Agranoff_Robert -Inside Collaborative Networks.pdf

8/10/2019 Agranoff_Robert -Inside Collaborative Networks.pdf

1/10

56 Public Administration Review December 2006 Special Issue

Tis paper offers practical insights for public managersas they work within interorganizational networks. Itis based on the authors empirical study of 14 networksinvolving federal, state, and local governmentmanagers working with nongovernmental organizations.Te findings suggest that networks are hardly crowding

out the role of public agencies; though they are limitedin their decision scope, they can add collaborative

public value when approaching nettlesome policy andprogram problems.

It is time to go beyond heralding the importanceof networks as a form of collaborative publicmanagement and look inside their operations. At

this point in the development of the field, it is wellknown (1) that the age of the network has arrived(Lipnack and Stamps 1994), (2) that hierarchy andmarkets are being supplemented by networks (Powell1990), (3) that public managers are enmeshed in aseries of collaborative horizontal and vertical networks(Agranoff and McGuire 2003), and (4) that networksneed to be treated seriously in public administration(Ooole 1997). If this form of organizing is so im-portant to public managers, why not study it in thesame sense that hierarchical organization or humanresources or the budget process is examined? Tat is

what this article addresses, taking a deeper look intohow public networks are organized and how they aremanaged. It offers some empirically based experiences,addressing 10 important features of collaborativemanagement.

Te issues raised here are based on a study of theoperations of 14 public management networks in thecentral states, comprising federal, state, regional, andlocal government offi cials and nongovernmental man-agersthat is, offi cers from nonprofits, for-profits,universities, and other organizations (Agranoff, forth-coming). Such networks can be chartered (organizedby some formal mechanism as an intergovernmentalagreement or by statutory action) or nonchartered(informal in legal status but equally permanent,organized, and mission oriented). Tese networks

are interorganizational (Alter and Hage 1998) andshould be distinguished from social networks, whichinvolve studied nodes linked by social relationships(Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden 1978) orrecurring relationships (Nohria 1992), both withinand outside organizations, for which there is an

already developed rich tradition (Burt 1992;Granovetter 1973; White 1992). Public manage-ment networks are, in every sense, collaborativeconnections like social networks, although they notonly comprise representatives of disparate organiza-tions but also go beyond analytical modes. Tey arereal-world public entities.

Te frequently used term network(broadcast, supplyservice, professional, friendship) needs to be furtherdefined. A term is required that fits the activity ofcooperation or mutual action without being sobroad that it encompasses every human connection.

Cooperationrefers to the act of working jointly withothers, usually to resolve a problem or find a corner oactivity. It can be occasional or regular, and it canoccur within, between, or outside formal organiza-tions. Here the interest is focused on the activities ofindividuals who represent organizations workingacross their boundaries. Agranoff and McGuire definesuch collaborative management processes as theprocess of facilitating and operating in multi organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot besolved, or solved easily, by single organizations (20034). In other words, the focus of public management

networks goes beyond studies of informal and intraorganizational networking among individuals to includeinterorganizationalin this case, intergovernmentalentities that emerge from interactions among formalorganizations. Tese bodies, according to the litera-ture, tackle the most nettlesome of public problems(Ooole 1997) and connect public policies withtheir strategic and institutionalized context (Kickert,Klijn and Koppenjan 1997, 1).

en practical suggestions emanating from a largerstudy of public management networks are offered

Robert Agranoff

Indina UniversityBloomingon

Inside Collaborative Networks: en Lessons for

Public Managers

Robert Agranoffis a professor

emeritus at the School of Public and

Environmental Affairs, Indiana University

Bloomington, and a professor at the

Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset in

Madrid, Spain. In 2005, he received the

Daniel Elazar Distinguished Scholar Award

from APSAs Federalism and Intergovern-

mental Relations Section.E-mail:[email protected].

Articles onCollaborative

PublicManagement


2/10

Inside Collaborative Networks 5

here. Readers who wish to gain deeper insights intothe workings of such networks will have to go beyondthe limited pages of this overview. Te issues are em-pirically derived from a grounded theory methodology(Strauss and Corbin 1998). In other words, it is aninductive study in which the theoretical findingsemanate from field-based data. Tus, the methodol-ogy places heavy emphasis on the responses of thepublic managers themselves. Extended discussions

were undertaken in the field on two separate occasionswith more than 150 public offi cials, in addition tofield observation and examination of network docu-mentation. In essence, the managerial lessons thatfollow come from the managers themselves. Hope-fully, these insights will not only contribute to thecollaborative management literature but also will be ofuse to those who practice this form of management.

Lesson 1: Te network is not the only vehicle ofcollaborative management. Networkingis a buzz-

word around public organizations these days thatsignifies social networking, within-organization lateral

relationships, and a host of other collaborative en-deavors. When it comes to cross-organization con-tacts, the managers in the study related that work

within the network represents just one of several col-laborative contacts.

