‘Active Intellect’ in Avempace and Averroës: An

OriginalpaperUDC159.955(045)(083.77)doi:10.21464/sp31208

ReceivedFebruary1st,2016

Daniel BučanLaginjina3,HR–[email protected]

‘Active Intellect’ in Avempace and Averroës: An Interpretative Issue

AbstractThis essay is about the understanding of the notion of activeintellect in Ibn Bāǧǧa (Avem-pace) and Ibn Rušd (Averroës). The traditional interpretation of both Avempace’s and Aver-roës’ concept of active intellect is that they both understand it as the lowest celestial intel-ligence which is dator formarum, and that man thinks and cognizes intelligibles only by “connecting” with it in a quasi-mystic way; cognition being the active intellect’s granting ideas (formae or concepts) to man’s intellect. The author believes that both in Avempace’s and Averroës’ theory of cognition the notion of active intellect is only the highest function of human intellect, not a celestial entity. Based on such a presumption, as well as on the analysis of his theory, Avempace’s notion of iṭṭiṣālbi-‘aqlfa“āl is interpreted not as a kind of mystic “conjunction” or “union” with a separate celestial entity, but as reaching the highest level of man’s intellect function in the continuity of the process of thinking. The same goes for Averroës’ theory, which is quite clearly presented in his EpistleonthePossibilityofConjunc-tionwiththeActiveIntellect, where one can find practically direct confirmation for such an interpretation, because Averroës says that “conjunction with it [i.e. active intellect] seems to resemble more the conjunction of form in matter than it does the conjunction of agent with effect. The well-known difference between agent and effect is that the agent is external, but here there is no external agent”, or that active intellect “conjoins with us from the outset by conjunction of in-existence”. The author concludes that the issue of the active intellect in Islamic philosophy is not disambiguous – for different thinkers it was a different concept – only the function of the active intellect is always one and the same: producing ideas.

Keywordscognition,intellect,hylicintellect,intellectin actu,activeintellect

Understanding active intellect as dator formarum

ThefirstMuslimthinkerwhoelaboratedtheunderstandingoftheso-called‘activeintellect’,whichbecamethegeneralunderstandingofitwithinIslamicphilosophy,wasAl-Fārābī(*cca.870†550).Hewroteaboutitinmanyofhisworks,especially inhisRisālatu-l-‘aql (Epistle on the Intellect)and inAl-Madīna al-Fāḍila(The Virtuous City).Al-Fārābīdefines‘activeintellect’inoppositiontothehumanintellect.Thehumanintellectiscalled‘materialintellect’or‘passiveintellect’becauseitisadispositioninmatter,readytoreceiveimprintsofintelligibles,priortowhichitisnotintellectin actu.Tobecomeintellectin actuitneedssomethingwhichtransfersitfrompotentialitytoactualitybyconferringintelligiblestoit.Thatwhichtransfers‘material’or‘passive’intellectintoactuality,saysAl-Fārābī,isseparatedfrommatteranditprovidesthe‘passiveintellect’withsomethinglikethelightthattheSunprovidestooursight.Throughtheinfluenceofthis

https://doi.org/10.21464/sp31208

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA62(2/2016)pp.(345–358)

D. Bučan, ‘Active Intellect’ inAvempaceandAverroës:AnInterpretativeIssue346

‘separateintellect’onthe‘materialintellect’thethingswhichwereonlypoten-tiallyintelligiblebecomeactuallyintelligible,and‘passiveintellect’becomesintellectin actu;thankstothisfunctionthis‘separateintellect’(asopposedtothe‘passiveintellect’)iscalled‘activeintellect’(‘aql fa‘‘āl).Besideslikeningthe‘activeintellect’tothelightoftheSunandlikeningitsfunctiontothatwhichenablesthefacultyofseeing,whosedescriptionissimi-lartoAristotle’sDe anima,III,5(430a15),1Al-FārābīdefinesitasthelowesttranscendentcelestialintellectinrankingorderemanatingfromtheFirstPrin-ciple.Assuchitisnotonlytheagentthattransfers‘material’or‘passive’intel-lectintoactuality,butactsuponthewholesublunarworldasdator formarum.Al-FārābīowesmuchofhisideasonthefunctionsofthesoultoAlexanderofAphrodisias,who identifiesAristoteliannoūs poietikoswith themindoftheFirstCause,butitismostlikelythatNeoplatonist’sMarinusofSichem’sdescriptionoftheactiveintellectasdaimonionorangelikonhastobecreditedforAl-Fārābī’sdefinitionoftheactiveintellectasthelowest,tenthemanationfrom the First Principle,2whose emanationswere equatedwith the angels.(Assuchadivinecelestialentity,inthetranslationsofArabicphilosophicaltexts,itisusuallycalledtheActive intellect–withacapitalAintranslationsfromArabic– inorder tostress itsbeingofdivineorigin). ItcouldbesaidthatAl-Fārābī–andafterhimotherMuslimphilosophersthroughNeoplaton-istinfluences–inawayexploitedAristotle’sgeneraltheoryofcognitionforcosmological purposes byusing the term ‘active intellect’ for naming (andidentifyingitwith)thelowestemanationfromtheFirstPrincipleactinginthesublunarworld.3

Bethatasitmay,inregardtotheactiveintellect’sfunctioninman’sthinkingandcognizing,Al-Fārābī’stheorymeansthatmanthinksandcognizesintel-ligiblesthankstotheactionofaseparateanddivineentity(which,inordertopreserveAristotle’spositioninAl-Fārābī’sphilosophicalideology,4couldbeinterpretedasAristotle’sthyraten noūs).SuchaninterpretationoftheroleascribedtoActiveIntellecthasbeenaccept-edbyvirtuallyallMuslimphilosophers.InsuchaninterpretationtheprocessofthinkingandcognizingdependsontheconjunctionofhumanintellectwiththeActiveIntellect,whichAl-Fārābīidentifiedastherūḥ al-qudus (theHolySpirit,i.e.theAngelofRevelation)fromtheQur’ān.Thisisthewaymostau-thorswritingonIslamicphilosophyinterpretthetheoryofcognitionofvirtu-allyallMuslimphilosophers,ascribingitnotonlytoAl-FārābīandAvicenna(*980†1037)–towhomitgenuinelybelongs–buttoAvempace(*cca.1085†1139)andAverroës(*1126†1198)–whosetextscastatleastaseriousdoubton such an interpretation – aswell.This interpretationwill be questionedhere in reference toAvempace’sRisāla iṭṭiṣāl al-‘aql bi-l-insān5andAver-roës’Epistleon the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect whichisknownonlythankstoamediaevalHebrewtranslation,commentedbyfour-teenth-centuryHebrew philosopherMosesNarboni.6Avempace’s risāla istraditionally translatedasConjunction of Intellect with Man (how this titleshouldbeunderstoodandtranslatedisthesubjectofthisarticle).

