Newsletter, Edition 3, Vol 2, April 2013

Editor’s Welcome

Welcome to yet another exciting edition of the AIIA newsletter.

April’s calendar was choc-a-bloc with sensational speakers. For instance, we heard from Mr Alan Chan on Confucian Values in the (Contemporary) Asian Century, and from Sebastian Kaempf on The Mediatization of War in a Transforming Global Media Landscape. Attendance to events keeps rising, which is indicative of the quality of our guest speakers, and the value our audience attaches to their content matter.

This edition of the newsletter features some interesting perspectives indeed. Intern Mary Overington writes on the latest Australia-China Strategic Partnership, while intern Samad Aftab turns his eyes to the concerning issue of water security in South Asia. We also present a special feature article by Alamelu Venkatesh, providing an insight into new security challenges for Australia in the Asia-Pacific. Finally, Maddy Cassidy starts the conversation on gender equality, and challenges for society in achieving the MDG’s.

Be sure to join us from 13 – 19 May when Brisbane goes Bollywood – and more. An exciting week encountering India awaits us, with AIIA members receiving special benefits (see right).

If you have any feedback or wish to contribute, please email us at qld.branch@aiia.asn.au Milly Arsic | AIIA Council Member

ENCOUNTERS – India

Members of the Queensland Branch of the AIIA can attend a key event of the ENCOUNTERS: INDIA program free of charge. They have been invited to take part in The Ties That Bind Us Symposium to be staged at Cinema A of the Gallery of Modern Art on Thursday, May 16 and Friday, May 17. The AIIA is a partner in staging this event. John McCarthy AO, the National President of the AIIA, will speak at the symposium. Interns from the Queensland Branch have volunteered to help with organisation of the event. Also, AIIA members are entitled to discounts on tickets for other ENCOUNTERS events. When buying tickets online through QTIX, click on ``partner’’ to gain the discount rate.

Register for next AIIA Event The Philippine-Australia relationship - deeper than economics? When: Thursday, 9 May 2013 6:00 PM for 6.30PM start Where: Harris Tce, 46 George St, Brisbane Presented by: Her Excellency, Mrs Belen Fule Anota, Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines to Australia. Mrs Anota was born on December 25, 1950 in San Pablo City, Laguna, Philippines. She attained a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from the University of Santo Tomas (1970); a Bachelor of Laws from the Ateneo de Manila Law School (1974) and a Masters in Urban and Regional Planning, University of the Philippines (1979). Her diplomatic postings include: Tel-Aviv – Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary 2002 – 2004; Singapore - Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary 2004 – 2008; Tokyo – Chargé d Affaires October 2010 to January 2011. To register for this event, go to: http://www.aiia.asn.au/qld-home/event/695-the-philippine-australia-relationship-deeper-than-economics Then go to Guest Menu and click on Register.

Newsletter, Edition 2, Vol 2, March 2013

AIIA EVENTS- SOCIAL PAGE:

Australia and China’s Strategic Partnership Words: Mary Overington The ‘Strategic Partnership’ that Australia and China inaugurated during Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s recent trip to China has been exulted as marking a new page in our countries’ bilateral relations. Australia now joins a small club of nations that share this relationship status with China. The new agreement will include annual meetings between the Australian Prime Minister and the Chinese Premier, as well as separate talks each year on foreign policy and on trade and economic issues. The new partnership comes at the same time as a currency deal that sees the commencement of direct trading in the Chinese Yuan and Australian Dollar, yet another bite out of the United States Dollar’s reserve currency status. Although the Partnership has left the respective Governments in high spirits, it is still unclear just how much practical ground this development represents. The Australia-China relationship resembles an idle seesaw. At one end sits a lofty annual trade volume of 130 billion dollars, and at the other end slouches our political commitment, embodied in the difficult child in the playground. Historically determined binds have meant that in the forty years since diplomatic ties were established there has been a deficiency in intimate and regular political dialogue. As a result, our interaction has been almost exclusively influenced by a transactional mentality, never really rocking the hard-hitting issues that lie in sandpits beyond coal and iron.