Foremost among these contacts are informal bilaterallinkages with representatives of other organizations.Tese used to be face-to-face and telephone contacts,but now e-mail allows for nonsimultaneous contact.Managers continue to spend a lot of effort on one-on-one relationships with those in other organizations. Inaddition, one must remember that many local govern-ments, nonprofits, and for-profits are bilaterally linked

with state and federal agencies through grants, con-tracts, or cooperative agreements. In some cases, thesecollaborative efforts are multilateral, involving three ormore entities. Tere are also interagency agreementsamong organizations within the same government.Tese can be either bilateral or multilateral. At theinterlocal level, there are a host of mutual service,compact, assumption of service, and other arrange-ments that will be familiar to those who study localgovernments (Walker 2000).

Tis is not to say that networks are unimportantvehicles of collaboration. Tey bring many organiza-tions to the table. Tey are, as we will see, importantvehicles for resource pooling, mutual exploration, andknowledge creation. Most importantly, networks openup new possibilities that would be hard for one, two,or even three organizations working together toachieve. But they are not the be-all and end-all ofcollaborative management. Tey share a placeinmany cases, a small placealongside literally thou-sands of interagency agreements, grants, contracts,and even informal contacts that involve issues such as

seeking information or some form of program adjust-ment (Agranoff and McGuire 2003).

Lesson 2: Managers continue to do the bulk of theirwork within the hierarchy. A familiar refrain is thatnetworks are replacing hierarchies (Castells 1996;Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Although it is certainlytrue that mutual dependency is leading to an increas-ing number of horizontal relationships crossing manyboundaries, lateral connections seem to overlay thehierarchy rather than act as a replacement for them.

According to the managers in the study, there is apremium on the ability to understand and functionacross boundaries, but this skill has not necessarilyreplaced the need for internal skills.

When asked, most managers said that they spent mosof their time working within the hierarchy. Tereseemed to be a sort of consensus that only 15 percentto 20 percent of their total work time was consumedby all forms of collaborative activity, including theirparticipation in networks. Te typical public manage-

ment network meets as a body monthly or quarterly,and focused project or workgroup efforts usuallyinvolve no more than five to seven hours per month.Te managers reported that the rest of their time wasfilled with various nonnetwork (e.g., bilateral) col-laboration. Most of my work is still in planning,budgeting and human resources, like my other coun-terparts in , said one agency head. Another saidIn my agency I am the orchestra leader, dealing withall of the tasks of a public agency. In , I am justone player, and a part-time one at that.

Tis does not include the growing number of bound-ary spanners or program specialists who are involvedin networks and thus spend somewhat more time oncollaboration. Program specialists frequently (andmore naturally) work across agency boundaries. Teir

work is technical or based on specialized knowledge,and it is geared to solving problems, belonging toepistemic communities, and acting on shared beliefs.For example, developmental disabilities professionalsinside and outside government in one public manage-ment network reported spending considerably moretime solving overlapping problems with clients, ser-vices, and funding. We have worked together so long

and so much that now we finish one anothers sen-tences, explained one longtime advocacy associationspecialist. Professionals working on problems seem toform these epistemic communities naturally and reachacross boundaries for routine as well as program interagency accommodation (Tomas 2003), and thusthey spend more time in collaboration.

Te same held true for the few administrators in thestudy who were full-time boundary spanners. Forexample, one administrator in the Nebraska StateGame and Fish Commission related that his entire


3/10


job involved acting as a liaison with environmentalagencies and bodies, along with those dealing withrural development. Another federal offi cial with theEconomic Development Administration was the solestaff person for two midwestern states. He spent mostof his time in the field working with local govern-ments or economic development groups, along withcollaborative efforts with other federal and stateagencies.

For the line administrator, however, it is largely busi-ness as usual most of the time, dealing with internalPOSDCORB matters, along with increasing collab-orative pressures. Of course, as external connectionsincrease, there will be more internal work related tooutside-agency contacts.

Lesson 3: Network involvement brings severaladvantages that keep busy administratorsinvolved. One clear observation is that sustainedcollaborative activity, such as that of ongoing net-

works, must demonstrate worth or busy managers

will not waste their time on participation. Te net-works in this study were not all without stabilitythreats, but all had been ongoing for a considerableperiod of time. Te oldest, an Ohio-based publicmanagement network that assisted small communities

with their water-supply and wastewater problems,dated back to the late 1980s. Tis was no easy accom-plishment, inasmuch as this network was nonchar-tered. Why do bodies such as these persist? Becausethey deliver different forms of public value to theirmultiple participants.

Performance counts in collaborative activity. But thetype of result is not completely tied to making thetype of policy adjustments mentioned at the begin-ning of this article. Actually, networks can perform agreat many public service purposes. Tey not onlybring many parties to the table but also have thepotential to expand the resource base. Te most im-portant element of the resource base is the potentialfor knowledge expansion, a function that administra-tors said was indispensable. From knowledge comesthe possibility of new solutions derived by, owned,and implemented by several parties. Finally, manymanagers related that a great deal of one-to-one

networking went on in and around networkactivities, reducing telephone and e-mail tag, asthe saying goes.

