AFRICAN UNION

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africaN UNioNYale Model United Nations Korea

May 17 - 19, 2013

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Table of Contents

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History of the Committee 3

Topic I: African Partnerships of the 21st Century

History 4

Current Situation 5

Bloc Positions 9

Questions to Consider 10

Suggestions for Further Reading 11

Topic II: State Failure and Reconstruction in Africa

History 13

Current Situation 16

Questions to Consider 24

Suggestions for Further Reading 26

Role of the Committee 30

Structure of the Committee 31

Notes 33

Following the beginning of widespread decolonization across Africa in the 1950’s, African governments were restructured with the advent of social-ist movements, military leaders, and nationalism. Freshly emancipated from colonial protection, many countries were left without strong militaries or international relationships to ensure their security and development. In the 1958, Kwame Nkhrumah of Ghana founded an early organization with Guinea and Mali to establish the Union of African States, a politically Marxist union that fell apart in 1962 over shift-ing allegiances between the US and USSR. In 1963 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established, with the intent to join 32 nations to-gether to speak with a unified voice for the continent. The OAU quickly gained symbolic power in the midst of conti-nent-wide decolonization, but bureau-cratic complications and a weak char-ter drew extensive criticism throughout the continent, as the OAU appeared to achieve few concrete results. Restricted in large part by their founding charter, the OAU held a strict interpretation of sovereignty that often held it back

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History of the Committee

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from even symbolical intervention. Additional international cooperation took place through groups like the African Economic Community, but often lacked coordination or consis-tent membership. With the growing humanitarian crises in the late 80’s, there was dissas-tifaction with the ineffectual stances of the OAU. By the mid-90’s the Rwan-dan genocide, repressive regimes, and bloody civil wars across the continent had highlighted the need for a more active international body. Driven forward by Libyan President Muam-mar Qaddafi, the African Union was founded by the Sirte Declaration in 1999. In July 2002, the Union began work and has been involved in inter-ventions and humanitarian relief from the Ivory Coast and the Congo to So-malia, and recently pledged $50 mil-lion for interventions in Mali. Today, the AU has 54 member states.

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independence of African states, but the fledgling democracies and econo-mies quickly collapsed during the eco-nomic turmoil of the 1970s, leaving Africa lagging far behind other coun-tries throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

During the Cold War, foreign aid graduated from an emergency relief regimen to a tool of international diplomacy, used by both NATO and the USSR to sway the opinions of countries belonging to the unaligned Third World. The neoliberal focus on democracy and aid for economic development that began in the 1980s now keeps old agreements in place, whether through governments or pri-vate donors.

Topic I: African Partnerships of the 21st Century

Foreign aid first rose to prominence in the early 1960s, arising out of the intersection between the rising tide of decolonization and the bi-polar inter-national political system. Certainly, there were aid programs prior to the decolonization of Africa and southern Asia, the Marshall Plan in post-World War Two Europe being one of the most famous, but it is only since the end of formalized imperialism that foreign aid has come to the fore, espe-cially on the heavily colonized conti-nent of Africa.

The decolonization movement of the 1950s and 1960s resulted in the

Topic History

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Union’s predecessor, the Organization for African Unity. NEPAD addresses six major themes: agriculture and food security, climate change and national resource management, regional in-tegration and infrastructure, human development, economic and corporate governance, and other cross-cutting issues such as gender or capacity development. NEPAD currently pro-vides a framework for further govern-ment-initiated development in Africa. The main subtopics of foreign aid are the conditionality of foreign aid, its allocation across the conti-nent, its effects on democratization, whether the provision of aid creates dependency upon it or development of the economy, and whether foreign investment might be a better course for countries in Africa to advocate for.

Africa is currently the largest recipi-ent of foreign aid in the world: 46% of global aid goes toward the continent. Many of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa receive aid donations which equal or exceed their own GDPs, and, for those that do not, only very few receive aid equal to or less than 20% of GDP. Foreign aid is therefore an important issue for much of Africa, as the continent’s economic and politi-cal strength rests upon this essential influx of capital. In 2001, to address the need for greater coordination of African Union member states development policies, the New Partnership for Africa’s De-velopment (NEPAD) was created by the founding members of the African

Current Situation

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an increased credibility of aid condition-ality related to support for human rights and democratic freedoms: states no longer could turn away from countries that acquiesced to some aid demands and took their side on an issue while also being dictatorial or authoritarian. However, the increased importance of oil reserves in West Africa and other resources on the continent muddy the waters here a bit, as do security concerns related to global terrorism - which some argue has driven US aid policies globally

