm
denies the existence
of
any
such overall
organizing
element: each element is assumed to be more of less
autonomous.
The mode
of
conceptualization
and
analysis
varies
greatly
in the
three
paradigms.
For Parsons all social
systems
are
treated
in the
same
way:
a universal
set
of abstract
concepts
are
interrelated
by analytical
formulations.
All
analysis
is
either
of
analytical
or
of concrete
social
systems,
with
emphasis being
given
to
the
analytical.
Discussion of
contemporary
U.S.
society,
and of
analytical
social
systems,
is
largely
in
static,
ahistorical and
non-comparative
terms, i.e.,
they
are
viewed as
developing
toward the
fully
articulated
analytical
model of advanced
industrial western
society
(the
U.S.A.).
For Merton
likewise,
all social
systems
are treated in the
same
way.
However,
only
small-scale social
systems,
not total
societies,
are considered
relevant.
Similarly,
a universal set of
abstract
concepts
are
related,
but
by
small-scale
(middle-range)
theory.
All
analysis
is
of
either
analytic
or concrete
systems
with stress
being given
to the concrete. The
analysis
is
ahistorical, static,
and
non-comparative.
The mode of conceptualization and analysis of Marx is
quite
different from either that of Parsons or Merton. For
Marx,
there are interrelated levels of abstractness-concreteness
of
concepts,
related
by
large
scale
theory.
Some
analysis
and
conceptualization
is on the
level
of
all
societies,
some on
the
level of all
class
societies,
some on the level of
particular
kinds
of
class societies
(esp. Capitalism),
and some of
the level of
historically specific
concrete societies. The
analysis
is
in
general
historical and
comparative.
For
Parsons,
there is a
high degree
of
interrelationship
between elements.
All
social
phenomena
are seen as
organized
into semi-autonomous
subsystems
which nevertheless have
important
interrelations
(through
common and
complimentary
values and
functions).
Social
phenomena
are
analyzed
accordingly by
the
separate
academic
disciplines
of
history,
economics,
political
science,
sociology,
etc.,
each
corresponding
to a
given
aspect
of
the flow of
social
experience.
For Merton all social
phenomena
are
viewed as
autonomous
until
proven
otherwise. The flow of
social
experience
is broken
into
certain
categories
corresponding
to
the various academic
disciplines:
economics,
political
science,
sociology,
etc.
According
to the
Marxist
paradigm,
all social
phenomena
within a
given society
are viewed as
integral
parts
of one
overall
system
or whole.
Separate
disciplines
such as
history,
philosophy,
economics,
sociology, anthropology,
political
science,
etc.,
are
viewed as
artificial
categories
that
only
hinder
the
understanding
of this whole.
According
to the Parsonian view
of change,
organization
and change are considered as analytically distinct although
interrelated
categories
which can be
analyzed
separately.
For
Merton this
is
true
to an even
greater
extent. He sees
change
and
organization
as
basically
separate
phenomena.
For
example,
change
should be studied
by
a
separate
subfield
of
sociology
called social
change.
The
Marxist view
of
change
is
totally
opposed
to the
Mertonian notion.
Change
and
organization
are viewed as
parts
of
a
single process,
not as
distinct
categories
to be
analyzed
separately.
All
aspects
of
class societies
are
viewed
as in a
continuing process
of
development.
The
Parsonian
paradigm
maintains that ail
societies have
in
varying
degrees
an
inherent
internal
tendency
leading
to
systematic
change.
This
tendency
is
caused
by
increasing
differentiation in order
to
increase
adaptation,
and
by
the
increasing
generalization
of
the
value
system
in order
to
integrate
the
increasingly
differentiated structure. Thus
change
is
seen as
evolutionary
and
moving
towards
gradually
increased
adaptation
and
integration
of the social
system.
Nevertheless,
contemporary
Western
society
(esp. U.S.A.)
is seen in
largely
static
terms,
as
more
or
less
the
end
of
history.
For
Merton,
there is
no
inherent
tendency
towards
systematic
change.
The
question
of
change
is
a
problematic
and
empirical
matter.
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Number 2
Spring/Summer
1975
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For
Marx,
again
completely opposed
to the
Mertonian
view,
all
class societies
have,
in
varying degrees,
an inherent internal
dynamic
tending
to
systematic
societal
change.