Te key to sustained network involvement is perfor-mance, and the key to performance is adding publicvalue (Moore 1995) by working together rather thanseparately (Bardach 1998, 8). In the 14 publicmanagement networks studied, four types of publicvalue were queried, and managers found substantialbenefits in each dimension. Te first benefit is thevalue added to the manager or professional, such as

learning new ways to collaborate, intergovernmentalskills, and how to network, along with enhancedtechnical and information and communications tech-nology skills. Second are the benefits accruing to thehome agency, such as access to other agencies infor-mation, programs and resources; access to informatioand communications technology; cross-training ofagency staff; and most important, enhanced externalinput into the internal knowledge base. Tird are thecollective process skills that accrue from workingtogether over a sustained period of timefor exam-ple, developing interagency planning, piloting anadaptation of a new technology, developing a mutualinteragency culture that leads to subsequent problemsolving, and experimenting with electronic groupdecision technology. Fourth are the concrete resultsaccrued, such as an action plan, a capability buildingconference, new interagency strategies, and multia-gency policy and program changes. Tese types ofvalue-adding performance results sustain administra-tors efforts in collaborative undertakings.

Lesson 4: Networks are different from organizationbut not completely different. When managers be-come involved in these emergent collectives, they findan interesting mixture of old and new practices. Yes,networks are different in the sense that they are non-hierarchical, players at the table begin largely equal asorganizational representatives, most actions are dis-cussed and decided by consensus, resources are multi-sourced, and there are relatively few sanctions for

withdrawal. But networks are not different in thesense that they require some form of organization,operating rules, routines, and so on. Most have statedmissions, goals, and objectives to frame their type oforganization, which, in many ways, look more like thstructures of nonprofit organizations than those oflarge bureaucracies.

Virtually all of the 14 networks studied operated withsome form of council or board, elected by the entirebody of agency representatives, very much like theboard of directors of a nonprofit organization.Normally, the various sectors (federal, state, nonprofitfor-profit) or identified interests (universities, regionaagencies) have a seat at the table, but these bodiesrarely do the work beyond strategic planning and fina

approval of projects and efforts. Te real work in all othe networks studied was done in either standingcommittees (e.g., finance, technology transfer, tele-medicine, educational applications, transportationtechnical review) or focused and usually shorter-term

workgroups (e.g., ortho-infrared mapping, bicycle anpedestrian, broadband usage, community visitation,

water and wastewater treatment). Such bodies, ofcourse, resemble the standing committees and taskforces of nonprofits in that their participation is vol-untary, they reach out to expertise inside and outsidethe network wherever it can be found, and they


4/10


generally try to reach agreement on technical meritsand possibilities without hierarchical involvement.

Tere is thus much less difference between organiza-tions and networks than initially appears, particularly

when one accounts for the fact that hierarchical orga-nizations themselves are changing. It is an acceptedfact that bureaucratic structures have become moreflexible and permeable over the past century (Clegg1990, 181). odays organizations are becoming moreconductivethat is, they are continuously generatingand renewing capabilities, bearing in mind the align-ment between internal forces and external demands,including the importance of creating partnershipsthrough internalexternal interaction, building alli-ances and coalitions, forming and reforming teamsacross functions and organization boundaries, andcollaborating to actively manage interdependencies(Saint-Onge and Armstrong 2004, 191). In this sense,perhaps bureaucracies and standing networks appear agood deal alike because both need to be concerned

with managing complex partnerships, with blurring

boundaries. Te difference is that one structures andcreates rules and strategies under the umbrella of oneorganization, whereas the other must interorganiza-tionally and collectively create structures, rules, andstrategies that fit their multiorganizational needs.

Lesson 5: Not all networks make the types of policyand program adjustments ascribed to them in theliterature. Tere are many public value benefits ofcollaboration, and not all of themfall neatly into the solving nettle-some interagency problems do-main. When asked how they wereable to forge agreement and arriveat a mutually beneficial course ofaction, managers from a number ofnetworks related that they did notreally engage in that type of activity.Subsequent investigation revealed that actually there

were four different types of networks among the 14.

Tree networks proved to be informational,whereinpartners came together almost exclusively to exchangeagency policies and programs, technologies, and po-tential solutions. Any changes or actions were volun-

tarily taken up by the agencies themselves. Anotherfour networks were developmental,wherein partnerinformation and technical exchange were combined

with education and member services that increasedthe members capacities to implement solutions

within their home agencies and organizations. An-other three networks were identified as outreach,

wherein the activities of the developmental networkwere engaged; in addition, however, they also blue-printed strategies for program and policy change thatled to an exchange or coordination of resources, al-though decision making and implementation were

ultimately left to the agencies and programs them-selves. Finally, four networks were actionnetworks,

wherein partners came together to make interagencyadjustments, formally adopt collaborative courses ofaction, and deliver services, along with informationexchanges and enhanced technology capability.

Te fact that informational and developmental net-works do not become directly involved in programand policy adjustments does not make them any lesspublic management networks. Te study of collaborative management is relatively recent, and no publicsector interagency body should be bound by precon-ceived or deductive research frameworks or defini-tions. Tey are every bit collaborative, public-servingbodies. Moreover, their actions often indirectly lead tsubsequent strategies, adjustments, programs andpolicies. Indeed, there may well be more types ofnetworks and collaborative structuresequally suc-cessfulwaiting to be discovered. Like other aspectsof collaboration, the typology suggests that networksmust be analyzed with an open mind.