Conditionality of Foreign AidForeign aid is not often given “for free”; rather, it frequently comes with conditions as to its use and provision. This conditionality of foreign aid is one of the most effective ways of ensuring that the donating country’s interests in the recipient country are protected. However, it is also entire-ly predicated upon the credibility of the provision of aid: if it seems likely that non-compliance with the aid conditions will go unpunished, states will simply treat the aid as if there were no conditions. If there is high credibility of aid conditionality, the conditions of the aid are more likely to be complied with. Additionally, some forms of government may be more responsive to conditions at-tached to aid than others, supporting the notion that any aid strategy must be tailored to the particulars of the recipient country. Originally, foreign aid to Af-rica, just as with most other foreign aid during the Cold War, was pre-cipitated upon the “strategic consid-erations” of donor states. Therefore, Thad Dunning, a professor at Yale, asserts that the end of the bipolar system of the Cold War resulted in

Effects on DemocratizationProvision of funds to countries, as conditional as it might be, often still goes to countries which do not neces-sarily have a fully-functioning liberal democracy (a democracy where one’s civil liberties are guaranteed). In fact, it seems more correlated with

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across the continent of Africa. Somestates, such as Senegal, Ethiopia, or Uganda, receive greater than 50% of GDP in foreign aid, while others, such as Algeria or South Africa, receive un-der 10%. However, despite this great need, corruption remains a problem for many of those most in need. Af-rican countries received $22.5bn in aid in 2008, but a 2002 African Union study showed that corruption cost Africa nearly $150bn, a number which has likely only risen. Obviously, some countries in Africa do have a greater need than others, but how should funds be used by African countries such that they may be working for the benefit of all, rather than merely the political elites?

geopolitical factors than a sense of civic duty: former colonies—such as many African states—receive dispro-portional amounts of aid. Many of these countries retain authoritarian vestiges, but the continuing provisions of aid for these governments may serve to prop them up. However, what are the effects on aid where democratization does happen? How can a democratic system use aid more effectively for the good of the country in the future rather than addressing short-sighted problems which loom large in the minds of the people?

Foreign aid is not equally distributedAllocation of Foreign Aid

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How can the African Union itself help to develop an anti-corruption infra-structure and normalize non-corrup-tive practices in member states?

An alternative to the commonly seen aid regimens for providing economic assistance to developing/undeveloped countries is through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). For example, during 2010, more than 50% of China’s foreign aid was in the form of interest-free and concessional loans, about 80% of which went to Asia and Africa. As a reciprocal arrangement between the debtor and creditor countries, FDI has certain ad-vantages which have increased it from $165.5bn in 2000 to $470.8bn in 2007. This increase has mainly been directed toward the BRIC states as well as Latin American countries, but it has been on the rise in Africa as well: countries have been working to increase their business friendliness and, with some help from FDI, been able to post continual growth numbers for their economies.

Dependency vs. DevelopmentThe injection of foreign capital into the markets of the developing and unde-veloped economies of much of Africa may engender a dependency upon this influx of capital rather than promot-ing the development of independent African markets. Former Goldman Sachs economist Dambisa Moyo lays into this with her book Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, asserting that aid regimens continue to be a pox on African economic development, effec-tively chaining the governments to the corruptive influence of easy money. On the other hand, from an African perspective, aid can be seen as a form of government stimulus, a boon to the economy and a means of stimu-lating African consumption of goods. Which of these is truly the case? Is aid to Africa the same as rewarding some-one for underperforming, or is it closer to social welfare that allows people to survive periods of crisis?

Foreign Aid vs. Foreign Investment

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With regard to foreign aid, there are no major blocs, as much of the debate appears to be concentrated in civil society. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some countries may still feel the need for overt sponsorship of countries via aid, and rising countries may see foreign aid and investment as a way to secure influence abroad.

Some countries will strongly support increased aid, seeing it as a promoter of de-mocracy and stable economic conditions in neighboring countries, highlighting past successes. Other countries may be quite critical of aid, seeing its misuse and a perceived lack of democratic progress in countries with large amounts of foreign aid.

Idealistic arguments may drive some, but national interests often collide with broad solutions - and plans must be able to work on the ground if there is going to be real progress.

Bloc Positions

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Keep in mind these questions:

• Does aid really promote democracy?

• Should our values be those of Western liberal democratic systems, or can we find some uniquely African modes of governance, which still guarantees civil liberties?

• How can we avoid misuse of funding?

• Does aid promote a dependency on industrialized powers or does it help jump-start economic development?

