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A STUDY ON FACTORS INFLUENCING VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE BY INDIAN
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP COMPANIES
M. Sathiyamoorthi,
Ph.D Research Scholar, PG & Research Department of Commerce,
AVS College of Arts and Science, Salem. E-Mail: [email protected]
Dr. P. Ashok Kumar,
Assistant Professor, PG & Research Department of Commerce
Sri Vasavi College, Erode. E-Mail: [email protected]
Abstract
Accounting operates in a socio economic environment as a ‘service function’. When
there is a drastic change in the political or economic system of the country, it is bound to
change the objectives of accounting and corporate disclosure. In developing countries, the
movement toward a market oriented economy has necessitated a revision of financial
reporting system. The emergence of joint stock companies together with the divorce of
management and ownership has led to the increasing significance of corporate disclosure.
Corporate Disclosure system provides re liable and relevant information to the interested
parties for their decision making. Through disclosure requirements, a proper recording and
classification of economic transactions of the business concern can be achieved.. However,
the present study proposes to analyze the factors influencing voluntary disclosures by Indian
government ownership companies. The sample is based on the financial information provided
by the CMIE Prowess 3.1 Database and audited financial results of the companies that
consist of financial information of BSE-100 listed Indian private ownership Companies. This
work focused on all non financial companies listed in Bombay Stock Exchange. The data
collected from this source were compiled and used for this study .The financial companies
are excluded from the sample due to the above mentioned reason. Total sample consists of 11
companies which are involved in the construction of BSE-100 index
Key Words: Factors Influencing, Government ownership companies, Voluntary Disclosure.
ADALYA JOURNAL
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A STUDY ON FACTORS INFLUENCING VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE BY INDIAN
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP COMPANIES
INTRODUCTION
Information should be prepared, audited, and disclosed in accordance with high
quality accounting standards. Stakeholders and potential investors require access to regular,
reliable and comparable information in details for them to assess the stewardship of
management, and make informed decisions. A strong disclosure regime enhances
transparency, and it is a powerful tool for influencing the behavior of stakeholders. It results
in the attraction of more capital, sustains investors‟ confidence in the capital market, and
possibly prevents fraud. Inadequate information may increase the cost of capital and result in
a poor allocation of resources. Moreover, the business environment has witnessed changes
over the years, mainly been influenced by globalization and technological innovation.
Companies worldwide are now trying to penetrate international capital markets. Therefore,
the disclosure of adequate and reliable information is necessary.
Accounting operates in a socio economic environment as a „service function‟. When
there is a drastic change in the political or economic system of the country, it is bound to
change the objectives of accounting and corporate disclosure. In developing countries, the
movement toward a market oriented economy has necessitated a revision of financial
reporting system. The emergence of joint stock companies together with the divorce of
management and ownership has led to the increasing significance of corporate disclosure.
The wider recognition of social responsibility of business for the last few decades has
important implications for corporate disclosure practices. This has emphasized the efficient
allocation of society's resources and wealth. The concept of social responsibility has now
become broader and includes employment generation, pollution control, civic amenities etc.
Now, groups other than shareholders such as employees, local communities, Social groups
and the general public have interest in the accounting information. They are having vital
influences on accounting and reporting.
Corporate Disclosure system provides re liable and relevant information to the
interested parties for their decision making. Through disclosure requirements, a proper
recording and classification of economic transactions of the business concern can be
achieved. Thus, a fair picture of the business and the true results of its operations over a
period of time are made available. The business future trends can be estimated with greater
accuracy, if the financial reports are prepared in accordance with the rules and regulations of
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disclosure. Thus financial reports should include all the material information relevant for
various interested groups for decision making.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Barako Hancock and Izan (2006) conducted a study on the factors influencing the
voluntary corporate disclosures by 43 companies in Kenya for the period 1992 to 2001. They
performed a longitudinal analysis on the voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports
of sample companies listed in Nairobi stock exchange. The study investigated the extent to
which corporate governance attributes, ownership structure, and company characteristics
influence the voluntary disclosure practices. The study found out that there was an increase in
the extent to voluntary disclosures over the sample period of ten years. Results of the study
also showed the existence of a relationship between the level of voluntary disclosures and
corporate governance attributes, ownership structure, and company characteristics. It was
also found that large companies and companies with high debt were disclosing mare
voluntary information. However, board leadership structure, liquidity, profitability and type
of external audit firm were not found having a significant influence on the level of voluntary
disclosure in corporate annual reports of Kenya.
