ADV. AMEET

UNIVERSITY OF PUNE

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

LONGISH TERM PAPERLONGISH TERM PAPER

SUBJECTSUBJECT ndash ndash ANTI-DEFECTION LAW amp ANTI-DEFECTION LAW amp PARLIAMENTARI PRIVILEGESPARLIAMENTARI PRIVILEGES

SUBMITTED TO ndash NAGARALE MAM Department of law

University of Pune Pune-07

SUBMITTED BY- AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LLM 1st year (2nd sem) Department of law University of Pune-07

Date of submission ndash20042010

AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LLM1st (2nd SEM) Page 1

TENTATIVE CHAPTERISATION 1 INTRODUCTION

11 General Introduction 12 Significance of study

13 Objective of study

14 Hypothesis

15 Scope of the study

16 Research methodology

2 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW AN OVERVIEW-

21 Anti-Defection - Meaning

22Constitutional Provisions

23Scheme of the Act

3 PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES amp ANTI- DEFECTION LAW

4 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW-NEED FOR REVIEW

5 AMENDMENTS IN ANTI-DEFECTION LAW

6 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW- INTENT amp IMPACT

7 CONCLUSION amp SUGGESTIONS

8 CRITICAL APPRAISAL


Bibliography

Webliography


CHAPTER 1- GENERAL INTRODUCTION

11 INTRODUCTION- The judiciary can function and deliver the fruits only when it acts with free and independent manner But in the name of independence uncontrolled arbitrary actions cannot be tolerated because honesty and conviction with justice are the principles on which the trust of whole judicial system is erected This requires not only judicial independence but also a supportive control over it so that the independence would be promoted and arbitrariness is restricted

12 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY-

I We are enable to know draw back in the implementation of anti-defection laws

II We can understand the reason which causes parliaments enact

this law

III In enables us understand why this law cannot be

implementation

IV Enable the points or the lacunas on which we can develop this

laws

V we can suggest for judiciary to perform more active role for the

stability Indian politics

14 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY-

i To study the relevant provisions of constitution regarding anti-defection

ii To study the utility amp mis-use of those provisions


iii To study the role of judiciary in the disputes regarding the matters of anti-defection

iv To study role of anti-defection law in the stability of Indian politics

v To study the possible improvements or modification in this law which can inspired Indian politics to be a matured one

15 HYPOTHESIS-

1 The Inheritant parliamentary democracy would not sustain in India because of circumstances the vastness of country ignorance of public towards election process etc

2 An Indian politics depends on the multi-party system amp instead of believing the separate ideals it is control of power ambition

3 Anti-defection laws are very necessary amp useful to control degradation of ldquoPolitical Behaviouralismrdquo

4 Unfortunately the laws other not made or implemented with honest mind or intimation

5 Ultimately it is the first steps towards a matured democracy

16 SCOPE OF THE STUDY-

My study would be limited regarding the original provisions of anti-defection laws and its current position My study looks in to some of the historical case laws which are important in the matters of constitutional adjudication of anti-defection laws

17 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY-

I have used doctrinal method of research for the study of this subject I will undergo through primarily various text books constituent assembly debates various law commissions reports international conventions law journals articles cases etc I will also use off-line and on-line study material


CHAPTER 2 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW AN OVERVIEW-


To discourage the practice of defection of members from one party to another after their election the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act 1985 was enacted by the Parliament The Amendment to Article 102(regarding Members of either Houses of Parliament) and 191 (regarding Members of state legislatures) seeks to put an end to the evil of political defections that undermines the basic principle of democracy Amendment had been made in Article 191 to provide that a person shall be disqualified for being a member of the state Legislature if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule

The new Tenth Schedule added in the Constitution contains provisions as to disqualification on the ground of defection The question whether a member has become subject to the disqualification will be decided by the presiding officer of the House The SpeakerChairperson has been empowered to make rules for giving effect to the provisions of the Schedule

Section 16 of the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi Act 1991rdquo provides for disqualification of Members of the Delhi Assembly on grounds of defection In pursuance of the powers conferred under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule and the GNCT Act the ldquoMembers of Delhi Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules 1996rdquo was framed


2222 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

TENTH SCHEDULE

[Articles 102(2) and 191(2)]

Provisions as to disqualification on ground of defection

1 Interpretation- In this Schedule unless the context otherwise requires- (a) House means either House of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly or as the case may be either House of the Legislature of a State

(b) legislature party in relation to a member of a House belonging to any political party in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 or as the case may be paragraph 4 means the group consisting of all the members of that House for the time being belonging that political party in accordance with the said provisions

(c) original political party in relation to a member of a House means the political party to which he belongs for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2

(d) paragraph means a paragraph of this Schedule

2 Disqualification on ground of defection - (1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 3 4 and 5 a member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House-

(a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party or

(b) if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf without obtaining in either case the prior permission of such political party person or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention Explanation- For the purposes of this sub-paragraph-


(a) an elected member of a House shall be deemed to belong to the political party if any by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member

(b) a nominated member of a House shall-

(i) where he is a member of any political party on the date of his nomination as such member be deemed to belong to such political party

(ii) in any other case be deemed to belong to the political party of which he becomes or as the case may be first becomes a member before the expiry of six months from the date on which he takes his seat after complying with the requirements of article 99 or as the case may be article 188

(2) An elected member of a House who has been elected as such otherwise than as a candidate set up by any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House if he joins any political party after such election

(3) A nominated member of a House shall be disqualified for being a member of the House if he joins any political party after the expiry of six months from the date on which he takes his seat after complying with the requirements of article 99 or as the case may be article 188

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this paragraph a person who on the commencement of the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act 1985 is a member of a House (whether elected or nominated as such) shall-

(i) where he was a member of political party immediately before such commencement be deemed for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph to have been elected as a member of such House as a candidate set up by such political party