• How should we parcel out foreign aid, both among states and within countries themselves? Which groups are most in need? What constitutes “greater need?”

Questions to Consider

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Aid is Political – and not always in a sinister way.http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0218/Uganda-election-Four-reasons-donor-nations-won-t-turn-their-

backs-on-President-Museveni/Somalia?nav=topic-tag_topic_page-storyList

Getting countries to work together can often mean supporting weak governments and forgiving flaws to ensure successful partnerships. How much can we give up for the sake of unity? What are our priorities when we we work to combat things as catastrophic as famine and war?

When Does Aid Work?http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0728/Four-reasons-help-is-slow-to-reach-Somalia-s-famine-victims/Al-

Shabab

If aid is the only money pouring into a country in crisis, it only makes sense that militant groups seize it as a stream of revenue. How do we respond to situations of crisis without exacerbating them? Must we commit military resources alongside humanitarian aid? What kinds of commitments are we willing to make, especially after knowing the US and UN are unlikely to intervene after Mogadishu?

Justice After the Fact – An African Question?http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/02/201321411585438138.html

Tyrants in African have committed some of the worst humanitarian crimes imagin-able – genocide, systemic exploitation and oppression, the use of famine, mass rape, and amputation as tactics in war. Once out of power, how does a country heal? And what do we do with deposed leaders? Are we concerned about justice? And who would dispense it?

Suggestions for Further Reading

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The ICC has taken on cases like Charles Taylor from Liberia, but they make slow progress and are far from the people he affected. Should justice be served by the citizens? Is justice what a healing country needs? How can a country come back together after something that turns neighbors and family members against each other? How can you rebuild when you know the man who killed your mother, your brother, your wife? Can the AU handle these kind of crimes? Can any one country? Can the ICC? How can we move forward?

Remarks With African Union Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma After Her Meeting with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/11/201178.htm

Plans for UN-AU Cooperationhttp://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/unlo

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With African nations finally cele-brating their independence, the 1960s was hailed as the decade of optimism for a formerly colonial Africa. This sentiment soon deteriorated as Af-rican nations began to face a myriad of economic, social, and political challenges that caused stagnation in many. Between the 1970s and 2000s, political disorder and violent conflict undermined many African nations; civil war rocked Angola, Sierra Le-one, and Nigeria, while corrupt and often violent leaders such as Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire), Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and Idi Amin in Uganda eroded state function and legitimacy. The African continent has also experienced varying degrees of state failure in Somalia, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Libe-ria, Guinea, Rwanda, Ivory Coast and Chad. The most severe of these state failures resulted in complex

humanitarian emergencies that often precipitated international interven-tions.

What is a “Failed State”?

The term “state failure” has two main senses: failure of the state to control actors and processes within its territo-ry, and failure of the state to promote

Topic II: State Failure and reconstruction in africaTopic History

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generally incapable of providing social services, meaning that health care, education, food security, and social se-curity are severely inadequate. Failed states experiencing violent conflict of-ten face internal population displace-ments and migration.

Political and Security Problems Failed states lack effective and/or legit-imate governments. State failure often involves corruption and undemocratic electoral and political processes. Hu-man rights and the rule of law are of-ten violated, with the failed state being incapable or unwilling to protect civil liberties and political freedoms. State failure often involves the loss of state monopoly over the use of legitimate force, and may involve violent internal conflict and militancy from groups competing for political power.

Causes of State Failure

There is no single, simple explanation for state failure and we continue to debate the particular causes and path-ways of state collapse. Not all states fail for the same reasons, and countries that struggle with civil war and insta-bility cannot always follow the same paths to success. However, many

human flourishing and provide public goods. In the first sense, a failed state is one in which social and political institutions have partially or totally collapsed due to internal conflicts. State failure involves the loss of the physical control over territory, as well as the breakdown or total inefficacy of bureaucratic and judicial institutions. In the second sense, state failure is the inability to provide security and social services, either because of a lack of ca-pacity or due to a lack of political will. The US think-tank Fund for Peace lists several additional attributes of failed states, including widespread corrup-tion and criminal behavior, military interference in politics, violent con-flict, and the displacement and flight of internal populations.