Avempace’s understanding of intellect and levels of cognition

LetusseewhatAvempace’srisāla isabout.He begins the risāla by discussing themeaning of one of its basic terms,whichisthetermwāḥid (=one;inthesenseof‘one’andinthesenseof‘one



asindivisible’,aswellasinthesenseof‘oneandthesame’).Heasksofwhatitcouldbesaidthatitis‘one’,andshowsthatitcanbesaidofmanythings:ofthatwhichiscontinued,ofthatwhichiscompact,ofthatwhichisawhole,andsoon.Buthestressesthatconcerningthisrisālahewilldiscuss,aspre-dicted,man,whois‘one’(‘one’asin‘oneandthesame’),regardlessofallthechangeshegoesthroughinhislife.This,saysAvempace,meansthatmanis‘one’thankstosomethingwhichisnotperceivedbythesenses,asopposedtothevisibleandperceivablechangesmangoesthrough.Thatbywhichmanisalwaysoneandthesameishis‘firstmover’,i.e.thesoul;andthesoulisman’sfirstmoverwhentheintellect(asitsfaculty)becomesin actu–manisanindividualthankstothinking:

“Bycognizingtheconceptstherecomestobeanaspirationwhichmovestothinkingandtothatwhichcomesforthfromit–heisanindividualmanthankstothisnotthankstothecon-cepts.”7

So,thatwhichiscalledman’sintellectualfaculty–whichisthesubject(hy-pokeimenon)ofthinking–isintellectin actu(intellectwhichreceivedintel-ligibles),andthesoulisindividualman’s“firstmover”onlybecauseofhisintellect.Avempacecontinuesbyaskingwhethertheintellectualfacultyasintellectin actuisoneforallmen;isintellectin actuonlyone,sothatallmenareone?Inthatcase,intellectwouldbeoneandthesameinallmen,likeamagnet(whichattractsmetals)coatedoncebythismaterialthenbyanothermaterialthenbyathirdmaterial,etc.,whichmovesthemetalseverytime,regardlessofbeingcoatedbydifferentmaterials.Inordertoanswerthisquestion,Avem-pacetransposesittothequestionofwhethereveryconcept(apprehendedbytheintellect)isone,andanswersthat,whetherweansweryesorno,equallyscandalousconclusionswouldresult.Ifwesayyes,“itnecessarilyresultsinanopinionwhichissimilartotheopinionofthosewhospeakofsoulmigra-tion”,8 because the conceptwould “migrate” fromman toman. Ifwe sayno,itwouldmean“thatfortheconceptwhichIhaveandtheconceptwhichyouhavethereisaconceptcommontothosetwo,thatthiscommonconceptwouldbeinmeandinyou,andthosetwowouldhaveanotherconceptcom-

1

WhereAristotle says: “There is an intellectwhichiswhatitisbyvirtueofbecomingallthings,andanotherwhichiswhatitisbyvir-tueofmakingallthings–itissomethinglikelight: the lightmakes potential colours intoactualcolours.”

2

Cf.Al-Fārābī,On the Perfect State, revisedtext with introduction, translation and com-mentarybyRichardWalzer,OxfordUniver-sity Press, Oxford 1985, “Commentary”, p.404–405.

3

Cf.MajidFakhry,A History of Islamic Phi-losophy, Columbia University Press, NewYork 1983; second edition: Longman, Lon-don1983,p.88.

4

Whichis:theessentialagreementofPlatoandAristotle.

5

IbnBāǧǧa(Avempace),La conduite de l’isolé et deux autres épîtres, introduction, criticaledition ofArabic text, translation and com-mentary by Charles Genequand,Vrin, Paris2010.

6

The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd, with Commentary of Moses Narboni,acriticaledi-tionandannotated translationbyKalmanP.Bland,The JewishTheologicalSeminaryofAmerica,NewYork1982.

7

Avempace, Iṭṭiṣāl al-‘aql bi-l-insān, § 15:Fa bi-ḥuṣūl al-ma’qūlāt taḥduṯ aš-šahwa al-muḥarrika ilä-l-fikrwamā yakūn ‘anhuwabi-hāḏihihuwaaš-šaḫṣinsānlābi-tilka.

8

Ibid.,§25:lazimaminḏālikara’yyašbihuahlat-tanāsuḫ.



montothem,andsoitwouldgoonwithoutanend”.9ButAvempacedifferen-tiatesbetweentwotypesofconcepts–aconceptthatisdrawn(directly)from(perceived)individualthings,andaconceptthatwecanhaveofthatwhichweneversaw,forexampleofsomeexoticanimal.Thislatterconceptexists,inaway,asanabstract,anditis‘oneinnumber’becauseitisnot‘plural’bybeingconnectedwithamultitudeofrealindividualsfromwhichitisdrawn.Forexample,apersonwhoknowsthesoulthankstoscience,saysAvempace,receivesconceptswhichhedrawsfromthescience of the soul–whichmeansfromthat‘whichstandsfortheindividual’,i.e.fromthatwhichisbothintheimaginationandin‘commonsense’(al-ḥiss al-muštarak)–andnotfromthesoul itself. Inotherwords,conceptsdrawnfromscienceexistabstractedly,drawnfromabstractconcepts(inthewaythe‘individual’conceptsaredrawnfromrealindividuals).10Fromthisweobtainan(indirect)answertotheques-tionwhetherintellectisoneforallmen.Inhavingconnectionwithconceptsdrawn from real individual objects, and as such connectedwith (multiple)persons perceiving those individual objects, the intellect is not one for allmen:“Bythis,theirintellectsbecomemultiple,anditisthoughtthatintellectismultiplebecausethatwhichisrelativeisrelativetothatwhichisrelatedtoit.Andsincetheconceptknowntothemissomethingwhichisrelative,andbecausetheindividualstowhichitisrelatedaremultiple,therelationofconceptofmantotheindividualofthatconceptwhentheconceptregardsǦarīrisnotidenticalwiththerelationofconceptofmanwhichregardsImrū’-l-Qays.”11

Ontheotherhand,whenithasapurelyabstractconceptforitsobject(notaconceptdrawnfromarealobject),intellectis‘one’.12Inthatcase‘oneness’ofhumanintellectisreflectedinthatwhichcouldbecalledabstractthinking:“Asregardsintellectthatforitsobjecthasitself,itsconceptdoesnothaveaspiritualformwhichwouldbeitssubject.[Insuchacase]intellectisunderstoodastheconceptofwhatisthought,anditisoneandnotmultiple,becauseitisdeprivedoftherelationbywhichtheformiscon-nectedtothematter.”13

