Ernst Bloch's 'The Principle of Hope' Richard Gunn ERNST BLOCH (1885-1977),the last of the major figures in the ' Western Marxist' traditiontoappearinextensiveEnglishtranslation,propoundsanatheist apocalyptic which is at the same time a Marxism set within autopian frame.The Principle of Hope- his massive chef d'oeuvre written inexile in the United States in the 1940s,published while Bloch lived in the German Democratic Republic in the 1950sandnowrecentlytranslated- laysclaimtoourattentioninawhole number of diverse,but interconnected, respects.It offers an ontology of human (aswellasnatural)existence;areworkingofthemainthemesof apocalyptic theology;adistinctive,andcharismaticallypersuasive,re-reading of Marx;an historical discussion of utopian thinking richer and more detailed than most of the standard academictreatmentsofthesametopic;and asurveyof hopeful and wish-fulfillingimageryfromthemosttrivialofourdaydreamstothehighest mystical, aesthetic and philosophical conceptions of saving bliss. The influence of Blochhasbeenasamulti-facetedashiswork.An inspirationalsourceforthe German s tudent movement of 1968,Bloch's hope-principle carries forward into the theology of Jurgen Moltmann as well as current Liberation Theology which, for its part,renews Bloch's project of synthesising apocalypse and Marx. To summarise The Principle of Hope in a short space isimpossible.(One might just as well try to summarise Augustine's City of God, awork which, like Bloch' s, uses an idea of apparent simplicity to organise a discussion whose power derives notmerely fromitsscopebut from itswealthof detail.)What Blochtermshis 'encyclopaediaof hopes',three volumesandcloseon fourteenhundredpages long,is ineffect amirror inwhichhe dares us not torecognize ourselves.Put * ErnstBloch,The Principle of Hope,translated byNeville Plaice,Stephen Plaice andPaulKnight. Threevolumes.Blackwell,1986,120.ThetranslationistobeweJcomednolesswarmlythanthe publisher's pricing policy is to be deplored: in Germany, where this work stiJJ has an underground and living reputation,itscurrentpaperbackcostis theequiva.lent of13for aset of thethreevolumes. Presumably,in Blackwell's view,Bloch's work is fit only to be read by solvent scholars, by those with accessto (fortunate)university libraries and by book-reviewers. Anyone who nonetheless manages to obtain a copy would do well to consul t, alongside it, Wayne Hudson's helpfuJ The Marxist Philosophy of Ernst BlochtogetherwithBloch's ManonHisOwn (acollectionof shortpieceswithastriking introduction by Jii.rgen Moltmann ofTiibingen) and/or his A Philosophy ofthe Future (the first volume of Bloch'sintroduction to philosophy,produced in Tiibingen in the 1960s after his move to the west). In 1968, renaming Tiibingen University the Ernst Bloch University was one among the r.adicaJ students' demands. RJCHARD GUN-2-. otherwise,itisaworkof' speculation'inthatterm'sliteralandetymological sense.Itsstyleissoaring,resonant and polyphonic:itsfi nalword,' homeland', namesthefuturegoalofanon-alienatedexistencewhicheachofitsthematic voicessummonsanduponwhich,throughouthi story,ourhopesconverge. Bloch,accordingtowhomtheorisingmeans'venturingbeyond',wagersthe success of his own venturing upon a future in which every aspect of alienation -the alienation of subjectfromobject,of self fron1otherand of humankindfron1 nature-is at last overcome. For it is from the vantage-point of such a future, and fromtherealone,that wecansee notmerelywhatwe mightbecomebut what (ontologically) we are.Thus Bloch's discourse is future-oriented and proleptic.At the sametime,however,it addressesusinthe present tense: holding beforeus theenormousmirrorofourhoping,Blochchallengesustoacknowledge ourselvesasoncourse,already,towardsthehomelandwhichourdreaming anticipates and foretells. He reminds us, forcefully, how arduous and absolute are theconditionsof ourhope's sati sfactionand yethowhumanlyinescapable,as wellas urgent,the project of that