Abbas Manoochehri: Ali Shari'Ati on Religion, Philosophy and Emancipation

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Abbas Manoochehri

Critical Religious Reason Ali Shari'ati on Religion, Philosophy and Emancipation

SummaryThe purpose of this article is to introduce one of the most novel aspects

in the work of the Iranian thinker Ali Shari'ati, namely his dialogue with

modern secular thought from a relig ious standpoint. The relationship

between religion and philosophy and the critique of tradition and

modernity are signific ant constitutive aspects of Shari'ati's thought.

Religious concepts shoul d be always studied in relation to concrete

human problems. By simultaneously criticizing ›historical religion‹,

›machini sm‹ and colonialism, Shari'ati has presented ›constructive erfan‹

as an alternative emancipatory response to the problematic of the

contemporary world.

Content

español

1. Introduction

2. Critique of Tradition and Modernity 2.1 Tradition

2.1.1 Religion, Reason and Morality

2.1.2 Religion Against Religion

2.1.3 Dialectics of Man and History

2.1.4 From Onto-Theology to Critical Social Ontology

2.2 Modernity

2.2.1 On Humanism

2.2.2 Machinism

2.2.3 Modernization and Civilization

3. Beyond Reified Tradition and Dominant Modernity

3.1 Mysticism 3.2 Equality

3.3 Freedom

3.4 A Synthesis

3.5 Constructive Erfan

4. Religion, Humanism and Emancipation

5. Conclusion

Bibliography

Notes

1. Introduction

1 During the past few decades, Ali Shari'ati's 1 thought has been

approached from different angles. Ervand Abrahamian has analysed

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Mohammad REZA

S ARKESHIK:

Ali Shariati.

Portal

Iran Chamber Society:

Iranian Personalities:

Ali Shariati.

Biography

Ali R AHNEMA:

An Islamic Utopian. A

Political Biography of Ali

Shariati.

Introduction

Laila JUMA:Remembering the

contribution of Shaheed

Ali Shari'ati.

Introduction

A Shi'ite Encyclopedia.

Encyclopedia

Al-Islam:

Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic

Library Project.Portal

Shari'ati's ideas in relation to the emergence of the new Islamic thought.

He has treated Shari'ati extensively in his book Iran Between Two

Revolutions. According to Abrahamian, Shari'ati has tried to reorient the

younger generation of Iranians towards the teachings of Islam by

applying western methodological tools borrowed from the social sciences.

In this regard, Abrahamian attempts to clarify the relationship between

Shari'ati's teachings and Marxism (Abrahamian 1982).

2 Shari'ati has also been studied in the context of general Islamic

thought. In his book Islam and Modernity Fazlur Rahman argues that

Shari'ati is one of the major thinkers in modern Islamic history. Shari'ati,

however, ads Rahman, is a member of the movement that has

undertaken the second attempt to modernize Islam; the first attempt

having been made in the time of Al-Ghazali (11th century CE). Rahman's

theory is that these two strands of modernization in Islam have been

efforts to form new ways of educating the Muslim community. The

significance of the second strand, according to Rahman, is challenging

the established Islamic teachings that have made Islamic thought »stand

on its head« (Rahman 1982, 109). Also, in a recent work, called An

Islamic Utopian, Ali Rahnama refers to Shari'ati as a thinker »who sought

a union of opposites« between Islam and Modernity (Rahnama 1998, ix).

3 The purpose of my considerations on Shari'ati's thought is to introduce

one of its most novel aspects, namely his dialogue with modern secular

thought from a religious standpoint. By considering the content of his

published works, Shari'ati can be characterised as a modern critical

Islamist. Although every one of the three elements in this characterization

is a fruitful interpretative approach in its own right, yet each one is valid

only in its association and dynamic interaction with the other two.

Therefore, it is the totality of this triad that is meaningful and not each

individual element separate from such totality. As an Islamic thinker,

Shari'ati understood Islam as a source of individual self-discovery andsocial emancipation. He, on the other hand, relates to problems such as

›machinism‹ and human alienation, which are essentially modern in

origin. Also, by critical notions such as »religion against religion«,

es'tehmar (acculturation) and assimilation he has presented a critical

view of both ›tradition‹ and ›modernity‹. As an alternative vision, however,

he has presented constructive erfan as a synthesis of equality, liberty and

mysticism.

2. Critique of Tradition and Modernity

4 As a non-European thinker, Shari'ati's understanding of ›tradition‹ and

›modernity‹ could not resemble that of a European intellectual. Having a

totally different historical experience with both tradition and modernity,

Shari'ati made an explicit distinction between their intellectual and the

institutional dimensions and heritages. His views regarding these two

were expressed in his notions of »religion against religion« and

»emancipatory awareness«, when treating tradition; the notions of

»machinism«, »modern humanism« and »assimilation«, when treating

modernity; and notion of »civility« when treating modernization.

2.1 Tradition

5

http://www.shariati.com/

http://www.shariati.com/rahnema_preface.html

http://www.al-islam.org/encyclopedia/

http://www.muslimedia.com/archives/book03/shariatibk.htm

http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/ashariati/ali_shariati.php

http://www.al-islam.org/





Shari'ati has a dialectical conception of religion as a tradition.

