Admin Law Compiled Class Digests 2

8/9/2019 Admin Law Compiled Class Digests 2

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CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. SALAS

FACTS:

On October 7, 1989, Rafael M. Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal

Security Staff Member (ISS) and assigned to the Casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. ISSmembers do not directly report to the Office of the Chairman, and are subject to the control andsupervision of an Area Supervisor who only implements the directives of the Branch ChiefSecurity Officer.

The BOD of PAGCOR terminated him on Dec. 3, 1991 on the ground of loss of confidence.Salas was allegedly engaged in proxy betting in affidavits of 2 customers, claiming to havebeen used as gunners.CA reversed finding that Salas is not a confidential employee and cannotbe dismissed on that ground, applying the proximity rule enunciatedin Case 63: Grino V. CSC& Case 60: De los Santos V. Mallare. CA also held that PD 1869 Section 16 has been repealed

by Section 2 (1),Article IX-B of the Constitution.ISSUE/S:

Whether Salas is a confidential employee?

Whether the Pinero doctrine is still applicable?

HELD:

Every appointment implies confidence, but more more than ordinary confidence is reposed in theoccupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only

confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office, but primarily closeintimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom frommisgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State.

In Pinero, et. al. V. Hechanova, et. al. since the enact ment of RA 2260: the 1959 Civil ServiceAct, it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is: a.)primarilyconfidential, b.)policy determining or c.)highly technical. Senator Tanada: in the 1st instance, itis the appointing power that determines the nature of the position. In case of conflict, then it isthe Court that determines whether the position is primarily confidential or not. -Employeesoccupying various positions in the Port Patrol Division of the Bureau of Customs, which is part

of the Customs police force, is not in itself sufficient indication that there positions areprimarily confidential.

1. No. Salas position is the lowest in the chain of command. His job description is ordinary,routinary and quotidian in character. His pay is only P2,200 per month. He does not enjoy thatprimarily close intimacy which characterizes a confidential employee. Where the positionoccupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no


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longer predominant. Citing the case of Tria V. Sto. Tomas, the fact that sometimes, privaterespondent may handle ordinarily confidential matters or papers which are somewhatconfidential in nature does not suffice to characterize his position as primarily confidential.

2. Yes. PD 1869 can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in cases of

conflict.1986 Constitutional Commission Records The primary purpose of the framers of the1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as a.) primarily confidential, b.)policy determining or c.) highly technical is to exempt these categories from competitiveexaminations as a means for determining merit and fitness. It must be stressed further that thesepositions are covered by the security of tenure, although they are considered non-competitiveonly in the sense that appointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations forpurposes of determining merit and fitness.CSC Resolution 91-830 does not make PAGCORemployees confidential, merely reiterates exemption from civil service eligibility requirement .Inreversing the decision of the CSC, the CA opined that the provisions of Section 16, PD 1869may no longer be applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have been repealed in

its entirety by Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. This is not completelycorrect. On this point, we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to theeffect that Section 16 of PD 1869insofaras it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisionsof the Civil Service Law & Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987Constitution & EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987.

However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section16 which providesthat All employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as confidentialappointees. While such executive declaration emanated merely from the provisions ofImplementing Rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959 Rule XX Section 2 The power to declare a

position as: a.) primarily confidential, b.) policy determining or c.) highly technical, as definedtherein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in EO 292: Administrative Code of1987 Book V. Civil Service Commission Section 12. The Commission shall have the ff powersand functions: (9) Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarilyconfidential, highly technical or policy determining. This later enactment only serves to bolsterthe validity of the categorization made under Section 16 PD 1869.Be that as it may, suchclassification is not absolute and all-encompassing. Prior to the passage of the Civil Service Actof 1959, there were 2 recognized instances when a position may be declared primarilyconfidential: 1:when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service,

has declared the position to be primarily confidential;2:in the absence of such declaration, whenby the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the appointingpower which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment of freedom from misgivingsof betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State.

RA 2260: Civil Service Act (June 19, 1959) Section 5.The non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared


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by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policydetermining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.

General Rules Implementing PD 807: Civil Service Rules Section 1.appointments to the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy determining, primarily

confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness to bedetermined as far aspracticable by competitive examinations.

De los Santos vs Mallare

FACTS:

Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946,by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments onAugust 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and

functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an adinterimappointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, theUndersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos toreport to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office,and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored himand paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings. Thepetitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, section 4 of which reads: "No officeror employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided bylaw." It is admitted in respondents' answer that the City Engineer of Baguio "belongs to the

unclassified service."ISSUE:

WON legality of the petitioner's removal from the same office which would be the effect ofMallare's appointment if the same be allowed to stand.

HELD:

No. The removal by Santos was rightfully made in accordance with the law.

RATIO:

Citing the case of Lacson vs Romero, it is contended that only officers and employees in theclassified service should be brought within the purview of Article XII of the Constitution.Section 1 of this article ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of theGovernment shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as those whichare policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made onlyaccording to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive


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examination." The adoption of the "merit system" in government service has secured efficiencyand social justice. It eliminates the political factor in the selection of civil employees which is thefirst essential to an efficient personnel system. It insures equality of opportunity to all deservingapplicants desirous of a career in the public service. It advocates a new concept of the publicoffice as a career open to all and not the exclusive patrimony of any party or faction to be doled

out as a reward for party service.

As has been seen, three specified classes of positions policy-determining, primarilyconfidential and highly technicalare excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasureof officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These positionsinvolved the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound out with and dependent on otherpositions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that thegood of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category determinable atthe will of the officer that makes them. The office of city engineer is neither primarilyconfidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. Every appointment implies confidence,

but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarilyconfidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee forthe duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse withoutembarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential mattersof state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does notformulate a method of action for the government or any its subdivisions. His job is to executepolicy, not to make it.

Espanol v CSC

Facts:

1. The position of Regional Manager of the National Irrigation Administration, Regional OfficeNo. 2, Cauayan, Isabela, became vacant. Petitioner Perfecto Espaol was Chief of theEngineering Division, and private respondent Orlando L. Bulseco was Chief Design Engineer.

2. In the organizational chart of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), the position ofChief Design Engineer is below the Chief of the Engineering Division, and the latter isconsidered next-in-rank to the position of Regional Manager.

3. Bulseco was the one appointed to the vacant position pursuant to Resolution No. 5302-86passed by the Board of Directors of NIA prompting petitioner Espaol to file a protest with theMerit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which subsequently referred the protest to the NIAAdministrator for appropriate action. However, the protest was dismissed on the ground that "inthe evaluation conducted, Mr. Bulseco has advantage over Mr. Espaol on the factors ofperformance and potential.


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4. Espanol alleges that he is the employee next-in-rank to the position of Regional Manager and,as such, he has promotional priority over Bulseco.

5. Espanol appealed, MPSB then ordered that he be appointed as Regional Manager ruling thatthe individual qualifications of the contestants exceed the qualification requirements, especially

those of respondent Bulseco. This prompted Bulseco to appeal to the Civil Service Commissionwhich then reversed the ruling of the MPSB and held Bulsecos appointment.

Issue: Who is entitled to the promotion? Espanol or Bulseco?

Ruling: Bulseco. Bulseco was previously designated and performed his duties and functions torank of equal and next-in-rank positions as to that of Espanols as certified by the Civil ServiceCommission.

