A Definition of Religion Horton

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A Definition of Religion, and its Uses

Author(s): Robin HortonSource: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol.90, No. 2 (Jul. - Dec., 1960), pp. 201-226Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2844344 .

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A DefinitionfReligion, nditsUsesROBIN HORTON

IN RECENT BRITISH ANTHROPOLOGY three principal types of working definition havebeen used in approaching the comparativestudyofreligion.The first reatsthe term'Religion' as lending tselfwithdifficultyo further efinitionnd as covering n area ofhuman activitywhich lacks sharplydelineatedboundaries; wheresuch a pointofviewprevails, the reader is simply asked to accept as 'religious' any phenomena which theauthor happens to select for treatmentunder this heading. The second type treats'Religion' as referring o a class of metaphorical statoments nd actions obliquelydenoting social relationships nd claims to social status.The thirdtypetreatsthe termas referring o commerce with a specificclass ofobjects,i.e. 'Religion is the belief nspirits' r Religion is thebelief n thesupernatural'.As they tand, believeall oftheseapproaches are unsatisfactory,nd in thispaper I shall followup their riticismwith theproposal of an alternativedefinition. efinitions eing mere tools towardsthe discoveryofempirical regularities, shall of coursetry o showthat the alternativeproposedis ofvalue in termsof the hypotheses nd questionsit suggests bout the determinants freligious orms.The approach which would presson with the scope of the term Religion' leftun-definedhas had some worthy dvocates-among them,ProfessorNadel, authorofoneof the most comprehensive nalyses of an Africanreligious systemproduced to date.AccordingtoNadel (I 954, pp. 7-8),

'Whicheverway we proposeto circumscribeheprovince fthings eligious,we areboundto encounter border one whichdefies recise priori llocation n thisorthatside oftheboundary. o be sure, his esidue f naccuracys entailed n thebroad viewofreligionwhichwemade ourstarting oint.Butno other tarting oint eemsfeasible.Bluntly tated,whatwe setout to do istodescribe verythingna particular ulture hathas a bearing n religion. nd since religion" s precisely ne of hosewordswhich elongtothemore ntuitive ortions fourvocabulary, nd hencecannotbe given sharp on-notation,we have no choice but tofeelour way towards he meaning tshouldhave ingiven ircumstances. e mustnotrisk mittingnything hatmight e relevant; heriskwe have to take s thatof ncluding, esides religion roper", lso that"border"zonecomposed fmere uperstitions;f ciencemisconstruedrall toocrudely ttempted;ndof cience iming oohigh r ncompletelyevered rommystic hought.'Now this s notenough. First fall, I believe that fornon-anthropologistst least theterm religion'has a much clearerconnotation than is suggestedhere. Secondly,to goahead with the comparative study ofreligion while leaving the scope ofthe term un-defined s to behave in a self-stultifyingay; for until some fairlyprecise criteria ofinclusion ofphenomena in the denotation of religion'have been given, t is impossibleto specify hose variables whosebehaviour we have to try o explain in our study. Untilsuch criteria have been given, it is also possible to carry on an endless and entirelybarrenargument boutwhether given tem ofhuman behaviour sor s not religious.The second typeofapproach makesup for he firstn positiveness fattack; but, n

201


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202 ROBIN HORTONdefining eligiousactivities s an oblique way ofreferringo relationsbetweenmen, itgrosslydistorts act.The point ofview is certainlyrespectable n sociological studies;introducedbyDurkheim (1915) and adopted withvariationsby Radcliffe-Brown,t ismaintained in essentialsby many contemporary igures. . R. Leach, one of themostforceful fthese,has statedtheposition s follows Leach 1954):

'Actions all ntoplace on a continuous cale.Atone extreme, e have actionswhichareentirelyrofane,ntirelyunctional,echnique ure ndsimple;at theother,wehaveactionswhich re entirelyacred, trictlyesthetic,echnically on-functional....Fromthis oint fview, echnique ndritual, rofanendsacred, o notdenote ypes f ctionbutaspects f lmost f nykind f ction.'Leach looks upon activitieswhich would commonlybe called 'religious' as fallingon to the sacred, aesthetic,technicallynon-functional nd of his scale. He says:

'It is these spectswhichhavemeaning s symbols f ocialstatus nd it s thesewhichI describe s ritualwhether r not they nvolvedirectlyny conceptualization fthesupernaturalrthemetaphysical.... In sum, hen,myviewhere s that itual ction ndbelief re aliketobe understoodsformsf ymbolictatementboutthe ocialorder.'Finally,Leach broadens the traditionalDurkheimianview by admitting he sym-bolization nmyth nd ritual of ocial conflicts s well as social solidarities:

'Since anysocialsystem, owever table and balanced itmaybe, contains pposingfactions,here reboundtobe differentythsovalidate heparticular ightsfdifferentgroups fpeople.... Myth nd ritual s a languageofsignsn terms fwhich laimstorightsnd status reexpressed, ut t s a language f rgument, ot chorus fharmony.'It will be noticed that n these inesLeach lumpstogether erformances fthesortcommonly abelledreligiouswithothers enerally escribed snon-religious eremonials.Here, however,we shall be concerned solely with the applicabilityof his ideas to re-ligiousactivity.Now there s no doubt that n mostculturesreligiousritual and religiousmythologydo sometimes etused as symbols fsocial relationships nd social alignments;but as tohow farsuch use is integralor incidental to the nature ofreligiousactivity,t may beuseful oanswerbyreferenceo a WestAfrican eligious ystemwithwhich amfamiliar-that oftheKalabari of theNigerDelta.In theKalabari state,whichconsists fa congeriesofprimary egments r 'houses'controlledby chiefs, nd a royalsegmentwhose core is the lineage whichprovidestheking, the cult of the chiefly nd royal ancestors s one of the principal sanctionsofauthority at both 'house' and state level. This ancestral cult is particularly rich inactivitiesnterpreted y thecongregations hemselves s symbolicofsocial and politicalalignments.Thus, formerly, hen a house chiefconductedrites n honourof thedeadchiefs f his ine, thecongregation fhousememberswould be supplementedby a num-berofchiefs fotherhouseswhowouldpresent amsfor acrifice otheirhost'sancestors.even though the latterwere in no blood relationship to them.Asked why the housemembers ttendedsuch a rite,Kalabari informantsay that t was because theywantedtheirdead masters o bringthemwealth and free hemfrom ickness.On theotherhand,thepresence ofchiefs romotherhouseswho presentedrams is explained by saying itwas a sign thattheywishedto remainfriends f thefeast-givinghief'.Again, when a


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 203newking ucceeded o theheadship f he tate, ehadto make heofferingf series frams o the pirit fhispredecessor.he firstf hese fferingsas of ramprovided yhimself: hiswasfollowed ythecuttingframsbroughtohimbyeach of hechiefs fKalabari and, finally,ythe uttingframs rought ytheheads6f hevarious illagesunderKalabari protection. f this uccession f acrificial resentations,t s said, thebringingf ramfor uttingmeant hat hebringerccepted henewking.'Here,then,we have examples f he ct of acrifice eingusedexplicitlys a symbolof social alignmentn thebestDurkheimianmanner.Butwhat wouldKalabari sayabouta man who ndulged n the actions f ancestor-worshipn thispurely ymbolic,gesturalway, yet merely hrugged is shouldersnd did nothingwhentold that hispainful llnesswas due to ancestral nger and could be brought o an end only bysacrifice? ike us, I suspect heywould say that themanno longerbelieved n hisancestors: ndeed, have sometimes eard hints o this ffectn the case of educatedmen returned rom broad to take up a chieftainship,ho have conducted ncestralrites or heir ousemembers ithout pplying hecultto thevicissitudesftheir wnlife.More common s theopposite ituation, hich ften riseswithmodern hristiancult-practicesnKalabari.The various orms fChristianulthave become mportantsymbolsfhigh tatus n thecommunity,robably hrough he ssociationfChristianideologywith the Western ducation,which chiefs rom n early date, usingtheirriches, ave to their ons.Many chiefs,herefore, ake careful arade oftheir hurchadherence, speciallynoccasions fpublic Christianitual.Whensomecrisis fmis-fortuneomes heirway, hey re apt to go surreptitiouslyo consult divinernd,as aresult fhis advice, o make a sacrifice,ither o thedead or to a water-spirit.n suchcircumstances,alabari sayas readily s we should hat hepeople concernedrenotChristians,onotbelieventheChristian od. In other ontexts,hristian bservancesbecome ymbolsf factional llegiance;and here again, examples uggesthatwhereit sseen o be this nd nothing lse, heKalabari reactions to saythat hose oncernedare notChristians. amremindedn particular fthecase of Kalabari villagewhoseheadmanand his descent-group ere n chronic pposition oanother escent-groupwhich ncluded prominent ater-spirit edium.When the time ameroundfor helatter o give theperiodic estival orhis spirit, heheadman,whohad been nvited oattend, efusedo do so on theground hat, s a Christian, is Godwouldnot llow t.Although ewas nfact fairly egular hurch ttender,many fthevillagersnbothsides fthecleavage nterpretedisreply s a sign fhis antagonismo thegiver fthefestivalnd hisgroup.Peoplefelt his nterpretationo have been vindicatedwhen wodays aterhiswifewhohad beenill for omeweeksreached crisis,nd he actuallycamequietly o the medium o consulthisspirit bout what he shoulddo. Theyallagreedthat he was, in fact,no more a Christian han thosewho stayed wayfromchurch.Where hen persons seen obeusing prayer,acrifice,rprofessionfbeliefnagod merely o makea statementbout social relations r abouthis own structuralalignment, alabari say that heoneconcerneddoesnotreallybelieve'.To find utwhathereally elieves, heywatch osee which f hegodshe goestofor elpwith hetroublesfhis ife,which f hegodshecommunes ithwhenhe s off arade.In the Near East and Europe,thehistory fJudaeo-Christianitys full f similar