Major Issues in Failed States

Social and Economic ProblemsFailed states often face economic de-cline, poverty, and economic disparity, which undermine the ability of states to provide public goods and may fuel social grievances and tensions. State failure also promotes human flight and brain drain, causing a vacuum of human capital that further complicates state recovery. Failed states are

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African countries share similar prob-lems, sometimes caused by regional crises like drought or cross-border resource conflict. Many cases of state failure in Africa result from a lack of capacity due to structural weaknesses inherit-ed from the colonial legacy. African nations were granted sovereignty as a result of decolonization and were assumed to be politically and eco-nomically viable entities, even though African colonies were not originally demarcated to exist as independent states. In reality, post-colonial Afri-can governments inherited extreme-ly complicated and often internally divided states. They often lacked the characteristics typical of sovereignty, such as territorial control, administra-tive presence, and a population with allegiance to the state. Most colonial governments were elementary bureau-cracies with limited personnel and finances, and administrative reach did not effectively extend much further than the capital city. The structural flaws that African nations inherited from their colonial legacy became dramatically apparent when local and global economic crises profoundly eroded governments’ revenue bases, incapacitating states’ ability to exercise physical and legislative control.

According to this view, the issue of state failure is largely about the extent to which the Western ideal of statehood has taken root, and some have argued that to talk of state failure is to obscure the reality that many African nations are still in stages of state formation.

Several contingent causes of state fail-ure in Africa have also been identified, including the failure of leadership and the presence of predatory actors such as warlords or ethnically-affiliated separat-ist movements. As the structural weak-ness of constitutional structures became apparent, African leaders strengthened and legitimized their rule through a sys-tem of politics through patrimony—that is to say, the gifting of political office for reasons of familial or tribal ties. With the emergence of patrimonial politics, authority was no longer dependent on popular support or legitimacy, but on

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one’s ability to accommodate power-ful political factions. The practice of patrimonial politics promoted the use of state apparatus for accruing person-al political power and wealth rather than for the delivery of public goods and the pursuit of state development. These strategies of securing personal power weakened the capacity of the state to provide public goods to all inhabitants fairly and equally. In ad-dition, warlords have been blamed for inflaming ethnic tensions and hasten-ing state failure in order to accumulate wealth through the control of formal and/or informal markets. Some scholars also argue that the attitude and response of the in-ternational community toward state failure has influenced the persistence of the problem in African nations. Upon independence, the United Na-tions and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) declared new African countries to be sovereign and ratified their borders. The international em-phasis on boundary stability contin-ues today, and it has been argued that this attitude has institutionalized state weakness and decline by dissociating a country’s economic and political performance with the legitimacy of its sovereign status.

Although state failure is not solely an African problem, it is arguably most widespread, deeply rooted and pressing in Africa. The World Bank’s Governance Matters 2008 report identified Africa as the global center of state failure. Africa contained nine of the 20 most politically unstable and potentially violent territo-ries, 13 of the 20 least effective govern-ments, and 12 of the 20 territories where the rule of law was weakest. In the 2012 Fund for Peace Failed States Index, the top ten failed states included six African countries, with Somalia ranking first and the Democratic Republic of Congo ranking second. African countries also constitute 15 of the top 20 failed states.

Current Situation

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The prevalence of state failure in Af-rica is a matter of international con-cern, as state failure may have seri-ous economic and security-related repercussions on local, regional, and even global scales. Failed states can spawn a variety of transnational secu-rity problems such as terrorism, arms proliferation, crime, disease, energy insecurity, and regional instability. For instance, the collapse of the DRC in 1998 sparked a regional conflict in-volving seven African countries, and the long-standing absence of authority in Somalia has led to piracy off the Somali coast that threatens interna-tional commercial waterways. More-over, with Africa accounting for an increasing proportion of worldwide oil exports and concerns rising about terrorist activities in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, state failures are projected to have even wider-ranging consequences in the future. The ques-tion of how best to strengthen weak states and prevent state failure has thus become an urgent international matter of the twenty-first century.

International Responses to State Failure

As failed states are generally perceived as lacking capacity for autonomous

recovery, intervention by the inter-national community has often been deemed necessary. The international community has led numerous external attempts to reassert state control in Africa’s failed states and to encourage Africa’s failing governments to guar-antee for their citizens basic human rights, as well as the availability of fundamental public goods.

