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Agenda Introduction The Basic Model: Full Information Optimal Contract Under Asymmetric Information Comparing the Contracts Discussion
Citation preview
A Supplier’s Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric Information
Charles J. Corbett Xavier de Groote
Presented byJing Zhou
Agenda
Introduction The Basic Model: Full Information Optimal Contract Under Asymmetric
Information Comparing the Contracts Discussion
Agenda
Introduction The Basic Model: Full Information Optimal Contract Under Asymmetric
Information Comparing the Contracts Discussion
Motivation
Inefficiency occurs under self-interest
Demand dSupplier Buyer
bs kk
bh
Lot size Q
Setup costs:
Holding cost:
sjb QQQ
Supply Chain
ks + kbhb
Literature Joint economic lot-sizing literature
The supplier wishes to induce the buyer to choose a higher lot size
Quantity discount scheme can achieve the jointly optimal lot size
The supplier has full information about the buyer’s cost structure.
Lal and Staelin (1984) N groups of buyers of different sizes Holding costs, order costs and demand rates vary
between groups but not within groups Optimal unified pricing policy (no closed-form)
In this paper The buyer holds private information about her
holding cost; The supplier knows the prior distribution of the holding cost
Arbitrary continuum of buyer types Demand per unit time is known and constant,
and is not affected by the lot sizing or contracting decision
The supplier can choose not to trade with buyers
Optimal contracts in both full information case and asymmetric information case (quantity discount)
Notation cases considered (full information and
asymmetric information) range of buyer holding cost hb supplier’s prior distribution and density over
hb payment from supplier to buyer, as a
function of hb, under contract i buyer, supplier and joint cost function
(excluding quantity discount) maximum net cost level acceptable to buyer
and supplier (reservation net cost level) buyer, supplier and joint net cost function in
case i, after quantity discount Partial derivative of P(hb) with respect to hb
sb TCTC ,
jsb CCC ,,
AIFIi ,
)(),( bb hfhF
)( bi hP
],[ bb hh
)( bhP
ijisib TCTCTC ,,, ,,
Agenda
Introduction The Basic Model: Full Information Optimal Contract Under Asymmetric
Information Comparing the Contracts Discussion
The Basic Model Two decisions: lot size Q and quantity discount P(Q)
per unit time from supplier to buyer
2/
/)(),(
Qh
QdkkQhC
b
sbbj
Cost Function (excluding discount)
Optimal Lot Size (without contracting)
Net Cost Function (after discount)
Trade No trade
Buyer
SupplierLargest allowable lot size
Supply Chain
2),( Qh
QdkQhC bbbb
b
b
hdk2
QdkQC ss )(
b
sb
hdkk )(2
)()( QpQCs
)(),( QpQhC bb
)(),( QCQhC sbb sb TCTC
bTC
sTC
A Necessary Condition If the joint costs under jointly optimal lot size
Qj exceed , there will be no trade. Therefore, we need
(1)
sbbsb TCTChdkk /)(2
sb TCTC
)(2)(
2
sb
sbbb kkd
TCTChh
Cut-Off Point h*b
Because of the reservation net cost level, , the supplier choose a cut-off point h*
b such that he will choose not to trade with buyers with holding cost hb > h*
b
sTC
The Principal-Agent Framework
The supplier is the principal and the buyer is the agent (adverse selection).
The supplier proposes a “menu of contracts” or discount scheme, specifying the discount P(q) offered for any lot size q.
The buyer decides whether or not to accept the contract. She chooses some order lot size Q if accepts.
The supplier gives the buyer a discount of P(Q).
The Supplier’s Problem
sss
bbbbbbbb
bbbbbq
bbq
ssQPQ
TCQPQCQTC
hhhTCQPQhCQhTC
hhhqPqhC
qhTCQ
QPQCEQTCE
)()()( :IRs
],[ )(),(),( :IRb
],[ )(),(minarg
),(minarg :IC s.t.
)]()([)]([min )(,
Optimal Contract Under Full Information (First-Best)
otherwise
)(2)( if))(,(),(
b
b
bsbjbbjbb
bFI
TCh
dkkhQQTChQhCQhP
Payment from supplier to buyer:
The buyer will choose the joint economic lot size Qj(hb)
The supplier keeps all efficiency gains
Condition (1) guarantees that for all
bbFIjbbbsbFIs
bbFIb
TChTCTCdhkkhTC
TChTC
)()(2)(
)(
,,
,
sbFIs TChTC )(,
],[ bbb hhh
Agenda
Introduction The Basic Model: Full Information Optimal Contract Under Asymmetric
Information Comparing the Contracts Discussion
Assumptions Assumption 1 Decreasing reverse hazard rate:
Many common distributions satisfy this assumption Assumption 2
Rule out the problems caused by the distribution with thin tails
Neither of these assumptions on F(hb) are necessary conditions
0])()([ b
bh hF
hfDb
bbsbbb hkkhfhhF allfor /)(/)(
Recall: The Supplier’s Problem
sss
bbbbbbbb
bbbbbq
bbq
ssQPQ
TCQPQCQTC
hhhTCQPQhCQhTC
hhhqPqhC
qhTCQ
QPQCEQTCE
)()()( :IRs
],[ )(),(),( :IRb
],[ )(),(minarg
),(minarg :IC s.t.