(ii) in any other case be deemed to be an elected member of the House who has been elected as such otherwise than as a candidate set up by any political party for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph or as the case may be be deemed to be a nominated member of the House for the purposes of sub-paragraph (3) of this paragraph

3 Disqualification on ground of defection not to apply in case of split- Where a member of a House makes a claim that he and any other members of his legislature party constitute the group representing a faction which has


arisen as a result of a split in his original political party and such group consists of not less than one-third of the members of such legislature party-

(a) he shall not be disqualified under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 on the ground-

(i) that he has voluntarily given up his membership of his original political party or

(ii) that he has voted or abstained from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by such party or by any person or authority authorised by it in that behalf without obtaining the prior permission of such party person or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such party person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention and

(b) from the time of such split such faction shall be deemed to be the political party to which he belongs for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 and to be his original political party for the purposes of this paragraph

4 Disqualification on ground of defection not to apply in case of merger- (1) A member of a House shall not be disqualified under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 where his original political party merges with another political party and he claims that he and any other members of his original political party-

(a) have become members of such other political party or as the case may be of a new political party formed by such merger or

(b) have not accepted the merger and opted to function as a separate group

and from the time of such merger such other political party or new political party or group as the case may be shall be deemed to be the political party to which he belongs for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 and to be his original political party for the purposes of this sub-paragraph

(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph the erger of the original political party of a member of a House shall be eemed to have taken place if and only if not less than two-thirds of the members of the legislature party concerned have agreed to such merger


5 Exemption- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Schedule a person who has been elected to the office of the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker of the House of the People or the Deputy Chairman of the Council of States or the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council of a State or the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of a State shall not be disqualified under this Schedule-

(a) if he by reason of his election to such office voluntarily gives up the membership of the political party to which he belonged immediately before such election and does not so long as he continues to hold such office thereafter rejoin that political party or become a member of a another political party or

(b) if he having given up by reason of his election to such office his membership of the political party to which he belonged immediately before such election rejoins such political party after he ceases to hold such office

6 Decision on questions as to disqualification on ground of defection- (1) If any question arises as to whether a member of a House has become subject to disqualification under this Schedule the question shall be referred for the decision of the Chairman or as the case may be the Speaker of such House and his decision shall be final

Provided that where the question which has arisen is as to whether the Chairman or the Speaker of a House has become subject to such disqualification the question shall be referred for the decision of such member of the House as the House may elect in this behalf and his decision shall be final

(2) All proceedings under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph in relation to any question as to disqualification of a member of a House under this Schedule shall be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament within the meaning of article 122 or as the case may be proceedings in the Legislature of a State within the meaning of article 212

7 Bar of jurisdiction of courts- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution no court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any matter connected with the disqualification of a member of a House under this Schedule

8 Rules-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph the Chairman or the Speaker of a House may make rules for


giving effect to the provisions of this Schedule and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing such rules may provide for-

(a) the maintenance of registers or other records as to the political parties if any to which different members of the House belong

(b) the report which the leader of a legislature party in relation to a member of a House shall furnish with regard to any condonation of the nature referred to in clause

(b) of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 in respect of such member the time within which and the authority to whom such report shall be furnished

(c) the reports which a political party shall furnish with regard to admission to such political party of any members of the House and the officer of the House to whom such reports shall be furnished and

(d) the procedure for deciding any question referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 including the procedure for any inquiry which may be made for the purpose of deciding such question

(2) The rules made by the Chairman or the Speaker of a House under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph shall be laid as soon as may be after they are made before the House for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions and shall take effect upon the expiry of the said period of thirty days unless they are sooner approved with or without modifications or disapproved by the House and where they are so approved they shall take effect on such approval in the form in which they were laid or in such modified form as the case may be and where they are so disapproved they shall be of no effect

(3) The Chairman or the Speaker of a House may without prejudice to the provisions of article 105 or as the case may be article 194 and to any other power which he may have under this Constitution direct that any wilful contravention by any person of the rules made under this paragraph may be dealt with in the same manner as a breach of privilege of the House

13 SCHEME OF ACT-The Tenth Schedule mdash popularly known as the Anti-Defection Act mdash was included in the Constitution in 1985 by the Rajiv Gandhi ministry and sets


the provisions for disqualification of elected members on the grounds of defection to another political party

The law was added via the 52nd Amendment Act 1985 soon after the Rajiv government came to power with a thumping majority in the wake of the assassination of prime minister Indira Gandhi The Congress had won 401 seats in the Lok Sabha

GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION UNDER THE ANTI-DEFECTION LAWS ARTICLES 102 (2) AND 191 (2)-

a) If an elected member voluntarily gives up his membership of a political party

b) If he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by his political party or anyone authorized to do so without obtaining prior permission

As a pre-condition for his disqualification his abstention from voting should not be condoned by his party or the authorized person within 15 days of such incident

Circumstances under which a split in a party is not considered a lsquodefectionrsquo-

A split in a political party will not be considered a defection if an entire political party merges with another if a new political party is formed by some of the elected members of one party if he or she or other members of the party have not accepted the merger between the two parties and opted to function as a separate group from the time of such a merger

The powers of a party whip under the Constitution in case of a defection-

The whip upholds the party directives in the House as the authorised voice of the party On defection of elected members of his party the whip can


send a petition on the alleged defection to the Chairman or the Speaker of a House for their disqualification He can also expel the members from the party But this does not necessarily mean that the members so expelled lose their seats in the House They continue to hang on to their seats as long as the Chairman or the Speaker of a House gives a final decision on their disqualification from the House after a proper enquiry on the basis of the petition filed by the party whip

Options before a disqualified elected member-

The members so disqualified can stand for elections from any political party for a seat in the same House But he naturally cannot get a ticket from his former party