The United Nations has played a prominent role in restoring peace to regions of armed conflict and in pro-moting the reconstruction of failed states. Traditional UN peacemaking efforts aim to end conflicts using diplomatic action and political nego-tiation. Recognizing that long-lasting peace and stability was attainable

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Sierra Leone, and Sudan. The African Union has also played an increasingly prominent role in promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa. The Africa Union’s Peace and Security Department (PSD) was created in 2003 to support efforts aimed at preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts. The PSD initially only provided support to peace build-ing missions led by other organiza-tions, but it has recently taken on a more active leadership role in African state reconstruction. For example, the AU partnered with the UN on a joint mission in Darfur, Sudan and the African Union Mission in Soma-lia (AMISOM) remains the principal actor in state reconstruction efforts in Somalia. Activities of the PSD are managed by four divisions: the Con-flict Management Division (CMD) which focuses on conflict prevention and management; the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), which plans, mounts, and manages AU peace support operations; the Peace and Se-curity Council Secretariat, which pro-vides administrative and operational support to the PSD and coordinates its actions with other organizations; and the Defense and Security Divi-sion (DSD), which focuses on security issues and arms control.

only by addressing the root causes of state failure, the UN expanded its peacekeeping operations to include state reconstruction efforts as part of the Peacebuilding Commission es-tablished in 2005. UN peace building operations aim to strengthen national institutions and to enhance the ca-pacity of the state to effectively and legitimately carry out its functions. The objective of state reconstruction is to restore state power by reestab-lishing political institutions, including governmental, judicial, and policing bodies. Current UN peacekeeping operations can involve establishing and monitoring ceasefires, demobi-lizing and reintegrating combatants, assisting the return of refugees and displaced persons, supporting the im-plementation of a peace process, pro-viding electoral assistance, supporting justice and security sector reform, and enhancing human rights protec-tions. The UN has conducted nineteen “complex peacekeeping operations” – which involved institution building as well as peacemaking efforts - since the end of the Cold War, ten of which were in Africa. They have taken place in Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Libe-ria, Mozambique, Namibia,

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Obstacles to State Reconstruction

The limited success of reconstruction efforts has led some to question the efficacy of outside intervention. Inter-national state reconstruction efforts assume that failed states are incapable of self-recovery and that external (of-ten Western) knowledge and strategies are crucial to rebuilding state institu-tions. But attempts to mold African state institutions to western templates through democratization efforts and economic reforms have often been met with resistance from African gov-ernments. Reconstruction agreements typically create new institutions, but these lack any real power if African leaders continually defer to corrupt institutions that existed prior to exter-nal intervention.

Moreover, reconstruction agreements often ignore non-state, informal

institutions that develop as providers of social services in the wake of state failure. This approach has been criti-cized for neglecting local agency and indigenous capacities for institution building and for failure to recognize that the success of reconstruction efforts depends ultimately on local actors. The case of Somaliland, for example, suggests that successful state building does not require in-ternational involvement. Somaliland seceded from Somalia after central government collapsed in 1991 and independently developed public in-stitutions restoring basic stability and order and economic activity. Though Somaliland is to this day unrecog-nized by most countries as an inde-pendent state entity, it is possibly the most successful recent instance of state building in Africa, despite its lack of external assistance. While external reconstruction assistance may be crucial in initiating and financing the steps necessary for stabilization, such as disarmament, humanitarian assistance, and the provision of economic incentives for leaders and elites to join peace and reconstruction processes, such short-term stabilization efforts may be insuf-ficient for the long-term establishment of sustainable state institutions.

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for power and resources facilitated by power-sharing agreements and promises of foreign aid. Such situa-tions have in the past brought about corruption and continued violence rather than reconstruction. Donated financial assistance often provides such governments with incentives to implement superficial and ineffective policies in return for more assistance (which can actually be used for cor-rupt ends), thus sabotaging rather than promoting the reconstruction process. Another conundrum in state reconstruction processes is the role and contribution of foreign finan-cial aid. One major difficulty in state reconstruction is the unwillingness of international donors to maintain com-mitments to the costly and lengthy effort of state construction. Recon-struction is financially demanding: in the DRC alone, the MONUC peace-keeping operation can cost more than $1 billion a year. Reconstruction aid is thus typically short lived, with pledges peaking soon after the formal recon-struction agreement, and then rapidly declining. As a result, reconstruction efforts are often superficial and limited in their capacity to contribute to the restoration of lasting peace and securi-ty. Foreign donors also have different

Opponents of top-down reconstruc-tion advocate that reconstruction support domestic efforts at recon-struction, and thus aim to foster state formation rather than to create new state institutions. Fostering state for-mation might involve mediating in-teractions between state and non-state actors, such as the local media, human rights organizations, and businesses, in order to promote political order and state accountability while maintaining local ownership of the reconstruction process. Another issue in state recon-struction is that transition govern-ments created for the reconstruction process are often problematic, as pow-er-sharing agreements tend to bring together the very political elite in-volved in the original state failure and/or conflict. Moreover, African leaders and foreign promoters of reconstruc-tion policies do not necessarily share the same understanding of failure and reconstruction. While foreign do-nors envision reconstruction as a new beginning after a political crisis, some African elites benefit from ongoing political instability by accruing per-sonal political power and wealth. For some elites, reconstruction means a return to politics as usual and is per-ceived as continued competition

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erceptions of the role of the state and non-state sectors in promoting eco-nomic development and providing social services; this dualism has of-ten produced inconsistencies in the amount of effort extended towards strengthening the capacity of state institutions.