Therearethreelevelsofcognition.Thefirstone,whichAvempacecallsnatu-ral, isthelevelonwhichtheconceptsareconnectedtomaterialforms,thelevelonwhichtheconceptisknowninaccordancetomaterialobjects(or-dinarypeoplebeingattentivefirst to thematerialformsandonlyafter thatto theconcepts).The second is the levelof theoretical cognition,which istheculminationofnaturalcognition(atheoristpayingattentionfirstofalltotheconcepts,payingattention to thematerialobjectsonlybecauseof theirconcepts).Thethirdlevelisreachedonlybyblessedones,i.e.bythosewhodirectlycontemplatetheobjectofcognition,evenidentifyingthemselveswithit.TakingtheSunasanexample,Avempaceexplainsthatthosehavingtheo-reticalknowledgeknowconceptsindirectly,aswhenwelookatthereflectionoftheSuninthewater,andthatordinarypeople,onthefirstlevel,lookattheimageofthereflection oftheSun.Onthethirdlevel,theblessedonesdirectlycontemplatetheobjectofcognitionitself.Seeing,saysAvempace,isformimpressedintosight.Thisformexiststhankstothelight,becauseofit;itcouldimpressitselfintosightinthedarkaswell,notonlyindaylight.Incognitionintellecthasthesamerolelighthasinper-ceiving.“Toknowsomething–hesays–meansthatthepersonwhoknowsknowstheattributeoftheobjectofknowledge,andthisisitsconcept.Topassjudgmentonindividualthings[towhich]thatconceptbelongsinacertainmomentislikeacting:thefacultyinwhichtheconceptisbeingimpressedisliketheeye,andtheintellect[i.e.‘aql,which–asweshallseefurtheroninthetext–meansthinking aswell;D.B.]islikeseeing,whichistheformimpressedintosight.Andin



thesamewaythatformexiststhankstothelight–lightisthatwhichmakesitexistin actu,soitisimpressedintothesensethankstothelight–thesameistrueoftheintellectin actu;itisbythisintellect–whichisnotindividual–thatformbecomes‘something’andbecomesimpressedintofaculty.Andastheformwhichisseen–notonlythelight–istheguide,sotheguidethatleadsintherightdirectionistheintellectin actu.”14

Thosewhoareonthelevelofnaturalcognitionaresimilartothosewhoseetheobjects(orasAvempacesays:thecolours)inacaveonlyinthedarkorintheshadow.Thosewhohavetheoreticalknowledgearesimilartothosewhohavecameoutofthecaveandintothedaylight,andtheyseetheobjects(i.e.colours)astheyare.“Butthesituationoftheblessedones–hesays–[issuchthat]thereisnothingsimilartotheirseeing,becausetheyidentifythemselveswiththething[theyarelookingat].”15

Thismeansthatthehighestformofcognitionistheforminwhichthecogni-zantwouldidentifyhimself/itselfwiththeobjectofcognition.Andthishap-penswhentheobjectofcognitionoftheintellectistheintellectitself–theinsightattainedis“man’sultimateself-sufficienthappiness,andthenthemostsublimeobjectsofspeculationarecontemplateddirectly”.16Speakingofthisformofcognition,Avempacesaysthatitis“thepinnacleoflife”.Thisformofcognitionisthemostperfectformof‘beingone’(tawaḥḥud)withtheobjectofcognition.Itisthatformofcognitionthatcanbereachedby‘thesolitary’(al-mutawaḥḥid)fromhisrisāla on‘thesolitarybeing’.Thusthesubjectofthisrisāla isintellectastheobjectofcognition–the cog-nized intellect.Andsincemanisanindividualpersonthankstointellect,i.e.

9

Ibid.,§26:anyakūnali-l-ma’qūlallaḏī‘indīwa‘indakma’qūlyu‘ammihāwaḏālika-l-ma’qūlyakūnuayḍan‘indīwa‘indakfayakūnulahuma’qūlāḫarwaḏālikailämālānihāya.

10

This refers towhatAvempace differentiates(inTadbīr al-mutawaḥḥid)as“universalspir-itualforms”and“individualspiritualforms”(i.e.formsdrawnfromrealobjects);“univer-sal spiritual form” is ‘one in number’, and“individual spiritual forms” are not ‘one innumber’.

11

Ibid.,§37:Wabi-ḏālikatatakaṯṯar‘uqūluhumfa-yuẓann anna al-‘aql kaṯīrwaḏālika annaal-muḍāfa muḍāf li-mā huwa muḍāf ilayhiwa li-mā kāna al-ma‘na al-ma‘qūl ‘inda-hummuḍāfanwa ašḫāṣ iḍāfatuhu kaṯīra fa-inna iḍāfatahu ma‘qūl al-insān ilä ašḫāṣihi‘indaǦarīrġayriḍāfatihima‘qūlal-insāniläašḫäṣihi‘indaImri’-l-Qays.

12

Taking different possibilities into accounttheword‘aqlandhowitcanbeunderstood,see further in this articlewhere it is shownthat ‘aql translatesnotonly theGreeknoūs,buttheGreeknoēsisaswell.Thisdifferenceinunderstandingof theterm‘aqlmaybeofimportanceincontextssuchasthecontextofthisandpreviouscitations,and,asamatteroffact,inanycontextinwhich‘intellect’canbeunderstoodas‘intellection’.

13

Avempace,Iṭṭiṣāl al-‘aql bi-l-insān,§38:Fa-amāal-‘aqlallaḏīma‘qūluhuhuwabi-‘aynihifa-ḏālika laysa lahu ṣūratan rūḥāniyyatanmawḍū’atan lahu fa-l-‘aql yufham minhumā yufham min al-ma‘qūl wahuwa wāḥidġayrmutakaṯṯiriḏqadḫalāminal-iḍafaallatīyunāsibbihāaṣ-ṣūrafī-l-hayūlä.