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204 ROBIN HORTONjudgements. hrist imselfondemns he cribes nd Phariseesor sing eligiousitualas a status-symbolndpoints otheir ttitude s the ssence f rreligion.ndChristianpastors p to ourowndayhavecontinuallyontrastedhe truebelieverwith newhouses heforms f hurch-goingna Pharisaicway.Onemight uess hat ommentsrominside nyreligious ongregationheworld verwould howmuch he ame reactionothedefinitionf heir ctivitiesnsocial-symbolicerms.Sucha reaction, f ourse,sa flat efutationfDurkheimiandeas. nthis heoreticaltradition,hestatementI believe n God' impliesI subscribeo thesystemfsocial-structuralymbolismfwhich hisbelief-statementspart; and, n utteringhis tate-ment, signifycceptance f ertain ocialrelationshipsndadoption f certainocialalignment'.Hence, a man'sreligious elief-statementshould be verifiableolelybywatchingoseewhether edoes, nfact, ccepttherelationshipsr takeup thealign-ments llegedly eferredo by suchstatements. he instanceswe haveraisedabove,drawnbothfrom n Africanulture ndfrom nenearerhome, uggesthat heveryreversesthe ase.Allthismust oundvery ritendobvious o theaveragenon-anthropologistf nyculturewho, fnotreligious imself, as beenbrought p in an environment hichincludedone or two Christians rother ult-practitioners.utfor hosebrought pacademicallyntheDurkheimianraditionndpossiblylso ivingna largely gnosticsocial nvironment,t seems hat hese hingsan still sefullye said. n effect,efiningreligion sstructuralymbolismomes omuch he amethingsdefininghe ubstance'linen' nterms f ts ccasional se as a flag: he ymbolic unctions as incidental o thenature fthefirst s it is to thatofthe second.The truth fthematter,urely,s this.One of hemostmportantre-conditionsor nething ecominghe ymbolf notheris theregular ssociation fthetwo n collectivexperience. ow, to theextent hatcertain eligious ctivities ndprofessionsavebecome ssociated n the collective x-perience fa given ulturewith ertain tatus-positionsnd socialgroupings,o thesethingsmaycometostand s symbolicor uchpositionsndgroupings; ut this ym-bolic functionsonly by-productfreligiousctivitynd is theresult fprior truc-tural ssociations hose ormationasnothingodowith ymbolism.his, think,s amostmportant oint:for twas ustthis o-ordinationfgods andtheir ultswith heenduring roups f a society hatDurkheim ndhissuccessorseemtohave felt nex-plicable on any basisother hanthat ofthe assumption hatreligionwas essentiallystructuralymbolism.s hope o how urthern,however,he mpressiveystemsfgod-to-group o-ordinationound n so many ocieties an be ust as readily xplained nthebasis f definitionfreligion hich onformserfectlyell omore eneral sage.Ofthe hree pproaches ealtwithhere, have eft ill astthedefinitionfreligionas belief n a certain indofobject,whetherhis e 'spirits' r thesupernatural'.hedefinitionfreligion s 'belief nspirits' ashad currencys a working oncept ome-whereor other n anthropologyver sinceTylor I871), surviving hecome-and-goprocession f more xotic deas with tsrobust loseness ocommon sage. n fact, hedefinitionshallput forwards so close to Tylor's hat hesitateo call itin anywaynew. Belief n spirits', owever,s ust a little oovague for urpurposes; nd beforegoing nyfurther, e shall do well to weedout the misleadingmplicationsfTylor'sformularomhose hat re ofvalue. One way nwhich his ormula an mislead sby


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 205makingus thinkof spirits'as the label fora class of objects characterizedby a specificmode of existenceor in terms f specific onditionsof knowledgerelevantto the makingof true statements bout them. One is easily led into this mistake by conventionalassociationsof theword spirit'withothers uchas 'immaterial'.Now whathappens ifwefollowup this rrorby trying o define he mode ofexistenceand conditionsofknowledgecommon to all thoseentitiesgenerallytermedreligiousWe find, irst fall, thatwe can pointto no singleontologicalorepistemological ategorywhich accommodates all religiousentities. Secondly,we find that everymajor onto-logical and epistemologicalcategorywe can devise containsreligiousas well as secularentities.Let us take a few llustrative xamples fromAfricancultures.Firstofall, from heNuer,as describedbyEvans-Pritchard I956, pp. 3I5-i6):

'Nuer philosophys .. dominatedby the idea ofkwoth,pirit.As Spiritcannotbedirectly xperienced ythe enses,whatweare considerings a conception. woth ouldindeed,be entirelyndeterminatend couldnot be thought fbyNuerat all were tnotthat t is contrasted ith he dea ofcak, reation,n terms fwhich t can be defined yreferenceo effectsnd relations nd by theuse ofsymbols nd metaphors. ut thesedefinitionsreonly chemata, s Otto puts t,and ifwe seekfor lucidation eyond heseterms, statementfwhatspirit s thought obe like n itself, e seekofcourse nvain.Nuer do not claim to know.Theysaythat hey remerely oar, implepeople,and howcansimple eopleknow boutsuchmatters?Whathappens n theworld s determinedySpirit, nd Spirit an be influencedy prayer nd sacrifice.hismuch hey now, utnomore.For religiousobjects ofradicallydifferentpistemological tatus,we mayturnto theKalabari oftheNiger Delta. In theKalabari view of the worldtwomainepistemological

categoriesobtain-the firsthat ofbodies, the second thatof what we may call 'spirits'forwantofa betterword.Bodies are thought fbyKalabari in muchthesame terms swe think fmaterialobjects.Spirits re ratherdifferent.o theordinaryman, they reknownonly by theireffects:he can neither ee them,norhear them,nor indeed haveany directexperienceof them. Such experiencecan be had onlyby expertswho haveundergonea seriesofherbal treatments nownas 'clearingtheeyesand ears', and canin consequence both see and hear spirits.These objects,nevertheless,re thought fasan order ofexistence ntirely ifferentrombodies. Thus, whereasa Kalabari would beas contemptuousas we should ofsomeone who talked about a table as being in twoplaces at one time,he would not be so of someonewho said the same thingof a spirit:for nstance,thedead, who are thought oexist in spirit'only,can be talkedofwithoutany senseof contradiction s both 'in theskywith God' and as 'in the burial ground'where expertsmay communicatewith them. In thisrespect they, ikeNuer Spirit,arecompared with the wind: theyare anywhere and everywhere t once. In Kalabariculture,however, he realm ofpracticeswhichtheeyeofcommon-sensewould identifyas religious s not directed to a range ofobjects co-extensivewiththatcoveredby theterm Spirits'. Of the threecategoriesof religious objects which we may call Deads,Village Gods, and Water-People,the first woare seen as existingin Spirit'only,whilethe ast ike humanbeingshave bothbodies and spirits:unlike Deads and Village Gods,they an be seen, heard,touched,and smeltby anyonewho happens to crosstheirpath

0 R.A.I.J.


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2o6 ROBIN HORTONin therivers. heyarenot ike the wind: they an be talked f as inhabitingefinitelocalities s the Deads and the Village Gods cannot.Many othergodsof primitivepeoples ouldbe cited s resemblingheKalabari Water-Peoplen their horough-goingmateriality.

A definitionf hemodeof xistencend conditionsfknowledgefreligious bjectswhich t oncedifferentiatedhem rom on-religiousbjects nd includedbothNuerSpirit nd Kalabari Water-Peoplemust ecessarilyefeat he magination:or t wouldhave to nclude ontradictoryssertions.urther han his, tseems rue o say that heepistemologicalharacteristicsfany religiousbjectone can think fare sharedwithsome class ofnon-religiousbjects. n the case ofKalabari Water-People his eemsobvious nough, or xistentiallyhey re of he ameorder shumanbeings, ables, tc.NuerSpirit nd similar onceptions ould seem at first ight o sharetheirmode ofexistence ithno secular bjects;but as Gellnerlhas shown, ven entitiesfthis ypefall ntoan epistemologicalategorywithotherswhichare not religious, .g. withcertain f he heoreticalntitiesfmodern cience uch s atoms,molecules,ndalphaparticles. heseentities re defineds incapableof direct bservation,ndstatementsaboutthem anonlybe said to beverifiedythebehaviour f ertain haracteristicsfobservable henomenawhich re assumed o be 'symptoms'fvariationsn the un-observablesKneale I952, pp. 89-I 13). Thus the ncreasing ressurefa gaswhich sheated n a vessel f onstant olumes ndirectonfirmationf he heoryhatmoleculesincrease heirvelocitywith ncrease n temperature,iventheassumptionhattheobservable ressure fa gas on thewallsof tsenclosuresthe ymptomfthe mpactsof countless nobservablemolecules n thiswall and thatthe ncrease npressures asymptomf ncreasenmolecular elocity. ere, ust as with he NuerconceptionfSpirit, hebehaviour fobservable bjects s heldrelevant o thetruth fwhat s inprinciple nobservable,ut onlybyvirtue f an assumptionhat variationsn theobservable re symptomsf certainvariationsn the unobservable-an assumptionwhich n both ases anhavenofurtherustification.It appears, hen, hat ven n thecaseofthose ntities hosemodeof xistencendconditions f knowledge emovethem furthestrom he sphereof ordinary,olid,materialhings, efind hereligiousideby idewith he ecular.So muchfor hemisleadingmplicationfTylor'sdefinition.he morevaluableimplications thatof analogybetweenhumanbeings nd religious bjectsgenerally.Extending his romhe contextf belief othecontext faction,we can saythatthevalue ofTylor's pproachsthatt eads ustocomparenteractionith eligiousbjectsand nteractionith uman eings.This,ofcourse,willencounterery trong bjections.t willbe said that o manycrucial differencesivide the twotypesof interactions to make any comparisonworthless.nthropologistsave ongbeendrawn oregard he entimentsnd actionsevokedby religious bjects s differentn kindfrom hose vokedbysecular bjects:this oint fviewcameto theforewithMarett I9I4) and received ewstrengthromthework fthe theologian tto (I928). But it seemsdoubtfulfthetheory fspeci-ficallyeligiousentimentsnd modes f ctionwillholdwater.Thus,the entimentsfawe and reverence hichwe tendto regard s very losely ssociatedwithreligioussituationsn our ownculture re replacedby someverydifferententimentsn the