Finally, the logic of state reconstruc-tion and its adherence to Western no-tions of statehood are being increas-ingly criticized. Scholars argue that attempts at “rebuilding” states that never demonstrated state function in the first place are flawed, and that the real solution to state failure in Africa lies in developing political communi-ties and civil societies that can provide public goods and gain recognition in wider global politics. Peace building efforts should thus not concentrate on resurrecting the old failed state, but rather accept alternatives to failed

states that are more congruent with the ways in which power is actually exercised, whether or not these re-semble Western ideals of statehood. The case of Somalia (and the now effectively autonomous Somaliland) demonstrates that alternative political units and structures already exist, but very few of them are granted official international recognition. This alter-native process would require the inter-national community to provide rec-ognition to those political units that are actually providing political order, as opposed to the ailing institutions of the failed state.

Somalia: A Case Study

Somalia has been synonymous with state failure for over twenty years. The country has been without an effective central government since clan mili-tias overthrew President Said Barre in 1991. Disagreement over a replace-ment plunged the country into war-fare between rival clans and left all in-stitutions of governance disintegrated. Years of conflict and natural disasters have led to the deaths of over 1 million people, and Somalia consistently ranks as one of the world’s poorest and most violent countries, plagued by warring militias, bandits and famine.

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little success by the time UNOSOM II ended in 1995. Following withdraw-al from Somalia, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was created in 1995 to support various initiatives by NGOs, local leaders, and regional political organizations to pro-mote peace and state reconstruction in Somalia. UNPOS has also collabo-rated with the African Union’s Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in supporting Somalia’s internationally recognized Transitional National Governments.

Although Somalia has lacked a perma-nent central government since 1991, several local systems of governance and sources of authority have emerged alongside international reconstruction efforts to provide political order. At the local and municipal levels, gover-nance structures include coalitions of clan elders, businessmen, and Muslim clergies. At the regional level, political

The UN has been active in Somalia since 1991 delivering humanitarian assistance, implementing recovery and development programs both directly and through partnerships with Non-Governmental Organiza-tions and the African Union. The first United Nations Operation in Soma-lia (UNOSOM I) was established in April 1992 with the aim of restoring peace and providing humanitarian assistance. Six main United Nations organizations contributed to human-itarian efforts in Somalia: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Na-tions Development Program (UNDP), UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-ugees (UNHCR), WFP and the World Health Organization (WHO). These efforts are estimated to have saved at least a quarter of a million lives. UNO-SOM I was followed by UNOSOM II, which aimed to restore peace through disarmament and national political reconciliation, and to re-establish So-malia’s institutional structure by reha-bilitating the country’s economy and infrastructure. Though a ceasefire agreement was reached in March 1992, this was largely ignored, and the UN’s na-tion-building initiatives had garnered

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power has been organized around the capital city of Mogadishu as well as the northern regions of the ‘Republic of Somaliland’ (which declared itself an independent republic in 1991) and ‘Puntland’ (which declared itself an autonomous state within Somalia in May 1998). These parallel sources of au-thority within Somalia have compet-ing views of the state. The internation-al community supports the restoration of a central government in Somalia, which is considered imperative both for economic development and for safeguarding against terrorist activ-ities. While this view is shared by Somalis who are likely to benefit from the resurrection of a central govern-ment, many Somalis are suspicious of state-building efforts because they see the state as an instrument of wealth accumulation and political domina-tion for a few corrupt elites who en-rich and empower themselves while exploiting and oppressing the rest. In August 2012, Somalia’s first formal parliament in more than 20 years was sworn in, marking the end of an eight-year transitional period.

Despite this hopeful development, infighting between clans for political power continues to undermine at-tempts to establish a unified national identity. Continued instability and violence spawn human rights abuses, and over a quarter of the population is either internally displaced or living outside of the country as refugees. In light of these deeply entrenched politi-cal and humanitarian problems, So-malia still poses a challenge to peace building and state reconstruction efforts.

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Keep in mind these questions:

• International groups and NGOs have been trying to help stabilize the Congo for decades – are there signs of progress? And what credit can we give international aid and intervention?