In the weeks following Gillard’s visit, relevant Australian publications were showered with expressions about Australia’s reserved ‘seat at the table’ and its latest ‘edge’. At a time when military modernisation and rapid economic growth define the region, it is definitely a move towards increasing mutual knowledge and understanding. Furthermore, dedication to ‘formalised, systemised consultation’, as Foreign Minister Bob Carr puts it, is a positive indication for future commitment toward a rule based regional order.

A more sceptical interpretation of this

development rests on the premise that the

Australia-China-United States trilateral

relationship is such that any degree to

which Australia swings towards China is a

direct step away from the United States. A

viable argument is that the core motivation

behind China’s decision to enter the

partnership was its significance as a

counterweight to Australia’s commitment to

the durable United States presence in the

region. According to the People’s Liberation

Airforce’s Colonel Dai, “Australia is one of

the links in America’s encirclement of China.

The first step of [America’s] strategic

eastward move was to send troops to

Australia.”1 While Gillard insists that the

arrival of 2,500 United States troops in

Darwin does not constitute a ‘base’, China

will be fastidiously watching forthcoming

activities, such as the conceivable stationing

of drones on Cocos Island and the possible

use of the Stirling naval base in Western

Australia as a home port for an entire United

States aircraft carrier battle group.2

“The Australia-China relationship resembles an idle seesaw.”

The avoidance of potholes during our journey will depend on how well Australia handles the myriad of complexities involved in this partnership. Choices such as hosting visits by the Dalai Llama, excessive commitment to free navigation through the South China Sea, over-bearing rhetoric on Human Rights, and an unwarranted bad mood towards Chinese investment in Australia, all exemplify key irritants that Australia now needs to address more than ever. These are indeed interesting times. References: 1 Carr, Robert. Interview with Jim Middleton. Australian Network

News. ABC News. April 10 2013. Web. < http://www.abc.net.au /news/ 2013-04-09/australia -and-china-enter-strategic-partnership/4619538 > 2 Garnaut, Jim. “Arm in Arm with Xi.” Sydney Morning Herald.

April 8 2013. <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/arm-in-arm-with20130407-2hezl.html> 3 Johnston, David. Interview with Tony Jones. Lateline. ABC

News. March 28 2013. <http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content /2012/s3466088.htm 4 White, Hugh. “Australia is now a Pawn in US-China Power

Plays”. The Age. April 16 2013. < http://www.theage.com.au/ opinion/politics/australia-is-now-a-pawn-in-uschina-power-plays-20130415-2hvwv.html> 5 Nicholson, Brendan. “General Hurley says strong military-to-

military links through the region were vital”. The Australian. April 10 2013. <http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/australia-is-now-a-pawn-in-uschina-power-plays-20130415-2hvwv.html>

Another point of contention concerns Australia’s role in the Asia Pacific. Australia has the opportunity to become a constructive power in the region. Some argue it should adopt a firmer role in facilitating a stable United States-China relationship, the most important relationship in the world today. Australia can be instrumental in supporting a stable relationship between the two powers that sees controlled competition and secure power sharing arrangements. It is possible this recent development has served to cause disgruntlement in America, unrealistic expectations in China and has merely assisted in categorising Australia as the “shuttlecock” in an interminable rally between our valued neighbour and our dear Uncle Sam. A more nuanced view of the strategic partnership is to see it as a preliminary beginning. With an agreed structure in place, we now need to focus on what is actually being said. Beijing can live with what Australia has done so far, and even accept our choices as inherently natural, so long as we are diligent in our future decisions. The fact remains that our vital ally’s main strategic competitor is also our biggest trading partner. Some would say that we are between a rock and a hard place. According to the Lowy Institute’s Rory Medcalf, “In the end there will be limits to the kind of real military trust that can be forged between the forces of a US ally and a country [China] that is uncomfortable with the regional strategic order.”3 It is unlikely ANZUS will be going anywhere soon, however this partnership is certainly a push along the lengthy road ahead.