Intellectually, Shari'ati conceives of tradition as a way of relating to

human problems and considers it to be authentic only when it has

something for us and not because of what it is, or claims to be, in-itself.

Shari'ati considers religious tradition as the historical manifestation of a

world-view that not only is antithetical to oppression, but provides the

basis for theoretical and practical negation of oppression. As such,

religion is considered to be a worldview consisting of morality,

awareness, responsibility and emancipatory tendency. The history of religion, however, is a dialectical process of self-negation. Such a

interpretation is explicitly expressed by Shari'ati through his notion of

»religion against religion«.

2.1.1 Religion, Reason and Morality

»Human awareness or

›hekma‹ is enlightening,

creative, … source of

existential responsibilityand a value that gives

man a new

›understanding‹ and a

different sense of needs

and ideals.«

Ali SHARI' ATI

(CW XXIV, 221-223)

6 Shari'ati defines religion in terms of ›awareness‹, ›morality‹,

›responsibility‹ and ›free will‹. He refers to two types of ›awareness‹,

»human« and »social«. »Human self-awareness« regards a uniqueexistential sense of being in the world:

7 It is what the Greeks called ›sophia‹ and Hindus call ›vidia‹ (vision).›Sepantame'no‹ (sacred-white reason) in ancient Iran and ›hekma‹(wisdom) in Islam have had the same connotation. Humanawareness or ›hekma‹ is enlightening, creative, … source of existential responsibility and a value that gives man a new›understanding‹ and a different sense of needs and ideals. (CWXXIV, 221-223) 2

8 The second type of awareness is social, that is »a sense of historical

and social responsibility.« (CW XX, 165-202)

9 Morality is also of two kinds: socio-historical ethics and human

morality (cf. CW XVI, 243). 3 The first type includes traditions and codes

of behaviour that are products of social, historical and cultural systems of

a nation or a historical stage. As such they are transitive and relative.

Compared with social ethics, however,

10 ›Human morality‹ … is composed of values emanating from humannature … and human evolution throughout history has beendirected towards them. Actually human genre has started withthese values. For, it is only human being who creates values. (CWII, 96) 4

11 Consisting of awareness and moral consciousness, religion would

lead to responsibility:

12 For a theist, responsibility flourishes from the deep world of existence and is rooted in objective reality that is free from personalsubjectivity and collective tradition. (Ibid., 94)

13 In fact, responsibility is in itself a sign of human existential freedom:

14 Responsibility is born from freedom; and since man is free s/he isresponsible. (CW XIV, 303)

2.1.2 Religion Against Religion

15 According to Shari'ati, the roots of modern antagonism towards

religion go back, first to the Greek mythology of human struggle with the

mythical gods, and then to the historical experience of Medieval





»I speak of a religion,

which is not realised yet.

Thus our reliance on

religion is not a return to

the past, but a

continuation of history.«

Ali SHARI' ATI

(CW XXII, 18)

Christianity. Neither of these, however, Shari'ati has argued, have

anything to do with religion in itself. In its original form religion has been

the foundation for the greatest historical examples of human

emancipation that is an undeniable virtue of monotheistic religion in the

Abrahamic tradition. 5

16 However, although Abrahamic message is essentially emancipatory, it

has still been subject to the dialectics of historical development. Although

tawhid (unity) emerged as a dialectical negation of tazad (contradiction) it

has not, as a historical force, been free from the dynamics of history. The

original message of Abrahamic tawhid, including the Islamic message,

has experienced the process of disintegration into a historical religion.

The message of tawhid, Shari'ati says, has practically been changed into

the established shirk (stratification). Therefore, historical religion can not

be the basis for judgement about the nature of religion in-itself. In fact,

the emancipatory character of religion has always been negated in

history by its institutionalization (cf. CW XII, 16).

17 With the notion of »religion against religion«, Shari'ati has tried to

reveal a tragic irony of the historical simultaneity of the liberating and

oppressing roles of religion. To him, the history of religion isencompassed in the dialectic of revolt and decay. Originally a means for

human emancipation, religion has recurrently been used as the

instrument of oppression. Therefore, Shari'ati says:

18 If I speak of religion, it is not the ›religion‹ which has prevailed inhuman history, but a religion whose prophets rose for theelimination of [the religion of] social polytheism. I speak of areligion, which is not realised yet. Thus our reliance on religion isnot a return to the past, but a continuation of history. (CW XXII, 18)

19 Such a conception of religion is fundamentally linked with certain

conception of man, history and society. Shari'ati has elaborated his views

on religion through a dialectical conception of history and a critical social

ontology.