Ratio: Even if the vacancy here had been filled by promotion rather than by lateral transfer, theconcept of "next-in-rank" does not import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the

person next in rank must be appointed to the vacancy. What Section 19(3) of P.D. No. 807, theCivil Service Law, provides is that if a vacancy is filled by a promotion, the person holding theposition next in rank thereto "shall be considered for promotion.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in whomit is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee shall possessthe qualifications required by law. This is a political question involving considerations ofwisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best

qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the department head or appointing authorityand not in the Civil Service Commission

Section 19, paragraph 6, Article VIII of Presidential Decree No. 807 defines a qualified next-in-rank as an employee appointed on a permanent basis to a position previously determined to benext-in-rank to the vacancy proposed to be filled and who meets the requisites for appointmentthereto as previously determined by the appointing authority and approved by the respondentcommission.

SISON v. PANGRAMUYEN

FACTS:

In sum, petitioner would want the Court to hold that since at the time of the appointment indispute, he was Chief Deputy Assessor exercising, according to his allegation, immediateadministrative control and supervision over respondent Maliwanag, who was Senior DeputyAssessor, and inasmuch as he has superior educational and appropriate civil service eligibilities


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to those of said respondent, the appointment aforementioned extended to the latter by respondentCity Mayor is illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank. Petitionermaintains that upon the promotion of the Assistant City Assessor to the position of CityAssessor, he, petitioner, instead of respondent Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto.

Maliwanag's appointment was recommended by the City Assessor and his reasons therefor,stated in said official's indorsement to the Mayor recommending dismissal of petitioner's protestthereto and quoted in the record, are substantial and well taken, as, in fact, they have beenreviewed by respondent Commissioner and found to be sustainable, as he did sustain them.

The appointment in controversy was made on November 23, 1973 and respondent Maliwanagassumed office on the strength thereof, albeit she claims she has not been paid her salary. On theother hand, the petition herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one yearafter the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question arose. This singlecircumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner instead of respondent Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto.

HELD:

No. Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section 16 of Rule 66 invoked by privaterespondent refers to actions of quo warrantoand since his petition is alsofor certiorariand mandamus, said rule is inapplicable. Such contention is not correct. As earliernoted in this decision, the allegations supporting petitioner's cause or causes of action boil down

to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to which she has beenappointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor.

Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warrantohas to be based on a nullification o herappointment, which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate remedy,therefore, is quo warranto. Besides, even if it could be also viewed as mandamus, it is alreadysettled that his latter remedy prescribes also after one year. (Cornejo vs. Sec. of Justice, L-32818,June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663.)

And it is of no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period of more than one year, hewas seeking relief from the corresponding administrative outhorities. The resort to suchadministrative remedy does not abate the period for the judicial action. (Torres vs. Quintos, 88Phil. 436; Galano vs. Roxas, G.R. L-31241, Sept. 12, 1975, 67 SCRA 8.)


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SEPARATE OPINION:

AQUINO, J., dissenting.

Petitioner Abraham C. Sison, as the incumbent chief deputy assessor, is the qualified and

competent next-in-rank employee who should be promoted to the contested position of assistantcity assessor of Olongapo City, as contemplated in section 23 of the Civil Service Law. He isqualified for that position because he is a provincial Assessor eligible and he holds a bachelor'sdegree in commerce. Those qualifications are required for the position of assistant city assessor.

Respondent Eureka F. Maliwanag, who was appointed by the mayor to that position, is notqualified because she is not a provincial assessor eligible and she is not a holder of a bachelor'sdegree. Her appointment to the contested position is in violation of section 23. Hence, theCommissioner of Civil Service revoked that appointment in his decision of May 3, 1974.However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Commissioner approved that appointment in his

decision of June 24, 1974.It is incontestable that Sison is senior to Mrs. Maliwanag. He was appointed senior deputyassessor of Olongapo City effective September 25, 1967. Then, he was promoted to the positionof chief deputy assessor of that city on September 1, 1969. On that date, Mrs. Maliwanag wasappointed to the position of senior deputy assessor, the position vacated by Sison(pp. 62-63,Rollo).

Thus, Sison (not Mrs. Maliwanag) was next in line for the position of assistant city assessorwhen that position became vacant on November 23, 1973. There is no reason why Mrs.Maliwanag should jump over Sison. The mayor should have apprised Sison as to why he was

being bypassed and why Mrs. Maliwanag was being appointed to that position. That legalrequirement was not observed.

Although Sison's petition in this Court is for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, he has nocause of action for quo warranto because Mrs. Maliwanag holds an appointment to the contestedposition of assistant city assessor. She cannot be regarded as a usurper of that position. Sison'spetition should be treated as one for certiorari and mandamus only. Those special civil actionsare adequate for assailing the decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service. The quo warrantoaspect of Sisons's petition should be disregarded.

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not fix any period for the filing of a petitionfor certiorariand mandamus. The one-year period within which the petition for quo warrantoshould be filled does not apply to Sison. His petition was delayed because, as he explained, he isa poor man who cannot afford to embark on an expensive and protracted litigation.


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SOLEDAD M. EUGENIO,Petitioner, v. DELIA TORRIJOS

FACTS:

Respondent Torrijos was appointed to the position of Assistant Chief of the Scientific Library

and Documentation Division of the National Science Development Board. The legality of theappointment was contested by petitioner who claimed that she had preferential right to thedisputed position. Her protest was denied by the NSDB Chairman. Her appeal to the CivilService Commission did not prosper as it was found that she is not an employee next in rank;that the contested position as well as the division where it belongs are newly created offices as aresult of the implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan; that the appointee is qualifiedand eligible; and that there is absence of a showing that her selection has been the result of graveabuse or discretion of fraud. The Commissions decision dismissing the appeal was elevated tothe Presidential Assistant, Office of the President, but the decision and resolution appealed fromwas affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointing authority (NATIONAL SCIENCE DEVELOPMENT BOARD)can choose Torrijos for the said position

HELD:

On certiorari, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part ofpublic respondents as the appointing authority has discretion in the choice of who is entitledto promotion considering as the basic factor, the needs of the public service, especially

where no question may be raised as to who is the employer next in rank.

Petition dismissed.

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE CORPORATION v COURT OF APPEALS

DOCTRINE

An employee cannot be promoted, even if merely as a result of a transfer, without his consent. Atransfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aimsto lure the employee away from his permanent position cannot be done without the employeesconsent

There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that a promotionis in the nature of a gift or reward, which a person has a right to refuse.


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FACTS

1. PT&T, engaged in the business of providing telegraph and communication employedvarious employees, herein private respondents.

2. After conducting a series of studies regarding profitability of its retail operations, PT&T

came up with a Relocation Restructuring Program designed toa. Sustain its retail operationsb. Decongest surplus workforce, to promote efficiency and productivityc. Avid retrenchment of employees occupying redundant productivity

3. Herein private respondents receive letters from PT&T giving them the option to choosethe branch to which they could be transferred. PT&T offered benefits/allowances to thoseemployees who would agree to be transferred under its new program. Likewise, theemployees would agree top be transferred would be considered promoted.

4. Private respondents rejected petitioners offer.5. PT&T asked an explanation for such refusal and to justify why disciplinary action should

not be taken against them.6. Private respondents explained that it would case difficultiesbecause they would be

assigned to distant places, which would require separations from their respective families.That some of them would need to ride a boat overnight in going to their new assignment

7. Dissatisfied with this explanation, PT&T considered the refusal as an insubordination andwillful disobedience to a lawful order thus they were dismissed from work.

8. Private respondents claim that their refusal to transfer could not possibly give rise to avalid dismissal on the ground of willful disobedience, as their transfer was prejudicial andinconvenient; thus unreasonable.