14

Ibid.,§46:Wama‘nä-l-‘ilmbi-’š-šay’huwaanyakūna ‘inda-l-‘ālimbihimaḥmūlahuwahuwama‘qūluhuwa-l-qaḍā’‘aläašḫāṣḏālika-l-ma‘qūl fīwaqt dūnawaqt yašbihu as-sa’ywa-l-quwwa allatī yartasimu fīha al-ma‘qūltašbihu al-‘ayn wa-l-‘aql yašbihu al-ibṣārwa huwa aṣ-ṣūra al-murtasima fī-l-baṣr wakamā anna tilka-ṣ-ṣūra hiya bi-ḍ-ḍū’ fa-innaaḍ-ḍū’ayūǧaduhabi-l-fi‘lwabihiyartasimufī-l-ḥāssafa-kaḏālikaal-‘aqlbi-l-fi’lbi-ḏālika‘aql allaḏī laysa lahu šaḫṣ yuṣīru šay’an-māwa yartasimu fī-l-quwwa wa kamā annahāḏihi aṣ-ṣūra al-mubṣara hiya hg-hādiya lāaḍ-ḍū’ al-mufrad kaḏālika hāḏa al-‘aql bi-l-fi‘lhuwaal-hādī.

15

Ibid., § 48:Wa amā ḥāl as-su‘adā’ fa-laysalahāfī-l-ibṣāršibhiḏyuṣīrūnahumaš-šay’.

16

Ibid.,§38:Wahuwaas-sa‘ādaal-quṣwäal-insāniyya al-mutawaḥḥida wa ‘inda ḏālikayušahidual-mušāhidal-‘aẓīma.



thankstothinking,17itcouldbesaidthattherisālaisaboutman’sself-cog-nizance.(InthatrespectthetextmakesawholewithAvempace’sothertworisālāt–withtheRisāla al-wiḍā‘andTadbīr al-mutawaḥḥid–becauseinthisrisāla, aswellasintheothertwo,thesubjectreallyishowmancanriseuptohisultimateperfectionbytheintellectualandmoralmeansathisdisposal.)

Possible different interpretations of the ‘conjunction’ with the active intellect

Nowsomethingshouldbesaidaboutdifferentpossibleinterpretationsoftheideaof‘conjunctionwiththeactiveintellect’.Avempacementionsthe‘activeintellect’inhisEpistle on the Solitary Being,anddoesnotmention it in therisāla underconsiderationhere,namely therisālaOn the Conjuction of the Intellect with Man.Still,virtuallyall thosewhohavecommentedonhistheoryofcognition–startingwithhiscontem-poraryIbnṬufayl(*cca.1105†1185)–sayheseestheprocessofthinkingas‘union’withtheActiveIntellect(asAl-FārābīandAvicennado).So,althoughhedoesnotmentionthe‘activeintellect’intherisāla On the Conjunction of Intellect with Man,itisstillofinteresttotrytoinvestigatewhathisunder-standingofthe‘activeintellect’–whichplaysthekeyroleincognitiontheoryofallArabphilosophers–mightbe.ThefactthatAvempacedoesnotmentionthe‘activeintellect’inthisrisālaalonemightsuggestthathisunderstandingofitisdifferentfromthatofAl-Fārābī.Inthisrisālahespeaksofa“conjunctionofintellectwithman”,andthis suggests that Genequand’s interpretation of the meaning of the wordiṭṭiṣāl as‘continuity’ratherthan‘conjunction’18–bearinginmindtheconti-nuityofman’sthinking–isacceptable.Still,Avempacedoesmention‘activeintellect’inhisotherrisālāt.Forexample,intherisāla On the Solitary Being(Tadbīr al-mutawaḥḥid)–wherehealternativelyusesexpressions‘aql fā’iland‘aql fa“āl –hesaysthatspiritualformswhicharenotprocuredbysensesandnatureareprocuredbythe‘activeintellect’,andthatbyreachingthelevelofthe‘activeintellect’manreacheshishighestperfectionandhisutmosthap-piness.So,thismeansthattoAvempacetheconceptofthe‘activeintellect’was,ofcourse,known,andthatheusesit(althoughnotinaperfectlyconsist-entway),andthisisreasonenoughtotrytoseewhathehadinmindwhenusingtheconcept.Ashasbeenalreadysaid,mostofthosewhohavecommentedonAvempacethinkheunderstoodtheconceptof‘activeintellect’asdidAl-Fārābī,i.e.asanameforthetenth(thelowest)of“celestialintellects”,whichemanatefromtheFirstPrinciple, and theconceptof ‘conjunction’asa formof“mystic”unionofman’sintellectwiththattenthcelestialintellect.Avempacewasin-terpretedinthiswaybyIbnṬufaylandbyAverroës,andalmostallmodernscholars–suchasAl-‘Alawī,A.Altmann,C.d’Ancona,E.I.J.Rosenthalandothers(exceptCh.Genequand)–adheretothatinterpretation.Forexample,intheHistory of Islamic Philosophy,19inwhichachapterisdedicatedtoAvem-pace,LennE.GoodmansaysthatAvempace–likeAl-FārābīandAvicenna– believes that knowledge is not gainedonly by the senses, that universalandnecessarynotionsarerealizedthroughtheassistanceoftheActiveIntel-lect,which is the incorporeal celestial intelligence governing the sublunarsphere.Asanargumentinsupportofthat,GoodmancitesAvempace’stextWuqūf ‘alä-l-‘aql al-fa“āl(whichcouldbetranslatedasComprehending the Active Intellect,orUnderstanding the Active Intellect).Contrarytothat,Ch.