This
tendency
stems from the structure
of
class
relations
(these
are
referred
to
as
contradictions). Change
tends
to
be
evolutionary
within a
type
of
class
society.
However,
a basic
discontinuity
(revolution)
is
likely
to occur on the level of the
relations
of
production
in
the
transition
between
types
of
societies
(e.g.,
feudalism to
capitalism).
Parsons
tends
to see
societies as
fundamentally
harmonies
of
interest. Societies tend to function to the benefit of all their
members
(given
the
restraints
of the
situation).
Equilibrium,
integration,
function,
and
maximum
adaptation
are
centrally
important.
Marx,
on the other
hand,
sees societies as structures of
overt
conflict and
struggle,
and
of covert conflicts of
interest.
The
questions
of in whose
interest and
who has
power
are
central. For
Marx,
societies
tend
to
benefit some at
the
expense
of
others,
the
antithesis of the Parsonian view.
The
Specific
Modes of
Thinking
In
addition to
the
above
general
ways
of
observing
and
analyzing
social
phenomena,
we
can
compare
our
paradigms
in
terms of the
ways they
observe and
analyze
specific
types
of
social experience. I will call these specific modes of thinking
(or
specific
orientations).
View of
Man's Nature:
Parsons and
Merton both
agree
in
conceiving
personality
as
a
product
of
internalization of
culture. Men
are socialized
into
role-expectations.
Innate
psychological
factors
other
then
plasticity,
sensitivity
to
sanctioning,
and tension
reduction
are
viewed as
nonexistent
or
not
important
for the
analysis
of
social
phenomena.
Marx
sees the
individual as
highly
malleable and
socializable
into a
wide
variety
of
social
structures.
Nevertheless there are
certain innate ahistorical
human needs which are
satisfied
in
varying degrees
by
different
types
of
societies. The frustration
of
these needs
has
an
important
effect on
social
phenomena.
The
most
important
of these are the
needs
for
creative
work,
dignity,
and
community.
View
of
Deviance: For
Parsons,
deviation
from a
system
is
caused
by
unsuccessful
socialization
or
sanctioning,
or
alternatively by
conflicts between values.
According
to
the
Mertonian
paradigm,
deviation from the norms is a
product
of
role
or status
strain,
or
alternatively
is a
response
to the
divergence
between common
goals
and
differentially
distributed means.
Marx,
on
the other
hand,
has no
concept
of
deviance.
The
notion
of
deviance
implies
a
concept
of
system,
equilibrium,
or
common
goals
that
is
alien
to
Marxism.
The
behavior
referred to as
deviant in
the
other
paradigms
is
explained
as is
any
other
in terms
of
class,
interest and
power.
View
of Social Structure:
Parsons sees
society
as a
self-sufficient
social
system,
all
the
parts
of which
function
towards the maintenance and advance of all other parts of the
system
as a
whole.
Stratification makes
possible
an
increase in
societal
efficiency
and
integration
.
For
Merton,
social
structure is
nothing
more
than the summation
of
individual
roles and
statuses.
He
has
no
overarching
view
of social
structure.
And for
Marx,
social structure is the
composite
of
unequal
but
integrally
related
classes
ordered
by exploitation,
power,
and
privilege.
View of Values and
Beliefs:
For
the Parsonian
paradigm,
values
are
central to the
analysis. They
are the
ultimate
determinants of
personality,
and of
the
organization,
integration,
and
dynamics
of
societies. Merton's
paradigm
has
no
systematic
approach
to
values and beliefs
other
than
that
they
tend to
correspond
to roles
by way
of
role-expectations.
For
Marx, however,
values and
beliefs
are
basically
determined
by
class
interests
and,
ultimately,
by
the mode of
production.
View
of the
State:
For
Parsons,
government
is the
institution
(analytical
or
concrete)
that
specializes
in
goal
attainment.
Government,
further,
is seen as
serving
the
interests of the system as a whole. Merton does not have a
view of
the
state. For him the
state is the
proper
subject
matter
for another
discipline,
i.e.,
political
science. And of
course,
for
Marx,
the state is
seen as
an
oppressive
instrument
serving
the interests of the
ruling
classes.
View
of
Economics: For
Parsons,
the
economy
is
the
institution
(analytic
or
concrete)
that
specializes
in
the
function
of
adaptation
of the
society
to
its
environment
through
the maximization of
production.