Private respondents and their new assignments:

1. Jesus Paracale, from General Santos Branch to Butuan City Branch;2. Romeo Tee, from Zamboanga Branch to Jolo Branch;3. Benjamin Lakandula, from Iligan City to Butuan City;4. Avelino Acha, from Legaspi City Branch t Odiongan Branch;5. Ignacio Dela Cerna, from Pagadian City Branch to Butuan Branch;6. Guillermo Demigillo, from Midsayap to Lebak Cotabato Branch

9. PT&T contends that the transfers were made in the lawful exercise of its management

prerogative and were done in good faith.10.Respondents however claims that since their respective transfers resulted in theirpromotion, they had the right to refuse or decline the positions being offered tothem. Thus, the refusal to accept the transfer could not have amounted to insubordinationor willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the employer.

11.NLRC declared PT&T guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering to reinstate individualcomplainants-appellants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other


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privileges and to pay them full backwages from the date of their dismissal up to the date of theiractual reinstatement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the refusals of private respondents constitute willful disobedience andinsubordination which will justify their dismissal?

RULING: NO, refusal did not constitute willful disobedience. Private respondents were illegallydismissed.

[P]romotion, as we defined in Millares v, Subido, is the advancement from onepositi on to another wi th an increase in duties and responsibi li ties as author ized by law, and

usually accompanied by an increase in salary.

Apparently, the indispensable elementfor there to be a promotion is that there must be

an advancement from one position to another or an upward vertical movement of theemployees rank or position. Any increase in salary should only be considered incidental butnever determinative of whether or not a promotion is bestowed upon an employee. This can belikened to the upgrading of salaries of government employees without conferring upon the, theconcomitant elevation to the higher positions.

The admissions of the petitioner are conclusive on it. An employee cannot be promoted,even if merely as a result of a transfer, without his consent. A transfer that results in promotionor demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to lure the employee away fromhis permanent position cannot be done without the employees consent.]

There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that apromotion is in the nature of a gift or reward, which a person has a right to refuse. Hence, theexercise by the private respondents of their right cannot be considered in law as insubordination,or willful disobedience of a lawful order of the employer. As such, there was no valid cause forthe private respondents dismissal.

As the questioned dismissal is not based on any of the just or valid grounds under Article282 of the Labor Code, the NLRC correctly ordered the private respondents reinstatementwithout loss of seniority rights and the payment of backwages from the time of their dismissal upto their actual reinstateme

DISPOSITIVE: Private respondents won.


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MANGLAPUS v. MATIAS

RELEVANT LAW:PD 807, Section 24. Personnel Actions. All appointments in the career service shall be

made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive

examinations. A non-eligible shall not be appointed to any position in the civil service wheneverthere is a civil service eligible actually available for and ready to accept appointment.

As used in this Decree, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in thecivil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment throughcertification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re-employment, detail, reassignment, demotion,and separation. All personnel actions shall be in accordance with such rules, standards, andregulations as may be promulgated by the Commission.

(a) Appointment through certification. An appointment through certification to a positionin the civil service, except as herein otherwise provided, shall be issued to a person who

has been selected from a list of qualified persons certified by the Commission from anappropriate register of eligibles, and who meets all the other requirements of the position.All such persons must serve a probationary period of six months following their originalappointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation in order to acquirepermanent civil service status. A probationer may be dropped from the service forunsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity any time before the expiration of theprobationary period: Provided, That such action is appealable to the Commission.

xxx(c) Transfer. A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is ofequivalent rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of anappointment.It shall be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in whichcase, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefore. If the employeebelieves that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to theCommission.The transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from oneorganizational unit to another in the same department or agency: Provided, however, Thatany movement from the non-career service to the career service shall not be considered atransfer

xxx(g) Reassignment. An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit toanother in the same agency: Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve areduction in rank, status or salary.

FACTS:

Abaya received an Assignment Order transferring him to the Philippine Embassy in Beijingas Minister-Counsellor and Consul General. On March 18, 1988, he requested deferment of histransfer to his new assignment in Beijing, to give him ample time to wind up official and


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pending family matters. On April 15, 1988, the Office of Personnel and Management Services(OPMS) recommended to the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs:

The appointment (in place of Abaya) of Ariel Abadilla to the Embassy at Beijing,Abayas suitability having been questioned by Ambassador Rodolfo Severino.

Abayas recall to the Home Office in line with the Departments program of recalling

overstaying officers and employees assigned abroad.

Chairman Ramon Diaz of the PCGG requested that Abaya be allowed to testify before agrand jury then investigating the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth in the U.S. OPMS addressed amemo to Secretary of DFA Raul Manglapus (petitioner) reiterating its recommendation to recallAbaya from New York had been extended on request of the PCGG. Abaya sent a telex messageto the home office requesting reconsideration of the recall order and a deferment of itseffectivity, for the reason that in the case of 8 members of the UN Mission, their recalls wereallegedly made effective some 16 to 23 months from receipt of recall orders, this being inconsonance with Foreign Service Circular No. 11-89 providing that recall orders are servedone year in advance to cushion those concerned against harsh tradition.

Abaya sent a telex communication to Secretary Manglapus duly noting the latter'sinstructions to report at Manila on June 1, 1989, and stating that: (1) the period of his initial tourof duty at the UN Mission at New York was not 13 years but 11 years and some 7 months, andhe served in the home office for 14 months before being reassigned to New York in June, 1984;(2) that these assignments involved no violation of rules but had been "lawfully made by the thenMinister of Foreign Affairs in the exercise of his legal prerogative to redeploy DFA staff in (the)interest of (the) servicea prerogative of any secretary of foreign affairs, past or incumbent . ..;" (3) that said prerogative was not being disputed, the issue being his right to "one-year advancenotice of recall orders," a right unconditionally conferred by FS Circular 11-89; and (4) that hisrequest for one-year notice should thus be granted.

Secretary Manglapus directed that if Abaya was unable to return to the home office, heshould file leave application with salaries computed at home office rate and payable in pesos.Abaya went to court. He filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Sec.Manglapus with the RTC of Manila. Secretary Manglapus moved to dismiss the action OTG that(1) Abayas recall is an exercise of Secs prerogative and discretion which may not be interferedwith by the Court; and (2) petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies.

The RTC denied the motion and granted the application for preliminary injunction. It ruledthat Manglapus had no authority to disregard Foreign Service Circular No. 11-89; he had notshown with convincing evidence that the exigencies of the service require the immediate and

peremptory recall of Abaya; Abayas case was substantially identical to those of eight othermembers of the Philippine mission who had been accorded advance notice of their recall of morethan a year.

ISSUE:W/N the Secretary of Foreign officers has the authority under the law to recall and reassignofficers as the interests of the service may in his discretion require? Corollary to this, W/NAbaya may be reassigned to another post


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RULING:

YES. Where an officer has served in a foreign post for at least four years, as in Abaya's case,it would appear that the Secretary's power of assignment and transfer rests entirely in his

discretion, guided chiefly by his perception of what is necessary for the good of the service.There is no need in that event that some "emergency or extraordinary circumstances" exist, thisbeing required only where the officer has served less than four years in a foreign post.