Lesson 6: Collaborative decisions or agreements arethe products of a particular type of mutual learningand adjustment. Despite a form of organization thatresembles a nonprofit organization, networks rarelyfollow parliamentary procedure. First, because allnetworks do not really make decisions, it is prefer-able to refer to many of their deliberative processes asreaching agreements rather than decisions, as the

latter normally connotes theaction of implementation. Incollaborative bodies, decisionsand agreements are necessarilybased on consensus, inasmuchas participating administratorsand professionals arepartners,not superiorsubordinates. Assuch, they are co-conveners,

co-strategists, coaction formulators, co-programmersand so on. It is also true that public agency adminis-trators possess neither ultimate legal authority (exceptof course, within ones home agency domain) norcontrol over all technical information. Authority inthe network is shared with the many stakeholders atthe table: other administrators, program specialists,

research scientists, policy researchers, and interestgroup and advocacy association offi cials. Among thepartners, it is unlikely that any single agency or rep-resentative at the table will have the legal authority orfinancial resources to completely approach a problemFinally, the all-important potential for agency-basedimplementation for most collaborative solutions liesnot in the network itself or in any one agency orprogram but among the many.

Collaborative decision making and agreement are nodoubt similar to the functions of knowledge-seeking

Tere are many public valuebenefits of collaboration, and

not all of them fall neatly intothe solving nettlesome inter-

agency problems domain.


5/10


workgroups within single organizations (Newell et al.2002). Consensus prevails over motions and voting.For example, one study participant related, We haveRoberts rules in our by-laws, but only use them after

we have reached agreement. Another network chairsaid, Parliamentary procedure rules wont workas alast resort when we are near consensus we may resortto informal Roberts rules to move things along. Telearning process is clearly and directly a parallel com-ponent of network decisions. Once we agree that aproblem is an issue we care to look into, we study itand discuss the results before any action is taken,reported one participant. We try to get on the sametechnical page if we possibly can. Tat means someoneor a work group has to study a problem, then we dis-cuss it, said another. Our echnology ransfer Com-mittee is charged with finding feasible small town

water solutions used elsewhere; they then become thebasis of Steering Committee discussions. Finally, onemanager interviewed commented, Te ransportationechnical Committee is charged not only with lookingat the feasibility of projects, but to advance state-of-

the-art [transportation] programming to the PolicyCommittee agenda. Tese comments from the discus-sants highlight the centrality of making the network alearning entity in the sense of Senges (1990) learningorganization. One can then characterize the typicalnetwork decision-making process as involving jointlearning that leads to brokered consensus.

Most importantly, this process is oriented towardcreating a collective power of new possibilities. In aconfusing, complicated world in which institutionalarrangements are loosely arranged, Te issue is tobring about enough cooperation among disparatecommunity elements to get things done (Stone et al.1999, 354). In order to open up new possibilities, thenetworks studied used six distinct predecision oragreement learning strategies. Tey prepared for bro-kered consensus through (1) group discussion orexchange of ideas; (2) political negotiation of sensitiveconcerns and intensely felt needs; (3) direct applica-tion of technology or preestablished decision rules orformats; (4) application of preestablished, formulaicprocedures (e.g., those related to regulations, grants,or loans); (5) data-driven decisions or agreements(e.g., market studies, usage patterns, traffi c or accident

counts); and (6) predecision simulation or electronicbase groupware or other decision techniques. Teinformational and developmental networks tended tobe involved in the first two categories exclusivelydiscussion and exchange and political negotiationwhereas the outreach and action networks engagedmany of the six. In all, public management networksprobably do not make decisions all that differentlyfrom the internal processes of learning organizations,but organizational boundaries must be acknowledgedthrough what one could characterize as partner respector nonhierarchical behavior.

Lesson 7: Te most distinctive collaborative activ-ity of all of the networks proved to be their workin public sector knowledge management. In ourcontemporary information-based society, work isincreasingly knowledge based, but substantial gapsin knowledge led each public management networkto seek more and, in the process, somehow managethis commodity. Knowledge is a fluid mix of framedexperience, values, contextual information, and experinsight that provides a framework for evaluating andincorporating new experiences and information(Davenport and Prusak 2000, 5). Whereas datareferto discrete, objective facts, and informationis a mes-sage in the form of a document or an audible or visuacommunication, knowledgeis more action oriented,both in process and in outcome. Knowledge manage-ment has two dimensions: explicit knowledge,whichcan be codified and communicated easily in words,numbers, charts, or drawings, and tacit knowledge,

which is embedded in the senses, individual percep-tions, physical experiences, intuition, and rules ofthumb (Saint-Onge and Armstrong 2004). Knowl-

edge management is the process of bringing togetherexplicit and tacit knowledge and displaying andmanifesting it, as it involves skilled performance, i.e.KM [knowledge management] praxis is punctuatedthrough social interaction (soukas 2005, 15859).