Merton
does not
have a
view
of
economics.
Economic
phenomena
are
the
subject
matter of another
discipline.
For
Marx,
however,
economic
phenomena
are
central to
the
understanding
and
analysis
of societies. Economic
principles
determine the
overall
organization
and
dynamics
of societies.
Further,
the
divergences
of
economic
interests
and economic
contradictions
are
the focus of
conflict
and
change.
Concepts
We
have listed the
major
concepts
of our
three
paradigms
in
Table 1.
As is
apparent,
the
concepts
of each
system
are
found
to mesh
very
well
with each
system's
mode of
thinking.
The
Parsonian
primary
concepts
are all built
up,
for the
most
part,
around the
central ideas
of
order,
system,
adaptation,
and
integration.
The
whole
set of
primary
concepts
are
logically
interrelated
and
complement
one
another.
Together they
provide
a
comprehensive
categorization
of
that
part
of
the flow of
experience
concerning
social
phenomena
that the Parsonian
paradigm
considers
relevant. The
Parsonian
paradigm
also
contains
another
set
of
concepts,
which
we
refer to as
secondary
concepts.
These
were
developed by
Parsons after his
original
system
was
advanced,
and are
all
complex concepts
built
up
from his
primary
set.
They
are
meant to
redefine and
integrate
into his
paradigm
terms that
have
been
at
the heart of
classical
social and
political
theory.
Merton's list
of
concepts
is
similarly
integrated
with
his
general
mode of
thinking.
They
are
primarily
built
around the
key
ideas
of
role,
group, goals,
and
functions. It should
be
emphasized
that both
Parsons'
and Merton's sets of
concepts
are
universally highly
abstract and
meant to
apply
to
all
societies
at
all
times.
The
Marxist mode of
conceptualization
is more
refined
than
either the
Parsonian or the
Mertonian. Like
them,
it
has a
set of universal and abstract concepts meant to apply to all
societies
at all
times,
e.g.,
forces
of
production,
relations of
production,
use
value,
etc.
However,
in
addition,
it has a
second
set of more
specific
concepts
meant to
apply only
to
class
societies,
e.g., private
property,
alienation,
exchange
value.
And
further,
Marxism
provided
a still more
specified
set
of
concepts
for each
type
of
class
society
with
which
it
deals,
e.g.,
for
capitalism: capital,
free
labor,
organic
composition
of
capital.
The Parsonian
and
Mertonian
paradigms
are forced
to
60
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observe
and
analyze
phenomena
on
either a
highly
abstract
or
on a
concrete
empirical
level.
The Marxist
paradigm,
however,
provides
two intermediate levels of observation
and
analysis,
thus
permitting
a
greater degree
of refinement
by providing
for
movement
between
many
levels of
abstraction.
On each level of Marx's
conceptualization
we can see
the
internal
integration
of the set of
concepts
and
the relation to
the
general
mode
of
thinking.
On the most abstract
level the
concepts
are interrelated
by
the
central idea of
production.
On
the intermediate level
they
are
organized by
the central ideas
of power and the division of labor. Finally, on the level of
capitalist
societies,
the
concepts
are
organized
by
the central
idea of
capital (as
opposed
to
wage
labor).
Further,
the levels
of
conceptualization
are related
to each
other.
The
concepts
of
the
highest
level
plus
the
concept
of
the
division of labor
generate
the
concepts
of the intermediate level. S
imilarly
the
set of
concepts
specific
to
capitalism
can
be
generated
from
the
concepts
of
the intermediate level
and the
concept
of
wage
labor.
Problems
For Parsons
three
of the most
important
kinds
of
problems
that his
paradigm
generates
are:
1)
How is a
given
social
system
integrated? 2)
What is the function of a
value-pattern
for a given structure? 3) Why did some societies and not others
develop incresingly
better mechanisms
of
adaptation
and
integration?
Specifically,
what was
the source of
the value
orientations
that motivated the
early capitalists,
and
why
was
this factor
lacking
in
other societies?
We should be able
to
see
the
relation
of
these
kinds of
problems
considered critical
by
the Parsonian
paradigm
to its
concepts
and
mode of
thinking:
value-orientations,
adaptation, equilibrium
integration,
and
function
are
the
key
ideas in which his
problems
are
posed
and
his
answers
given.