• Now that the UN will be involved, what is the outlook for long-term intervention? How does the African Union respond to UN missions of peacekeeping and stabili-zation? Where are the African Union’s limited resources best used?

• How can we improve on AU failures in the Congo?

• Underfunded, Understaffed, and Overmatched – What is the African Union’s role?

• With so many problems, who can we lean on for leadership and resource commit-ments?

• Many African countries are a patchwork of allegiances, ethnicities, and religions, assembled haphazardly into their present borders. What does it mean to respect the sovereignty of a country? What makes a revolutionary movement legitimate? Should every tribal group have its own nation? Are semiautonomous regions better off on their own, or part of a governing whole? What makes civil war about free-dom and what makes it about power? Can we ever support revolution if it means such indiscriminate violence?

Questions to Consider

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When writing your position papers, consider these points:

• What should be the role of the UN and the AU in brokering peace agreements in nations experiencing internal conflicts?

• How should the international community respond to humanitarian crises in failed states?

• What should be the responsibilities of the international community in the recon-struction of failed states?

• How can the underlying causes of state failure be addressed in state reconstruc-tion efforts?

• In what ways can the challenges of state reconstruction be overcome?

Questions to Consider

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• Peacebuilding and Counter-terrorism in Somalia o http://kroc.nd.edu/sites/default/files/Somalia_book.pdf

• Statebuilding in Humanitarian Crisis o http://www.enoughproject.org/files/Somalia%20State-Building.pdf

• Foreign Affairs - On Somalia o http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65462/bronwyn-bruton/in-the- quicksands-of-somalia

• Political Problems in Somalia o http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.74

• Ugandan Intervention in Somalia o http://www.independent.co.ug/the-last-word/the-last-word/6393-ugandas- state-building-in-somalia

• More Reading Suggestions o http://www.fragilestates.org/2012/02/27/what-to-read-on-somalia/

Suggestions for Further Reading

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Books:While all the books on this list will help you develop your understanding of the complexity of the issues we’ll be addressing, I’ll quickly recommend these two. They are both very readable and focus more on a story than exhaustive data, but have different insights on development and stability.

Confessions of an Economic Hitman by John Perkins

While it’s a quick, entertainingly conspiratorial read, this book offers some window into the ways that aid and structural adjustment can be used as political tools. John Perkins describes his time working as an economic consultant for groups like the World Bank and USAID, and details how the promise of economic development can saddle countries with crippling debt – arguing that this is sometimes the goal, so that large Western countries can use debt and debt relief to control developing nations across the globe.

We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families by Phil-ip Gourevitch

This book tells the story of the 1994 Rwandan genocide through interviews gath-ered by the author over several years around Rwanda. Incredibly powerful, it de-scribes the ways that Rwandan society slipped over the edge into genocidal violence and spends time with the survivors as they try to rebuild their society again. Goure-vitch is a stunningly good writer, and he brings the sadness and hope of the people he profiles to life. While the book is most fundamentally about the genocide, most of the last third is dedicated to teasing apart different responses to the crisis in the years following. It follows Rwandan politicians attempting reconciliation, neigh-bors piecing communities back together, and long discussions of how to implement justice, or whether to try to at all. Most pressingly, it examines the effects of human-itarian aid, tracking the ways that it supported both the refugees and the fleeing killers, providing supplies and a safe haven for them to reassert their power and restart cycles of violence in the refugee and internal displacement camps.

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Africa Unchained: A Blueprint for Development, George AyitteyThe Fate of Africa, Martin MeredithGetting Somalia Wrong, by Mary HarperIn My Father’s House, by Kwame Anthony AppiahFixing Failed States: A Framework for a Fractured World, by Ashraf Ghani & Clare Lockhart

Movies:Zimbabwe – State of DenialInvisible Children

While they’ve taken criticism for their Kony 2012 campaign, the Invisible Children movement started with this movie – filmed by three film students who literally went to Africa with cameras to see what was happening. Starting in Southern Su-dan, they followed refugees south into Uganda, where they found villages where hundreds of children would walk miles into the nearest city every night to sleep in hospitals and bus pavillions, all in an effort to avoid being abduction into child soldiery. A very personal look at one of the large problems facing Africa, this mov-ie does offer some perspective on the ways rebel groups affect local communities. These groups often straddle borders (in this case between Chad, Uganda, and the Sudan) and can draw out civil wars for decades. In a similar vein, though even less married to any particular facts, I would recommend Blood Diamond, The Inter-preter, and The Last King of Scotland, if only because they’re good films.