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 207religionsofotherpartsoftheworld such as WestAfrica.A complexofsentiments ndemotions common to all religions everywhere s as much of a chimera as an episte-mological categorywhichwill contain all religiousobjects. Even withinthebounds ofthe Christiantradition, vidence against the existence of a specifically eligioussenti-mentseemspatent in thefact that so manywho have claimed close contact withGodhave not found tnecessary o coin anyspecial new terms n describing hefeelings ndemotions hatsuch contact evoked.All thiswas noted a long timeago byWilliamJameswho, for ome curiousreason,is commonlymisreported yanthropologists s having thought he essenceofreligion oconsist n some peculiar kind oforganic thrill. can hardlydo betterthan quote him(James i902, pp. 28-9):

'Consider lso thereligious entiment hichwe see referredo inmanybooks as if twere a single ort ofmentalentity.... The momentwe are willing o treatthe term"religiousentiment"s a collective amefor hemany entiments hich eligious bjectsmay arouse n alternation, e see that tprobably ontainsnothing fa psychologicallyspecific ature.There sreligious ear, eligiousove,religiousoyandsoforth. utreligiousove sonlyman's naturalemotion f ove directed o a religious bject; religious ear s onlytheordinary earofcommerce,o to speak,thecommon uakingofthe humanbreast n sofaras thenotion fdivineretribution ay arouse t; religious we is thesameorganicthrillwhichwe feel na forestt twilightr ina mountain orge;only his ime tcomesoverus at the thought four supernatural elations; nd similarly f all thevarioussentimentshatmaybecalled ntoplay n the ives f eligious ersons....As there eemsto be no one elementaryeligious motion, utonly common torehouse ofemotions n whichreligious bjectsmaydraw, o theremight onceivably lsoprove o be no one specificnd essential ind ofreligious bjectand no one specific ndessential ind freligiousct.'Though the thinnessof the case fora religious sentiment hould encourage us tomore explorationof the parallels betweenman-to-man and man-to-godrelationships,we must firstdeal with some apparently wide-spread contrasts between ordinaryhuman social activity nd religiousbehaviour. Thus, it is undeniable thata great dealof religiousbehaviour is highlystereotyped,while activityoriented to other humanbeings contrastswith it in greater flexibility.Again, much religious behaviour isgovernedby the idea that its objects can be compelled by the actors involved; whilebehaviour orientedto otherhuman beings usually contrastswith t in a much greaterdevelopment fthe dea thattheobjectshave freedom fchoice in their esponse.On closerreflection, owever, t should be clear that the stereotypingnd ideas ofcompulsive efficacy f human action so markedlydeveloped in verymany religioussituations re byno means entirely oreign o relationsbetweenhuman beings; norarethe flexibilitynd ideas offreechoice which we tend to associate with inter-humanrelationshipsntirely nrepresentedn certainreligious ontexts.Let us look a littlemore carefully t the contrastbetween secular flexibility ndreligiousstereotyping. n an interaction equence involvingtwo human beings takingup familiarrolesin which theyare co-operating owardsdefinite nds,experience willhave taughteach participantthe limitedpredictability f hispartner'sreactions to hisownmoves. Alter'sreactionto ego on successiveoccasionswill showa wide variation n


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208 ROBIN HORTONresponseto a given move; and ifego is to achieve the ends he hopes to fulfil hrough heinteractionwith any degree ofregularity,t is clear thathe must be capable of a flexi-bilityof action sufficiento compensatefor heeffectsf alter'sresponsevariability ndto secure consistent esultsdespite t. This flexibilitymust be manifested s a capacityformoment-to-moment odification f action in the lightof alter'sobserved reactions.To drive home the forceof this, suggestthe example ofa mother and her child. Oneach new day, the mother'sresponseto a givenmove by thechild is likelyto vary as afunction f suchthings s rows withherhusband and late nights ut; and ifthe child isconsistentlyo secure various favoursfrom ts mother, t must be capable of modifyingits own behaviourtocompensateforhervariability.If now we substitute orthe human alter a god, conditions for fulfilment f ego'saims become ratherdifferent. irstof all, in the majorityof contextsofreligious be-haviour therecan be no questionofmodification fego's action in thelightofthegod'sreactions, ince theseare inaccessibletoobservation. n mostcases, what happens is thatthereaction s made knownto ego by a signafterhispart in the interaction s over: inthecase ofa curativeritual,thepatienteithergetsbetterorhe does not; in the case of arain ritual, either t pours or it does not. Anyway, ego may get no 'feedback' as to thegod's reactionsto hisbehaviour untildays, weeks,or months fterhe has completed t.Then, if he sign snegative,hemayinitiate nother equence ofritual actionsand againwaitfor heresults;and so on. In all thisthere s no equivalent to theneed formoment-to-momentmodification fego's action in the lightof alter's reaction; and in the ab-sence ofsuch pressures owardsflexibility,tereotypingf actionwould seeminevitable.The resultingpatterncontrasts tronglywith most behaviour directed towardshumanpartners; but is not entirelywithoutparallel in thissphere. In quite a fewcontextsofman-to-man behaviour, for example, the uncertaintiesarising through the limitedpredictability fhumanpartners re recognizedas threatening o the businesson hand;and stepsare takento obviate the danger by explicitdefinition f a limitednumber ofpermissibleresponsesforany stage in the interaction.The result s thestereotypingocharacteristicof 'official' correspondence and communication in our culture-astereotyping hose resemblanceto thatofreligiousbehaviour has givenrisetomuch ofthefunpoked at civil servants.A contributoryause ofthisparallel maybe thegeneraltendencyfor arge status differencesetweenactors to be accompanied by stereotypingof their nteractions. ince the gods are by definition he status superiorsofmen, weshould expect action directed toward themto resemble n thisrespectaction directedtowardhuman beings ofmarkedlyhigherstatus than ego. By corollary, heflexibilityassociatedwiththemajorityofrelationshipsbetweenhuman beings does come to thefore n certainreligiouscontexts-notably, as we should expect,in thosewhereeventswhichpassformoment-to-momenteactionbythegods replace the more usual situationwhere such 'feedback' is lacking. A typical case is where one or more human beingsinteractwitha god who is 'possessing'a medium.Amongstthe Kalabari oftheNigerDelta, forexample, a great deal ofreligious activity akesthe formofa highly tereo-typed prayerand offering o the gods; and in these stereotyped ituationsthere s nomanifestationf thegods in moment-to-momenteaction to what the human congrega-tion sdoing: 'thegods are therebut we do not see them.' On otheroccasions, however,one ofthegodswill be called by a human congregation o come to the community nd


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 209possess a medium. What follows s sometimes spectacular sequence ofactions summingup the characterofthe god, sometimes conversation etweenthegod and men; but inboth these conditionseveryaction of the human congregationsecures an observablereaction from he god, and in so far as such reactionshave only limited predictability,we find ust thesame moment-to-moment odification fthecongregation'sbehaviourin the lightofthe god's responseas we should expectto see were thegod replaced by aman. The othertypeof situationwhere thesame thing houldapply iswheretheman isconfrontedwith hisgod in visual, auditory, r othertypesofhallucination.Here again,his every action has the same moment-to-moment eaction from he god as when thelatter s possessing medium; and once more the facts ndicate a change from tereo-typing oflexibility. alabari doctor-clairvoyantsonversingwith hedead incemeteriesbehave littledifferentlyromKalabari laymen passing thetime ofday withtheirfellowmen in market places: and Christianmysticswho have described their confrontationswith God stress heconversationalgive-and-take fsuchexperiences.

Stereotyping nd flexibility, hen, are opposite poles of behaviour dominant inreligious and non-religiouscontexts respectively.But this contrast between the twocontextscan now be seen as veryfarfrom bsolute; and it is therefore f no use as acriterion ordifferentiatinghereligious rom henon-religious.Much the same conclusionspresentthemselveswhen we investigate hose ideas ofcompulsionof the object which seem to be much more strongly eveloped in the con-context ofman's interactionwith his gods than in that of his interactionwith fellowmen. In no culture is it thoughtveryodd or unusual for one man to refuse nother'srequest through heer bloody-mindedness'; but there are relatively ew cultureswhosereligiousworld-view dmitsofthe possibility hat. god may refusehuman requests ustbecause he chooses to. Nevertheless, deas of compelling one's fellow-men o directagood deal of secular action; and there are religiouscontexts nwhich the wide range ofchoice open to thegodswhenaddressedbyman is a prominent eature fdoctrine.All men, everywhere, re in somedegree rkedby thefreedom f choice enjoyed bythosewithwhomtheypass thegreaterpartoftheir ives; to have the ends thatone hopesto see fulfilledwith thehelp ofother men constantlymenaced by the latter'sfreedom sa source of anxiety the worldover. The mostobvious responsesto this form f frustra-tion,bystatesmenwhomobilizearmiestobatterneighbourswhowill not be reasonable,and police to truncheonrecalcitrant ubjects,have long been the sport ofhistorians.But it sonlymorerecently hatstudents fhuman relationshave drawn attention othedreams and realities ofmore subtle methodsof compulsion,which probably have aslong a history s thatofphysicalviolence itself.And here again, the emphasishas beenon rulers of men as the principal exponentsof such methods-whereas, in truth, heordinaryman of no influencehas, throughthe ages, been as deeply involved as hismaster n theattempt ocompel and curtailthewillof those aroundhim.Even in so-called 'primitive' societies,there existsa wealth of subtle techniquesintendedto 'change men's minds'-love magic designed to secure inevitable hopelessinfatuation n place of the uncertainties f seduction; potions to compel approbationand spare the social climber fromthe exertions and hazards of having to win it. InmodernWestern culture,brain-washing nd subliminaladvertising re seized upon bypower hounds as long-soughtmeans of controllinghuman behaviour without risking