For the Mertonian
paradigm,
similarly,
the
problems
are
generated
by
the mode of
thinking
and the
set
of
concepts.
Some of the
major problems
with which
Merton deals are:
Why
does a
group
choose
a
particular
response
to anomie?
Why
does
an individual
choose
a
given
reference
group?
What
are the
latent
positive
functions of an
element?
What is the
cause of deviance? What is
the
source
of
influence?
Or for
some more
specific examples:
Why
do liberals accommodate
to
bureaucracies?
What is the
function
of
the
political
machine?
What is the cause of racial discrimination?
Why
was
morale
higher
in some
army
units than
in others?
Likewise,
with
the
Marxist
paradigm,
the Marxist mode
of
thinking
and
conceptualizing
generates
the
key
problem
areas.
For
Marxists,
some of the most
important problems
are: What
are the laws
accounting
for the transformation
of class
societies? What is the relation
between a
given ideology
and
social
structural
interests?
How does an underclass
develop
class consciousness? What is the
origin
of alienation? Some
more
specific
kinds of
problems
follow:
Why
isn't
the
working
class class-conscious? Why does capitalism seem to have
stabilized
itself? What was
the
source
of
primitive
accumulation?
Why
didn't
capitalism develop
in China
or
India? What
are the laws that
govern
the accumulation
of
capital?
What are
the causes
of
crises,
unemployment,
and
wage
fluctuations?
A
number
of
additional
observations
can
be
made
concerning
the kinds of
problems
generated
by
each
paradigm:
1)
The Parsonian
paradigm
seems to
generate
fewer
relatively
specific
(and
hence
empirically testable)
problems
than do the
Mertonian or Marxist.
2)
The
Mertonian
paradigm
seems
to
generate
problems
that
are less
systematic
and interrelated
than do the other two
paradigms. 3)
From the
point
of view of
the Mertonian and Parsonian
paradigms
all of the
Marxist
problems
are
unreal
(nihilation), wrongly
stated
(integration),
or irrelevant
(segregation).
Further,
it should be noted that
although many
of
the
problems generated by
the
separate paradigms
bear
a
superficial relationship
to those
generated
by
other
paradigms,
the relation is more apparent than real. This apparent but
unreal
similarity
is a result of the
treating
of the same data
range
by
different
concepts
and modes
of
thinking.
For
example,
the Marxist
problem
of the
source
of
primitive
accumulation and
the
Parsonian
problem
of the source of the
value-orientations of the
early
capitalists
are
not
the same
problem.
The
Marxists
look
for
interests,
free
labor,
and
expanded
commerce,
while
Parsonians look for
religious
innovations.
This distinction is borne witness to
by
the
existence of
two
separate, largely
unrelated,
and
ever
growing
bodies
of
literature
on
the
origins
of
capitalism:
one
growing
from the work of Karl
Marx,
and
lately
from that of Maurice
Dobb
(1963),
and the
other
growing
from the work of Max
Weber
(1930)
as
interpreted by
Talcott Parsons
(1937).
Theories
The central theories of each of the three
paradigms
correspond
to the kinds of
problems
each
generates.
Indeed,
they
are
nothing
other than
attempts
to
provide
answers
to
these
problems.
Thus,
the
Parsonian
paradigm
provides
a
theory
of the
function of
the
value-orientations involved in the
doctor-patient relationship,
a
theory
of the
relationship
of
Calvinism
to
the rise of
Capitalism,
a
theory
of
the
mechanisms
of
social
control,
and
a
general theory
of the
development
of world
history (with
special
sub-theories for
each
major
society).
Likewise,
the Mertonian
paradigm
has theories of
reference
groups,
influence,
bureaucracy,
anomie,
and
deviance
corresponding
to the
problems
generated by
the
paradigm.
Similarly
for the Marxist
paradigm.
Its theories
of
the rise
of
the
bourgeoisie,
the
development
of
proletarian
class
consciousness,
the
source
of
primitive
accumulation,
the
theory
of
crises,
and
of
imperialism
and
monopoly
all
attempt
to answer
the
problems
generated
by
the
paradigm.
It should
be noted that the
only
parts
of the Marxist
paradigm
that have
been
proved wrong by
the course
of
history
are
some
of
the
specific
theories and statements
put
forth
by
Marx
himself
or
by
his students to
attempt
to
answer the
questions
raised
by
the
overall
paradigm, e.g., perhaps,
the law of the
falling
rate
of
profit
or
the
iron law
of
wages.
