Afghan Crisis

Outline:

• Historical Background

• Incident Of 9/11 And End Of Taliban Rule:

• Operation Against Al-Qaeda Network.

• Surging Of Forces In Afghanistan

• Pakistan’s Commitment In War On Terror And American Response

• Preparing For Post US-Afghanistan

• Aftermath, Once India Would Seize The Opportunity In Afghanistan

• American’s Mistakes In Afghanistan And Repetition Of History-Critical Analysis

• The Road To Peace-Conclusion

Historical Background:

Afghanistan is an under-developed landlocked mountainous Muslim country of South West Asia.

Since ages tribal system had been the basis of its society. The Afghan people are brave, peace-

loving and devoted Muslims. They had been living peacefully under princes and kings. This state

of affairs continued till 1973 when King Zahir Shah was deposed by Mohammad Daud and the

country plunged into civil war and disharmony is continued to this day.

After the fall of monarchy in 1973, Afghanistan fell victim of chaos and confusion. The Soviet

Union exploited this situation and establishes its control over Kabul in 1979 which lasted till

1988. After the withdrawal of USSR, Afghanistan was ravaged by civil war which ended in 1996

when Taliban became the master of this land. Taliban rule was marked by Islamic

fundamentalism which led to the establishment of Al-Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden. The

Taliban attracted the attention of the world by their fundamentalism and strict policies towards

women folk and the non-Muslims. In the meantime, US and Britain charges Afghanistan with the

acts of supporting Terrorism and freedom fighters in Chechnya. In this connection, US launched

a Cruise missile attack against the bases in Afghanistan in August 1998.

Incident Of 9/11 And End Of Taliban Rule:

Afghanistan became the focus of the world after the terrorists attack on WTC and Pentagon in

New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. US blamed Taliban-sponsored al-Qaeda for

these attacks. As a result, US-led UN forces attacked Afghanistan, and on 13th November, 2001

dislodged the Taliban rule. Later on, all the factions of Afghan people participated in the Bonn

meeting and on 5th December 2001 signed an agreement to establish a 30-member Interim

Government under Hamid Karzai which installed a democratic government through a Loya Jirga.

Operation Against Al-Qaeda Network.

After establishing an Interim Authority in Afghanistan, US-led multi-nation forces began

operation against Al-Qaeda network and their supports. This operation has been continued since

January 2002 in all parts of Afghanistan. Ruthless force is being used to kill or capture militants

of Al-Qaeda and their supporters. As Taliban forces are also engaged in this operation, but so far

the American forces have to failed to clear the land from Extremists. The Afghan people are the

main sufferers because continuous state of war has not only ruined their country but also

deprived them of food, shelter and peace.

Surging Of Forces In Afghanistan

US forces in Afghanistan have surpassed those in Iraq since 2003. US numbers in Afghanistan

are scheduled to peak at about 98, 000 after the first detachment of 30,000 reinforcement. Obama

has given his senior commander, Gen. Patraeus until July 2011 to turn the tide of insurgency and

bolster forces.

Pakistan’s Commitment In War On Terror And American Response

Pakistan has lost more soldiers than the combined loss suffered by foreign forces in Iraq and

Afghanistan and more civilians than lost in 9/11 strikes which eminently reflect Pakistan’s

commitment in the war on terror. Despite Pakistan’s such commitment and immense loss in the

WOT; the US is continuously threatening Pakistan with following serious consequences:

i) Chocking the country economically

ii) Invasion on FATA

iii) Drone strikes across the country

iv) Seizure of nuclear storage sites by special operations

v) Air blitz against these sites

Instead of living in mortal fear the Americans should shed the paranoia that has gripped them

and the arrogance that characters their conduct with the weaker states and show some grace,

serenity of mind, understanding and respect to Pakistan’s concerns and constraints. Their

uncalled for outburst against a ‘partner’ would only serve to alienate the Pakistani people even

more.

Preparing For Post US-Afghanistan

As a consequence of the rapid deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan has also

preparing option in case the US departs. Pakistani officials who speak of the US-led coalition as

“occupation forces” in Afghanistan, are convince that history will repeat itself and that the US

will sooner or later leave the region. Once the Americans are gone, NATO determination will

fade and Afghanistan will be left to itself.

The Taliban tactics so far has been to attack where NATO presence is weak, but they are now

able to mass more and more fighters and launch large-scale raids. They will most likely take on

NATO troops directly, thus increasing the number of causalities.

Should Western troops leave the country or reduce their number to a symbolic presence, the

position of Afghan government could well weaken. Pakistan would be faced with political

vacuum that it believe would have to fill to prevent any other power from acquiring a

predominate influence.

Aftermath, Once India Would Seize The Opportunity In Afghanistan

i) India will try to sandwich Pakistan between the threats from both Eastern and Western borders.

ii) It will exploit every possible opportunity to spark the flames of sectarianism and ethnicity in

Baluchistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa.

iii) Pakistan’s economy will be strangulated by the Indian blockade.

iv) The regional balance of power will be destabilised massively.

v) Indian’s extended presence in Afghanistan will create problems for China as well.

vi) The US will cash in the opportunity by selling military hardware to India in the name of

upgrading overhauling the Indian Army to enable it to take on Chinese forces.

American’s Mistakes In Afghanistan And Repetition Of History-Critical Analysis

History is repeating itself in Afghanistan because America is repeating the mistake made by the

Soviets. They are being made to pay for their folly of overestimating themselves, and

understanding the skill and fortitude of the Afghan guerrillas. As a consequence, they have put in

place a new strategy of withdrawal of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) from

Afghanistan from July 2011 onwards.

The first mistake made by America was to defy history. But having chosen to do so they should

have assigned the resources needed to accomplish the mission. Thus, their main effort should

have been in Afghanistan not in Iraq.

Their second mistake was to initiate the air-bombing campaign without securing the crossing

sites on their sides of the Durand Line to prevent the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from escaping to

tribal areas of Pakistan.

Their third mistake was not to end the Taliban domination in the mountains where they have

their safe havens. Yet instead of taking corrective action they persisted with the mismatch

between the mission assigned and resources given. Consequently, they have suffered operational

setback and blamed Pakistan for them.

The additional US forces sanctioned are still not enough to accomplish the mission. However,

the least that can be done is to employ the available forces judiciously. One, for blocking at last

those crossing sits which are used by the Haqqani group to make forays into Afghanistan from

North Waziristan and two for ending the domination of the mountains by the Taliban.

The Road To Peace-Conclusion

Pakistan must learn from past and stay away from a future role in Afghanistan or the impeding

civilian war in the next round will enter our land and there will be no stopping the national

nosedive to extinction. Ultimately, the situation to the problem lies in sorting out the people’s

difficulties connected with governance and security in the first place.

The road to peace in Afghanistan lies in making a major governance overhaul that needs to be

administrated by someone who is acceptable to all the people. In the existing situation that

someone could be from the former King Zahir Shah’s family-that person can craft an exit

strategy through which Afghanistan could re-emerge as a peaceful country under democratic

constitutional monarchy working under parliament. This formulation is likely to be acceptable to

many ethnic nationalities in the country including the Taliban. Pakistan could do well to

encourage such move.

Pak-Afghan Relations

Outline:

• Historical Background

• Current Situation

• Geo-Strategic Significance Of Afghanistan

i) Direct Importance

ii) Indirect Importance

• Interests Of Foreign Powers In The Affairs Of Afghanistan

i) US Interests

ii) Russian Interests:

iii) Chinese Interests

iv) Indian Interests

v) Iranian Interests

vi) Pakistanis Interests

a) Political Interests

b) Economic Interests

c) Security Interests

• Significance Of Afghanistan In Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

• Pakistan’s Dilemmas

• Conclusion

Historical Background

Pakistan and Afghanistan are two Muslim neighbouring countries having common border and

common history. Since 1947, relations between the two countries have seen many ups and

downs. In the beginning from 1947 to 1979, Afghanistan remained under the influence of Soviet

Union and India. As such, Kabul adopted anti-Pakistan policy. The Pakhtoonistan stunt and

frequent border skirmishes resulted because of this attitude. However, Pakistan showed restraint

to give peace a chance. In 1954 and 1955, the relations between the two countries reached the

lowest ebb, when Pakistani consulate in Kabul and Jalalabad were attacked by the Afghans. The

relations between the two countries were strained, as result of these events.

In 1963, relations were restored through the efforts of Shah Raza Shah Pehlvi of Iran. During

1965 Indo-Pak War, Afghanistan did not create any problem for Pakistan.

In 1979, the scenario of this region underwent a drastic change when the Soviet sent 40 thousand

troops to support pro-Russian Kabul government. Actually, it was a move to capture Afghanistan

like the East European satellite states. The entire free world led by USA denounced Russian

military intervention in Afghanistan.US supplied weapons to Afghan fighters so that they might

wage guerrilla war against Russians. Millions of Afghan refugees took shelter in Pakistan.

During the nine year war (1979-1988), the Afghan fighters inflicted heavy losses on the Soviet

Union troops. As a result, Soviet forced withdrew from Afghanistan.

After their withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, Afghanistan plunged into a bloody war form

1988 to 1996. During this eight year period, Najib government fell on 1992 and a provincial set

up under Sibghat Ullah Mujaddid took control of Kabul. In May 1993, President Rabbani and

premier Gulbaddin Hikmatyar came into power.

In 1996, the situation changed again when Taliban under Mullah Umar took control of Kabul and

extended their authority over 90 per cent area of the country. Taliban rule was marked by

fundamentalism through which they enforced strict rules and regulations. After the event of Nine

Eleven, the USA asked Taliban to handover Osama Bin Laden, but they refused to do so.

As a result, US led multi-national forces attacked Afghanistan in

October 2001 and toppled the Taliban rule. Hamid Karzai succeeded as provincial head of the

state and was later on elected by a Loya Jirga comprising of 1500 members. In June 2002,

Pakistan lent all sorts of support to the Afghani government. In December 2002, six states

including Pakistan signed the Kabul Declaration pledging that these States would not interfere in

Afghani affairs.

Current Situation

Currently, US-led multi-national forces are operating in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and

Taliban. Pakistan is non-NATO ally of US against terrorism. Thus, it is assisting Karzai regime

as non-NATO ally of USA. Presently Pak-Afghan relations have become very delicate due to

Karzai’s frequent allegations that Taliban’s are operating from inside Pakistan territory.

However, Pakistan government has refused these charges that the 30 thousand troops have sealed

the porous Durand Line and no foreigner is allowed to use Pakistani territory.

Geo-Strategic Significance Of Afghanistan

Direct Importance:

i) Afghanistan is located at the juncture of three strategic regions of Central Asia, South Asia and

West Asia.

ii) Sparse population, rugged terrain and warrior tribes make Afghanistan a dumping ground of

superpowers of the times.

Indirect Importance

i) Afghanistan is also called a region at the cross-roads of history. That is, in the 21st century,

Afghanistan is still keen to practice the medieval age customs and traditions.

ii) The potential land-bridge of oil and gas pipelines and trade route to and from Central and

West Asia.

iii) The landlocked nature of Central Asia offers Afghanistan significance of a transit route-to

have access to sea ports of Indian and Arabian sea.

Interests Of Foreign Powers In The Affairs Of Afghanistan

i) US Interests:

a) Energy resources of Central Asia

b) Containing China and Iran

c) Countering Russian influence in the region

d) Checking the outflow of narcotics

e) Checking the export of religious extremism

f) Closely monitoring the cooperative framework between China, Russia, Iran, CARs, India and

Pakistan.

g) Supporting broad-based, moderate and US-friendly government in Afghanistan.

ii) Russian Interests:

a) Reasserting itself in its backyard and avenge its defeat (i.e. the collapse of former USSR).

b) Securing control over oil and gas resources of Central Asia.

c) Countering US influence and regional designs

d) Preventing spread of extremism to Chechnya

iii) Chinese Interests

a) Future energy requirement and possible supplies demand from Central and West Asia

including Iran.

b) Halting unrest in adjoining Chinese territories (owing to spill over effect)

c) Neutralizing the influence of US/NATO forces in the region.

iv) Indian Interests

a) Creating friction between Pakistan and Afghanistan to keep the former under pressure.

b) Instigating the covert low intensity conflict (LIC) against Pakistan to keep Pakistan busy with

conflict coming from Western border.

c) Exploring the trade opportunities with the countries of Central and West Asia.

d) Watching its geo-strategic interests through empowerment of the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras

against the Pashtuns.

v) Iranian Interests

a) Neutralizing the influence of US/NATO forces in the region.

b) Securing its share in reconstruction of Afghanistan

c) Safeguarding the minority Shia population residing in Afghanistan

d) Reversing the tide of afghan refugees.

vi) Pakistanis Interests

a) Political Interests

• Ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan

• Supporting Pak-friendly government in Afghanistan

• Neutralising Indian influence by setting the border issue

• Reversing the tide of afghan refugees.

b) Economic Interests

• Securing its share in reconstruction of Afghanistan

• Securing a transit trade access to Central Asia

• Securing an uninterrupted supply of oil and gas from the CARs and Iran

c) Security Interests

• Precluding the Talbanisation in Afghanistan (and thereby Talbanisation in Pakistan)

• Preventing cross-border terrorism

• Prompting departure of US/NATO forces from Afghanistan.

Significance Of Afghanistan In Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

As a neighbour of Pakistan, Afghanistan occupies a cultural place in the issues affecting

Pakistan’s foreign policy. Afghanistan’s significance increases with the ongoing turmoil on its

land. The New Great Game being played in the region. Pakistan finds itself intricately linked

with the entire issue, the effects of which may have far-reaching bearings on Pakistan.

Secondly, owing to geographical contiguity and ethnic sharing with Afghanistan, Pakistan

considers itself a natural player in the whole scheme of affairs related to or going on in

Afghanistan.

Thirdly, owing to hosting a major chunk of afghan refugees, Pakistan is a major stakeholder in

whatever situation emerges in Afghanistan.

Fourthly, ongoing WoT is affecting Pakistan both politically and economically thereby making

Pakistan a major regional player in settling a terror situation both in Pakistan and across the

Western border.

Fifthly, Pakistan is keen to shun the ideology of Islamic Fundamentalism being exported from

Afghanistan to Pakistan, thereby making Pakistan conscious of preservation of its democratic

value.

Sixthly, Pakistan is keen to make it socially free from drugs and arms which is not possible

unless there is peace and order in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s Dilemmas

Geographically, Pakistan is sandwiched between India and Afghanistan. One is the world’s

biggest democracy and the expanding economy and other is world’s crisis ridden (both

politically and socially) country and a shattered economy. The second aspect of dilemma is that

India is bent on having strong relations with Afghanistan and that to the detriment of Pakistan.

Conclusion

The war waged by the US in 2001, in the name of War on Terror (WoT) is still ravaging in

devastated Afghanistan and yet no conclusive end is discernible.

Since November 2008, there have taken place developments. First, the US President Barack

Obama, after getting elected, is intending a withdrawal from Afghanistan in a manner that could

be offering the US maximum face-saving and could yield monopoly to the US in the region.

Secondly, with the tacit approval of the US, the Afghan President Hamid Karzai is holding talks

with Taliban to join the government and offer the US a safe exit-strategy. Thirdly, the US has

formally acknowledged that Pakistan play a significant role in mitigating a near-disaster situation

in Afghanistan. That is how, Pakistan’s political significance vis-à-vis, other regional players

including India is automatically enhanced.

Pak-US Relations

Outline:

• Introduction

• Defence Alliance SEATO And CENTO

• Indo-Pak Wars Of 1965 And 1971

• Pak-US Relations During Afghanistan Crisis

• Relations After 9/11

• US Reaction To Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests

• War On Terrorism And Pakistan’s Role

• Critical Analysis

• Conclusion

Introduction:

Ever since, Pakistan emerged on the map of the world, it has always been in search of alliance

for its security, survival and sustainability. The history of Pak-US relations had a history of roller

coaster rider. During the ties between the two nations, there have been more ebbs than flaws.

Due to trust deficit on the both sides, relations between the two nations have been tumultuous.

Being a Muslim State and anti-Communist which had its roots from Khilafat Movement and

capitalist bloc. The United States policy is based on self-interest towards the world in general

and Pakistan in particular.

There is no permanent friend for the US as saying goes “There is no permanent friend and

permanent enemy in international politics, only interests are permanent”. The US is major player

of this game among the nations of the world.

Defence Alliance SEATO And CENTO:

In 1950s, Pakistan’s inability to match India in military and economic spheres and for search of

security led it to enter into pacts like Baghdad Pact or Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and

South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Although these pacts actually were to contain

Soviet Union baked communism but this fact cannot be altogether denied that these pacts really

strengthened the relationship between the two nations. At that time relationships with the US

were so close and friendly that it was called the ‘United States allied ally’ in Asia.

Indo-Pak Wars Of 1965 And 1971:

The suspension of US military aid during 1965 Indo-Pak war generated the feeling in Pakistan

that the US was not a reliable ally. We can take an example of Kashmir form the early periods of

Pak-US relation n analyse the sincerity of the US towards Pakistan. Then, the wars of 1965 and

1971 give clear indication of the US dualism towards Pakistan. Although, the US suspended,

military aid to both countries involved in conflict, the suspension affected Pakistan much more,

and India still received military aid from Soviet.

Gradually, relations improved and arms sales were renewed in 1975. But again in April 1979, the

US cut off economic aid, except that of food assistance, as required under the Symington

Amendment to the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, due to concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear

programme.

Pak-US Relations During Afghanistan Crisis:

The US policy took a U-turn after Soviets intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan fought a

proxy war as a part of US policy to contain Soviet backed communism. When Soviet invaded

Afghanistan in 1979, the convergence of interests between the two nations again brought them

close to each other. With the US assistance largest covert operation of history, Pakistan trained,

armed and supplied anti-Soviet mujahedeen to Afghanistan, eventually defeating Soviets, who

withdrew in 1988. After the disintegration of former Soviet Union and victory of Western bloc,

Pakistan did not remain that much dear to the US and bright colours of their close relations got

dim after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. It was the period when Pakistan remained under

immense pressure due to its ongoing nuclear programme to match with India, to which Pakistan

was determined and committed to its completion because it considered it as a weapon for its

survival.

Relations After 9/11:

To maintain its hegemony, the US needed allies since the phenomenon of regionalism has

emerged. After tragic incident of 9/11, the US started the so-called war on terrorism and Pakistan

became its frontline and major non-NATO ally. When the US geo-strategic interests are so

dictated, relations with Pakistan warmed up, followed by military aid and economic assistance.

One factor of mistrust has remained pinching though Pakistan armed forces through its

operations in the Tribal areas which are the sanctuaries of Taliban and al-Qaida, still Pakistan

and its premier intelligence agency ISI is accused of covertly supporting Taliban and providing

them assistance to launch their operations against the US-led allied forces. Because of the US

dualism policy, anti-American sentiments are found in both the common people and even at

government level.

Before 9/11, Pakistan was under four US sanctions:

First, President Bush (senior), under Section 620.E of Foreign Assistance Act or the Pressler

Amendment, it is normally known as the suspended economic assistance and military sales to

Pakistan in October, 1990.

Second, after the nuclear explosion by Pakistan, another set of military and economic sanctions

was imposed on Pakistan under Arms Export Control Act.

Third, under the democracy law, sanctions were applied on Pakistan, when General Musharraf

assume power in Pakistan on 12 October, 1999.

Fourth, in November 2000, the US applied two years sanctions on Pakistan’s Ministry of

Defence and Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Organization, for receiving

nuclear technology and equipment from China.

Pakistan is perhaps the most important US ally in the war on terror. Not only has Pakistan lost

more personals than any other ally, critical fuels for vehicles and aircraft used in the war effort in

Afghanistan moves through Pakistan without difficulty. Without this logistical support, bot

operation Enduring Freedom and NATO operations in Afghanistan would prove very difficult to

sustain without interruption. Pakistan is strategically very important for the US to sustain in

Afghanistan. There-quarters of supplies for US troops in Afghanistan either move through or

over Pakistan.

US Reaction To Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests:

Pakistan’s nuclear programme reached to its logical conclusion on 28th and 30th May 1998

when it conducted six nuclear tests to become the Seventh nuclear power of the world. The

nuclear capability gave Pakistan nuclear deterrent against India which it needed badly after 1974

when India had exploded its first nuclear device. The people of Pakistan in particular and the

Muslim nations in general expressed their jubilation over Pakistan’s nuclear achievement. But

the US, Japan, Canada, Netherlands and Australia expressed their indignation and at once

announced the imposition of sanctions on military and economic assistance.

War On Terrorism And Pakistan’s Role:

In the wake of war on terror, Pakistan has emerged to the US. Since, then it has played a critical

role in helping g reduce the operational capabilities of Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements in and

around its borders with Afghanistan.

Pakistan has handed over more terrorists and suspects to US than any other coalition partner,

though many questions have been raised regarding its interests. Thus it feels that its concerns

regarding India have been undermined by the USA. Thus combination of several factors has

created a situation in which many Pakistani are sceptical about the need of combating militants

and supporting the American cause. Although the ruling political elite seem to be comfortable to

what the US has to offer, media and parliamentary debate reflect an opinion more reflective of

the general population i.e. the US is making unreasonable demands of the Pakistan’s governing

and military structures.

Critical Analysis:

Trust is the main factor for sustainable relations between the States. This factor is unfortunately

missing in case of the Pak-US relations and both are suffering from the disease of trust deficit.

From the very beginning till the present time, Washington has been using Pakistan as a tactical

level instrument and never trusted Pakistan as its strategic ally.

Throughout the history of their relations, the US has never tried to build up long term and equal

bilateral relations with Pakistan. It always saw Pakistan as a tissue paper to use and deposed at

the time of need. Due to this policy of the US, irreparable anti-American sentiments exist among

Pakistanis.

There are three main reasons behind negative feelings about America. One involves American

policies towards Pakistan such as its failure to Pakistan’s aid during 1971 War, using Pakistan

for its own interest, and opposing Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear programme.

Second reason deals with American global policy, including support of Israel, opposition to

Iran’s present government and the use of force against small third World nations.

Third reason deals with American involvement in Pakistan, for example support to military

regimes and now violence of Pakistan’s integrity and accusing Pakistan for playing dual game

with US despite the sacrifices given by its soldiers and civilians during the War on Terror.

Conclusion:

First of all, they should remove trust deficit and ensure full cooperation to exterminate this

common enemy from the region which can hurt both US and Pakistan’s interests in this region of

South Asia. Then the US should also review its policies towards the weaker Muslim States and

should play a serious role in solving the issue of Kashmir. There is need by the US to remove the

mutual trust-deficit with Pakistan and build a relationship rooted in the ground realities and

driven by the mutual benefit.

The US should not extend its war on terrorism to the territory of Pakistan and let the Pakistani

armed forces to do their job, as they are well trained to perform their duties. According to recent

reports, India by using its secret agency RAW, is exploiting these circumstances to destabilize

Pakistan, it’s crystal clear that a destabilized Pakistan is not in the interest of US as it will

hamper efforts to wipe out terrorism.

On the other hand, the US is extending its hands towards India by signing the nuclear deal with

Delhi. This discriminatory attitude of US should be changed if it really wants to ensure

Pakistan’s unrestricted and full cooperation in this ongoing war on terror. If the US really wants

to minimize anti-US sentiments in Pakistan, it must help Islamabad in energy sector as a priority.

The US really has to revise its policy towards South Asia region abandoning its discriminatory

attitude towards Pakistan as compared to India. It must consider Islamabad request for a civil

nuclear deal similar to the one gifted to Delhi US must respect Pakistan’s sensitivities.

Indo-Pak Relations:

Outline:

• Background

• Brief History Of Dialogues

• Peace Process In Pause After Mumbai Attacks

• Resumption Of Composite Dialogue-Present Condition

• Benefits Of Peace For India And Pakistan

• Critical Analysis

• Conclusion

Background:

Since 1947, India and Pakistan have witnessed half a century long period of mistrust, hostility

and confrontation. They have fought three wars during this period. At the time of independence

they inherited many problems like Kashmir issue, Rann of Kutch dispute, Canal water dispute,

division of assets, refugee problem and the problem of accession of states. Out of theses,

Kashmir has been on the top of the list of irritants.

Brief History Of Dialogues:

The two countries have a history of unfruitful peace processes. In the 50s, as a follow-up to the

UN Security resolution, the UN special representative Sir Owen Dixon tried to negotiate a

settlement on his “partial plebiscite and partition plan”. Then in early sixties Bhutto and Sarwan

talks were held without any significant headway.

After the 1965 war and in the post 1971, internal problems kept Pakistan focused domestically.

In 1972, Simla Agreement was concluded. Under Simla Agreement the two countries agreed to

settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful

means mutually agreed upon between them.

In the 1990s, Kashmir resistance added a new dimension to the struggle there and brought

renewed international focus on this issue especially in the context of human rights issue. From

1990 to 1994, seven rounds of foreign secretary level talks were held without any major

breakthrough. In March 1997, talks were again resumed at foreign secretary level. In all four

rounds were held in which foreign secretaries reached an agreement on 23 July 1997, lying down

an eight-item agenda. This was the first time in their 50 year history that the two countries had

agreed formally on pursuing an integrated and composite dialogue on all issues including

outstanding issue of Jammu & Kashmir.

The period between 1997 and 1999 saw a significant development in the India-Pakistan peace

process in the form of several summit level meetings between the two countries on the sideline

of the UN annual sessions and other regional and international conferences. These high-level

talks led to Lahore Summit in February 1999 in which Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and PM

Vajpayee signed Lahore Resolution as a genuine breakthrough in the history of the two

countries. The two countries agreed “to intensify their efforts to resolve all issues including J&K.

this indeed was a high watermark in India-Pakistan bilateral relations. But the peace process was

soon interrupted when the two countries faced the Kargil issue.

A ceasefire at LoC in November 2003 with several mutual confidence building measures,

including Pakistan’s assurance of not letting its territory to be used by any terrorist activity of

cross-border infiltration as well as a constant pressure from influential outside powers led to the

resumption of the stalled India-Pakistan dialogue in January 2004 on the basis of what is called

‘Islamabad Joint Statement of January 6, 2004”.

President Musharraf made unprecedented but unreciprocated gestures of flexibility. He proposed

a four-point “out-of-box” solution of the Kashmir issue which involved dividing Kashmir in

ethnic regions, their demilitarization, self-rule and a joint mechanism. But none of his gestures

elicited, at least publicly any matching response from India.

Peace Process In Pause After Mumbai Attacks.

Unfortunately, the peace process was stalled again, when after the November 26, 2008 terrorist

attack, India suspended the “Composite Dialogue” process.

On November 26, 2008 when some militants attacked multiple targets in Mumbai, in which

some 182 people were killed, including nine terrorists and 22 foreign nationals and some further

327 received injuries. Relations between India and Pakistan had already been strained following

a suicide attack on Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008, in which over 40 people were

killed. The attacks in Mumbai served as a nail in the coffin as all fingers pointed to Pakistan.

Resumption Of Composite Dialogue-Present Condition:

With the US efforts, at a meeting between the PMs of the two countries on the sideline of the

non-aligned summit in Sharm-el-Sheikh in July 2009, an agreement was reached for the

resumption of dialogue.

However, the thaw came finally when India in February 4, 2010 offered to resume talks at

foreign secretary level with Pakistan. Welcoming the move, Pakistan accepted the offer and a

delegation went to Delhi on February 24, 2010 with the hope of recreating an atmosphere of

friendship. The delegation had gone to New Delhi with a roadmap of guidelines leading to a

potential resumption of Composite Dialogue, including an invitation for External Affair Minister

S.M Krishna to visit Pakistan. During the meeting India handed over three dossiers to Pakistan

and demanded that thirty-three individuals, including two serving Pakistani army officers and

Indian fugitive allegedly involved in terror attacks, be handed over to India. However, the talks

failed to melt the ice due to lack of trust between the two countries.

The pressure from USA as well as SAARC members played a vital role in bringing both the

countries to some sort of an agreement in Bhutan. The two countries agreed to resume Foreign

Minister as well as Foreign Secretary level talks as soon as possible. Taking the spirit of Bhutan

forward, Nirupama Rao visited Islamabad in June 24, 2010 and met her counterpart Salman

Bashir to set an agenda for Foreign Ministers in July 2010.

Resultantly, Indian Foreign Minister S.M Krishna visited Islamabad in July, but talks could not

bore fruit for paving the way for further composite dialogue due to Indian usual intransigence

over the issue of terrorism.

Benefits Of Peace For India And Pakistan:

There are many broad benefits from peace accruing to both countries and this serves as a

motivation towards normalisation. With initiating peace process India and Pakistan could earn

enough foreign exchange. On trade, our market size will expand to $ 1.2 billion equal to China.

Opening vistas of trading opportunities within the region, the foreign direct investment which

presently stagnates at 3 billion dollars could increase manifold. China attracts 40 billion dollars.

Access to alternate energy, natural gas from Iran and Central Asia will be available to this

region, bringing down the energy cost by at least fifty per cent. Tourism can flourish as the

region has vast treasures of tourist attractions. Reductions in defence expenditure could take

place. This will lead to availability of fund for social sector and poverty reduction and lastly

sports will be enhanced. Through mutual sports India and Pakistan can regain glory at least in

cricket and hockey.

Critical Analysis:

Now both the countries must come to grip with the fact that progress through incessant

discussion may, at first be slow but at least it will erase the high-levels of mutual suspicion. The

benefit could be long-lasting as far as the well-being of the people, who share common history

and culture, is concerned. The core issues as far as Pakistan is concerned are Kashmir and Water.