The deciding authority-

The decisions on questions as to disqualification on ground of defection are referred to the Chairman or the Speaker of such House and his decision is final All proceedings in relation to any question on disqualification of a member of a House under this Schedule are deemed to be proceedings in Parliament or in the Legislature of a state No court has any jurisdiction


Chapter 3Parliamentary Privileges amp Anti-Defection law

Does the anti-defection law which was legislated to deter rampant floor-crossing in parliament curtail freedom of MPs who feel powerless and stifled to express their views freely in parliament Many MPs may think so and have expressed the need to take a relook at a law that was enacted in 1985 to check the aya-ram-gaya-ram syndrome - so called because of the phenomenon of MPs crossing the floor repeatedly to switch party affiliation lured by the prospect of office or other blandishments Wholesale defection is allowed but retail is not Shahid Siddiqui former MP and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) general secretary said at the Conference on Effective Legislatures organised at the Taj Mahal Hotel Wednesday by PRS Legislative Reserach Political parties in India are undemocratic and have turned into feudal parties being controlled by individuals or group of individuals Party bosses who are not even in parliament decide what stand an MP should take or not (in parliament) Siddiqui rued as he strongly recommended a relook at the legislation The legislation which was the 52nd amendment to the constitution made legislators liable to for suspension if they did not always vote according to their party whip-unless one-third of a partys bench strength defected and formed a new party Voice of legislator is stifled and if they chose to speak their conscience against their party will they face a whip Siddiqui said adding parties should be punished when they deflect from their poll manifesto in the name of common minimum programme in case of a coalition government He made a case for lawmakers being allowed to vote according to their conscience or the compulsions of their constituency with the whip only applying for no-confidence motions and money bills


The speakers who included Congress MP and Supreme Court advocate EMS Natchiappan former chief justice YK Sabharwal and veteran journalist BG Verghese agreed that the law stifles parliament debate as legislators cannot afford to dissent without risking disqualification from the house Siddiqui also a journalist had to quit as Samajwadi Party (SP) MP last year after he crossed over to the BSP over the India-US civil nuclear deal The SP was initially opposing the pact but later supported the Manmmohan Singh government in the confidence vote We need this law but legislators should have more say given the undemocratic functioning of political parties he said Verghese said most of intra-party defections are based on convenience and not conviction Political parties also dilute their manifestos Coalition (government) is the marriage of convenience said Verghese and advocated amendment to the law Natchiappan said an MP who gets elected after particular party fields him owes allegiance to that party Heshe should abide by the laws of the party The member has to face disqualification if heshe decides to join some other party or votes against his party Natchiappan said while admitting that the problems in the law can be solved through democratic process in political parties


Chapter 4 lsquoAnti-Defection Law ndash Need for Reviewrsquo

It was after painstaking endeavours spread over almost a period of two

decades that the Anti-Defection Law could find place on the statute book

with the passage of the Fifty-second Constitution Amendment Act in 1985

which introduced the Tenth Schedule to our Constitution The Objects and

Reasons of the related Amendment Bill clearly stated and I quote The evil

of political defections has been a matter of national concern If it is not

combated it is likely to undermine the very foundations of our democracy

and the principles which sustain it Today even twenty-three years after

coming into force of the Anti-Defection Law the concern still remains

Political defection among legislators is indeed a matter of great concern

which affects the stability of the governments and is indeed destructive of

the true principles of parliamentary democracy The Supreme Court in the

case of Kihota Hollohon v Zachilhu amp Ors (AIR 1993 SC 412) has

observed that these provisions in the Tenth Schedule give recognition to the

role of political parties in the political process A political party goes before

the electorate with a particular programme and it sets up candidates at the

election on the basis of such programme A person who gets elected as a

candidate set up by a political party is so elected on the basis of the

programme of that political partyhellip that political propriety and morality

demand that if such a person after the election changes his affiliation and

leaves the political party which had set him up as a candidate at the election

then he should give up his membership of the legislature and go back before

the electorate


The Indian polity has had to contend with the menace of political defections

for a long time The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a surge in political

defections causing on several occasions political instability both at the

Centre and in the States The genesis of the endeavours for bringing forward

a legislation in India for curbing the malaise of defections can be traced to a

Private Memberrsquos Resolution moved in the Fourth Lok Sabha by Shri

PVenkatasubbaiah The adoption of the Resolution eventually led to the

constitution of the Parliamentary Committee on Defections in the late

sixties followed by attempts to enact the Constitution (Thirty-second

Amendment) Bill 1973 and the Constitution (Forty-eighth Amendment)

Bill 1978 These attempts laudable as they were did not yield significant

results

A serious attempt to tackle this problem was made in 1985 with the passage

of the Anti-Defection Law as was contained in the Constitution (Fifty-

second) Amendment Act The Act sought to curb individual defections in

the Legislatures by providing for disqualification of the defecting member

while it allowed splits if it involved one-third of the strength of the party in

the legislature and mergers of political parties under certain conditions

thereby seeking not to suppress political dissent an essential pre-requisite

for a healthy democracy However the fact remains that the operation of the

Act over the years indicated many grey areas in the law Breaking away

with the support of one-third of the members of the party appeared easy and

defections could not be checked specially so far as smaller parties were

concerned

As a consequence demands were made from various quarters for

strengthening the anti-defection law so as to achieve the desired result The

Constitution was amended in 2003 through the Constitution (Ninety-first)