Cooke (1992) examined the association between the level of disclosure and three
corporate attributes - size, listing status and nature of industry- for 35 Japanese companies.
He constructed an index of disclosure consisting of 165 items, which consisted of both
statutory and voluntary items of information. He analyzed the disclosure levels of Japanese
companies using the annual reports of companies for the year 1988. This study was a unique
one in the sense that the size of the company was measured in terms of a composite variable
i.e., a linear combination of eight alternate indicators of size - capital stock, turnover, number
of shareholders, total assets, current assets, fixed assets, shareholders funds and bank
borrowings. He concluded that the extent of disclosure was positively and significantly
associated with dl the three explanatory variables - size, listing status and nature of industry.
Singh and Bhargava (1978) examined the disclosure of financial and non-financial
information in annual reports of 40 public sector enterprises on the basis of index of
disclosure consisting 35 items. They also analyzed the relationship between the quality of
disclosure and organizational pattern and nature of industry. The findings of the study
indicated that there were significant cross sectional differences in the disclosure of
information by sample companies. Based on the analysis, the study inferred that the
organizational pattern did not have any impact on the quality of disclosure of information,
whereas the nature of industry did influence.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The main objective of this study is to explore the factors influencing voluntary
disclosures by Indian Government Ownership companies. The model, the variables used in
the study and the statistical techniques applied to explore the factors influencing voluntary
disclosures of Indian Government Ownership companies are discussed in the section.
Statement of the Problem
In India though there is availability of research studies pertaining to capital structure
Bhaduri (2002) and Pandey (2002) which are performed after the pioneering works in the
west Modiglialini and Miller (1958) and Titman and Wessels (1988), the work related to
factors influencing voluntary disclosures of Indian companies is meager in count.
To fill the gap in the existing literature it was intended to study the factors influencing
voluntary disclosures of Indian Government Ownership companies. Hence, it was thought
appropriate to study the factors influencing voluntary disclosures by BSE-100 listed Indian
Government Ownership companies. The reason for taking BSE-100 is for the convenience of
data availability.
Scope of the study
The scope of the study is limited to the factors influencing voluntary disclosures by
BSE-100 listed Indian Government Ownership companies. The reason for not including
financial companies as that financial intermediation and insurance, these company due to
differ in their capital structure from the rest of the companies Muller (2008) and finance
companies have different accounting practice and reporting rules from the companies in other
sector Lin (2008).
In this study, we are going to examine empirically the factors influencing voluntary
disclosures by the Indian Government Ownership companies.
Objectives of the Study
To identify the factors influencing voluntary disclosures by the Indian Government
Ownership companies.
Hypotheses of the Study
In the light of the above objectives, the following testable hypotheses are formulated.
Hypotheses 1
Ho: There is no significant influence of ownership structure on disclosure practice.
Hypotheses 2
H0: There is no significant influence of profitability on disclosure practice.
Hypotheses 3
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H0: There is no significant effect of risk of a firm on disclosure practice.
Hypotheses 4
H0: There is no significant impact of net fixed assets on disclosure practice.
Hypotheses 5
H0: There is no significant influence of size on the disclosure practice.
Sample
The sample is based on the financial information provided by the CMIE Prowess 3.1
Database and audited financial results of the companies that consist of financial information
of BSE-100 listed Indian government Companies. This work focused on all non financial
companies listed in BSE-100 in Bombay Stock Exchange. The data collected from this source
were compiled and used for this study. The financial companies are excluded from the
sample due to the above mentioned reason. Total sample consists of 11 companies which are
involved in the construction of BSE-100 index.