For India the core issue is terrorism. Kashmir has been hanging for the last 63 years, despite the

three wars fought between the two countries. Water issue is dragging from years now and

terrorism is recent one. All these issues can be hammered out only in the Composite Dialogue

which India is avoiding so far.

It is Pakistan that is paying heavy price due to terrorism. India should realize that Islamabad is

doing all within its approach. Pakistan Army has been successful in dismantling Taliban’s dens

and has weakened the terrorist significantly. India must understand that terror war is also being

fought by the US and Nato troops in Afghanistan and terrorists have power to strike anywhere in

the world.

Indian leader should realize that tough talks cannot help improve situation. Sincere parleys can

break the impasse. Friendly relations between the two countries can help improve economic

conditions and trade will flourish along with people-to-people contact. All intricate issues can be

resolved if trust is built between the two countries. There is dire need to improve business

relations between the two countries. Pakistan and India pick up the cue from the fostering China-

US relations despite Taiwan issue.

Conclusion:

Present time is ideal for resolution of all disputes and ushering an era of peace, harmony and

prosperity. People of our country want it. the influential business communities are looking

forward to it in both countries. Media also seems to favour it. Pakistan and India have lost half a

century in mutual squabbles. Both have tried pressure tactics. Both have fought wars, tested

nuclear weapons and have remained engaged in hot confrontation throughout. Both have applied

coercive diplomacy but it has not worked. Nothing side has blinked. It is time to give dialogue

and negotiation chance once again. Negotiating from a position of strength is an old-age maxim

but no doubt in the case of Pakistan and India that has also been used and founded to be

unsuccessful. Sincerity in living peacefully side by side and solving all issues through

negotiation seems to be the only answer people of our countries want peace and are fed up of

confrontation. The no-war pact offer and the non-aggression pact issue can be reopened.

why its important Talk to the Talibans

1. insurgency couldn’t be end through force

2. US is strongly mistaken

3. also the Taliban leadership that they could expel the foreign troops by force

4. after a decade fighting, cost of billion of dollar, and thousands of afghan lives . both US and Talibans needs to

realize that neither is winning the war

5. the year 2014, when the drawdown of international forces is due to begin is posing a nightmare for afghans ,

international community and also for afghan crumbling Kabul administration

6. the cuurent setup will unable to sustain a single day after international forces left

7. political rapprochement is the final solution

8. US must revert its policy to its original policy of tracking down the Al Qaeda network and leaving out talibans

militia that has neither harmed US interests nor harbours any idea of doing so outside Afghanistan

9. the talibans have learned enough through there mistakes

10. if Taliban came to power they will not allow anybody to use afghan soil against foreign country

11. in last decade Afghanistan has been overly exposed to the world

12. now Afghanistan is changes placed with thousands of cell ohones users, internet, electronic media

13. in the post all afghan elections Taliban allows the electoral process to go on in the democratization of

Afghanistan

14. the US must understand that the Taliban are the only force that can gurantee peace and discourage Al Qaeda

using its soil for its operation

15. US must delist Taliban from UN list of terror organization

16. lift sanctions on talibans and let it form a political wing

17. trying negotiations to talibans surrendering their arms and accepting the country’s constitution is a bizaree

demand as the talibans are a formidable force

18. Pakistan being a major stakeholder in the conflict needs to honestly encourage washingtonand the Taliban to

seek a negotiated settlement.

Afghanistan and the new great game

John Foster

Why is Afghanistan so important?

A glance at a map and a little knowledge of the region suggest that the real reasons for Western military

involvement may be largely hidden.

Afghanistan is adjacent to Middle Eastern countries that are rich in oil and natural gas. And though

Afghanistan may have little petroleum itself, it borders both Iran and Turkmenistan, countries with the

second and third largest natural gas reserves in the world. (Russia is first.)

Turkmenistan is the country nobody talks about. Its huge reserves of natural gas can only get to market

through pipelines. Until 1991, it was part of the Soviet Union and its gas flowed only north through

Soviet pipelines. Now the Russians plan a new pipeline north. The Chinese are building a new pipeline

east. The U.S. is pushing for "multiple oil and gas export routes." High-level Russian, Chinese and

American delegations visit Turkmenistan frequently to discuss energy. The U.S. even has a special envoy

for Eurasian energy diplomacy.

Rivalry for pipeline routes and energy resources reflects competition for power and control in the

region. Pipelines are important today in the same way that railway building was important in the 19th

century. They connect trading partners and influence the regional balance of power. Afghanistan is a

strategic piece of real estate in the geopolitical struggle for power and dominance in the region.

Since the 1990s, Washington has promoted a natural gas pipeline south through Afghanistan. The route

would pass through Kandahar province. In 2007, Richard Boucher, U.S. assistant secretary of state, said:

"One of our goals is to stabilize Afghanistan," and to link South and Central Asia "so that energy can flow

to the south." Oil and gas have motivated U.S. involvement in the Middle East for decades. Unwittingly

or willingly, Canadian forces are supporting American goals.

The proposed pipeline is called TAPI, after the initials of the four participating countries (Turkmenistan,

Afghanistan, Pakistan and India). Eleven high-level planning meetings have been held during the past

seven years, with Asian Development Bank sponsorship and multilateral support (including Canada's).

Construction is planned to start next year.

The pipeline project was documented at three donor conferences on Afghanistan in the past three years

and is referenced in the 2008 Afghan Development Plan. Canada was represented at these conferences

at the ministerial level. Thus, our leaders must know. Yet they avoid discussion of the planned pipeline

through Afghanistan.

The 2008 Manley Report, a foundation for extending the Canadian mission to 2011, ignored energy

issues. It talked about Afghanistan as if it were an island, albeit with a porous Pakistani border. Prime

Minister Stephen Harper says he "will withdraw the bulk of the military forces" in 2011. The remaining

troops will focus mostly on "reconstruction and development." Does that include the pipeline?

Pipeline rivalry is slightly more visible in Europe. Ukraine is the main gateway for gas from Russia to

Europe. The United States has pushed for alternate pipelines and encouraged European countries to

diversify their sources of supply. Recently built pipelines for oil and gas originate in Azerbaijan and

extend through Georgia to Turkey. They are the jewels in the crown of U.S. strategy to bypass Russia and

Iran.

The rivalry continues with plans for new gas pipelines to Europe from Russia and the Caspian region. The

Russians plan South Stream – a pipeline under the Black Sea to Bulgaria. The European Union and U.S.

are backing a pipeline called Nabucco that would supply gas to Europe via Turkey. Nabucco would get

some gas from Azerbaijan, but that country doesn't have enough. Additional supply could come from

Turkmenistan, but Russia is blocking a link across the Caspian Sea. Iran offers another source, but the

U.S. is blocking the use of Iranian gas.

Meanwhile, Iran is planning a pipeline to deliver gas east to Pakistan and India. Pakistan has agreed in

principle, but India has yet to do so. It's an alternative to the long-planned, U.S.-supported pipeline from

Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India.

A very big game is underway, with geopolitics intruding everywhere. U.S. journalist Steven LeVine

describes American policy in the region as "pipeline-driven." Other countries are pushing for pipeline

routes, too. The energy game remains largely hidden; the focus is on humanitarian, development and

national security concerns. In Canada, Afghanistan has been avoided in the past two elections.

With the U.S. surge underway and the British ambassador to Washington predicting a decades-long

commitment, it's reasonable to ask: Why are the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan? Could the motivation

be power, a permanent military bridgehead, access to energy resources?

Militarizing energy has a high price in dollars, lives and morality. There are long-term consequences for

everyone. Canadian voters want to know: Why is Afghanistan so important?

JIHAD: The Great CIA Game: Part 1

JIHAD: The Great CIA Game: Part 1

GLOBAL ISLAMIC JIHAD

OR A STRATEGIC ASSET OF THE CIA?

This is a rather lengthy article, and I was delaying publishing it for this very reason. Yet I see

that terrorism is on the rise in India too.

Unfortunately my frequent predictions that after Afghanistan and Pakistan, India because of it

again getting involved in Afghanistan, would soon itself become a hot bed of terrorism, appear to

be coming true.

This article is therefore being published to give a bird eyes view of the issues to the general

public who blame Islam and Pakistan for the rise of global terrorism. Unfortunately the subject is

such that despite my best efforts I could not make it any shorter.

In the series already published under Part-1, we studied the background to the US involvement in

Afghanistan. Essentially Curzon’s great game of containment of Russia had been turned on its

head by India. It decided that its interests would best be served by allying with the Russians.

The resulting rise in Afghan militancy against Pakistan supported both by Russia and India,

invited the ire of the Shah of Iran as well as the Saudi’s who viewed Russian interference as an

attempt to reach the warm waters and oilfields of the Persian gulf.

We also saw how Alexandre de Marenches head of French Intelligence exercised central

influence on development of events in this region. His creations, the Safari Club along with the

BCCI, took on the load of containment of world wide Soviet penetration at a time when CIA was

‘castrated’ due to Congressional inquiries. He too was convinced Russia wanted access to the

warm waters of the Gulf through Afghanistan. Just three weeks before the Russian Invasion of

Afghanistan when Arnaud De Bochgrave of Newsweek asked for advise where to go to in order

to get the best breaking news story he replied,” If I were you, I would go to Kabul’!

Finally we saw how building up on this, Brzezinski conceived the idea of trapping and ‘bleeding’

the Russians in a Vietnam of their own – using Islamic militants. In this article we will see

exactly how – after having drawn the USSR into Afghanistan – the USA went about achieving

this objective.

It is important to note here that till the time of this US involvement, the suicide bomber was an

unknown phenomena in Pakistan but had been discovered and first used by the Tamil rebels of

Sri Lanka. Also the rest of the Muslim world, specially the Arabs had not been involved in

Pakistan’s war with Afghanistan – hence global radical Islamic Jehad was an un invented

commodity.

FROM ‘COLD WAR’ TO ‘DÉTENTE’ TO ‘GLOBAL JIHAD’

Even in the early stages of the cold war the US had realized that religion was the most potent foe

of the atheistic communist doctrine; and that the dynamic and fast growing religion of Islam was

much more anti-communistic than even the Christianity. Since WW2 it sought to contain

communism using Muslim allies.

Nevertheless the division of US ally Pakistan into two by Russian backed ally India in 1971 –

made US helplessness apparent – world wide. The perception gained ground – within US

government itself as well as – around the world, that the USSR had achieved nuclear parity while

the US had been seriously weakened by Vietnam. To counter this, the US decided to use its

relations with Pakistan as a bridge to improve relations with China and thus contain the USSR.

Following on the heels of a secret visit to China by Kissinger, in February 1972 Richard Nixon

met with Mao Zedong and Chou En-Lai at Beijing to announce a stunning rapprochement. A fear

of encirclement by adversaries, lead the Soviets towards détente. Strategic Arms Limitation

Talks started in May 1972, resulting in the signing of the SALT II treaty, on June 18, 1979. With

this the ‘cold war’ came to an end.

But the post Watergate functioning of the Safari Club awakened the Americans to the possibility

of re-energizing their fading dreams for a Pax-Americana. The work already done by The Safari

Club in Afghanistan; Pakistan’s visible determination to avenge their recent defeat in East

Pakistan (1971) through a defeat of the Russo/Indian axis in Afghanistan; as well as Carter’s

keenness to avoid the stigma of direct US involvement; enamored Brzezinski with plans of

drowning the USSR in a flood of Jihadi fighters drawn from around and within the USSR. He

started taking just enough interest to provoke a Soviet Invasion.

The successful enticement of Soviet troops into Afghanistan raised the love affair another notch

into a marriage of convenience.

US President Jimmy Carter withdrew the SALT II treaty from the Senate, describing the Soviet

intervention in Afghanistan as “the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World

War”. In 1980, Ronald Reagan went further vowing to increase military spending and confront

the Soviets everywhere. After getting elected he revived the B-1 bomber program, installed US

cruise missiles in Europe, and announced his experimental Strategic Defense Initiative, i.e. “Star

Wars”. Also he dramatically increased support for Afghan War, while Richard Pipes the head of

the NWG at the time, predicted that with the right encouragement Soviet Muslims will “explode

into genocidal fury” against Moscow.

It would turn out to be a marriage in which the willing bride ‘Pakistan’ –as well as other Muslim

in-laws – would be wooed with all sorts of enticing visions, heedless of the consequences!

Meanwhile much had to be done before the marriage could be consummated-and so Brzezinski

set about the task of arranging the party.

The guests would include China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia –and but for the fiasco of the Shah having

been allowed permission for medical treatment in USA –even Khomeini’s Iran. The plan

involved their co-operation with the west in assembling, training, equipping and raising against

Russia; the largest, most efficient and most motivated guerilla force the world had ever seen.

JIHAD: The Great CIA Game: Part 2

PAKISTAN IS THE LAUNCHING PAD

THE OUTLINE PLAN

Brzezinski came up with a plan to recruit Muslim fighters not only from Islamic countries

around the globe, but also from Muslim minorities in other countries including the west. They

would be motivated by the concept of Islamic Jihad; believing that God had ordered them to

defeat the Godless Russians invaders. Their earthly reward would be glory, good pay and

massive earnings through drug trade for the leaders; while in case of death they would be

Shaheeds (martyrs) and would gain paradise!

The CIA would co-ordinate the global effort and provide special forces (green berets and

SEALs/SAS) to train Islamic Jihadi leaders and instructors all over the globe; and along with

Saudi and Egyptian help recruit and dispatch these Islamic fighters to Pakistan’s ISI .The USA

and Saudi Arabia would also finance and equip the entire war effort. Pakistan’s ISI (along with

its special forces SSG) would be responsible for the recruitment and training of local Jihadi

fighters, as well as the training of those arriving from outside. Moreover Pakistan would serve as

the sole pipeline for the operational control, re-supply and logistics including payments to all

fighters within the theatre of operations.

It will be revealing at this stage to see which particular countries were relevant to this US plan;

and why?

EGYPT

Anwer Sadat, a close ally of the Americans had been isolated in the Muslim world ever since he

made his peace treaty with Israel. The Al Azhar University in Cairo was recognized throughout

the Muslim world as the foremost religious institution. The Muslim Brotherhood also had

branches throughout the world, and like Pakistan’s Jamat-e-Islami advocated the establishment

of an ideal Islamic state based on the teachings of the Holy Quran. The support of Anwer Sadat

was vital for gaining access to Egyptian bases as regional collection and dispatch points of arms

and equipment to Mujahideen in Afghanistan; while the support of two above mentioned

institutions was the key to raising a huge army of Egyptian fighters for the envisioned global

Jihad. In addition it was hoped that Anwer Sadat’s identification with the Global Jihad might

serve to end his isolation in the Muslim world.

PAKISTAN

It was the bride Brzezinski must woo at all costs if his global Jihad was to succeed. Already

engaged in covert operations against Afghanistan for the last five years, it had the required

intelligence already in place. Moreover being the country most jeopardized by the Russian

invasion, it could be counted on to be the most zealous in the fight. The Jamat-e-Islami founded

by Maulana Mahdoodi had a wide following in Pakistan –and had also branches world wide. The

Jamat also advocated the use of militancy for the achievement of its aims if necessary, and had

prepared many of its followers to fight in Afghanistan as well as Kashmir. Enlisting its support

would greatly facilitate the recruitment drive both in Pakistan as well as globally.

SAUDI ARBAIA

We have already discussed the important role it played in the Safari Club both with regards to

spreading of the teachings of Wahabi radicalism world wide, as well as the financing of covert

operations. It enjoyed enormous respect as an ally amongst all sections of Pakistanis. Moreover

as the custodians of the Holy Kaaba it commanded respect throughout the Muslim world. Its

importance both as financers as well as enablers of massive recruitment worldwide, in support of

global Jihad could never be under estimated.

CHINA

Both as a regional power, as well as a country with which Pakistan had close ties, getting China

on board for any major undertaking was unavoidable. Moreover its large Muslim population and

Russian origin weaponry would be invaluable in provision of both recruits and equipment which

could not be pinned on the Americans.

But US relations with Pakistan were at low ebb because of a US anti-nuclear proliferation

embargo.

So Assistant secretary of State Warren Christopher was sent on a mission to woo the bride, soon

Brzezinski would follow with the formal proposal. He would go first to Egypt then Pakistan;

while US Defense secretary Harold Brown would go to China.

THE INITIAL US EFFORT

Soon after Warren Christopher’s wooing mission to Pakistan; in January 1980 Brzezinski visited

Egypt.

From that date the airbase at Qena- already in US use for reconnaissance flights against Iran –

was also made available for airlifting supplies to Pakistan. Later Aswan was also made available,

and Egypt started sending it’s own out of date surplus Russian equipment for use by the

Mujahideen. An old arms factory near Halwan was converted to produce copies of Russian

weapons for dispatch.

Later Representative Charlie Wilson would travel to Israel to meet W. Zvi Rafiah; and Israel

would also feed captured Egyptian, Syrian and PLO equipment-including T-55 tanks- into this

supply route.

Over time much useful equipment including artillery and mortar shells and even Strela missiles

were sent. By summer of 1980 Cairo west airbase was also made available; and by end of 1980

US special warfare troops (SEALs) were based in Egypt to impart training to Egyptian

instructors-including Al-Zawahari- who in turn would train the Egyptian recruits.

From Egypt Brzezinski flew straight to Pakistan. Pakistan viewed the Russian invasion of

Afghanistan as a God sent opportunity to strike a tough bargaining position. The ISI chief Akhtar

A. Rehman was keenly in favor of using Afghanistan as a Vietnam for the Russians, yet Zia was

determined to strike a tough deal. He asked for and got the US to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s

perusal of its nuclear ambitions.

He also got the US to accept that all arms, supplies, finance and training must be provided

through Pakistan and not directly by CIA.

Later when US coordinated aid started flowing Zia insisted on absolute adherence to this

condition. He further specified that the countries supporting must maintain absolute secrecy and

repeatedly deny if necessary any shipment. Second the arms were to start immediately and be

sent to Pakistan by fastest means available, but not less then two plane loads per week. Third the

remaining supplies must be regular, and could come overland (China and Iran) or via sea from

others (USA, UK, France, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia etc.)

JIHAD: The Great CIA Game: Part 3

BIN LADEN AND THE INTERNATIONAL JIHAD

Henry Kissinger had already used the close ties between Pentagon and Pakistan military to build

a link with China. Now after Brzezinski’s visit to Pakistan, US defense secretary Harold Brown

flew to China where he secured Chinese assent and active help for the global Jihad.

OSAMA BIN LADEN

It will be worthwhile at this stage to focus on the role of Osama bin Laden-the man who was to

be painted post 9/11 as the maniacal leader of Al-Qaeda Islamic terrorist network.

In his book CIA’s Beardman claims that Osama bin Laden was never aware of the role he was

playing on behalf of Washington. This is likely an attempt at distancing the CIA from Osama as

a result of 9/11, for enough evidence is available to prove that not only was Osama aware of US

effort in support of the Afghan war, but also that he was closely involved in routing it to the Arab

fighters.

What is certain is that Osama Bin Laden appeared on the scene immediately after the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan. Leaving Saudi Arabia together with a group of supporters and heavy

engineering equipment he arrived in Pakistan in 1979. According to Prof. Michel Chossudovsky,

Osama was 22 years old in 1979, when he was trained in an ISI sponsored guerilla training camp

near Peshawar, Pakistan. It is said that the ISI wanted a Saudi prince to head the Saudi

contingent as proof of the Saudi commitment for the anti-Soviet effort. They failed to get

royalty, but a person from the influential bin Laden clan was considered good enough.

Richard Clarke, counter terrorism head during the Clinton and Bush administrations, believes

Osama was handpicked for the job by the head of Saudi intelligence (Turki). The Saudis deny he

was ever their agent, but it is known that he regularly met with Prince Turki and Saudi Interior

Minister Prince Naif. Turki’s chief of staff Ahmed Badeeb one of bin Laden’s teachers in high

school even said: “I loved Osama and considered him a good citizen of Saudi Arabia.” Badeeb

will later say bin Laden developed “strong relations with the Saudi intelligence and with our

embassy in Pakistan. We were happy with him. He was our man”.

It seems clear therefore that Osama was hand picked soon after the Soviet invasion to play a

middleman’s role between Saudi intelligence and ISI. More over the status of his relations with

the CIA though cloudy, are also thus clearly established.

The truth is that although Osama was neither recruited by the CIA, nor was their agent; once the

US had decided to come in a big way; as the middleman between Saudi intelligence and ISI it

was inevitable that he would get closely involved with the CIA too.

Numerous charities and foundations coordinated by Saudi intelligence in close liaison with

Safari Club were already in existence and financing covert operations world wide. In addition as

per Indian claims Pakistan had already set up 37 training camps in Pakistan ,49 in Azad Kashmir,

and 22 camps in Afghanistan to supply fighters for Afghanistan and Kashmir. Now that the USA

had also committed the CIA to globalization of the covert fight in a big way, it too would have to

set up front organizations for undertaking the required financial and recruitment drive.

The CIA would be the main coordinator globally and the ISI would co-ordinate everything

within Pakistan. Staying within this arrangement, Osama was possibly placed in charge of co-

coordinating and marrying up the existing Arab global effort with the one to be set up by the

CIA/ISI.

Soon after his training in Pakistan Osama left for a visit to the USA in 1980, and also reportedly

was seen in the UK in 1981.Nothing is certain about the reasons for the visit. Barnett Rubin, a

senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations claims that about this time in the USA, – a man

“enlisted” by the CIA who had “close connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi

intelligence, and the Muslim World League.” – was given the role of looking after the financing

and recruitment of foreign JIhad.

Slate writes, “Azzam trotted the globe during the 1980s to promote the Afghan jihad against the

Soviets”.

Now this Azzam also later became known as Osama’s mentor. Was Osama also trotting

alongside him on the same

mission? It would appear to be so, for in 1984 Azzam set up the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK),

also known as Al-Kifah in Peshawar, a Pakistani town bordering Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden

soon took it over from him.

Azzam moved back to the US to set up its first American branch in New York – known as the

Al-Kifah Refugee Center.

As we shall see in a later part of the article Azzam then enlarged the network to 30 branches! All

US branches were CIA backed, and served both as financial as well as recruitment centers.

It becomes obvious that the office at Peshawar was a set up for tying in the CIA effort with the

effort already in place in Pakistan. Thus the MAK center at Peshawar is in a position to receive –

through Pakistan’s ISI- not only the money of private Arab charities, but also all CIA funds and

equipment for Arab fighters. It would become the main center for funneling foreign funds and

fighters from all over the globe into the Afghan war. In fact back in 1982 the CIA had become

unhappy with the ‘Afghan native’ fighters due to rivalry ridden infighting, and wants more Arab

fighters as Arab were easier to ‘read’ and also ‘one-dimensionally anti-Soviet ’.

CIA Director William Casey visited Pakistan to sign an agreement committing CIA’s support for

recruitment of Muslims from around the world. In addition to Gulf States, this would include

Turkey, the Philippines, USA, UK and China.

Azzam and Osama were probably tasked after this by their respective handlers to set up a

suitable funnel for the purpose. They came up with the MAK center at Peshawar. From here

Osama could keep a tab on and control the financing and feeding of all foreign fighters into the

Afghan Jihad.

The entire initial data base was initially also held by him. Researcher Kurt Nimmo writes:” This

database of Islamic fighters was labeled in Arabic, ‘Q eidat ilmu’ti’aat’, which is the exact

translation of the English word database. But the Arabs commonly used the short word ‘Al

Qaeda” which is the Arabic word for ‘base.’” Robin Cook, British Foreign Secretary from 1997

to 2003, also confirms this: “al-Qaeda was originally the computer file of the thousands of

Mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians.”

Thus starting soon after the Russian Invasion in 1979, US efforts had by 1984 laid the

foundations for converting the discordant Pakistani covert war against the Soviets, into a global

Jihad- code named ‘Operation Cyclone’. Even by end of 1982 the rate of flow of equipment

would rise to 10,000 ton annually, and the flow of foreign fighters also increases.

OPERATION CYCLONE-THE US LED GLOBAL JIHAD AGAINST RUSSIA

NSDD 166

In March 1985, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 166, (NSDD 166).

William Casey director of CIA described it as the largest covert operation in history. It

authorized stepped-up covert military aid to the Mujahideen, and laid down a new goal for the

Afghan war: Total defeat of Soviet troops in Afghanistan through covert action leading to a

Soviet withdrawal.

The new covert U.S. assistance began with a dramatic increase in arms supplies — a steady rise

to 65,000 tons annually by 1987.”

In addition to arms, it provided very specialized training, state of the art military equipment

including surface to air missiles, military satellite maps and latest communications equipment.

The U.S. supplied support package had three essential components-organization and logistics,

military technology, and ideological support for sustaining and encouraging the Afghan

resistance.

The ISI increased its staff to over 150,000 military and intelligence officers, bureaucrats,

undercover agents and informers. In the final stages U.S. counter insurgency experts worked

closely with the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) even in organizing Mujahideen

groups and in planning operations inside Afghanistan.

Eventually the entire Afghan nation, supported by tens of thousands of Pakistani Jihadis and

some 35,000 Muslim radical Jehadis from 40 countries would join the fight.

Most of the funding would be from the United States and Saudi Arabia with a significant part

generated from the Golden Crescent drug trade

JIHAD: The Great CIA Game: Part 4

GRAND STYLE RECRUITMENTS & INDOCTRINATION

We have already seen how Abdullah Azzam, a CIA agent mentored Osama in setting up his

financial and recruitment fronts; and also the main funnel at Peshawer. Azzam also followed this

up by expanding the US network to 30 branches. For this reason Slate calls him “the Lenin of

international jihad.”

The war lords in Afghanistan recruited their own followers. These were reinforced by fighters

from all over the world. In Pakistan the Jamat-e-Islami set up recruitment centers all over the

country-including Kashmir.

Recruitment centers were also opened in many other countries including the Middle East,

Turkey, UK, Philippines and China. These were funded by MAK (through CIA and ISI) but

operated and run through mosques and Islamic centers in respective countries.

TRAINING

Initially key Pakistani officers and some Afghan Mujahideen leaders were trained by Navy Seals

and Green Beret officers at Camp Peary, near Williamsburg, Virginia, which is said to be the

CIA’s main location for training spies and assets.Other training took place at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina, Harvey Point, North Carolina, and Fort A. P. Hill, Virginia. US consular official

Michael Springmann reports fighters from many Middle Eastern nations were getting US visas,

apparently to train in the US for the Afghan war.

Training was imparted in how to detect explosives, surveillance, how to recruit new agents, how

to run paramilitary operations, and more. They are taught to use different weapons, including

rockets, mortars, missiles, remote-controlled mines and bombs, and sophisticated timers and

explosives.

Guerrilla training was integrated with inspirational Jihad lectures, featuring CIA sponsored

speakers. They could be CIA-trained Afghan fighters traveling on a CIA-issued visa; or clean-cut

Arabic-speaking Green Beret lecturing on the glory of being ‘warriors of the Lord.’

People like Azzam, Abdul-Rahman, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, could often turn up as star guest

speakers to deliver fiery sermons on themes like ‘Blood and martyrdom are the only way to

create a Muslim society’ or ‘the world opposes our objectives, because it is the enemy of

Muslims.’ # Predominant themes were that Islam was a complete socio-political ideology, and

that this was being violated by the atheistic Soviet invaders who must be killed, and that the

Islamic people in Afghanistan are warriors of Allah through Jihad.

Instructor’s training centers staffed by Green Berets and SEALs were set up in 1980 both in

Egypt and Pakistan. Fearing a diplomatic incident, US and British troops rarely ventured into

Afghanistan, but up to 1982 the British SAS did provide weapons training even in Afghanistan.

After Russian soldiers found the passports of two British instructors in a training camp this was

discontinued; and UK enrolled Mujahideen were trained in secret camps in remote parts of

Scotland.

The instructors thus trained were used in turn to train tens of thousands more in camps set up by

ISI in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

RADICAL INDOCTRINATION

Under NSDD 166, Washington also supported and financed the process of religious

indoctrination. The CIA spent $ 51million to create and supply Afghan school children with

textbooks filled with violent images and militant Islamic teachings, part of covert attempts to

breed radicalism from the grass roots. Nebraska academic Thomas Gouttierre led the textbook

project.

These were filled with talk of Jihad and featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines,

violent images and militant Wahabi teachings. Children were even taught to count with

illustrations showing tanks, missiles, and land mines. Mathematics involved posing the children

with problems like how many second would it take for a bullet aimed by a Jihadi to crack open

the head of an infidel Russian, given the velocity. The primers are so radical that even the

Taliban regime would continue using these American-produced books!

FINANCING THE JIHAD THROUGH DRUG TRADE

The history of the drug trade in Central Asia is closely connected to the CIA’s operations. Prior

to the covert operations opium production in Afghanistan and Pakistan was small- and directed

to regional markets. There was no local production of heroin, but within two years of the

onslaught of the CIA operation in Afghanistan, “the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands became

the world’s top heroin producer.” (Alfred McCoy, Drug Fallout: the CIA’s Forty Year

Complicity in the Narcotics Trade. The Progressive, 1 August 1997).

OPERATION MOSQUITO

CIA involvement started with a small suggestion in1981. Alexandre de Marenches head of the

Safari Club met President Reagan at the White House. He proposed ‘Operation Mosquito’ a joint

French-American-ISI operation to produce fake Russian newspapers with articles designed to

demoralize Soviet troops. He also suggested US supply of drugs to Soviet soldiers. It is claimed

that the idea was rejected, but soon after fake issues of the Soviet army newspaper did appear in

Kabul; and also large qualities of cocaine, hashish, opium, and heroin become available to Soviet

troops. At that time cocaine was only grown in South America!