Amendment Act to rectify what seemed to be a lacunae The amendments

omitted the provision relating to splits from the Tenth Schedule to the

Constitution and also provided that a member disqualified under the

provisions of the Tenth Schedule shall also be disqualified for being be a

defence appointed as a Minister or for holding a remunerative political post

for the duration of the period commencing from the date of his

disqualification till the expiry of the term of his office or till he is elected

again Thus the new law provides that the split would no longer

The basis of a functional Parliamentary Democracy rests on the party

system where parties have their policies and programmes with different

priorities Since our independence when India became a Republic and

adopted the system of Parliamentary Democracy we have seen gradually the

weakening of the strength of the leading parties resulting in the formation of

multiplicity of parties having conflicting ideologies programmes and

policies For the last few decades no single party has been able to earn the

peoplersquos confidence resulting in the coming together of parties whose

members are elected in the House with different programmes and ideologies

and form coalition Governments The result has been that both in the Centre

and in the State Governments have been formed on occasions by political

parties with disparate programmes and ideologies who combine only with

the object of acquiring power even by encouraging defections from one

party to another and forming unprincipled coalitions which has greatly

resulted in vitiating the political morality in the country Politics based on

certain values and well-defined policies and priorities has become a casualty

leading to vitiating the political atmosphere and creating uncertainties in the

governance structure Often allegations of horse trading are made of which

we have seen recently a most sordid spectacle Parties who fight each other


bitterly during the election come together immediately after the election

only for the purpose of sharing power and such unprincipled coalitions

brought about only to grab power have resulted in the people losing respect

for our political system as a whole The country has witnessed instances

when some members elected as Independent candidates are persuaded to

support one or other of the big parties with the offer of Cabinet posts to

enable the formation of a Government Unfortunately the spectacle of aya

rams and gaya rams still remains the bane of our political system There

have been many instances of post-poll understanding or adjustments

between the different political parties only for the purpose of formation of

Government This has resulted in disparate groups coming together without

having any common policies and ideologies

The situation still continues to remain largely destructive of the principles of

parliamentary democracy as defections motivated by power and

opportunism continues to be one of the debilitating features of our political

system There has to be a concerted effort to see that political defections are

totally banned or at least are not rewarded

At the Conference of Presiding Officers held in 1998 there were detailed

deliberations on the need to review the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution

and a Committee of Presiding Officers was constituted under the

Chairmanship of Shri Hashim Abdul Halim Honrsquoble Speaker of the West

Bengal Legislative Assembly The Committee after in-depth deliberations

identified certain problem areas in the law and recommended measures to

bring about amendments in the Tenth Schedule to further strengthen the law

This apart institutions like the Law Commission of India Election

Commission and the National Commission to Review the Working of the

Constitution have also expressed their concerns and have made suggestions


for amendments to the anti-defection law But not much headway has been

made in this direction

Under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution the

Presiding Officers of the Houses of legislature have been given the authority

to decide questions of violation of the provisions of the Anti-Defection Law

However over the years the exercise of this power by Presiding Officers has

caused controversy and in many cases allegations of political considerations

being applied by the Presiding Officers in deciding the matters of defection

have been made which considerably affects the dignity of the high office of

the Presiding Officer It may be that in some occasions unfortunately there

have been causes to justify prima facie such allegations

While discharging their functions under the Tenth Schedule of the

Constitution the Presiding Officers are treated as Tribunals exercising

specific jurisdiction as conferred by the Schedule Such exercise of power is

dehors the constitutional authority of the Presiding Officers to have

exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the proceedings of the House and as such

the Presiding Officers are not immune from their orders being challenged in

Courts of Law and in many cases not only such orders have been set-aside

by the judicial authorities but adverse comments have also been made It has

recently appeared in the media that a Presiding Officer of one of the

Legislative Assemblies in our country has been directed by the Court to

indicate the time within which a pending matter relating to defection will be

disposed of by the Presiding Officer as a grievance has been made before

the Court as appears from the Media that the concerned Presiding Officer

was deliberately delaying the disposal of the matter before him


The judiciary has taken up matters where the decisions of the Presiding

Officers under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution have been challenged

and this jurisdiction has been upheld by the Supreme Court of India

It is desirable and indeed necessary that the jurisdiction and authority to

deal with matters of defection as provided in the Tenth Schedule need not

continue to be exercised by the Presiding Officers and the power should be

conferred on some other authority like a special Tribunal comprised of

people well versed in law or on an authority like the Election Commission

The exercise of power and jurisdiction by the Presiding Officer of any House should not be subjected to such scrutiny which considerably affects the status and the position of the Presiding Officers With all respect to the Judiciary whose jurisdiction cannot be denied it will be fit and proper and indeed to my mind desirable that the Presiding Officers do not continue to be under such judicial scrutiny which in many cases has given rise to in my opinion avoidable tension between the two constitutional authorities


CHAPTER 5 CHAPTER 5 AMENDMENTS IN ANTIAMENDMENTS IN ANTI - DEFECTION LAWS- DEFECTION LAWS

It is almost fifty-six years since India had awoken to freedom And our Constitution gives us a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic These words are enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution Democracy means power to the people and power to the people means Citizens Right to elect representatives for the governance of the country Democracy and election are synonymous or in other words these two are the two sides of the same coin As we are living in a democratic country we ought to cast our vote after every five years (if there is no mid-term election) It is our obligation to our democratic set up

The first elected Parliament came into being in May 1952 half a century ago but the tragedy in our Indian democracy is that the behavior of the elected representatives becomes more and more rude flirts and power hungry Split in a party or defection of the legislators change of sides withdrawal of support became common phenomena with the coming of coalition era Our systems of election have been wading through the dirty water of corruption for the past few decades

The process of choosing representatives is more and more narcissistic process of me my men my constituency rather than my State or my country The theory first to win from my constituency have forced many MPs and MLAs to focus their concentration only to their constituency in order to be elected again and again There is nothing of devoted committed people to be elected in election not only for five years but all the time

But in order to win elections in the quest for power the Parliament or the Legislative Assemblies should not be a den of defectors