Abaya's reassignment to Beijing in January, 1988, and his recall to the Home Officereiterated in December, 1988, were thus well within the authority granted to the Foreign AffairsSecretary by law (RA No. 708). Those acts were based on reasoned conclusions of the OPMSand the head of the Beijing Embassy including the fact that Abaya is really an "overstaying"officer in the UN Mission, having served in that post for much more than the maximum term offour (4) years prescribed by Section 6 of the Foreign Service Law, as amended and hence,could not in truth be said to be in any sense capricious or whimsical, no matter how debatable

Abaya might think the validity of those conclusions is.No grave abuse of discretion, or lack or excess of authority, may rightfully be ascribed to the

respondent Secretary. It is the RTC which the facts disclose to have gravely abused its discretionin having so utterly misread the facts and the applicable law and overruling the Secretarysplainly valid and legally authorized actions.

Sec. Ricardo T. Gloria vs Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr

FACTS:Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics

(PAFCA) by virtue of temporary appointments because at the time of their appointment, theylacked appropriate civil service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessaryqualification standards for their respective positions. One of them was Rosario Cerillo who wasappointed as Board Secretary II of PAFCA. However she was relieved from the position byreason of loss of confidence. Subsequently, she was designated as "Coordinator for ExtensionServices". Said appointments expired when the PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA(Philippine State College of Aeronautics) Aggrieved, private respondents filed a Petition forMandamus and Reinstatement before the RTC of Pasay. Petitioners filed an answer upon theground that mandamus will not lie to compel reinstatement because their appointment prayed foris discretionary on the part of the appointing power (Board of Trustees). Respondent Judge deGuzman rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of Cerillo as coordinator for extensionservices. Thus, Sec. Gloria filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the SC.

ISSUE:Whether or not private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement to the

position of "Coordinator for Extension Services"?


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RULING:The judgment of respondent Judge de Guzman which orders the reinstatement of Ms.

Rosario V. Cerillo to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services" is patently improperbecause it finds no support as to facts and the law. The fact is that private respondent'sassignment to the said position was a mere designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the

designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement. The fact that privaterespondent Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service Examination after the termination of hertemporary appointment is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint her. Acquisition of civilservice eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be considered by the appointingauthority are: performance, degree of education, work experience, training, seniority, and, moreimportantly, as in this case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of theappointing power, considering that the position of Board Secretary II, by its nature, is primarilyconfidential. Reappointment to such position is an act which is discretionary on the part of theappointing power hence it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus.Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which is essentially discretionary, tobe performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition

being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Such exercise of thediscretionary power of appointment cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as long as it isexercised properly by the appointing authority. Thus the order of the lower court for thereinstatement of the private respondent amounts to an undue interference by the court in theexercise of a discretionary power vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees. To the question as tothe legality of the termination of the services of the petitioners, the only answer is there was notermination to speak of. Termination presupposes an overt act committed by a superior officer.There was none whatsoever in the case at bar. At most, PSCA Chairman of the Board of TrusteesCol. Julian gave notice to the petitioners of the expiration of their respective contracts.Petitionersappointment or employment simply expired either by its very own terms, or becauseit may not exceed one year, but most importantly because the PAFCA was dissolved andreplaced by the PSCA.

BORRES v. CANONOY

FLOREZA v. ONGPIN

FACTS:

Petitioner Reynoso B. Floreza joined the government service in May, 1955 as a clerk

(action attorney) in the Administrative Division of the Department of Finance. December, 1959-he transferred to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) where he was

appointed Senior Revenue Examiner. While based in Davao City as Regional Director of Revenue, he was informed by then

Acting BIR Commissioner Ruben B. Ancheta of the latter's intention to designate him tothe position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal). Floreza accepted the designation.

April 4, 1986Pursuant to reorganization program, BIR Commissioner, Bienvenido Tan,Jr. issued a memorandum asking the all Service Chiefs and assistants to tender their


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resignation. Floreza refused to do this. Commissioner Tan then issued Travel AssignmentOrder assigning Floreza to the Office of the Commissioner as Consultant due to "theexigencies of the service." The same order directed Jaime M. Maza to report to the LegalOffice as its acting chief.

The President issued EO 127 reorganizing the Ministry of Finance. Three days later, Feb.

2, 1987, the new Constitution was ratified. Section 3 of the transitory provisions providesthat all existing executive orders and issuances not inconsistent with the constitution"shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

Thereafter, the committee constituted to effect the reorganization of the Bureau submitteda staffing pattern and structure to the Commissioner and the Secretary of Finance.

Feeling that he had been placed in a "freezer" 11 and having been confidentially advisedthat he would be removed from the position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal) as he wasnot among those recommended for reappointment, Floreza filed in the Court of Appealson June 4, 1987 a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.He alleged that this violated his right to security of tenure.

CA: Dismissed the petition. CA ruled that Executive Order No. 127 was issued pursuant

to Section 2, Article III of the Freedom Constitution mandating that "(a)ll elective andappointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in officeuntil otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation orappointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within aperiod of one year from February 25, 1986.; that Floreza's non-reappointment as RevenueService Chief (Legal) did not violate his constitutional right to security of tenure for itmerely confirmed his earlier separation from the post.; Section 59 of Executive Order No.127 which took effect on January 30, 1987 or within the one-year period prescribed bythe Freedom Constitution, personnel of the Ministry of Finance, including Floreza, wereconsidered removed on said date. Hence, the present petition.

March 7, 1988 - President Aquino issued appointment for Jaime M. Maza and Rizalina

Magalona to the positions of Assistant Commissioners for Legal Service and Planningand Research Service, respectively. It is not shown why Commissioner Tan had to securePresidential appointments for these two items since persons appointed to these positionsare not and have never been presidential appointees at least, not under the law.

Floreza appealed on March 12, 1988 to both the Department of Finance and the CivilService Commission his non-reappointment as Revenue Service Chief and theappointment of Maza and Magalona to said position.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DECISION: Directed the BIR to appoint Floreza "to a

position in the new staffing pattern equivalent or comparable to the rank of RevenueService Chief, There is however no showing that the post of Assistant Commissioner isequivalent to the post of Revenue Service Chief Assuming however that such is the case,

there is no showing either that Floreza is more qualified than either Maza or Magalona tomove up to the contested Assistant Commissioner post. Floreza then filed the other petition herein. He prays that said decision be modified by

"restoring" him to the position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal) 'retitled AssistantCommissioner (Legal)."


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ISSUES:1. WON Florezas assignment as Consultant in the Office of the Commissioner through a travelassignment order, is considered a transfer under Sec .24(c) of PD 807, hence his position asLegal Revenue Service Chief was considered discontinued?

2. WON Floreza was invalidly terminated?

RULING: No. Florezas assignment as Consultant is considered a Detail under Sec. 24(f) of PD

807. Under such provision,

Detail. A detail is the movement on an employee from one agency to another without theissuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of

employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee

believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to theCommission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executoryunless otherwise ordered by the Commission.

Under Sec. 24(c),Transfer. A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent

rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment.

Therefore, Floreza continued holding the position of Revenue Service Chief untilCommissioner Tan went to the President for the appointments of Jaime M. Masa asAssistant Commissioner for the Legal Service and Rizalina S. Magalona as Assistant

Commissioner for the Planning and Research Service on March 7, 1988. Since both the Planning and Policy (or Research) Service and the Legal Service were

given new Chiefs, Floreza was in effect terminated in his employment even as he wasoffered a demotion in rank to replace it.

As to the second issue, Yes, Floreza was invalidly terminated. The Court ruled thatgovernment reorganization may continue under the 1987 Constitution. However, noemployee shall be terminated without just cause and due notice.

In this case, the Court held that Floreza was deprived of his right to security of tenure byhis non-reappointment to the position of Revenue Service Chief or its new title under thereorganized Bureau of Internal Revenue.