In 1982, a secret memo will exempt the CIA from reporting on drug smuggling conducted by

CIA officers or assets. Obviously the CIA wished to use the proceeds of the Afghan drug trade to

finance its operations. Alfred McCoy’s study confirms that” Under CIA and ISI protection,

Afghan resistance opened heroin labs on the Afghan and Pakistani border. Among the leading

heroin manufacturers were Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Afghan leader who received about half of

the covert arms that the CIA shipped to Pakistan.

In 1995 the former CIA Director of this Afghan operation, Mr. Charles Cogan, admitted

sacrificing the drug war to fight the Cold War.

“Our main mission was to do as much damage to the Soviets. There was fallout in terms of

drugs, yes, but the main objective was accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan.” (Alfred

McCoy, Testimony before the Special Seminar focusing on allegations linking CIA secret

operations and drug trafficking-convened February 13, 1997, by Rep. John Conyers, Dean of the

Congressional Black Caucus)

The Pakistan backed Taliban government which came to power in 1996 virtually eliminated this

trade, with opium production declining by more than 90 percent.

But in the immediate wake of the US led invasion of Afghanistan, opium production has again

increased 33 fold from 185 tons in 2001 under the Taliban to 6100 tons in 2006. In 2007, this

was approximately 93% of the global supply of heroin, and valued in excess of 190 billion

dollars a year. (Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, 6 January 2006)

JIHAD: The Great CIA Game: Part 5

THE OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE OF JIHADI GROUPS

The entire Jihadi fighting force was united under the banner of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan

Mujahideen, which was an alliance of seven Afghan parties fighting against the Soviets : Islamic

Party (Khalis), Islamic Party (Hekmatyar), Islamic Society (Rabbani), Islamic Union for the

Liberation of Afghanistan (Sayyaf), National Islamic Front for Afghanistan (Gailani),

Afghanistan National Liberation Front (Mojaddedi), and Revolutionary Islamic Movement

(Mohammadi).

Although the alliance took its formal shape in the 1985, it had de facto existence as a political

bloc since May 1979, when the Pakistani government decided to limit the flow of foreign

financial aid, mainly from USA and Saudi Arabia, to the said seven organizations, thus limiting

infighting amongst numerous smaller groups-while simultaneously cutting of the flow to

doubtful and undesirable groups.

The seven parties between themselves controlled a number of affiliated commanders –the highest

operational rank amongst the Jihadis. Significant commanders typically led 300 or more men,

but there were many commanders with lesser number of fighters. Each commander controlled

several bases to dominate a district or a sub-division of a province. Some of the legendary

commanders of the Afghan war were:

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar the favored warlord of the ISI and CIA. Casey was said to be particularly

fond of him as both shared a goal of extending the fighting beyond Afghanistan into the Soviet

Union itself. He was a ruthless fighter, who also led several raids into USSR territory. He was

also a major drug trafficker. Almost half of all the covert weapons directed at Afghanistan were

sent to his group.

Another ISI and CIA favorite was Jalaluddin Haqqani. In the 1980s, he was cultivated as a

“unilateral” asset of the CIA, helping to protect Osama bin Laden, who was building his own

militia to fight the Soviet forces.

Originally a member of the Hezb-i-Islami, he was the first resistance leader to capture a city,

Khost, from the Najibullah government. After the fall of Kabul to the Mujahideen in 1992, he

was appointed justice minister in the first Mujahideen government. He attracted generous

support from prosperous Arab countries compared to other resistance leaders.

Haqqani was not originally a member of the Taliban. In 1995, just prior to the Taliban’s

occupation of Kabul, he switched his allegiance to them. In 1996-97, he served as a Taliban

military commander north of Kabul, and was accused of ethnic cleansing against local Tajik

populations. During the Taliban years in power, he served as the Minister of Borders and Tribal

Affairs and governor of Paktia Province.

The GID’s (Saudi Intelligence Agency) favorite was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a Pashtun warlord. He

was a member of Akhwan-ul-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood), founded in 1969 by Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar and Dr. Syed Burhanuddin Rabbani, which had strong links to The Muslim

Brotherhood in Egypt.

Fluent in Arabic, his tenure as an Ustad (Professor) at the Shariat faculty in Kabul ended in 1973

when he fled to Pakistan after an unsuccessful plot to overthrow President Daoud Khan . Sayyaf

then headed the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, and fought against Soviet

occupying forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s, forming a close relationship with Osama bin

Laden .

Together in the Jalalabad area they established a training camp network, later used by Al-Qaeda

personnel, with bunkers and emplacements. In 2001 he was the only Pashtun leader allied with

the United Front (Northern Alliance) –and therefore the US – in its war against the governing

Taliban prior to the fall of Kabul. In this period though wielding little clout as a military leader,

he was able to maintain a small army paying men under his command with donations he received

from his Arab benefactors. He is also the one who trained the dreaded Abu Sayyaf terrorist group

of the Philippines.

Ahmed Shah Massoud of the Panjshir valley north of Kabul, was one of the most independent,

charismatic and effective of Mujahideen commanders. He was also the most well read and

certainly the most militarily proficient amongst them all. His tragedy was that in a land over

which all sorts of powers vied for control he dreamed of a democratic and free Afghanistan, with

the result that he was always relatively poorly supplied.

Opposed to both Russian as well as Pushtun domination, he is credited by some western writers

of having caused over 60% of the Russian losses-but found little favour with the ISI or Saudis.

By the end of the war he was leading at least 10,000 trained troops-the only semblance to an

army amongst Mujahideen commanders- and had expanded his political control of Tajik

dominated areas to Afghanistan’s northeastern provinces. His Northern alliance later also

provided the base for the US invasion of Afghanistan. After the Russian withdrawal he remained

the lone obstacle preventing Taliban and Pakistani domination of the country. However in this

final stage, he was being supported by the Russians, Iranians and the Indians-and perhaps

covertly even by the US.

The fighters under the warlords operated through over 4000 bases spread all over Afghanistan.

The bases served as sources of supply and control. Hierarchies of organization above the base

level were attempted, but the results varied depending on regional, ethnic and sectarian

considerations. In the Pashtun areas of the east, south and southwest; tribal structure, with its

many rival sub-divisions, provided the basis for military organization and leadership.

Mobilization depended on the traditional fighting allegiances to quickly raise a tribal lashkar

(fighting force). In favorable circumstances such formations could quickly reach more than

10,000.

Normally they could be formed to besiege towns, but because of the independent nature of

Pashtun , the Lashkar durability was necessarily short-and most sieges ended in failures. Despite

the proven ability to cause fearfully unacceptable attrition in hit and run missions, such troops

were woefully inadequate for purposes of capturing or holding any major cities and bases in

operations against trained troops.

Mujahideen mobilization in non-Pashtun regions was very different. The Persian and Turkish

speaking regions of Afghanistan lacked strong political representation in a state dominated by

Pashtuns. Prior to the invasion, non-Pashtuns possessed very few firearms and little military

tradition upon which to build an armed resistance. Here the leadership for mobilization was

found from amongst pious learned or charismatically revered pirs (saints).The military leadership

being closely tied to Islam helped avoid the infighting common amongst the Pashtun and led to

some of the most effective mobilization during the war.

Thus Ahmed Shah Massoud of the Panjshir valley north of Kabul, one of the most charismatic

and effective commanders, rose from within their ranks. By the end of the war he was leading at

least 10,000 trained troops-the only semblance to an army amongst Mujahideen commanders-

and had expanded his political control of Tajik dominated areas to Afghanistan’s northeastern

provinces. His Northern alliance later also provided the base for the US invasion of Afghanistan.

The Mujahideen leaders were skilled at sabotage operations. They concentrated on both civilian

and military targets, knocking out bridges, closing major roads, blowing up power lines,

pipelines, radio stations, government office buildings, air terminals, hotels, cinemas, ambushing

patrols, attacking convoys, disrupting the electric power system and industrial production, and

attacking police stations and Soviet military installations and air bases. From 1985 through 1987,

an average of over 600 “sabotage acts” a year were recorded. The Mujahideen would often

launch 800 rockets per day. Between April 1985 and January 1987, they carried out over 23,500

shelling attacks on government targets. They also made heavy use of land mines.

MUJAHIDEEN ATTACKS WITHIN THE USSR

In 1985, the CIA, MI6 (Britain’s intelligence agency), and the Pakistani ISI agreed to launch

guerrilla attacks from Afghanistan into then Soviet-controlled Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,

attacking military installations, factories, and storage depots within Soviet territory. The task was

given to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

According to, Mohammad Yousaf, a high-ranking ISI officer at the time. the attacks on the

Soviet Union actually began in 1985:“These cross-border strikes were at their peak in 1986.

Scores of attacks were made across the Amu (River)… Sometimes Soviet citizens joined in these

operations, or came back into Afghanistan to join the Mujahideen. That we were hitting a sore

spot was confirmed by the ferocity of the Soviets’ reaction. Virtually every incursion provoked

massive aerial bombing and gunship attacks on all villages south of the river in the vicinity of

our strike.”

THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

By 1987 the USSR decided it has had enough! Its Politburo decided that the Soviet-Afghan War

must end “within a year” and by November 1987 both the CIA and the ISI were aware of this.

As a result of an agreement signed in Geneva, between Afghanistan and Pakistan the Soviet

Union pledged to withdraw all of its troops from Afghanistan by February15, 1989. On that

exact date the last of its soldiers were out of Afghanistan.

But they left a Soviet backed Communist regime holding the fort at Kabul. None of the players –

including the USSR – expected this regime to survive for more then three months. Yet even

though it was acceptable to neither the Mujahideen fighters nor even their principle backers – it

would survive for three years!

JIHAD: The Great CIA Game: Part 6

CONCLUSION

This article conclusively proves that ‘Global Islamic Jihad’ was forged as an instrument for the

pursuit of US strategic interests, and that it proved itself as a worthwhile CIA asset in

Afghanistan. It’s very first operation – “Operation Cyclone” – the organizing and launching of

the biggest covert operations the world had ever seen; proved a remarkable success; enabling the

USA and it’s Jihadi allies to attain the stated goal of defeating and forcing the Soviet troops out

of Afghanistan.

Yet as we have seen in some of the remarks of US officials it was an instrument forged to pursue

goal stretching far beyond the immediate objective of defeating the Russian in Afghanistan. It is

here that except for some success in Yugoslavia –Bosnia and Kosovo-and Chechnya; the idea

backfired very badly.

In the first place the unexpected resistance of the Najeeb government upset US planning and

forced the ISI as well as the CIA to continue funding the Mujaheddin for another three years. In

the process the conflicting tactical and strategical compulsions of the many strange bed fellows

in ‘Global Jihad’ started to surface.

Leadership at all levels –US, Pakistani, Afghan as well as Arab – failed to rise to the occasion.

Obsessed by their own objectives -now that the common enemy was removed- each group would

fail to show any unity of purpose, or even the flexibility and accommodation required to attain

the fruits of their massive effort. This in turn would propel the war uncontrollably into

unexpected and unchartered territory!

To begin with –amongst the various Afghan Mujahideen groups – the concept of ‘holy war’

seemed to give way immediately to an ethnic based struggle for leadership and control of the

Afghan capital. Pakistan having a huge Pashtun population in it’s tribal area, and, also interested

in retaining control over Afghanistan as a means of strategic depth as well as access to Central

Asia; was increasingly drawn in on the side of Gulbadin Hikmatyar and the Pashtuns.

The USA aiming for quick stability in order to implement it’s greater game in Central Asian

Republics and Yugoslavia – and also perhaps to lessen Pakistani and Pakhtun influence on

Afghan issues – supported the concept of a more broad based government. This brought it into

conflict the issue of Pakhtuns domination- an issue the US never seemed to be inclined to

support. Nevertheless because of Pakistani hold on Pakhtun commanders, the US had little

choice but to appear to go along with what Pakistan was doing, while continuing to do whatever

was needed to pursue its own objectives.The death of General Zia in a mysterious plane crash

tended to sabotage Pakistani influence on Pashtun commanders; however even if-as some say-

engineered by CIA the crash proved counter productive, as for some time thereafter neither the

US nor Pakistan had much control over the war lords in Afghanistan.

The uncontrolled Mujahideen parties now committed enormous atrocities on their own citizens,

and, destroyed whatever infrastructure was left as they battled each other for control of Kabul

and the major cities. The country was politically divided with warlords holding sway on ethnic

basis; ruthlessly suppressing their own citizens-and eliminating their opponents. The rise of the

Pashtun Taliban in 1994 – a Pakistani attempt to re assert control – was therefore tolerated for a

while even by the US, in the hope that this would bring the required peace and stability in

Afghanistan.

Similar differences also developed between Bin Laden and his mentor Azzam. We have already

noted that Azzam was a CIA man, while bin Laden was an ISI/GID man; Bin Laden sided with

the “Islamic Party” lead by the Pashtun Hekmatyar, while Azzam tried to impose the US option

of peace between the Mujahideen faction and the Jama’a Al Islamiya faction under the

leadership of Rabani and Masuod. Azzam even issued a Fatwa forbidding Jihadi fighters from

participating in the power struggle in Afghanistan. These differences thus appear to be an early

reflection of the differences between the outlook of the US and pro Pashtun parties to the

conflict.

One early effect of this on the set up of Arab fighters within Afghanistan was that Bin Laden

disengaged from Azzam and was forced to move to Sudan to begin ‘independent’ operations.

In November 1989 Azzam was murdered in New York under mysterious circumstances and Bin

laden became the sole ideological leader of the organization of Arab fighters- Al-Qaeda. In 1990

Al-Zawahiri the leader of the Egyptian fighters in Afghanistan also moved to Sudan to join Bin

Laden. But even at this stage both the ISI as well as Osama seems to have been part of the US

operations involving the use of Al-Qaeda Jehadis in Chechnya and Yugoslavia.

Peace did not come even after the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan; Osama would return to

Afghanistan-and Hikmatyar the CIA and ISI’s blue eyed boy would flee to Iran! Ahmed Shah

Masud would form the Northern alliance and continue battling the Taliban. Osama allied with

Al-Zawahiri, would announce that peace is not possible until Massoud is killed. Massouud in

turn would speak to the EU parliament warning against terrorism and an imminent major terrorist

attack in the near future. Soon Massoud would be assassinated by men posing as press

photographers. Two days later 9/11 would occur. The USA would embark on its invasion of

Afghanistan using the deceased Massoud’s Northern alliance as a base.

What are we to make of all this? Did the creation of an instrument of global Jihad have

unforeseen and undesirable ramifications for the USA? Did Osama at some stage along the line

develop major differences with the CIA – leading to 9/11 and his subsequent vilification as the

leader of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda? Was the difference much deeper and involved a

gradually widening chasm between the CIA and ISI itself?

In the next article God willing I propose to wind up the subject in the light of the events relating

to the rise and fall of the Taliban – and culminating in 9/11 and the presence of US troops in

Afghanistan.

Concluded.

Kashmir Issue:

Outline:

• Background:

• India’s Reluctance To Abide By UN Resolutions:

a) Plebiscite Administrator

b) Sir Owen Dixon’s Report

c) Frank Graham’s Report

d) Geneva Talks

e) Bogra-Nehru Talks

f) Nehru’s Statement In Lok Sabha

g) Gunner Jarring Proposals

• 1965 War Of India-Pakistan Over Kashmir

• Nuclear Test-Kargil Clashes And Kashmir Issue

• Agra Summit 2001

• Kashmir Issue After 9/11

• Effects Of Mumbai Attacks on Kashmir

• Kashmir-Possible Solution

• Critical Analysis

• Conclusion

Background:

The valley of Jammu and Kashmir which covers an area of 84,471 square miles has been a bone

of contention between India and Pakistan. Geographically, politically and economically Kashmir

is closer to Pakistan than India.

The Kashmir dispute originated on 26th October, 1947, when Hari Singh, the Maharaja of

Kashmir, against all his commitments and wishes of the majority of people signed Instrument of

Accession in favour of India.

Consequently, Indian troops entered the valley and full scale war started. The Pakistani troops

and the frontier tribesmen aided by Kashmir people fought bravely and succeeded in liberating a

sizeable portion (Azad Kashmir) from India. Sensing defeat, India approached United Nations

for a ceasefire. As a result, the security Council passed a resolution on 17 January, 1948 and

asked both the countries to observe cease-fire. However, the fighting continued and the UN

appointed United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and

propose solution to the problem. The Commission passed a resolution on 13th August 1948, I

which it asked both countries to observe ceasefire and directed Pakistan to withdraw its troops

from the valley. The commission adopted another resolution on 5th January 1948, in which it

spelled in clear language that the future of the valley would be decided through plebiscite. In the

meantime, India and Pakistan signed a ceasefire which came into effect on January 1st, 1949.

India’s Reluctance To Abide By UN Resolutions:

Ever since the partition of the sub-continent on 14th August, 1947, India has been flouting the

provisions of the instrument of Accession and resolutions of the UNO regarding the Kashmir

issue.

a) Plebiscite Administrator:

The UN Secretary-General appointed Admiral Fleet Chester Nimitz (USA) as the plebiscite

Administrator in the Kashmir on March, 1949. Pakistan accepted the arbitration of C.W Nimitz

but India failed to do so. Thus, this move failed to bring any result.

b) Sir Owen Dixon’s Report:

In March, 1950, the UN Security Council disbanded UNCIP and designated Sir Owen Dixon, an

Australian judge, to arrange the demilitarization in the valley. Sir Owen visited India and

Pakistan and submitted his report in September, 1950, but India’s negative attitude proved a

hindrance in the way of a solution.

c) Frank Graham’s Report:

In March, 1951, the UN Security Council appointed Frank Graham (USA) as the UN

representative of Kashmir. He visited India and Pakistan and submitted his report on 19th

October, 1951, in which he recommended the demilitarization of Kashmir. Again, in May 1952,

he visited India and Pakistan but as before Indian intransigence o accept any mediation prevented

the peaceful solution.

d) Geneva Talks:

In February 1953, India and Pakistan held discussion in Geneva to resolve Kashmir issue.

However, India refused to accept all proposals aimed at holding plebiscite in the valley.

e) Bogra-Nehru Talks:

In 1953, Pakistan Premier Mohammad Ail Bogra and Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru

discussed the Kashmir issue in their meetings held in London, Karachi and Delhi. They could not

achieve any result due to Nehru’s delaying tactics in order to buy time.

f) Nehru’s Statement In Lok Sabha:

In 1956, Nehru in an address in Lok Sabha sounded a changed Indian policy on Kashmir by

declaring that the question of plebiscite on Kashmir was out of date because of American

military assistance of Pakistan, economic development of Kashmir, creation of the Constituent

Assembly in the valley and Pakistan’s membership of CENTO and SEATO.

g) Gunner Jarring Proposals:

In February, 1957, UN Security Council appointed Gunner Jarring President of the Council to

submit a report on Kashmir. He visited India and Pakistan and submitted his report on 29th

April, 1957. Pakistan accepted his proposals but India rejected them with its traditional

obduracy.

1965 War Of India-Pakistan Over Kashmir:

India flouting all canons of International Law attacked Pakistan on 6th September 1965. Thus

full scale war started between India and Pakistan. Within days war spread from Kashmir front in

the North to Rann of Kutch in the South and East Pakistan in the East. The valiant forces of

Pakistan fought bravely and frustrated enemy designs at Sialkot, Lahore, Fazilka and Rajasthan.

The war continued for 17 days till a UN sponsored ceasefire took effect on 23rd September,

1965. Later on, in January 1966 India and Pakistan signed the Tashkent Declaration in which the

two countries declared to withdraw their troops from the valley in pre 15 August, 1965 position

and resumed their normal diplomatic relations.

Nuclear Test-Kargil Clashes And Kashmir Issue:

In 1998, the two arch-rivals in South Asia conducted their own nuclear tests, since then, the

international community especially the great powers are really concerned about the security of

the region. The resolution of the Kashmir issue is earnestly felt, as it can trigger nuclear debacle

in the region. The Kargil clashes further intensified the apprehension and need to resolve the

issue. The military stand-off between India and Pakistan in the wake of terrorist attacks on Indian

Parliament on December 13, 2001, further increased the fear of nuclear war in the region. Since

then, the role of international community in resolving the Kashmir issue has come to the face.

Agra Summit 2001:

In July, 2001, Agra Summit between PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf

started with great hopes and expectations. Pervez Musharraf visited India on the call of Vajpayee

with confidence to resolve all the impeding issues to improve relations between the two arch-

rivals of South Asia. Unfortunately, the summit ended abruptly without bringing any fruitful

development for the peace I the region.

Kashmir Issue After 9/11:

The events of 9/11 brought overwhelming consequences for both the global and the regional

politics. Its impacts on Kashmir are not ignorable. The whole international community agreed on

a one-point agenda to combat terrorism in its all forms and manifestations, everywhere in the

world. The world is no more ready to tolerate any type of insurgency in the name of self-

determination and freedom. Terrorists and freedom fighters are no more distinguishable to the

world. In such circumstances Kashmir freedom fighters cannot maintain the status of their

domestic insurgency against India as a legitimate freedom struggle. Most the Kashmir Jihadi

groups are outlawed and declared as terrorists groups creating restlessness in Kashmir.

Effects Of Mumbai Attacks on Kashmir:

The attacks which took place in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 carry severe implications for the

Kashmir issue. After the attacks, the peace process between India and Pakistan suffered a

setback. Although no direct link is established between the terrorists operating in Kashmir with

those who carried out Mumbai attack, a case has been made by India that eventually all jihadi

groups are bound by a commo Islamist Philosophy.

Kashmir-Possible Solution:

Following steps are suggested to evolve an effective policy on Kashmir to achieve the desired

solutions.

i) Efforts to bring about a united Islamic stand.

ii) Holding international conference on Kashmir in the major capitals of the world where pro-

Kashmiri international personalities be invited to address.

iii) Supporting overseas Pakistanis and students in foreign universities of stage demonstrations

and influence the elected members of houses of government.

iv) Evolve a “think tank” for formulating coherent guidelines on Kashmir.

v) Start a national Fund on Kashmir.

vi) Most important of all, we should take advantage of the revival of Kashmir issue at the United

Nations through a united move by the Muslim Ummah and Organisation of Islamic Conference.

vii) Approaching International Court of Justice by Pakistan, for the issue of a “cease and desist”

order to the Indian forces in Kashmir who are ruthlessly persecuting, the Kashmir Muslims and

are violating the human rights.

Critical Analysis:

For resolving Kashmir issue it is the time that international community must differentiate

between the terrorism and freedom movement. The process of peace for normalisation of

relations between the two neighbouring countries through negotiations and talks for resolving all

outstanding issues, irritants and problems and lingering issues have gained boost recently.

Musharraf repeatedly asserted that Pakistan is against war. “we are for peace; we are for

deescalating; we are for reduction of tension.” However, the reduction of tensions between the

two neighbouring countries could have been achieved only if the confidence building measures

agreed upon earlier would have been followed. In this regard, there is a positive response from

Pakistan but unfortunately a negligible one from India.

If even now Kashmir conflict is left unresolved through the international efforts, then to borrow

Iqbal’s symbolism, “the time has come when the desperate sparrow will pounce upon the mighty

falcon and overpower it”.

Conclusion:

Solution of the problem requires a change in the position adopted by all the three parties

involving-India, Pakistan and Kashmiris themselves.

Certain developments at regional and global levels augur well for the peaceful solution to the

Kashmir problem. Pakistan must exploit the situation with a pragmatic policy on Kashmir.

Plebiscite as the basic solution is not possible as evidenced in the past years. Pakistan must

pressurise India and bring United States to a mechanism to solve the Kashmir issue.

It is therefore essential that first step is to keep alive sustained dialogue between the leaders of

the two countries. Step two is acceptance of Kashmir as issue that must be resolved.

Step three would be to look at all possible solutions and agreed on which ones could be mutually

discarded as unworkable. The fourth step would be to go on to further discussion in involving the

people of Kashmir from both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) with a view to arriving at some

reasonable solution acceptance to all parties concerned.

US-India Relations And Pakistan:

Outline:

• Introduction

• Indo-US Strategic Partnership And Implications For Pakistan

• President Obama’s Visit To India

• Pakistan’s Concerns

• Indo-Pak Tensions

• Kashmir Issue

• Conclusion

Introduction:

The US and India have always considered themselves a major strategic and political powers.

Both feel that the world must acknowledge this status. They have defined and described the

international peace and priorities within their own norms and terms and have developed their

relations with the other states within these parameters.

Indo-US Strategic Partnership And Implications For Pakistan:

The US is sing different means, methods, techniques, ways, tools and linkages to advance its

policy goals in South Asia and its strategic agreement with India signed in June 2005 and July

2005 (Unclear deals) are the most recent and the best examples of Indo-US strategic partnership

after 9/11 events.

The indo-US nuclear deal has much implication for the deterrence stability between the nuclear

belligerents in South Asia as the nuclear facilities provided through this agreement will spare

many Indian nuclear faculties which it has been using for civilian purposes and India will be able

to manufacture abundant nuclear warheads out of them. On the other hand, Pakistan found a

straight forward negative response for civilian nuclear deal despite the havoc created by the

power shortage in the already thriving industrial sector. Then US and Israel backed Indian

missile defence system will be another dent to Pakistan’s stability.

President Obama’s Visit To India:

President Obama’s three-day visit to India was predicated on two major objectives-US economic

recession and war in Afghanistan.

During his visit, Obama signed 20 business deals worth US 10 billion dollars with India. He also

sent message to Pakistan during his visit that “terrorists’ safe places in its territory are

unacceptable”. To appease India, he also asked Pakistan to bring to justice the perpetrators of the

2008 Mumbai attacks. While addressing the Indian Parliament, he supported Indian desire to

become the permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Pakistan’s Concerns:

After Obama’s support to India on the UN seat issue, Pakistan’s Foreign Office reacted

immediately and requested Obama not to back New Delhi because of its role in suppression of

Kashmiri’s and its hegemonic designs in the smaller countries of the region. India has egregious

track record of stranded relations with almost all its neighbouring countries, not to say about

Pakistan. It has disputes with Bangladesh over water, with Srilanka for tis backing of Tamils and

Nepal for its interference in Kathmandu’s internal affairs.

Obama’s support for India’s UN bid has compounded Pakistan’s concerns over its rival designs

in Afghanistan. Pakistan is already anxious at its nuclear-armed rival’s growing role in

Afghanistan and fears India is trying to gain a foothold along its Western borders.

Indo-Pak Tensions:

President Obama during his visit also offered to play a role in reducing Indo-Pak tensions. The

efforts of the sole superpower in reducing tensions between the two nuclear states can help

maintain peace in the region. But the problem is that US is willing to mediate provided both

India and Pakistan request. But India is not ready to accept any third party mediation and insist

all the issues including Kashmir will be resolved bilateral negotiations as per Tashkent and Simla

Agreement.

Kashmir Issue:

Washington has been unsympathetic to appeals of help from the people of Kashmir. On Kashmir,

Obama said, “We will continue to welcome dialogue between India and Pakistan, even as we

recognize that disputes between your two countries can only be resolved by the people of your

two countries. US could play role in resolving the dispute if both the sides asked to do so but it

could not impose any solution on the both sides.” Obama kept quiet about human rights

violations by the Indian occupation forces, contrary to what human rights organizations have

been saying against brutal killings in the valley.

Conclusion:

There are many in Pakistan who view with alarm the growth in India-US ties that have now been

reinforced by Obama visit. But, it is a mistake to regard the matter as a zero-sum game. If US

ties with India grow, it does not necessarily mean loss for Pakistan, or vice versa. Pakistan-US

relations are based on their own rationale. In fact, at time when the primary US security concern

is the war against Al-Qaeda and Taliban, US considers Pakistan as a pivotal ally without whose

support the war cannot be won. Obama has already confirmed that he will be visiting Pakistan

soon.

Israel-Palestine issue:

Outline:

• Background:

• Arab-Israel Peace Accords:

i) The Sinai Agreement:

ii) Camp David Accord:

iii) Oslo Accord

iv) Wye River Peace Accord

• Israel’s Intransigence:

• Apathetic Role Of Arabs:

• Current Situation:

• Limitations To Direct Negotiations:

• Only A Regional Approach Can Bring Middle East Peace:

• Conclusion:

Background:

It is a historical fact that the Jewish came into existence in 1948 with the blessings of the US,

Great Britain and France. Later on, it succeeded in defeating the Arabs in the wars of 1948, 1967

and 1973 with the active military and financial support of USA and her allies. America needed a

vassal state in the heart of the Middle East to keep the oil-rich Arab States under control. From

the Suez Crisis in 1956 to the disintegration of USSR in 1991, the Middle East has been the hot

spot in the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West. Since 1948 Israel has played at the

hands of America and in turn has received billions of dollars worth military and economic

assistance.

Arab-Israel Peace Accords:

After the 1973 Arab-Israel War, Israel has signed the following peace accords with the Arab

States.

i) The Sinai Agreement: Egypt and Israel signed two Sinai agreements in January 1974 and

September 1975.

ii) Camp David Accord: Egypt and Israel signed the famous Camp David Accord in September,

1978. According to this agreement, Israel withdrew from Gaza Strip and Sinai peninsula. This

pact ended confrontation between two traditional rivals.

iii) Oslo Accord: PLO chief Yasser Arafat signed Oslo agreement in 1955 on interim autonomy

of the Palestinians.

iv) Wye River Peace Accord: PLO signed the historic Wye River Peace Accord with Israel in

October, 1998. Under this agreement Israel agreed to transfer 27 per cent territory of West Bank,

Gaza strip and Jericho peninsula to the Palestinian Authority. It also provided safe passage to the

Palestinian from Gaza to West Bank and allowed the opening of an airport at Gaza.