This is the reason behind the annexation of another schedule known as The Tenth schedule in the Constitution which is widely known as Anti-Defection Law

In the existing Anti Defection Act there is a provision to allow bulk defection and it is taken as a legal split of a political party If the violation of the whip is by one third of the strength of the parliamentary or the


Legislature Party there could be no disqualification - that means one third of the MPs or MLAs of a political party have the right to split and form a new political party

This is the drawback in the existing Anti-Defection Law MPs and MLAs for defection are not available in retail but available in whole sale This encourages splits in political parties So we have seen the splits of many political parties and birth of new political parties majority of them having the alphabetical suffix to their parent parties

The Union Cabinet in a meeting on the 24th April this year chaired by the Prime Minister had decided to curb bulk defection through legal splits by amending the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution by deleting the Para three of the schedule that pertains to exemption form disqualification in case of splits

The existing Tenth Schedule had failed to achieve the goal of checking defections and demands have been made from many quarters from time to time The Dinesh Goswami committee on electoral reforms The Law Commission Report and the Constitution Review Commission had already recommended the deletion of the Para that recognized splits

The NDA Government at the Centre has hinted at strengthening the Anti-Defection Law and determined to bring legislation in this regard in this current session itself

Under the new amendments the defectors should be debarred to hold any public office of a Minister or any other post of profit till they win the next election that is till the defector is re-elected

According to KN Bhatt Senior Advocate Supreme Court Former Additional Solicitor General of India the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution should be amended specifically to provide that all persons defecting - whether individually or in groups from the party or the alliances of parties on whose ticket they had been elected must resign from their parliamentary or assembly seats and must contest fresh elections He further holds the view that the power to decide questions as to disqualification on ground of defection should vest in the Election Commission instead of in the chairman or speaker of the House concerned

There is every possibility of passing the Bill of Amendment of the Anti-Defection Law if it is brought in the current session for discussion The


Congress expresses its willingness to support the Bill and why not the tenth schedule of the Constitution was annexed during the regime of Rajiv Gandhi with an aim to cleanse the electoral process

The passage of a Constitutional Amendment requires a separate vote in each House Further the requirement is for a two third majority which will be easy for NDA if Congress supports the Bill

On the other side of electoral process the Election Commission of India is doing its best to steer democracy in India into a right course There are many new Dos and Donts which have gripped many candidates and political parties like a vice during the time of election In fact we are now at a key turning point in our history of democratic process of election

In the coming elections most probably in the coming Lok Sabha Elections many front pages of the newspapers will be occupied by the bio-datas of the candidates their past records their source of income since it has becomes mandatory of each candidate to file an affidavit showing all these things and the copies of the affidavit should be made available to the print and electronic medias

Let us hope that the amendment bill pass without any hindrance in this session so that the days of Aya Ram Gaya Ram come to an end

lsquoSPF DPA and Anti-Defection Lawrsquo

lsquoUneasy lies the head that wears the crownrsquo ndash This maxim holds true for all the time for all the heads that wear a crown and for all the hands that hold a scepter and the head of our Chief Minister Ibobi is not an exception Uneasy lies more in his head than the heads of the Chief Minister of other States

In retrospect the year 2003 was not altogether a favorable year for Ibobi Many unfortunate events came hand in hand many untoward incidents came one after another during the last year The controversy over the grading of minimum qualifying marks for the SC and ST candidates for MBBSBDS course the intrusion of 13 NSCN (IM) men with arms inside the territory of Manipur the kidnap and murder of Lungnila Elizabeth the daughter of one of his Cabinet colleagues these are some of the major events which the Chief Minister wants to forget once and for all

The Chief Minister had spent many sleepless nights in 2003 in guarding his fort in trying to calm down the tremor that shook his seat and at the same


time to counter the blows inflicted upon him from the Opposition DPA to topple his Government

But the severest blow from the DPA came in the last week of the previous year All fingers were crossed all eyes were focused on the Chief Ministerrsquos Bungalow and it was the exception of all from a street vendor to an erudite scholar that the fall of SPF was eminent and there would be a new Government in Manipur in 2004

The scathing attack of the Opposition DPA to snatch away some Ministers (almost all the MLAs in the SPF are Ministers) from the ruling SPF was so great that O Ibobi had no alternative but to deport some of his Minister with whom he had the suspicion of having divided loyalty both on the SPF and the DPA and could be lured away by the latter to outside the State under the careful eyes of his trusted lieutenants During the blows of the Opposition he hid like a snake coiling its body around its head while exposing its whole body to the external blows Ibobi deliberately forgot the obligation of calling the requisite number of Assembly session in a calendar year His efforts finally bore fruits

Now with the coming of 2004 whether it is fortune that favors the brave or not but fortune began to smile on Ibobi The amendment in the Anti-Defection Law (the 97th Constitutional Amendment) comes as a last savior for Ibobi as well as the SPF This Amendment deletes Para (3) of the 10th Schedule of the Constitution (Anti-Defection Law of 1985) which allows lsquobulk defectionrsquo (one third of the total legislature of a party) as a legal split In the new amendment the defectors (except those expelled from the party) will not be allowed to hold any Ministerial post on any post of profit till they contest and win a new election

From now onwards if any legislator wishes to change sides he will neither gain the head nor the tail The importance of a Speaker who is often labeled as an engineer of defection under the previous defection law has been reduced almost to naught in the new law while the scepter of the party president becomes longer and tougher