satisfactionis. Marxism The themes of Marxism and of apocalypse supply the twin axes of Bloch's work. At the cost of a somewhat artificial separation, I shalldiscuss each of them in turn. TheWestern Marxisttradition,whichbesidesBlochincludes Lukacsandthe 'Frankf urtSchool'v.r riters(Horkheimer,AdornoandMarcusetogetperwith Walter Benjamin), always combined, explosively, despairing pessimism as to the chancesofanemancipatorysocialexistencetogetherwithcommitmentto revolutionarytransformationaffirmedintheface,even,ofthemost overwhelming soctal andpoliticalodds.Theascendingcurve of thetradition's development coincides with the ernergence of Nazism and Stalinism as the major obstaclestoradical change.Blochforhispart championswhat he calls' militant optimism'andthusseeminglyalignshimselfwith.WesternMarxism'smore triumphalis t and sanguinestrain. However,theevery extremismof hishoping conjuresdesperationasthedarkgroundagainstwhichthefigureofhis luminescent hope-principle stands out:we learn that nothingless than thenunc stansofthemystics- theabsolutelyfulfillingmoment of'abeing-hereatlast adequatetoitself'- can satisfy our hopeful longings,andthusinBloch's view count as aworthwhileradical and political ai m.Onl y anew heavenand anew earth,or rather aheavennowhere elsethan uponthis earth,canmeasureup to the Marxist revolutionary imperati ve that all things (ourselves included) be made anew.Nootherwriterwi thinMarxismsetsthestakesinrevolutionary transformation so awesomely high. Setting them thus,Bloch contends that it is in thetradition of apocalyptic thinking, accordingto which history culminates in a final dramatic action>vhichis at onceredemptive (inthe sense of transcendi ng alienation) and revelatory (i nthe sense of making history' s meaning at last clear), that Marxism itself stands. Marx's 1844 characterisation of communism as ' the riddle of history solved' and his 1859 depiction of capitalism as the last epoch in human ' prehistory' certainly bear this apocalyptic reading out.Nor doesthe soundness of Bloch' s contention dependonisolatedpassagesalone.Ifrevolutionistobe,asMarxheld,the coincidenceofsocialchangeandhuman' self-change',thenmuch1noreis involvedthanmerelyanalterationinsocialinstitutions,asthoughthesame counterswerebeingrearrangedonthesamesocialboard.Rather,ourentire -3- EDINBURGH REVIEW being-in-the-world (including, for example, our experiences of such fundamental ontologicalstructuresastimeandspace)mustbeplacedatissueina transformationwhich,ifitistocount assuch,opens ontowhat Hegel - in a passage quoted by Bloch- tern1s a ' nev. world'. For Walter Benjamin, too, in his ' ThesesonthePhilosophyofHistory'writtenin1940,revolutionentailsnot merely a social re-orderi ng but an apocalyptic deconstruction of the linear clock-time in which history - that is,the history of alienation - unfolds. Bloch adds to this reappraisal of Marxism a novel hermeneutical principle in the light of which Marx's writings are to be understood. It is his view, that, besides a 'cold stream' of social analysis - which evaluates, instrumentally, the 'objective possibility' of successful revolutionary action - a complementary 'warm stream' within Marxism isto be discerned. This warm stream projects what he caUs ' real possibility'or,inother words,ourutopianaspirationstowardsthehomeland which isMarxism's raison d'etre and fi nal goal. The cold andthewarm streams represent,respectivelythereality- andthepleasure-principlesofMarxian thought; once homeland is reached (but not until then) these principles coincide. Bothprinciplesareneedful.Minusthe correctiveofprosaic socialanalysisthe pleasure-principleof utopiaremai ns abstract andcourtspolitical importence or disaster;minusthe euphoricwarm streamthereality-principle of instrumental calculationbecomesail-encompassing,theimageofhomelandd isappears, revolutiondE!generatesintoreformismand- thisbeingBloch'scrucial hermeneutical insight - Marx's texts become literally unintelligible inasmuch as theconceptuallinesofforcewhichmouldthemcannolongerbeseen. 