Israel’s Intransigence:

So far Israel has in one way or other safeguarded American interests in the region. Without US

support it would not have been possible for Tel Aviv to survive in the face of bitter Arab

opposition. Due to this factor Israel has been able to back out from its commitments on several

occasions. For example, the 1993accord required Israel pull out from all of its West Bank

settlement and the occupied West Bank areas. But Israel did not fulfil its commitments mainly

due to American backing. Furthermore, Israel has surpassed all limits of brutality by using

military force against the unarmed Palestinians. In addition Israel has accelerated its settlement

expansion drive.

Apathetic Role Of Arabs:

After the reverses suffered in the Arab-Israel wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, the Arab leaders

were convinced that it was not possible to wipe out the Israel through war. Thus President of

Egypt Anwar Sadat signed Camp David Accord with Israel in September, 1978. Under this

agreement Egypt got Gaza Strip and Sanai Desert back and felt satisfied. Consequently, the

withdrawal of Egypt, the strongest nation from the theatre betrayed the Palestinian cause and

made the issue more complicated. Similarly, Jordan under Shah Hussain signed peace accord

with Israel and pulled itself out of boiling pot of the Middle East. This accord further weakened

the position Palestine Liberation Organisation. While after signing peace accords with Egypt and

Jordan Israel attained a strong position. The Arab States viz Egypt, Jordan, Syria, UAE and

Saudi Arabia have adopted an apathetic role towards Palestine. They have confined their role to

passing resolutions only. The GCC and Arab League have no practical role to play for the

establishment of a free Palestinian States.

Current Situation:

The US announced the resumption of direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians in

Washington on September 2, 2010. However, the talks stalled within four weeks when Israel

refused to extend a self-imposed 10 month building freeze that expired on September 26, 2010.

Washington has since offered Israel a package of jet fighters and diplomatic guarantees in

exchange for concession on settlements.

Limitations To Direct Negotiations:

As the rounds of talks move forward there are three basic limitations to direct negotiations. First,

the Palestinians are concerned that the talks without deadline would simply allow Israel more

time to build more settlements, which would further undermine any agreement.

The second problem is that a bilateral peace deal is no longer attractive to either side. Israel

would find it difficult to find stomach the painful concessions necessary to win peace deal with

only some Palestinians-Hamas, who run Gaza, are not involved-while the Palestinians need

cover from wider Arab World to sell tough choices to their own people.

Finally, and worst of all, a two-state solution will no longer work. Despite serious efforts to build

a Palestinian State this option effectively disappeared as Israel settlers spread throughout the

West Bank.

Only A Regional Approach Can Bring Middle East Peace:

Given this trio of deficiencies, the bilateral approach alone should be abandoned. Instead, a

comprehensive accord between Israel and all Arab countries should be pursued. This could build

on the terms laid out in Arab Peace Initiative; adopted during an Arab League in meeting in

Beirut in 2002. This offered Israel both normalised relations with Arab countries and security

guarantees, in exchange for agreements over borders and the refugee problem. A further strength

of the plan was that it offered regional cover for both sides.

Conclusion:

The conditions for bilateral settlement do not currently exist. Renewed talks between Israel and

Palestinians are unlikely to change this, no matter how much the Obama administration hope

they might delaying difficult decisions in hope of better opportunities tomorrow will only make

it harder to end conflict. But a regional approach is both possible and desirable as a way forward.

And the time is to act now.

What is happening between the US and Pakistan?

By Shaukat Qadir (retired brigadier and a former president of the Islamabad Policy Research

Institute)

Those who recall my attempt some months ago to explain Joe Biden’s hurriedly-arranged visit to

Pakistan, would recall that I tried outlining why and how Pakistan was assisting the Afghans to

find an Afghan solution for their future — a future in which all Afghans across the ethnic divide

would participate, including the various chapters of the Afghan Taliban. While Pakistan would

assist, the ‘(Burhanuddin) Rabbani initiative’ was intended to be exclusively Afghan.

I also mentioned in the same article that, when Biden’s hurriedly-scheduled visit was announced,

The Washington Post (concluding from the briefings he received) outlined his messages to

Pakistan. Apart from increased military and civil aid/assistance, these included a reassurance that

no ground attack by US/Isaf forces would occur on Pakistani soil, the US would no longer press

for an operation by the Pakistan Army in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) and, that “Pakistan

has an important, if not dominant role in Afghanistan”.

A month later, we were caught up in the Raymond Davis imbroglio. However, that, too, was

settled amicably and CIA operatives in Pakistan were grossly reduced. It should have been

expected that relations between these two ‘allies’ would improve. But what has happened since?

Let us examine recent developments before attempting to understand why these have occurred.

The day after Davis’s release, a drone attack in NWA killed around 44 civilians (no militants).

For the first time, Pakistan launched a genuinely strong protest; so much so, that the army chief,

General Kayani, vocally condemned the attack (a first). For some days, the Pakistan Air Force

patrolled the skies along the Durand Line and drone attacks halted. In the meantime, our ISI

chief travelled to Washington for a meeting with his counterpart at the CIA.

He had not yet set foot in Pakistan when, on April 22, another drone attack in NWA killed 22

people, including women and children! I have frequently commented that, since 2008, drone

attacks by the CIA have become increasingly accurate in targeting militants and the (indecent

term) ‘collateral damage’ has become minimal. Suddenly, after Davis’s departure, these have

become even more inaccurate than they were in the period from 2006-2008! Why?

In his online article, “Carving up Pakistan: The Balochistan gambit”, Tony Cartalucci wrote on

April 22: “In a broader geopolitical context, these constant and seemingly random attacks in

western Pakistan serve a more diabolical purpose. With each attack on ‘suspected militants’, the

all-inclusive term used to describe CIA targets, the authority and stability of Pakistan’s

establishment is undermined and whittled away. With many of the attacks claiming the lives of

civilians, outrage and unrest is purposefully being fanned and spread. The recipient of this

outrage and unrest is a national government seemingly bent to the will of the United States as it

callously murders Pakistanis. In particular, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is being

intentionally weakened, undermined and isolated from the whole of Pakistan”.

The last sentence is given credence by the fact that, after a considerable interval, during which

the ISI was not subjected to false allegations by the US, suddenly US military chief Admiral

Mullen found it necessary to castigate this organisation again. With such vehemence did he do

so, that once again, Pakistan’s army chief had to decry this ‘negative propaganda’!

Then there is the incident of the two-day firefight in Dir! Where did that come from? It certainly

isn’t al Qaeda, which maintains only a token presence in Afghanistan, having moved to greener

pastures in the Middle East and Iraq. Equally certainly, it wasn’t the Taliban.

In his online article “CIA Directs and Funds Terrorism In Pakistan CIA’s Afghan Kill Teams

Expand US War in Pakistan”, published September 21, 2010, Spencer Ackerman points at the

likely perpetrators. “Let there be no doubt that the US is at war in Pakistan. It’s not just the drone

strikes. According to insider journalist Bob Woodward’s new book, the CIA manages a large and

lethal band of Afghan fighters to infiltrate into Pakistan and attack al Qaeda’s bases. What could

possibly go wrong?” He adds, “Administration officials didn’t just confirm the existence of the

teams — they bragged about them. ‘This is one of the best Afghan fighting forces and it’s made

major contributions to stability and security,’ says one US official who would only talk on

condition of anonymity — and who wouldn’t elaborate”. Ackerman concludes, “One of the

larger political narratives Woodward’s book apparently presents is President Obama’s inability

to either bring the Afghanistan war to a close or find good options for tailoring it to the US’ main

enemies in Pakistan. When the CIA comes to the Oval Office with a plan for inflicting damage

on the safe havens — no matter how fraught with risk and blowback the plan is — is it any

surprise that Obama would approve it?”

Ackerman’s comments seem to confirm my growing belief that US foreign policy, at least

towards this region, is not tailored in the White House, but in the Pentagon and Langley. If the

GHQ has a definite input in our foreign policy, it seems we are only following the sterling

example of ‘the World’s Greatest Democracy’, the US of A!

And what is more, the US has, once again, linked this seizure of promised aid as well as its intent

to continue its inaccurate drone attacks in NWA to the precondition that Pakistan undertake a

military operation in NWA — if not, no aid and drone attacks now (rather obviously) targeting

civilians will continue!

“Elementary, my dear Watson”, as the inimical Sherlock Holmes would have said, “the US has

to destabilise Pakistan”. The only question is: Why?

Why we need America

1. Pakistan Us six decade relation is a mirage based on reason rather than convenience.

2. it is based on sound fundamentals.

3. the first of these is from inception Pakistan faces economical and territorial insecurity.

4. the India reluctance to open its doors to western capitalism and its inclination to experiment with socialist

methods internally and non-alignment internationally only helped Americans to set aside their reservations and opt

for friendship with Pakistan.

5. the relation hit the road bumps because of America “do as they say” methods.

6. Pakistan friendship with china,its use of American defence equipment against India, American obsession against

nuclear project. This was result in first parting of ways during the carter presidency.

7. carter the Us president flew over to Pakistan in merely ten months the Us was bending over backwards to win

over Pakistan to meet the challenge posted by Russian tanks railing down Afghanistan in decmber 1979.

8. American’s disdain for Pakistan returned after the nuclear tests of 1998 and aggravated with second half of 2001.

9. Pakistan was on the verge of default on its foreign debt repayement.

10. after 9/11 america was once again compelled to seek pakistan’s cooperation. And the reaction for that

cooperation came quickly as pakistan’s economy was bailed out.

11. major difficulty with post 9/11 american doctrine is an excessive recourse to military means rather that statecraft

or diplomacy.

12. consequently the Americans prefer to deal with Pakistani comrades and sleuths rather than the country’s civilian

leadership or bureaucracy.

why its important Talk to the Talibans 1. insurgency couldn’t be end through force 2. US is strongly mistaken 3. also the Taliban leadership that they could expel the foreign troops by force 4. after a decade fighting, cost of billion of dollar, and thousands of afghan lives . both US and Talibans needs to realize that neither is winning the war 5. the year 2014, when the drawdown of international forces is due to begin is posing a nightmare for afghans , international community and also for afghan crumbling Kabul administration 6. the cuurent setup will unable to sustain a single day after international forces left 7. political rapprochement is the final solution

8. US must revert its policy to its original policy of tracking down the Al Qaeda network and leaving out talibans militia that has neither harmed US interests nor harbours any idea of doing so outside Afghanistan 9. the talibans have learned enough through there mistakes 10. if Taliban came to power they will not allow anybody to use afghan soil against foreign country 11. in last decade Afghanistan has been overly exposed to the world 12. now Afghanistan is changes placed with thousands of cell ohones users, internet, electronic media 13. in the post all afghan elections Taliban allows the electoral process to go on in the democratization of Afghanistan 14. the US must understand that the Taliban are the only force that can gurantee peace and discourage Al Qaeda using its soil for its operation 15. US must delist Taliban from UN list of terror organization 16. lift sanctions on talibans and let it form a political wing 17. trying negotiations to talibans surrendering their arms and accepting the country’s constitution is a bizaree demand as the talibans are a formidable force 18. Pakistan being a major stakeholder in the conflict needs to honestly encourage washingtonand the Taliban to seek a negotiated settlement.

PAK-INDIA RELATIONS

Section I: Introduction

It is axiomatic that Pakistan and India share a turbulent and complex, if also short, history. While

the dynamics of the relationship may shift from time to time, numerous existential issues remain

in place. Characterised by mistrust, contrasting interests and the oft-quoted ‘missed

opportunities’, the bloodshed of 1947 has been replaced by a more diverse set of issues that

continue to mar the relationship. Kashmir has come to exemplify the classic case of a territorial

dispute between neighbouring countries in the modern world composed of nation States.

Extended hostile periods have only been sporadically separated by periods of relative peace –

interludes that many hoped would prolong into perpetuity. But failures of State, internal

conflicts, deep-rooted differences and perhaps unavoidable circumstances have meant that these

spells of tranquillity remain mere specks of light in an otherwise dark corridor, at best offering

missed opportunities.

In studying the Pakistan-India ties, it is simplistic but also convenient to divide them into phases

with regard to important junctures in South Asian history. None of the occasions that gave rise to

optimism could ultimately become the watershed they were built up to be. The most recent such

case was in 2004; following a prolonged period of military standoff, there began a ‘peace

process’ led by President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee. This phase was significant

since it allowed for a more systematic approach to negotiations by adopting the concept of

“Composite Dialogue” that covered various issues that have continually hindered progress on

even seemingly non-contentious fronts.

A move away from a traditionally line of control- (LoC) and Kashmir-centric policy, it called for

a number of concerns to be brought to the table and economic cooperation to be enhanced. While

the strategic imperatives and finer points of this process will be discussed later in this study, it is

relevant to say here that even though progress was made on multiple fronts, enthusiasm waned as

the momentum died out perhaps due to the more pressing internal political turmoil in Pakistan.

However, the process did expose some important aspects of the relationship. One, it established

that progressive talks and meaningful solutions were not just desirable, they were also possible.

And two, it exhibited a lack of political will, or more suitably, the political constraints, in both

countries that prevent agreeable solutions from being implemented. This was clear for instance in

the case of the Sir Creek and Siachin issues where significant progress through collaboration

could not be translated into concrete agreements. Similarly, when a proposed visit to Islamabad

by Prime Mister Manmohan Singh, as part of this process, could not materialise, progress was

further derailed.

Thus, if one divides the relationship into phases, the current phase succeeding the

aforementioned period of peaceful, if not altogether successful Composite Dialogue, begins with

the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on November 26, 2008. While this signalled an instant

breakdown of talks, the irony was that Pakistan’s foreign minister was present in New Delhi at

the time in order to help revive the deflated process of dialogue.

It is widely acknowledged that only effective diplomacy, on both regional as well as global

levels, prevented the situation from reaching a complete meltdown. However, subsequent

suspension of dialogue ensued and that has only recently been revived in 2010. While this does

not mean that all communications died out, it did signal an end to an official exchange of views,

particularly the Composite Dialogue.

Ever since the attacks, with the international pressure and attention garnered by India, militancy

in Pakistan has been under intense scrutiny. For Pakistan, this opened a new chapter in its own

policy framework on dealing with terrorism. Since February 2010, when foreign ministers of

both countries met in India after a period of fourteen months for what turned out to be ‘talks

about talks’, a clear divide between priorities has been established.

India’s stance on Pakistan’s alleged State policy of supporting militants and on dealing with

certain individuals and groups, whose name has been linked to the Mumbai attacks, is paramount

to all other areas of negotiations as far as New Delhi is concerned. Pakistan’s priorities remain

the more traditional long-standing issues such as Kashmir and water security. Moreover, there is

insistence from Pakistan for a more structured rather than uni-dimensional dialogue, since

otherwise only superficial talks with no concrete results will emerge. Ironically, some suggest

that the current positions are paradoxical since it was actually India that had benefited from the

Composite Dialogue process. This nonetheless remains a minority opinion as both countries

remain adamant in their positions.

Confusions reign supreme. After the 16th SAARC summit in Bhutan in April 2010, there has

been a revival of sorts that some see as a resumption of the Composite Dialogue ‘for all practical

purposes’ even as the term itself has been avoided. For others, this is simply a continuation of

erstwhile stubborn attitudes and signifies no progress on any front. Even as intent for dialogue as

the only way forward has been appreciated, there are no solid foundations, proposed framework

or clear guidelines as to how talks will proceed. Future talks between foreign ministers of both

countries are expected to bring some coherence to negotiations.

However, additional complications arise from, for instance, the case of Ajmal Kasab, the sole

captured terrorist from the group that was involved in the Mumbai attacks who has now been

charged by Indian courts amid great public and official outpouring against Pakistan. Moreover,

with the failed bombing attempt in New York’s Time Square by a Pakistani that once again

highlights terrorist outfits in the country, there are concerns that the process of negotiations with

India will be derailed before it even begins since Pakistan remains in the Indian narrative as an

‘epicentre’ for terrorism. In these circumstances, Indian insistence of terrorism being the focal

point of all discussions has only strengthened, although the language used may have mellowed

since the two countries are preparing to embark on another process of building bridges.

In this study, we aim to assess the current state of Pakistan’s relationship with India covering

some of the most important issues, not all of which may have been on the forefront in the post-

Mumbai phase. In the next section, the political process and engagements between

representatives of the two countries since the attacks will be addressed in addition to progress

made on the military front. Section III will cover recent dynamics of terrorism in India-Pakistan

relations followed by the contentious long-standing issues of water and Kashmir, respectively. In

section VI, the more marginalised area of trade as a consequence of, or motivator for, peace will

be analysed before concluding the study.

It is important to understand both bilateral and multilateral considerations in India-Pakistan ties,

so that after a long period of sixty-three years, the curse of ‘missed opportunities’ is finally

broken. While not attempting to scrutinise any single area specifically, and with the admission

that some important issues have been ignored for the sake of limiting the argument to

contemporary debate, this study hopes to add to a cautiously developing platform for a roadmap

for peace. And, it is in this context that it should be read.

Section II: Mumbai 2008 and beyond

At the outset, it is relevant to discuss the events that have dominated headlines in both Pakistan

and India, and have been the juncture from which starts a new phase in a troublesome

relationship. On November 26, 2008, a group of militants simultaneously attacked multiple

targets in Mumbai, killing around 183 people, including nine terrorists and 22 foreign nationals,

while some further 327 people received injuries. Although relations between India and Pakistan

had already been strained following a suicide attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 7,

2008 that had killed over 40 people including the Indian defence attaché, these attacks in

Mumbai served as a nail in the coffin as all fingers pointed to Pakistan.

Such was the rage in India that suggestions of military action against Pakistan were floated,

while the saner voices advised covert action as against any hasty and rash decisions that could

potentially lead to unprecedented catastrophic consequences. Option of a military strike was

ruled out by the Indian government, but on December 16, 2008, Foreign Minister Pranab

Mukherjee announced that the Composite Dialogue process with Pakistan was to be put on hold

until credible action is taken against those responsible for the Mumbai carnage. Since then, there

has been hardly any vacillation from this stance.

Pakistan’s repeated protests that an incident of terrorism, howsoever drastic, should not be

allowed to spoil a working process, fell on deaf ears. Following the 2009 Lok Sabha elections

that saw the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coming back to power, there were high hopes

that India would show some flexibility. However, on June 16, 2009, on the sidelines of a

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg, Prime

Minister Manmohan Singh on meeting President Zardari, flouted traditional norms of diplomacy,

saying that, “my mandate is to tell you that Pakistani territory should not be used for terrorism

against India” in the presence of the international media.

Unsurprisingly, the incident was not taken well in Pakistan, and in a statement made in the

Senate, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Malik Amad Khan made it clear that the comments

were unacceptable to Islamabad. In response, Pakistan decided that the president would not

participate in the upcoming Non-Aligned Summit (NAM) in Egypt and instead Prime Minster

Yousuf Raza Gillani would lead the country’s delegation. It had been decided earlier that the

foreign secretaries of both countries would meet to discuss the steps taken by Pakistan to check

terrorism against India before a possible Singh-Zardari stock-taking meeting in Egypt.

Nevertheless, things were looking up when on July 16, 2009, Gillani met with Singh in the

Egyptian city of Sharm-el-Sheikh on the sidelines of the NAM summit. The meeting concluded

with the issuance of a joint statement in which both countries agreed to de-link action on

terrorism and the Composite Dialogue process. It clearly stated that “both Prime Ministers

recognized that dialogue is the only way forward. Action on terrorism should not be linked to the

Composite Dialogue Process and these should not be bracketed.”

This statement received mixed reaction in both countries. In Pakistan, the aspect of de-linking

dialogue and action on terrorism was praised and perceived as a positive development. On the

other hand, the Indian premier had to face severe criticism not only from Opposition parties but

also from coalition partners and some members of the Congress party. Dubbing the statement a

‘surrender’ by India, Opposition parties, particularly the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), made such

a hue and cry that Singh was forced to backtrack from the commitment made in Sharm-el-

Sheikh. The very next day, in order to clarify his position, he stated that de-linking dialogue and

action on terrorism only served to strengthen India’s commitment that a meaningful process of

engagement cannot move forward unless Pakistan takes measures to control terrorism.

Similarly, a reference to Balochistan in the joint statement was also criticised in India as it was

perceived as an acknowledgement of its alleged role in the Pakistani province. Singh defended

himself by saying that India had nothing to hide and that the statement was perhaps a case of bad

drafting. In Pakistan, the reaction to the inclusion of Balochistan was seen as a great success, but

at the same time an absence of any reference to Kashmir was also highlighted.

The following months saw growing tensions as Pakistan witnessed a tirade of allegations from

India, unsurprisingly with terrorism as the central theme. Ranging from allegations and issues

such “forty-two terrorist camps operating in Pakistan”, rise in infiltration to India, exporting

terrorism and using it as a State policy to further its strategic goals and targeting Indian interests

in Afghanistan, the narrative emerging from India adopted an accusing stance that supposed a

lack of interest in tackling terrorism that targeted India. There were also occasional threats given

to Pakistan, albeit coming from various sources and covering different levels of intensity, of dire

consequences if another Mumbai-type attack was to take place.

The former Indian Chief of the Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor also came forth and

announced his provocative Cold Start strategy which aims at quick mobilisation in order to

launch a retaliatory strike against Pakistan in case of a terrorist attack. The war doctrine, which

had been in place before the attacks took place and was now re-emphasised, seeks to make

territorial gains 50-80 kilometres inside Pakistan which could be used in post-conflict

negotiations to extract concessions.

Indian intentions, coupled with its military strength, have consequently led to much debate in

Pakistan. Not surprisingly, references to its defence spending have been highlighted. It is

interesting to note that India is currently the tenth largest defence spender in the world with an

estimated two per cent share of global expenditure. It has earmarked a massive amount of money

for a modernisation programme of its armed forces and has inked agreements with other

countries worth billions of dollars. However, it vehemently opposes any such agreement for

Pakistan. Recently, France finalised a $2.2 billion deal with India to upgrade its fleet of Mirage

2000 fighters, but suspended the sale of electronics and missiles for Pakistan’s JF 17 fighters,

reportedly under “Indian pressure.”

Renewed incidents of firing on both at the line of control (LoC) and the international boundary

also served to escalate tensions. However, despite Pakistan’s accusing India of creating unrest in

Balochistan and FATA through its consulates in Afghanistan, it also continued its efforts towards

a process of dialogue. There were also growing voices in India that advocated the opening of

some kind of channel of communication since there was a realisation that complete breakdown

was not serving its purpose anymore. However, strong public opinion and an aggressive stance

taken by Opposition parties prevented early engagement with Pakistan. According to the Indian

media as late as January 2010, Prime Minister Singh discussed his desire to restart dialogue with

Pakistan with three BJP leaders but met stiff resistance and decided against taking such a step.

However, the thaw finally came when on February 4, 2010 India formally offered to resume

foreign secretary-level talks with Pakistan. Without clarifying the scope of the proposed

discussions, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupuma Rao invited her Pakistani counterpart Salman

Bashir for talks to New Delhi. It was claimed that the offer had been made with an open mind,

and official sources made it clear that while India would be willing to discuss all issues including

Balochistan, its sole focus would be on terrorism. It was also stressed that this revival of a

bilateral relationship should not be seen as resumption of the Composite Dialogue.

A behind-the-scene role played by the U.S., as well as the emerging situation in Afghanistan,

were perhaps the main reasons behind this Indian decision. Besides, there was also a tacit

realisation that coercive diplomacy had run its course and was now counterproductive for India;

indeed it was felt that by establishing ‘measured contact’, India would be able to put more

pressure on Pakistan. An unstructured dialogue such as the one on offer would help present

terrorism as the core issue without giving Pakistan an equal chance to raise other issues.

Welcoming the move, Pakistan accepted the offer and a delegation went to New Delhi on

February 24, 2010 with the hope of recreating an atmosphere of friendship. During the meeting,

India handed over three dossiers to Pakistan¬¬¬ and demanded that thirty-three individuals,

including two serving Pakistan army officers as well as Indian fugitives allegedly involved in

terror acts, be handed over to India. Repeated references to terrorism were always likely to lead

to inconclusive talks. And, indeed, this was exactly what forced the Pakistani foreign secretary to

remind India that his country had witnessed “hundreds of Mumbais” and lost 5,366 civilians in

3,043 terror attacks since 2008 and, therefore, was not ignorant of the dangers of terrorism.

The delegation had gone to New Delhi with a roadmap with guidelines leading to a potential

resumption of the Composite Dialogue, including an invitation for External Affairs Minister

S.M. Krishna to visit Pakistan. The proposal envisaged, or rather recommended, that the

February meeting lay the ground for future discussions between Prime Ministers Singh and

Gilani that could take place on the margins of a SAARC meeting in Bhutan in late April, where

resumption of the Composite Dialogue could be announced through a joint statement. However,

India was more interested to broaden the discussion at official levels first, and suggested a

‘technical meeting’ to improve cross-LoC trade, a meeting between commerce secretaries to

carry forward discussions on trade issues and a session of the Indo-Pakistan judicial committee

for release of prisoners and fishermen.

The meeting visibly failed to melt the ice and both officials decided to conduct press briefings

separately, indicating that talks had not progressed as desired and this opinion was strengthened

as the two made counter-claims regarding the issues discussed. Rao claimed that 85 per cent of

talk time had been taken up by terrorism and the remaining by eleven other issues. She insisted

that Kashmir was only briefly touched on, and Afghanistan was not discussed at all. On the other

hand, Bashir categorically stated that Kashmir had been discussed “extensively” since it is the

core issue and one that cannot be left out.

A lack of trust between the two countries limited the task of the foreign secretaries and there was

no consensus on a potential roadmap to resumption of a composite or any structured dialogue

process for the future. India’s sole focus on terrorism can be gauged by the fact that Pakistan had

to make last-minute changes in its delegation, leaving behind members from interior and water

and power ministries due to Indian insistence.

Pakistan strongly advocated resumption of the Composite Dialogue with India stressing that it

was “unfair, unrealistic and counter-productive” to allow the issue of terrorism to stall the

process of improving relations. However, much to the disappointment of Pakistan, the Indian

foreign minister responded that “the resumption of such a process would have to await the

restoration of greater trust and confidence.” The only positive outcome of these talks then, was a

commitment to further engagement.

As expected, the decision to hold talks with Pakistan met severe criticism in India. All major

political parties came down hard on the government and alleged that it had bowed to U.S.

pressure. However, the prime minister defended his stance by saying that the decision was not

sudden but a “calculated” move after weighing all the costs and benefits. During March 2010,

India repeatedly expressed its desire to conduct a second round of foreign secretary-level talks in

Islamabad. However, Pakistan made it clear that it was not interested in a mere photo

opportunity and wanted result-oriented talks that discussed all outstanding issues.

In this backdrop, the aforementioned SAARC summit was held in Bhutan from April 28-29,

2010 and it led to a meeting between the two prime ministers, although both countries gave

mixed signals till the last moment. This came soon after a 47-nation summit on nuclear security

that had taken place in Washington in early April. Referring to the exchange of pleasantries that

had occurred during that meeting, Pakistan’s foreign minister insisted that both India and

Pakistan “need to go beyond a handshake.” He further demanded that India stop demonising

Pakistan since terrorism is a challenge common to both countries.

However, pressure from the U.S, as well as from SAARC members played a vital role in

bringing the two countries to some sort of an agreement in Bhutan. The two leaders had three

meetings, including a one-on-one discussion that lasted over an hour. What emerged was an

agreement that there was lack of trust that necessitated dialogue. In order to pacify Opposition

parties and the general public, terrorism and prosecution of terrorists allegedly involved in the

Mumbai attacks were issues highlighted by Manmohan Singh, to which the Pakistani premier

responded by giving assurances that terrorism was a threat that the country is working against.

Both countries also agreed that foreign ministers and foreign secretaries meet as soon as possible

to work out modalities for future course of talks and restore trust. Dispelling the notion that this

might lead to a resumption of the Composite Dialogue, Indian officials made it clear that a move

to resume a dialogue that had existed before the Mumbai attacks would make no sense since a

new method of engagement needed to be introduced.

It is argued that Pakistan’s assertion that it cannot give guarantees against another Mumbai-like

attack in India goes against the sprit of the January 6, 2004 joint statement between the then

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpaee and former President Pervez Musharaf which formed the

basis for the resumption of Composite Dialogue. It is also being said that Pakistan’s action

against those accused in the Mumbai case will shape the contours of future engagement.

Terrorism, then, has remained a necessary focal issue.

Taking the sprit of Bhutan forward, Nirupama Rao visited Islamabad on June 24, 2010 and met

her counterpart Salman Bashir to set an agenda for a meeting between the foreign ministers in

July. However, prior to the meeting, India made it clear that Pakistan’s willingness to build on

progress made by the two countries in back-channel diplomacy on Kashmir would be viewed

favourably. The meeting was held in a cordial atmosphere as both the countries pledged to work

together to reduce the trust deficit.

The talks, as Rao put it, “provided an opportunity to talk to each other and not at each other.”

Both sides exchanged proposals on issues that were deemed deliverable during the foreign

ministers’ meeting in July. While India’s proposals dealt with trade and humanitarian issues, Rao

also asked Pakistan to ensure that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) chief Hafiz Saeed is prevented from

issuing anti-India statements or making contentious speeches. At a joint press conference, both

confirmed that all main issues had been taken up for discussion. The talks, according to Bashir,

began as an exploratory venture, but “after this round, we are much more optimistic of good

prospects at the foreign ministers’ meeting.” Rao too described the talks as forward-looking with

both sides trying to understand each other’s position.