Ibobi is now holding the duel post in the Congress party in the State much to advantage one leading the Congress Legislature Party as a Chief Minister of the coalition SPF Government and the other holding the rein of MPCC (I) He can face any challenge in his leadership in the Congress Legislature Party for the time being The Congress High Command in Delhi will not allow any crisis brewing in the State before the Parliament election which


will only help to tarnish the image of the party

On the other hand the Opposition DPA had fallen prostrate The alliance is now knocked out from the ring bleeding severely and it is unlikely to flex muscle with SPF in the near future The DPA had been trying its best to topple the SPF (this is what an Opposition party in Manipur ought to be) and no stone was left un-turned in searching for an inroad to the fortress of the SPF during the last two years Even at a gentle breeze which is not enough to move away the ringlet curl from a girlrsquos cheek the DPA took it as a good omen coming in their way

They had had the chance In June 2003 when Arvind Dave took charge from Ved Marwah as the Governor of the State when Home Minister ID Swamy lashed the Chief Minister and his SPF with the remarks that the SPF Government had no moral rights to continue there was a bright chance of BJP-led Government in Manipur This misunderstanding between Imphal and Delhi offices of the BJP was that the BJP State unit built castle in the air that Article 356 will be used by the Centre to install a BJP led Government in Manipur while the Centre insisted that the State unit had to muster majority by hook or by crook The NDA in the Centre did not want to repeat the failure of dismissing Rabri Government in Bihar

So RK Dorendra though he cleverly managed to rope in an MSCP MP to merge with BJP had succeeded in becoming DPA leader backed by Federal Party which has more sitting MLAs than the BJP the seat of Chief Minister still eluded him this time also As wild goose chase ends people of Manipur expect a role of good and constructive opposition in ruling the State

Now the crew of the ship under the captaincy of Ibobi has passed through the rough weather The foremost duty for him now is to project himself as one of the ablest Chief Minister of the State and does something concrete in the overall development of the State so that he can silence the storm within his Congress party and at the same time lead the State triumphantly from the present messes


CHAPTER6 CHAPTER6 ANTI-DEFECTION LAWANTI-DEFECTION LAW INTENT AND IMPACTINTENT AND IMPACT

Mr BG Verghese 1048707 Defection first became a problem in the 1960s with floor-crossing in

state legislatures and in the Parliament becoming common This gave rise to the lsquoAaya Ram Gaya Ramrsquo phenomenon Defection was motivated by lure of office and money

1048707 In present times elected members switch parties soon after the elections as post-election coalitions which often happen after a fractured verdict In this case it is the political party which induces defection

1048707 The problem starts with political parties their structure and lack of internal democracy Political parties are also not accountable to individuals

1048707 Political parties also lsquodefectrsquo from their members by abdicating from the manifestoes or election-time promises that they make Candidates get elected on the basis of these promises and after the election the party often deviates from their manifesto The elected member has no option but to toe the party line

1048707 There is a general consensus that the law needs a review One possible change is that disqualification for disobeying whips be limited to Money Bills or Confidence Motions for or against the government

1048707 Political parties have also become important as a basic unit of the democratic setup Therefore political parties themselves are in need of reform

1048707 Anti-defection law was brought in to promote stability However a developing country like ours needs to change in order to develop So stability might in fact become an impediment to change

Justice YK Sabharwal AMIT ANIL SALUNKE LLM1st (2nd SEM) Page 27

1048707 Defection is more of a political question and most legal issues that have come up have been examined and settled He referred to several important cases before the Supreme Court where the validity of the Tenth Schedule was challenged The validity was challenged on various grounds such as the powers of the Speaker curtailment of an MPMLAs freedom of speech and expression (For the list of issues that have come up before the Supreme Court see PRS Background Note)

1048707 A National Commission to review the working of the Constitution was set up by the government The Commission recommended that the power to disqualify should be vested in the Election Commission or the government

1048707 The Supreme Court has also expressed the desirability of the government vesting this power in an authority other than the Speaker It may be vested in the President or the governors acting on the advice of the Election Commission

1048707 This type of law is an exception to the general rule and is rarely found in established democracies Developed western countries do not seem to regulate defection (See PRS Background Note for details)

1048707 One basic issue is whether defection is incompatible with democracy or whether such a law itself is undemocratic

Mr Shahid Siddiqui The law is undemocratic but it is a necessary evil given the political context The political atmosphere makes it necessary for us to have this law but it needs to be reformed

1048707 The law is problematic as political parties are not democratic and there is little or no internal discussion on issues Party leaders who may not be members of the legislature often take decisions regarding which way members in the legislatures should vote As a result the voice of the legislator is completely lost

1048707 The leaders of a political party become very important and can change the political stance of the party at any given point of time This leads to legislators not being able to represent their constituency or their representatives well enough


CHAPTER CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION amp SUGGESTIONS

Defections and splits in parties have always been a feature of Indian Politics Every time the National Parliament or state legislatures return a less-than-certain outcome out come the suitcases and allegations of horse trading drown out every other public discourse In the mad circus that follows parties spirit their legislators away hide them suborn them and then triumphantly parade them before the world

In response to this madness the Fifty-Second Amendment to the Indian Constitution introduced for the first time anti-defection measures into Indian Law As the preface to the Amendment Bill states The evil of political defections has been a matter of national concern If it is not combated it is likely to undermine the very foundations of our democracy and the principles which sustain it With this object an assurance was given in the address by the President to Parliament that the Government intended to introduce in the current session of Parliament an anti-defection Bill This Bill is meant for outlawing defection and fulfilling the above assurance (Emphasis mine)The Amendment introduced provisions to ensure disqualification of a member of a House belonging to a political party if (a) If he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party or

(b) If he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf without obtaining in either case the prior permission of such political party person or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention (Emphasis mine)

(-from the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution)


Now in theory this would discourage party backbenchers from changing party affiliations at the drop of a hat and thus be good for democracy In theory Communism works in theory If you look carefully what these laws do is make the political party essential to the legislative process This was not the case prior to the Amendment The only earlier Indian law that recognised political parties was the Elections symbols order of 1968 Our Constitution meant for MPs and MLAs to vote according to their consciences and the will of their constituents not according to party fiat