In the networks studied, the process of knowledgemanagement in many ways defined the major focus otheir standing committees and working groups. First,essentially all of them began by surveying the universeof data and information that their partners had devel-oped or could access, plus external databases of use tothem. Second, this information then used to developtheir own source explicit knowledge using resourcessuch as libraries, map inventories, strategic plans, factsheets and policy guides, focused studies, surveys,conferences and workshops, electronic bulletin boardprocess reviews, long-range plans, models and simula-tions, and market studies. Tird, tacit knowledge wasrarely formally codified, but it was regularly ap-proached through stakeholder consultations, bestpractices booklets, workgroups as communities ofpractice, study project report panels, expert presenta-tions, specialized workshops, SWO workshops,hands-on technical assistance, community leadership

development sessions, forums on what works, direcagency outreach, help desks, and public hearings.Fourth, the networks tried to organize the explicit/tacit interface not through codification but throughinformal feedback on the myriad of knowledge man-agement activities in which they engaged, usuallythrough some informal post-project assessment or atits board or steering committee meetings. Fifth, mostof the networks directly served some of the knowledgmanagement needs of their partner agencies by pro-ducing formal reports, responding to data requests,supplying modeling and planning data, circulating


6/10


policy reports, sponsoring in-agency forums andreport sessions, providing technical expert linkagesbetween the network and specific agencies, and insome cases, providing agency-requested studies.

All of these knowledge management activities are nowsupported by the use of information and communica-tions technology, such as e-mail, teleconferencing,

Web-based geographic information systems, decision-support software, and the like. Tese are essential forpartners that are situated in disparate organizationallocations, although they are no substitute for face-to-face communication, the normal mode of detailedknowledge management work. In the same way thatorganizations seek structured predictability, networkstry to use their open-ended processes of coordinatingpurposeful individuals who can apply their uniqueskills and experiences to the local problem confront-ing the collaborative undertaking (soukas 2005,111). Tey are part of the distributed knowledgesystems that are created across boundaries, possessingsomewhat fewer constraints or rule-bound actions and

approaching those problems beyond the scope of anyone agency.

Lesson 8: Despite the cooperative spirit and aura ofaccommodation in collaborative efforts, networksare not without conflicts and power issues. Teseconcerns became quite evident

when the networks agreementsand actions were broken down.Collaborative management,

with its joint learning, consen-sus, and mutual accommoda-tion orientation, may be as-sumed to be all hugs and kissesas the group sits in the hot tubof small groups, contemplates,becomes mellow, and somehowagrees. In fact, a number of thenetworks participants studiedreported that many of theirchallenges related to conflicts among partners.

For example, the Darby Partnership, an informationalwatershed network in central Ohio, almost fell apartwhen some of its members supported a congressional

bill to make the Darby Creek a national wildlife ref-uge. Te wildlife refuge was so divisive that it im-peded the partnerships efforts to exchange ideas aboutthe environmental status and remediation efforts inthe watershed. Likewise, the Iowa Geographic Infor-mation Council struggled for more than two years

with the state of Iowas chief information offi cer. Teoffi cer was unwilling to support the councils efforts torecruit a field technical offi cer to help local govern-ments access the geographic information system. TeKentucky-Indiana Planning and Development Agencyhad to deal with major conflict over the siting of a

second bridge over the Ohio River into the city ofLouisville. After years of conflict, two bridges wereproposed (city/suburban), displacing many other locatransportation improvements.

Tese mega-conflicts, so to speak, illustrate thepoint that all is not harmony in collaboration.Numerous mini-conflicts occur over agency turf, thecontribution of resources, staff time devoted to thenetwork, the location of meetings and conferences,and most importantly, threats of withdrawal becauseof frustration over the time and effort expended toachieve results. Tese are the more or less hiddenaspects or the other side of collaboration.

Also hidden is the issue of power within networks.Some look at policy networks as coequal, interdepen-dent, patterned relationships (Klijn 1996). On theother hand, it appears that different actors can occupydifferent role positions and carry different weights,creating unequal opportunity contexts and fillingstructural holes (Burt 1992, 67), whereas others may

be less willing or able players. Indeed, Clegg andHardy conclude that [We] cannot ignore the faade otrust and the rhetoric of collaboration used to pro-mote vested interests through the manipulation andcapitulation by weaker partners (1996, 679). It is alsopossible that this type of power over exists alongside

the power to, depicted earlier asthe power of possibility. In fact,both are at work in networks andother collaborative enterprises.Indeed, both types proved to bethe case in the 14 public manage-ment networks studied.

In fact, the two dimensions ofpower were manifest in a complexpower structure found in eachnetwork. Beyond the formalstructure of the governing bodyand working committees and

groups were four elements of power. First, virtuallyevery network had a champion(and in two cases, twochampions)a visible, powerful, and prestigiouspublic agency head or nonprofit chief executive offi ce

who organizes or sustains the network. Te presence

of the champion in the network signaled to others inthe field to stay in and cooperate. Second, there

was apolitical core,normally comprising the primaryparticipating department heads or federal governmenstate directors and chief executive offi cers of the non-governmental organizations. Tese managers tendedto be part of the governance structure, they sent amessage to other participants that the network wasimportant to be involved with, and they were thepeople who were most likely to be involved in high-level interagency negotiations and resource accommodations. Tird, there was a technical core,primarily

Collaborative management,with its joint learning, consen-sus, and mutual accommoda-

tion orientation, may be

assumed to be all hugs andkisses as the group sits in the

hot tub of small groups, con-templates, becomes mellow, and

somehow agrees.