On the heels of her visit, Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram also flew to Islamabad to attend

a SAARC Interior Ministers’ conference, and met Pakistan’s Interior Minister Rehman Malik.

He reiterated the Indian position, insisting that Pakistan bring to justice all the 26/11 plotters,

including Hafiz Saeed. He also asked Pakistan to hand over voice samples of all seven LeT

terrorists who have been in Pakistani jails for their involvement in 26/11 as ‘a first step’ towards

restoring confidence. He demanded that Pakistan step up efforts to locate and arrest thirteen

absconders who had been found guilty by Indian courts, and Pakistan on its part assured full

cooperation.

Since the two sets of meetings, India has been continuously insisting that Pakistan take some

credible action before the visit by Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna as it was “an important test of

Pakistan’s willingness to act against terrorism directed at India.”

Although the fruits of these high-level contacts and the durability of this new phase of dialogue

is still open to assessment, it is interesting to note that India, while agreeing to discuss all issues

of concern to Pakistan, is hesitant to call this resumed dialogue a return to the Composite

Dialogue since it does not wish to appear to be returning to its old position. Pakistan, on the other

hand, had been strongly advocating resumption of the earlier process, but has nevertheless

welcomed the resumption of a dialogue as long as all issues of mutual concern are discussed in a

meaningful manner.

Good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan would benefit the entire region. Since

both countries have decided to restart a dialogue process, it must be ensured that it is sustained

and that the bilateral relationship is not held hostage to a single incident of terrorism. It must be

kept in mind that terrorism is a global phenomenon and to fight this menace, the world

community - particularly countries in South Asia - need to work together. The issue of terrorism,

as has been raised in the discussions between both countries examined in this section, will now

be examined more deeply, specifically in the way it has affected the relationship since the events

of 26/11.

Section III: Terrorism in India-Pakistan ties

Ajmal Kasab, the protagonist of the saga that followed on from the terrorist attacks on Mumbai

in November 2008, was sentenced to death by Indian courts in May 2010. The verdict has in that

country been hailed by the media and politicians alike, with Law Minister Moily terming it a

message to Pakistan to abandon its “State policy of terrorism”. A similar statement by Home

Minister Chidambaram also makes for ominous reading, warning Pakistan to refrain from

“exporting” terror to India.

It does not take much for one to conclude then that hostility with regards to terrorism is central to

understanding the current state of affairs. That these comments come after a dialogue of sorts has

begun, shows that the air surrounding any engagement is not yet completely clear. While Kasab,

the sole surviving terrorist, who after initial reluctance had been confirmed as a Pakistani citizen,

has now been charged in Indian courts; the saga is far from being over.

Questions of alliances between people and groups across borders, the role of militant groups;

specifically the infamous Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), attackers’ training and planning inside

Pakistan and the roles of the State and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI); have since provided the

framework within which the Indian response has been based. For our purpose it is important to

understand three major aspects of the entire debate. Firstly, how Pakistan has dealt with the

terrorists related to the attacks; secondly, Indian perception of Pakistani actions; and thirdly, the

people and groups – most notable LeT – named and brought up as part of the alleged and

confirmed terrorist groups.

While terrorism has long been a constant part of any India-Pakistan discourse, it has only

recently become the primary talking point. Since the Mumbai attacks, perhaps this was

inevitable. However, a cynical Indian policy of maligning Pakistan and making repeated

references to alleged State sponsorship of terrorism in order to gain international sympathy, have

done considerable damage to the relationship. The rhetoric of Pakistan’s being the “epicentre” of

extremism and terrorism dominates the jargon designed for the Indian narrative, and the global

response clearly shows not just the importance of external actors, but also the success of Indian

policy. This has, according to some analysts, broadly covered a two-pronged strategy for coping

with terrorism in Pakistan – one, using coercive diplomacy by moving troops from peacetime

locations to positions closer to the border, and two, through the aforementioned tough statements

by civilian and military officials.

While rumour mills among masses, and of late also a largely independent and expressive media,

have traditionally blamed actors from across the border for mishaps in both countries, events of

Mumbai have brought this to an official platform with even the Indian premier blaming

“agencies” in Pakistan. There has been an overwhelming consensus in India that Pakistan is not

inclined to pursue those involved in the attack; the role of the ISI is brought up specifically in its

alleged historical ties with groups like the LeT. Indeed, the intelligence agency has been

suggested to have played a “direct role guiding Lashkar-e-Tayyiba” in Mumbai attacks.

This is even more worrisome since talks between the two countries have had no extensive

framework since then. While Pakistan has been pushing for a structured dialogue, Indian focus

has solely been on terrorism – more specifically, Pakistan’s attitude to terrorism and its

commitment, or lack of commitment, in dealing with the masterminds of the Mumbai attacks.

The LeT and its members, with alleged leader Hafiz Muhammad Saeed being the most sought-

after individual, dominate this terrorism debate.

Strongly denying Indian criticism, Pakistan claims to have been working adequately, even

attributing delays in investigation to India. Accepting that Kasab was a Pakistani citizen, there

was an implicit acceptance also of the fact that training and planning had taken place in the

country. The arrest and subsequent release of Hafiz Saeed is seen by India as a masquerade,

based on allegations of the ISI supporting LeT. However, anti-terrorism courts are already

hearing prosecution arguments against seven men captured in November 2009 for their

involvement in the said attacks. The most prominent of these, Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi, is

believed to be second-in-command of the LeT. Moreover, arrest warrants have been issued for

nine others charged in absentia.

For his part, the enigma that is Hafiz Saeed has had his mystique further enhanced by assuming

the leadership of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), a religious charity organization that is deemed to be a

front cover for the LeT. JuD has been officially banned due to UN interjection but continues to

garner respect in Pakistan due to its charitable activities. Hafiz Saeed has in fact distanced

himself from the LeT in a private interview, even condemning the Indian attacks in the process

and claiming that he has been a victim of Indian propaganda.

The Indian focus on Hafiz Saeed and the belief that he still heads the LeT remains intact. This

has come up time and again; the most glaring example being the occasion of foreign secretary-

level talks in February 2010 when his freedom was openly criticised. More recently, Pakistan’s

foreign minister termed Indian demands for his arrest as the “same old beaten track”, noting that

the legal system was leading the process in Pakistan. Regardless of that, as late as July 2010,

before the foreign ministers meet in what is expected to be a return to comprehensive dialogue,

Indian officials continue to stress extradition of certain alleged terrorists among other demands

regarding the capture of LeT members including Saeed.

This Indian pressure is troublesome for Pakistan since after the UN declared JuD a terrorist

organization, it was banned and Saeed was captured before the court decided to release him and

dismiss charges against him. It is even more worrisome since the criticism comes at a time when

the judiciary is experiencing unprecedented independence in the country.

For India, Pakistan’s alleged State policy of at worst supporting terrorism and at best adopting a

relaxed attitude to fighting it, is manifest in its reluctance to comprehensively dismantle the LeT

and sentence Hafiz Saeed. While some members of the banned LeT are undergoing trial,

Pakistan has failed to convince India of its commitment. LeT, a banned organisation as it is, is

seen as a low priority even as the country is involved in counterterrorism operations.

Other groups including Al Qaeda, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban are seen

as requiring more immediate attention as far as Pakistan’s security is concerned. Punjabi groups

such as the LeT have in the last decade not been prioritised in comparison. While chances are

that this trend is changing as Punjab-based organisations face severe criticism from inside the

country and it appears that a large-scale showdown against these is possible, if talks between

India and Pakistan remain uni-dimensional in focusing on the LeT, they ignore other larger

dimensions of security threats to Pakistan.

Taking down the LeT has nonetheless been the mantra for those who believe that Mumbai needs

to represent a decisive turning point in the regional battle against terrorism. It is hence relevant to

discuss briefly the dynamics of the Lashkar.

Increasingly, it is being seen as the most important group after Al Qaeda in terms of its global

reach, even though it is still based in Pakistan and has only Pakistani members. Founded in 1987,

alleged State support led to a steady flow of finances and volunteers as its initial role in

Afghanistan gradually evolved into Kashmir-centricism. It has reportedly been part of a network

that aims to destabilise India since 1993 where it has “literally launched hundreds of attacks”;

now, its interest in Afghanistan make it an organisation of interest to the U.S. as well.

Allegedly nurtured by State patronage for influence in Kashmir and Afghanistan, the LeT was

banned in 2002 and has since outgrown its reported State sponsors. Indeed, “more than any other

group, LeT encapsulates the complicated history of intertwined relations between Pakistani

security services and ideologically-driven militants.” However, since it is now recognised that

proxy fighters will not lead to a settlement in Kashmir, Pakistan may possibly try to eliminate the

group using a gradualist approach – arresting members and banning JuD might have been the

first steps already taken to reach such an eventuality.

With an overall focus on Kashmir and India, this mainly Punjabi outfit shares a rocky

relationship with other militant groups due to ideological differences, a reluctance to join in the

Afghan jihad and alleged close ties with the military. With no militant allies, LeT remains

susceptible to State pressure even if it has outgrown State control and so refrains from launching

attacks inside Pakistan. Lately, however, it has reportedly increased its presence in Afghanistan

and FATA under the banner of JuD with aims to infiltrate fighters in Afghanistan, using its

charitable venues for recruitment.

While India remains its primary concern, there are members within the LeT who are believed to

be providing support to the Pakistani Taliban. Lately, evidence of support from the Gulf

countries, the U.K., America and Australia has appeared to make it a more dangerous

organisation with a global agenda – David Headley’s capture in the USA being a case in point

showing LeT’s global reach. While this is still debatable; what is certain is that India remains its

priority even if its “peripheral jihad” has in some ways expanded to the West.

While there are signs of Pakistan’s cracking down on the group, a gradualist approach may not

be acceptable to India. There is even an argument that for Pakistan, the risk of escalating

violence that is sure to accompany swift action, may be well worth taking if it leads to peace

with India. Events since Mumbai have made the Indian position stronger. While initially it had

tried to engage Saudi Arabia and the U.S. to gain sympathy against the LeT, there had been only

superficial reciprocation since the Al Qaeda and Taliban offered a bigger threat to these

countries; now, however, events may have caused a shift in the discourse on LeT.

Favoured by the army due to its Punjabi character and State loyalty, it is claimed that it was

given all kinds of support and has now grown in part due to its charity wing JuD from whose

finances and resources are siphoned off. As a result, its autonomy from the ISI has increased and

it now requires only specific support – including safe havens, intelligence and campaign

guidance rather than finances.

May 2010 has been an eventful month; in India, a “historic trial” with many “legal firsts” has

seen the death penalty and imprisonment for life for Kasab. At the same time, individuals are

being tried in Pakistan and the Pakistani-American David Headley in the U.S. Cautious voices

cognizant that the Kasab trial is a mere piece in the jigsaw have warned against enthusiastic

claims of victory since this is just the beginning of a long process. However, where it goes from

this point is still not clear.

India and Pakistan did appear to be moving in the right direction in July 2009 with Prime

Ministers Singh and Gilani issuing a joint communiqué after meeting in Egypt. As noted earlier

in this study, this was seen as a diplomatic victory for Pakistan and the Indian premier faced

much backlash from the public and political parties – including his own – for being too soft on

the issue of terrorism and not making it the focal point of further discussions.

The much publicized foreign secretary talks in Delhi in February 2010 were also inconclusive, if

not altogether demoralising. The necessity of engagement was apparent; Nirupama Rao admitted

this much when she noted that “dialogue between India and Pakistan is obviously the way

forward for normalisation of relations and to resolve outstanding issues between the two

countries. We in India have never turned our back on dialogue with Pakistan. But let me also add

that terrorism is a stand-alone phenomenon that affects the climate of dialogue.”

Needless to say, the climate at the talks was also adversely affected and was noticeable in the

aftermath, with Pakistan’s foreign secretary reminding dissenters that Pakistan had suffered

tremendously from terrorism and was a victim rather than a sponsor. More unusual was the

public display of antagonism, with India being clearly irate with Pakistani dealing with the

Mumbai perpetrators and the fact that Hafiz Saeed is still free, and Pakistani officials coming out

with a statement that Islamabad had “photographic evidence” of Indian nationals working in

Afghanistan to undermine Pakistan’s security by supporting militants. The meeting also involved

India’s handing over three dossiers to Pakistan regarding personnel and militant groups that it

wants extradited and tried in India – a request that Pakistan has since refused.

Indian response to Mumbai has been seen as largely inadequate by the public; warning signs are

that a further attack traced to Pakistan will not be responded to with restraint. “Minor, cosmetic

gestures including the brief arrest of Hafiz Saeed” by the Pakistani government are unlikely to

appease a growing tension that could find any further attack being responded to in some form of

military retaliation – as manifest perhaps in the Cold Start doctrine.

When one focuses on the aftermath of Mumbai while analysing terrorism in Pakistan-India

relations, there is the risk of overlooking other developments. There has, for instance, been alarm

on the Pakistani side regarding Indian role in supporting militants in Balochistan – for which

officials claim to have “conclusive proof”. This is an added dimension to what is being called a

proxy war between the two countries in Afghanistan.

Counterterrorism cooperation between the two seems impossible in the foreseeable future. Policy

shifts are required in both countries and need to incorporate a multitude of avenues that include

terrorism if a long-term stable South Asia is to surface out of the current turmoil and a new,

hopefully permanent, phase in the relationship is to rise out of the current hostile one. As it

stands, however, the multidimensional aspect of terrorism – unfortunately narrowed down to the

LeT – remains on top of the agenda as India and Pakistan try to restore peace to the region.

Section IV: Water insecurity

Water-sharing has been an ever-present issue and one that has had, at least ephemerally, all the

attributes of a successful resolution between Pakistan and India in their use of rivers. Indeed, the

Indus Water Treaty signed decades ago has had the distinction of a unique precedent, the

magnitude of which has yet to be replicated in any sphere between the two countries since then.

However, the use of water resources and security issues related to these, remain in place. These

have been enhanced in recent years, as economic concerns coupled with water insecurity have

led to legal, ethical, environmental and geographic discussions as water becomes a prominent

talking point. Not surprisingly, Pakistan being the lower riparian has been the natural

complainant in this debate.

Just as terrorism and Kashmir remain unresolved points of contention, the row over water has

escalated to such an extent that it has acquired a similar, if not a more important, position in

bilateral disagreements. For the two nuclear neighbours that have fought three wars since

independence, rivers flowing to Pakistan from Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir have again

emerged as a belated flashpoint. And, their re-emergence at a time when relations were already

going through a troubled period has not helped matters. The dispute has seen Pakistan raise its

concerns, since its very economy and the livelihoods of citizens are at stake. This is because the

country comes under direct threat due to the construction of various dams and projects by India

on western rivers that decrease the flow in rivers that provide water to Pakistan, the lower

riparian.

In itself, the issue of water is not new; in fact, it is rooted in Indo-Pak history. The river Indus

originates in western Tibet, flows through China and Kashmir and then turns south into Pakistan

before entering the Arabian Sea. The partition of the Punjab had severely affected the water

system of the Indus as well as five other rivers (Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) of the

province. Just after partition, in 1948, India stopped the flow of water from the canals on its side,

denying water to some eight per cent of cultivated area and 5.5 percent of sown area. This

necessitated, on the one hand, clear guidelines, and on the other, it gave indications of a problem

that could, in future, get extremely complicated. This contention has indeed shown remarkable

foresight.

On May 4, 1948, India agreed to an Inter-Dominion agreement with Pakistan which allowed for

the continuation of water flow to Pakistan for irrigation until the newly formed Muslim State

developed alternative water resources. This agreement was not a permanent answer to the

problem and a long-term, substantial solution was required. Pakistan, therefore, approached the

World Bank in 1952 to settle the issue permanently. Negotiations were carried out between the

two countries through the good offices of the World Bank and culminated in the signing of the

Indus Water Treaty.

The treaty allocated three eastern rivers; Ravi, Beas and Sutlej; to India, and the western rivers;

Chenab, Jhelum and Indus; to Pakistan. It also enunciated a mechanism to exchange a regular

flow-data of rivers, canals and streams. Moreover, it stipulated that if either of the two countries

plans to carry out “engineering work” on any of the rivers and potentially interferes with the

water flow, it would be required to provide the other with relevant details. Accordingly, a

Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) was constituted, headed by commissioners from both

countries. In addition, the treaty also set the procedures for settlement of differences and

disputes, both bilaterally and through international arbitration. The conditions were deemed

acceptable and the Indus Water Treaty emerged as a victory for diplomatic and political

negotiations between India and Pakistan.

The treaty is also a unique example of a success story of international riparian rights, and has

withstood two major wars. However, it could not successfully be used to put an end to a water

dispute that arose in 1984. This was when India began the construction of the Wullar barrage on

River Jhelum in occupied Kashmir. New Delhi halted construction work in 1987 after Pakistan

lodged a strong protest over the project over its alleged violation of the Indus Water Treaty.

The controversies did not end there; in fact, they had only just begun. Since then, India and

Pakistan have looked at water as an issue in its own right, and one that threatens to supersede

Kashmir and gain primacy among unresolved issues. In the mid-1990s, India started another

project, the Baglihar dam on River Chenab which is very important for Pakistan’s agriculture.

This badly reduced the flow of water and, unsurprisingly, perhaps also belatedly in 2005,

Pakistan again sought the World Bank’s help. Although the World Bank allowed India to go

ahead with the project after a few modifications, it did not permit the interruption of the agreed

quota of water flow to Pakistan.

Yet, in 2008, Pakistan suffered a huge setback to its autumnal crops due to reduced water flow of

the Chenab. Jamat Ali Shah, Pakistan’s Indus Water Commissioner, claimed that this was

because of a shortage of water in the river that had occurred due to the filling of the Baglihar

dam. India did nothing to address the problem initially, exacerbating the relations that had

already turned hostile. However, there was cause for some optimism later when, as in 1978 when

the Salal Dam issue was resolved through talks, given the necessary will, the Baglihar Dam issue

also led to settlement through meetings of the two countries Indus water commissioners in June

2010.

Settlements such as these, however, appear myopic when the sheer numbers of projects that are

deemed controversial are brought up. The Kishanganga dam on Jhelum River is another alleged

violation of the treaty that represents a deep cleavage in India-Pakistan water issues. The project

involves the construction of a 37m high concrete-faced, rock-filled dam and an underground

powerhouse. A maximum gross head of 697 m is proposed to be utilised to generate 1,350

million units of energy, achieving efficiency of 90 per cent in a year with an installed capacity of

3x110 MW. New Delhi maintains that it is within its rights, under the treaty, to divert

Kishanganga waters to the Bonar Madmati Nallah, another tributary of the Jhelum, which falls

into the Wullar Lake before joining the Jhelum again.

Pakistan has objected to this, noting that India’s plan to divert water causes an obstruction to the

flow of the Kishanganga, claiming that the project has been designed to divert water from one

tributary of the Jhelum to another. This in effect will adversely affect Pakistan’s own 969 MW

Neelum-Jhelum project being built downstream on the Jhelum with Chinese support. It has also

raised objection to the depletion of dead storage in the run of the Kishanganga project. However,

both countries have failed to resolve the issue bilaterally at different levels.

Consequently, India has decided to nominate Peter Tomka, Vice-President of the International

Court of Justice at the Hague, and Lucius Caflisch who is a Swiss international law expert, to

represent its case in the Kishanganga project dispute with Pakistan. Pakistan had already named

Bruno Simma, also of the International Court of Justice, and Jan Paulsson, a Norwegian who

heads an international law firm, as its arbitrators in the Court of Arbitration that will be set up to

resolve its differences with India under the bilateral Indus Waters Treaty of 1960.

The aforementioned Indian hydro projects are just some examples from a long list of works by

India which could adversely affect Pakistan. On the Chenab River, planned projects include the

Bursur dam, Swalkot, Pakul dul, Dul Hasti, Chenani-I, Chenani-II, Chenani-III, Bhaderwah,

Baglihar-II, Kawar, Kiru and Kirthai-I; on the Jhelum, there are the Lower Jhelum, Upper Sindh-

I, Ganderbal, Upper Sindh-II, Pahalgam, Karnah and Parnai; while on Indus basin, they include

Iqbal, Hunder, Sumoor, Igo-Mercellong, Haftal, Marpachoo and Bazgo Stakna (with J&KPDD).

Needless to say, individual settlements on every project seem an uninviting and implausible

solution; water security needs to be pushed to the forefront considering the urgency of the

problem that can not afford wastage of time.

There is reason, however, to be cautiously hopeful. One positive aspect related to the issue is that

during a meeting between the Indus Water Commissioners that lasted from June 1 to June 4,

2010, Pakistan withdrew objections on two Indian projects (Chutak and Uri-II). The 44 MW

Chutak is located in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir on River Suru and Pakistan had

earlier raised objections to its construction. The other project, the Uri-II is a 250 MW dam, is

located in the Uri Tehsil of Baramulla district in Jammu and Kashmir. However, differences on

the 45MW Nimoo Bazgo project on the Indus in the Ladakh region of Indian-held Kashmir

remained unresolved, with settlement depending on further talks and information.

Despite these limited successes, the issue has to be dealt with much more intensely, involving a

multitude of sectors. For Pakistan, water security as a result of Indian projects takes such a

precedence since its economy – some might say its very survival – depends on water from these

sources. India, on the other hand, sees a natural decrease in the amount of water due to

environmental and climatic effects, affecting both countries as a consequence.

The projects that are underway are likely to have serious implications for Pakistan’s economy,

security and especially agriculture. Out of 79.6 million hectares of land that make up Pakistan,

20 million are available for agriculture. Of these, 16 million are dependent on irrigation from the

water sources in question. Consequently, 80 per cent of agriculture is dependent on the water that

is allegedly being ‘stolen’. Many industries, including textile, are agro-based, and 80 per cent of

food needs are fulfilled domestically. Thus, an interruption of water supply will have broad-

ranging effects, putting massive strains on agriculture, economy and security since dams

constructed on western rivers can be used to dry out major canals and distributaries. To counter

the likely catastrophic results, there needs to be a drastic change in regional approaches towards

handling such issues.

It is high time that both India and Pakistan forego vested interests for overall prosperity of the

region. A cooperative relationship could create constituencies for peace in the region, deepen

economic integration, and ultimately provide a smooth platform for both countries to realize their

ambitions. For the urgency of the problem at hand, while it is an issue that could exacerbate any

progress in the overall context of the relationship, it is also an issue that requires attention solely

for humane concerns. In that sense, water cannot be separated from Kashmir, since not only is

the same dimension visible in that dispute, but also many of the projects being scrutinised find

their importance in the rivers coming from the valley of Kashmir, which not for no reason has

been referred to as the jugular vein of Pakistan.

Section V: Kashmir

A South Asian dispute with global dimensions, Kashmir has been the one most prominent issue

that divides Pakistan and India. Economic concerns mix with the ideological, religious, political

and the historical and even with matters of pride and prestige as a solution to the territorial

dispute becomes a major hurdle to lasting peace in the region.

In this context, events since November 2008 have, for once, relatively marginalised the issue as

larger questions of terrorism are put forward. That said, Kashmir is unlikely to remain on the

sidelines for long, and in the current phase of Pakistan-India ties, there have been movements on

this front, even if they have been relatively insignificant given the milieu. In this section, an

overview since the Mumbai attacks, of how events pertaining to Kashmir have progressed, will

be given in order to contextualize the situation.

Almost a year after the Mumbai attacks, in October 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

made his first visit to the valley since re-election in the 15th Lok Sabha election. During his visit,

he seemed to be extending a hand of friendship to Pakistan by signalling strong commitment of

his government in proceeding with unconditional dialogue with all Kashmiri groups, provided

that they shun violence.

Prior to that, Home Minister Chidambaram had also hinted that the Indian government was

working on holding ‘quiet’ talks with every group in Kashmir, so that a unique solution to the

issue could be sought. Talking at an editors’ conference, he stressed that “talks will be held

silently, away from the media glare,” noting that this was important at least until the contours of

a political solution could be found.

Even as Pakistan’s relationship with India was going through a rocky phase, Prime Minister

Singh’s offer for unconditional talks in Kashmir came at a time when militant violence in the

valley was at an all-time low. And, on this occasion, there were many who were looking at such

a dialogue with optimism; indeed, there was even speculation that the offer would be

accompanied by a number of confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as the potential

reduction of troops, and the abrogation of the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act

(AFSPA).

The approach was welcomed by Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and former

Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, who insisted that talks without pre-conditions could

help resolve the Kashmir problem. Announcing his readiness for “sincere and meaningful talks”

with the Centre, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, chairman of the moderate faction of the Hurriyat

Conference, stressed, however, that the participation of New Delhi, Islamabad, Muzaffarabad as

well as the people of Kashmir is imperative for the realisation of any proposed solution. While

showing optimism, he also argued that without adhering to the six-point proposal put forward by

the Hurriyat Conference - which included the revocation of all draconian laws, the unconditional

release of all detainees and the withdrawal of troops - dialogue would be insubstantial.

The Mirwaiz also clarified that willingness to engage in talks with New Delhi did not

compromise the alliance’s basic principle, since the Hurriyat believes that the right to self-

determination is the basis of any solution. Stressing that Kashmir’s problems cannot be resolved

through bilateral talks, he added that the Hurriyat had taken a triangular approach that involved

engaging India as well as Pakistan so as to pave the way for tripartite talks.

The effect of this new round of desired negotiations as put forward by Manmohan Singh was not

universally praised or accepted with optimism. Syed Ali Shah Geelani, for instance, was one of

those who rejected the initiative, with the contention that “talks have been held over 130 times

between Kashmiris and New Delhi since March 23, 1952, but failed to achieve desired results.

There is nothing new in the offer of talks.” Thus, as the suspension of bilateral dialogue

continued between Pakistan and India through this period, New Delhi was facing ambivalent

reaction to its initiative in Kashmir as well.

By the middle of November 2009, however, reports of a secret two-hour meeting between

Chidambaram and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, along with his coalition colleagues Abdul Gani Bhat

and Bilal Lone, appeared in the media. Mirwaiz, while denying that such a meeting had taken

place, accepted that that there were ongoing back-channel contacts between the Hurriyat and the

government but that these amounted to “communication” rather than dialogue. On the other

hand, Chidambaram’s office refrained from making any comments, except that since the Home

Minister had initiated a process of “quiet diplomacy”, details could not be made public.

The implied progress was corroborated and confirmed on November 18, 2009 when Mirwaiz

Umar Farooq, while talking to the media, said: “A lot is happening. Work is going on … on

many possible solutions, one of which is an agreement between New Delhi and Srinagar with

Pakistan’s blessings.” It was also reported that India and Pakistan had held two rounds of

meetings in Bangkok and that the dialogue had been conducted between former Pakistan High

Commissioner Aziz Ahmed Khan and former RAW chief A S Dullat despite an apparent

suspension of overall talks between the two neighbours.

The Mirwaiz also said that the basic paradigm of discussions was inspired by Pervez Musharraf’s

four-point proposal for an acceptable solution to Kashmir. However, India was not ready for the

aspect within these that called for joint management and control of foreign affairs, currency and

communications in Kashmir. He noted that it was hoped that back-channel communication could

create a substantive opening before the Hurriyat considered entering into public dialogue with

the Centre. He also admitted that the new momentum had much to do with pressure from the

U.S. which was pushing for a solution in order to address Pakistan’s growing concerns.

However, the Mirwaiz has been in a precarious position due to the process being followed.

Facing allegations of starting this “quiet diplomacy” with the Indian government without taking

General Council of the amalgam and the Kashmiri people in confidence, he has argued that that

talks for resolving any issue were yet to start, insisting that both India and Pakistan needed to

start dialogue in order to pave the way for tripartite talks.

Whatever the progress on Chidambaram’s approach, the process received a setback when senior

All Parties Hurriyat Conference leader Fazal Haq Qureshi, believed to be a key player in the

secret talks held between the Mirwaiz Umar Farooq-led APHC and the Home Minister, was

attacked. The assassination bid was seen as a move to disrupt the covert negotiations and came

as a direct threat to Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and his separatist conglomerate in reaction to their

apparent decision to begin engaging in quiet and direct talks with New Delhi.

Some effects, as had been expected at the initiation of the talks, have since seen light. On

December 19, 2009, Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony announced that two Army divisions

(about 30,000 troops) had been withdrawn from Jammu and Kashmir and that there were plans to

pull back more troops if the law and order situation continued to improve. At the same time

though, he ruled out revocation of the AFSPA from areas where armed forces were deployed for

counterinsurgency operations.

On December 24, 2009, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs released its year-end review which

noted that the number of terrorism-related incidents in Kashmir had dropped by 27 per cent in

2009 as compared to 2008. India continued to accuse Pakistan, however, of abetting in the

training and infiltration of militants in Kashmir. The review stated that during 2009, 473

infiltration bids were made, out of which 367 were foiled; from these, 93 terrorists were

intercepted and 227 retreated into Pakistan on being intercepted, whereas 110 terrorists managed

to sneak into the valley.

Indian intelligence sources also contend that Pakistan has set up dedicated communication

towers at Tum, Nikral, Samani and Zaffarwal in Azad Kashmir to provide assistance to terrorists

operating in the Poonch, Rajauri, Naushera and Kathua regions. Upping its ante against Pakistan,

the Indian media reported that in 2008, of the 237 militants killed, 171 had been foreigners; in

2009 another 161 militants were killed and these included 133 foreigners. In the current year,

until mid-March, 21 militants had been killed, and out of these, five were reported to be

foreigners. Defence Minister Antony also alleged that there are forty-two training camps

operating in Pakistan and that there had been little effort to close them down.