South Asia is currently in the midst of a debilitating energy crisis that has resulted in extended power cuts becoming a way of life for huge numbers of people. Around two-thirds of the population in India and Pakistan each and under half of Nepal and Bangladesh’s respective populations have access to electricity.1 These numbers become all the more frustrating when one takes into account the massive hydropower potential that lies untapped in South Asia’s mountain ranges. So far, the states of South Asia have collectively tapped only 16% of hydropower.2 This low figure can be attributed, amongst other factors, to economic mismanagement and the hesitancy to cooperate between the countries. Devastating floods regularly cause havoc in many of the states in South Asia. In fact, the annual floods in Bangladesh are a major impediment to its economic progress.3 Consequently, one of the most pertinent benefits that would accrue from cooperation would be the building of infrastructure to better prepare these countries for the floods and ergo, mitigate the level of destruction. This will also reduce the enormous strain the floods place on their economies.4

Water Security in South Asia

Words: Samad Aftab South Asia faces a crippling problem of water security. A major cause for this is the inability of the states in the region to cooperate on shared sources of water that transcend political borders. Improved cooperation over water security will benefit all the states of South Asia vis-à-vis many areas including agricultural output, energy security, improved intraregional relations, and flood damage control. In 1960, Pakistan and India came to a water sharing agreement called the Indus Basin Waters Treaty, which divides the major rivers in their territories between the two. Despite the obdurate animosity between the two countries, this treaty offers a glimpse of the potential of cooperation over scare resources. The Indus Basin Waters Treaty has not yet been revoked despite three wars since its inception, though disagreements between Pakistan and India over the building of dams and other structures have been commonplace over the years. It is vital that greater efforts are made on effectively mediating such disagreements.

A major cause for water scarcity per capita in South Asia can be attributed to the ignominious management of the water supply system. Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are all culpable in not maintaining their system of pipes, canals and pumping stations which lose massive amounts of water to leakage. A lack of treatment plants ensures water that is ripe with bacteria. Improved practices on the domestic level can be shared on the regional scale because, as with many of the problems plaguing the states of South Asia, water scarcity is a common issue throughout the region and therefore similar solutions are required.

In the coming decades, the concomitance of scarce resources in South Asia, a booming population and lack of regional cooperation will generate further strain and cause for conflict amongst the states in the region.5 It is imperative, therefore, on the governments of South Asia to make concrete efforts on improved cooperation in water security. References: 1 (n.d.). Regional Cooperation & Integration on Water:

Challenges and Benefits. World Bank, Retrieved from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21511029~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html 2 Faris, S. (2009). The Last Straw. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/failed_states_index_the_last_straw 3 Kugelman, M. (2011). Safeguarding South Asia’s Water

Security. Seminar. Retrieved from http://www.india-seminar.com/2011/626/626_michael_kugelman.htm 4 Khadka, N. S. (2012, August 12). South Asia's Energy Crisis

Demands Collective Action. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19107372 5 Mittra, S. (2012). The South Asian Hydropower Story. Observer

Research Foundation, IX (28) 6 Agrawala, S., Ota, T., Ahmed, A. U., Smith, J., & van Aalst, M.

(2003). Development and Climate Change in Bangladesh: Focus on Coastal Flooding and the Sundarbans. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 7 Robert Looney (2012): Economic impacts of the floods in

Pakistan, Contemporary South Asia, 20:2, 225-241 8 Faris, S. (2009).

Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Words: Alamelu Venkatesh For Australia in the modern era, there are major security concerns stemming from Asia. These are found in the areas of energy security, terrorism, Asian-Middle Eastern relations for oil supplies and other features of national security, such as pandemic diseases and environmental problems. Global security issues are rising as the major security challenges for the Asia-Pacific region. These global security issues can be defined as non-military threats that cross borders and create danger to a state either politically, socially or physically, such as through health damage. As transnational challenges grow, many security planners around the world are distinguishing global security issues as the main challenge to states in the 21st century. The major concerns of transnational security dangers are found in the areas of transnational crime, terrorism, maritime crime, small-arms trafficking, illegal migration, infectious diseases, environmental degradation and money laundering. Transnational crime in the Asia-Pacific region is a main concern. A variety of crimes occur in this region, including drug trafficking, human smuggling, credit card scamming and computer generated crimes. Many criminal organisations take advantage of globalisation and free border arrangements to cover up their location of operation. This is happening due to the presence of corrupted and weak government organisations. Terrorism is another issue in the Asia-Pacific region. This problem has deteriorated due to increased globalisation, co-operation between different terrorist organisations and the use of new terrorist sources and methods.