Data
Ranges
Parsons' data
range aspires
to
comprehend
all social
systems
everywhere
and at all times.
However,
he
focuses
heavily
on
contemporary
middle class America.
Merton's data
range
is restricted
(except
for
some
of his
very early
writings)
to
small-scale
contemporary phenomena,
not
whole
societies.
Further,
he also tends to
focus
on
the
world
of
contemporary,
middle class
America.
Marx's data
range
is all
societies at
all
times,
but
mostly
his
analysis
deals with
Capitalist
societies. Much more
than the
other two
paradigms,
the
Marxian
paradigm
is
comparative
and
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Number 2
Spring/Summer
1975
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historical.
However,
in Marx's
own work
he
tended to
focus on
the
study
of
England
for economic
phenomena,
on the
study
of France for
political phenomena,
and
on
Germany
for the
study
of
ideological phenomena.
These
focuses were
generated
by
his
paradigm
which
depicted
each
of the three countries
as
being
the
most
developed
in each of the relevant
aspects.
Methods
Parsons
himself relies
principally
on
secondary
sources and
common sense to
give
illustration to the models he
develops
through
rationalistic methods
(similar
to the method of
marginal utility
economics).
However,
but to
a
lesser
extent,
his
paradigm
is
compatible
with
survey
methods
(to
acquire
information
of values and
beliefs),
experimental
small
group
research
(for
data
on
adaptation, integration,
etc.),
and,
most
recently,
historiograph
y (to
illustrate his
evolutionary
schema).
Merton's
paradigm
is most
compatible
with
experimental
small
group
research
(for
the
analysis
of individual
role
sets
and
group
structures)
and
survey
methods
(for
data
on
attitudes and their structural
correlations,
e.g.,
cross
cutting
cleavages).
This fit of the
Mertonian
paradigm
with
the
method of
survey
research makes
it most useful to and
resonant with
what C. W. Mills called the Abstract
Empiricists.
These researchers, who are committed to survey research alone
as a
method,
need
simple
and
practical
theory
to
interpret
their data to maximize
its
practical application
for those
who
pay
their salaries.
They
shun
high-level theorizing
(of
either
the
Parsonian
or
Marxist
variety)
as
irrelevant,
since
it
does
not
normally help
in
the
interpretation
of their data
for
practical
application.
Survey
research
fits
well
with
the Mertonian
concepts
and mode of
thinking.
Marx
relies
principally
on
historiography,
statistical
analysis,
and
the use of official documents
(e.g.,
factory
reports).
The use of these methods
naturally
stems from the
Marxist
paradigm's
central
concern
with
overall
societies
in
the
process
of
development (emphasizing
economic
phenomena).
Small-scale
experimental
research
is irrelevant for the
treatment
of
the
kinds of
problems
the
paradgim
generates.
Survey
research,
because
of its nature as a recorder
of
conscious
opinions,
because
of
its limited
temporal
and
spatial
application,
and because of its
inaccuracy
in
controversial
matters
(which
are of
special
concern
to
Marxism),
is
only
of
marginal
use in
answering
the
questions
generated
by
the
paradigm.
(However,
its use as a
supplementary
tool
is
probably
more
compatible
with the Marxist
paradigm
than
most Marxian critics
of
survey
methods
realize.)
Values
An
integral
part
of our
paradigms
is
the
implicit
set of
values that are a
part
of all
of them
equally.
For
Parsons,
and for Merton in a lesser
degree,
the
whole
mode
of
thinking
and
conceptualizing
reflects a
b asic
commitment to the maintenance of the status
quo.
The
central
ideas
of
equilibrium,
order,
system,
and function
all
imply
that
everything
contributes
to the
working
of
society,
i.e.,
there
is a
natural
harmony
of interests and
the
present
order
of
things
is
basically good. (Merton's
theoretical
concept
of
dysfunction
does not absolve him
from
this
evaluation.)
The
Marxist mode of
thinking
and
conceptualizing implies
the
exact
opposite
evaluations.
Permeating
the entire
paradigm
is a
fundamental
hostility
to all
class
societies as
producers
of
the
suppression
of man's
inner
potential
and
the
exploitation
of the
majority
in the interests
of the
ruling
class.