GenequandbelievesfirmlythatAvempace’sideaoftheactiveintellectises-sentiallydifferent.ItishisopinionthatAvempacedoesnotconceiveactiveintellectasaseparatedivine(celestial)entity,forwhichhebelievestofindtextualsupportintherisāla On the Solitary Being,whereAvempaceputs‘ac-tiveintellect’(callingit,aswesaid,alternatively‘aql fā‘iland‘aql fa“āl)inthesamecategorywithso-called‘acquiredintellect’(‘aql mustafād);moreo-ver,Genequandsaysthatthoseintellects,accordingtoAvempace,areone and the same entity.Basedonthis,GenequandelaboratedhisowninterpretationofAvempace’s understanding of the ‘active intellect’.According toGene-quand’sinterpretation,itisatheoryofactiveintellectbeingsimplythehigh-estfunctionofman’sintellect.HesaysthatAvempace,speakingof‘conjunc-tion’,doesnothaveinmindaunionorfusionwiththeActiveIntellectasthetenthemanationfromtheFirstPrincipleina“mystic”,“vertical”sense,buthasinmindonly,sotospeak,a“horizontal”continuityofman’sintellectthathasreachedthehighestlevelofitsactivity.SoGenequandunderstandstheti-tleoftherisāla differently,explainingthatIṭṭiṣāl al-‘aql bi-l-insānshouldbeunderstoodasContinuity (orintegrality)of theIntellect in Man,asanexpres-sionoftheideathatmancanthinkinacontinuousmanner.20Althoughques-tioningthetitleoftherisāla (whichisIṭṭiṣāl al-‘aql bi-l-insān),remindingthereaderthattherisāla isaletterwhichhasbeen“putintocirculation”onlyafterthedeathoftheauthor,Genequand(inhiseditionoftheArabtextandinhistranslation)keepsthetraditionallyestablishedtitle(forobviousalthoughnotexpressedreasons:Avempace’stextbearsthistitleinallbibliographiesandlibrarycatalogues).AlthoughGenequand’sinterpretation(especiallytakingintoaccountthetextofthisrisālaandthetextofotherworksbyAvempace)is,tomymind,cor-rectandwellargued,Ithinkyetanotherargumentcouldbeputforward.First,ifwe look in adictionary searching for themeaningof theword ‘aql,wewillfindthatS.M.Afnan’sdictionary21saysthatArabic‘aqltranslatesnotonly theGreeknoūs (Metaphysics 1074b20), but theGreeknoēsis (Meta-physics1074b36)aswell. InsupportAfnancitesseveralexamples, twoofwhichcouldbecitedhere:“Thinkingisnotbutcognitionoftheconstitutionof existing things and of their order” fromAverroës’Tahāfut;22 or “Whenthe rational soul acquires knowledge, its activity is called thinking”, fromAvicenna’sRisāla an-nafs.23Bearingthismeaningoftheword‘aqlinmind,itwouldbepossible tosuppose that‘aql fa“ālcanreallybe interpretedasanexpressionforthehighestfunctionofintellect,thattheexpressioniṭṭiṣāl bi-l-‘aql fa“ālpointstothehighestformofthinking.Afnan’sdictionary,forexample,‘aql fa“āl –besidetheLatintranslation‘intellectusagens’ –citestheEnglishtranslation‘activeintelligence’andtheFrenchtranslation‘intel-

17

Cf.ibid.,§15.

18

Cf.IbnBāǧǧa,La conduite de l’isolé et deux autres épîtres,p.63.

19

Cf. History of Islamic Philosophy, ed. bySeyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman,Routledge,London–NewYork2007.

20Cf.IbnBāǧǧa,La conduite de l’isolé et deux autres épîtres,“Introduction”,p.63.

21SoheilM.Afnan,A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic,DarEl-MashreqPublish-ers,Beirut1969.

22Al-‘aql laysa huwa šay’an akṯar min idrākniẓāmal-ašyā’al-mawǧūdawatartībaha.

23

An-nafs an-nāṭiqa iḏā aqbalat ilä-l-‘ulūmsummiyafi‘luha‘aqlan.



ligenceactive’.TheFrenchdictionaryRobertsaysthat‘intelligence’doesnotmeanonly‘intellect’,but‘l’ensembledesfunctionmentalesayantpourobjetlaconnaissanceconceptuelleetrationelle’aswell,andtheAmericanWebstersaysthat‘intelligence’means‘capacityforreasoning,manifestationofsuchcapacity’,etc.Suchanunderstandingoftheterm‘aql dismissesthenecessityofinveterateinterpretationofthe‘conjunctionwiththeActiveIntellect’asamysticunionwithadivineentity.So,ifwetranslatetheword‘aqlnotas‘intellect’butas‘intelligence’(whichmeans‘thinking’ or‘reasoning’),wecancertainlyun-derstandthatAvempace’stitlecanbetranslated/understoodasContinuity of Thinking in Man,orContinuity of Man’s Thinking.Besides,dictionarysaysthattheexpression iṭṭaṣala bi-nāmeans‘wecametoknow’,which,asitseems,notranslatororinterpretertookintoaccount.Basedonthis, it isplausibletounderstandthetitleIṭṭiṣāl al-ʻaql bi-l-insānasMan’s Cognizance of the Intellect.WhenAvempace’srisālahasbeenreadandunderstood,itwillbeclearthatitisexactlyaboutthat;itisatreatiseonhowmancognizeshisownintellect.Andsince,accordingtohim,manbe-comesanindividualthankstohisintellectorthankstothinking,thetreatiseisaboutman’sself-cognizance.

What is Averroës’s understanding of iṭṭiṣāl bi-l-‘aql al-fa‘‘āl?

Theunderstandingofiṭṭiṣāl bi-l-‘aql al-fa“āl as‘conjunction’or‘union’ withtheActive Intellect (asdator formarum) is sodeep-rooted that it is, aswealreadysaid,almostautomaticallyascribed toallMuslimphilosophers, re-gardlessoftheirgeneralphilosophical“ideology”,equallytoAl-FārābīandAvicennaastoAvempaceandAverroës.But,aswehaveseen,itisreasonableenoughtorejectsuchaninterpretationofAvempace’snoetictheory,andwewilltrytoshowthatitcanbeequallyrejectedconcerningAverroës.AtthebeginningofhisEpistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Ac-tive Intellect,Averroësexpressesthepurposeoftherisāla bysaying:“Thepurposeofthistreatiseistoinvestigatewhetherornotitispossiblefortheintellectwithinus,theso-calledhylic[intellect],ultimatelytoapprehendtheseparateforms.”24

Thisandotherstatementsinwhichthereismentionof‘separateforms’wasoneofthemainreasonswhymanyinterpreters,fromThomasAquinasinthefourteenthcentury toMunkandRenan in the twentiethcentury,werecon-vincedthatAverroës’‘activeintellect’waswhatAl-Fārābī,Avicenna,orIbnṬufaylcalled‘ActiveIntellect’,i.e.thetenthemanationfromtheFirstPrinci-ple.Butthetreatiseitselfprovidesargumentsthatthisisnotthecase.SpeakingoftheactiveintellectinhisEpistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active IntellectAverroësexplicitlysays:“We say: thatActive Intellect conjoins with us from the outset by conjunction of in-exist-ence.”25

Essentially,thismeansthatman’sintellectisthesubject,i.e.supportorsub-stratum,oftheactiveintellect,theactiveintellectbeingtheformconjoinedwithasubject!Averroëscontinuesbysaying:“The[Active]Intellect,inthisrespect,isourform;butinsofaraswecausethepotentialintellectwithinus[…]topassfrompotentialitytoactuality,itisas it were apartfromthehylicintellect.Thefunctionanditsconjunctionwithitseemstoresemblemoretheconjunction of form in mat-



terthanitdoestheconjunction of agent with effect.Thewell-knowndifferencebetweenagentandeffectisthattheagentisexternal,buthere there is no external agent.”26