'Comprehended hope', or in other words socially and historically concrete utopia, becomesforBlochthesignunderwhichthewarmandthecoldstreamsof Marxism flowtogether and also the governing interpretive principle under which Marx hin1self is to be read. In Engels' view, which became an orthodoxy, Marxism isbornwhensocialismgraduatesfromimmature'utopia'tomature'science'; Bloch's contrary insistence is tl1at it is only when construed as on-course towards utopiathat the scientificity of Marxism canappear.For the Engelsiantransi ti on fromutopiato science,Blochsubstitutesatransition fron1abstract(historically ungrounded)utopiatoconcreteutopiainwhichwarmandcoldcurrentsof theorising intertwine. * Apocalypse JustasMarxismconjures,forBloch,animageofapocalypticworldly transforn1ation so, co11versely,it is for him Marxism which is apocalyptic theory's authentic and most rigorous heir. Traditionally, as for example in Augustine and Luther, Christianity has located its image of heaven in an other-worldly 'beyond' andin an'eternity' outwith the line of mundane historical time.Thus, as Hegel remarks,theworldofChristianityisonewhichis' double,divideda11dself-opposed':itscharacteristicpathosisthatofwhathetermsthe'Unhappy Consciousness'whichdespai rs.ofsurpassingalienationinthisworldand consolesitselfwithdreamsofanother-worldlyandtrans-historicalbliss. * In Edinburgh Review No. 71(November1985) I urged that the terms ' utopia' and ' apocalypse' should be seen as systematically distinct.In order to avoid confusion it may be worth noting,here,that inthe present reviewIfollowBloch'susageandtreat thenotionsof utopiaandapocalypse asconvergent rather thanasopposed.Ineffect(inmy terms)Blochdrawsthediscussionof utopianliterature asa whole on to apocalyptic ground. RICHARD GUNN-4-Alongsidethispredominant orthodoxy,however,Christianityhasrecurrently projectedtheapocalypticscenarioofaredemptionenvisagedinwhoUythis-worldlytermsandoccurring atsome(future)mon1entonthelineof historical time:againto quote Hegel,within the conceptualframeworkof apocalypse the ' heaven'oftheUnhappyConsciousnessis'transplantedtoearthbelow'.Not infrequently,the scenario of apocalyptic transformation - the wordly arrival of the Kingdom and the making of allthings anew - has been the vehicle of social andpoliticalradicalism:examplesarethe Hussiterevolution in Bohemiainthe fifteenth century, the German peasant wars at the tin1e of the Reformation and the seventeenth century English Revolution. (Conversely, as proposed earlier, it is on theideaofapocalyptictransformationthatthenoti onofrevolutionitself depends.) It is in this tradition of radical or 'left' apocalypse that Bloch himself stands. The Blochianhomeland li es, not elsewhere in space (like the utopias of Thomas More orCampanellaorBacon),norasforAugustineandLutherina' hereafter' disconnected from worldly and historical existence, but in a future towards which notonlyhumanbutevenperhapsnaturalbeingalways-alreadyaims.Allof Bloch'scentralcategories- forexample,'venturingbeyond',the' utopian function'andthe' not-yet'- areindeedfuture-orientedinadeeplywishful sense. We have seen already how in his view it is the mystics (no less) who foreteU revolution's goal.Once th.is goal has been reached, we learn,nature ceases to be an inert object of instrumental manipulation and becomes,instead,a' possible subject' wi th which ahuman ' technology without violation' can ally itself.