Another rising transnational challenge is marine piracy. The majority of crimes committed at sea are piracy and include drug dealings, human smuggling, illegal fishing and crimes against the environment. Arms trafficking remains another major threat to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region and this is often linked to other transnational challenges like crime and terrorism. In most cases, the excess supply of arms is the result of war that has occurred in the past as in Afghanistan, which has an extensive supply of small-arms. Illegal migration and human smuggling are growing transnational challenges in the Asia-Pacific and heavily linked to economic discrepancies throughout the region. Migration has increased significantly in the past 25 years. Approximately a third of the world’s immigrants are situated in Asia and yet most Asian countries are not part of international refugee agreements. Infectious disease is another major concern to the Asia-Pacific region and it is increasingly severe for a variety of reasons, including globalisation, increased movement, urbanisation, changing sexual habits and poor water quality.

Make Shift Medicine Words and photo: Sylvia C. Frain

Common diseases like malaria, cholera, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS not only reduce quality of life, but also weaken national security by humiliating civil governance, and causing losses in the labour force and massive burdens on government health budgets. Environmental degradation is another threat in the Asia-Pacific region, which has recently witnessed catastrophic destructions of its environment. Pollution of water, air and land are widespread and the tendencies in most countries are deteriorating. Crucial environmental challenges in the region are poor water quality, marine pollution, food insecurity, deforestation and global climate change. (August 2000 Conference Report, Honolulu, Hawaii). Energy Security in China

Currently China’s energy security has become an urgent problem. China meets more than 90% of its overall energy demand with domestic supply. China will stick to their policy of meeting their energy requirements mainly through domestic supply and will also take an active part in energy co-operation with other countries on the basis of mutual benefit. China’s economic security depends on “Three Es”: Economic growth, Energy security and Environmental protection. These variables are vigorously linked with one another. Due to rapid economic growth, Chinese energy security has become increasingly important in maintaining this development. Energy security means security of supply, continuous access to global energy resources, security of demand, competence in energy consumption and environmental protection.

China’s energy diplomacy is considered as building strong relationships with major energy exporting countries, securing foreign energy supplies and launching a pipeline network of oil and natural gas flow in the Asian region. China is the world’s fastest developing country and the second largest oil importer. Energy is a key issue for China’s economic development, social stability and national security. China sees an energy shortage as one of its biggest potential threats. Until 1993, China was self-sufficient in meeting its energy requirements. A decade later, it had become the world’s major consumer of oil after the United States (US). By 2004, it was the world’s third largest importer of oil after the US and Japan (Dr. Xuecheng Liu, 2006). Energy issues are crucial aspects of both economic and political debate. The main focus of this debate is not only about growing regional energy demands from China and India, but also on the recurring and organised factors in the global energy market which lead to major changes in accessing energy, its prices and consistent supply.

There is currently a worldwide argument about the long-term availability of resources like oil and gas. Some argue the supplies may exist to meet the increasing global demands in the next twenty years. However, it has also been argued that although these resources are sufficient, they will not brought to the market because of lowered investment and the very high cost of the oil and gas industries. Any alterations to the continuous increase of energy prices will be difficult for developed countries like Australia who export coal, uranium and LNG to the Asia-Pacific region. An important issue for policymakers is how China’s demand for oil will affect its international behaviour. In Chinese foreign strategy, this oil issue is playing a significant role, even though Beijing’s priority varies by country. Most Asian countries are energy importing countries (e.g., China, Japan & South Korea) importing oil from the Persian Gulf which holds an estimated 66% of the world’s renounced oil reserves. The three major battles in the Gulf region in the past three decades have created an atmosphere of disturbance. Due to its geographical location and geopolitical understanding, the management of the Gulf coast’s immense oil and natural gas reserves cannot be taken into consideration.