ThisquotestatesclearlythatAverroësdoesnotseetheactiveintellectastheagent that issomethingapart fromman’s intellectandwhichcausesman’sthinkingorreasoningfromtheoutside,letalonefromabove.Averroëscomparestherelationofactiveintellecttothehylicintellect27withapotter“alreadyimmersedintheclay”,sothattheactiveintellectisaformwhichconjoinswiththehylicintellect“inaconjunctionofin-existence,notaconjunctionofperception”.28Withthisheobviouslywantstosaythattheactiveintellectisnotreachedbyperceivingorcognizingit(ashappenswhenmanperceivesorcognizesacelestialsubstance),becauseitiswithinthehylicintellect.Whydoesnotmanapprehendtheactiveintellectfromtheoutset,althoughAverroëssaysthatitiswithinusfromtheoutset,thatactiveintellect“con-joinswith us from the outset by conjunction of in-existence”?The obsta-cleis theexistenceoftheso-called‘acquiredintellect’,whoseexistenceinmaniscausedbyman’snature,and‘acquiredintellect’isstilldefinedbyitspotentiality.Soonlywhenitreachesitsfinalentelechy(whenitisdivestedofanypotentiality)doesit‘conjoin’withtheactiveintellectinanewway,whichisnolongera“conjunctionofdeficientwiththeperfect”buta“betterconjunction”,aconjunctionthatpossessesafunctionthatrendersitunique.Andthatfunction“isnothingotherthantheconceptionofActiveIntellectbytheacquiredintellect”.29Whatdoesthismean?Itmeansthat‘conjunctionbyin-existence’(whichisgivenfromtheoutset)doesnotmakethecognitionofactiveintellectpossibleper se,i.e.justbybeingthere.Onlya“higher”formofconjunction,“conjunctionbyperception”,30makescognitionoftheactiveintellectpossible.ButwhatofAverroës’statementthatthishigherformofconjunctionbycog-nizanceis“theapprehensionoftheseparate,ActiveIntellect,bytheacquiredintellect”?31Itmayseemthat,insayingofactiveintellectthatitisseparate,he indeedmight have had inmind a celestial, divine substance. Firstly, itshouldbenotedthatby‘separate’he(practicallyalways)means‘abstract’,i.e.‘separatedfrommatter’,and–accordingtoAverroës’doctrine–intellectassuchis‘separatedfrommatter’.Secondly,asregardswritingActiveIntel-lectwithacapitalletter,itshouldbenoted(andstressed)thatitisuptothetranslator’sfreeinterpretation,sinceinHebrew(inwhichtheEpistlearrived

24

The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd,p.23(Hebrewtextonp.4).

25

Ibid.,p.45 (Hebrew textonp.43).Hereaselsewhere in the passages cited fromAver-roës’ text, the capital inActive Intellect is atranslator’s choice, which suggests that hisinterpretation ofAverroës’ understanding isdifferentfromours.

26

Ibid.(italicD.B.).

27

Averroës’expressionforman’sintellectwhenitisinastateofpotentiality forthinking.

28

Ibid.,p.46.

29

Ibid.,p.46(CapitalAinActive intellectisthetranslator’s–interpretative–choice,sinceinArabictherearenocapitalletters).

30

Ibid.,p.46.

31

Ibid., p. 48 (again, capital letters are K. P.Bland’schoice).



tous),aswellasinArabic,therearenocapitalletters.Averroës(afewlinesearlierinthesamesectionofthetext)speaksof“apprehensionofthelowerby the higher”, but in noway could itmean ‘earthly by celestial’, it onlymeans‘ahigherformofintellect’and‘alowerformofintellect’,activebeinghigher,hylicandacquiredbeinglower,aswillbeshown.Bethatasitmay,whatAverroësdoesmeanhere(inSectionsevenoftheEpistle)bysayingthatactiveintellectapprehendstheacquiredintellectisthatthehigheraspect(orform)ofintellectalways“apprehends”theloweraspect(orform)thankstothemerefactthatitisthe“higher”aspect(orform),while(asalreadysaid)theacquired intellect,being the lower form,canapprehendactive intellectasahigherformofintellectonlywhenitreachesitsfinalperfection.Whatdoesthismean?Whatthisapprehensionof(higher)activeintellectby(lower)acquiredintellectmeanshasbeenhintedatbythestatementthatthefunctionrendering theconjunctionbycognizanceunique is “nothingother than theconceptionoftheActiveIntellectbytheacquiredintellect”.32

Butfirstweshouldseewhatthe‘acquiredintellect’meansforAverroës.Sincetheso-called‘hylicintellect’–whichreceiveditsnamebecauseofbeingpas-sive (hylēbeingessentiallypassive,becauseitisreadyto“receive”anypos-sibleform)–isman’sintellectwhileonlyin potentia,notbeingactive,butready for acquiring intelligibles, thatwhich is called ‘acquired intellect’ isman’sintellectwhenithasacquiredintelligibles.Butitshouldbeborneinmindthattheacquiredintellectstillhasacharacterofpotentiality,sinceitcanbeperfected;theacquiringofintelligiblesisonlyitsfirstentelechy.Whenitreachesitsultimateentelechy,it–aswehaveseen–“apprehends”theactiveintellect.Andfinally,whentheactiveintellecthasbeenapprehendedbytheacquired intellect, the latter, saysAverroës, isobliterated.So, theacquiredintellectisaconditionforthecoming-to-beoftheactiveintellect.AsAver-roëssays:“Theexistenceofthisintellect[i.e.theacquiredintellect]atthelevelofitsfirstentelechy[i.e.whenitconceivesintelligibles]isaconditionforthis[ultimate]existence.”33

Andhecontinuesremindingthereaderthat,althoughthe“weaker”formisaconditionforthecoming-to-beofthe“stronger”one,the“stronger”oneal-waysdoesawaywiththe“weaker”one,justas“theexistenceofthesensiblefacultyisoneof theconditionsfor theimaginativefaculty,afterwhichthesensiblenolongerremains”.34So,whentheacquiredintellectbecomesreadyto“apprehend”anddoes“apprehend”theactiveintellect,itnolongerco-ex-istswithit,asitdidwhenitwasnotabletocognizeit.Inaway,itcouldbesaid,by“apprehending”theactiveintellectitbecomesit,and,consequently,nolongerremainsasalowerform;itceasestoexist.Now,ifwerecapitulate,weshouldsaythefollowing.Manpossessesintellect,whichassuchiscalled‘hylicintellect’(compared,becauseofitspotential-ity,tohylēastheprimematterwhichhasnoform,butpotentiallyisreadytoreceiveanyform).Whenthis‘hylic’intellectbecomesin actu (i.e.whenitbeginstocognizerealthingsbyproducingconceptsfromthem),itbecomes‘acquiredintellect’.Itisclearthat‘hylicintellect’and‘acquiredintellect’aretwoaspects–orfunctions–ofthesameincorruptibleimmaterialsubstance.When this substance finally becomes able to think itself as an immaterialincorruptiblesubstance,itreachesitshighestlevelandiscalled‘activeintel-lect’.Therefore,Averroës’theoryofconjunctionwiththeactiveintellectis,infact,adescriptionoftheprocessofman’scognition.Thisprocessgoeslikethis:throughhissensesmanperceivesthingsandbythepowerofhisintel-lect“turns”themintoconcepts,then“works”withthemandproduceshigher