(Here, Green and ecological politics find themselves amongst Bloch's apocalyptic heirs.) Nothing inthe redempti ve charge of Christianity islessened,but the envisaged redemption goes forward in wholly mundane and worldly terms. Within Christianity, apocalyptic has always s tood close to heresy. Bloch, for his part,pressesheresytothepointwhereliteralatheismisentailed:' Without atheism', he states ' messianism has no place'. This is so because any in1age of an other-':\forldly beyond can only delimit our freedom and alienate us from what, as human,we might yet become.AsBlochhas it,'Wherethe great world-ruler is, freedom has no space'. Bloch styles his thinking ' meta-religious', meaning by this that his atheism is at the opposite remove from complacent and prosaic rejection of religiously-formulated goals and hopes. What Augustine (for example)places inaheavenly city andthere alone, Bloch sites at the end of the history of travail and alienation which is our own. The same hopes stand; only, their other-worldly signisreversed.Thepathtoredemption liesthroughrevolution,but precisely redemption remains revolution' s goal. Thus, apocalyptic atheis m dovetails with Marxism,and entailsthelatter sinceitisMarxwhogivesconcretesocialand his torical substance to religion's dreams. Ontology A final expository step is needful to make Bloch's challengeto us clear, since it is not only to readers who count themselves as Marxists or apocalypticists that The Principleof Hopeisaddressed.Asremarked earlier,Blochoffersanontology of human existence: this ontology can be summarised by saying that, for hiln, we are already,as human,what we arenot-yet.What Blochmeans bythis(andit isan insistencethat he shares with, amongst others, Hegel and Marx) isthat we exist 'ecstatically'intheliteralsenseof standingout aheadof ourselvestowards an -5- EDINBURGH REVIEW openfuturewhichweourselvesactivelydetermineandtowardswhichour hoping isaddressed.(If nature isa'possible subject'this means that, in Bloch's view,ittoo exists as what it isnot-yet).In sum,forBloch,we freelydetermine ourselvesinandthroughour actionsandsoarenotmerely- asfor'vulgar Marxism' - deterministic products of our past. Allthisbeingso,itfollowsthat(asBlochstresses)ourpossibilitiesareas ontologicallyrealaswhat,atanypresentmoment,wefindourselvestobe. Bloch'sphrase,'realpossibility',isintendedtounderscorejustthis point.We existasthepossibilityofbecomingsomethingirreduciblyandfundamen tally new, and ecstatic 'venturing beyond' is just that in which, as human, we consist. The ecstacy of our hoping isaccordingly the ecstasy which we are, and what we areisnothingotherthantheprincipleof hopeitself.Blochexpressesthisby sayi11gthata'utopian function'- aforward-dawningprojectionof ourselves towards aself-chosen andhoped-for future - isintrinsictoourpsychicaland indeedtoour ontological economy.In short,as huma11,we are alreadyoncourse towardstheutopiaof ho1nelandalthough,as he concedes,nothing guarantees tha t our utopian venturing (and thus our human status) may not, just because they are self-chosen, go awry. Our possibilities are our utopias; these possibilities are what we are; hence, in the present, we exist always-already as utopians who seek in one way or another to wrestle with the challenge of our dreams. Two co11sequences followfromthe ontology of human existence whichBloch presents.One isthat his ' encyclopaedia of hopes', in its entirety,isthe carrying out in a detailed and concrete way of the project of 011tological description which the notion of not-yet-existi11gsketches in general and abstract terms:if we exist ecstatically,then we can learn what we are only by surveying what we yet hope tobe.Itisinthissensethat,asremarkedearlier,Blochholdsbeforeusa panoramic mirror and calls upon us to recognize ourselves in the totality of what we there see. Thesecondconsequenceisthat,if whatweseeinthen1irrorofBlochian speculation is indeed hope articulated as Marxism and as apocalyptic redemption, then Bloch challenges us precisely ashu1nan and not merely as readers who share a prior com1nitment tothe idea of revolutionary cha11ge.To recognize ourselves inthegalaxyofBloch'shopefulimageryistorecognizeourselvesasnot-yet citizens of our 1-lomelandandthus,iI1the present, as already en1batked(if onlyin ourdaydreams)onthatventuring-beyondwhichthemotifofapocalypse summarisesandconnotes.Blochavoidstherelativisirninherentinjustifyi11g