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2IO ROBIN HORTONthe mediation ofthevictims'faculty fdeliberate choice, means of sneaking round thebacks of their rational, conscious minds to slug them mentallyfrom behind (HuxleyI930; I958; Packard I957; Sargant I958); while for he Little Man of no position thereare the Occult Bookshopswith theirtorrent fpopular 'psychological' literaturewhichoffers imtechniquesofgainingcontrol n a lessambitiousway over the reactionsof hisacquaintances and employers. ome of the literature f the How to Make friends ndInfluence People' genre ooks, ndeed, as if t mightgo a long way towards reinstillingpopular belief n thecompulsivepower ofthe spokenword.The idea that a man can develop wide powers for restricting is fellow men'sfreedomof choice is thus a very ive one in all societies we know. Nevertheless, n thecontextof social relationships mong human beings, the obvious recalcitrance of one'sfellows providescontinuous empirical demonstration f the limits beyond which theycannot be compelled. On the otherhand, the frequentunavailability ofgods to con-tinuousobservation,which we foundto be an important orrelateof actionstereotyping,also impliesa lack of directevidenceoftheiruncoercibility. rue, the benefit hat failsto materializewhen a god has been invoked to provide it might throw doubt on thecompulsive efficacy f human action in thissphere: but in a polytheisticworld-viewsuch doubt can be allayed by postulating nterferenceromanother god who, in histurn, s none the esssusceptible o compulsion through rayer; and so on. Given that nmany cases there is no further vidence which would differentiate etween the twoalternative xplanationsoffailure, nd giventheanxiety-reducing alue of beliefswhichimply the elimination f free hoice, it is likely hat n such contexts xplanations stress-ing interference y othergods and retaining deas of the coercibility f gods in generalwill prevailover explanationswhichaccept thefailureas evidencethat Man proposes,God disposes'. Out ofthisgrowsthe commonparadox ofthegod who greatlyexceedshis worshippers n power,yet sundertheir losecontrol.Where there s monotheism, f course,such developmentswould seem to be ruledoutbythe absence ofalternative gentsto save the dea ofcompulsion n cases ofprayerfailure.Fromthis ssumption risesthehypothesis, hich merits esting,hat n a sampleofworld religionsmonotheismwill be foundhighlycorrelatedwith the attribution fwide freedom f choice to thereligiousobject,while polytheismwill be associated withideas ofwide or totalcoercibilityfthegods.As we found with stereotyping f religious action, in the less common situationwhere the reactions fthegodstohumanbeingsaredirectly bservedrather hanmerelyinferred rom ventual results, ven polytheistic eligions re forcedto incorporatethepossibility hatthegodsmaynot choose to accede tohumanrequests.Thus, inKalabarireligion,one praysand makes offeringso a god in order to obtain a certain result. nmostcontexts, hegod himselfs notobservablypresent;and thesuccessofone's actionsoftenbecomes apparentonly aterwhen theresultprayedfor ithermaterializesor doesnot. Normally, too, prayerin the correct termsand offering n the correct scale arethought f as sufficientonditions f success. fthere s failuredespitecorrect pproach,this s not simply nterpreted s due to thegod's inscrutablefreedom fchoice: it is dueeitherto interferencey anothergod, or to a mistake on the part of the diviner whoadvised as to whichof thegodswas concerned n thesituation.Sometimes,however, hegod is visibly nd audiblypresentwhen requestsare made to him. This happens when


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 2IIhe is addressed by human beings while possessing a medium; and, under these con-ditions,one quite frequently ncounters point-blank nscrutablerefusalto accede totherequestof a petitionerwhich contrasts harplywiththeprevailingviewstressinghecoercivepower ofhuman address tothegods.Here again, we see that anothercommon point ofcontrast etweenthereligious ndthenon-religioussbynomeansabsolute: hence, t s no more useful s a differentiatingcriterion hanstereotyping ersusflexibility.These findingsustifyus in makingmore explicituse ofthe implicationofanalogybetween human beings and religious objects, which we pointed out earlier as thevaluable aspect ofTylor's definition. or purposesofthedefinition ut forwardhere,it will be assumed that in every situation commonly abelled religiouswe are dealingwithaction directed towardsobjectswhich are believed to respond n terms f certaincategories-in our own culture thoseofpurpose, ntelligence nd emotion-which arealso the distinctive ategories for the descriptionof human action. The application ofthese categories eads us to say that such objects are 'personified'.The relationshipsbetween human beings and religious objects can be further efinedas governed bycertain ideas of patterning and obligation such as characterize relationships monghuman beings. In short,Religion can be looked upon as an extensionof the fieldofpeople's social relationships beyond the confinesof purely human society.And forcompleteness' ake,we should perhaps add the rider that this extensionmust be one inwhichhuman beings nvolved see themselves n a dependentpositionvis-d-visheirnon-human alters-a qualificationnecessary o exclude pets from hepantheonofgods.What are the criteriaof a good definition n this sphere and how far does theapproach outlined above measure up to them? Firstof all, we are concernedwith atermwhichhas a clearcommon usage inourown culture.To avoid confusion, herefore,any definitionwhichwe put forward s the basis of ts use in anthropology hould con-form s closely s possibleto the usage ofcommon sense.At thesame time,we must ookfor heuniversal spectofthe phenomena commonlydenotedby theterm:for culture-bound label is ofno use in cross-cultural omparisons.This universal spect, fortunately,is nothard to discover;for aymen have freely sed theword religion' to refer o hap-penings observed n a wide variety fcultures therthanourown. Secondly, we shouldbear in mind that membersof several other academic disciplines-notably Psychologyand History-are also bent on the study of comparative religion'; and our definitionshouldbe sufficientlyongruentwith their ssumptions or he results hey chieve to becompared withour ownfindings.Our approach seemsto measure up fairlywell to these requirements. t sticks loseto commonsense npreserving heconnexionbetween religion'and otherterms uchas'god' and.'spirit'; and it talliescloselywith the assumptionof psycho-analystsnd his-torians. Many anthropologists, f course, may continue to object that by laying allemphasis on the similaritiesbetween man-to-god and man-to-man relationships,wehave missedthe crucial something xtra' which givesthe real essence ofreligion. havegone to considerablepains to showthatin fact there sno 'something xtra'whichdis-distinguishes ll religious relationshipsfrom all secular relationships. n so far as thefeelingofdissatisfaction ersists espite such a demonstration, suggest hat themodeofdifference aries from ociety o society nd has no universalfeatureswhatsoever.As


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2I2 ROBIN HORTONfar as I can see, theway in whichreligiousrelationships re seen to differ rom ecularrelationships n any given society s much the same as the way in which any one categoryofsecular relationshipss seento differ rom ll other categoriesof suchrelationships.fthis s true, hen togo on askingfor he something xtra' s tocryfor hemoon.There stillremainsone very arge question to be asked about our definition. hat is,is it scientifically seful? Does itpointto a numberofpossibledimensions long whichreligiousphenomena can be seen to vary? Does it suggest estable hypotheses bout theway in which variationalong thesedimensions s connectedwith othersocial facts?AsI said before,definitionsre mere tools, standingor falling by theirusefulness; o thelast sectionofthispaper will be taken up witha fairly engthydiscussionof someof thehypotheseswhich our approach suggests.An obvious consequence of defining eligionas an extensionof social relationshipsbeyondtheconfines fpurelyhuman society s theassumption hat variables founduse-ful n the analysisof man-to-manrelationshipswill also be founduseful n the analysisofman-to-god relationships;and in what follows,we shall select one of the mostim-portantof uchvariablesto seehowfar thelpsusinhandling religiousphenomena.Two poles of relationship can be distinguished n the sphere of interpersonalbehaviour amonghumanbeings.At the one pole,we have a situationwell illustratedbytherelationship etween twounmarried oversofequal financial and social standing nmodernWestern ociety. n such a relationship, go's action s directedentirely owardsobtainingcertainresponses n alter which he values intrinsically nd towardsgivingcertainresponses o alterwhose discharge s ofsimilar ntrinsic alue to him. We maycall thisa pure communionrelationship.At theotherpole, letus take theexample of a'business' relationshipbetween two unscrupulousfinanciers.Here, ego values intrinsi-cally neither his own nor alter's responses,alter being treated as a mere means ofarriving t a goal which can be definedwithoutreference o thebehaviour included intherelationship.We may call this a pure manipulation relationship. n betweenthesetwo poles, of course, there s a continuum of relative importance of communion andmanipulation aspects,onwhich everyhumanrelationship alls omewhere r other.2As mightbe expected grantingthe validityof our definition f religion, the samedimension of variability s important n the relationshipsof man with his gods. Itssignificancesbrought ut inNadel's (I 954) pioneeringworkonNupe religion, nwhichhe usesthe sortofreligious xperiences nd activities escribedby William James I902)as comparisonsforthe Africanmaterial. The wide-spread differences oth in contentand in endssubservedby religiousbehaviour in thetwo cultures eem to have surprisedhim; buthe is toogood an ethnographer ohave squeezed Nupe religion ntoajamesianmould and has leftus instead with some stimulating,funsystematic, omparisons.Thepoint that emerges clearly is thatJames's American and European case material ismainlydrawn from eligiousrelationships f an extreme haracter n which sheer com-munion with God is stressed o thevirtualexclusion ofbenefits ccruing either n lifeorafterdeath; while Nupe religion by contrast ays emphasis almost exclusivelyon themanipulation of God forhis worldlybenefits fhealth, wealth, and increase. If, as Ihave a hunch,the communion aspect of religiousrelationships n all Christiandenomi-nations in our culture s becoming more and more important than manipulation, weneed to remindourselvesvery forcibly f the existence of this dimension of variation