Newspapers:Most major news outlets have regular news on Africa. Particularly good ones in-clude the following: Al-Jazeera BBC New York Times Wall Street Journal Le Monde The Guardian

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Articles:All of the journal articles cited here may be found online in commonly accessible databases such as JSTOR, ProQuest, etc.

Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth, March 2000: 33-63.Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. “Foreign Aid and Policy Conces-sions.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, April 2007: 251-284.Dalfaard, Carl-Johan, Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp. “On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth.” The Economic Journal, June 2004: F191-F216.Goldsmith, Arthur A. “Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa.” International Organi-zation, Winter 2001: 123-148.Hattori, Tomohisa. “Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid.” Review of International Politi-cal Economy, Winter 2001: 633-660.Knack, Stephen. “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?” International Studies Quarterly, March 2004: 251-266.Lancaster, Carol. “Redesigning Foreign Aid.” Foreign Affairs, Sep.-Oct. 2000: 74-88.Mosley, Paul, John Hudson, and Arjan Verschoor. “Aid, Poverty Reduction, and the ‘New Conditionality’.” The Economic Journal, June 2004: F217-F243.Mourmouras, Alex, and Peter Pangazas. “Foreign Aid Policy and Sources of Pover-ty: A Quantitative Framework.” IMF Staff Papers, 2007: 59-90.Woods, Ngaire. “The Shifting Politics of Foreign Aid.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), March 2005: 393-409.Wright, Joseph. “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science, July 2009: 552-571.

In addition to the above suggestions, feel free to expand upon the topics you find interesting!

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Since its founding, the AU has been guided by a number of strategic plans, as well as primary documents such as “The Constitutive Act of the African Union.” In these documents, the vision of the African Union is stated to be “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dy-namic force in global arena.” The various documents establish the working organs of the African Union (different committees, bodies, secretariats) as well as the extent of the Union’s power. Notably, the AU explicity gives the organization the power to interfere in the affairs of a member state for human rights and humani-tarian reasons. This represents one of the first codifications of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.

Since its founding, the AU has been active internationally and in African issues. Of its actions, the Union’s peacekeeping force in Darfur is likely the most high-profile. Since 2003, the AU has maintained a presence in the region that has had question-able effect in preventing human rights abuses. The AU has also spearheaded other military actions across the continent – notably Somalia, Burundi, and Anjouan.To this day, the AU has been unable to escape questions about the value of its role in the region. Nevertheless, the AU continues to be a voice for African unity and human rights on the world stage.

Role of the Committee

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Debate will follow standard parliamentary procedure as described by the con-ference. All documents, including resolutions will be in standard format. Exam-ples may be found on our website. Working papers and resolutions should not be planned in advance, but position papers are required. Voting on procedural and substantive issues will, again, follow standard rules of parliamentary procedure.

Position papers are required for this committee and should be one to two pages per topic in standard format. Examples can be found on the YMUN website. Papers submitted early can expect feedback from the Dais, and papers must be submitted by the first committee session in order to be eligible for awards. Working papers and agreed conclusions should not be planned in advance, though delegates are en-couraged to discuss their position papers in committee. Voting on procedural and substantive issues will follow standard rules of parliamentary procedure.

To submit your position papers and for all questions, please contact the chair:

Michael Harris (michael.harris@yale.edu)

Our council includes all AU. These countries are listed below: • Burundi • Guinea • Kenya • Liberia • Malawi • Namibia • Niger • Sao Tome and Principe • Zimbabwe • Benin • Botswana • Lesotho

Structure of the Committee

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• Mali • Senegal • Uganda • United Republic of Tanzania • Algeria • Angola • Chad • Cote d’Ivoire • Democratic Republic of the Congo • Mauritania • Mozambique • Nigeria • Rwanda • Sierra Leone • South Sudan • Sudan • Swaziland • Ethiopia • Mauritius • Ghana • Somalia • South Africa • Egypt

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Bates, R. H. When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Englebert, P. and Tull, D.M. Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa. International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2008), pp. 106–139 Menkhaus, K. State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts. Review of African Political Economy, No. 97 (2003), pp. 405–422. Messner, J.J., ed. The Fund for Peace Failed States Index 2012. The Fund for Peace. 2012. <www.failedstatesin-dex.org> Milliken, J., and Krause, K. State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies. Development and Change, Vol. 33, No. 5, pp. 753–774. Oxford, 2002. Williams, P.D. State Failure in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Responses. Africa South of the Sahara 2010. 39th Edition, pp.21-28.

Notes