When Floreza was not reappointed as Revenue Service Chief or as AssistantCommissioner either in the Legal Service or in the Planning and Research Service, andother persons were appointed to the positions, he was, in effect, dismissed from theservice in violation not only of his right to security of tenure but to due process as well.

There was no vacancy in the office to which Jaime M. Maza was appointed and,therefore, the latters promotion was invalid.


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RTC MAKATI MOVEMENT AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION vs. ATTY.INOCENCIO E. DUMALAO

FACTS:Atty. Inocencio Dumalao, then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,Branch 134, was charged by the petitioner for allegedly engaging in usurious activities,immorality and violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. First, Atty. Dumalao hasbeen collecting commissioners fee from party litigants and lawyers in exchangefor favourableaction on their cases. Second, He is neglectful of his duty. He was often absent during courthearings. Third, He withheld the salary checks of all RTC Makati employees and compelledthem to borrow money from him at usurious rates. He charged them 10% per month. Failure onthe part of the employees to pay would lead to his filing of criminal charges against the

employees.ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Dumlao must be dismissed from office given the findings of guilt againsthim by the lower court.

HELD:

YES. Dismissal of respondent is based on grave misconduct and dishonesty prejudicial to theinterest of the service and acts unbecoming of a court officer.

Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. The administration of justice is asacred task. The conduct of all officers charged with the dispensation of justice must not only becharacterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be above suspicion.

First, it is expressly provided in the Manual for Clerks of Court that No branch clerk of courtshall demand and/or receive commissioners fees for reception of evidence ex-parte. Defense ofunfamiliarity with the manual is not considered by the Court. Ignorance of the existence of theManual clearly demonstrates how grossly remiss he has been in the performance of his duty.

Second, Atty. Dumalao, although he cannot be charged civilly and criminally because of the

suspension of the Usury law, can be held administratively liable under the Civil Service lawwhere lending money at usurious rates of interests is specifically listed as grounds for

disciplinary actions. The court is not a lending institution, by engaging in the lending activities,respondent has caused dishonour to the courts of justice.

Lastly, respondents failure to prepare proper or correct monthly reports of cases was found bythe court to be a serious breach of duty. His reliance on the reports prepared by the Clerks-in-charge was insufficient and is a lazy and sloppy manner of performing his duty.


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DISMISSEDFROM SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS, IF ANY, ANDWITH PREJUDICE TO HIS REINSTATEMENT IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE,INCLUDING GOVERNMENT OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.

Aquino v. Fernandez

Facts:

Judge Manuel R. Aquino of the Municipal Trial Court of Caba, La Union submitted tothe Office of the Court Administrator his Report/Findings dated November 16, 1998recommending that an appropriate disciplinary action be imposed upon Jocelyn Fernandez whoholds the position of Stenographer I in his sala. It appears that respondent committed severaltransgressions, among which are:

1) Her failure to comply with the instruction to type the drafted order in CriminalCase No. 41978 entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Jose Runas on November4, 1998;

2) For absenting herself from office for the period November 4,5,6, 1998 withoutprior leave of absence as required by law;

And for these transgressions the investigating judge recommended her suspension for 1 monthwithout pay together with a stern warning.

Issue:

Whether or not the recommendation of the investigating judge was appropriate

Held:

No. Although the first transgression is considered a less grave offense under Sec. 23 of theOmnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.292 for which a penalty of suspension for one month and one day to six months shall be imposedfor the first offense and dismissal for the second offense, The Court considered her admission

and plea for compassion with a promise not to commit the same acts in the future, thus deemed alighter penalty than suspension for one month and one day on respondent would suffice in thiscase.

As for the second offense, sections 50-51 of the Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil ServiceRules and Regulations state that it is not mandatory to submit an application for vacation leave ofabsence and in the case that these were not approved by the department or agency head, the


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employee will not receive his salary to the corresponding date of absences and but does not ipsofactorender an employee administratively liable. These set of facts were found by the Court asinsufficient to discipline the respondent.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Jocelyn C. Fernandez, Stenographer I, Municipal Trial

Court, Caba, La Union GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. She is FINED the amount of TwoThousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similaroffenses in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

CSC VS. CA

FACTS:Guevarra and Cezar were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President forAdministration, respectively of the PUP.

Cueva, then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against Guevarra and Cezarfor gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official documents among othercharges. In Guevarras application, he denied the existence of his pending criminal andadministrative cases..rllIn his Application, he answered Question No. 11 in this wise:

11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? NO. If so, state briefly thenature thereof NO.rll

This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had17 pending cases before the Sandiganbayan. Cezar, knowing fully well that both he andGuevarra had existing cases before the Sandiganbayan, endorsed and recommended the approvalof the application.rll

They explained that they believed "criminal or administrative records" to mean final convictionin a criminal or administrative case.Thus, because their cases had not yet been decided by theSandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded in good faith.

Meanwhile, the CSC formally charged Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with ConductPrejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CAessentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. The CA granted the petition, nullifying andsetting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been rendered without jurisdiction.The CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out thatthe latter should have exhausted all administrative remedies by first bringing his grievances tothe attention of the PUP Board of Regents.


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Hence, these petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original concurrent jurisdiction overadministrative cases falling under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.

RULING: Yes, the CSC has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of whoinitiated the complaint.

The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint anddiscipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by orbrought before it directly or on appeal.rll

By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341,PUP became a chartered state university,thereby making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whoseemployees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the CSCs original jurisdiction.

Villaluz vs Zaldivar

Facts:

Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958.In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and hadcaused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. Consequently, ExecutiveSecretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter.After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then issued anAdministrative Order removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has nojurisdiction to remove him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removedconsidering that he is an appointee of the president.

HELD:

Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of thePhilippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointeewho belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No.2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassifiedservice of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office afterdue hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that the power to remove isinherent in the power to appoint .


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The Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide theadministrative charges filed against said official, because his authority to pass upon questions ofsuspension, separation or removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officialsand employees in the classified service to which classification the administrator does not belong.

There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extendto the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to theexecutive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified servicefor such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power toappoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified servicefor as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of ourConstitution which says that the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferiorofficers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.

Quimbo v Gervacio

FACTS:Petitioner Prudencio C. Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, was administrativelycharged forharassment and oppression by Elmo V. Padaon, a general foreman. During thependency of the case, he was placed under preventive suspension without pay. The Office of theDeputyOmbudsmanfound Quimboguilty of oppression and recommended that he be suspendedfromoffice for a period of 8 months without pay. This was approved by the Ombudsman.TheCA found Quimboguiltyof simple misconduct only and penalized him with suspensionfromoffice fora period of 2 months without pay. Quimbo filed a Motion for

Modification/Reconsideration calling attention tothe fact that he had been on preventivesuspension from March 18, 1998 to June 1, 1998 and praying that the order underreconsideration be modified to take into account the period of his PREVENTIVE SUSPENSIONof 2 MONTHS and 17 DAYS WITHOUT PAY as part ofthe finalpenaltyimposed. TheOmbudsman clarified that preventive suspension is not a penalty butapreliminary step in an investigation; and that if after such investigation, the charge isestablished and the person investigated upon is foundguiltywarranting the imposition ofpenalty, then he shall accordingly be penalized. Such was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:WON the preventive suspension pending the investigation is a penalty.