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 2I3whenwe are observing lien religious ystemswhere theposition maybe reversed.Thesortof conditions hat precipitateconversion, or nstance,will be quite differentn thecase of a primarily ommunionrelationship nd in that of a primarilymanipulativeoneconcerned withvarious benefits f a material kind; and a memberof the Church ofEngland is unlikelyto find nsightsderived fromhis own conversionexperiencesveryhelpful n a study of, say, the spread of fertility ults or even of Christianityn WestAfrica. (Although membershipof a religious denomination may be valuable to theanthropological student of alien religions n so far as it gives him some modicum ofsympathywith the psychologicalrealityof religiousrelationships, t can clearlyalso bea drawback in so far as it may obscure insight nto the sustaining conditionsof suchrelationships, t least where thesediffer idely n characterfrom hoseof the observer.)So muchfor warenessofthisdimension as a safeguard gainst the anthropologist'sethnocentricityn religiousmatters. n fact, he majority f religiousrelationships ikelyto be studied will have both communion and manipulation aspects and any compre-hensive nalysis nd interpretationmustreckonwithboth.Several British nthropologists, rominent mong themForde and Worsley FordeI958a; I959; Worsley 956) have recently nalysed systems f religiousrelationshipsntheirmanipulative aspect, i.e., as instrumental o the fulfilmentf thevarious externalgoals pursued by the congregationmembers. Pushed to its logical conclusion, suchanalysis may prove to have greatexplanatoryvalue in such matters s the co-ordinationof cult structure o social structure nd the extinctionand proliferation f religiousrelationshipsgenerally. A theoryof god-to-groupco-ordination capable of replacingthosederivedfromDurkheim can perhapsbe elaborated fromt as follows:Assumption : The individual memberofany societypursuesa givengoal withseveraldifferentevelsofsocial-structural eference. uch a goal will generallybe pursuedwithdifferent eferences n different ccasions. To take an example, a memberof a givensocial category n an Africanvillage communitymay activelypursue thegoals ofhealth,wealth, and increase forthevillage as a whole, forthe descent-group f whichhe is amember and for himself s an individual. Generally, his concern with one of thesestructural evels on a given occasion excludes for the moment his concern with theothers.AssumptionII: The religious relationships n which the members of a society areinvolved function s instrumentso the achievement f theirvarious goals. Where thereis any change in the structureof such goals, the religious relationshipswill alwayschange and develop towards thepoint at which theycan be seen by those nvolved asseverallymakinga contribution o all of theirgoals at all of the atters'various levelsofreference.Where the structure f goals becomes stabilized, thispoint s one at which thesystem freligious elationships lso becomes stabilized.Assumption II: In a societywhere the relationsbetween segments f the total grouparemarkedly ompetitive, hefact thata god and its cult are seen as contributing o themembers'goals at the totalgrouplevel ofreference pso acto mplies thatthey annot beseen as contributing o the same goals at the next ower evel ofreference,.e. thatofthesegments.Thus, a cult which is defined s contributing o collectivewelfareof a group


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214 ROBIN HORTONclearlycannot be seen as contributing o the welfareofany one of tssegments n con-textswhere such welfare s defined as achieving benefits t the expense of the othersegments.By converse,where relationsbetweensegments fa group are notmarkedlycompetitive, elevanceof a god tomembers'goals at their otalgroup level of referencedoes not debar it from elevanceto the samegoals at thesegmentevel ofreference.

Fromthese assumptions herefollowgeneralizations bout the sortofcult structurewhich s likely o arise n connexionwitha givensocial system. irstofall, in thecase ofa systemn which relationsbetweenthe segments fa group at any level in thewholeare markedly ompetitive, very evel will have its own setofcults distinct rom hat ofall other evels in thesystem. n each level, furthermore,herewill be at least as manydistinct, houghmutuallyequivalent, cultsas there re competing egmentsn it. At thelowest level-that of the individual-an alternative to the last conditionmay be thesolicitingbymany individualsof a single god whose culturallydefined ack of concernwith the welfare of any particular social group makes him a suitable instrument findividualistic spirationsthrough n implicationofhis readinessto sell to thehighestbidder rrespective fprovenance.In a systemwhererelationsbetweensegments t any level are predominantly on-competitive nd harmonious, heremaybe one or more cults co-ordinated o thegroupat thetop level and no additional cultsco-ordinatedto itssegments r to thesegmentsof the atter.The minimal ntensity fcompetitionwhich would give rise to thistypeofsituation s,however,probably fairly are.To take a concrete llustration fthefirst ypeofsystem,et us considera Kalabarivillage community.This consistsof a congeriesof apically unrelated descent-groupswhoseinterrelations re normally haracterizedby strong ompetition.The componentindividuals ofeach suchdescent-groupre also pronetocompetevigorously mongeachotherforheadship and otherpositionsof nfluencewithinthegroup.As we shouldpre-dict on thebasis of our assumptions, ach of the three evels, village,descent-group ndindividual has its distinctive et of cults: thus at village level, we findthe cult of theFounding Heroes who are considered as instrumentsfcollectivevillagewelfare,whileat descent-group evel we findthe apical ancestorsconsideredas instruments fcollec-tivedescent-groupwelfare, ach descent-grouphaving its own one or more ancestors.At thelevel oftheindividual, though there s no co-ordinationof a distinct od and itscult to each man,we find ndividualistic ompetitive spirations atered forbythecultsof theWater-People,who are defined as associated with none of the enduringsocialgroups ofthe community nd as conferring heirbenefits n all comers on a scale pro-portional toofferings ade. The lifeof thesevariouscults smaintained to an importantextentby thedecisions of ndividuals as towhichtheywill make use oftomeeta givencontingency; nd many Kalabari explain theirchoice in termsverysimilarto those ofour assumptions.Thus, it is commonlybelievedthatonlytheWater-Peopleare capableofconferringn an individual a degreeof wealth that s excessive n relation to thatoffellowmembers of his community nd descentgroup. For such wealth,it is said, onewould notgo to thefoundingHeroes ofthevillage, or to the descent-group ncestors;forbothoftheseare concerned alike withthewelfare fall thoseunder their urveillanceand would hardly benefit ne of theirchargesabove the others.The Water-People,on


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 215the other hand, 'choose no one'. They 'look to see what one carries n one's palm forthem' and give accordingly.As I said above, systems n which competitionbetween segmentsat any level ofgrouping is virtually bsent are probably rare; so I find t hard to provide examples.However, ifBenedict was in any way correct n her analysis of Zuni culture and herthesis f Zuni non-competitiveness,hispeople providesthe sortof contrast o Kalabariwhich ourgeneralizationswould lead us to predict Benedict I935). Thus, descriptionsof Zuni religiousorganization place very strong mphasison cultswhose effectiveon-gregation s the community s a whole and stress he ack of cultswhich could be seen ascatering mainly for competitive spirationsat sectional or individual levels.Althoughmany priestly ffices nd religious duties are vested in particular clan sections of thecommunity, hose concerneddo what theyhave to do on behalf of Zuni as a whole andnot on behalf of their own clans. Again, as Benedict points out, the Guardian Spiritcult which is so vital an instrument f individualistic spirations over much ofNorthAmerica findsno equivalent n Zuni.This attempt at explanation of the relations between cult-structurend socialstructure n non-Durkheimian inesalso providesuswitha broad answerto thegeneralquestion,still ometimes sked,as towhatis the social structural ignificance freligiousactivity.Given theassumption hatreligious ystems end to take suchforms s are seento make a contribution o all the goals of a society'smembersat all their levels ofstructural eference,t follows hat where theconstituent nits of a widergroup are incompetition,cults will tend to be adopted by these units which contribute o achieve-ment of the goals involved in this competition; and to the extentthat the competitioninvolves mutual hostility f the units nvolved, these cults can be seen as agentsof dis-integration cting n opposition to the cult concerned with thecollective welfareof theinclusive group. Where, on the other hand, the constituent nitsare not markedly ncompetition, he god concerned with the welfare f the nclusivegroup will be adequateto their needs, and cults co-ordinated to these units and contributing o factionalhostilities nd disintegration re unlikely o appear. In otherwords,our approach leadsus to look at religious relationships n their manipulative aspects as means towardaccomplishing what those participating n them want to do: if what the participantswant to do involvesdisintegrative ompetition, hen the world of theirgods is likelytoinclude somewho are defined s helping theirhuman partners n such competition;orifwhat theywant to do involves ittle ompetition, heirworld ofgodsis ikely o be moreconcerned with the collective welfare and harmony of all. In a sense, then, religiousactivity ends to be as integrative r as disintegrative s the particularcongregation rindividual wants t to be.An explanation ofthe co-ordination freligious ystem o social structure ased ontreatment fthegods as a set of nstrumentsmeetinghumanwantsdoes ofcourse mplya process occurring ver time wherebythe existing tructure f wantsacts to develop incult certainreligious deas selected from pool available to thesociety.The processeswhereby this pool is kept filled have no necessary connection with the processesofselection; indeed, in many cases they may be quite random relative to these latteraswhen tradingcontractswithneighbouring nd alien cultures keep the members of acommunity acquainted with outline features of a number of cults which until the


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2I6 ROBIN HORTONappropriate want situation' ariseswill not be utilized. The most lluminating nalogyhere appears to be that of Natural Selection operatingon an animal population whichhas a certainfairly onstantrate of spontaneousrandom mutation.Given this assumption, the religious-social structural co-ordinations found* nsocieties which are more or less static when observed by the anthropologistmustberegarded as theoutcome of a selectionprocesswhich took place in an unobservableandoftenunrecorded past; and our theorywill accordinglybe strengthened y studiesofongoing religiouschange whichdemonstrate heuniversal operationof the selectionofreligious oncepts n the ightof wants and desires tandard to thesocial group nvolvedin the change. This sort of analysis of religiouschange has been commonly enoughpractised amonghistorians uch as Tawney and Weber (Tawney I948; Weber inGerth& Mills I948); but it is only recently hat anthropologistsn England have takenup thetune. One of the first o do so was Worsley,who recentlymade a vivid analysis ofMelanesian Cargo Cults (Worsley I958), treating hem as responsesto new structuraldevelopments nd hence to new (super-tribal) evels of structural eference orexistinggoals of action.Worsley howsthat the pre-Cargocult religious ystem f the peopleshedeals with contained nothingwhich could be seen as contributing o theirgoals ofaction at thenew level of referencend interpretshe Cargo cultsas being developed asfillers fthisgap.In my own field-work mongstthe Kalabari ofthe Niger Delta, treatment f thetraditional ystem fgods as a system f nstruments een as contributing o thefulfil-ment of the standard action goals at their various levels of referencehas made thecuriouslyselective effect f incoming Christian ideas readily understandableas theoutcomeofrecent hanges nvillagesocial structure.n Kalabari communities enerally,there s a great emphasison the incompatibility f the cults of the Village FoundingHeroes withthenewreligious deology; whileat the same time thereexists n elaborateseriesof rationalizationsustifyingontinuing ttention o descent-group ncestors ndto theWater-People.The selectivitys all themorestriking or he fact thatthese atterrationalizations re, from logical pointofview,no moreand no less valid as ustifica-tion forcontinuingthe cult of the Village Heroes than as justificationforcontinuingthat ofancestors and Water-People. All becomes clear, however,when we rememberthat the Village Heroes have special relevance to the collective welfareof the com-munity s a whole, the ancestors pecial relevance to collectivedescent-groupwelfare,and the Water-People special relevance to individual aspirations.The last fifty earshave seen the gradual withering way ofsolidarity t village level, the advent of thePax Britannicahavingmade otiosethecrucial defensive unctions f this eveloforgani-zation. On the otherhand, the descent-groupshave lost no whit of theirformerm-portance, and individualistic tatusstrivings emain as characteristic fthe cultureasever. Given thesestructural hanges and the respective nstrumental elevancesofthethreecategoriesofgod, the selectiveeliminationofthe cult of theVillage Heroes couldreadilyhave been predicted. n the Melanesian situation, he addition ofanother evelof tructural eference othe standard actiongoals of thepopulation was followedbytheadoption of a furthereriesofcults.Here, on theotherhand, we have a reversed itua-tion,where droppingout of the top level of structuralreference s being followedbydropping-out f thecorresponding eriesofcults.