revolutiononlytorevolutionariesbydaringustodispute,inthefaceofthe enormousutopian heritage whichhe sets before us,that to exist as hum.an is to existinrevolutionary(ecstaticandhopeful)terms.Blochianutopiabecomes hun1anlyconcreteinasmuchashisontologyofhun1anexistence,itself,goes forward in a utopian mode. To be hun1an is to set ourselves the goal of apocalyptic self-transformation;tobethustransformedistobeno morethanwhat,inthe present, we not-yet already are. Bloch's proleptic wager on a redemptive future is, thus,notawagerpeculiartohisowndiscoursebutratheronewhichwe ourselves, in our actions no less than in our dreaming, already n1ake.And so his future-orientedsummons can be understood as calling forth,fromus, apresent - because already utopian - response. RICHARD GUNN-6-Principles of hope No comprehensive evaluation of Bloch's enterprise can be undertaken here. Its rich cultural and historical detail must needs be set to one side (although I would recommend,especially,chapters36,37,39and53toanyoneinterestedinthe history of utopian and/or religious thought, and chapter 19 to a prospective reader of Marx). Nor is it possible to evaluate in a short space its most dubious and at the sametimeitsmost challengingthesis,namelythe conception (developedmost extensivelyinchapter37)ofnatureasa'possiblesubject'or- inSpinoza's terminology, which Bloch invokes - as not merely natura naturata but also natura naturans.On this score, I would refer the reader to Habermas's discussion, in his TowardaRationalSociety,ofasimilarthesiswhichheh.oldstobeimplicitin Marcuse. Finally,I can make no atten1pt to assess Moltmann's project, in his God inCreation, *of steeringBloch'satheistapocalypticbackonton1oreorthodox theistic and Christian rails.According to Moltinann,if religion isthe forecourt of apocalypse then it must formthe main edifice as well; only aKingdomwhich is notwhollythis-worldlycanpreservetheopennesstowardsworldandfuture whichiscelebratedinBloch'sownontologyofventuringbeyond.Whethera reversiontotheism can sustain openness may be doubted, since, as Bloch would be the first to indicate, any deity whatever must i_n the end figure as a closure and asanobstacleonself-determination'spath;and,ifthisisso,thenitisinthe forecourt of apocalypse andthere alone that theism belongs. However,to argue thisraisesquestionswhichwouldhavetobedebated(lengthily)intheirown right. Inplaceof adiscussionof theseissues I shall confinemyself towhat,inthe sectionon'ontology',emergedasThePrincipleof Hope'scentralclaim.Dowe recognizeourselvesinthen1irrorwhichBlochholds?Thesheerbeautyand charisma of his writing together with the logical elegance of his argument (which I have attemptedtosummarise) make dissentno easy matter but,nonetheless, difficultiesremain.Theseattachprincipallytohisconceptionofhopeitself. Conceding toBlochthat we exist as hopeful,we can suspect that -as hopeful - we remain divided wi thin and thereby against ourselves. Not hope as s uch,butratherthenotionofaunitan;hope-principle,threatenstoblur distinctionswhichBloch'sownnotionof'comprehendedhope'requiresusto draw. A first indication of this is the way in which conceptions of hope have appeared inthe history of philosophical and religiousthought.Sometimes hope has been presentedinaninstrumentalist guisesignallingtheascendencyof (inFreud's sense)areality-principle,aswhenHobbesdefineshopeas'appetite,withan expectationof attaining'.Onthe otherhand,hopehasalsobeen presentedas turning on a pleasure-princi pie in full bitter-sweet consciousness of its fragility, as inWalter Benjamin's remark (quote byMarcuse)that itis'for the sake of those withouthope'thathopeinthefirstinstanceappears.Thecommonphrase, ' hoping against hope' - aphrase which Bloch himself employs - draws out the sameparadox,namely,theparadoxof setting instrumentalcomputationaside while yet wishing (hoping?)that the instruments of satisfaction lie to hand. The hope which we hope againstis hope premised on a Hobbesian and