HELD: Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension aspreventivemeasure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspectof the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.Preventive suspension is merely a preventivemeasure, apreliminarystep in an administrative


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investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using hisposition and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamperwith records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after suchinvestigation,the chargeis established and the person investigated is foundguiltyof actswarranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the

penalty. That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987(Executive OrderNo. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. As stated in Sec. 24,preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is consideredto be a preventivemeasure. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventivesuspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the sameRule XIV provides that the period within which a public officer or employee charged is placedunder preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspensionimposed upon the employee found guilty. Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be

credited as service of penalty. To rule otherwise is to disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25of the Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the substantial distinction between, andpurposes of imposing preventive suspension and suspension as penalty.

CANIETE v. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE and SPORTS

TOPIC: CIVIL SERVICE; DECISION

DOCTRINE: Administrative Law; Publi c Off icers; Preventi ve Suspensions.Although civil

service employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to thepayment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, there are, however, entitled tocompensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are foundinnocent.

There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are chargedwith offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pendinginvestigation (51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by thedisciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated(47[4]).

FACTS:

1.

Petitioners are public school teachers at the Juan Sumulong High School in Quezon City.For being absent on September 20 and 21, 1990, they were charged by Secretary Cario,then Secretary of DECS, with alleged participation in the mass actions/strikes on saiddates.

2. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension on September 21, 1990. In thedecisions of Secretary Cario on May 28, 1991 and July 9, 1992, the petitioners wereguilty as charged and dismissed them from the service effective immediately.


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Apuyan vs Sta. Isabel

Facts:-Complaint for Gross Misconduct, Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Official and Graft andCorruption.

-Apuyan is one of the plaintiffs in a civil case. In that civil case, a writ of attachment wasissued by the RTC against the monies and properties of defendants.-Apuyan fetched Sheriff Sta Isabel and other policemen for the execution of the writ ofattachment against the defendant.-Sta Isabel told Apuyan that the Sheriffs rate is 5% of the total amount attached, but he waswilling to settle for a 0.5% share. The total amount subject to attachment was

P10,000,000.00, or a share of P50,000.00.-After levying the properties, Apuyan handed Sta Isabel an envelope containing P2,000.When the latter saw the money, he threw the envelope and cursed him, saying that the amountof P2,000.00 is a big insult to his person. He grabbed Apuyans collar, uttering, O, ano anggusto mong mangyari ngayon?Sta Isabelsofficemates intervened to avoid further harm and

embarrassment to complainant Apuyan.-For his defense, Sta Isabel denied that he threw the envelope and grabbed Apuyans collar.Accordiing to him, Apuyan was angered when he refused to accept the offer of P2,000.00goodwill money.-The Office of the Court Administrator found Sta Isabel guilty of the charges andrecommended the suspension of Sta Isabel. Case was submitted to the Supreme Court forresolution.

Issue: Is Sta Isabel guilty?

Ruling:1. Yes. Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the sheriff to estimate his expensesinthe execution of the decision. The prevailing party will then deposit the said amount to theClerk of Court who will disburse the amount to the sheriff, subject to liquidation. Anyunspent amountwill have to be returned to the prevailing party.

In this case, no estimate of sheriffs expenses was submitted to the court by Sta Isabel. In fact,the money which he had demanded and had received from Apuyan was not among thoseprescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court.

The SC has ruled that any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowedbythe Rules of Court is an unlawful exactionand renders him liable for grave misconduct andgross dishonesty.

2. However, this is the first time that Sta Isabel has ever been charged administratively. Thus,instead of imposing the penalty of dismissal which is the imposable penalty for commission ofthe first offense of grave misconduct and dishonesty, Sta Isabel, as appropriately recommendedby the OCA, should be suspended for a period of one year without pay with a stern warningthat a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely .


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Nilo Malanyaon v Hon.Lising

Facts:

Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was

pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought the payment of the Mayor's

salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides -

should a public officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose all retirement or gravity

benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the

salaries and benefits to which he failed to receive during his suspension. Malanyaon was a

member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur.

He filed an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to

the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion of the salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such

municipality during the period of his suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November 28,

1979. However, Judge Lising dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against

Mayor Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal.

Issue:

Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused constitutes acquittal?

Held:

No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted". It means that

after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that

his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt thus it is decided based on the merits of

the case. BUT Dismissal is not decided based on the merits of the case against the suspended

officer but due to other considerations such as, lack of jurisdiction of the court to decide the case.

THEREFORE, dismissal does not amount to acquittal.

Paredes v. CSC

Facts:

This is a consolidated case of G.R. 88177 and 89530 wherein the former case, Paredesassails the resolution sustaining the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) directing therevocation of her appointment as HS Project Coordinator in the HLURB and declaring the saidposition vacant while, the latter case, Paredes assails another resolution affirming the decision of


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the MSPB dismissing all charges against Atty. Amor except habitual tardiness for which Atty.Amor was reprimanded and warned.

G.R. 88177 G.R. 89530

Peredes entered in government servicesas a public school teacher in 1950 and later

transferred to the General Auditing Office asAuditing Clerk at the Phil/ TobaccoAdministration. Subsequently, she joined theHuman Settlements Regulatory Commission(HSRC) as Project Officer (PO) II and waspromoted to PO III and afterwards, as the HSProject Supervisor (PS). Respondent Atty.Amor, HS PO IV, assailed the promotion ofParedes; the case was docketed in the HSRC.

HSRC Commission and CEO Mendioladismissed Amors protest because: (1) as it was

filed beyond the prescribed period provided inSec 10 Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules andRegulations; (2) Amor is not among the topnext-in-rank candidates; and even thoughParedes is only a holder of a 2 year ElementaryTeachers Certificate her educational deficiencycan be substituted with her 31 years of servicein the government. Amor appealed to theOffice of the President but it was forwarded tothe MSPB. The appeal was favored to Amor.MSPBs ground was opined that (1) the

position requires a lawyer, architect, engineeror a holder of a masteral degree forappointment thereto; (2) Paredes length inservice cannot be used; (3) even if the 2 yeareducational requirement can be substituted,Paredes is only a holder of a 2 year elementaryteacher certificate not meeting the standards asprovided in the HSRC Qualification Standards;(4) in the exercise of appointing authorityshould be guided by the Civil Service Law andRules.

Paredes files her motion forreconsideration alleging that there is noQualification Standards; that the CSCResolution No. 84-215 approved only theHSRCs Merit Promotion Plan (MPP) and theSystem of Ranking Positions (SRP) ; that theQualification standards is separate from theMPP and SRP; that the promotional

Peredes filed a complaint against Amor forfalsification of documents, dishonesty,

violation of the Civil Service Law andreasonable office Rules and Regulations,habitual tardiness, conduct prejudicial to thebest interest of the service and for beingnotoriously undesirable.Amor denies all allegations against her andalleges that shes being harassed.Finding prima facie evidence against Amor,Legal Officer Aquino of HSRC recommendedto resolve the issue at the CSC pursuant toCSC Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of

1978, implementing PD No. 1409, thenCommissioner Mendiola requested in his letterdated June 25, 1986 that the saidadministrative case be taken cognizance of bythe MSBP. MSPB favoured Amor of allcharges.Not satisfied with MSPB, Paredes appealed toCSC however it was dismissed on the groundsthat she is not the party affected by thedecision


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appointments of petitioner are legal. However,it was denied by the MSPB. On appeal, theCSC ruled that although the HLURBQualification Standards has not been approvedit can be used as basis for recruitment and

promotion.

Issues

whether or not the public respondentcommitted a grave abuse of discretion when itsustained the revocation of petitioner Paredes'appointment as HS Project Coordinator and indeclaring the said position vacant.

