A Resurgent Russia?

7th largest economy (before the crisis) 1/3 or more of global natural resources A nuclear superpower A space superpower A permanent member of UNSC A member of G8 A key international actor across Eurasia (involved

in more international organizations and projects than any other state except US)

Comprehensive national power (CNP) (Social Sciences Center, Beijing, 2006):

United States 90.62 Britain 65.04 Russia 63.03 France 62.00 Germany 61.93 China 59.10 Japan 57.84 Canada 57.09 South Korea 53.20 India 50.43

"Russia is never as strong as she looks; Russia is never as weak as she looks."

Attributed to Talleyrand, Metternich, and Churchill

Putin, May 2002: "Russia has never been as strong as it has wanted

to be and never as weak as it is thought to be."

Pierre Morelle, EU Special Rep to Central Asia: “I am struck by the contrast between our interdependence

and the problems in our relations which remain unresolved. It is a contrast between practical cooperation and psychological confrontation. Ties between the two worlds are strengthening on a scale which was unthinkable in the past – and yet psychological tensions remain. Even though experience implies that it is better to learn together – and even if we experience disappointments, we will achieve a lot if we move forward working together.”

Март 2008 :: Пьер Морель. По одну сторону стола. http://sr.fondedin.ru/new/admin/print.php?id=1206353430&archive=1206354399

Why this psychological confrontation No one in 1999 expected that Russia would

experience this turn of fortunes And no one expected that the West would be

confronting such a formidable array of challenges as today without ready solutions to deal with them

So, on the Western side, there is discomfort and unease about Russia’s resurgence

And a desire to find ways to delegitimize it (“Russia is not playing by the rules”)

In Russia, there was a recovery of self-confidence And a a belief that while being a Western client

was bad for Russia, putting Russia’s own interests first and driving hard bargains with the West does bring results

But also: like winning huge in a lottery and scrambling to find ways to spend the money

Assertiveness mixed with insecurity, a fear that this moment is fleeting, that things may change for the worse very quickly

Part of Western unease about Russia’s resurgence is that it was happening amid signs of relative decline of the West

It can be too easily pictured as a zero-sum game But it is anything but a zero-sum game – as the current

economic crisis demonstrates Tremendous exaggeration of:

The degree of differences between interests And of the ability to succeed without cooperation from

the other side Russia cannot, and does not plan to, thrive on Western

troubles Neither can the West hope to gain by undercutting Russia’s

resurgence Win-win is possible – but both sides do need new thinking

Western concerns Russia is authoritarian again A revival of Russian imperialism Russia is using resources as leverage in foreign

policy

Conclusion: A containment of Russia is necessary NATO is a natural instrument for this It’s a new Cold War

Russian concerns The West wants to undermine the current regime

– that is, stability The West wants to prevent the rise of Russia’s

influence The West wants to control Russia – in particular,

to grab Russia’s resources The West is not playing fair NATO continues to expand, despite Russian

objections – or even because of Russian objections

Conclusion: Russia needs to be strong and vigilant. Prepare for confrontations with the West

Both sets of concerns do reflect some realities On both sides, there are forces – neocons, siloviki

– which see the world through the prism of zero-sum games

And they feed on each other And there are vested interests feeding this

Manichean view And there is the organizing power of simplistic,

binary thinking – Us vs. Them Ironically, both believe in American omnipotence Perhaps, this is the cardinal flaw

But, apart from the logic of zero-sum thinking, the accumulating Western and Russian mutual concerns are a fact of life –

And they stem from the fact that important changes have taken place, while thinking and policies on both sides have not caught up with these changes

But we are much better equipped today to develop new security concepts and new international policies through joint efforts - dialog, negotiations between Russia and the West, Russia and NATO

So, let us discuss both sets of concerns to see where they are coming from – and what follows from them

1. Russia is authoritarian again Yes, 20 years after Gorby persuaded the CP to hold

competitive elections… Is it a matter of concern? Of course Has a communist system been restored? Do Russians feel unfree? What are the exact parametres of Putin’s authoritarianism? Why has the auth. regression taken place? How far can it go? What can be expected in the coming years? What should the West do?