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 217A significant hough more or lessincidental contribution o the analysis of religiouschange was made by Nadel in hisNupe work, n whichhementions hecurrent ystemof goals pursued bymembersofa society s an importantdeterminant fcult importa-tions. His particular contributionwas to point out that recent importations nto the

Nupe cult system orm nlya limited selectionfrom mong the wide varietyofmodelsavailable to thepopulation, who are acquainted withthemthrough heircontact withrepresentativesf alien cultures but utilize onlysuch as are seen to have relevance tocurrentrequirements.One hopes that future tudies of religious change, by drawingattentionto the unutilizedas well as the utilized componentsof the pool ofreligiousideas available to a givenpopulation,willhave similarrelevanceto testing heapplica-bility fthe Mutation-Selectionmodelto this phere.If we assume that the gods of any population have become co-ordinated to in-dividuals and thevarious levelsofgroupingthat nclude them as a resultof a processofselectionbased on perceivedrelevance to particular goals at particular evels ofstruc-tural reference,we can expect to find written n' to the character of any god someimplicationof relevance in theparticularsocial contextwhereit has become fixed. nfact,so far as correlationsbetween characterand structuralpositionare discoverable,it would seem that charactermaybe either he ndependentor thedependentofthe twovariables. In thesituationwhere it is the independent variable, thecharacter of a godwhichforms artofthepool ofunutilizedmodels will determine ts structural atewhenchangingconditionsgive it new relevanceto human needs. Thus, in the West Africancoast belt, extensive trade linkages give any communitya large pool of unutilizedreligiousmodels in theshape ofthegods of tsculturally lien neighbours;but whetheror not the cult of a god spreads beyond the group withwhom it originated dependspartly, t least, on whetheror not there swrittenn to thegod's character an implica-tionofexclusive relevance to the needs ofthatgroup. Contrast,forexample, the fixed,static social co-ordinationsof the Dahomean Clan-Founding Heroes (defined as ex-clusivelyconcerned withthe interests f their own descendants),with the continuousspreadand congregational xpansionof the cults of thevodun,hegreat gods in chargeofthevarious naturalelementswho have no implicationofrestricted ocial relevance builtin to their haracter. One might ndeed saythatthe peculiar congregational tructure fDahomean religion, o much of it marked by recruitment irtuallyunconnected withsocial provenanceand resultingnritualgroupings oincidentwithnoneof the enduringstructural nits ofthekingdom, s a function f the characterpeculiaritiesof the vodun(Herskovits 938).Anothercontextwhere characterprobably determines he type of social co-ordina-tion reached is that of the Dead conceived as surviving n personal form.Whetheragiven population has or has not a developed cult of the Dead, in so far as the latter areseen as surviving n the other side ofthe grave, theyare very generallyconsideredtohave passed over with the same values as theyheld during life.Where their cult isdeveloped, this definition f theircharacter mpliesa relevancerestricted o the socialcontextswithinwhich theirvariousobligations ay during ife.Thus,whenthe head ofaYoruba or Ibo patrilineage dies, his ghostwill be seen as relevant to the needs of hisdescent-groupmore or lessexclusively.Hence thecultof a given Dead tends to becomeco-ordinatedto the groupwithin which his principal obligations ay during ife and is


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2I8 ROBIN HORTONhighlyunlikely o be adopted by individuals and groups outside this social context. nso faras-this nflexibilityf co-ordination ppears not to hold, theexceptionsare likelyto be the 'bad Dead', the ghostsof thosewho, during ife,conducted themselveswithruthlessdisregard of the social obligations aid down for themby society. Among theKalabari of the Niger Delta, forexample, these, in so far as they carryover theiramoralitywith them,can oftenbe utilized for hepurposesofanybodywho approachesthem withsufficientnducement,be his endsgood or evil. Here again characterologicaldefinitionwould seem to determine hepattern f ocial co-ordination.By contrast,character may be the dependent variable; as where implications ofrelevance to the particular interests f the worshippinggroup are the outcome of asteady processofmoulding bymembersof thisgroup, a processofwishful einterpreta-tion of thebodyofexisting octrine.An exampleofthismoulding process sprovided byTawney's study I945) of the modification f Christiandoctrineunder thepressure f agrowing endencyfor he ndividualisticpursuitof material wealthin sixteenth-centuryEurope: such a pursuitof wealth was in fact a condition of damnation in earlierChristiandoctrine;but withChristianity ontinuing s thereligionof a class ofpeopleforwhom this became irresistiblyheprimaryvalue in life, t suffered radual reinter-pretation t theirhands until financial ndividualismof a mostruthless ortbecame nota conditionofdamnation but, ifsuccessful, signof election fortheenjoyment fblissin theworldhereafter.The structure f theBible, indeed,seemsparticularly itted o make thecharacterofthe Judaeo-Christian god function as a dependent variable in relation to its socialcontext:fordifferentartsof the book provide widely differing odels,and it spossibleto selectfrom mongstthema god congruentwith almostanysocial setting.Thus wherethere s a readiness toidentify ith the Chosen People of the Old Testament,the atter'smodels can be easilyutilized to caterfor heaspirations fa group nconflictwithothers.New Testamentmodels,on the otherhand, are moreeasilyconnectedwithuniversalisticaspirations.Our treatment f a human population's relationshipswith its gods as a systemofsocial relationships iewed in itsmanipulative aspect does, I think twill be conceded,suggesta wide varietyofhypotheses bout the relations between religiousforms ndothersocio-culturalvariables. These hypotheses over questionsboth ofgod-to-groupco-ordination nd of the character ofthegods themselves.Equally, however,thistypeof treatmentuggests eryforciblyhe imitations n our attempts opredictthetypeofreligious organization which will supervene in a given socio-cultural situation. Ingeneral, the gods as instruments re invited to intervene n human affairs n thosesituations where the apparatus of empirically-tried echniques currentlyavailableleaves a ratherwide marginofuncertainty s to the accomplishment fa desiredend.But in thisposition,the gods are functionally quivalent to a multitudeof other non-empiricalinstrumentswhich are of a secular nature, e.g. charms, medicines, and thehost oftechniqueswhich utilize the principlethat the symbolizationof a desired endbringsabout its fulfilment.hus, fromthe point of view of an instrumental nalysis,whether fighter ilot setting ut on a hazardous missionpraysto a god orpacks a luckcharm s a matter fchance.

This conclusion givesthe lie to one ofthe strongest fanthropology'sDurkheimian


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 2I9prejudices about religion; for, n asserting hat eitherreligiousor secularmeans may beinvoked to attain any end in any social context, t rejects the traditionalassociation ofreligion with collective action and the attainment of socially approved goals, and ofsecularnon-empirical echniques with ndividualistic ction and anti-socialgoals. Suchan association is generally upportedby citing a selection of societies n which seculartechniques satisfy ndividualisticaspirationsand religiousrelationshipsthe collectiveaspirations of wider social groupings. But the selection is a biassed one and can becounteredwithoutdifficultyy citing large number of societies e.g. many n theWestAfricanand NorthAmerican cultureareas) in whichreligiousrelationships etween agod and an individual are consideredessential nstruments f the latter'scompetitiveand even anti-social spirations.In fact,whether ny new situationdemanding supplementation fempiricalby non-empirical nstrumentss metby religiousor secularmeans depends on which are moreprominent n the stock of unutilizedmodels available to the individual or group con-cerned at the time. And this s a question whichwill depend on such incidentalfactorsas theculturalmake-up ofneighbouring ommunities nd theparticular diomused byindividual nnovators.As we pointedout earlier, everyman-to-godrelationship an be assigneda place onthe communion/manipulation imension of variability; and to the extent that thecommunionaspectis importantn a given case, byso muchinterpretationsased on themanipulative aspect are inadequate. This, of course,is true in man-to-manrelations.To the extentthata relationship s purely business',so far s it capable ofexplanationin terms f the ends it is setup to serve; but as moreand more ofa 'personal' elemententers n, so this sortofexplanation becomes less and less applicable. It is fineforthechoice of a partner n a marketing nterprise, isillusioningly pplicable to the choiceofa marriagepartner, nd quite inapplicable to thechoice ofa lover; and in so far asmany religiousrelationships re as near the latter extreme s theyare theformer, heneed for complementary pproach isacute.Two typesof question suggestthemselveshere. The first s, whydo some societieslike the Nupe have religious ystems haracterized by an extreme mphasison manipu-lating the gods as tools forthe achievement of health,wealth, and issue, while othersocieties such as our own show a very high loading of emphasis on sheercommuniondivorced from heseekingof other benefits?The second is, how farcan theparticularcharacteristics f a society'svariousgods be explained in terms f thegoals involved nthecommunion spectof ocial relationsWe are hampered in answeringthese two questionsby the rudimentary tate oftheorizing bout the communionaspect. Some anthropologiststill ee social systems smade up of a myriadparts all grinding way madly to produce maximum cohesion,neglecting the goals and values actuating their members. Others cock a snook atcohesion and look at a system f social relationships s a set of toolsserving hepartici-pants' materialconsumptiongoals. Few have acted upon the truism tressed yLinton(I945) that social relationsare what theyare partlybecause of the participants'con-tinued seeking after a certain give and take of love, hate, approbation, contempt,dominance,submission,.nd otherkindsofaction and reaction seen,notas instruments,but as valuable in themselves.t is truethat someworkers ave lookedin thisdirection;