The usual concerns regarding energy security, like the importance of safe and secure access to sea lanes and conflicts in the sea borders of South and East China, continue to challenge security experts and governments. Due to the greater consumption of oil in Asia, there are top concerns about navigation freedom. Ongoing US commitments to ensure open sea lanes of communication remains a critical factor in regional stability as it relates to energy. Further, the financial crisis had a massive impact on economic growth and development of most Asian countries, but it has not primarily changed their prediction of future energy requirements. Chinese energy demand growth in the long-term is expected to exceed its production capacity. Ultimately, China is the leading consumer of the world’s energy supplies. There are predictions that the Asia- Pacific region, led by India and China, will act as the world’s largest energy market in the next decade. Due to their advancement in technology and problems posed by a difficult energy market, there has been growing dependence on natural gas and nuclear power. The region’s long established sources of energy, coal and oil, remain primary energy sources, with the rate of growth of oil demand set to increase significantly in the next decade (Dr. Xuecheng Liu, 2006). Strategic Implications of Asia – Middle East Relations Asia’s speedy economic growth and industrialisation will bring an increasing dependence on Middle Eastern countries for their oil supply requirements in the coming years. Middle Eastern oil producers and exporters are also heavily dependent on Asian countries for their growth in capacity.

From a political and security perspective, there are at least four significant considerations which can be made of this current oil arrangement (factoring in its expected long-term growth and nature of its supply source being the Middle East). These are: (1) The history of political instability in the Middle East lifts the possibility of large scale interruption of oil exports, if Asian countries’ energy security interests rely primarily on the Middle East for their oil supplies. (2) Asia’s increasing dependence on the Middle East increases the importance of sea lanes from the Persian Gulf across the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, through the Straits of Malacca and nearby waterways and across China, Korea and Japan. (Calder, 1999). At present, the US Navy is playing an important role by safeguarding these waterways in ensuring safety and open access. It also strives to prevent any blockages from energy-poor countries like Korea and Japan. (3) East Asia will probably expand its interest in the Middle East (and vice versa) as a natural overflow outcome from this greater energy interdependence. The unity between China and Iran and Japan with Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi are examples of rising relationships between Asia and Middle-Eastern countries. (Calder, 1999, p.5). (4) This Asia – Middle East energy tendency is taking place when the US is declining dependence on the Middle East for its oil, mainly because of the increase in oil producers in North and Latin America. From a geopolitical outlook, reinforcement of the Middle East’s relationship with Asia over energy may create a new controversy with US interests in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East.

Asia is playing a major role in world energy markets, mainly due to China’s outstanding growth in demand. Their increase in energy competition virtually guaranteed a collision with US policies in many ways. China’s increasing demand for energy has already had an immense impact on intra-Asian tensions, mainly in Sino-Japanese relations. In addition to the competition over the pipeline from Angarsk, China has blocked their oil exports to Japan. This issue of energy security is a big concern for the governments of South Korea and Japan, who are US allies. The US coalition’s primary objective has been to maintain stability to support open trade and investment in the Asian region. This arrangement has allowed Japan and South Korea to secure access to energy resources in the Middle East. Due to competition based on Chinese energy demands, the US coalition might face new tensions (Calder, 1999). Terrorism in Indonesia The other major concern to Australia includes terrorism in the Asia-Pacific, especially within Indonesia. The terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which means “Islamic Group” in Arabic, was founded in 1993 and is based in Indonesia. The terrorist networks’ main objective is to attack American or Western values. JI has a Jihadist image of building an Independent Islamist state in the areas where the majority of Muslims live. They seek to spread out secular governments in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, southern parts of Thailand and the Philippines so as to start a new supra-national Islamic state, which includes these countries. The terrorist attacks in recent years in Indonesia from JI groups were against foreigners. A triple bombing attack in Bali on 12th October 2002 killed around 200