Variables
The dependent variable under the study is Promoters holding, Public holding to
measure the ownership structure.
i) Dependent Variables
To measure the ownership holdings of companies, promoters‟ holdings of shares, and
non promoters or public holdings of equity is used (Dwiredi and Jain (2005)). To find out
market value of equity the holdings are multiplied by the closing stock price of the particular
year. By getting market value of holdings on yearly basis is considered as the reasonable
assumption for calculating the ownership structure (Friend and Lang (1988)).
ii) Independent variables
The Independent Variables used in the study are classified as Leverage, Profitability
and Control variables.
iii) Leverage variables
To calculate the leverage level of companies‟ debt to value ratio calculated as debt
divided by total value of book assets defined on a book value basis excluding trade credit and
short term accruals from debt (Friend and Lang (1988), Rajan and Zingles (1995) and Lin
(2008)). This is considered by various researchers as a measure of corporate leverage.
iv) Profitability variables
To evaluate the profitability of companies EBIT divided by total assets on a book
value basis is taken as a reasonable proxy for measuring the profitability of a firm (Demsetz
and Lehn (1985), Cho (1998)).
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To corner the fluctuation in earnings or risk of a firm, standard deviation of earnings
divided by assets on a book value basis is taken as a proxy to spot the risk of a business
Friend and Lang (1988). These are considered as effective tools to measure the profitability
and fluctuation in earnings of a particular firm.
v) Control Variables
Besides, the other variables like firm‟s size and asset structure that may have
influence on ownership structure are taken as control variables where total assets is taken as a
proxy for size of the company by using natural logarithm of total assets Rajan and Zingles
(1995), And the fixed assets ratio which is calculated by dividing net fixed assets to total
book assets is considered as a appropriate measure to mark the asset structure of a firm Friend
and Lang (1988).
Statistical Tools
To inspect the data, descriptive statistics like mean, median and standard deviation
and a statistical tool Pearson‟s Correlation matrix is used for data to observe the association
between variables like ownership interest, leverage and profitability. Further, for the purpose
of identifying influence of the independent variables on dependent variable multiple
regression analysis is used.
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
In this section, the factors influencing voluntary disclosures by BSE-100 listed Indian
Government Ownership companies is analyzed by employing statistical techniques such as
Descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis. These are used to derive
quantitative value for our said arguments which is necessary to prove or disprove our framed
hypothetical statements. By taking the quantitative value, proper interpretation would be
given with the existence of casual relation that is formed on the basis of existing empirical
research work.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics which represents the data set related to
manufacturing companies where ownership vests in the hands of private parties.
Table 1 displays the summary statistics which represents the data set related to public
utility companies where ownership vests in the hands of Government. In this summary
statistics government holding used in the place of promoters holding because in these
companies holding are held by government of India‟s nominal head president of India. When
compared with the total sample of BSE-100 non-finance listed companies, government
companies shares a smaller portion.
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Table - 1
Descriptive statistics of Government companies
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
NFA 99 0.361 0.199 0.005 0.801
SIZE 99 3.906 0.782 1.792 4.994
DT 80 0.185 0.133 0.000 0.572
ROAM 99 0.100 0.049 0.011 0.243
ROAS 99 0.030 0.026 0.002 0.151
GMV 82 5.226 0.729 1.628 6.623
NPMV 99 5.959 0.828 3.696 8.606
Description of the variables: NFA: Ratio of net property, plant and equipment to book assets;
SIZE: Log of total assets; DT: Debt/Asset ratio; ROAM: Mean of earnings / asset ratio; ROAS:
S.D of earnings / asset ratio; PMV: Market Value of equity held by promoters; NPMV:
Market Value of equity held by public.