My MP Shivajirao Patil belongs to the Shiv Sena Now in a perfect world he would be my constituencys representative in Parliament and that his vote in Parliament would reflect this However I cannot expect him to take decisions based on what he thinks best for the constituency or his better judgement He will vote according to the line his party takes His vote in Parliament will be decided by his party boss Bal Thackeray The votes of other MPs will likewise be decided by their party bosses And that in these days of crumbling inner-party democracy means that decisions are ultimately made by people who are accountable to no one

In a large country like India direct democracy is not possible We must have a representative democracy But Representative Democracy demands legislators who actually represent their constituents Indian legislators dont they represent their parties This means that a government is responsible to its people only at election time not all the time as one would hope Legislation in India cannot be overturned by popular opinion it is decided solely by Party High Commands This is why anti-defection legislation is so popular among parties And the best thing is legislators now cannot vote against such laws because it is against the policy of most parties and would invite anti-defection penalties

The reality is anti-defection law in India has seriously weakened our Democracy Anger against defections by MPs and MLAs has been used by political parties to appropriate more power at the expense of the people


CHAPTER CHAPTER 8 CRITICAL ANALYSIS

When the anti-defection law was enacted by Parliament back in 1985 it was expected to effectively curb defections that has plagued Indian political life Sadly experience has shown us otherwise in Manipur as much as elsewhere The anti-defection law turned out to be a classic case of the remedy being worse than the disease One of its most glaring loopholes the provision sanctifying defection if it is done by one-third of a partys legislators was gleefully pounced upon by opportunistic politicians to completely subvert the spirit of the law while keeping to its letter The fall of the VP Singh government heralded the era of mass defections in Indian political history and of course in Manipur our own breed of netas were quick to learn the lesson In smaller Assemblies such as ours it was not difficult to find a few MLAs willing to change over given the right inducements and defections have been shamelessly used both to bolster governments as well as to topple them all without attracting the provisions of the 10th Schedule The result constant political instability and widespread public disillusionment with politics and politicians

Given this sorry state of affairs the Union governments recent decision to drastically amend the anti-defection law is most welcome Indeed a Consitutional amendment bill has been introduced in the current session of Parliament and if it is carried through it can be expected to have a most salutory effect on our political life For one thing the notorious paragraph three of the 10th Schedule providing exemption to the disqualification penalty in the case of defection of one-third the strength of the legislature party is to be removed altogether For another the proposed amendment to the anti-defection law envisages further penalising defections by prohibiting the defector from holding any public office or remunerative political post for a certain period Concurrently it is also proposed to limit the size of the council of ministers in a state to ten percent of the size of the Assembly These changes are in line with the recommendations of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution NCRWC

One can imagine how much of a nightmare it would be to our MLAs and netas if these provisions go through Rather than the rich rewards reaped in years past defection would mean automatic disqualification and forfeiture of ones seat in the Assembly And with a limit imposed on the size of


be prepared by the Lok Sabha Secretariat will be discussed in the winter session ministries there would be little to offer a potential defector The enactment of the Constitutional amendment bill would mean an end to such ridiculous situations as the one we have now where all but one of the 39 MLAs of the ruling SPF alliance are holding ministerial or Cabinet rank posts We may even see at long last a government lasting its full term in Manipur which is a feat no government has been able to accomplish ever since Manipur achieved statehood

In this context it is rather unfortunate that the Union government has not seen fit to include another change proposed by the NCRWC which was to take away the power to decide on disqualification from the hands of the Assembly Speaker and vest it in the Election Commission of India As we have seen time and again in Manipur a partisan Speaker can wreak havoc in a House using the anti-defection law as a weapon and more than one Speaker have used the post as a stepping stone for gaining the chief ministers chair Empowering the Election Commission would have taken away a weapon from the hands of the Speaker that is prone to misuse and ensure a quick and objective decision on the issue of disqualification in the case of defection

There are also those who say that the proposed amendment would severely curtail the democratic right of dissent and there is certainly a grain of truth in this But it is equally true to say that the average Indian politician has yet to prove that he has a conscience rather than being driven by selfish motives By all means make sure that the proposed law has enough safeguards to avoid giving unbridled dictatorial powers to party leaderships but that should not be used as an excuse to stall the proposed amendments which are solrely needed if electoral politics is to have any meaning

The Anti-Defection Act incorporated in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution has come into sharp focus ever since the Bharatiya Janata Party engineered a majority in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly with the help of defectors from other parties That the law had loopholes that needed to be plugged was known for long but the latest instance of its blatant abuse has lent urgency to the matter Prime Minister IK Gujral convened a meeting of leaders of various parties for November 10 The leaders agreed on the need for amendments to the law a background paper on the issue to of Parliament


The law as enacted in 1985 when Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister empowers the Speaker or Chairman of the House concerned to decide on the question of disqualification of a member who defects The defector invites disqualification if he or she voluntarily gives up membership of his party or abstains from voting in violation of any direction issued by the party Independent members too invite disqualification if they join a political party

The law also recognises splits in and mergers of parties A split is recognised if at least one-third of the total membership of the legislature party defects If more than two-thirds of the number of legislators of a party decide to join another party it is recognised as a merger in that case the remaining legislators of the parent party will not be disqualified

A note prepared by the Government recently states that the law has failed to prevent bulk defections On the other hand the law has been criticised on the grounds that it curtails the powers privileges and immunities of members in regard to freedom of speech and freedom of action including freedom of vote

The Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms appointed by the VP Singh Government in 1990 recommended that the disqualification provisions should be limited to cases where a member voluntarily gives up his membership of the party The committee further said the disqualification provision should apply when a member violated the party whip in respect of a motion of vote of confidence or no-confidence or a money bill or a motion of vote of thanks to the Presidents address