people and injured over 300 others. One of the suicide bombers carried explosives in his backpack. The second terrorist had fixed a car bomb in a Mitsubishi van just outside the Sari nightclub in Kuta. The third bomb exploded outside the US embassy causing little damage but injuring some people. The J.W Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta on the 5th August 2003 was another terrorist attack that struck Indonesia. A car bomb which was placed outside the hotel lobby killed at least 12 people and injured over 150 others. Another bombing on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on the 9th September 2004 killed ten people and wounded 140 people. These bombings had a massive impact on the Indonesian tourism industry. The complete history of JI’s leadership is unclear. It is believed that an Indonesian operative, Riduan Isamuddin who is known as Hambali, played a vital role in JI. Through 2002, JI’s leader was Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who was convicted of his connection with the 2002 Bali bombings. He was later released in 2006 and then cleared for his actions. According to Southeast Asia security issues specialist, Zachary Abuza, it is estimated that JI’s group consists of some 500 to 1000 members (CRS report for Congress, Feb.2005). There is a strong belief that Jemaah Islamiyah has links with Al Qaeda. Most media reports describe JI as “Al Qaeda linked”, and Al Qaeda maintain that Indonesia is ready for its Islamist transformation. The intensity of these links is unclear. Few members of JI have accepted that they had connections with the September 11 terrorists and two of them even met the JI members in Malaysia in 2000. There is evidence that they provided a safe haven for some

Al Qaeda operations and financial assistance for their terrorist activities worldwide. In April 2007, the chief suspect of JI (currently in US custody) denied any associations with Al Qaeda when questioned at Guantanamo Bay (CRS report for Congress, 2005). The Indonesian tsunami in December 2004 provided an opportunity for Islamist extremists to enlarge their power by supporting people in susceptible positions. US humanitarian relief through the navy was intended to reduce the influence of terrorist groups (CRS report for Congress, 2005). Conclusion

While traditional security concerns continue, there

are rising problems that require closer scrutiny by

policy officials and scholars. The changing patterns

in trade, greater dependence on the Middle East for

oil and on open access to sea-lanes and strategic

relationships all have an impact on regional energy

security. Further, there are concerns about Asia’s

increasing dependence on the Middle East which

suggests ‘regional bait’ for stability in the Middle

East. This might encourage countries like China to

consider selling weapons to non-status quo powers

in the Middle East (1999 Seminar, Honolulu,

Hawaii). Further, there is a need to address

terrorism to deal with its root causes. The

international community should give more of its

attention towards resolving political issues of the

Muslim world. Despite security improvements since

the Bali attacks, many unidentified terrorists remain

at large, with uncertainty as to their local and

international connections (Atmasasmita, p 98-99).

References:

Atmasasmita R. Strategy of combating terrorism and its implications in Indonesia, http://www.lcki.org/images/seminar_terorisme/Dampak-Terorisme.pdf

Calder, Kent E. "Energy: Catalyst for Asian Energy Conflict?" Paper presented for the APC Seminar on Energy Security in the Asia-Pacific, 15 January 1999, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Chapter Four, Implications of China’s Energy Security Activities, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1244/MR1244.ch4.pdf

Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, 2009, Defence White Paper, http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf

Downs E. (2006) The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series China, The Brookings Institution, http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/research/energy/2006china.pdf

Dr. Liu X. (2006) China’s Energy Security & its grand strategy, The Stanley Foundation, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/pab06chinasenergy.pdf

Dupont A. (2001) East Asia Imperilled, Transnational Challenges to Security, Cambridge University Press, http://books.google.com.au/books?id=Y UM6N4 Kg2ZQC&dq=e ast+asia+ imp erilled:+transnational+challenges+to+security&printsec=frontcover&s ource=bl&ots =OqFZUGHEXZ&sig=YEEdQRZnE6v31FSqknTSdGdY_8U&h l=en&ei=KPouSpf3LYLe7AO_uaXCCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1