Somewhat contradictory at first glance are reports of an alleged spike in violence even as talks

progress amid relatively peaceful times. Citing various factors such as the quiet talks, the prime

minister’s reconstruction programme, and a stable government in the state as reasons for rising

frustration among militant groups, Chidambaram warned that “militant groups are coming

together to give a push.” Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor also insisted that Pakistan had

done nothing to dismantle the forty-two anti-India training camps and was continuing to support

militants. Pakistan is also being blamed for the recent spurt in violence and renewed ceasefire

violations both at LoC and the international border.

Towards February 2010, in an effort to mollify anger in the valley over the killing of a teenage

boy at the hands of security forces, India announced that it was considering a major confidence-

building measure of granting amnesty to young Kashmiris who had allegedly joined militant

groups in Azad Kashmir, as well as to families that had crossed the LoC to save themselves from

shelling and troop harassment. India hopes that this “surrender and rehabilitation policy” would

go a long way towards addressing the political dimensions of Kashmiri dynamics.

Under such a scheme, those who seek to return are to be “quarantined” for at least a month for

interrogation by agencies. The proposal has attracted severe criticism from various quarters as it

is being pointed out that a return of militants would escalate violence as it could be abused by

forces that are bent on creating havoc. In these testing times, this comes as a challenge to New

Delhi in terms of balancing its negotiations with APHC and appeasing the Kashmiri populace.

Home Minister Chidambaram has come out and defended the initiative, saying that the

identification, screening, facilitation of travel from Pakistan, de-briefing, rehabilitation and

integration with the country will be part of the policy and will be observed with meticulous

organisation. He observed that there was nothing new in the scheme as the Central Reserve

Police Force (CRPF) has already recruited one full battalion of surrendered militants, whereas

the Border Security Force (BSF) also absorbed 450 ultras. On May 12, 2010, Jammu and

Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah announced that the rehabilitation policy to facilitate

return of militants from Pakistan-administered Kashmir is in the final process of submission to

New Deldi.

As far as Pakistan’s own approach to Kashmir is concerned, the manner in which it has now

attempted to raise the issue in the now reopened bilateral discussions with India shows how its

importance has never diminished. While the strategic element has never been questioned, even if

it has remained sidelined relative to the emotive aspect; of late, the economic facet has surfaced

like never before due to a cognizance of water insecurity in the region. Nevertheless, Kashmir

remains a major issue for Pakistan as it attempts to engage India in systematic and organized

discussions on a number of issues.

Recently, Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri disclosed that the

previous government had completed almost 90 per cent of the spadework on the Kashmir dispute

by 2007, and that the entire exercise needed just the formal signature of all the three parties to

the issue - Pakistan, India and representatives of Kashmir. He said that the solution is ‘just a

signature away’ once India and Pakistan decide to pull the file from the rack as the entire paper-

work has been done.

He also claimed that the copies of related documents are safe with some friendly countries as

negotiators from Islamabad and New Delhi had quietly toiled away for three years, talking to

each other and Kashmiri representatives from the Indian side as well as those settled overseas, to

reach the “only possible solution to the Kashmir issue.” Through this, the two sides had

reportedly agreed to full demilitarisation of both Indian-occupied Kashmir and Azad Kashmir. In

addition, a package of loose autonomy that stopped short of the ‘azadi’ and self-governance

aspirations had been agreed and was to be introduced on both sides of the disputed frontier. “We

agreed on a point between complete independence and autonomy,” he said.

He noted that this arrangement needed a review after fifteen years of its announcement and was

to be implemented and monitored by all parties concerned, and that it could be further improved.

However, following a political upheaval in Pakistan, the issue was thrown in the backburner.

Similar claims were made by former President Pervez Musharraf when addressing a gathering in

the House of Lords in England, where he said, "We were not far from resolving Kashmir

problem with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the basis of a four-point parameter which

would demilitarise Kashmir and make the line of control irrelevant."

However, rejecting these claims, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said that

neither he nor the people of Pakistan have any knowledge about such a Kashmir solution as the

proposal has never been debated and there exists no corresponding record in the Foreign Office.

While acknowledging the important role of backchannel diplomacy, Qureshi insisted that

disputes were always resolved through formal talks and this is exactly what the current

government is attempting.

On May 25, 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once again announced that his government

was ready for dialogue on Jammu and Kashmir if separatists shun violence. He said, “I would

like to appeal to all the groups outside the political mainstream that our government is ready for

dialogue if they shed violence.” Rejecting the offer to resume dialogue, APHC leader Mirwaiz

Omar Farooq said that "genocide of Kashmiris and dialogue can't go together." He also asked

Pakistan to raise the issue of human rights abuse of Kashmiris at the hands of Indian occupation

forces during the India-Pakistan talks in July, insisting that, "you can't have only one kind of

terrorism on the agenda."

For the past couple of years, the Indian government has been taking credit for a decline in

militancy, and a turnout of 60 per cent voters in the 2008 state election which is deemed to be a

reflection of people’s attitude against separatist politics. However, the recent spate of violence

indicates how deceptive that claim has been and how frustrations among the Kashmiri people,

and especially the youth, have risen due to the state of affairs in the valley.

The younger generation has come out to the streets not with guns but with stones to express

anger and disillusionment. The deployment of the army for the first time in a decade indicates

the gravity of situation. Though protests or even stone pelting is not a new phenomenon in

Kashmir, the latest round of violence which started with an incident on May 30, 2010, a fake

encounter in the Machil sector, has shown how the situation has not improved. Three young

Kashmiris were declared to be cross-border terrorists and had been killed by an Indian army unit

in this encounter which was exposed and naturally led to much backlash.

The motive behind staging this incident was the monetary reward and promotion that comes with

encounters on the LoC. Tempers in the valley were already high when the killing of a seventeen-

year-old student by occupation forces on June 11 added fuel to fire. Since then, fifteen people

(mostly teenagers but also a nine-year-old boy and a woman) have been killed by the CRPF in

just over a month. As a result, as Kashmir again dominates headlines, the rhetoric of negotiations

is increasingly being replaced with the slogan of “azadi” in the valley.

While refusing to admit its own failures and looking at the root causes of unrest, the Indian

government was quick to shift the blame on the Pakistan-based LeT as Home Minister

Chidambaram noted that anti-national elements linked to LeT were trying to exploit the situation

in Kashmir.

The statement evoked strong reactions in Kashmir as not only the mainstream political parties

but also ordinary people felt the insensitivity of these words as well as the actions of the Indian

government. Mehbooba Mufti, leader of the main Opposition party in Kashmir, termed the

statement an “insult to the Kashmiri people”. Fingers were also pointed towards hard-line

separatists for fomenting trouble in the valley since the Union Home Ministry claimed to have

intercepted a conversation between two senior office-bearers of the Geelani-led Hurriyat faction

in which they were allegedly discussing the killing of at least fifteen people in a procession near

Srinagar.

Pakistan was also not spared as on July 7, 2010, Indian Defence Minister A.K Antony professed

that attempts of infiltration into Kashmir from Pakistan were increasing with “conscious,

calculated attempts” to push more terrorists into the valley. The very next day, the Congress

party held Pakistan responsible for the turmoil in Kashmir and advised the government to take up

the issue of “inimical elements” from across the border that had a hand in perpetrating violence,

with the neighbouring country.

Despite these efforts to shift the blame to Pakistan or LeT, it is heartening to see that a large

number of Indian analysts have been able to understand and highlight the root causes of current

turmoil. Though admitting that Pakistan can take advantage of the current situation by mobilising

the international community, the majority of analysts have rejected the idea of Pakistan’s hand in

creating unrest. Instead, these commentators have blamed both the Union as well as the state

government. It is being pointed out that while the abuse of human rights is a major factor, other

concerns such as the growing gap of communication between the state government and the

people has played a key role in forcing the people to protest.

Few of the ministers of the Legislative Assembly have bothered to engage with their

constituencies since elections in 2008 and the state administration remains indifferent to the

problems faced by the people. The laxity of the Union government can be gauged by the fact that

on November 18, 2004, in an effort to win the hearts and minds of the Kashmiri people,

Manmohan Singh had announced a reconstruction plan, involving an outlay of Rs 24,000 crores

for basic services, employment generation, and relief and rehabilitation to families of victims;

but most of this has not gone through. Six years later, the Indian government has recently

admitted that only half of the 67 projects drawn up under the Prime Minister's Reconstruction

Plan for Jammu and Kashmir have been completed. Omar Abdullah’s government is also being

blamed for corruption and mismanagement.

Moreover, the CRPF has also been severely criticised for its brutal response to the protests. The

total indifference of the political elite towards human rights abuses has turned the people of

Kashmir against the government. Furthermore, it is being largely acknowledged that India has

failed to build on the gains made by occupation forces by bringing the overall law and order

situation under control. New Delhi has been unable to introduce CBMs such as the revocation of

AFSPA that could have helped win back the confidence of the Kashmiri people. This latest

acknowledgment has come from the Indian Chief of the Army Staff General V. K. Singh.

Cautioning the government, analysts and commentators are denouncing the efforts to relate these

protesters to LeT or Al Qaeda as these arguments could be used by security forces to justify

civilian killings. Demonising the protesters and labelling them LeT cadres or anti-national

elements would only further alienate them. The need of an internal dialogue between the Union

government and Kashmiri political parties to address the political future of the state is also being

highlighted. Better training of the police and paramilitary forces to control mob violence has also

been suggested as the politicians need to be more responsive to people’s grievances.

But all these measures may not bear fruit unless India realises the fact that it cannot suppress the

popular demands of the people by using force and a strategy of denial is not going to serve its

purpose. The settlement of Kashmir is central to peace in South Asia. A resolution between India

and Pakistan with the Kashmiri leadership on board will contribute to the fight against terror and

ensure prosperity not only for the two countries but for the entire South Asian region. And, given

the importance it has on a global stage, not only will it improve the regional image, but allow for

potentially unprecedented progress on other avenues of contention between the two countries.

While there is no reason to dismiss arguments that the best possible solution to Pakistan-India

problems would be to overlook the Kashmiri dimension, making less controversial issues the

bedrock, it is equally important to recognize the other side of the argument – that a reasonable

solution to Kashmir may well end up defining the future course of action on most of the

important facets of the relationship including water, terrorism and trade.

Section VI: Trade

While seemingly non-contentious an issue, trade relations have also suffered from strident and

chronic politicisation. Two contrasting views have traditionally existed when prospects of peace

through trade are considered. While it has been assumed, perhaps a little too simplistically, that a

stable relationship is a prerequisite to trade, recent scholarship has suggested that in fact Pakistan

and India should enhance trade relations as a means to attain regional stability and bilateral

friendship.

As it is, successful trade between Pakistan and India, while problematic, offers multiple

workable avenues that have tremendous potential. The irony is that while trade between the two

countries is abysmally low, there has, except for a period of nine years between 1965 and 1974,

never been a complete trade embargo. While the debate of whether flourishing trade can precede

regional security continues, there is almost unanimous agreement that economics offers the one

most potentially effective path for bilateral as well as regional benefits. It was for this reason that

“one of the most important meetings between India and Pakistan on trade issues” in 2005

attended by President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh generated considerable

optimism. However, a subsequent joint communiqué has not seen any fruitful results five years

down the line

In 2008, trade between India and Pakistan amounted to a paltry 2 billion dollars with India

accounting for one per cent of Pakistan’s and Pakistan accounting for 0.5 per cent of India’s

trade. Despite these seemingly low figures, compared to trade with other countries in the South

Asian region, 36 per cent of South Asian imports of India come from Pakistan. The

corresponding figure for Pakistan is 69 per cent, making them two major trading partners in

South Asia “despite all hurdles” and deceptively low absolute figures. Current official trade

figures of about $2 billion are actually a substantial increase from the meagre $300 million in

2003-2004, so while still “unnaturally small”, any increase in trade needs to be studied in

context.

While criticised on many grounds, one giant failure of the South Asian Association for Regional

Cooperation (SAARC) has been in its ineffectiveness on trade expansion. While the South Asia

Free Trade Agreement or SAFTA has been signed by members, interregional trade has not

grown. Some argue that India needs to take the lead since it represents 80 per cent of South

Asian GDP and has the “primary responsibility for promoting economic stability in the region.”

This has in fact allowed China to build up its own regional strengths by partnering with Pakistan

and Bangladesh. However, much of the responsibility also rests on the bilateral failures of

Pakistan and India to reach agreeable solutions to conflicts outside of the trade relationship since

the two dominate dynamics within SAARC.

Two primary reasons and significant features of low trade between the two countries are largely

cited. First, Pakistan’s failure to grant India the MFN or Most Favoured Nation status which, if

nothing else, is politically significant, especially since India had done so in compliance with the

principles of the WTO regime in 1995. Secondly, highly problematic are the substantial tariff

and especially non-tariff barriers which are more significant in India’s case since they prevent

Pakistan from developing a market. Pakistan’s ‘Positive List’, examined later in this section,

while having its fair share of critics, has widely been regarded as being fair to India. This is a

telling point since a large percentage of imports from India covers a small part of this list of

importable goods, and additions have been made to it when need is felt. A further breakdown of

barriers to trade – both tariff and non-tariff barriers – is given in the table below.

Source: Mohsin S. Khan, “India-Pakistan Trade: A Roadmap for Enhancing Economic

Relations”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Number PB09-15, July 2009.

While bilateral and regional figures show the essential dynamics of trade, some important facets

of specifically Pakistan-India are ignored if one focuses on official statistics. Third-country trade

and smuggling or illegal trade increase the official figures substantially, even if by adding their

value, figures still remain much lower than expected. Third-country involvement alone is likely

to increase the figure by a factor of four or five. Informal trade via third countries such as UAE,

but specifically Dubai, is estimated to be between $2 billion and $3 billion per year – even higher

than official bilateral trade; needless to say, if carried out bilaterally, it could be done at a much

lower cost and bring substantial benefits.

The issue of trade in the energy sector – and it is here that regional security issues are most

important – is a further area of substantial interest. Through this, Pakistan seeks to gain royalty

figures that could be equivalent to as much as 5 per cent of its total export earnings. And, when

one encompasses other regional issues in the trade debate, there are also concerns emanating

from India regarding its trade with Afghanistan where land routes and transportation through

Pakistan makes it much more effective. Needless to say, regional stability and at times issues that

may not be in State control hinder progress on all these fronts. With the politicisation of trade in

energy accompanied by foreign policy dilemmas, the potential of trade in energy, as well as of

transit routes, will take some time to be actualised.

This regional dimension for trade in South as well as Central Asia is highlighted in a recent

World Bank report on peace and economic cooperation. It stresses the need for a more

comprehensive cooperation that brings security together with trade in this “moment of reckoning

in South Asia”. It argues for a leadership role for the region in a global economy that rests on

cooperation rather than competition in order to maximise individual gains. Taking the example

of perennial hostile neighbours Pakistan and India, the argument is that there has been a

persistent zero-sum game where one tries to gain at the expense of the other. However, a clear

winning strategy is cooperation.

To elaborate as an example, India needs to sustain its high growth rate and will require cheap and

stable supplies of oil, gas and industrial raw material from Central and West Asia, for which

Pakistan is “the most feasible conduit”. Additionally, it will need to develop a larger regional

market for its exports, and again the relevance of Pakistan, given its proximity, cannot be

discounted.

For Pakistan, one major problem that has been exacerbated by Indian policy is its most prized

commodity - the textile sector. While internal energy problems need to be accounted for, there is

reason to suggest that better economic ties with India would have prevented the decrease of 9.3

per cent in exports from this sector alone. In addition, the strong sense of an Indian failure to

adopt leadership is seen by the existing non-tariff barriers and its disapproval of liberalisation

policies and innovative partnerships with Pakistan such as common trade zones at distinct points

at the border.

Indeed, this ‘sabotage’ by India is also evidenced in its bilateral trade with Pakistan as its imports

from Pakistan are among the lowest, while the reverse is true for Pakistan. While this may be

acknowledged as a biased understanding from a partisan Pakistani framework, it goes to show at

the very least the mistrust that has seeped into economic spheres as well.

Based on some earlier studies, under the SAFTA treaty, Pakistan and India’s trade could be

increased to up to fifty times its current level if its true potential is achieved. A more recent

report by the Peterson Institute for International Economics on India-Pakistan trade presents a

more conservative but still substantial potential figure for official trade being twenty times

greater if relations are normalised.

Some of the salient features of Pakistan’s trade policy 2008-09 – whether implemented or not –

are very relevant to trade ties with India as noted by the Economic Survey of Pakistan 2008-09.

This included the import of cheaper raw material machinery sourced from India due to the

addition of 136 items in the Positive List which also included diesel and fuel oil which will be

cheaper due to lower transportation cost. Reducing these costs is a policy followed since the

import of stainless steel and cotton yarn has been allowed through both trains and trucks at the

Wagah border.

While there is no comprehensive trade agreement between the two countries and Pakistan only

allows limited number of tradable goods in its Positive List, the number has been growing. As

per potential tradable goods, there is scope for tremendous improvement if one analyses the

current imports and exports of both countries.

For instance, 32 per cent of the value of Pakistani exports occurs in goods that are imported by

India from other countries and these cover multiple sectors – significantly, in the non-textile

arena. Similarly, Indian exports cover almost 53 per cent of the goods that Pakistan imports. This

distinction of the goods is important since firstly it looks at diversified sectors and can cause

much benefit to the economy in many ways, and two, it can allow more effective, low-cost trade

in goods that are already being traded from other parts of the world, perhaps a necessary lead-up

to a South Asian leadership in the global economy.

Moreover, it needs to be recognized that the oft-quoted high potential for trade between the two

neighbours has been highlighted due to a number of reasons. Indeed, given the circumstances, it

seems almost incredible to a neutral observer in the modern world that the potential benefits are

not being harnessed; the countries are rich in resources and labour, provide land routes for

regional trade and energy supplies, and being neighbouring countries can undertake trade at

much lower costs. Moreover, sharing a long border, innovative strategies can be implemented for

enhancing trade and raising employment levels. Hence, it needs to be analysed as to why trade

has remained low despite all the likely advantages to the contrary.

There are other less obvious areas of interest. The energy sector, for instance, offers numerous

chances but is dependant on political stability. India’s export of its ‘soft power’ and increasing

partnership with Pakistan brings in an altogether more social dimension to economics.

Entertainment industries in both countries have traditionally sought common ground and this has

risen in recent years. And the issue of India’s trade relationship with Afghanistan and transport

routes through Pakistan also needs to be highlighted. There are numerous implications for the

trade debate and there have been many suggestions made as to how the two countries should

proceed.

One recommended process to be followed has been divided into two phases of short-term and

medium-term measures that could be adopted. The former, many of which were agreed to in

principle at the aforementioned Musharraf-Singh meeting in 2005, have been widely debated and

relate to trade facilitation. These include easing restrictions on visas, eliminating requirements of

ships touching a third country port before bringing imports, opening additional border crossings

and additional bus routes, allowing branches of banks to function in both countries and

increasing air links. The medium-term measures primarily relate to Pakistan’s granting MFN

status to India, and India’s reducing tariff rates on goods relevant to Pakistan and removing non-

tariff barriers. Other goals for mutual benefit in the long term include transit routes and

infrastructure development.

Since the Mumbai attacks, the climate for negotiations has been unusually bad. Indeed, on the

first anniversary of the attacks, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry

(FICCI) released a contentious document titled “Task Force Report on National Security and

Terrorism” that recommended “a limited but intense attack on Pakistani territory to prevent

similar acts of terrorism” and proposed an immediate ban on trade, “closure of travel routes, as

well as denial of permission for overflights to Pakistani airliners.”

Seeing this within the larger framework of Indian designs against Pakistan, the Lahore Chamber

of Commerce and Industry proclaimed that it was suspending all trade delegations to India till

the resumption of the Composite Dialogue. Since then, however, the situation has cooled down.

In December 2009, a Pakistani delegation took part in a Trade Expo in India and returned

optimistic. Later, in 2010, the Indian High Commissioner, speaking on trade issues also noted

that construction work on Integrated Customs Check Posts had started at Wagah and would

allow both countries to ship consignments easily. Suggesting the opening up of trade on further

land routes, he also noted that potential of $10 billion trade could be achieved if other such

measures are taken.

One can safely say then that enhanced trade offers much potential for economic and perhaps also

political ties between India and Pakistan. The current state of affairs shows a rise in trade but the

figures still remain unsubstantial. The most obvious issues include Indian tariff and non-tariff

structures and Pakistan’s delaying the MFN status to India. There are also other more technical

concerns of the Positive List – whether or not this should be a system at all, and if so, how it

needs to be enhanced.

More immediate concerns of visa issuance, red tape and travelling also require political

solutions. Moreover, the entire subject needs to be studied keeping in mind large quantities of

informal trade through third countries as well as illegal trade, which if added to current official

data makes up a bigger if still unsatisfactory picture. The energy sector may end up providing the

biggest challenge, but also the most potential as India and Pakistan look to develop an enhanced

trade relationship. For, only if that happens will the proverbial chicken-and-egg riddle of trade

and regional peace be solved.

Conclusion

This study has attempted to comprehensively point out the main areas of concern, especially

since the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, that have caused the relationship between Pakistan

and India to enter a significant phase in an already turbulent current history. Perhaps more

importantly, it has tried to establish the regional implications of peace and security through

cooperation between the neighbours that require amiable solutions to all the problems, among

many others, listed above.

It is increasingly becoming clear that the relationship is moving into a new phase. For all the

darkness and mistrust in the time since 26/11, there is now cause for some mobilisation towards

a political negotiation of sorts, the contours of which are yet to be manifested. And, despite the

prevailing hostility and the collective, often despairing notions of helplessness and fatalism, there

is no reason to withhold any aspirations and optimism.

In July 2010, there is an expected meeting between the foreign ministers of both countries; this is

to be sandwiched between a second meeting between both foreign secretaries and an expected

meeting between the prime ministers at a later date. There are those who scoff at dialogue and

how years of meetings have held no fruitful results; however, it is also noted that periods of

negotiations go hand-in-hand with periods of relative peace, even if no substantial or tangible

progress is made. This allows for deeper understanding to develop between the nations, for

people to be able to move across the border and for a rising sense of security that may in the end

diminish the hostile collective memories that have plagued processes of peace in the first place.

More importantly, these periods of negotiations, however superficial, deny the existence of a

vacuum that could be used by militants and extremist ideologues and lead to regional insecurity,

hostility between the countries and an exacerbation of unresolved issues.

Various untested avenues are continually being sought. The power of soft image is slowing

coming into the more informal field of diplomacy being tested by people of the two countries.

Cooperation in media and the entertainment industries as well as projects such as ‘Aman ki

Asha’ between media groups have, for instance, have added to the already existing innovative

and non-traditional attempts at peace-building that previously included ‘cricket diplomacy’.

Broadening the discourse to include all the multifaceted efforts can only result in decreasing the

improbability of lasting peace.

However, with rising regional issues at play, there are other more serious indicators that will also

require new platforms to discuss previously ignored or irrelevant issues. A ‘proxy war’ in

Afghanistan being fought between India and Pakistan, for instance, is an issue that may replace

Kashmir and terrorism as the primary talking point. There is a resurfacing of allegations on both

sides, regarding the support of militants that cause destabilisation in the home country, and the

situation with water insecurity has the potential to cause tremendous problems for policymakers.

In the end, while there are warning signs that need to be examined, there are also signposts that

indicate paths towards peaceful, if not altogether mutually beneficial, co-existence. As the world

grapples with new and more immediate challenges on a truly global scale, Pakistan and India

need to evolve, more so now than ever before, from what has been an extremely narrow and

regional view of political economy to a more relevant platform from where both can aim to reach

the ends they desire. The old conventional wisdom of one of the two succeeding as opposed to

the other has run its course. For Indian ambitions of regional, if not global, leadership and

Pakistan’s quest for national stability, the discourse itself needs to be enhanced.

That a political solution is being sought, is indeed a positive sign, but a sustained, concentrated

and systematic effort to solving broader issues needs to be made. Over six decades of interaction

at the highest possible level has not led to such an effort. However, as both countries deal with

pressing concerns – some, on which they become minor players for each other – there is reason

to hope that conditions now allow for more meaningful talks with substantial results. It remains

to be seen whether missed opportunities of the past will now be translated into an actualization of

the potential that generations continue to wait for. The challenge is to transform a negative

collective memory of two peoples into a collective hope – and that is something that belligerence

has never achieved. India-Pakistan Trade 1. world trade in 2009 amounted to 12 trillion dollar. 2. the size of Pakistan domestic market is only 180 billion dollar. 3. Pakistan has 0.5 % share in the global exports implies that our exports could increase to 60 billion dollar. 4. imports bring into the country the transfer of technology. 5. the balance of economic power is moving way from developed countries to the developing nations. 6. china has overrun germany to become the largest exporting country . 7. china has also surpassed japan to become the world second largest economy in the world. 8. china and India are projected to be the fastest growing economies of the world over the next several decades. 9. India Pakistan trade is win win situation. 10. India has middle class about 300 million people with rising purchasing power that matches that of south eastern Europe while Pakistan middle class is approximately 30 million. A 10% penetration into the Indian middle class market would double the market size for Pakistan. 11. and for the Pakistani companies and market. 12. 2646 common items of pakistan’s imports and that of india’s exports worth over 15 billion dollar. 13. Pakistan can import these items cheaply from India at the same item 1181 items worth 3.9 billion dollar are common btw india’s imports and Pakistani exports.

There are three main reasons that have impeded the growth of trading relation. • Political realations btw the two countries have remained discordant. • Contentions over long period of time. • A trust deficit does not allow stability which is prerequisite for any exchange of goods and services to take place. • Both countries have pursued import polices substitution poloices that protected local industries behind protective barriers. • The commitment to the regional economic integration in south asia has remained quite weak.

steps to be taken A) Pakistan should grant MFN treatment to India while India should reduce its tariffs on the agriculture commodities, textiles etc. B) Both countries should reactivate regional trade agreement like SAFTA. C) Railway , air and road connections between the two countries should be increased. D) domestic tax , tariff and subsidy policies should be substituted by neutral polices. Water Diplomacy in South Asia • India support to Afghanistan in water sector development and dam building. • Hydro-politics appears setto influence the foreign policy of the three major players of the region. • That Pakistan , India and Afghanistan. • Intense water diplomacy is now needed to rationalize water based relationships in this area. • India understands the significance of river waters to strength its geostrategic interests in the region. • In may 2011 indian PM visit to Afghanistan and his pledge of $1.5 billion includes development and construction of 14 small and medium size dams. • The world bank and asian bank had already agreed to provide funds for these dam projects. • Pakistan and Afghanistan currently shares water of nine rivers. • The construction of dam in northern Afghanistan is annoying iran because restriction in flow of water will have negative effect on agriculture of that region. • While construction of dams in upper Kabul would likely effect Afghanistan relation with Pakistan . • However Afghanistan is poor country . • There is general need to support this country . • Afghanistan must be allowed to full benefit of its own water resources. • An integrated approach is needed to solve water conflict in the south asia. • Pakistan must avail the US offer to facilitate Pakistan-afghanistan talks on bilateral water treaty as a part of its efforts for trilateral water cooperation. • There is a need of establishing scientific fact finding working group. • That group would mutually agreed upon hydrological knowledge and agriculture development plan that effect

both countries. • Pakistan and iran must develop mechanism to resolve water related disputes of the present and future time for the long time benefit of the entire region. • India’s obsession with building dams on western rivers of Pakistan, its conflict with Nepal (on water) and conflict with Bangladesh may harm the confidence building measures in the region.

Iran’s Nuclear Program

Outline:

• Historical Background:

• Turning Point:

• Current Situation And US Sanctions On Iran:

• Energy Demand:

• Iran And US Double Standard OR Critical Analysis:

• Conclusion:

Historical Background:

Iran’s nuclear program can be traced to the 1950s when, with strong US support, Iran began its

efforts to develop nuclear technology. By 1975 the UD had entered into a nuclear cooperation

agreement with Iran for the sale of equipments and then in 1976, the US offered Iran

reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. A nuclearized Iran, at

that time, was in the US favour to contain Soviet backed communism and Arab nationalism.

Turning Point:

After the 1979 revolution, during which Shah was overthrown, the relations between Iran and the

US changed dramatically, marking a turning point in the once robust international cooperation

and the US involvement in Iran’s development of nuclear technology. The issue became highly

politicised precisely because the Islamic Republic openly declared its intentions to continue with

a reinvigorated nuclear program using indigenously manufactured fuel and sustain an ambitious

agenda for developing nuclear power rector and fuel cycle technologies.

Current Situation And US Sanctions On Iran:

In November 2006, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to impose sanctions on Iran for

refusing to put an end to uranium enrichment, increasing pressure on the Iranian government to

prove that it was not trying to make its nuclear weapons.

Currently Iran has again become the focus of US attention because it is trying to build its nuclear

and missile capability IAEA has repeatedly expressed its fear that Iran is enriching Uranium in

order to make nuclear weapons.

The Obama administrations is perturbed by Iran’s growing nuclear power as well as its long-

range development. In April, 2010, US increased pressure to impose sanctions on Iran for its

nuclear program. Consequently, the UN Security Council imposed a fourth round of sanction on

Iran on 9th June, 2010 for nuclear program that West Suspect is aimed at the development of

atomic weapons.