)]()([)]([min )(,
Contracting Procedure The buyer knows hb, unobserved by the supplier The supplier offers a menu for any
the buyer announces To ensure that IRb and IRs are satisfied, the supplier can set h*
b such that IRb and IRs are met for all hb <=h*
b
The buyer chooses to accept or reject the contract. Accept (hb <=h*
b): buyer choose buyer and supplier incur net costs per period of
Reject (hb >h*b): both parties revert to their outside alternatives
and incur net costs per period of , respectively
)}ˆ(),ˆ({ bb hPhQ ],[ˆ bbb hhh
)ˆ( and )ˆ( bb hPhQ
)ˆ())ˆ(( and ˆ)ˆ(,( bbsbbbb hPhQC)hP(hQhC
sb TCTC and
Revelation Principle The revelation principle (Laffont and Tirole 1993)
states that if there is an optimal contract for the supplier, then there exists an optimal contract under which the buyer will truthfully reveal her holding cost. Formulate an IC constraint on PAI(hb):
Let FOC be satisfied at and yields IC constraint:
)ˆ()ˆ(2
ˆ
)ˆ(min
ˆ bAIbAIb
bAI
b
hhPhQh
hQdk
b
bb hh ˆ
)())(2
()ˆ( 2 bAIbAI
bbbAI hQ
hQdkhhP
IRb Assume that IRb is always met for any ,
and for IRb becomes
The supplier’s problem
*bb hh
],[ )(())(,( *bbbbbbbbbb hhh)P(hhQChQhTCTC
*bb hh
IRs IRb, IC, s.t.
][)]()(
[
)]([min
**
* ],[),(,
shhbb
shh
bshhhhhPhQ
TCEhPhQdkE
hTCE
bbbb
bbbbbb
Revelation Principle (Con’t)
ly.respective , and costs incurringes,alternativ outside their
revert to playersboth and place takes tradeno ],,[For
.)()(2
)( and )(/)(
)(2)(
by given are schemediscount and sizelot the],,[For
.in increasing is and ),()(
osolution t
theis where with buyers with only trade illsupplier w
then,informatio asymmetricunder schemediscount optimal In the
*
2
*
***
**
bs
bbb
bAIbAI
bbbAI
bbb
bsbAI
bbb
sbbAIbAI
ss
bbb
TCTC
hhh
hQhQdkhhP
hfhFhdkkhQ
hhh
TChhPhQdkTC
hhh
Proposition 1
)()(21)2()(2)(
)()(21)22()(2
21)(
)22()(221)(
)2)((221
2)(
2)(
2)(2)(
: are ],[for levelscost
ingcorrespond andpolicy optimal theuniform, is )(prior When the
,
*,
*,
*
*
bAIbbbbbsbAIj
bAIbbbbbbbsbbAIs
bbbbbsbbAIb
bbbbsbsb
AI
bb
bsbAI
bbb
b
hQhhhhdkkhTC
hQhhhhhhdkkTChTC
hhhhdkkTChTC
TCdhhkkQdkkQhQP
hhdkkhQ
hhh
hF
Proposition 1 (Con’t)
There is a probability 1 - of no trade taking place. For , QAI(hb) is decreasing in hb. In general, cannot be found explicitly as it is
impossible to write PAI(hb) explicitly. Both QAI(hb) and PAI(hb) are strictly decreasing in hb, so
there is a one-to-one mapping PAI(Q) which is increasing. Supplier’s and buyer’s costs are increasing in hb. The buyer’s net costs are equal to at . At , the resulting lot size is equal to the
jointly optimal lot size; as hb increases, the discrepancy between QAI(hb) and QFI(hb) increases.
*bb hh
Some Findings)( *bhF
*bh
*bh
bTC
bh )( bAI hQ
Agenda
Introduction The Basic Model: Full Information Optimal Contract Under Asymmetric
Information Comparing the Contracts Discussion
Proposition 2
],[ )),(,())(,(
ninformatio private has she when decrease costsnet sbuyer' The
][][ :asymmetry
ninformatiounder increase costsnet expected ssupplier' The
],[ ,
:oncoordinati of form nothan efficient more is gcontractin but asymmetry n informatioby reduced is efficiency Global
],[ ),()()()(
:satisfy sizeslot then,informatio asymmetric Under
,,
,,
,,,,
bbbbAIbAIbbFIbFIbb
FIshAIshs
bbbjjFIjAIjbj
bbbbjbFIbAIbb
hhhhQhTChQhTCTC
TCETCETC
hhhTCTCTCTC
hhhhQhQhQhQ
bb
Agenda
Introduction The Basic Model: Full Information Optimal Contract Under Asymmetric
Information Comparing the Contracts Discussion
Discussion
Contribution Consider asymmetric information in EOQ
environment: buyer’s holding cost is not observable to the supplier
The supplier can choose not to trade with buyer with certain large holding cost
Introduce the cut-off point policy
Discussion (Con’t) Limitation
The assumptions on prior distribution are too specific
Lack of necessary proof or explanation of major results or findings
Demand is not affected by the lot sizing or reduction of unit price
Only the uncertainty about buyer’s holding cost is considered. More dimensions can be analyzed.
Thank you!