Whether or not petitioner Paredes has the legalpersonality to appeal the decision of the MSPBabsolving private respondent Amor of allcharges except for habitual tardiness for whichthe latter was reprimanded.

Held

No. In declaring the Position of HS ProjectCoordinator vacant; the public respondent has

therefore not abused its discretion as theQualification Standards of the HSRC whichshould be the basis and guide for appointmenthas not been approved by the Civil ServiceCommission.Section 20 of Article III on Personnel Policiesand Standards under Presidential Decree No.807 dated October 6, 1975, expressly mandatesthem to do so. Also, it prescribes for theminimum qualification requirement in terms ofeducation, Civil Service eligibility, training,

experience, physical fitness and other qualitiesfor appointment to a particular position asdetermined by the appointing authority. AQualification Standard is to be established orformulated by the Department or agencyconcerned but must be approved by the CivilService Commission. Approval is required bylaw because the Civil Service Commission isthe central personnel agency of the governmententrusted with the enforcement of laws relativeto the selection, promotion and discipline of

civil servants. Once approved, theQualification Standards shall be used as guidesin appointment and in the adjudication ofcontested appointments.

No. Paredes the complainant is not the partyadversely affected by the decision so that she

has no legal personality to interpose an appealto the Civil Service Commission. In anadministrative case, the complainant is a merewitness (Gonzalo v. D. Roda, 64 SCRA 120)Section 37 & 39 allows appeal to the CivilService Commission in an administrative caseis extended to the party adversely affected bythe decision, that is, the person or therespondent employee who has been meted outthe penalty of suspension for more than thirtydays; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty

days salary demotion in rank or salary ortransfer, removal or dismissal from office. Thedecision of the disciplining authority is evenfinal and not appealable to the Civil ServiceCommission in cases where the penaltyimposed is suspension for not more than thirtydays or fine in an amount not exceeding thirtydays salary. Appeal in cases allowed by lawmust be filed within fifteen days from receiptof the decision.Here, The penalty was only a reprimand so that

even private respondent Amor, the partyadversely affected by the decision, cannot eveninterpose an appeal to the Civil ServiceCommission

Ratio

For an act of a court or tribunal to beconsidered as committed in grave abuse ofdiscretion the same must be performed in a

Appeal in judicial proceedings is a statutory

right that must be exercised only in the

manner and in accordance with the


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capricious and whimsical manner astantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse ofdiscretion must be so patent and gross as wherethe power is exercised in an arbitrary ordespotic manner by reason of passion or

personal hostility as to amount to an evasion ofpositive duty or to a virtual refusal to performthe duty enjoined by law or to act incontemplation and within the bounds of law(Carson et al. v. Judge Pantamosos, Jr., G.R.No. 75934, December 13, 1989; IntestateEstate of Carmen de Luna v. IntermediateAppellate Court, G.R. 72424, February 13,1989; People v. Manuel, 11 SCRA 618)Failure on the part of the petitioner to showgrave abuse of discretion will result in the

dismissal of the petition (Del Rosario v.Subido, 31 SCRA 382).

provisions of law (Ozaeta v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. 83281, December 4, 1989;

Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 439).

This doctrine is also applicable in quasi-

judicial proceedings so that one must first

ascertain the law applicable to determinewhether or not the party can appeal the

order or decision

ANGELITO HUERTASvs. ANDREW GONZALEZ

FACTS:

An administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the Regional Director of the thenDepartment of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), NCR, by Dr. Carolina C. Dizon, the

principal of the Bacood Elementary School in Sta. Mesa, against Angelito M. Huertas, a schoolteacher in the same school, for grave misconduct, disrespect of authority and violation of theprovision of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.

The school conducted a regular election of the officers of the faculty club. Huertas was re-elected president, besting for the second time around his co-teacher, Mrs. Catalina Lorenzo. Thisnotwithstanding, a group of teachers circulated a manifesto denouncing Huertas. As acountermove, Huertas launched his own signature campaign to show his clear mandate.

Huertas received information that Dizon was preventing the teachers from signing in hisfavor. He rushed to the office of Dizon and angrily confronted the latter. After the heated

exchange of words, Huertas decided to leave, but before doing so, warned Dizon that if shedoesnt stop, he will sue her. Dizon preempted Huertas and filed an administrative complaintagainst him.

An Investigating Committee (Grievance Committee) was constituted for the purpose. TheInvestigating Committee conducted a preliminary hearing. The formal investigation was set onSeptember 10, 1996, during which Huertas appeared without the assistance of counsel. The


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parties agreed to submit the case for resolution without any formal investigation on the basis ofthe affidavits on record.

In time, the Grievance Committee submitted its investigation report, finding Huertas guilty ofgross discourtesy in the course of official duties. In a Resolution dated October 16, 1996,

Regional Director Nilo Rosas modified the findings and recommendation of the GrievanceCommittee. He found Huertas guilty of gross disrespect and imposed on him the penalty of one(1) month suspension from service without pay.

Huertas moved for a reconsideration of the resolution on the alleged ground of lack of dueprocess, both substantive and procedural. He claimed that he was not represented by counselduring the investigation and that the Grievance Committee failed to conduct a formalinvestigation of the case. Director Rosas denied the motion, prompting Huertas to appeal theresolution to the DECS Secretary viaa petition for review.

Then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloriaissued a Resolution reversing the resolutions of the

Regional Director and dismissing the administrative complaint for want of a formal hearing. TheSecretary ruled that Huertas was deprived of his right to due process when the GrievanceCommittee dispensed with a formal investigation and based its report-recommendation merelyon the affidavits of the parties and those of the witnesses of the complainant.

Dissatisfied, Dizonherself filed a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution. Then ActingSecretary Erlinda C. Pefianco reconsidered the ruling of her predecessor and reinstated theresolution of the Regional Director.

Huertas filed a petition for review which was treated as a motion for reconsideration by thenDECS Secretary Andrew Gonzalez, FSC. Secretary Gonzalez reconsidered and set-asideSecretary Pefiancos Resolution and reinstated Secretary Glorias Resolution. In reinstatingSecretary Glorias Resolution, Secretary Gonzalez tersely and succinctly ratiocinated:It is evident that then Secretary Pefianco acted on the motion for Reconsideration of the[complaint] contrary to the rule that only the respondent can file a motion for reconsideration(CSC Resolution No. 94-0512, Sec. 7).

The CA ruled that Dizon herself had the right to appeal or move for a reconsideration of theResolution of Secretary Gloria as held by the Court inCivil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy.Itrejected the argument of the OSG that a decision in administrative cases penalized by one monthsuspension or less shall be final under Section 47(2), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V ofE.O. No. 292. According to the CA, the petitioners case does not fall within the ambit of E.O.No. 292 because the root of the penalty is an illegally constituted investigating committee. Asthe old adage tells us it is a fruit of a poisonous tree.

Petitioner avers that respondent Dizon was barred from filing a motion for the reconsiderationof the Resolution of Secretary Gloria. This resolution reversed that of Regional Director Rosasand ordered the dismissal of the said complaint, on the ground that the petitioner was deprived ofhis right to due process when the committee dispensed with a formal investigation and becauseits report was based merely on the affidavits on record. The petitioner cites Section 39(a) of
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Presidential Decree No. 805, which provides that appeals where allowable, shall be made by theparty adversely affected by the decision. He also citesDel Castillo v. Civil ServiceCommission, where the Court ruled that only the government employee against whom theadministrative case is filed is entitled to appeal from a decision adverse to him, and the ruling ofthis Court inMendez v. Civil Service Commissionthat the civil service law does not contemplate

a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges. Thepetitioner insists that when Secretary Gloria ordered the dismissal of the complaint against himfor lack of due process, he was exonerated of the charge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent Carolina Dizon has the locus standi to file a motion forreconsideration.