Energy Demand:

Iran sees nuclear power as a means of modernizing and diversifying its energy supply, since its

large oil reserves will be depleted over the next seven to none decades. Its oil reserves are

estimated at 137 billion barrel or the 11.6 % of the world’s total reserves; and it has 29,000

billion cubic meters of natural gas or the 15.4% of the World’s total reserves. However, given a

doubling of Iran’s population to 70 million since 1979, energy demand at home has risen

exponentially.

Iran And US Double Standard OR Critical Analysis:

Since Iran is signatory to NPT, it legally allows Iran to build any nuclear facility. It also allow

member-states to withdraw from agreement, subject to 90 days’ notice to IAEA, if they believe

that abiding by the terms of NPT threaten their national security. The crisis between Iran and the

US on Iran’s nuclear program exposed a flaw in the Bush administration’s understanding of why

Tehran to be a nuclear power. The Bush administration was willing to negotiate the North Korea

that had to quit the NPT and went on for a civilian nuclear deal with India but was not ready to

show flexibly in case of Iran.

Conclusion:

President Obama should take political risk of engaging in direct talks with Iran. At the first stage,

the process should start with persuasion of political factions inside the United States and

encouraging them to change their perception regarding aims and ambitions of Iran’s nuclear

program. A key step would be differentiating between the themes of nuclear energy and the issue

of weaponization. Moreover, connecting Iran’s nuclear program to issues of deterrence must be

stopped. These are the important steps towards confidence-building and to alleviate the

perceptions of an Iranian nuclear threat mong the American public and in Congress.

Pak-Sino Relations:

Outline:

• Background-Recognition Of People’s Republic Of China:

• First Meeting Of The Prime Ministers:

• China’s Membership Of UNO:

• Sino-India Border Conflict And Pakistan:

• 1965 And 1971 Indo-Pak Wars:

• Pak-Sino Relations During 1970s:

• Pakistan’s Support To China In National Issue.

• China’s Support On Afghan Issue:

• China’s Support On Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests:

• China’s Support During Kargil War:

• US-Led Anti-Terrorism War And Paki-Sino Relations:

• Reliance On Strong Military-To-Military Relations:

• Growing Economic Relations:

• Pakistan’s Entry Into SCO:

• Mutual Strategic Concern’s About India:

• Growing US Regional Role:

• Conclusion

Background-Recognition Of People’s Republic Of China:

Pakistan was the first Islamic country and third non-communist state to accord recognition to the

people’s republic of china in January 1950. Currently Pakistan and China are enjoying warm and

friendly relations which have gone from strength to strength since their inception in 1950s.

First Meeting Of The Prime Ministers:

The premiers of both the nations laid the foundation of these relations during Bandung

Conference. Chinese premier Chou En Lai and his Pakistani counterpart Mohammad Ail Bogra

were the architects of this historic relationship which was destined to prove unprecedented in the

annals of international relations.

China’s Membership Of UNO:

The actual consolidation between relations started in the early 1960s, when Pakistan changed its

stance and supported China’s seating in the UNO in 1961.

Sino-India Border Conflict And Pakistan:

In 1962, during China-India border conflict Pakistan had to face pressure from its western allies

UK and US. However, Pakistan brushed aside the pressure and supported China whole-

heartedly. As a result, the two countries amicably negotiated and signed an agreement on the

demarcation of their common border in March 1963.

1965 And 1971 Indo-Pak Wars:

During 1965 Indo-Pak war, China played a commendable role in its support to Pakistan in

achieving ceasefire by issuing stern warning to India. Following the war, China also in an

attempt to compensate for war losses, supported Pakistan with military equipment including

tanks and aircraft. During 1960s, Pakistan-China relations evolved on firm footings of mutual

trust and confidence.

During 1971 Indo-Pak war Chinese leaders in a message to Pakistan’s President Yahya Khan

assured full support against India and Soviet Union. China also openly declared India as an

aggressor. China also extended armed aid to Pakistan at this stage. Thus, the relations further

strengthened.

Pak-Sino Relations During 1970s:

In the decade of 1970, Pak reciprocated by supporting China internationally. It supported China

in its border confrontation with Soviet Union, Pakistan was instrumental in Dr.Kisisnger’s visit

to china in July 1971 and President Nixon’s visit to Beijing in Feb 1972.

Further, the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 introduced a new dimension in strategic balance in

the region and gave a fresh impetus to expanding Pak-China defence cooperation. Between 1971

and 1878, China assisted Pakistan in building two defence related mega-projects, first, the Heavy

Rebuild Factory for T-59 tanks and the second, and F-6 Aircraft Rebuild Factory.

Pakistan’s Support To China In National Issue.

Throughout the 1980s, Pak-Sino relations continued to develop in a comprehensive relationship.

Pakistan always supported chian in all issues important to Chinese national interests such as

sovereignty over Hong Kong, Taiwan and Tibet and issue relating human rights and democracy.

China’s Support On Afghan Issue:

The next milestone in Pakistan-China relations was the period between 1979 and 1988, when

Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan and defied world demand to pull out its troops from

Afghanistan. Millions of Afghan refugees fled from their homeland and sought refuge in the

refugee camps on the Pakistan’s soil. However, [Pakistan faced the situation bravely. It not only

provided to afghan refugees but also provided all assistance for the training of Afghan

Mujahedeen. In this hour of need, China extended moral support to Pakistan.

China’s Support On Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests:

Following the withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Afghanistan in 1999-89, the strategic dynamics

in the region changed once again. Throughout the 1970s, Pakistan remained under the USA

sanctions and chian was the primary source for military hardware procurements. After the Indian

nuclear tests, the strategic balance in South Asia was changed; China expressed its understanding

of Pakistan’s compulsion to go nuclear. It supported Pakistan to establish strategic balance in

South Asia by conducting its own nuclear tests.

China’s Support During Kargil War:

In 1999, during the Kargil war between the two nuclear states, India and Pakistan, China adhered

to a strict neutral position. China was concerned over the possibility of escalation of the conflict,

and asked both countries to defuse tensions. During the Indo-Pak military stand-off in 2000-

2001, China continued with its position of neutrality and played an important role in defusing

tensions between India and Pakistan through telephone diplomacy.

US-Led Anti-Terrorism War And Paki-Sino Relations:

President Musharraf’s visit to People’s Republic of China on December 20, 2001 as an event of

special importance between the two countries as it conveyed a strong signal to the world over

that Pak-China relations could not be affected by Pakistan’s joining US-led anti-terrorism

coalition and its improved relations with the West.

Pakistan’s side was likely to renew its commitment that China would continue to enjoy the

highest priority in the country’s foreign policy. President’s visit gave a new boost to mutual

beneficial relations and help strengthened traditional bonds of friendship and cooperation

between the two countries. China understood and supported Pakistan’s decision made in the light

of its national interests and that time situation.

Pakistan’s emergence as a key partner to US led anti-terrorism war did not affect Pak-China

relations because at the political level both countries have unanimity of views on issues like the

war on terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Iranian nuclear program.

Reliance On Strong Military-To-Military Relations:

Military relations have long been the most important and vibrant component in China-Pakistan

relations. Bilateral military Cooperation is “usually strong” and ranges from naval cooperation to

combined military and anti-terror exercises.

After the event of 9/11, anti-terrorism related cooperation between the two countries has

consistently expanding. On August 6, 2004, China and Pakistan conducted their first joint

military exercises named “Friendship 2004” in Xinjiang. In April 2005, during Premier Wen

Jiabao’s visit to Islamabad the two sides signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and good

neighbouring relations as well as combating terrorism and extremism.

In order to enhance military-to-military cooperation, both the countries conducted a joint

maritime search-and-rescue exercise in Shanghai. This was the first time for the navy of (PLA)

to conduct joint exercise with a foreign navy. Similarly, in November 2005, during their visit to

Pakistan, Chinese naval ships conducted second joint maritime search-and rescue exercise with

Pakistan navy. This was again the first time for the navy of PLA to conducting a joint exercise in

waters abroad. Defence production-related cooperation has also expanded.

Growing Economic Relations:

Today’s China is an economic juggernaut. It has world’s fastest growing economy for more than

20 years and continues to grow at a blistering pace of 9% a year. Nearly 70% of Pakistan exports

to China are cotton yarn and cotton fabric. China contributed $198m for the construction of

Gwadar port’s $250m phase. The first phase, which was built by the Chinese construction firm,

was completed ahead of premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pakistan in April 2005. China has also

agreed in principles for funding for the second phase of the port, which will have nine more

berths, an approach channel cable for large oil-tankers vessels, strong terminal and related

infrastructure facilities.

Many projects have been completed with Chinese assistance and these include, Karakoram

highway, First phase of the Gwadar port, Chashma-I nuclear power station and machine tool

factory. The projects now underway with Chinese assistance include, the second phase of the

Gwadar port, Chashma-II nuclear power plant, Saindak Cooper mines development, Gomal Zam

Dam, and several oil and gas exploration schemes.

Besides China is investing in a number of other projects like $ 2.6bn Kohala project and $8bn

Bunji Dam project. The bilateral trade between Pak and Chian rise from $ibn in 2002 to $6.8bn

in 2009. Chinese Premier desires this trade should be brought to the level of $10bn.

The size of Chinese business in Pakistan is growing. The potential for growth of Pak-China

economic relations is enormous, provided that the process remains on track and certain enabling

conditions for future growth are successfully created.

Pakistan’s Entry Into SCO:

The overall geo-strategic environment for regional cooperation is gradually becoming more

favourable. China supported Pakistan’s membership to Shanghai Cooperation Organization

(SCO). Pakistan’s entry into the SCO as an observer and China’s entry into the South Asian

Association for regional Cooperation as an observer, would allow Pak-Chian bilateral economic

relations to grow from a regional perspective. Also, there is a convergence of economic interests

at the strategic level, especially in the areas of energy, security and communication networks.

Economic cooperation has taken centre stage, while defence and security related cooperation has

assumed a new dimension. People-to-people contacts are increasing at all levels in the civil

societies. All these indicators point the fact that Pak-China relations will remain on the track of

constant growth in all areas of mutual benefit.

Mutual Strategic Concern’s About India:

India remains a central force of China’s and Pakistan’s geographical concern, dating back to a

time when the Soviet Union was India’s principle patron. Both China and Pakistan have similar

geographical and historical concerns with respect to India. These include:

i) Shared borders with India, in Pakistan’s northeast and in China’s southeast.

ii) A history of hostility and confrontation with India.

iii) A mutual interest in manoeuvring to balance or contain India’s power and influence in the

region.

Both China and Pakistan also have compelling reasons for cooperating with other to avoid being

a sole focus of India’s strategic attention. China and Pakistan appear to view their political,

military and economic cooperation as a tool with which they can counter India’s power by trying

to bind India’s activities within a South Asia context and to limit India’s connections with

resource-rich Central Asia. Sino-Pak security cooperation also helps to tie down Indian troops in

Kashmir, whee India, China and Pakistan all have territorial claims.

Growing US Regional Role And Its Implications:

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the growing US role in Central and South Asia also has troubled

Chinese leaders and raised many new issues in China’s relationship with Pakistan. This is a two-

edge concern. On the one hand, they noted, the United States and China, share a common

interests in working for Pakistan’s stability and political and economic viability, and so China is

comfortable with US actions which help support Pakistan’s economy and bolster the stability of

its regime. On the other hand, China tends to view the US war efforts in Afghanistan and its

growing involvement with Pakistan as a catalyst for regional unrest, making China

uncomfortable with the US role. A failure of US could lead at best to further instability in

Pakistan, or at worst to the installation of a fundamental religious government in Islamabad.

Conclusion: A Futuristic Strategy

In view of the regional situation and the impact of developments at the global level, a proper

strategy for security in the region should focus on the following facts.

• There should be no doubt that the region has been in the throes of instability because of mutual

conflicts between the states of the region as well as because of the proxy wars of global powers.

This region is one of the most backward areas in the world, in terms of development of human

resources. It is, therefore, necessary to give attention to economic and social development.

• In the present day world, which has shrunk to a global village, stability is impossible to achieve

without preventing and eliminating the danger of aggression from any country. Adoption of a

common strategy for meeting the challenge of hegemonic designs, whether at regional or global

level, is becoming inevitable. China and Pakistan have exhibited exemplary cooperation in this

regard. Maintaining these good relations and keeping the level of cooperation high, efforts

should be made to include other countries of the region in any such scheme of mutual

cooperation and working together. It is pertinent to note here that relations between Pakistan and

Russia have improved during the last few years, while the relationship between China and Russia

has become stronger. The need is to come up with a common vision and a scheme for joint

actions, taking along the Central Asian states.

• Instability in Afghanistan gives rise to instability in the whole region, besides being an obstacle

in the way of full use of resources in the region for economic development. No doubt, this is a

formidable challenge and interests of different countries even conflict with each other, at times,

the common destiny requires that Afghanistan’s neighbors should increase mutual consultations

and contacts and find out some common strategy. It should not be forgotten that instability in

Afghanistan is exploited by the outsiders for their own intervention and presence in the region.

• A review of the defense capabilities and technological development of the countries in the

region establishes that India’s efforts about acquiring latest, sophisticated military equipment

along with developing its own nuclear and missile programs have Pakistan as their first target,

and China as the second. However, defense strategies of both the countries and their close

relations have prevented it from committing any aggression. It is necessary to keep a check on

India’s growing war capabilities.

• Besides the hegemonic designs of India, the prolonged Kashmir issue between India and

Pakistan poses a grave threat to regional security. Because of deep public emotions on both

sides, the two countries cannot resolve the issue by themselves. All bilateral efforts have

invariably failed to produce any tangible results, let alone a lasting solution of the contentious

issue. It is, therefore, inevitable for the international community and the neighbors to play their

role and try to enforce a judicious solution to it for the sake of peace in the region. Being a major

country in the region as well as being a neighbor of both Pakistan and India, China can play a

role in diffusing tension between Pakistan and India. It can play a better role than any ‘outside’

power. Obviously, no outside country can be as sincere in, or in as much need of, peace in the

region as those situated here.

• Along with the Kashmir issue, the question of Palestine and other problems are symbols of

injustices committed in the past, yet they are victims of indifference of the international

community and institutions. Continued insensitivity of the international community has turned

political movements in these areas into armed struggles, which, in return, has led to an unending

chain of violence and counterviolence. Doubts and suspicions over the US-led war against

terrorism carry weight: that it is more about serving self-interests rather than elimination of

terrorism, that this war has in fact increased the dangers to world peace. Lest these suspicions

come true and the situation get further aggravated, the need is to make international institutions

stronger and more effective. Along with recognizing movements for right of self-determination

and distinguish between freedom struggle and terrorism, these institutions should be able to resist

the US unilateralism and the US approach of bypassing international law and norms. Otherwise,

wide-spread anger and frustration would feed those who can go to any extent of use of force for

achieving their ends.

• While terrorism is being condemned everywhere, proper attention has not been paid to its

causes. Terrorist activities in which a human beings sacrifice their lives indicate to the height of

frustration. This frustration is there among the Muslim masses because their genuine freedom

struggles are being suppressed by repressive regimes, on the one hand, while, on the other, their

leaderships do not represent their sentiments, nor do international institutions and powers exhibit

any judicious approach or inclination in solving their problems.

Pakistan And The Central Asian States:

Introduction:

Pakistan’s relations with the Central Asian Republics have made good progress during the past

few years. The Central Asian States (CAS), i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are located on historical Silk Route. The region has adjoining

borders with South Asia, West Asia, China and Russia and is of great geo-strategic and politico-

economic importance. Its potential is attracting the attention of extra regional powers.

Pakistan-Central Asian relations are based on geographical proximity, common history, religion,

culture, traditions, values and destiny. Pakistan and these states can work together in matters of

security, stability and development of the region.

They can collaborate in numerous areas such as scientific and technical fields, banking,

insurance, information technology, pharmaceutical industry, tourism and media. The economies

of CAS and Pakistan are complementary to each other. There is cooperation in several spheres

notably, war against terrorism, combating religious extremism and drug trafficking.

ECO, Pakistan And Central Asian States:

• Pakistan and Central Asian States are also the members of Economic Cooperation

Organization; it provides a good opportunity for the Heads of States and Government to meet.

• Bilateral meetings on the sidelines offer a closer focus on bilateral relations.

Common Security Policy:

• There is a desire in Pakistan that the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) of the CAS,

which is basically an economic grouping, should try to play to assume a political role and in due

course of time also aspire to the possibility of geopolitical and geo-economic role.

• ECO may help in adopting a common security policy on similar grounds as pursued by EU in

the European States combating religious extremism and Terrorism.

Trade And Economic Cooperation: • Pakistan should concentrate on the economic and trade ties with CAS.

• An important agreement has been concluded with Germany for a rail-road from Hamburg to

/Shanghai, through Eastern Europe, Moscow, Tashkent, Kabul, Lahore, Delhi and Shanghai.

• This would open the rich mineral deposits of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for exploration and

export by Pakistan and through the Arabian sea again, with a new railway road from the Khyber

Pass to the Russian land.

Investing In Untapped Natural Resources Of CAS:

• The Caspian Sea in Central Asia contains the world’s largest untapped oil and gas resources.

• All countries in the region are getting close to CAS and they geared up their trade.

• Pakistan’s loans of $ 10 to 30 million to each of the CAS and its commitment to cooperate in

the building of $ 500 m hydel power station in Tajikistan are some of the many indicators of its

keen wish to assist them on their economic development.

Direct Air Link:

• The expansion of PIA’s air network to Tashkent in Uzbekistan and Alma Ata in Kazakhstan is

a major step forward in cementing ties with these two states.

Cooperation In Admission To OIC:

• Pakistan cooperated with CAS in their admission to the organization of the Islamic Conference

(OIC).

Communication Network And Media Exchange:

• Radio Pakistan is working on projects to strengthen its service for the Central Asian region so

that the people there can be informed and educated about Pakistan in their own native languages.

• An expansion of Pakistan Television’s Transmission facilities in Peshawar can enable it to

beam its TV programmes to the entire Central Asian region, covering all of Afghanistan as well.

Establishment Of Joint Economic Commission:

• Pakistan developed institutionalized arrangement to promote cooperation in the economic and

commercial fields.

• For this purpose Joint Economic Commissions (JECs) have been established with all the

Central Asian States.

Technical Assistance Programme:

• Under Technical Assistance Programme initiated in 1992-93, Pakistan provided training

facilities, which are fully funded.

• The programme includes courses ranging from English language, banking and accountancy to

diplomacy.

• These have contributed to better understanding and closer cooperation. Pakistan wishes to keep

up the momentum.

Suggestions:

Following measures and implementations will improve the ties between Pakistan and CAS.

i) Pakistan An Attraction Of Shortest Land Route:

Pakistan would enjoy the role of middleman between the SAARC, ECO and EEC and the

attraction of the shortest land route to the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf and the Black Sea would

clearly irk Russia.

ii) Encourage Mutual Trade:

The government of Pakistan, despite its economic difficulties, should provide more credit

facilities to the Central Asian States to encourage mutual trade and the setting up of stable

banking channels.

iii) Better Port Facilities For Handling The Transit Trade:

Despite their ethnic bonds with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, the CA States can benefit more

from Pakistan’s port facilities, trade and commerce with the countries in entire Southern

Hemisphere.

The port of Abadan and Bader Abbas in Iran and Karachi port in Pakistan can handle this transit

trade by expanding their facilities rapidly. The Tajik capital of Dushanbe is about 3000 km from

Bander Abbas in Islam and about 2200 km from Karachi. While the Black Sea port of Odessa for

access to the Mediterranean is about 4200 km away.

iv) Speedy Implementation Of Projects.

Bilaterally and through the ECO, many schemes and projects are rapidly emerging, whose

speedy implementation would be to their mutual advantage.

v) Expertise in Banking System To Be Shared:

A strong modern banking system capable of operating internationally is a dire need of all Central

Asian States and Pakistan has the expertise and the infrastructure to assist them in this direction.

vi) Joint Shipping Company To Be Established:

The landlocked Central Asian States can even set up a joint shipment company with Pakistan

under the aegis of the ECO to handle a large port of their transit trade.

vii) Gwadar Port An Asset For Pakistan And The CAS:

If Pakistan speeds up the development of the Gwadar port on the Baluchistan coast into a large-

size modern port, it can be an asset for this province as well as for the CAS.

viii) Trade Via The Land Route:

Kazakhstan’s ruling leaders, who are energetically improving their relations with Beijing, have

shown interest in building rail and road links with Urumchi, capital of the Chinese province of

Xinjiang, and thus using the Karakoram Highway between Pakistan and China for trade via the

land route.

ix) Cheap Air Cargo Service:

A cheap and regular air cargo service between Pakistan and the CAS is the need of the hour.

x) Dynamic Railway Network:

The Pakistan railway network should be linked via Iran with Turkmenistan.

xi) Pakistan TO Invite Senior Editors Of Newspaper Of CAS:

Pakistan should invite senior editors of newspapers of the CAS to Pakistan and provide them

with ample opportunities to know facts about Pakistan’s economic development and

industrialisation.

xii) Business Encouragement Backed By The Government Of Pakistan In CAS:

With Government encouragements, Pakistani entrepreneurs can set up industrial units in

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other CAS.

xiii) Cooperation Between The Universities:

There is immense scope for cooperation between the Universities of Pakistan and those in the

CAS. Pakistan can learn a great deal from the CAS which have made nearly 95% of their

population literate.

xiv) Regional Security Is TO Be Improved:

Pakistan’s relations with the Central Asian Republics have made good progress during the past

few years. With improved regional security after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan,

Turkmenistan and Pakistan have decided to push ahead with plans for the ambitious 1500 kms-

long gas pipeline. The leaders of the three countries have signed a framework agreement (The

Trans Afghanistan Pipeline).

The Trans-Afghanistan pipeline would export Turkmen gas (from Dualtabad gas field) via

Afghanistan to Pakistan, from where it could reach world markets. Proponents of the project see

it as a modern continuation of the Silk Road.

The Asian Development Bank is the leading coordinating financial and technical partner.

Conclusion:

The stabilization and steady expansion of these relations may take time and would require deft,

patient and wise handling on the part of the States concerned. A time may come, perhaps sooner

than expected, when Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and the six West and Central Asian

States; having a population of nearly 300m and an area larger than that of the SAARC region,

may form a Common Market.

In the meantime, Central Asia and Pakistan must keep on vigorously pursuing the peace option

in Afghanistan. Mutual Pak-Afghan trade is expected to reach Rs. One billion in this year.

In the final analysis, it is the “Afghan corridor” that is still blocking Pakistan’s physical access to

the CARs, and vice versa, only its unblocking will materialize the connectivity with South and

Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, the war-torn Afghanistan remains a major stumbling block. Yet it

holds the ultimate key for Pakistan to gain access to the CARs. Therefore, all efforts need to be

focused to try opening this passage to gain access to the ex-Soviet Republics.

While regional and international circumstances have no doubt conspired against Pakistan, the

latter should have no stone unturned in combating international terrorism, building a sound

infrastructure along Pak-Afghan border and cleansing its own fraction tribal belt of foreign

militants. At the same time, there is a dire need in setting its political house in order by co-opting

major political parties and regaining the trust and goodwill of Afghans through trade assistance

and policy of non-interference.

South Asian Association For Regional Cooperation (SAARC):

Formation:

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in December

8, 1985 at Dhaka by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Srilanka. The

objective were to promote the welfare and improve the quality of life of the people of South Asia

by accelerating economic growth in the region and building up mutual trust among the member

states.

Objectives:

The objectives of the Association as defined in the Charter are:

i) To promote the welfare of the people of South Asia and to improve their quality of life.

ii) To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to

provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potential.

iii) To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia.

iv) To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another’s problems.

v) Too promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural,

technical and scientific fields,

vi) To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries.

Principles:

i) The principle of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-

interference in the internal affairs of other states and mutual benefits.

ii) The cooperation is to complement bilateral and multilateral relations.

iii) Such cooperation should be consistent with bilateral and multilateral responsibilities of the

member states.

iv) Decisions at all levels are to be unanimously taken.

v) Bilateral and contentious issues would be executed from its deliberations.

Membership:

i) Pakistan

ii) Bangladesh

iii) India

iv) Srilanka

v) Nepal

vi) Bhutan

vii) Maldives

vii) Afghanistan

in April 2007, at the Association’s 14th Summit, Afghanistan became its eighth member.

Observers:

i) Australia

ii) China

iii) EU

iv) Iran

v) Japan

vi) Mauritius

vii) Myanmar (Burma)

viii) United States

ix) South Korea

Fields/Areas Of Cooperation:

The areas of cooperation among SAARC members as decided at the time of its establishment

were:

i) Agriculture and Forestry

ii) Health And Population Planning

iii) Meteorology

iv) Rural Development

v) Telecommunication

vi) Transport

vii) Science and Technology

viii) Drug Trafficking And Abuse

ix) Postal Service

x) Women Development And

xi) Sports, Arts And Culture

Structure:

The SAARC has four tier structure including:

i) SAARC Summit Conference

ii) Council of Minister

iii) Standing Committee

iv) Technical Committees and Secretariat

SAARC Summit Conference:

The highest decision-making authority rests with the ‘SAARC Summit Conference’ convened

generally once in a year or two years, comprising Heads of State or Governments of SAARC

countries.

Council Of Ministers:

The ‘Council Of Ministers’ of SAARC countries formulates policies of the organisation. The

council appoints Secretary General of SAARC on the basis of rotation in alphabetical order for a

period of two years, upon nomination by a member state. It meets twice a year.

Standing Committee:

The “Standing Committee of SAARC” is composed of Foreign Secretaries of member states: It

approves projects and programmes. The financing of such programmes and project is also

determined by the Standing Committee.

Secretariat:

The SAARC Secretariat was established in Kathmandu on 16 January 1987 and was inaugurated

by late King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah of Nepal. It is headed by a Secretary General appointed

by the Council of Ministers from member countries in alphabetical order for a three-year term.

He is assisted by the Professional and the General Services Staff and also an appropriate number

of functional units called divisions assigned to Directors on deputation from member States. The

Secretariat coordinates and monitors implementation of activities, prepares for and services

meetings and serves as a channel of communication between the Association and its member

states as well as other regional organisations.

Achievements:

• Twenty-five years have passed since the establishment of SAARC in 1985.

• When we analyse its achievements disappointment prevails over us.

• The SAARC has not many achievements at its credit.

• However, it must be kept in mind that the Association consists of countries having diversity in

culture, religion, economic development, foreign policy etc.

• It is itself an appreciable thing that these countries have come on one platform for their

economic development.

• No doubt, SAARC performance is not good as was expected, yet it has some achievement at its

credit.

They are;

i) It has developed feelings of understanding among countries.

ii) It signed SAARC Regional Convention of Suppression of Terrorism in 1998.

iii) It established SAARC Food Security Reserve which is operational since 1988.

iv) The SAARC has also signed South Asia Professional Trade Agreement (SAPTA) in seventh

summit in 1993 and SAFTA Agreement, signed during the 12th Summit in January 2004.

v) SAARC Agricultural Information Centre (SAIC) has been set up at Dhaka to promote

cooperation in the field of agricultural.

vi) A Centre for Human Resource Development (CHRD) has also been established.

vii) The member countries have devised modalities for confronting many important issues such a

poverty, terrorism, drug-trafficking etc.

viii) Institutional arrangements such as South Asian Development Bank, South Asian

Development Fund etc. have been initiated.

Causes Behind Slow Progress:

A bird’s eye view of the SAARC’s achievements tells us that the performance of the Association

is not satisfactory. Generally speaking, following are the reasons for the slow progress of

SAARC.

i) Indian aptitude is the foremost factor for the slow progress of SAARC.

ii) There are flaws in the charter itself. According to one principle, bilateral issues are excluded

from the activities of the Association.

iii) Almost all the member countries are internally unstable and faced with internal political

tension.

iv) Many of many of the important sectors of economy which affect directly the lives of the

people of the region have not been included in the Association’s activity. The areas include:

reduction in the defence expenditure, power generation, improvement and proper use of regional

water resources, the use of SAARC for getting financial assistance from donor agencies.

v) All the SAARC countries formulate their foreign policies according to their own national

interests and objectives. This hinders to achieve any common ground and policy to make

Association successful.

vi) The extra regional alignment of the member countries is also a hindrance in the progress of

the Association. Their alignment often works at cross purpose to the objectives aimed by

SAARC.

vii) There’s not the same level of economic development among countries. The imbalance of

economic development creates tendency of domination, doubts and suspicions which create

hurdles to achieve success.

Pakistan’s Role In Strengthening SAARC:

Pakistan has been an active and enthusiastic member of the SAARC. The twelfth SAARC

Summit in Islamabad has highlighted Pakistan’s contribution in making SAARC a highly useful

forum of South Asia. Pakistan’s tension ridden relations with India has never deterred it form

playing an active role in the Association.

Pakistan played a pivotal role in the formal launching of the SAARC at the first summit at Dhaka

in 1985. After the formation of SAARC, Pakistan has lived up to its commitments by taking part

in all the activities of the SAARC.

The broad objectives of the SAARC were to promote the welfare of the people of South Asia,

accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region. In all of

SAARC’s endeavours in the relevant fields, Pakistan has shown keen interest and played an

active role.

Pakistan has always played a leading role in both initiating and welcoming visits and exchanges

with personalities from various fields of life in the member countries of the SAARC. It has

always favoured the inclusion of mutual disputes and bilateral issues between member countries.

Pakistan has argued that successful regional groupings like European Union and ASEAN use the

mechanism of consultation for discussion that promote conciliation and strengthen peace.