2.1.3 Dialectics of Man and History

20 Deriving his conception of man from his interpretation of the Qur'an,

Shari'ati speaks of a dialectic between man and history consisting of

three moments. The first moment is man-in-himself, a dialectical being

without determined and fixed nature. The second moment is the material

development of the human condition, which in essence resembles theinner-dialectical characteristic of man. Finally, the moment of socio-

historical developments consequent of the first two. This conception is

explained by reference to the symbolic language of the Qur'an. According

to the Qur'an, Shari'ati says, man is a two-dimensional being, a being

which:

21 is composed of mud (hama'e massnun) and divine spirit, a two-dimensional being, a creature with a dual nature, in contrast to allother beings which are one-dimensional … Every man is endowedwith these two dimensions, and it is his will that enables him either to descend toward the pole of sedimentary mud … or to ascend

toward the pole of exaltation … (1982b, 74)22 Shari'ati further develops this anthropological dialectic into a

foundation for a philosophy of history. History, then, is the battlefield in

which the anthropological struggle takes an objective form. This struggle

is not between two potential forces within man; it is rather the actual





»When Abel the pastural

was killed by Cain the

landowner, the period of

common ownership of the

sources of production …

[and] the spirit of

brotherhood and true

faith, came to an end andwas replaced by …

religious trickery and

transgression against the

rights of others …«

Ali SHARI' ATI

(1982b, 99)

confrontation between two historical forces, each manifesting one or the

other tendency within human species. To explain this struggle, Shari'ati

refers to the myth of Cain and Abel:

23 Abel represents the age of a pasture-based economy, of theprimitive socialism that preceded ownership; and Cain representsthe system of agriculture and individual ownership. When Abel thepastural was killed by Cain the landowner, the period of commonownership of the sources of production … [and] the spirit of brotherhood and true faith, came to an end and was replaced by …

religious trickery and transgression against the rights of others …(Ibid., 99)

24 Human history, therefore, is composed of two stages, the »two curves

of history«, »the stage of collectivism« and »the stage of private

ownership«. Unlike the first stage that was the era of social equality and

spiritual oneness, the second stage, in which we now live, has thus far

been essentially one of social domination and exploitation of »the many«

by »the few«. The second stage, as the result of which a new social

formation came into existence, began with the emergence of private

ownership. As a turning point in history, private ownership has been the

starting point for social domination. Although this new formation has had

private ownership as its founding element, the forms that it has taken at

different points in history have varied. Slavery, serfdom, feudalism, and

capitalism are only some of its forms. Hence, there is no more than one

foundation; and this is not bourgeoisie, feudal, capitalist, communist,

serfdom or slavery. It is merely ownership that is of two kinds: private

(monopoly) and social (public) (cf. 1980, 37). Unlike the stage of social

ownership, when all material and spiritual resources were accessible to

everyone, the emergence of private ownership polarized the human

community. Private ownership created new ills by changing men's

brotherhood and love to duplicity, deceit, hatred, exploitation,

colonialization, and massacre (cf. ibid., 39). No wonder, then that the first

serious reflections and expressions of discontent in history actually

appeared at exactly the same juncture of the triumph of private

ownership. It is in this relation that distinguished historical figures such as

Buddha, Laotze, Confucius, and Zoroaster in the East, and Socrates,

Plato, and Aristotle in the West, were all contemporaries, because:

25 They appeared in reaction to the deteriorating conditions of their societies which were created mainly by the change from socialownership to private ownership … (Ibid., 32)

2.1.4 From Onto-Theology to Critical Social Ontology

26 According to Shari'ati a similar »curve« can be observed in the history

of religion. The first historical form of the religious view was a primitive

form of oneness (tawhid, unity). Such a religious perspective was by its

nature in harmony with the objective characteristics of a social formation,

namely, communalism. However, with the emergence of private

ownership and with the development of a hierarchical-social structure, a

polytheistic world-view began to emerge to justify the objective tazad

(contradiction) within the social formation of private ownership. In other

words, the historical sources of polytheism were concrete socio historical

developments that were subsequently reflected on the theological level:

27 Social objectivity created religious subjectivity in order to let thelatter manifest itself as the creator of the former. This is how thehierarchy which was imposed in the existential world created apolytheistic world-view to explain the intrinsic hierarchy in the social





Al-Tawhid:

A Quarterly Journal of

Islamic Thought and

Culture.

Journal

M.M. SHARIF (ed.):

A History of Muslim

Philosophy.

Book

system. (CW XVI, 30)

28 The first historical challenge to polytheism was the Abrahamic

monotheism (tawhid). Abrahamic monotheism was not a response to

atheism, but a challenge against polytheism, which had emerged with the

appearance of private ownership and the ascendancy of the historical

Cain. Polytheism, then, is the religion of social stratification. Monotheism,

therefore, is not the beginning of religion, but its reorientation. The

struggle between monotheism and polytheism is not a theological dispute

but a challenge to polytheistic social formation (class domination, racism,etc.) Unlike monotheism (tawhid), which is rooted in ittehad (solidarity,

oneness), polytheism was rooted in domination of some by others.

29 As a monotheistic world view, tawhid rejects the division of the world

into dichotomous categories like ›natural‹ and ›supernatural‹, ›matter‹

and ›idea‹, ›body‹ and ›spirit‹, or ›this world‹ and ›the other‹. tawhid is the

negation of all dichotomies, in both the celestial and the social plane.

Celestially, it is a living totality in process toward unity; socially, it is the

foundation for unity and harmony in human relations. tawhid, then, is the

negation of all forms of antagonisms. Since domination is anti-unity and

tawhid is anti-domination, the social expression of tawhid is a dialectic of unity.