The Marxist
concepts
of
power,
class,
and interest
all
imply
that social
structures
suppress
the individual
and are therefore
bad.
For Parsons and
Merton social control
is
basically good.
The individual
is born as
a
tabula
rasa,
and needs to be
socialized
and
sanctioned
if
society
is to be
possible.
For
Marx,
on
the
other
hand,
social control is
basically
bad.
The
individual's needs
are
suppressed
by
socialization and social
structure. For
Marx,
man
ought
to be liberated from societal
suppression (which can occur only in a classless communist
society).
For
Parsons,
evolutionary change
or
progress
is
good.
Whatever
is
wrong
with societies is
gradually
being
corrected
through
the
process
of
increasing adaptation
and
integration.
Any
drastic radical or
revolutionary
action would therefore be
unnecessary,
foolish,
and bad.
For
Marx,
on the other
hand,
revolutionary change
is both
necessary
and
good.
The
only way
a
society
compatible
with
human
potentiality,
and without
exploitation
of
man
by
man,
can
be
brought
into
being
is
through
the
revolutionary
destruction of the
existing exploitative
class structure
together
with all the muck of the
ages.
For
Parsons deviance
is
basically
bad. The
deviant
should be
resocialized into the
dominant
values and norms.
Briefly,
the
individual
ought
to be
readjusted
to
society.
For
Merton,
similarly,
deviance
is
basically
bad. Institutional means
ought
to be
spread
around
more to alleviate the structural causes of
deviance.
The
goals
of
any society
are
as
acceptable
and as
good
as those of
any
other.
For
Marx,
the behavior that Parsons and Merton call
deviant is
not
bad,
it is rather
a
natural
reaction
to
suppressive
social
structure and
exploitive
class relations.
In
brief,
for
Marx,
the
society ought
to
be
adjusted
to
the
individual.
In the
Parsonian
paradigm,
the idea of the
necessity
of
social control mechanisms
as a
secondary
line of
defense
against
deviance
implies
that the use of force
by
the state is
basically good.
For
Marx,
on the
other
hand,
since the use of
force by the state is fundamentally in the interests of the
ruling
class
that controls the
state,
it is
basically
bad
(except,
of
course,
as a tactical mechanism to
destroy
the
repressive
structure).
Parsons' definition of
power
as the
ability
to
accomplish
collective
goals
implies
that its
exercise
is
good.
While
for
Marx,
on the other
hand,
the definition of
power
as the
control of some
by
others
implies
that
power
is
fundamentally
bad
(although again tactically necessary
to
destroy
a
system
of
institutionalized
violence).
The
division
of
labor,
in the
Parsonian
paradigm,
is
defined
in terms of
increasing
adaptation.
This
definition
again implies
that the
division
of
labor
is
good.
For
Marx the
opposite
is
true. For
him the division of labor is the
first cause of
alienation in
all its
forms,
and is therefore
fundamentally
bad,
and to be
supplanted
by
communal
production
in
communist
society.
Parsons'definition
of
religion
as
an
integrating
force in
society
is
consonant with the idea that it is
good.
For
Marx,
religion
is
false-consciousness,
and
therefore
bad;
again,
the
opposite
evaluation
from Parsons.
Parsons' definition
of stratification as
increasing
a
society's
effectiveness of course
implies
that stratification
is
good.
For
Marx,
since class structure
is defined in terms of
exploitation
62
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and domination
of the
weak
by
the
strong,
it is seen as
fundamentally
bad.
Lastly,
Parsons' definition of
the state as the
mechanism
of
collective
goal
attainment
implies
that it is a
positive good.
And
naturally,
Marx's definition
of the state
as the
dictatorship
of the
ruling
class
implies
that the state is
innately
bad.
The most
outstanding
observation
to be made about
the
above
comparison
is
the total and
complete polarization
of
implicit
values in the Parsonian and Marxist
paradigms.
This
point has of course essential ideological significance which
cannot be
further
dealt with
here.
However,
it is
enough
to
summarize
by noting
that the
Parsonian
system
is
overwhelmingly
conservative-liberal in
its
value
implications,
while
the
Marxist
system
is,
of
course,
overwhelmingly
radical-revolutionary.
The
mode
of
evaluation
in the Mertonian
paradigm
is more
subtle than
that
of the other two.