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220 ROBIN HORTONbut, in general, theyhave concentratedexclusively n the pursuitof approbation anddominance-a rathernarrowpartofthe totalrange of thesecommunion trivings.In search ofpeople who have been sensitive o the complexityof the communionaspect of social relationships, ne turnsnaturally o the psycho-analysts. nfortunatelytheir theorieson this subject multiply ike rabbits; their concern with problemsdefinition nd empiricaltestinghas lagged sadly behind their speculations.Neverthe-less, they are the only people who have anythingto say in this sphere; and certainpersistenthemesdo emergethrough heriot oftheir ften onflictingdeas. One such isthe tenet that the extentto which any particular typeof give-and-takeof response isfosteredn one of a person'sroles will affect he extent to whichhe actively seeks thesame give-and-takeof response in his other roles. Thus, the degree to which, say,dischargeofanger is developed in one rolewill affect nd be affected y thedegree towhich aggression s cultivated n other rolesplayed by thesame person.Such an inter-dependence will involve bothrolestakenat different eriodsoftheperson's life-history,and also roles taken up in different ocial contexts during a given phase of the life-history. n so far as one can summarize the general view, it seems to be that rolessucceedingone anotheralong the time dimensionwill tend each to reflect hevarioustypes of communion striving-for love, hate, approbation, etc.-that have beenfosteredn earlier contexts.On the otherhand, the several roles held by a personat agiven phase of his life-history ill tend to strike balance in thisrespect: thus Parsons(I952) and Homans (I95i) have both suggestedthat in any social system he field ofimpersonal relationshipswill always tend to be balanced somewhereelse in thesystemby relationships hatplace heavystress n personal affection,nd that the more thefieldof impersonal relationships xpands, the more the remainingrelationshipswill stresssuch affection.Homans treatsthe contrasting elationshipswithfather nd mother'sbrother n unilineal descentsystems long these ines.Parsonsgivesa similaranalysisofchanges in the marital relationshipsn theUnited States,treatingwhat he regardsasthe greaterand greateremotional loading of the attitude toward one's spouse as acounter-weightothe ncreasingdepersonalizationof business' relations.At the present stage of anthropological theorizing, t is not at all easy to see howtheseconceptsfit nto themain stream;but theydo seem to providesome oftheonlyclues available as to how we might set about studyingthose variables of religiousrelationshipsnot covered by an analysis of theirmanipulative aspects. Given that wetreat roles played vis-a-visgods and roles played vis-a-vis men as parts of a unitarysystem, hen tfollows hat variations n thecommunioncontentof relationswith menmust be interdependentwith variations n the communion contentof relationswith thegods. If a balance of ove, hate, and the restof tis to be struck, hiswill be in the totalfieldofpeople's relationshipswhich ncludesboth men and gods.Work exploring histypeofassumptionhas been done principally n America and,to date, is suggestiverather than scholarly. However, as it is suggestions ather thanscholarshipwe are lookingfor n the present context,a couple of articles seem worthquoting by wayof llustration.In the first f these (Bushnell I958), the author deals with a society n which arelationshipof great intensity nd affection xists between motherand child, but inwhich the motherwithdrawsherself bruptlywhen the child has reached about three


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 22 Iyears of age. For the female child in this ociety,growingup and marrying ringsbackthe possibility fa further eries of such warm, affectionate nvolvements n the role ofmother. But for the male child, there is no equivalent in later life to the warmth,affection, nd security eceived n thisearly period: both friendship nd sexual relationslater on are marked by insecurity, istrust, nd littleemotional depth. The author cor-relates with this situation the peculiar emotional intensitywith which the cult of theBeneficentVirgin has become invested n this society; here, t would seem, the balancebetween typesofrelationshipshas not been worked out in the fieldofpurelyhumanrelations,but in the wider fieldwhich includes relations with the gods. In the secondarticle,also by an American (Wallace I 958), moresuggestions long these ines emergeduringa discussionof culturalchanges mediated by religiousexperts. n speculatingasto how an individual can suddenlytake on a newsocial role wherebyhe freeshimself oa great extentfrom nvolvement n certain crucial communion relationships, he authorpoints out that exchangeof theserelationshipswithhuman beings for imilar oneswithgods maybe one ofthemost mportant actors n enablinghim to do this.As one examplehe quotes the acquisitionof a personal Guardian Spirit n North American societies, nacquisition which enables the man concerned to satisfyhis need for dependence andsubordinationwith reference o a god and hence to act in a liberated, independentfashions is-a-vishis parents and otherclose associates. Here again, we have a case wherethe majorityof a population works out its balance of communionin thewider socialfield ncludingboth gods and man.It will be noted that I use theword 'balance' here, in preference o terms uch as'compensation', substitution' nd 'projection'more familiar n psycho-analytic itera-ture. This use is an intentional ejectionof the direction f causality mplied n theusualpsycho-analytic onceptual schemes. The tendency of such schemes is to suggestthatreligious relationships re always a sort of 'second best' for human ones; whereas itseemsto me thatto do justice to thefacts uch a simple view is quite inadequate. Loveand other satisfying ommunion relationships n our own societyhave been frequentlygiven up for he more pressing emands of relationswith a god: indeed, in an institutionliketheCatholic Church,someone who was applyingforpriestly ffice nd appeared tobe makingno sacrificeof rich human relationships n order to be a servant of Godwould be an objectofgravedoubt.One might uggest numberofverydifferenteasonsfor hereadinessof omepeoplein all societies o throwup human fordivine communion.At one extreme, ome people'sgods are likeprostitutes: orthosewho can pay, theygive moreof a sortthan ordinaryhuman partners n return ora great deal less effort n the part of their clients.At theotherextreme, hey maydemand farmore effort nd sacrifice han any human being,but may provide in returna perfectionfor those involved which quite eclipses therichest of their human involvements; they may, for example, combine in one personroles which are separated in the human social fieldsof their worshippers, .g. thoseofmother,father, nd spouse. For such reasons as these, our approach to studyingthecommunionaspectsofreligionmustbe one that looks at a person's total social fieldofmen and gods as one in which causal relationscan have all possible directions: gods ofunimaginable delightcan seduce theirworshippers way frommen ust as effectivelysaridrelationshipswithmencan precipitate turn owardsthe gods.

P R.A.I.J.


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222 ROBIN HORTONFromall this, ne answer o ourquestion bout the oadings f communionndmanipulationn religioneems o be that thosereligionswith highlymanipulativeemphasis re found n conjunctionwithhumansocial systemswhosecommunionaspects re balanced' in thesense ketchedbove; whilst hosereligions ith very

stronglement fcommunionccurwhere heres a similarlytrongmbalancen thehumansocial system.Whether henatureofthegodsfosteredhe mbalance n thehuman ector, rwhether hehuman mbalancenourishedhegodsmustbe a matterfor istorical esearchneachparticularase.Another ossible nswer o the samequestion eems fparticular elevance othehistoryfWestern ulture.Variation f religious elationshipslongthe communion/manipulationimensionouldbe connected ith hangesn the mportancef cientificthinking.cienceversus eligion asbeena causeelebren much ecentwritingywell-known cientists,fwhomJulianHuxley I957) has been one ofthe morenotablecontributors.uxley nd most therworkersnthenon-humanciences avetended oassumethatas a widerand widerfieldof phenomenawas coveredby scientificx-planation, o thefieldof relevance f the godswould shrink,ventuallyonothing.Certainly,fwe lookat thepurelymanipulativespectof religious elationships,hisseems likely utcome:for s empiricalciencebroadenstsscope,roomforbeliefngodlynterventionsdeterminingheresultsfvariousife rises ecomes rogressivelyreduced.This is so, at least for hosewhocannottolerate he moreblatantformsfcontradictionn their eliefystems. owever, o nferromhis heeventual emise freligions to overlook he communion spectof religious elationships,hich s notdirectlyffectedythe dvance f cience.As this dvance ontinues,t eemsikelyhatthemanipulativeignificancefourreligious eliefswill be continuouslyrodedwhilecommunionremalns.Hereofcourse,wetouch na very ontroversialoint;forHuxley nd othersmain-tainthatthescientificutlookhas madelogically bsurdnotonlythe dea ofgodsasintervenersn the events f thephysicalworld.buttheverydea ofgodsat all. Theseareviewswhichhold widecurrencymongWesternntelligentsiat thepresent ay;butthebanner fRationalism'which hey olduptosupportheir icture f godlessworlds n onesense banner f imited erspective hichmaywellbe abandonedbyafuture nd no less scientificeneration. or 'Rationalism' n the twentieth enturyimplies heprogrammefholding estable eliefsnly ndof cting nthe ssumptionthatconnexions etween vents n the futurewill continue o resemble onnexionsbetween vents bserved n thepast.As philosophersow acknowledge, o furtherjustificationf uch programmeanbe foundwhichdoes notappealto thevery rin-ciples nvolved.t is in otherwords programme hichhascausesdeep n theroots fournature, ut one whichhas norationale; nd as such ts tatuss no differentromprogramme hichacceptsfaith s sufficientroundforbelievingn a god or gods.Where man is facedwith ertain tatementshat reempiricallyestablend othersthatare not,there s nothing ogically bsurdin his applying he rationalist ro-gramme o the testable tatementsnd theprogrammeffaith o theuntestables.fthegodsare so defined hatno observationsre relevant o the truth r falsehood fstatementsboutthem,uch scheme f ctionremoveshem romherationalistur-viewand subjects hem o the trials f faith. t maybe simpler o liveout one's life