7/10


workgroup or committee activists who knew the mostabout a particular topic (e.g., watershed management,planning, geographic information systems, finance,regulation, information and communications technol-ogy, and so on). Because a great deal of the work wasbound up investigating problems, creating knowledge,and looking for feasible solutions, their work was atthe core of network activity, and the most knowledge-able of these individuals held considerable operatingpower. Finally, there were paid staff who held thenetwork together through their support efforts, whichin the 14 networks ranged from one or two persons

who devoted to the network full time to 18 full- orpart-time participants in one action network. Becausestaff orchestrated all of the workarrangements,negotiations, technicalthey had a foot in everyphase of the operations and, in their own way, holdconsiderable sway over networks work. Tis powerstructure is deep, and the four dimensions overlap inpracticeit is every bit as real as those in the organi-zations from which representatives are drawn.

Lesson 9: Networks have their collaborative costs,as well as their benefits. If managers give up or addto the job of internal operations to engage in coopera-tion, they obviously do this at some cost. o mostmanagers, the most primary costs are related to givingup agency authority or turf and giving up agencyresources (Bardach 1998). Many line managers aresaid to be protective of agency autonomy for one offour reasons: (1) the agency manager knows best, andtherefore should carry out its mission and programs;(2) loss of autonomy is associated with the loss ofcontrol and guidance of the agency; (3) people placea greater value on losses than on gains; and (4) auto-nomy reduces uncertainty (Tomas 2003, 33 34). Inthe study, these turf questions existed, but they werenot foremost because most managers thought theyhad suffi cient control over their own organizationsand that the collaborative work of the network rarelycut into their core missions. Most managers felt theyhad ultimate policy control. Resource contributions

were somewhat different. For the informational anddevelopmental networks, the only resources con-tributed involved staff time and information, whichnormally come at a low or marginal cost. Te othernetworks did have to yield resources for the cause, but

when the partners could see their contribution to thelarger issue or cause, they felt they could make suchcontributions. Te only problematic issue occurred

when resources were withheld.

Tere were, however, other real costs associated withnetwork participation that the managers and profes-sionals articulated. Six general cost categories wereindicated: (1) time and opportunity costs lost to thehome agency as a result of network involvement; (2)time and energy costs resulting from the protracteddecision-making process, based on nonhierarchical,

multiorganizational, multicultural human relationsprocesses; (3) agreements not reached because of theexertion of organizational power or the withholding opower; (4) network gravitation toward consensus-based, risk-aversive decision agendas; (5) resourcehoarding, or agencies failure or unwillingness tocontribute needed resources; and (6) public policybarriers embedded in legislation, coupled with legisla-tors or other policy makers unwillingness to makeneeded changes, which, in turn, frustrated collabora-tive decisions. All of these appear to thwart progress

within networks.

In the literature, there has been less emphasis on thecosts than on the benefits of collaborative efforts.Because the seven costs identified here (turf plus thesix drawn from the study) do not nearly exhaust thelist, more emphasis must be placed on this dimensionFor public managers, they are as real as the benefits.

Lesson 10: Networks alter the boundaries of thestate only in the most marginal ways; they do not

appear to be replacing public bureaucracies in anyway. Just as some assert that networks are replacinghierarchies, there are those who believe that collaborative structures such as networks are pushing out thetraditional role of government to include a host ofnongovernmental decision makers. Have theboundaries of government changed? Rhodes (1997)refers to the multiple influences of complex networksamong other forces, as differentiating the British pol-ity. Loughlins (2000) analysis of European regional-ism suggests that the transformation from a welfarestate to a liberal state to a communitarian state hastransformed government into an enabling state in

which decentralized publicprivate partnerships,among other forces, are diminishing governmentshold. Frederickson (1999) points to the increasingdisarticulation of the state, where there is an in-creasing gap between jurisdiction and programmanagement.

Most of the managers and other partners studied feltthis to be true, but only to a limited extent. o adegree, the deliberations of the network and the in-volvement of nongovernmental organizations clearlyinfluenced the courses of action taken by government

and in some cases, new programs and strategies ema-nated from network deliberations. But the partners

were quick to point out three large caveats. First,when it comes to policy decisions, it is almost alwaysthe public institutions that make the ultimate call,and in the case of implementation, it is the agency.Second, in virtually every public management net-

work, it is government administrators at federal, stateand local levels who are the core or among the coreactors in the network. Tey are able to inject legisla-tive, regulatory, and financial considerations right intothe network mix, which hardly marginalizes them.