The
Mertonian
paradigm,
by
studying
only
small-scale
problems
and
omitting
an
overall
analysis
of
total
societies,
is consonant with the
acceptance
of
the status
quo
as
good.
Because
sociology
has
nothing
to
say
about total
societies,
the
field is left
open
to common
sense,
apologists
for the status
quo,
and
politicians.
That
is,
the
abdication
by
sociology
of a
systematic
view
of
social
phenomena
is conservative
by
omission. This is of course
strongly
reinforced
by
the
Mertonian
claim that the scientific
study
of total societies is not
yet,
if
ever,
possible,
thus
giving
legitimacy
to
the utterances
of
the
apologists
and
politicians.
Further,
the claim
that
economic and
psychological
variables are not relevant for
the
study
of
society
has
a
similar
effect
by
omission. If
these
factors
are
not
relevant,
they
cannot be used as
the
basis
for
criticism
of
society.
This
again
is consonant with the evaluation of the status
quo
as
good.
In addition
to these fundamental evaluations
implicit
in the
Mertonian
paradigm,
there
are a
number of
more
specific
evaluations
implicit
in his various theories.
The
idea
of
self-fulfilling
prophecy
as
a
cause of racial discrimination
and
bank
failures
(which
are
interpreted
as
stemming
from the
social definition
of
reality
rather than
from
social
structure)
is
consonant with the evaluation of the social structure as
basically
good
(since
these are
problems stemming
from
faulty
education, communication,
or social
control,
and not social
structural
interests or
dynamics).
The idea
of
anomie as a
response
to
the
disparity
of
common
goals
and institutional means
implies
the
fundamental
acceptability
of the
goals,
and that
everything
would
be
all
right
if
only
adequate
means
were available
(or
alternatively,
if socialization and communication
were
controlled so that
people
would not learn
goals
they
could
not
satisfy).
This
again
is consonant
with the evaluation of
the
social structure and the
system
of
goals
as
basically good.
But,
above
all,
the
Mertonian
paradigm
is
fundamentally
conservative in that its innate denial
of the
possibility
and
legitimacy
of all
attempts
at
developing
a
systematic theory
of
society
hinders the
comprehension
of the overall
workings
of
the
social
system
and its dominant
institutional-class structure.
Summary
and Conclusions
An
integrated
and
cumulative
sociology
does not exist.
Incompatible sociological systems
compete
with
one another
for
predominance.
During
the 1950's and 1960's the two
major
contenders
within American
sociology
were the
paradigms
best articulated
by
Talcott
Parsons and Robert
King
Merton.
Throughout
that time
and
since,
the
leading
perspective outside of the U.S. has been Marxism. This paper
has drawn out the
systematic
differences
among
these
three
paradigms
in order to demonstrate that
an
integrated
and
cumulative
sociology
did not exist
during
this
period
and
that,
instead,
incompatible sociological systems competed
with one
another for
hegemony. Beginning
in the late
1960's
and
increasingly during
the 1970's numerous
other
sociological
paradigms
have
entered
the
sociological
scene as
serious
contenders for
predominance.
Formal and mathematical
sociology
have
gained
considerably
at
the
expense
of both
Grand
Theory
and
middle-range theory among
more
prestigious sociologists,
while
a
wide
variety
of idealist and
voluntarist
approaches,
such as
ethnomethodology,
phenomenology,
critical
theory,
and
symbolic
interactionism
have become current
among younger sociologists.
Marxism,
on
the other
hand,
which was
taken
seriously by
much of
American social science
in the
1930's
and
1940's
before
it
was
purged
from
the universities with the assistance
of
McCarthyism,
has made
a
significant
comeback.
Although
still
rather weak
in
academic
circles,
the
competition
between
Marxism
and the
other
major
paradigms
within
sociology
is
once
again
real.
Sociology
in the 1970's is more
open
than at
any
time since
the
1940's.
This
paper
has
not
attempted
to deal with
questions
appropriate
to
the
sociology
of
knowledge.
It has not tried to
offer
explanations
of
why
a
given paradigm,
or
paradigms,
are
predominant
at
any
given
time. Neither
has
it dealt with
empirical
questions concerning
which
paradigm
is
in
the
last
analysis
the most
consistent
with social
reality.
Both these
questions
are of course of extreme
importance.