During the first Summit Pakistan gave a suggestion that women’s participation should be

increased in the SAARC related activities. The suggestion was welcomed and accepted as the

SAARC leaders agreed that meaningful progress could not be achieved without the active

participation and enhancement of the status of women.

In the fifth SAARC Summit meeting Pakistan vetoed Afghanistan’s application for membership

of SAARC because at that time it was under the Soviet influence. In addition Pakistan

condemned Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

The sixth summit Conference of SAARC was held in Colombo on 21st December 1991. During

this meeting Pakistan proposed to make Asia a nuclear free zone.

Similarly in the subsequent SAARC Summits too Pakistan made positive proposals for the

promotion of political, economic and cultural cooperation among the states.

Political Issues:

SAARC has intentionally laid more stress on “core issues” mentioned above rather than more

decisive political issues like the Kashmir dispute and the Srilanka civil war. However, political

dialogue is often conducted on the margins of SAARC meetings.

SAARC has also refrained itself from interfering in the internal matters of the member states.

During the 12th and 13th SAARC summits, extreme emphasis was laid upon greater cooperation

between the SAARC members to fight against terrorism.

Political Economy Of South Asia:

South Asia accounts for nearly 23% of the total world population. However, its share in the

global GDP is less than 3%. The region is home to the world’s 400 million poor, which means

nearly 30% of the region’s population lives below the poverty line.

All SAARC countries have a rather low raking on the Human Development Index (HDI), which

according to the Human Development Report 2007-08 is: Srilanka (99), the Maldives (100),

India (128), Bhutan (133), Pakistan (136), Bangladesh (140), and Nepal (142). The HDI ranking

is based on achievements in terms of life expectancy, education and real income. The low HDI

ranking reflects poorly on these vital indicators in the region.

South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA):

In order to achieve objectives of SAARC and increase regional integration, the member countries

created South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2004 at the twelfth SAARC Summit.

This agreement which came into force on January 1, 2006 provides that members will reduce

their tariffs to 0.5 per cent by December 31, 2005.

The success of SAFTA, however, largely depends on normalization of Pakistan-India relations.

In case the relations between the two countries do not normalize, SAFTA, a fate will not be

different from that of its predecessor, South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA).

Reasons Of Low Trade:

the major reason for meagre intra-SAARC trade is low volume of trade between Pakistan and

India, the largest economies and trading nations in the region. Though formal Pak-India trade

(the two countries have informal trade of more than $ 3bn a year) has increased from $ 236

million in 2001-2002 to $ 1.95 bn in 2007-08, it still constitutes less than 1 per cent of the global

trade of the two countries!

Pakistan has not even granted MFN status, a basic requirement under WTO, to India and

continues to conduct its imports from India on the basis of positive list. On its part, India

maintains high tariffs and non-tariff barriers on products of export interest to Pakistan.

SAARC And ASEAN:

The poor trade performance of SAARC stands in marked contrast with that of the neighbouring

regional alliance-Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The ASEAN countries

accounts for merely 8.4% of the total world population.

However, their share in total world trade is nearly 7%. ASEAN’s contribution to Asia’s total

trade is 23 per cent. Intra-ASEAN trade accounts for nearly 30 per cent of the global trade of the

10-mmeber countries. ASEAN countries have remained embroiled in territorial disputes but that

has not hampered their trade relations.

Organization Of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

Outline:

• Establishment

• Aims And Objectives

• Structure

• Members

• Pakistan’s Role

• Role of OIC For Muslim States

• Causes Of Its Failure

a. Lack Of Unity:

b. Lack Of Resources:

c. Lack Of Modern Technology:

d. Role Of American And Jewish Lobby

• OIC and Modern Challenges:

a. Globalisation:

b. Security:

c. Economic Integration Of The Ummah:

d. Human Development:

e. Global Media And Islamphobia:

• Suggestions

• Conclusion

Introduction:

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation is the association of Muslim countries. It was established in

September 1969 in Rabat (Morocco) after the burning of Masjid-Aqsa in Jerusalem. The

inaugural was attended by 24 heads of Muslim countries. In this meeting, the OIC condemned

the desecration of Al-Aqsa mosque by the Jews. Currently the membership of this body had

increased to 57.

The OIC is the symbol of Islamic unity and integrity of the Muslim world. This organisation

provides the Islamic world a unique forum to solve the problems faced by Muslim world and to

increase cooperation not only amongst the Muslim countries but also between other countries

and Islamic states.

Aims And Objectives:

i) To promote cooperation among Muslim nations.

ii) To protect rights of Muslims around the world.

iii) To promote the spirit of brotherhood between the Muslims.

iv) To eliminate all racial distinctions.

v) To promote economic, scientific, social and commercial links between Islamic nations.

vi) To assist Palestinians for the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Structure Of OIC:

The OIC comprises of following organs and affiliated bodies.

a) Islamic Summit Conference

b) Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference

c) Secretariat

d) Special Committees

e) Other Agencies

Pakistan’s Role In The OIC:

With its deep commitment to the promotion of Islamic solidarity Pakistan has played a

significant role in the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in

1969, and became an active member of the Conference.

Pakistan has the honour to host the second Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore in 1974. The

Conference acknowledged with thanks the efforts of Pakistan for promoting unity amongst the

Muslim world. The first extraordinary conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Islamabad,

Pakistan, in Jan 1980. Pakistan has also endeavoured to contribute to the strengthening of various

organs and agencies of the OIC, such as the Islamic Solidarity Fund.

In October, 1980 the President of Pakistan was accorded the unique honour of addressing the UN

General Assembly, on behalf of the entire Islamic World. The speech made by General Zia in the

25th Annual Session of the General Assembly, as a representative of the Islamic World, was not

only hailed by the majority of the Muslim countries but was also regarded as the Islam’s

universal message of peace.

As Chairman of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, President General Zia-ul-Haq

undertook a goodwill mission to Tehran and Baghdad, in September, 1980, in an effort to bring

to an end the unfortunate war between the two Islamic countries. Pakistan attended the 15th

Islamic conference of Foreign Ministers at Sana’a in December, 1984. It was at this Conference

that Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada was unanimously elected Secretary General of the OIC.

Role of OIC For Muslim States And Causes Of Its Failure:

The OIC aims at consolidating solidarity of Muslim world and the promotion of political,

economic, cultural and scientific cooperation among the member states. So far as the manifests

of the OIC is concerned it offer many prospects for the solidarity of the Muslim world and the

resolution of issues faced by its members but practically the record of this organisation is not

very encouraging. This body has failed miserably to resolve the problem faced by the Muslim

world.

For example, OIC has not played its proper role to resolve the Kashmir issue between Pakistan

and India, the Palestine issue between Israel and the Arabs, the Chechnya issue between Russia

and the Chechens, and the Shattul Arab dispute between Iran and Iraq. Recently OIC failed

completely to prevent American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The limitations of this organization were also exposed during 1980 to 1988 when Iran and Iraq

were fighting an aimless war. Later on, in 1991, OIC failed to convince Saddam Hussain to

evacuate Kuwait before the US-led coalition forces expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait and UN

imposed economic sanctions on Baghdad.

The period from 1991 to 2002 marks another phase of utter failure of organization of Islamic

Cooperation because during this period this body failed to resolve problems strained relations

between Iraq and its Arab neighbours, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Consequently,

United States was forced to invent the hoax of Weapons of Mass Destruction in order to invade

and capture Iraq in 2003.

The petty differences between the Muslim States have not only weakened the Muslim nations

individually but also have made OIC an effective body. This organization holds summit meetings

regularly where resolutions are passed but no practical result is achieved towards resolving the

problems of the member states.

Causes Of Failure:

The ground realities which inhibit the capacity of OIC as an effective body to protect legitimate

interests of Muslim world are the following.

i) Lack of unity among the member states

ii) Lack of resources

iii) Lack of modern technology

iv) Role of American and Jewish lobby.

Lack Of Unity:

Unfortunately, the Muslim states lack unity and cooperation which is the call of the hour. Most

of the Muslim countries are engaged in local rivalries and politics. For example, Iraq has some

claims over Kuwait oilfields, Iran has to settle issue of Shtt-el-Arab with Iraq and some African

Muslim countries are involved in local disputes. Even Pakistan and Afghanistan has still to

complete the demarcation of their boundary. This disunity among the Muslim states has

weakened the apparatus of OIC and hinders an effective collective action.

Lack Of Resources:

Most of the Muslim countries are very poor and belong to the under developed third world.

These nations have limited resources of income and are overpopulated with millions of illiterate

unemployed people to feed. Majority of the people of poor nations of Asia and Africa are living

under poverty line. Many land locked Muslim nations like Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan

and other depend on others for their trade and commerce.

Lack Of Modern Technology:

Unfortunately, majority of the Muslim states lack modern knowledge and technology. Only

Pakistan, Turkey and Malaysia are to some extent exempt from this category. Thus the Muslim

world is entirely dependent on Western countries for their goods like machinery, equipment,

medicines, textiles and military weapons. Hus OIC is basically a body of under developed

countries and thus cannot force other countries.

Role Of American And Jewish Lobby:

The American and Jewish lobbies are always engaged in anti-Muslim activates. They ensure that

the Muslim world remains divided. Thus OIC becomes an effective body.

OIC and Modern Challenges:

i) Globalisation: The Muslim World stands at a historic crossroads and faces tremendous challenges with

immense repercussion for its future. With regard to the challenges posed by the process of

globalisation, the necessity for unity within the Ummah has increased tremendously.

ii) Security:

The major and current problems faced by Ummah are, the Palestinian issue, terrorism, the media

and Islamization, dialogue among civilization, the political and human rights of Muslim

minorities in non-OIC Muslim countries. Concrete efforts are required for the peaceful resolution

of conflicts and OIC can play an important role.

iii) Global Media And Islamphobia:

The state of Islamphobia in the west is alarming and in fact is a form of racism and

discrimination. Being a powerful tool in the globalised world, the media can project a positive

image of Islam and can promote the interests of the Ummah.

iv) Human Development:

Being a unique Muslim international organisation, the OIC has the potential to play a major role

in creating a brighter and prosperous future for the Ummah.

v) Economic Integration Of The Ummah:

At present, the figure of intra-Ummatic trade is not more than 14 per cent. This proportionate

must be enhanced by the creation of a Free Trade Area leading to the Islamic Common Market in

the long-run.

Suggestions:

There is no need to hugely reshuffle OIC’s organisational structure except to force on the

following important points.

• Reforming the Charter and renaming the OIC to the Muslim Union (MU).

• Several members do not pay a financial contribution to OIC but have high expectations from it.

this attitude must change as in such an environment the OIC cannot work efficiently.

• Advancement in the fields of science and technology.

• Establishment of a sound central financial system for Muslim World, for which it require the

establishment of:

a) A Muslim Monetary Fund (MMF)

b) A Human Development Fund (HDF)

c) A new currency with the name of Islamic Dinar.

• Establishment of an Islamic Common Market (ICM) for the promotion of mutual trade.

• Establishment of a strong Muslim New Agency (MNA) at par with CNN and BBC.

• Establishment of two new security institutions:

a) Muslim Security Council (MSC) and,

b) Muslim Defence Force (MDF).

Conclusion:

The challenges and problems faced by the OIC could be weighed against a wide range of

opportunities. The member countries possess resources as well as expertise which if properly

harnessed can transform the quality of life of their people. The Muslim world has a vast human

and material resources and a potential for coordinating effort to economically strengthen their

countries vis-à-vis industrialised countries. If such an accomplishment could be made within the

Muslim countries, the OIC would acquire a leverage that would have a profound effect on

international politics. Given the rich heritage of shared religion, culture and commonality of aims

and aspirations, OIC could potentially emerge as a major vehicle for economic progress and a

potential force. Despite existing diversity there are great opportunities to maximize development

through cooperation. In this regard model for European Economic Community can be helpful to

revitalize the OIC for achieving the economic goals. There are a number of similarities between

both the organisations. These similarities range from geographical contiguity among the member

states to the diversity in economic resources.

Fruitful cooperation on the platform of OIC can take place only if Ummah identity is given

priority by Muslims. This change, however, will not be easy to achieve. For worthwhile

cooperation it is necessary to understand the challenges and problems of the existing situation.

Once this is properly understood, it will be easier to determine a realistic goal.

United Nations:

The United Nations is an international organisation which was established on 24th October 1945

in order to foster international cooperation in the resolution of economic, social, cultural and

humanitarian problems. The number of founder members in 1945 was 41 which has risen to 192.

In the preamble to the charter of UN the signatories pledged to practise tolerance and to live

together in peace with one another as good neighbours and to ensure by the acceptance of

principles and the institution of methods that armed forces shall not be used. According to the

article 1 of the charter the UN works to maintain international peace and security to that end to

take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace.

Peace Making Record Of UN:

Since its inception in 1945, the UN has met partial success in maintaining peace in the world.

During major conflicts involving opposing ideologies the performance of UN was influenced by

the attitude and cooperation of the USA and Russia (previously up to 1991). In addition to this

handicaps this forum faces the limitation that according to the charter all the disputes are not

referred to UN for immediate treatment.

According to an Article, 2:3 all members are to settle their international disputes by peaceful

means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered. Only if

parties have exhausted all the means referred to in Article 33 should the matter be brought before

UN.

However, despite all these hurdles the UN offers numerous opportunities for peaceful settlement

through its machinery. In addition, the Secretary General has proved to be an effective arbiter of

conflicting claims and in delicate matters which could be kept alive on his initiative.

On the whole, so far, almost all the Secretary Generals have played important role in the

maintenance of peace in the world. For example, Hammarskjold and U.Thant were instrumental

in resolving the complicated issues of Middle East (1956), Lebanon, Congo, Cyprus and

Vietnam. Later on, Kurt Waldheim and Perez de Cuellar used shuttle diplomacy successfully and

contributed towards the solution of the Middle East crisis and the Afghanistan issue. The Geneva

Agreement (1988) was concluded under the auspices of UN.

Achievements Of UN:

So far the achievements of UN regarding the maintenance of international peace have been as

under:

a) Indonesia:

In 1947, the UN arranged a truce between Netherlands’ and Indonesia. A year later in 1948 when

Holland violet the truce, the Security Council asked the parties to stop fighting and proposed an

independent state of Indonesia. Consequently Indonesia was granted independence in 1949.

b) Greece:

In 1946, Greece charged USSR for organizing guerrilla activities on her soil. The UN Security

Council set up a commission which reported that Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria were

responsible for helping the communists in Greece. Consequently, UN established a Peace

Observation Commission in 1951, with authority to continue observation work in the region.

c) Kashmir:

In January 1948, India complained to the Security Council that Pakistan has committed

aggression in Kashmir. The council immediately arranged a UN Commission for India and

Pakistan (UNCIP) and appointed many administrators to arrange for a plebiscite in the valley.

However, India went back on her commitment. Since, then SC has passed several resolutions

asking India to comply with the earlier resolutions.

d) Korea:

In June 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea and occupied substantial territory. As a result

the UN forces led by US helped the S.Korea to recover its territory up to 38th parallel.

e) Suez Crisis:

In July 1956, Britain and France felt grieved when Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal because

they owned shares in it. as a reprisal Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt and occupied the

Suez Canal. UN efforts together with pressure of USSR helped Egypt to recover control of the

canal.

f) Congo:

In 1960, Belgian intervention and cessation of Katanga threatened independence of Congo. The

UN force defeated Moise Tshombe’s cessionists and restored the solidarity of Congo.

g) Arab Israeli Wars:

The UN has played a very constructive role in the Arab-Israel wars of 1967 and 1973. The UN

Emergency Force (UNEF) played an important part in maintaining peace in the region till 1967

when Egypt asked for its withdrawal. During the Arab-Israel wars UN passed resolutions calling

for ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories.

h) Afghanistan:

Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in December 1979. The UN condemned this aggression and

in the subsequent years passed resolutions with overwhelming majority calling for withdrawal of

Soviet forces from Afghanistan. In the meantime, UN arranged for Geneva talks between

Pakistan and Afghanistan which resulted in the Geneva Agreement in April 1988. Consequently

the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan by February 1989.

Sidelining Of UN:

International political scenario took a dramatic turn after the disintegration of Soviet Union in

1991. The US emerged as the only super-power of the world and took over the role of sole

policeman of the world community. USA took full advantage of the situation and promoted its

interests in all continents.

In Middle East, it supports the Jewish state of Israel to maintain her hold on the Arab territories

occupied in 1967 war. The UN was not allowed to force Israel to accept UN Resolution no: 242,

which called for withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab-territories. The US brokered land for

peace accords between Palestinians and Jews have fallen short of the requirements of the

problem. Still millions of Palestinians are languishing in refugees’ camps, the status of Al-Quds

stands unresolved, majority of West Bank is under Jewish control and more and more illegal

Jewish settlements are being established on Palestinian soil. In late 2001, US vetoed an Arab

request to Security Council to send peacekeepers to Middle East. Thus UN is not being allowed

to play its peacekeeping role in a free manner.

In 1990, the Gulf war gave a new dimension to the UN politics when US formed a multi-nation

UN force to defeat Iraq. Similarly, this idea was put into practice again in October 2001 when a

US-led multi-nation force launched war against Afghanistan to destroy terrorist camps there.

Henceforth began the era in which USA gave its own agenda to the world body which aimed at

shaping the political, economic and military features of the globe. US president George Bush put

forward his famous “Bush Doctrine” on 20th September, 2002, which authorised USA to launch

pre-emptive strikes against hostile regimes which posed or could pose threat to America. In this

connection, the regimes could be changed to protect democracy and freedom in the world.

The first great practical demonstration of the Bush Doctrine was witnessed in March 2003 when

US-led forces invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam regime. USA achieved this target without the

help of France, Germany and Russia. Thus ended the 58 year peace and security role of UN in

2003 when USA invaded Iraq without its permission.

Currently US administration is working under active instructions of Jewish lobby to fulfil the

agenda of Tel Aviv in the world. Israel’s policy of aggression and oppression against the

Palestinians is a strong reminder of the end of UN authority in peace and security role.

In the recent years, the UN has become a tool in the hands of US. The majority of the members

of Security Council are economically and politically so dependent on US that they have no other

choice but to support the policies of Washington. There is no doubt that the technology

advancement has reduced the world to a global village but under the pretext of New World Order

US and its allies are busy in flouting all cannons of justice and fair play. They are using UN

agencies of IMF and World Bank to catch important countries through debt trap so that they may

not oppose their policies at the UN platform.

All these factors have given USA a free hand and limited the manoeuvrability of the World

Body. Consequently, many international issues such as Kashmir, Chechnya, Taiwan and

Palestine are wailing solution since decades. Big powers have found common cause in using UN

for their own political interests.

Updated CA Notes In Bullet Form

After posting my last year's ca notes, now iam going to post updated ca notes that i hav prepared

from all the articles that i have been collecting and reading from different newspapers since

March 2011 till today. i have made into bullet form notes keeping in view current scenario from

every angle.i have trimmed and amended all the articles and made some changes of my

own.Hope these will help all the members, corrections will be highly appreciated. Do remember

me in ur prayers

First of all i'll post PAK-US-AFGHAN issue keeping all the angles, including us withdrawal its

implications, indian factor, options for pak etc etc

Afghanistan, US policies and our options

• America is going to face the worst ever defeat of its history.

• If completes, it would be the second biggest after the Vietnam War, which shall be regarded as

the superpower’s another unparalleled.

• Such a big humiliation the American are about to face in Afghanistan at the hands of the

Taliban.

• Washington would run out of options of an honourable exit, if it fails to find out an amicable

way out in order to avoid the great embarrassment.

• The Crusade that the US launched against the Taliban-al-Qaeda after 9/11, the much desired

victory has not fallen into its lap in accordance with its plan.

• The Taliban proved to be a hard nut to crack for the American policymakers.

• Now the defeat at the Taliban hands seems to be the writing on the wall.

• Instead the US realized the realities on ground and formulated strategy to find out a negotiated

way out, it is constantly committing blunders, which are not only poised to create problems for

Washington, but also to have lasting impacts upon the regional countries, especially Pakistan and

Iran.

• The rulers in Pakistan and the national security institutions need to keep a watchful eye on the

situation unfolding out of the various steps taken by the US in Afghanistan, and take preventive

measures to block negative impacts reaching Pakistan.

• The negative impacts can result into gearing up of the acts of terrorism and violence across the

country.

• America is committing the blunder of holding backdoor negotiations with the Taliban, without

involving Pakistan.

• Washington plans to pull out allied countries’ troops from Afghanistan by year 2013 and keep

10,000-15,000 Special Forces or Marines present there with their bases in Kabul and Kandahar.

• Washington plans to wage a covert war against the ‘terrorists’ using the drone strikes and

surgical operations.

• Most of the operations, it is feared, will be conducted within the Pakistani territory.

• After the recent attack on the NATO headquarters as well as the US embassy in Kabul, Leon

Panetta, the US defence secretary, held in his press talk the Haqqani Network (HN) responsible

and that “Pakistan has failed to dismantle the network”.

• He threatened of a unilateral surgical operation against the HN inside Pakistan territory.

• If the US continues to using drone strikes or conducts direct incursions into Pakistan territory,

then the anti-Americanism will rise in the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan.

• The Pakistan government and national security institutions will be left with no option but to

respond to the assault on its sovereignty and violations of its territorial integrity.

• This would not only spoil the Pakistan-US relationship, but also ravage the achievements made

so far in the WOT.

• Consequently the world at large would suffer a lot in terms of benefiting the outcome of WOT,

putting further the world peace at stake.

• Pentagon must be aware that the situation on ground is not conducive for surgical operations, as

in Afghanistan and other neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran; the hatred for

Americans is at its height.

• China and Russia would also not like the US to linger on the Afghanistan imbroglio for a

longer period of time.

• The sooner the Americans leave Afghanistan, the better it would be for peace in the region.

• If America militarily quits Afghanistan, then there is a possibility that a broad-based

government is installed in Kabul.

• If the exit is delayed, then it is obvious that the Taliban would make their comeback possible.

• They have hardened in their experience of fighting the Americans; they know the Americans

have betrayed them many a time after using them against the Soviet Union; they left the Taliban

in lurch and turned their guns on them terming the Taliban their enemy.

• Now the Taliban do not trust anybody, they trust only themselves.

• If the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan, then the covert war would be difficult for American

Special Forces or Marines to continue.

• This would result in an unprecedented defeat for the Americans, which would cause them the

neurosis to differentiate between the friend and foe.

• If the Americans want a safe and sound honourable exit from Afghanistan, the region in

particular and the world in general becomes safer place, then they must quit Afghanistan

immediately.

• They should follow the policy of consultation, taking all political powers and neighbouring

countries into confidence, and pave way for a broad-based government in Afghanistan.

• Washington, instead of keeping the negotiations with the Taliban secret, needs to realize the

vitality of Islamabad’s role in bringing peace and normalcy to Afghanistan.

• The US must not forget that Pakistan is directly affected to whatever happens in Afghanistan,

as Pakistan is the party to the dispute.

• It should not make the mistake of direct unilateral attacks on Pakistan; it has to trust the

Pakistan armed forces and their capability to fight.

• Our armed forces have proved by defeating the inimical forces in the asymmetrical guerrilla

war.

• Such a victory is not even in the credit of the superpower of America.

• Washington needs to facilitate the armed forces of Pakistan in moving ahead to defeat terrorism

keeping in view its own ground realities.

• Be it the terrorists belonging to Haqqani Network or any other group, Washington should not

pressure Islamabad and instead realize the realities on ground.

• Nor should it stop the military and economic aid to Pakistan on the pretext of apprehensions or

coercive conditions.

• The country’s armed forces and its people have rendered countless sacrifices in this war.

• If the Americans fail to comply, then Afghanistan will not only prove to be another Vietnam

for them, but also the hydra-headed monster of terrorism will once again come out to shatter the

world peace.

• Such a situation is posing grave threat and multiple challenges to Pakistan.

• It is hoped that Washington would follow the advice, otherwise if the surgical operations

intensify, and under-the-cover violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty are made; it would be

construed that the strategic assets of the country would be targeted.

• The possible takeover of the Taliban in Afghanistan and its impacts on Pakistan would not be

ignorable.

• The closure of US aid may cause economic repercussions in Pakistan, for which Islamabad

should get ready.

• The US incursions within Pakistan territory will have to be stopped, the strategic assets will

have to preserved, Indo-Israel-US intelligence agencies’ activities will have to be countered, the

presence and number of American officials working on various joint missions will have to be

reduced to a minimum level; and the headway in the in the war against terrorism will have to be

made to an extent where a ‘live and let live’ environment could be created.

• Now the situation in Afghanistan should not be allowed to affect Pakistan so to stop further

destruction.

• Now the situation should not be seen with an eye of friendship with America, rather it should

be seen in the context of greater national interests.

Ten Reasons to End the Occupation of

Afghanistan

1. US and NATO occupation creates civilian casualties, angering Afghans.

2. Military occupation has hampered humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts.

3. Afghan women continue to face violence and oppression under the occupation.

4. US policy has empowered warlords, drug lords and the Taliban.

5. The occupation contributes to violence and destabilization for ordinary Afghans, including

refugees.

6. NATO allies and military leaders are questioning the occupation.

7. US troop casualties in Afghanistan are on the rise.

8. Afghans are calling for a negotiated end to the war.

9. Military escalation will only increase the violence, and potentially lead to a wider War

involving nuclear-armed Pakistan.

10. Military occupation of Afghanistan does not curb terrorism.

Recommendations for a Changed US Policy

1. Set a swift timetable for the withdrawal of US and NATO military forces, to be

substituted by UN forces for short-term security.

2. Immediately cease air strikes on targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

3. Support negotiations between all parties involved in the conflict, including Afghan

Women leaders.

4. Reform humanitarian aid and reconstruction funding efforts to prioritize Afghan

organizations over foreign contractors. Ensure that funded projects address the needs and

requests of Afghans and are not simply pet projects of foreign donors.

5. Invest in long-term aid that increases self-reliance such as sustainable agriculture

efforts.

6. Immediately discontinue the use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which are

Costly, inefficient, and have militarized the aid process.

7. Standardize, increase, and publicly document compensation to Afghan families And

communities affected by US military actions.

8. Sign the treaty to ban cluster bombs, pay for cluster bomb and landmine clean up In

Afghanistan, and pledge never to use these weapons again.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Roshan wadhwani

Pak-US Relations

[B]Outline:

• Introduction

• Defence Alliance SEATO And CENTO

• Indo-Pak Wars Of 1965 And 1971

• Pak-US Relations During Afghanistan Crisis

• Relations After 9/11

• US Reaction To Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests

• War On Terrorism And Pakistan’s Role

• Critical Analysis

• Conclusion.

I think that the overall outline is fine but needs some more refinement. I suggest you make it in

this way:

1- Introduction

2-Historical Perspective:

Defence Alliance SEATO and CENTO

PK-Indo war of 1965 and 1971

PK-US relation during Afghanistan crisis

3- Factors affecting Pak-US relation:

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal

Pakistan's strategic position in the region

US war on terror

China factor

4-Recent developments:

Drone attacks

Abbottabad operation

Post-Abbotabad relations

5-Critical analysis

6-Conclusion

Regards

This question was asked in 2011

AF-Pak policy

What is AF-Pak policy; how to manage its implication on Pakistan? • AF-Pak policy is a new American war scheme of an old war is Afghanistan.

• It is three-pronged strategy: military surge in Afghanistan; more participation of Afghan

civilian parts and involving Pakistan.

• The AF-Pak policy has serious implications on Pakistan.

• The increase in drone attacks, 'do more syndrome' and American intelligence involvement in

Pakistan speak volumes.

• Pakistan has to bring all its diplomatic and political forces united to protect its national and

strategic interests.

• The paper will define the angles of AF-Pak policy and some suggestions for managing interests

of Pakistan.

AFPAK Policy Three dimensions

a) Military surge in Afghanistan. 1) 30000 more troops (totalling 137,000)

2) Starting withdrawal from July 2011

b) Making civilian parts less dysfunctional 1) Fight against corruption.

2) Good and bad' Taliban.

c) To work with Pakistani government. 1) Aid (Military and non-military).

2) Long-term cooperation promise.

Suggestion for Pakistan 1) Challenge drone attacks.

2) Question American quick withdrawal.

3) Durand Line infiltration check.

4) Working close with Afghan administration.

Afghan pull-out: Pakistan needs to revise its role

So what must we do?

• Pakistan must be on the right side of history.

• That means that we must consider and respect the needs and wishes of the Afghan people.

• The Taliban may not be popular, but neither is Hamid Karzai.

• Our negotiations with non-state actors and individuals are unsustainable in the long-run, and

risks inflaming public opinion against us.

• Efforts should be made to resolve differences and grievances with non-Pashtun groups.

• Importantly, what is often overlooked is the dispute over the Durand Line.

• Afghanistan still disputes the Durand Line as a working international boundary.

• Resolution of this issue once and for all, rather than brushing it under the diplomatic table

would help calm the Pakistani establishment’s fears of an unfriendly Afghan government stirring

up trouble along the border.

• As for negotiations, it’s obvious that in the most conflict ridden parts of Afghanistan, the east

and the south east, local communities are between a rock and a hard place.

• Both ISAF and the Taliban are unpopular.

• Communities want to see an end to violence.

• Pakistan should do what it can to facilitate this process, but do so without taking sides overtly

or covertly.

• If not then we will return to the early 1990s.

• The West will pump money from a distance into a dysfunctional government in Kabul.

• Ethnic and regional factions will divide the country up, and Pakistan will be accused of

interfering and pushing its agenda in another country.

• After all, treating the Afghan’s in the same way, we accuse the US of treating us, is not going

to win us many Afghan friends.