8/10


Tird, many collaborative efforts outside the networkform are more tightly controlled by the government,in the form of grant expectations, contract provisions,or loan conditions, tying the nongovernmental orga-nization to the public agency in a tighter way. Onemight also add that for informational and develop-mental networks, there is hardly any governmentalscope at issue, at least in any direct form. In fact, inmost cases, even the outreach and action strategicnetworks worked on a rather narrow scope of issuesfederal transportation funding, educational broadcastpolicies, rates for use of the state Web portalorstrategies that did not compel but assumed voluntarycompliance, such as a small-town water upgradeor a value-added agricultural initiative. In all, networkshave some impact on traditional government agencypowers, but it is far too early to discuss closing themdown.

Hirst (2000) cautions us that government retainsessential powers over decision making and traditionalnormative and services domains. As Sharpe (1986)

once suggested, government is not just another orga-nization in the mix of interorganizational actors. Teimportant issue appears to be taking the next research-oriented step to examine just how and how muchnetwork-generated complexity affects what we havetraditionally known asgovernment.Do complexes ofnetworks extend public management processes out-

ward to nongovernmental organizations? In the in-terim, the research reported here suggests that it is fartoo early for practicing managers to look for other

work. Teir day jobs appear safe.

ConclusionTese lessons represent a start in understanding howcollaborative bodies such as networks work on theinside. Teoretically, the broader study is able to makeseveral arguments that add fuel to the debate regard-ing networks. As suggested here, however much theera of the network is present, hierarchies persist tofulfill the legal and policy functions of government. Italso demonstrates that not all public networks arealike; they are differentiated by what they do ormore precisely, by what powers they have. Many havefew or no powers. An internal look at networks indi-

cates that although they are largely self-organizing,they require structuring that reflects their knowledge-seeking orientation. Tey need to be managed likeorganizations but in collaborative, nonhierarchical

ways. Indeed, the datainformationknowledge func-tion of networks is so paramount that their collabora-tive communities of practice across agenciesdistinguish them from more bureaucratically orientedhierarchies. Although most public managementnetworks lack formal power to make policy andprogram adjustments, they do make a difference inother ways. In particular, they add value through their

knowledge-enhancement functions, which, in thelong run, bring beneficial outcomes to the participat-ing managers and professionals, the partner agencies,the collaborative process, and to short- and long-termpolicy and program solutions. Finally, networks dochange the way in which public managers work, inas-much as their actions and behaviors are influenced bycollaboration, but there are other means of collabora-tive management and real legal and regulatory limitsto the amount of flexibility that most managers have

within networks. In this sense, networks threaten orhollow the boundaries of the state in only the mostsubtle ways.

A research tradition on network operation is begin-ning to fill in some of the theoretical blanksforexample, the work of Provan and Milward (1991,1995) on governance structure and outcomes, Man-dell (1999) on management styles and instruments,

Agranoff and McGuire (2003) on collaborative instruments, Bardach (1998) on theories of collaborativeleadership, Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) on manage-

ment knowledge to deal with uncertainty, McGuire(2000) on management styles, and Ooole and Meie(2001) on managerial strategies and behaviors. Inaddition, Agranoff and McGuire (2001) have pulledtogether a number of core concepts in collaborativenetwork management into a post-POSDCORBparadigm.

Te lessons related here suggest that in some areas ofstudy, there is more than meets the eye, but in manymore, there is substantially less. In regard to the latternetworks are far from the only form of collaborativemanagement, and they may be much less importantthan contractual or interagency and other cooperativeagreements. Managers do spend more time in collaboration, at some cost, but less than one would think.odays wicked policy problems, dispersed knowledgeand resources, first- and second-order effects, andintergovernmental overlays guarantee that managersmust engage other governments and nongovernmentaorganizations (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Ooole1997). Te payoff is that public management net-

works have a lasting collaborative effect, as they buildcollective capacity for subsequent collaborative solu-tions and teach managers the essential skill of

collaboration.

As observed earlier, it may be impossible to preciselyweigh the benefits of networks against the costs, butthe advantages must be therebusy administratorsand program specialist partners would not engage incollaboration solely for social purposes or for theintrinsic merit of cooperation. Tere has to be some-thing more in terms of holding participants in. It ishoped that these 10 lessons will be of use to managers

who are engaging in or contemplating networkcollaborative public management.


9/10


ReferencesAgranoff, Robert. Forthcoming. Managing Within

Networks: Adding Value to Public Organizations.

Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Agranoff, Robert, and Michael McGuire. 2001. Big

Questions in Public Network Management

Research.Journal of Public Administration Research

and Teory11(3): 295326.

. 2003. Collaborative Public Management: New

Strategies for Local Governments. Washington, DC:Georgetown University Press.

Alter, Catherine, and Jerald Hage. 1993.

Organizations Working ogether. Newbury Park,

CA: Sage Publications.

Bardach, Eugene. 1998. Getting Agencies to Work

ogether: Te Practice and Teory of Managerial

Craftsmanship. Washington, DC: Brookings

Institution Press.

Burt, Ronald. 1992. Structural Holes: Te Social

Structure of Competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press.

Castells, Manuel. 1996. Te Rise of the NetworkSociety. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Clegg, Stewart R. 1990.Modern Organizations:

Organization Studies in the Postmodern World.

London: Sage Publications.

Clegg, Stewart R., and Cynthia Hardy. 1996.