instrumentally calculated'expectation of attaining':we set this latter hope aside not,of course, because we do not wish to attain but because it is from no such an expectation that * Based on his Gifford Lectures delivered in Edinburgh in 1984-5. -7- EDINBURGH REVIEW either the pathos or the legitimation of hoping is derived. In the New Testament, and again in Augustine, the same non-instrumental point is made by linking hope tofaith:faithrequires hope,since otherwiseitwouldamount merelyto value-neutral opinion or instrumentally entitledbelief,but if it ishope which rescues faith fro1nthis instrumentalism then the hope concerned cannot for its part be made intelligible,withoutremainder,ininstrumentalistterms.Sotosay,hope(qua paradoxical)overshootsitselfintothevulnerablepleasure-principleoffaith although,of course,the faith in question 11eed have no other-worldly reference, and least of all a.n other-worldly guarantee, but may instead aim towards just such a this-worldly redemptive future as Blochian speculation ardently invokes. To be sure, paradoxical hope is drawn on to the terrain of instrumental hope insofar as it wishes to attain itsobject - in Bloch's terms,the 'real possibility' which we are summons forth issues of 'objective [or instrumental] possibility' -but the former must be acknowledged as irreducible to the latter since, if hope consisted solely i11 expectation, then it would amount simply to desire or intention and in the end no longer to hope at all. It might seem as though,this said,the notion of a unitary hope-principle could still be sustained.For to contend that one thing isirreducible to another is not at allto imply that, between a contradictory or antagonistic relation obtains. Ananatagonisticrelationdoesobtainbetweenparadoxicalandinstrumental hope, however, simply because instrumental computation, once embarked upon, discovers no limitation within itself tothe areas where it may be validly applied. Put otherside: its project is hegemonic fromthe start, and no pleasure-principle-least of all, those of faith and of hope-as-paradox - can place obstacles in the way ofitsdemythologisingadvance.JustthisisthethemeofHorkheimer'sand Adorno'sDialectic of Enlightenment,the work (likeBloch's,a product of the Nazi exile)inwhichthedarkerandmoretroubledstratuminWesternMarxismis articulatedinparadign1aticform.Conversely,asFreudand,later,Marcuse emphasise,thepleasure-principlewhichprojectshomelandanathematizes instrumental postponement and remains present- repressed, oppositional and (in a word) paradoxical- even when required to petition for its entitlement on an instrumentalistterrain.Inthisway,unitaryhopebecomesinternally contradictoryandcomplexdespitetl1ecircumstancethathope-as-expectation requires hope-as-paradox (if it isto remain hope) while hope-as-paradox requires hope-as-expectationinsofar as it isreally(which means,instrumentally) serious about what it wants. Whatthisamountstoisanacknowledgementthat,notmerelyinMarxist theorising but inthe world,the 'warm stream'of utopian ecstasy andthe 'cold stream'of instrumentalanalysis - respectively,the pleasure-principle ai1dthe reality-principle of revolutionary change-totalise less easily than Bloch claims to think.Leaving aside the question of whether,as Blochmaintains,they become coincident in the homeland of 'a being-here at last adeqt1ate to itself', what is clear enough is that they remain distinct in a world which is by no means self-evidently oncoursetowardsitsredemption.Insuchaworld,theinternalcontradiction withinthehope-principlebecomes apolitical contradictio11aswell.One of the central points in the critique of instrumental reaso11ing presented by Horkheimer, AdornoandMarcuseisthattothink instrume11tallyin asocietyistoacceptthatsociety' sowncategoriesandterms:political'success' requiresthe following of extant socialrules,in the same way asthe 'successful' RICHARD GUNN-8-constructionof atechnicalartifactispossibleonlybydoingwhattherelevant