notionsof immaterialsubstances,becomingmoreperfect throughthis,andfinallyreachesthehighestlevelbycognizingitselfassuchasubstance.Inthisprocess–whosepeakisthepurposeofman’slife–threeaspectsofman’sin-tellectperformtheirfunction,eachofthembecomingtheother,higheraspect:the‘hylicintellect’,which–beingtheuniversalpotentialstructureofhumanthinking– forAverroës is ‘eternal’ and ‘incorruptible’, the ‘acquired intel-lect’,whichisintellectin actu,andwhich–beingdependentonbodilyfacul-ties–forAverroësiscorruptible,andthe‘activeintellect’,whichiseternalandincorruptiblebeing,thethinkingessenceoftheimmortalsoul.Hewantstoshowthatman’ssoulisabletoapprehendandcognizeseparate,immaterialsubstances,althoughstillbeingunitedwiththebody,becauseintellect(whichisoneofthesoul’sfunctions)apprehendingitselfasintellectisapprehendingaseparate(i.e.immaterial),autonomoussubstance.Therefore,onecouldbefairlycertaininsayingthat,affirmingthepossibilityofconjunctionwiththeactiveintellect,Averroësdidnothaveinmindakindofmysticunionwithadivinesubstance.Thefact thathespeaksof‘activeintellect’as‘eternal’,doesnotcontradictit;weshouldbearinmindwhatthenotionof‘eternal’heremeansforAverroës.Forhim,the‘eternity’ofintellect(inits‘guise’of‘activeintellect’)reflectsthefactthatintellectisa‘separate’substance(separatefrommatter,i.e.abstract,andassuch‘eternal’).Byhav-ingitselfforthe‘object’ofapprehension,it‘becomes’onewiththeobjectofitsownknowledge,andthroughthisbecomes‘activeintellect’,which,asanotionofthe‘object’ofknowledge,is‘eternal’,justasanyothernotion,be-causeitisnotdependentonmatter.‘Eternity’ofactiveintellectin‘practical’termscanbeunderstoodaseternityofnotions,i.e.ideasthat,assuch,cannotperish,andinspeakingof‘possibility’of‘conjunction’withtheactiveintel-lectAverroës issimplysaying thatnotallmenarecapableof reaching thehighestlevelofcognizance.

Understandings of active intellect may be different, but its function is one

Inconclusion,itcanbesaidthattheissueoftheactiveintellectinIslamicphi-losophyisnotdisambiguous.Differentphilosophersunderstoodthisexpres-siondifferently, fordifferent thinkers itwasadifferentconcept.Al-Fārābī,Avicenna,IbnṬufayl–incongruencewiththeiressentiallyNeoplatonistema-nationtheory–speakingof‘activeintellect’definitelyhadinmindadivine,separated,celestialIntellectwhichactsdirectlyonthesublunarworld,amongother thingsby inspiringman’s reason inwhich itproduces ‘separate’, i.e.abstract,notions,enablingittoapprehend“higher”forms.Ontheotherhand,aswe tried to show, other thinkers, likeAvempace andAverroës, saw thehighestfunctionofman’sintellectinthe‘activeintellect’,which,byappre-hendingitselfasa‘separated’,i.e.abstract,substance,reachesitsperfection.AsAverroës says in hisMiddle Commentary on Metaphysics, interventionofa‘separated’(celestial)intellectintheworldofgenerationandcorruptionisimpossiblebecausetheactionofanimmaterialintellecttakesplaceonlywithinitself.IfwekeepinmindwhathesaysinTahāfut at-tahāfut –i.e.that

32

Ibid.,p.46.

33

Ibid.,p.50–51.

34

Ibid.,p.51.



thecausedoesnotcommunicatetoitseffectthatwhichtheeffectdoesnotpossess in itself in potentia–wecanconclude that the right interpretationwouldbethatAverroësseesthe‘conjunction(iṭṭiṣāl)withtheactiveintellect’ascontinuity(whichisoneofthemeaningsofiṭṭiṣāl)inman’sthinking,con-tinuitythatbrings‘hylicintellect’fromperceivingrealthings,derivingcon-ceptsfromthem,sothatitbecomes‘acquiredintellect’,and,finallytothinkessentiallyabstractconcepts, thathavenoconnection toanythingmaterial,andamongthemthinking/apprehending/cognizingitselfassuch,reachingbythisitshighestperfection.The same can be said ofAvempace.Ch.Genequand stresses the fact thatAvempacespeaksofthe‘intellect’inmostofcaseswithoutanyotherqualifi-cation,disregardingalldefinitionsofdifferentintellects.35SoitisnoaccidentthatAvempacebeginshisrisāla onThe Conjunction of Intellect with Manbyexplainingthemeaning/meaningsofthenotionof‘one’(wāḥid),butaneces-saryintroductiontothediscussionof‘unity’ofintellect,i.e.ofshowingthatintellectisoneasawholeis‘one’,regardlessofthemultiplicityofobjectsitapprehends.Whenintellect,attheendofitsascensiontoeverhigherdegrees,turns to itself, it becomes (according to theAristotelian theory) ‘identical’toitselfanditsperfectunitycomesintobeing.Intheframeworkofsuchaprocess,thereisnoneedforascensiontowardsamysticunionwithacelestialdivineentity.Finally, it should be said that to think ideasmeans thinking thatwhich is‘separated’ (frommatter),which is immaterial,which is only thinkable; itmeanstoproduceideas,toproducethatwhichisthinkable.Andthatispre-ciselywhat‘activeintellect’doesinbothtypesofunderstandingofwhatthe‘activeintellect’is.