30 Tawhid, in its social and historical expression, is the struggle for

human emancipation from the historic dialectic of deception, a deception

rooted in the projection of historical-social stratification on ontology. For,

in its original form, the human community was a harmonious partnership,

an expression of celestial harmony. At this stage, social reality reflected

the ontological foundations of the existential world.

31 Therefore, there has always been a struggle in history between the

oppressed family of Abel, the Mustazafin (the oppressed), and the

oppressive clan of Cain, the Mustakberin (the oppressors), historicallysymbolized in the trinity of wealth, power, and hypocrisy. It has been out

of this contradiction (tazad) that the Abrahamic tawhid (unity) has

emerged as the negation of the oppressive domination of Cain.

2.2 Modernity

32 Instead of dismissing modern consciousness from the standpoint of

›truth‹, Shari'ati relates to it sympathetically. Existentialism, Scientism,

Socialism, Marxism, and other Western perspectives are not ›enemies‹ tohis mind and spirit and he tries to understand them and learn from them.

He, in fact, deeply shared with them the need to challenge the

established norms, truths, myths, and mentalities. Yet he challenged

modern perspectives for not being open to the possibility of theism (cf.

CW XXV, 23). In challenging modernity for its shortcomings, he analyses

some of its intellectual and objective dimensions.

2.2.1 On Humanism

33 Shari'ati highlights the main premises of modern humanism by

identifying their intellectual foundations in Greek mythology. He believes

that Greek mythology emanated from a certain historical experience of

man in confrontation with non-human forces. Since these forces had

http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/hmp/

http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/





Ali SHARI' ATI:

The Free Man and

Freedom of the Man.

Article

Reflections of Humanity.

Article

Where Shall we Begin? Article

been given divine attributes, human bondage was perceived as the work

of anti-human gods:

34 Of course, such a bond of enmity between men and gods wasaltogether natural and logical to the Greek myths; and from acertain point of view even proper and progressive. Since gods inthese myths constitute archetypes and expressions of naturalforces … The war between gods and men was in reality the latter'swar against dominance of the physical forces that rule over humanlife, his will, and his fate … (1982a, 18)

35 This mythological treatment of the human predicament, Shari'ati says,

led to an anthropocentric view of the universe, a view in which man

himself has become the basis for moral and aesthetic judgements. Greek

humanism,

36 through its denial of gods, disbelief in their rule, and severance of the bond between man and heaven, struggled to arrive at ananthropocentric universe, to make man the touchstone of truth andfalsity, to take the human form as the criterion of beauty, and toassign importance to the components of life that enhance humanpower and pleasure. (Ibid., 19)

37 Another historical reason which contributed to the formulation of this

world view was Catholicism in the Middle Ages which:

38 set Christianity (regarded as religion per se) at odds with humanity:it maintained the same opposition between heaven and earth thathad obtained in ancient Greece and Rome; and, with its Greek-style exegeses of original sin and man's expulsion from paradise, itrepresented man as helplessly condemned because of divinedispleasure to an inferior world, and declared him to be an abject,reprehensible, and weak sinner. (Ibid., 26)

39 Therefore, with the philosophical standpoint of the Church and the

Greek mythological heritage in mind, the new intellectual movements in

early modern Europe took the road of secular humanism. By doing so,

modern humanists committed a grave mistake. Secular humanism has

developed its view in opposition to the ›historical‹ rather than the original,

›human‹ religion. Modern humanists, Shari'ati says, have equated »the

mythical world of ancient Greece« with the original world of the

Abrahamic heritage. Whereas in contradistinction with Greek mythology,

in which the relation between man and gods required human bondage

and suffering, in the Abrahamic tawhid the relation between humanity and

the sublime is that of a dynamic process of love and emancipation.

2.2.2 Machinism

»The bourgeoisie sumsup all of existence in one

word: Consumption, the

more the better. Life's

purpose lies in

consumption and the

satisfaction of material

40 In its latest stage of development, private ownership has led to

machinism. As a new social order, machinism began to emerge in the

19th century. By then handicrafts were being left behind and the

emerging machine age was creating new anxieties and myriads of new

problems. The machine, Shari'ati argues, is not a marketable commodity

but the foundation for the modern social formation of machinism:

41 Machinism is a sociological phenomenon. It is a particular socialorder, not a marketable, consumable, or technical product or

commodity. (1980, 35) 642 This new social order, Shari'ati further argues, has extended itself

within various spheres of Western life and also beyond the geographical

borders of the West. Machinism has come to dominate all spheres of

modern life. In a sense machinism is the sophisticated version of the

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http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/ashariati/works/free_man_freedom_man.php

http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/ashariati/works/reflections_of_humanity.php





and economic needs.«

Ali SHARI' ATI

(1980, 39-40)

social formation that was created by the emergence of private ownership.