In this Table net fixed assets (NFA) shows mean value of (0.361) and this variable
deviated (0.199) which closer to zero level. Size posts mean value (3.906) and deviated to
(0.782) maximum value shows (4.994). In the case of debt it shows some less observations
when compare with other variables because some government companies has zero level of
debt in their capital structure.
Earnings level shows mean value of (0.100) and it is deviated (0.049) level. Risk level
of firm touch (0.002) close to zero and maximum reaches to (0.151).
Government market value of equity shows less number of observations because some
companies holdings fully held by public. Public holding shows (5.959) as mean value and
deviated at (0.828) is more when compared with other variables. Table 2 exhibits the
correlation coefficient matrix of government ownership companies.
Table – 2
Correlation Coefficients Matrix of Government Ownership Companies
NFA SIZE DT ROAM ROAS PMV NPMV
NFA 1
SIZE .621** 1
DT .382** .118 1
ROAM .269** .280** -.414** 1
ROAS .047 .081 -.044 .551** 1
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GMV -.015 .398** -.278* .375** .312** 1
NPMV -.194 .511** -.532** .201 -.097 .476** 1
** Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Description of the variables: NFA: Ratio of net property, plant and equipment to book assets;
SIZE: Log of total assets; DT: Debt/Asset ratio; ROAM: Mean of earnings / asset ratio; ROAS:
S.D of earnings / asset ratio; PMV: Market Value of equity held by promoters; NPMV:
Market Value of equity held by public.
In that correlation matrix government holding to net fixed assets (-0.015) shows
negatively in significant correlation but government holding to debt (-0.278) shows negative
correlation at 0.05 percent significant level. But public holding to debt level shows (-0.532)
shows negative significant correlation at 0.01 percent level. Higher level of correlation
between public holdings to debt level than government holding to debt level may be due to
public risk averting attitude or government obstacle in issuing equity to public or problem in
disinvestment.
There is a positive correlation between earnings level and risk (0.551) of a firm at
0.05 percent significance level means that if risk increases, earnings level also will increase.
Government holding to risk level of firm (0.312) shows positive correlation at 0.01 percent
significance level. But public holding to risk level touches (-0.977) which reveals there less
amount of risk prevails if companies are going for public. Debt to earnings level shows (-
0.414) negatively significant correlation discloses that if there is any increase in debt due to
their fixed amount bearing nature which normally charge against profit may reduce the
earnings.
Table 3 explains the multiple regression estimates for the government ownership
sample. Government market value of equity and public market value of equity is taken as
dependent variables. Then we have to discuss about the influence of independent variables on
the dependent variable.
Table – 3
Multiple Regression Estimates for the Government Ownership Sample
PMVi = α+ β1 NFAi +β2 SIZEi +β3DTi +β4 ROAMi +β5ROASi + µ…. (1)
NPMVi = α+ β1 NFAi +β2 SIZEi +β3DTi +β4 ROAMi +β5ROASi + µ… (2)
GMV NPMV
Variable Co.ef t-value Co.ef t-value
NFA -1.182 -2.53*
-0.975 -2.7*
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(0.014) (0.000)
SIZE 0.689 6.46
*
(0.000) 0.946
7.29*
(0.000)
DT -1.371 -2.01
*
(0.048) -2.149
-3.9*
(0.000)
ROAM -0.380 -0.17
(0.868) 2.214
1.28
(0.206)
ROAS 3.471 1.08
(0.265) -6.753
-2.78*
(0.000)
Adj R2 0.440 0.617
*Regression is significant at 0.05 level
Description of the variables: NFA: Ratio of net property, plant and equipment to book assets;
SIZE: Log of total assets; DT: Debt/Asset ratio; ROAM: Mean of earnings / asset ratio; ROAS:
S.D of earnings / asset ratio; PMV: Market Value of equity held by promoters; NPMV:
Market Value of equity held by public.
Adj R2
describes there is a evidence of 44 percent variation in promoters
holding and 61.7 percent variation in public holding is explained by the independent
variables.