Harris S. (2008) Regional energy security: An elusive objective?, Canberra, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/pubs/work_papers/08-2.pdf

Jones S. (2005) The Changing Face of Terrorism in Indonesia, The Asian Wall Street Journal http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3505&l=1

Nadim F. (2008) Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol.51, Issue.7,pp.556-565, University of Connecticut, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Unit 2037, Storrs, CT 06269, United States

Rising Energy Competition and Energy Security in Northeast Asia: Issues for US Policy, 2005, CRS Report for Congress, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32466.pdf

Smith Paul J. and Berlin D. (2000) Transnational Security Threats in Asia: Conference Report, Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Transnational%20Report%20version%2020%20Dec%202000.html

Song J. (1999) Energy Security in the Asia-Pacific: Competition or Cooperation, Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Report_Energy_Security_99.html

Terrorism in Southeast Asia, 2005, CRS Report for Congress, Notable Attacks: 2002, http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/p/Jemaah_Islamiya.htm

Zalman A. Ph.D., Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), about.com, http://terrorism.about.com/od/groups leader1/p/Jemaah_Islamiya.htm

Let’s Start the Conversation Words: Maddy Cassidy In 2000, the United Nations set 8 goals for international development in which member states and various international organisations agreed to achieve these goals by 2015. The third goal is “promoting gender equality and empowering women”. While we’ve made some great advances in terms of the position of women in the world, I am very concerned at a particular issue making news frequently in 2013, just two years off the proposed date of the achievement of the MDG’s. According to the UNDP, up to 7 in 10 women around the world experience physical or sexual violence at some point in their lifetime and as many as 1 in 4 during pregnancy. According to a UN Women study on the Asia Pacific, 10,000 men were surveyed on their use and experience of violence against women and girls in Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka. The survey found that one in two men admitted to using physical or sexual violence against an intimate partner. One in four reported having raped a woman and one in 25 admitted to having participated in gang rape. It seems since the gang rape and death of Jyoti Singh in New Delhi, India, the global community is slowly waking up to the reality of violence against women. Countless amounts of sexual assault cases are emerging from India including assaults against tourists and children. I feel as though we are failing to recognise something crucial though. That borders, cultures or ethnicity do not determine violence against women. It has become a global phenomenon.

Whilst in Australia we fear for the lives of women in the streets of Delhi, raise awareness about the abuse of women in villages across Papua New Guinea, and advocate against sex trafficking in Cambodia and Thailand, are we forgetting our own women? According to the World’s Women 2010 report, 34% of women in Australia are likely to experience sexual violence at least once in their lives. Here in Australia and other parts of the Western world, we empathise with the women of the world when they are violated, but once one of our own is, we’ve become accustomed to blaming her. You see we’re living in a ‘Rape Culture’. As the term becomes popularised, more women are beginning to speak out. Not only are they sharing their stories, but also finally coming to terms with it. The majority of rapes in the western world are beyond our preconceived idea. It’s not the men lurking in the dark alleyways that we’ve never seen before (although, that certainly does still happen), but it’s men who attend the same parties, it’s our boyfriends, our colleagues and our friends. Whilst I’ve noticed we’ve been discussing violence against women in the global arena, I feel as though we’re neglecting it in our own backyard. We need to acknowledge that this behaviour is wrong; we need to promote it, to change societal perceptions. We need to end victim blaming and tell women that they did not ask for it, nor did they deserve it. Feminists like me, including women and men, have been standing up against rape culture; however it seems like an uphill battle. Our society has become accustomed to it and perpetuates it in our everyday lives – it is now normalised. So how can we change that? Stop disrespecting women. Stop telling the jokes about rape and violence. We need to start at the root cause: the men. Just as I can recognise this toxic normalisation, they can too! Let’s start the conversation. We need to commit to a global partnership for the sake of women worldwide. We need to stop rape in 2013. Without an end, it doesn’t seem possible to achieve gender inequality and certainly not the empowerment of women.