However, the
rapid
changes
in the
positions
of
paradigms during
the course
of the
20th
century suggest
that the
question
of
predominance
has little
or
nothing
to do with the
question
of
correspondence
with
social
reality.
In
order to determine
why
particular perspectives
are
predominant
at
a
given
time we
must
look
to the
value
resonance of each
paradigm.
A careful examination of the
rise
and
fall
of
sociological paradigms, together
with the rise and
decline
of
political
ideologies
and
movements,
and
the
changing
needs of the
corporate upper
class in America
will,
I
believe,
demonstrate that
it
is indeed
paradigmatic
values
which are the
explanatory
link between social
reality
and
sociological paradigms,
and
further,
that
it
is
political
developments
outside of
sociology
which
induce
changes
within
sociology.^
Volume 2
Number
2
Spring/Summer
1975
63
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TABLE
1
CONCEPTS
Parsons Merton
Marx
(Primary)
Value-Orientations
Action Frame
of
Reference
Norms/Beliefs/Goals
Functional
Imperatives
Adaptation
Integration
Goal Attainment
Pattern Maintenance
Pattern Variables
(as
modes of
orientation)
Social
System
Personality System
Cultural
System
Equilibrium
Instrumental
Evaluative
Expressive
Collectivity
Sanction
Socialization
Differentiation
Allocation
Social Control
Mechanisms
Institution
(
Secondary)
Power
-
(ability
to
accomplish
collective
goals
Prestige
-
(allocation
of
generalized
rewards)
Wealth
-
(generalized
capacity
to command
goods
and
services)
Influence
-
(generalized
mechanism of social
interaction)
State
-
(institution
specializing
in
achieving
collective
goals)
Family
-
(institution
specializing
in
pattern
maintenance and tension
management)
Economy
-
(institution
specializing
in
adaptation
to the
environment)
Religion
-
(institution
specializing
in
integration
of the
social
system)
Stratification
-
(differentiation
of
function to
increase
adaptation
and
integration)
Role
(sum
of
role
expectations)
Status
(position)
Role Set (of a status)
Group
(26 dimensions)
Collective
Role
Strain
Status Strain
Values
Common
Goals
Institutional Means
Anomie
Reference
Group
Authority
(pattern
of
influence)
Social Structure
(sum
of roles and
statuses)
Manifest
Function
(intended
and
recognized)
Latent Function
(unintended,
unrecognized)
Positive Function
(toward
system
maintenance)
Negative
Function
(against
system maintenance)
Status Set
(of individual)
I.
(Applicable
to all
Societies)
Forces of Production
(energy, machines)
Mode of
Production
(organization)
Relations of Production
Consciousness
Use Value
Property
II.
(Applicable
to all Class
Societies)
Class
(exploitation
of
A
by
B)
Class Interest
Power
(A
over
B)
Private
Property
Division
of
Labor
Exploitation
State
(A
against
B)
Ideology (false-co n scious
ness)
Superstructure
Alienation
Surplus Value/Profit
Labor/Cost
Commodity/Price
Exchange
Value
Ilia.
(Applicable only
to
Capitalism)
Capital
Free
Labor/Wage
Labor
Primitive
Accumulation
Expanded
Reproduction
Concentration of
Capital
Centralization
of
Capital
Circulation
of
Capital
Realization of Capital
Mercantile
Capital
Industrial
Capital
Money Capital
Productive
Capital
Commercial
Capital
Organic
Composition
of
Capital
IHb.
(Applicable
only
to
Feudalism)
Guild
Manor
Peasant
Lord
IIIc.
(Applicable only
to
Ancient
Societies)
Master
Slave
64
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FOOTNOTES
*An
earlier
version of
this
paper appeared
in
a
student
journal
circulated at Columbia
University (1967).
This version
was
translated and
published
in The Soviet Bulletin
of
Sociology
(1969).
lln addition to
Kuhn
(1964)
I have drawn
heavily
on
Berger
and Luckman
(1966)
and Horton
(1964, 1966).
Others
who have
dealt with the
general
issues of
competing sociological paradigms
include: Friedrichs
(1970),
Gouldner
(1970),
and Nisbet
(1966).
~
For
documentation
of
this thesis see Baritz
(1960),
Cornforth
(1963), Lange
(1963),
Robinson
(1964),
and
Szymanski (1971).
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