From this table it is observed that the influence of leverage on government market
value of equity (β = -1.371; t= -2.01; p <0.05) shows negatively significant effect. From the
coefficient value we identified that one percent level of change in debt level would affect the
government market value of equity at (-1.371) percent level. The effect of public holding on
leverage (β = -2.149; t= -3.90; p <0.05) shows negatively significant relationship. We
inferred from the co efficient value that one percent level of increase in leverage is negatively
impact the public holding at (-2.14) level (Friend & Lang (1988); Guney & Ozkan (2005)).
Due to their fixed bearing charges or threat of bankruptcy or anticipating growth
opportunities may tape the equity issue. Existing shareholders aim to increase their holing by
rights, bonus shares may be the reason. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis that there is a
significant impact of leverage level on ownership structure.
The impact of profitability on promoters holding (β = -0.380; t= -0.17; p <0.05)
shows insignificant negative influence. From the co efficient value it is identified that one
percent level of change in earnings explains (-0.380) level variation in government market
value of equity. The influence of profitability on public holdings shows (β = 2.214; t= 1.28; p
>0.05) in significant positive impact. We observed from the beta value that one percent level
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of increase in profitability gives (2.214) percent increase in public equity (Hovey and
Noughton (2003); Wei and Varela (2003)). If government companies‟ posts profits in a
financial year, public are eager to get shares of those concerns or government prefer to
disinvest the company‟s shares. Hence we accept the null hypothesis that there is no
significant impact of profitability on ownership structure.
It is observed from the table that the influence of risk of firm on promoters holding (β
= 3.471; t= 1.08; p <0.05) shows insignificant positive effect. The co efficient value discloses
that one percent level of increase in risk gives (3.47) percent increasing trend in government
holding. If there is increasing trend in risk of a firm government may hike their holding to
stabilize the problem. So accept the null hypothesis that there is no significance influence of
risk on ownership structure of a firm.
The impact of risk of firm on public holding (β = -6.753; t= -2.78; p <0.05) exhibit
significant negative effect at 0.05 percent significance level. The coefficient value expressed
that one percent variation in risk of firm inversely affect the public holding at (-6.753)
percent level. It is normal that increasing amount of risk of firm can make the public to
offload their holding. Here, we accept the alternate hypothesis that there significant influence
of risk on public holding.
The influence of fixed assets on government holding shows (β = -1.182; t= -2.53; p
<0.05) significant negative effect. From the co efficient value we inferred that one percent
level of increase in fixed assets will have -1.182 percent level of decrease in government
equity. But the effect of fixed assets on public holding (β = -0.975; t= -2.70; p <0.05) posts
significantly negative influence. The beta value says if there is one percent increase in fixed
assets have negative impact of the public holding at -0.975 percent level. Therefore we accept
the alternate hypothesis that there is a significant impact of net fixed assets on ownership
structure. Industrial distributions play a role in determining the companies fixed assets (Moon
and Tandon (2007)).
We can infer from the government holding observation table that the leverage is
influencing the ownership structures in a negatively significant manner. It is observed that
the net fixed assets shows negative impact and size shows positive influence on the
ownership structure. Risk of firm shows significant negative impact on the public holding
which implies that the public holding can restrict the volatility in earnings of a firm.
CONCLUSION
From the sample which consists of only government companies it is found that the
negative influence of leverage on public holding is comparatively higher than the impact of
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leverage on government holding. It is because of the hesitation of the public to reduce the
holding in highly levered firms. It is discovered from the result that the impact of profitability
on government holding shows insignificantly negative. But it posts positive insignificant
reaction with the public holding which reveals the favorable effect of external monitoring in a
firm. It is revealed that the effect of risk on government holding shows insignificantly
positive but the risk effect with the public confirms significant negative. This reveals the
negative attitude of pubic towards the risk. It is disclosed that the effect of net fixed assets on
government holding is significantly negative, which is comparatively higher than the public
holding. It shows the attitude of the Government in appropriation of profit.
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