Just as a new world vision was formulated with the emergence of private

ownership, with the machine too a new conception of the world began to

develop. Illuminating this point, Shari'ati looks into the historical

development of machinism:

43 After the French Revolution the bourgeoisie pushed aside themedieval aristocracy and began to rule as it got hold of science. …The bourgeoisie sums up all of existence in one word:

Consumption, the more the better. Life's purpose lies inconsumption and the satisfaction of material and economicneeds. … Since the bourgeoisie provides society's material needs,naturally the transformation of man from an ethical being into aconsuming creature is to his class advantage. (Ibid., 39-40)

2.2.3 Modernization and Civilization

»Modernization is a

apocryphal form of

progress. In fact such

modernization issymptomatic of a

fundamentally destructive

tendency within the

contemporary non-

Western world.«

Ali SHARI' ATI

(1979, 11)

44 In Shari'ati's view, during the past hundred and fifty years non-Western

societies have suffered from various internal and external forces of

domination and exploitation. Imperialism (is' temar), tyranny (is' tebdad),economic exploitation (is' tesmar), and cultural colonization (is' tehmar)

have together inflicted deep wounds on the peoples of the Third World

and justified them by the alleged necessity for ›modernization‹. Third

World modernization, therefore, is simply a historical extension of the

process that began with the emergence of private ownership and was

then intensified by machinism. Having already gained control over a vast

part of the world by colonial domination, Europe now had more reasons

to sustain its economic grip over these areas. The emergence of

manufactured goods in large quantities created new needs, »the need for

productions and the production of needs«, with global impacts:

45 Since the machine compulsively produces excess goods, it muststep over all national boundaries and push goods into the worldmarket … When in the eighteenth century the capitalists gainedcontrol of machinery, as well as technology and science, man'sdestiny was determined. Every single human being on the face of the earth was to be coerced into becoming a consumer for theproduced merchandise. European goods had to go to Africa and Asia. Asians and Africans had to consume the surplus Europeanproducts. (1979, 11)

46 Accordingly, Shari'ati makes a distinction between ›civilization‹ and

›modernization‹. In his view, unlike civilization that involves a long

process of development within a community, contemporary Third World:

47 modernization is a apocryphal form of progress. In fact suchmodernization is symptomatic of a fundamentally destructivetendency within the contemporary non-Western world. (Ibid.)

48 Shari'ati, therefore, neither accepts the established interpretation of

tradition nor adapts to the modern mind, but rather, calls for an encounter

between the two. Hence, he can not be conceptually dichotomised as

›modernist‹ or as ›traditionalist‹.

3. Beyond Reified Tradition and Dominant Modernity

49 Shari'ati has suggested that main historical strands of human thought

can be categorised as one or other of the three basic currents of

mysticism, equality, liberty (erfan, barabari, azadi). Each of these





currents, Shari'ati has argued, has emerged in response to human

problems and then has developed historically in ways that have revealed

the strengths and the weaknesses of each.

3.1 Mysticism

Jalal al H AQQ:

Epistemology of

Prophethood in Islam.

In: Al-Tawhid 4.1/2.

Article

Muhammad LEGENHAUSEN:

The Relationship between

Philosophy and Theology

in the Postmodern Age.

In: Al-Tawhid 14.1.

Article

50 Mysticism, Shari'ati believes, has always existed in both the East and

the West. The reason for identifying mysticism with the East, he argues,

is that advanced civilizations, and certainly the social order of domination,

first arose in the East, »the birthplace of thought, culture, and the great

religions«. Therefore, mysticism must also, as a matter of course, have

had its beginning there (cf. CW II, 62). Mysticism, Shari'ati says, arises:

51 from the essential nature of man. The most general meaning of theword ›mysticism‹ is the inner sense of apprehension people havewhile they are here in the world of nature. (Ibid., 50)

52 Although it can provide man with spiritual sensitivity and sublime

psychological and spiritual values, nevertheless, mysticism, blinds man to

the disastrous conditions around him:

53 Outside the wall of [the mystic's] place of retreat, oppression,disaster, poverty, shameful acts, ignorance, corruption, anddecadence are dishonoring all the spiritual values of man. [Of these, the mystic] never becomes aware. (Ibid., 62)

54 Shari'ati has further argued that aside from the essential weaknesses

in mysticism itself, its historical transformation into established religions

has in fact betrayed even the good that it contains. ›Eastern mysticism‹,

Shari'ati argues,

55 was later to enter religion, which gradually assumed the form of an

ecclesiastical establishment and gave rise to a new class. As a partof the ruling class, it formed social ties with the other elements of that class. The unfortunate consequence was that religion andmysticism were transformed into a superstitious justification for theexploitation of the people by the ruling class, and also into anenemy of human growth, the growth of man's primordial nature.Mysticism became a shackle on the foot of the spiritual andmaterial evolution of mankind. (Ibid., 52)

56 [Such a religion] actually separates man from his own humanity. Itmakes him into an importunate beggar, a slave of unseen forcesbeyond his power; it deposes him and alienates him from his ownwill. It is this established religion that today we are familiar with.(Ibid., 60)

3.2 Equality

57 In the nineteenth century the advent of the machine intensified class

polarization, oppression and the gap between rich and poor. And, as

religion proved to be on the side of the oppressors in this schism,

socialism emerged as the human quest for equality and justice. Socialists

felt that:

58 if a socialist system were realized in society, humanity would befreed from the bonds of materialism, and class differences andconflicting interests would cease to exist. They felt that withoutthese contradictions, there would be no war, and without war andexploitation, all of the powers of humanity would be united andplaced at the service of human development and spiritual growth …(Ibid., 117)

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59 However, by reducing man to a merely social entity, socialism was not

able to respond to all human needs. There are needs which are deeply

troubling man; needs to which socialism and its materialistic view of the

world can not respond:

60 We see that Socialism removes from man all limbs and branchesexcept one, but it so encourages that one to spread out that itoutgrows root and trunk. Thus, it makes man one-dimensional,however lofty and sublime that one dimension may be. (Ibid.)