2. Revival of Russian imperialism What exactly is Russia doing? Russia’s military power – traditionally, a key

element of Russia’s power Contrast w. USSR and the preceding Romanov

Empire Defence spending, 2006 (SIPRI) $35 bln (1.7% of GDP, USSR – 25%)

Canada – 1.1% of GDP US - $580 bln (16 times more than Russia, 4.4% of

GDP)

NATO – Russia military balance Total armed forces personnel 3:1 Military aircraft 10:1 Tanks 3:1 Artillery 2:1 Naval ships 2:1 Submarines 3:1 Aircraft carriers 19:1 How real is this picture? Partly And - Russia’s rebuilding its military Questions about Russian military power

How is Russia maintaining its influence in Eurasia? The post-Soviet space is characterized by a growing

tendency of all states in the area to assert their national interests, as they are perceived by the ruling elites – and to form partnerships and associations with other states based on these perceptions.

The post-Soviet space remains largely open for wider international cooperation. The defining pattern of international politics in the area is not centralized control exercised from Moscow, but rather a set of complex multiplayer games in which Russia is only one of the players. Its dominant role in CSTO and EurAsEC is limited by the ability of most other members to pursue multivector foreign policies, and its influence in SCO is shared with China, which provides the other members with considerable room for maneouver.

Russia’s interests were not well served by some of the methods employed by Moscow and mistakes it has made in its newly assertive policy in the post-Soviet space, which have generated anti-Russian trends in the politics of several neighbouring countries, Georgia being the prime example.

But it seems that no matter how exactly Russia would have tried to reassert its interests in the area, intensification of geopolitical competition was inevitable. In that competition, Russia’s main assets are security, economic and cultural ties with post-Soviet states.

The Network Principle The Russians are discovering that what works for

Russia is networking Not hegemony, not building imperial hierarchies But networking Based on pragmatic pursuit and matching of

national interests In the growing network of Russia’s ties with the

world, the west is only one segment, even if the most important

Business expansion is top priority for the Kremlin Russian business is trying to expand into every market

available And the post-Soviet space is a natural market for it Europe, North America? Complaints about obstacles being

put in the way Moscow has tried to limit freedom of operations for foreign

multinational corporations inside Russia and in the post-Soviet space – with limited success

From time to time, Moscow tries to pressure some neighbouring countries – again, with minimal success

Withdrawing subsidies – a sign of failure of hegemony

Sphere of influence? Does Moscow have a right to express concerns about events and especially government decisions in neighbouring countries? Imagine Canada joining CSTO and agreeing to let

Russia build BMD radars and missiles on its territory

Imagine US reaction Imagine Ottawa saying: We are a sovereign nation,

you cannot dictate to us how we assure our security

Oh, but this is America – and that is Russia. We cannot tell the Russians that their security

concerns are less legitimate than American

3. Energy security Definitely, the current trends are working in favour of

Russia, as well as other energy suppliers – and they do undermine Western economies – as well as China’s and Japan’s

A bit of zero-sum game, supply-demand, market logic Role of the Russian state – typical of energy markets today Issue: not whether energy trade is “politicized” (because it

always is) – but what specific policies are pursued Boils down to the question of whether Russia is a mere

gas station or a sovereign country where the national government must have a say in how its natural resources should be used

NATO expansion vs. gas supply? Yes, as a final argument But let us not allow events to get to this stage

Now to the Russian concerns

1. The West is undermining stability in Russia Oh, really? Western support of Putin has been one of the major

causes of his success – the West has helped the rise of Putin and shares responsibility for Putinism

Western critique of Russia’s retreat from democracy is fully justified – not just as a prudent policy, but also as maintenance of international legal regime re human rights

No real interference or pressure And it’s not just the West, but Russian democrats, too Russian leaders should admit that it has compromised a

number of key norms of democratic governance, for whatever reason – and they should commit themselves to restoring these norms, because Russian democracy is needed by the Russians themselves

And don’t get paranoid – it’s no longer the Cold War

2. The West wants to prevent the rise of Russia’s influence Partly true, but is there such a united policy of the West? No – not yet, at least The overall attitude remains ambivalent Different countries have different attitudes Some are traditionally wary of Russia, others not There is both competition and cooperation If EU is looking for ways to reduce its dependence on

Russian energy supplies, it’s not an anti-Russian policy, it’s good business practice

We cannot abolish competition But we can regulate it together to prevent it from

threatening everyone’s security And we should be able to expand our cooperation Does the West need a strong Russia? Of course!