Conclusions: Representation. In Handbook of

Organization Studies, edited by Stewart R. Clegg,

Cynthia Hardy, and Walter R. Nord, 676708.


Davenport, Tomas H., and Laurence Prusak. 2000.

Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage What

Tey Know. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Frederickson, H. George. 1999. Te Repositioning of

American Public Administration. PS: Political

Science and Politics32(4): 70111.

Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. Te Strength of Weak

ies.American Journal of Sociology78(6): 136080.

Hirst, Paul. 2000. Democracy and Governance. In

Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and

Democracy, edited by Jon Pierre, 1335. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Kickert, Walter J. M., Erik-Hans Klijn, and Joop F. M.

Koppenjan. 1997. Introduction: A Management

Perspective on Policy Networks. InManaging

Complex Networks, edited by Walter J. M. Kickert,

Erik-Hans Klijn, and Joop F. M. Koppenjan, 113.


Klijn, Erik-Hans. 1996. Analyzing and Managing

Policy Processes in Complex Networks.

Administration & Society28(1): 90119.

Koppenjan, Joop, and Erik-Hans Klijn. 2004.

Managing Uncertainties in Networks. London:

Routledge.

Laumann, Edward O, L.. Galaskiewicz, and P. V.

Marsden. 1978. Community Structure as

Interorganizational Linkages.Annual Review of

Sociology4: 45584.

Lipnack, Jessica, and Jeffrey Stamps. 1994. Te Age of

the Network. New York: Wiley.

Loughlin, John. 2000. Regional Autonomy and State

Paradigm Shifts. Regional and Federal Studies10(2):

1034.

Mandell, Myrna P. 1999. Community Collaborations:

Working through Network Structures. Policy

Studies Review16(1): 4264.McGuire, Michael. 2000. Collaborative

Policy Making and Administration: Te

Operational Demands of Local Economic

Development. Economic Development Quarterly

14(3): 27691.

Moore, Mark H. 1995. Creating Public Value: Strategic

Management in Government. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

Newell, Sue, Maxine Robertson, Harry Scarbrough,

and Jacky Swan. 2002.Managing Knowledge Work.

New York: Palgrave.

Nohria, Nitin. 1992. Information and Search in

the Creation of New Business Ventures:

Te Case of the 128 Venture Group. In Networks

and Organizations: Structure, Form, and

Action, edited by Nitin Nohria and Robert

Eccles, 24061. Boston: Harvard Business School

Press.

Ooole, Laurence J., Jr. 1997. reating Networks

Seriously: Practical and Research-Based Agendas in

Public Administration. Public Administration

Review57(1): 4552.

Ooole, Laurence J., Jr., and Kenneth J. Meier. 2001.

Managerial Strategies and Behavior in Networks.

Journal of Public Administration Research and

Teory11(3): 27194.

Powell, Walter W. 1990. Neither Market nor

Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization. In

Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 12, edited

by Barry M. Staww and Larry L. Cummings, 295

336. Greenwich, C: JAI Press.

Provan, Keith G., and H. Brinton Milward. 1991.

Institutional-Level Norms and Organizational

Involvement in a Service-Implementation

Network.Journal of Public Administration Research

and Teory1(4): 391417.

. 1995. A Preliminary Teory of

Interorganizational Effectiveness: A Comparative

Study of Four Community Mental Health

Systems.Administrative Science Quarterly40(1):

133.

Rhodes, R. A. W. 1997. Understanding Governance:

Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and

Accountability. Buckingham, UK: Open University

Press.

Saint-Onge, Hubert, and Charles Armstrong. 2004.

Te Conductive Organization. Amsterdam: Elsevier.


10/10


Senge, Peter M. 2006. Te Fifth Discipline: Te Art

and Practice of the Learning Organization. Rev. ed.

New York: Doubleday.

Sharpe, Laurence J. 1986. Intergovernmental Policy-

Making: Te Limits of Subnational Autonomy. In

Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public

Sector: Te Bielefeld Interdisciplinary Project, edited

by Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, Giandomenico

Majone, and Vincent Ostrom, 15981. Berlin:

Walter de Gruyter.

Stone, Clarence, Kathryn Doherty, Cheryl Jones, and

imothy Ross. 1999. Schools and Disadvantaged

Neighborhoods: Te Community Development

Challenge. In Urban Problems and Community

Development, edited by Ronald F. Ferguson and

William . Dickens, 33969. Washington, DC:

Brookings Institution Press.

Strauss, Anselm, and Juliet Corbin. 1998. Basics of

Qualitative Research: echniques and Procedures

for Developing Grounded Teory. Tousand Oaks,

CA: Sage Publications.

Tomas, Craig W. 2003. Bureaucratic

Landscapes: Interagency Cooperation and the

Preservation of Biodiversity. Cambridge, MA:

MI Press.

soukas, Haridimos. 2005. Complex

Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Walker, David B. 2000. Te Rebirth o f Federalism:

Slouching toward Washington. 2nd ed. New York:

Chatham House.

White, Harrison C. 1992. Identity and Control: A

Structural Teory of Social Action. Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press.

Documents

Agranoff_Robert -Inside Collaborative Networks.pdf