61 Historically speaking also, Shari'ati contends, socialism as an

ideological movement has betrayed the very goals that it had originally

set itself to achieve:

62 We have seen how that very socialist system that was to freepeople, assumed the forms, first, of worshipping personality andparty, and then the worship of the state. (Ibid., 107)

3.3 Freedom

Allamah Muhammad

HUSAYN T ABATABA'I:

Islam and the Modern

Age.

In: Al-Tawhid 1.2. Article

Sayyid Muhammad

RIDA HIJAZ:

The Concept of Love in

the Shi'i Creed.

In: Al-Tawhid 11.1/2.

Article

63 Existentialism has sought human freedom by rejecting all gods, earthlyand heavenly alike. The essence of existentialism is to reject all bases for

human choice outside man's own self. Freedom of choice is the founding

principle of existentialism. Religion, argues an atheist existentialist, looks

to God for what it seeks, whereas socialism gives legitimacy to the state

(and the collectivism) for determining right and wrong, hence, both

negate the authenticity and freedom of man. Existentialism, on the other

hand, tells man that:

64 choice and freedom are yours unconditionally. All values existwhen this freedom exists. However, should this freedom be takenaway from you, these values would cease to be, you would become

a slave to other powers: God or the state. (Ibid., 111)

65 With its rejection of both socialism and religion, therefore,

existentialism gives man absolute freedom in choosing his own destiny.

But, Shari'ati adds, if both the collective sense of choice and the

transcendental basis of existence are rejected, then what is to stop a

hedonistic form of self-fulfilment. Such a choice produces precisely those

social consequences which existentialism was intended to challenge and

provide an answer for. In order to reach its goals this philosophy would

need an ethical ground which would justify altruistic action. Indeed,

contemporary existentialist schools of thought are by their nature unable

to provide such an axiology:66 Existentialism, however much it may turn on the primacy of man

and human freedom, … leaves man suspended in midair …Existentialism lacks a basis on which to answer my questions. NowI am bent on a course of action where I may either sacrifice myself to the people or sacrifice the people to myself … (Ibid.)

3.4 A Synthesis

67 According to Shari'ati, the shortcomings of the three currents of

mysticism, equality and freedom are both essential and accidental.Essentially each one has certain characteristics that frustrate its attempt

to deliver to humanity what it has always sought. Accidentally, however, it

has been due to certain developments that the ability of these currents to

contribute to human happiness has been mollified. Whereas all these

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currents have been an expression of dissatisfaction with realities, and

have been generated in response to the problems caused by the two

great moments of historical transformation, they all have (in one form or

another) been turned into a preserving force for the status quo.

68 As such then, Shari'ati concludes, none of these three currents by

itself can provide a tenable solution to human problems. The only way

that any one of them can play the role that they each propose, he

continues, is by a totality consisting simultaneously of all three of them.

Only when an existential self-awareness is coupled with a sense of social

consciousness can it result in an authentic self-realization. This essential

authenticity can lead to practical emancipation when there is an ethical

basis for action. Whereas the first two conditions are fulfilled by the two

modern schools of existentialism and socialism, the last one can only be

satisfied by a mystical sense of self-recognition:

69 Therefore, the most perfect person or school for the purpose of liberating man would be the person or the school that embracesthese three dimensions … When these three dimensions eachseparately takes the form of a school, their negative aspects areactualised, whereas if these three dimensions were united, the

negative aspects could no longer exist. (Ibid., 37)

3.5 Constructive Erfan

Martyr Murtada

MUTAHHARI:

Introduction to 'Irfan.

In: Al-Tawhid 4.1.

Article

Muhammad Taqi MISBAH

Y AZDI:

Islamic Gnosis ('Irfan) and

Wisdom (Hikmat).

In: Al-Tawhid 14.3. Article

Sayyid Wahid AKHTAR:

The Islamic Concept of

70 In search of existential self-realization and social harmony, Shari'ati

has tried to find a way of possible unity between the liberating principles

of authentic religion with the modern ideals of equality and freedom. Such

effort can perhaps been categorized under the title of constructive erfan.