The committee recommended that the power to decide on disqualification under the Act should be given to the President or the Governor who shall act on the advice of the Election Commission

Former Lok Sabha Speaker Shivraj Patil told Frontline that the stipulation in the law on recognition of splits was introduced so as not to stifle legitimate dissent

At a UF Steering Committee meeting on November 5 Parliamentary Affairs Minister Srikant Jena favoured an amendment which would rule out the dissolution of the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies before the completion of their terms In his opinion such a move would discourage defections But the Communist Party of India (Marxist) disagreed with this saying that on the contrary such a move would induce MPs and MLAs to defect freely as the threat of dissolution would no longer be there The


CPI(M) and the CPI favour automatic disqualification in case of defection irrespective of the number of persons breaking away or violating a party whip

A section of the Janata Dal is against amending the law at this point of time This section led by former Prime Minister HD Deve Gowda (who is reported to have some interest in the political developments in Karnataka where the ruling Janata Dal is troubled by dissensions) warned against amending the Constitution hastily to appease the Congress Another section favoured a Congress proposal to make it mandatory for one-half of the legislature party to defect for a split to be recognised This was not favoured by the Left

CPI(M) Rajya Sabha member and member of the partys Polit Bureau S Ramachandran Pillai said his party favoured an amendment to ensure that the decision on the question of disqualification of alleged defectors was taken within a reasonable time He said the CPI(M) would seek an amendment to provide for the involvement of the Election Commission in adjudicating the cases of disqualification arising out of defection Ramachandran Pillai said The Speaker can be removed by a majority of the members of the House hence he cannot be impartial

According to a senior BJP leader the party supports the position that all defectors irrespective of their strength should lose their seats but it has opted to be pragmatic as long as the law exists

The first momentous ruling under the Act was passed in the Lok Sabha in November 1990 when Speaker Rabi Ray declared 28 members of the Janata Dal unattached after they were expelled from the party by the Janata Dal leader in Parliament VP Singh The law does not provide for the recognition of some members as unattached but neither does it provide for disqualification of members who have been expelled from a party

Subsequently Ray recognised the Janata Dal(S) headed by Chandra Shekhar which consisted of 54 Lok Sabha members of the Janata Dal Parliamentary Party These 54 included the 28 unattached members Ray however disqualified seven members of the Janata Dal including VC Shukla and four others who were then Ministers in the Chandra Shekhar Government for defecting to the Janata Dal(S) Ray thus interpreted the law to establish that a split was a one-time affair


Shivraj Patil took quite some time to pronounce his verdict on the splits that occurred in the Janata Dal when he was Speaker In the case of the first split that occurred when Ajit Singh and 20 other MPs broke away from the Janata Dal he took nine months to pronounce his judgment In the second instance when seven members quit the Ajit Singh faction he took two years to recognise the split

The law also requires that a split in the legislature party be a consequence of the split in the partys organisational wing Observers however note that it is difficult for Speakers to judge whether a split has taken place in the partys organisation


BIBLIOGRAPHY-BIBLIOGRAPHY-

1 Basu D D Commentary on the Constitution of India Vol K ( Calcutta Kamal

Law House 1991)

2 Iyer Venkat Constitutional Perspectives (New Delhi ULPCL 2001)

3 Jain M P Indian Constitutional Law (Nagpur Wadhwa amp Co 2002)

4 Pandey J N Constitutional Law of India (Allahabad Central Law Agency 2003)

5 Seervai H M Constitutional Law of India Vol 1 286 (New Delhi Universal

Book Traders 2002)

6 Shukla V N Constitution of India (Lucknow Eastern Book Co 2001)

WEBLIOGRAPHY- WEBLIOGRAPHY-

1 httpwwwuscourtsgovsupremecourthtml

2 httpwwwlibmemphisedugovpubscourtshtm

3 http wwwwikipediacom

4 httpwwwlegalservicecom

5 httpwwwindiakanooncom


TENTATIVE CHAPTERISATION 1 INTRODUCTION

11 General Introduction 12 Significance of study

13 Objective of study

14 Hypothesis

15 Scope of the study

16 Research methodology

2 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW AN OVERVIEW-


22Constitutional Provisions

23Scheme of the Act

3 PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES amp ANTI- DEFECTION LAW

4 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW-NEED FOR REVIEW

5 AMENDMENTS IN ANTI-DEFECTION LAW

6 ANTI-DEFECTION LAW- INTENT amp IMPACT

7 CONCLUSION amp SUGGESTIONS

8 CRITICAL APPRAISAL


Bibliography

Webliography







this law


implementation


laws










15 HYPOTHESIS-


















TENTH SCHEDULE

[Articles 102(2) and 191(2)]
































































































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)









Bibliography

Webliography







this law


implementation


laws










15 HYPOTHESIS-


















TENTH SCHEDULE

[Articles 102(2) and 191(2)]
































































































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)














this law


implementation


laws










15 HYPOTHESIS-


















TENTH SCHEDULE

[Articles 102(2) and 191(2)]
































































































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)












15 HYPOTHESIS-


















TENTH SCHEDULE

[Articles 102(2) and 191(2)]
































































































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)
















TENTH SCHEDULE

[Articles 102(2) and 191(2)]
































































































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)










TENTH SCHEDULE

[Articles 102(2) and 191(2)]
































































































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)































































































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)




















































































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)









































































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)
































































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)






















































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)











































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)





































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)


































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)
































the electorate













results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)




















results












concerned





































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)









































































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)













































































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)

















































































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)























































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)













































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)





































































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)




























































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)


















































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)











































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)





































































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)



























































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)


















































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)












































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)







































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)


































Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)





























Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)





















Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)














Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)











Law House 1991)





Book Traders 2002)









Documents

ADV. AMEET