3. The West wants to grab Russia’s natural resourcesRussia needs to sellIt is a matter of dealsAnd of regimesCurrent Western policy is, indeed, aimed at achieving

maximum market freedomAnd yes, the West would like to have unimpeded access to

resources in Russia and elsewhereSo would China and India – every country that relies on

imports of raw materials, energy, etc.But is such unimpeded access a realistic goal?Sovereign states will continue to assert their rightsWestern policy is evolving, pragmaticInternational energy security is a key interest for everyone –

and appropriate regimes need to be created collectively

4. NATO enlargement

Takes place based on shared interests

Provides security

An organization of democracies

Russia has opposed it from day one

NATO has heeded some of Russia’s concerns

But perhaps not enough

And perhaps enlargement has acquired an inertia which has generated unnecessary tensions

And we can certainly start a new dialog about it

Let’s discuss our mutual concerns

Let us create a NATO-Russia audit panel to examine the relationship

Russia-West Obsolete assumptions What is “the West”? Is Russia needed to give “the West” coherence? But will Western interests be served by treating Russia as

a rogue state? Need to rethink – but only together The West needs self-critique, not smugness The West is confronted with huge problems The global center of economic gravity is shifting from

Atlantic to Pacific – and the West cannot do anything about it

What is Western unity? Against whom? For whom? Mobilizing the West against the Rest is lunacy

Russia won’t be drawn into an anti-Moslem alliance

It won’t be drawn into an anti-China alliance And it won’t be drawn into an anti-Western

alliance Russia wants to retain maximum freedom of

action – But what is that maximum? International constraints are very tight even for the

US

Current tensions between Russia and the West Partly – a natural process of sorting out interests Do we need to introduce elements of military power in this

process? It’s like putting your gun on the table when you’re

discussing a business deal The other side will do likewise… It creates an unhelpful atmosphere So, let’s keep competing and keep talking But let’s not turn it into preparations for war It won’t be like Iraq or Afghanistan No one is winning in those wars – but at least the rest of

the world is alive A war between NATO and Russia will be humanity’s last

war in the sense that there will be no humanity left after it Mutual interests – mutual vulnerabilities in all spheres

4 modes of relationships: Integration Cooperation Competition Conflict

In the 1990s, the West’s influence was growing both inside Russia and around it.

The result: growing opposition to Western pressures and interference

In the 2000s, Russia has been trying to become more independent

A tough, “realist” approach to IR The world as an increasingly anarchic place, disorder is

growing, every one has to guard their interests But at the same time, Russia has become more deeply

integrated with the West than ever before On both sides, the rise of concerns and frictions reflects

the fact of that deepening of integration A divorce is not an option

The dominant trends No desire to confront the West Recognition of Western concerns Relations with the West are top priority

But also: Primacy of national interests, emphasis on

independence Multivector foreign policy

Pragmatism Emphasis on business Readiness for dialog, for development of joint

solutions to problems

Western countries, including Canada, do and will influence the ongoing debates in Moscow one way or another –

By their own actions, or inactions Both individually and collectively A key factor in these debates – assessing the

state of the world How is it perceived by Russian policy-makers,

interest groups, public opinion? There is no aspect of world politics or the world

economy which would not affect Russia in one way or another

If the idea of containment of Russia gains ground, it is unlikely to result in a more cooperative, more pro-Western Russia

Quite the contrary outcome can be expected Anti-Western elites in Russia are strong and active Let us not push Russia toward totalitarian mobilization Antagonizing Russia won’t solve any of Western problems It will only create new ones The world cannot afford zero-sum games between the

West and Russia - Because the two sides are too well-armed, and their arsenals

remain trained primarily on each other And there is no good reason why Russia and the West

should be in confrontation - Because mutual interests between Russia and the West far

outweigh any differences and considerations of competition

We have to accept the fact that the world is confronted with a formidable range of challenges which we do not know how to deal with

We are mired in obsolete thinking We are only pretending that we are dealing with

the problems

Global disorder is surging New role for the state is inevitable Retreat of the state is over Does it mean a retreat from democracy and the rise of

new authoritarianism? Not necessarily. In the 20th century, democracy was saved

by the policies of a democratically activist state Does it mean more competition? Not necessarily. In 1648, proclamation of national

sovereignty was viewed as salvation from war and chaos

New forms of cooperation between states are necessary

Our capability for collective action is too limited Neither Russia, nor the West are interested in

fostering global disorder Perhaps, we are coming to the real end of the

Cold War

Terms of the deal Priority of cooperation over competition Construction of a new world order Mutual security

Which means taking each other’s interests and concerns into account

No hegemony No ideological wars Competition by the rules Primacy of international law

Huge agenda for joint actions Arms control and disarmament – prospects for

NPT, START, SORT, INF, CFE? Struggle against international terrorism Energy policy Climate change The food crisis The unfolding water crisis The crisis of democracy, human rights under attack