instructional-manualsays.Thepointisnotmerelythat,incapitalistsociety, instrun1entalreasonisintheascendantbutthataninstrumentalpolitical orientationperseservesonly tounderscorethat status quo.Tobesure,anon-emancipated societyisnot (asthe Frankfurt Schoolwritersseemsometimesto imply)aseamlesswholeofestrangementandrepression.Withinit,asMarx emphasises,contradictionsobtain.Butnonethelessrevolutionarychange remainsalwaysandnecessarily,aprojectundertakenagainstthesocialodds simply because those odds are,themselves, socially constructed in such a way as tominimisethechancesoftransformationalchange.Vulgar-Marxist triumphalisn1 - the conviction,always of course'scientifically' sustained,that historyisonrevolution's side - stands,onthis score,at the opposite extreme fromthe theory of ideology articulated by Marx himself. This being so, it follows that Marxism's 'cold stream', which instrumentally weighs revolution's chances, becomes apoliticaltoolwith more than a single(arevolutionary) use. To think instrumentally is to think not against the odds but with them, and to think and act with the odds is to do battle on terri tory where the enemy is, by definition, strong. And,of course,themost that a given set of socially-constructed odds entitle is reformism.Whereas ecstasy projects nothing short of homeland-and its sheerly absolute and uncompromising character n1akes its non-instrumental status dear - thethrustof analysisunderthesignof anyreality-principlewhatever isto lowerthepoliticalstakesfarbelowthethresholdofredemptiontothepoint where,withinapre-givensocialspace,merelyarearrangement of institutions formstheorder ofthepoliticalday.Insum,andparadoxically:itisoptimism whichundermineshopefulnesswhiletheunitedfront'Yithinstrumentalism which ecstasy certainly (on pain of abstraction and political impotence) requires is one shotthroughwithreadinesstothrow allbalancingofprobabilitiestothe winds. To be sure,the kairos of this dismissal has co-ordinates which analysis no less than ecstasy must bring to light. The light,however, is that of ecstasy and the united front of the hope-principle's warm and cold currents isno unproblematic solidarity but rather an alliance whose terms must needs be renegotiated at each venturing, and necessarily uncertain, step. Thus,inwayswhichIhaveindicated,Bloch' sunitaryhope-principle deconstructs into a complex field of theoretical and practical tendencies which are internally related but fromwhich reciprocal anatagonism can never (at least, this side of homeland) be excised. What we recognize in the Blochian mirror are beings more inunity with themselves and more harmonious than we findourselves to be.Blochknows this,at least inthe sense that he iswilling to place the stakes of hope'ssatisfactionsoabsolutelyhigh:it. isnotthereality-principlebutthe pleasure-principle which declares that, in homeland, these two principles may at last coincide.Atthe levelof first-order'theory' ,Blochurges that the warm and colddimensions of hoping complement one another directly;at the level of his second-order'metatheory'itisthewarmstream,solely,whichdictatesthe alliance's terms. In the space which thus opens between theory and metatheory, darkness becomes apparent and it is against this darkness that the blazing galaxy ofBloch'sredemptive imagerystands out.Thus,itisonlyseeminglythatThe PrincipleofHopeendorsesunequivocallyoptimisticviews.Minustheological guarantees andminusinstrurnentalist complacency - that is,precisely,as the author of an atheist apocalypse and a utopian Marxism - Bloch offers us paradox -9- EDINBURGH REVIEW rather than triumphalism.If we failto recognize ouselves within his speculation this isbecause, as not-yet-existing,we are nothing (no thing)which canbe seen andacknowledgedonceandforall.Withintheframeofparadoxthemirror-imageryalters andwhatBlochshowstous- withoutever sayingit - isthe contradictionwhichhopefulnessentitlesandwhich,ecstatically,weourselves presently are.