Erfan is an existential self-awareness, a way of relating to tawhid, and of

experiencing tawhid at a personal level.71 [Erfan] in the most general sense, is that inner sense of

apprehension people have while in the world of nature. Man quaman experiences needs that nature can no longer satisfy … That iswhat produces a lack, a sense of alienation and exile in us while weare in this world … Erfan is a manifestation of the primordial natureof man and it exists as a means of journeying to the ›unseen‹. It isthe mystical sense that endows man, with excellence and nobility;the more highly developed a person is, the stronger this need, thisthirst, becomes. (1982a, 26)

72 Erfan, then, is an existential force which enables man to inwardly

transcend whatever forces are surrounding him. In fact, contrary to the

materialists belief:

73 that man's propensity for the unseen degrades him – we might saythat man's propensity for what actually exists degrades him. Bypursuing values that do not exist in nature, he is lifted above natureand the spiritual and essential development of the species issecured. Erfan is thus a lantern shining within humanity. (CW II, 64)

74 Shari'ati then characterizes the erfanic sense of relation to the Divine

and also to the social other as love:

75 Love is a power that has an unknowable source and can inflame and

melt all of my existence; it even impels me to self-denial. Love grants me

values higher and more sublime than expedience; and no physical,material, or biochemical account can comprehend it. If love were taken

away from man, he would become an isolated, stagnant being, useful

only to the systems of production. (1982a, 112)

76 Erfan, therefore, is that current which manifests the human pursuit of

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Knowledge.

In: Al-Tawhid 12.3.

Article

happiness through a purely spiritual and ontologically transcendental self-

awareness in the world. As such erfan is an emancipatory theistic

humanism. This is a philosophy of existence in which individual self-

awareness and the social sense of practical responsibility for human

liberation are harmoniously embodied. Emanating from the world view of

tawhid, erfanic humanism puts God, man, and nature in a meaningful and

dynamic harmony with each other. Constructive erfan is a transcendental

insight that retains the concreteness of the individual self as an essential

element. This insight involves an inherently dialectical interactionbetween the human self and the Divine Other. In this interaction there is a

dialectical process of simultaneous reduction/elevation. The Divine Other

is related to from the human standpoint (reduction); meanwhile the

individual human being is enabled to transcend the confining constraints

of his life-situation (elevation). The most immediate and essentially fruitful

outcome of such a process is the formation of a critical attitude that can

focus on the surrounding problems of life while having the transcendental

ability to subject those problems to profound questioning and critique. By

pursuing ethical unity with the Divine Other (tawhid), the individual comes

to confront domination in all its various forms. As such, this perspective is

seriously oriented towards fundamental social change; hence it isconstructive.

4. Religion, Humanism and Emancipation

Mehrzad BOROUJERDI:

Iranian Islam and the

Faustian Bargain of

Western Modernity.

In: Journal of Peace

Research 34.1 (1997).

Article

Can Islam be

Secularized?

In: M.R. GHANOONPARVAR /Faridoun F ARROKH (eds.):

In Transition: Essays on

Culture and Identity in the

Middle Eastern Society.

Laredo: Texas A&M

77 According to the vision presented by Shari'ati, religion, as ethical

awareness, allows man to move from the »instinctive heaven« to the

»promised paradise«, to ascend (me'raj) from an earthly to a divine

being. Such an ascent is in fact an existential responsibility, a Divine

Trust (lmana) imposed on man. Such characteristic is the core of whatShari'ati calls Islamic Humanism. As such:

78 Islam bases its divine humanism on tawhid; on the scientific level itdefines man as of the earth while on the level of existential analysisit raises him from dust toward God and absolute transcendentalvalues. (Ibid., 85)

79 Based upon such a conception of human existence, and deriving his

ideas from the notion of the »forbidden fruit of awareness«, Shari'ati

introduces his view of Islamic humanism. According to him, human

authenticity is rooted in »the pain of existence«, a pain that is the

outcome of human awareness:

80 To the degree that one attains this fruit, one finds oneself more andmore contained by the earthly life. It is out of this pain and the needfor that which is ›absent‹ that man comes to rebel against the ›willof God‹, the will that is manifested, through the ›four prisons of man‹ in the natural, historical, social, and physiological laws. (CWXXXII, 16)

81 Human revolt against these »prisons« would ultimately lead man to

unity with God. As man frees himself more and more from these

»prisons«, the world declines more and more for him. Transcending

these »prisons« creates higher and more sublime needs, needs which in

man's loneliness would be met only in his return (tawba) to God, a›return‹ which is the realization of man's becoming. The Quranic

humanism, hence:

82 resembles a reciprocal relationship between God and man. Arelationship which accounts values as the emanation of divineattributes in the human sphere and defines man's self perfection as

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International University,

1994.

Article

Lamin S ANNEH:

Between East and West:

Confrontation and

Encounter .

In: The Christian Century

(13 November l99l). Article

the self aware return to God. We see that in the philosophy of Islam … self-knowledge and knowledge of God come to besynonymous, where the former functions as a preliminary to thelatter; as the Iranian Aref [Bayazid Bastami] puts it in a profoundremark: For years I sought God and found myself; now that I seekmyself, I find God. So, quite to the contrary [of the materialistphilosophy of Feuerbach], it is not humanity that has made God,reposed its proper values in Him, and worships Him; it is rather God Who has made humanity, reposed His proper values in it, andpraises it. (Ibid., 88)

83 Such a perspective, Shari'ati then notes, stands in opposition to both

materialist and providentialist determinism. While it avoids materialist

determinism by conceiving of free will as an essential facet of human

existence, it simultaneously remains free from providencialism by

attributing to man the character of rebellion. In explaining these

dimensions of Islamic humanism, Shari'ati argues that in Islam:

84 The society possesses ordering principles, and the continuousevolutionary movement of human history is based upon scientificlaws. But because it considers the human will to be a manifestationof the universal will of being (and not an unwitting product of the

exigencies of production or of society), Islam never hurls into theterrible pit of materialistic determinism. Likewise, by proclaiming theprinciple of ›assignation‹ or ›descent‹ [huboot], it frees mankindfrom the bond of divine determinism in which the Eastern religionsare caught. … In this way, by presenting man as an aware beingpossessed of a will and freed from the captivity of heaven and earthalike, [Islam] arrives at true humanism. (Ibid., 85 and 90)

85 Therefore, in Islam, Shari'ati adds, man carries the divine

responsibility of making his own self and the world as an ontological axio-

praxis. (Ibid., 88-89)

5. Conclusion

86 As a religious thinker, Shari'ati has regarded abstract acceptance or

rejection of the divinity as essentially alike. It is, he believed, the social

and historical significance of these two that distinguish them from each

other. According to Shari'ati, religious concepts should be studied in

relation to concrete human problems, and instead of reducing present

problematic to the conditions of the revelation, those revelations should

be extended to one's own time. In his view, the historical contexts of

revelations would lose their relevance unless they share their significance

with us. Otherwise, to define problems in terms of the historical pastwould only make revelation irrelevant (cf. CW VI, 205).

87 As an intellectual living in modern situation, learning about modern

notions of reason, freedom, existence, while experiencing modern forms

of despotism, colonialism and assimilation, Shari'ati came to have

particular understanding of ›tradition‹, ›modernity‹ and ›emancipation‹.

Any form of speculation, be it theological, philosophical, or scientific, he

believed, which does not challenge domination and oppression is a mere

scapegoat for ignorance. Accordingly, with an intra-paradigmatic critique

of tradition and a paradigmatic critique of modernity, he opened a way for

exchange between the two. He, therefore, can be considered to be aforerunner for the dialogue between religious and secular thought.

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polylog: Forum for Intercultural Philosophy 4 (2003).

Online: http://them.polylog.org/4/fma-en.htm

ISSN 1616-2943

© 2003 Author & polylog e.V.

Bibliography

Ervand ABRAHAMIAN (1982): Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

— (1986): "Ali Shari'ati and Islamic Re volution". In: Middle East Report 22, 54-64.

Hamid ALGAR (1980): The Islamic Revolution in Iran. London: Open Press, 36-52.

Fazlur R AHMAN (1982): Islam and Modernity . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ali R AHNAMA (1998): An Islamic U topian . New York: I.B. Tauris.

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Ali SHARI' ATI (1979): Civilization and Modernization. Houston: Free Islamic Literature.

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— (1990): Vol. 3: Abu Zar . Tehran: Elham.

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Notes

1 Ali Shari'ati was born in 1933 and was raised in a highly enlightened atmosphere. His parents and the

political milieu in which he grew up contributed substantively to his unconventional education. His

father was known for his open criticism of the government and in 1953 was along with him imprisoned

for political activities against the Shah's government. In 1959, after finishing his studies on Near EasternLanguages, Shari'ati received a scholarship and went abroad. At Sorbonne he studied philology and

sociology and was politically active during his five-year stay in France. During the Algerian war, he was

imprisoned in Paris for his collaboration with the Algerian revolutionaries. Upon his return to Iran in

1963, he encountered problems with the government for his past political activities. He nevertheless

continued his activities by teaching and co-operating with the underground revolutionary movements.

Having strong convictions as to the value of direct communication with his audience, and having a

personal sense about his »time-limit«, Shari'ati presented his ideas almost entirely through lectures to

university students both in classroom and in mostly student sponsored forums. These lectures, along

with two books and a few hand-written pieces are now compiled in a collection of 35 volumes.

In 1976 Shari'ati was imprisoned for eighteen months and was brutally tortured. After an international

campaign he was released, but in a few months died mysteriously in exile.

2 All Collected Works (=CW) are in Farsi (Persian) and the references are translation into English.

3 Shari'ati has not made any reference in this regard to Hegel's notions ofSittlichkeit and Moralität .

4 Such a conception of morality seems to be reminiscent of Kohlberg's theory of moral development.

5 It is important to note that Shari'ati, according to the Qur'anic view, conceives of the Abrahamic religion

as one religion. Islam is the name for this religion and not one among several.

6 In his views regarding »machinism«, Shari'ati is profoundly affected by Herbert Marcuse.

Author

Abbas M ANOOCHEHRI (*1956 in Isfahan, Iran) is Assistant Professor in Political Science at Tarbiat Modarres

University, Tehran, and Chairperson of the Department of the Political Science in the International Center for

Dialogue Among Civilizations (ICDC) in Tehran. After graduating in Management in 1978 from Shiraz

University (Iran), he went to the U.S. to study at the University of Toledo, Ohio, where he obtained a Master in




Political Science (1980). In 1988, he obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Missouri,

Columbia. His main areas of interest are Comparative Political Thought, Philosophy of Social Science, and

Historical Sociology of Iran.

Prof. Dr. Abbas Manoochehri

International Center for Dialogue Among Civilizations

Political Science Department

Farmaniye Ave. Ziba StationTehran

IRAN

[email protected]

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Abbas Manoochehri: Ali Shari'Ati on Religion, Philosophy and Emancipation