Daniel Bučan

‘Djelatni um’ kod Avempacea i Averroësa: interpretativni problem

SažetakTema ogleda je razumijevanje pojma djelatnog uma u Ibn Bāǧǧe (Avempacea) i Ibn Rušda (Averroësa). Tradicionalno tumačenje Avempaceova i Averroësova koncepta ‘djelatni um’ jest da ga obojica razumijevaju kao najnižu nebesku umnost, koja je datorformarum, te da čovjek misli i spoznaje pojamnine jedino »povezujući« se s njime na gotovo mistički način, i da se spo-znavanje sastoji u tome da čovjekovu umu djelatni um pribavlja ideje (formae, odnosno pojmo-ve). Autor vjeruje da je i u Avempaceovoj i u Averroësovoj spoznajnoj teoriji pojam djelatnoga uma tek najviša funkcija ljudskoga uma, a ne neki nebeski entitet. Na takovoj pretpostavci te na raščlambi Avempaceove teorije zasniva se tumačenje po kojemu pojam iṭṭiṣālbi-‘aqlfa‘‘āl nije neka vrsta mističke »spregnutosti«, odnosno »sjedinjenosti« s nekim nebeskim entitetom, nego postizanje najviše razine funkcioniranja čovjekova uma u procesu mišljenja. Isto vrijedi za Averroësovu teoriju koja je prilično jasno izložena u njegovoj Poslaniciosprezisdjelatnimumom, u kojoj se može naći praktično izravna potvrda takove interpretacije, jer Averroës kaže da je »sprezanje s njime, čini se, više nalik spregnutosti oblika s tvarju no što bi bilo nalik sprezi činitelja s učinom. Dobro znana razlika između činitelja i učina je u tome što je činitelj izvanjski, a tu nema takovoga izvanjskog činitelja«, odnosno djelatni um je »s nama povezan od početka povezanošću su-bitka«, što znači da je čovjekov um podmet djelatnome umu. Autor zaključuje da pitanje djelatnoga uma u islamskoj filozofiji nije jednoznačno – za razne mislioce to je razli-čit koncept – jedino je funkcija djelatnog uma uvijek jedna ista: proizvođenje ideja.

Ključne riječispoznaja,tvarnium,odjelovljenium,djelatnium



Daniel Bučan

„Aktiver Intellekt“ bei Avempace und Averroës: ein interpretatives Problem

ZusammenfassungDieser Aufsatz handelt vom Verständnis des Begriffs des aktiven Intellekts bei Ibn Bāǧǧa (Avempace) und Ibn Ruschd (Averroës). Die traditionelle Interpretation von Avempaces und Averroës’ Begriff des aktiven Intellekts lautet, beide würden ihn als die niedrigste himmlische Intelligenz auslegen, die datorformarum sei, und der Mensch denke und erkenne Intelligibles nur durch das „Verbinden“ damit in einer quasimystischen Weise, wobei die Erkenntnis darin bestehe, dass der aktive Intellekt dem menschlichen Intellekt Ideen (formae bzw. Begriffe) zu-kommen lasse. Der Autor glaubt, der Begriff des aktiven Intellekts sei sowohl in Avempaces als auch in Averroës’ Erkenntnistheorie erst die höchste Funktion des menschlichen Intellekts, und nicht eine himmlische Entität. Basierend auf einer solchen Vermutung sowie auf der Analyse seiner Theorie wird Avempaces Begriff iṭṭiṣālbi-‘aql fa“āl nicht als eine Art mystische „Ver-bindung“ oder „Vereinigung“ mit einem separaten himmlischen Wesen interpretiert, sondern als Erreichung der höchsten Ebene der Funktion des menschlichen Intellekts in der Kontinuität des Denkprozesses. Gleiches gilt für Averroës’ Theorie, die eher eindeutig in seiner EpistelüberdieMöglichkeitderVerbindungmitdemaktivenIntellekt ausgebaut wurde, wo man eine praktisch direkte Bestätigung für eine solche Auslegung finden kann, weil Averroës behauptet, „die Verbindung damit scheint mehr der Verbindung von Form und Materie zu ähneln, als sie der Verbindung von Agens und Wirkung ähnelt. Die wohlbekannte Differenz zwischen Agens und Wirkung besteht darin, dass das Agens extern ist, jedoch gibt es hier kein externes Agens“, bzw. dass der aktive Intellekt „sich von Anfang an mit uns verbindet durch die Verbunden-heit des In-Seins“. Der Autor kommt zu dem Schluss, die Frage des aktiven Intellekts in der islamischen Philosophie sei nicht unzweideutig – für unterschiedliche Denker war es ein an-dersartiges Konzept – lediglich die Funktion des aktiven Intellekts sei stets ein und dieselbe: Ideengenerierung.

SchlüsselwörterErkenntnis,Intellekt,hylischerIntellekt,Intellektin actu,aktiverIntellekt

Daniel Bučan

« L’intellect agent » chez Avempace et Averroès : problème interprétatif

RésuméCet essai traite de la compréhension du concept d’intellectagent chez Ibn Baja (Avempace) et Ibn Rochd (Averroès). L’interprétation traditionnelle de la notion d’intellect agent chez Avem-pace et Averroès affirme qu’il s’agit d’une forme d’intelligence céleste inférieure, le datorfor-marum,et soutient l’idée selon laquelle l’homme pense et connaît les intelligibles uniquement en « se connectant » à lui de manière quasi mystique, la connaissance consistant en ce que l’in-tellect agent amène les idées (formae, à savoir les concepts) à l’intellect de l’Homme. L’auteur pense que, dans la théorie de la connaissance d’Avempace et dans celle d’Averroès, le concept d’intellect agent représente tout au plus une fonction supérieure de l’intellect humain, et non pas une entité céleste. Sur la base de cette supposition et selon l’analyse de sa théorie, la notion de iṭṭiṣālbi-‘aqlfa‘‘āl d’Avempace n’est pas une sorte de « jonction » ou d’« union » mystique à une certaine entité céleste, mais plutôt l’acquisition du plus haut niveau de fonctionnement de l’intellect humain au sein du processus de la pensée. Il en va de même pour la théorie d’Aver-roès qui est peu ou prou exposé dans son Epîtresurlapossibilitédelajonction, où il est possible de trouver une confirmation presque directe d’une telle interprétation puisqu’il est dit que « la jonction avec l’intellect agent semble davantage ressembler à la jonction de la forme à la ma-tière plutôt qu’à la jonction de l’agent à l’effet. La différence bien connue entre l’agent et l’effet

35

Cf.IbnBāǧǧa,La conduite de l’isolé et deux autres épîtres,“Introduction”,p.60.



consiste en cela que l’agent est extérieur, alors qu’ici il n’y a pas d’agent extérieur comme tel », à savoir l’intellect agent « se joint à nous au commencement par la jonction de l’intellect à l’existence ». L’auteur conclut que la question qui se rapporte à l’intellect agent dans la philo-sophie islamique n’est pas univoque – c’est un concept qui varie selon les auteurs – et que la fonction de l’intellect agent est la seule qui reste toujours la même : la production d’idées.

Mots-clésconnaissance,intellectmatériel,intellecthylique,intellectenacte,intellectagent

Documents

‘Active Intellect’ in Avempace and Averroës: An