HELD:

We do not agree with the petitioner. The Court overturned its ruling inMendez v. Civil ServiceCommissionand in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, which latter holding, in turn, was

reiterated inPhilippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr. Thus:In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Reynato S. Puno explained that the Civil Service Law did notcategorically sanction the old doctrine barring appeals by parties other than the respondentemployee. What the law declared as final were only those decisions of hea ds of agenciesinvolving suspensions of not more than thirty days or fines not exceeding thirty days salary. These decisions, he said, involved minor and petty offenses, and to allow multiple appeals inthose instances would overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative systems.

Neither can the old doctrine barring appeal be justified by the provision limiting the jurisdictionof the Civil Service Commission. According to that provision, the CSC was limited to thereview of decisions involving: (1) suspension for more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in anamount exceeding thirty (30) days salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer,removal or dismissal from office. Nothing in the provision, however, indicates a legislativeintent to bar appeals from decisions exonerating a government official or an employee from anadministrative charge.Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously underminedif we bar appeals of exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature ofcriminal actions, in which acquittals are final and unappealable based on the constitutionalproscription of double jeopardy.

Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review.Thus, to prevent appeals of administrative decisions except those initiated by employees willeffectively and pervertedly erode this constitutional grant.

It must be stressed that the petitioner was not exonerated of the charge against him in theNovember 20, 1997 Resolution of Secretary Gloria; the DECS Secretary merely nullified theproceedings before the committee as well as its report/recommendation. Hence, respondentDizon was moving for the reconsideration of the November 20, 1997 Resolution of theSecretary, and was not, in effect, appealing from any resolution exonerating the petitioner.


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CSC v. GENTALLAN

FACTS: On December 14, 1994, then Mayor Jose Salcedo appointed Jocelyn Gentallan as localcivil registrar of the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Commissioner Thelma Gamindeof the CSC, when queried about Gentallans qualifications, confirmed that Gentallans work

experience was more than enough to meet the minimum requirement of 3 years experience forthe local civil registrar.

On January 5, 1995, the Cicvil Service Commission Regional Office No. 10 (CSCRO-10)approved her appointment as permanent. However, Rosalina Asis, a researcher aide in the Officeof the Local Civil Registrar, filed a protest. It was dismissed by the CSC in CSC Resolution No.95-5317, because the protestant was not a qualified next-in-rank. In the same resolution,however, the CSC reviewed the appointment of respondent Gentallan. It held that Gentallan wasnot qualified as she failed to fulfill the required 3-year experience relevant to the position of localcivil registrar. Her motion for reconsideration was denied in CSC Resolution No. 96-0582. She

then filed a motion for reconsideration

Mayor Paurom, pursuant to the CSC resolutions, ordered respondent to vacate her post as LocalCivil Registrar and directed her to assume the position s of Assistant Registration Officer. CA setaside the questioned resolutions and found respondent qualified to the position. On December21, 1998, the mayor issued a memorandum, directing respondent to assume office as the localcivil registrar, and a notice of respondents salary adjustment was issued. The court also held thatshe was entitled to back wages as well as other bonuses. In contrary to the decision of the courtthe CSC avers that Gentallan was not entitled to the back wages and other emoluments as shewas not illegally dismissed from office.

ISSUE/S: WON the CSC has the standing to appeal the decision which adversely affects thecivil service (entitlement to back wages and other emoluments).

HELD: YES. The CSC has the standing to appeal and/or file its motion for reconsideration.

RATIO: The CSC, as an institution whose primary concern is the effectiveness of the civilservice system, has the standing to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration of a decisionwhich adversely affects civil service. At the outset, it should be noted that the Civil ServiceCommission, under the Constitution, is the central personnel agency of the government chargedwith the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to

the civil service.

The Civil Service Commission is declared with legal standing to file its appeal and/or motion forreconsideration in this case. But the Court sustained the decision of the CA insofar as it declaresthat Gentallan should be reinstated to her position with back wages, RATA and bonuses to bepaid by the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.


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NAB vs Mamauag

466 SCRA 624

Facts:

Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay left the residence of Judge Angeles in Quezon City. Gasparand Pacay were both minors and were later classified as moderate or mild mental retardatesby the DSWD. Agnes Lucero found Gaspar and Pacay wandering around the vicinity of thePhilippine Rabbit bus terminal in Cubao. Gaspar and Pacay narrated to Lucero stories ofmaltreatment and non-payment of salary by Judge Angeles.

Lucero brought Gaspar and Pacay to the Central Police District Command (CPDC). At thepolice station, desk officer SPO1 Billedo recorded the girls complaint in the police blotter.On Billedos instruction, SPO1Cario brought Gaspar and Pacay to the East Avenue MedicalCenter for the requisite medical examination. The two girls were returned to the policestation where Cario interviewed them. Carios Initial Investigation Report was reviewed

and signed by SPO2 Almario and approved by P/Insp. Mamauag. SPO1 Felipe and SPO4Garcia escorted Gaspar and Pacay to the DSWD. P/Insp. Ganias signed the Letter ofTurnover to the DSWD.

The incident drew the attention of the media and spawned several cases. One was a criminalcase for child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 against Judge Angeles. Another was anadministrative complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by Judge Angeles against Ganias,Mamauag, Almario, Cario, Felipe and Garcia. Judge Angeles later impleaded Billedo asadditional respondent.

Judge Angeles filed an administrative complaint, The Inspectorate and Legal AffairsDivision of the CPDC investigated the administrative complaint. After its investigation, theILAD recommended the dismissal of the charges. The CPDC District Director approved therecommendation and dismissed the complaint. Not satisfied with the outcome, Judge Angelesmoved for re-investigation of the case before PNP Chief Sarmiento.

In a Decision dated 7 June 1996, PNP Chief Sarmiento ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Headquarters finds: Respondents P/CINSP. Ganias, SPO1 Billedo,and SPO1 Cario guilty of Serious Neglect of Duty and orders their dismissal from thepolice service; P/INSP Mamauag and SPO2 Almario guilty of Less Serious Neglect ofDuty and orders that both of them be suspended from the police service for Ninety dayswith forfeiture of pay; and SPO4 Erlinda Garcia and SPO1 Vivian Felipe exonerated of

the charge for insufficiency of evidence.

PNP Chief Sarmiento nmodified his previous ruling and ordered the dismissal from the

service of Mamauag, Almario, Garcia and Felipe.

Mamauag, et al. forthwith filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against PNP ChiefSarmiento, PNP Inspector General Sales and Judge Angeles before the RTC of Quezon City.


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The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioners to exhaustadministrative remedies and for failure to show that respondents abused their discretion.

Mamauag, et al. then appealed the PNP Chiefs Resolution before the NAB.

The NAB dismissed the appeal for late filing and lack of merit. Mamauag, et al. filed amotion for reconsideration of the Decision but the NAB denied it. Thus, Mamauag, et al.sought relief from the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether the private complainant in an administrative case has the legal personality to movefor reconsideration, or appeal an adverse decision of the disciplining authority.

Ruling:

No. RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the

disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize either party to appeal in theinstances that the law allows appeal. One party is

Documents

Admin Law Compiled Class Digests 2