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 223applying single ogicalprogrammeo all beliefs, utthe man who applies secondprogrammeo beliefs boutwhich hefirstan say nothings certainlyo more r esslogicalthanhe who appliesonlyone; and as we have seen, hepressureso behave nthiswaymaybe very owerful.To sum up on thispoint, t looksas ifthe first lush f twentieth-centuryogicalPositivismed to a godlessworld-pictureor n intellectuallite tronglyaluing ogicalconsistencyn theirbeliefs; ut the aterelaborations f Positivismn whichthe m-plicationsftheposition ave been fully ollowed p leave thepicture pen for urtherreligious evelopments. aving beenthrownut withthe bath-water,he baby bidsfair o return hroughhe window.For thereasonsgiven bove, it seems ikely hatfuture evelopmentsn ourownculturewill nvolvenot thedisappearance freligion,but a greater nd greater mphasis n itscommunionspect.Such a development,indeed, eems o have beengoing n for ome imensections f heProtestant hurch,whichhasdonea gooddeal ofreinterpretationfdogmathatformerlyeemed o stressthefunctionsf heAlmightysprovidern thematerialworld.A final opicwhich eemsusefully ealtwith n terms fthemanipulation/com-munion imensionfvariationoncernsherelations f hose eopleknown sprophetsandshamans otheothermembersf heirocieties.n most roupswhere herelation-shipsof themajoritywith theirgods are primarilymeans of obtaining he prosaicbenefitsfhealth,wealth, nd issue,we stillgenerally ind few ndividualswhosereligious elationshipsontrast ith his ituationn a strikingashion. heir nvolve-mentswith heir odsare talked f withgreat tress n elements f ove,dependence,and admiration; nd in manycasestheymaywell be peopleof unusualpersonalitystructurehose ommunionoalscannot eeasily ulfilledn anyof hevarious ossiblefields f humanrelationshipaid downbytheir ociety s standard. or example,think ere f ertainKalabaripossessionriestesseshosegods reconceptualizeds sopersecutingnd aggressiveowards hem hatone is led to suspect paranoiac per-sonality orwhoseresponse equirementshepurelyhuman ocialfields ftheir om-munitiesannot ater.Many uchpeopleplaya markedlyreative ole ntheir ultures,introducingothreligiousnnovationsnd wider ocialchanges. ndeed,Wallace,inthe rticle uoted bove, uggestshat or he ntroducerf nyradical ocial nnovationtouching n thebasic moralnorms fthecommunity,ntense ommunion elationswith loving nd approving od,who s seen as the ultimateponsor fthechanges,maybe an essentialonditionor hemaintenance f ufficientesolve ocarry ispro-gramme hrough:his, ecause n challenginghe basicmoralnorms fhissociety, eprobably acrificeshe ove and approvalofmostofhis humannearest nd dearest.Thismaybe onevery oodreasonwhymoral hanges regenerally ung n a religiouspeg.The contrastingypes freligiousnvolvementhownbyprophetsnd their on-gregationsre well llustratedhroughhehistoryfJudaeo-Christianityndof slam,(seefor xampleEvans-Pritchard949, pp. I-27). Here,as elsewhere,uch ndividualsas Mosesand theOld Testament rophets, hrist ndMahomet reclearly eopleofexceptionalersonality;nd t s ikelyhat he onditions hich ed to their evelopingintenseommunionelationshipsutside hepurely uman ontext ere eldom resentin thegeneral ongregationho were nfluencedytheirdeas.Often nough,t s an


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224 ROBIN HORTONimplicationfmanipulativeelevance rittennto he rophet'sefinitionrredefinitionofhisgod whichsells'the atter o hisfollowers-in hecase ofChristianitynd Islamthe promise f present omfortsnd future liss conditional n certainbehaviourobservances.Much ofthephrasingf the character f a godin such circumstancesscarried utbypeople nvolvedwithhim na way argely nparalleledn thecongrega-tion t arge; and thiswidedifferencef ttitude anbe a source f onsiderableensionbetweenprophetand laymen,the prophetcontinually emonstratinggainstthe'worldly'manipulativepproach ftherabblewhichhe seesas an affrontnd an out-rage to the god. This sortof prophetic xasperation as beenwell documented orJudaismna recent omparativetudy Rowley 956,pp. I I I-20).In the ongrun, fcourse, herabblewin;and there san emotionaldessication' ftheritual esulting,s inpresent-dayhristianity,nperformanceshose outinizationand lackofemotionalnvolvementeemstrangelyncongruous iththe deasof thegive-and-takef love recurringhroughoutheverbal partofthe service. n manysocietiestudied yanthropologistse getan evenstrongermpressionf dessication'inmany fthereligiouselationships;houghnthis ontextwe aregenerally ot n aposition o confirmhesort f nterpretationutlined bove. Nevertheless,ontextsnwhichwe have the historical epthwe need do giveus a usefulwarning bout thelimitations hichwe may expectto encountern tryingo interpret eligious ormswhere uchdepths acking. etus takefor xample hereligiousorms f heKalabarifishing-villagesn theNigerDelta. In eachcommunity,efind he cultofa hero-godwho,sometimen thedistant ast, ivedas a humanbeing,gave thecommunityhecode of norms t should iveby and, finally, isappeared ntothesky.Now, in onevillage, his odmaybemale, nthenext emale,nd nthenextmaleagain.Asregardsthemanipulativespectofthe ituation, owever,heresnoparallelvariation n theimplicationsfbenefitor he ommunityrittennto hedefinitionsf hevarious ods.Further,here eemsno variationn thegeneral ocio-cultural ake-up f thecom-munityoncomitant ith hevariationnsexof tstutelary od.Thoughfrustratingoanyanthropologistot contentwithmeredescription,his s ustthesort fsituationthatdiachronic ataonreligious evelopment ould eadus toexpect: he ndividualsresponsibleor heoriginal ormulationsf henatures f hevillagegodsmaywellhavebeen actuatedby needsforparticular ypes f communion elationship uplicatedneithern themajorityf their ontemporariesor n thesubsequent opulation, orwhom hemanipulativespect sthatwhichmaintained hevitalityfthecult. fthisis a correct econstruction,ttemptsofind ocio-culturalariationsoncomitant iththosensexof he everal illage ods reclearly ruitless.In an earlier aragraph,wenoted hat ncertain ituationsheequivalence fgodsto non-religiousnstruments ade it difficulto say that n specifiedocio-culturalconditionsodswouldbeintroducedo meetnewneeds: nmany ases heres anequalprobabilityhat non-religious eanswill be broughtn instead. n this astsection,anothermportantestrictionn ourgeneralizingasemerged. he definitionf god'scharacter,t seemsprobable,bears n largemeasure he mprint fthecommunionstrivingsfor ove,security,pproval, tc.) ofthe ndividualwho ntroducedt to thecommunity.ut since t sgenerallyome mplicationfmanipulativeelevancehat scrucialfor tssurvivaln a particularociety, verywiderangeofpossible mprints


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A DEFINITION OF RELIGION, AND ITS USES 225reflecting he communion strivingsof the inventor will be compatible with suchsurvival.So muchfor omeofthelines ofthought n religiousquestionswhichare suggestedby the common-sense efinition freligionwhose use was advocated in the first art ofthispaper. A major implicationof this definitionwas that the comparative studyofreligionshould go ahead throughthe systematic pplication of thevariables of inter-human relationships o therelationships fmenwith theirgods. In thispaper, we haveexplored onlyone suchvariable, that of communionversusmanipulation. The results,however, were encouraging in some of the possibilitiesof interpretationwhich theyoutlined; and ifsympathetic eadersoftheseparagraphs try o carryout the same sortofexplorationwith someofthemanyothervariablesof nter-human elationship, feelthat this sectorof anthropologymay at last escape from ts imprisonmentwithinthebondsofsheerdescription.Anothervalue ofthecommon-sensepproach outlinedaboveis that t enables us to see how thework done bymembersofdisciplines uch as historyand psycho-analysisitsnwith thereligious tudiesofanthropologists.Besides thesepositivevirtues, ur approach has thenegativeone ofhigh-lightinghewide limitationswhichwe may expect to encounter n trying o make a socio-culturalinterpretationf a givenreligious ystem.Further, n so far as it emphasizesthe closeaffinityf man-to-man nd man-to-godrelationships,t givesus a timelywarningthata comprehensivetheoryof religiousformsmust wait on a comprehensivetheoryofhuman social relationships enerally;and we all knowhowfarwe arefrom hat.

NOTESIn a paperread to theLondonUniversityointpost-graduatenthropologicaleminar n I956.2 This formulationwesa greatdeal to Talcott Parsons'sdistinction etween Instrumental'nd'Expressive' oles n humanrelations. evertheless,havenotused histerminology,artly ecause amnotsurewhether he distinctions ade here are quite the sameas hisown,partly ecause found heword Instrumental'ad all sorts f rrelevantssociations or ritisheaders.

REFERENCESBENEDICT, R. I935. PatternsfCulture.ondon.BUSHNELL, J. I958. La Virgen de Guadelupe as Surrogate Mother in San Juan Atingo. Amer.Anthrop.,6o,no. 2, pp. 26 I-5.DURKHEIM, E. I9I5. TheElementaryormsf he eligiousife. ondon.EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. I949. The anusi fCyrenaica.xford.EvANS-PRITCHARD, E. E., I956. Nuer eligion. xford.FORDE, D. I 958a. TheContextfBelief. he Frazer Lecture, I 957. Liverpool.FORDE, D. I958b. Spirits,Witchesand Sorcerers n theSupernatural Economy of theYako. J. R. ANTHROP.INST.,88,pp. I65-78.HERSKOVITS, M. I938. Dahomey.ew York.HoMANs, G. I95I. TheHuman roup. ondon.HUXLEY, A. I930. Brave ewWorld.ondon.HUXLEY, A. I958. Brave ewWorld evisited.ondon.HUXLEY, J. I957. Religion ithoutevelation.ondon.JAMES,W. I902. VarietiesfReligiousxperience.ondon.


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226 ROBIN HORTONKNEALE, W. . I952. Probabilitynd nduction.xford.LEACH, E. R. I954. Political ystemsfHighland urma. ondon.LINTON, R. I945. TheCulturalackgroundf ersonality.ew York.MARETT, R. R. I9I4. The ThresholdfReligion.ondon.NADEL, S. F. I954. NupeReligion.ondon.OTTo, R. I928. The deaof he oly. ondon.PACKARD, V. I957. TheHidden ersuade

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A Definition of Religion Horton