MIAA v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006

Facts:The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Paraaque City under Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as amended. As such operator, it administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of its Charter. Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June 2001, it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport lands and buildings.At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying Opinion No. 061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of exemption. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but this was dismissed for having been filed out of time.Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is exempt from real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. It invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself as a justification for exemption, since the airport lands and buildings, being devoted to public use and public service, are owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On the other hand, the City of Paraaque invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC. It asserts that an international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in the said law. Meanwhile, the City of Paraaque posted and published notices announcing the public auction sale of the airport lands and buildings. In the afternoon before the scheduled public auction, MIAA applied with the Court for the issuance of a TRO to restrain the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day of the auction sale, however, the same was received only by the City of Paraaque three hours after the sale.

Issue: Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not government-owned controlled corporation (GOCC) and as such exempted from tax.

Held: The Petition is GRANTED.The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with Sec. 133(o) of the LGC, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of local governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in favor of national governmentinstrumentalities.MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the government.The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. At any time, the President can transfer back to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. As long as the airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the State. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing these properties from public use, they remain properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable, hence, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt from real estate tax.However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such portions for a consideration to a taxable person.

Santos vs GoG.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005Petition for review on certiorari

Facts:The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of FilEstate Properties, Inc. (FEPI).October 17, 1995, FEPI allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC. Under the terms of the Agreement, FEPI was to convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a first-class residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational complex. The said Project Agreement clothed FEPI with authority to market and sell the subdivision lots to the public.Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. Lot 17 measured approximately 1,079 square meters and the purchase price agreed upon was P4,304,000. The Contract to Sell signed by the parties was the standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. Under the terms of said contract of adhesion, Go agreed to pay a downpayment of P1,291,200 and a last installment of P840,000 on the balance due on April 7, 1997. In turn, FEPI would execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of Go and deliver to Go the owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) upon complete payment of the purchase price.Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the property. In several letters to its clients, including respondent Go, FEPI explained that the project was temporarily halted due to some claimants who opposed FEPIs application for exclusion of the subject properties from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Go was neither satisfied nor assured by FEPIs statements and he made several demands upon FEPI to return his payment of the purchase price in full. FEPI failed to heed his demands. Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). He likewise filed a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles 316 and 318 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioners as officers of FEPI. Go alleged that the petitioners committed estafa.Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City to conduct the preliminary investigation on the ground that the complainant was not from Pasig City, the contract was not executed nor were the payments made in Pasig City. Besides, countered petitioners, none of the elements of estafa under Articles 316 and 318 were present. They averred that FEPI was not the owner of the project but the developer with authority to sell under a joint venture with MSDC, who is the real owner. After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for estafa. thus:Go appealed the City Prosecutors Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in turn reversed the City Prosecutors findings.The DOJ found that there was a prima facie basis to hold petitioners liable for estafa under Article 316 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.Petitioners herein filed with the Court of Appeals. On September 2, 2002, the appellate court disposed the case. The appellate court opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. The decision to file an information or not is an executive and not a quasi-judicial function.Petition for CERTIORARI.

Issue:Whether or not the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function. OR Whetehr or not the petition made by the petitioners for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutors to file an information in a criminal case.

Held:No.In the course of this determination, SC must also consider whether the conduct of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor is a quasijudicial function.Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not among the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.Among these agencies are: Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission SC cannot agree with petitioners submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition for review.

Petition DENIED.

Odchigue-Bondoc vs Tan Tiong BioGR 186652, October 6,2010

Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary, herein respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations.The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error.The CA set aside the DOJ Secretarys resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based).Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of courts of justice, and it does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ.Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.Issue: Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power. Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power.Held: No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the guilt of innocence of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the determination whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused. No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Sec 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.