Airland Battle

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DESERT STORM: OCTRINAL AIRLAND BATTLE SUCCESS OR "THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR?"

A MONOGRAPH BY

Major Robert J. Paquin Armor

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff

College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 98-99 Approved fo r Public Release Distribution is Unlimited

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S C H O O L O F A D V A N C E D MIL ITARY S T U D I E S MONOG R A P H A P P R O V A L

Major Rober t J . Paqu in

Tit le o f Monograph: ESERT STORM: Doctrinal AirLand Battle Success or "The Amer ican Way of War?"

Approved by:

Monograph Direc tor

LTC Robin P . Swan , MMAS Director, Schoo l o f Advanced Military Studies

fJL/if cJ * pcvrti Phi l ip J . Brookes , Ph . D . Director, Graduate Degree

Program



ABSTRACT

DESERT STORM: DOCTRINAL AIRLAND BATTLE SUCCESS O R "THE

AMERICAN W AY OF WAR"? by M AJ Robert J. Paquin, USA, 59 pages.

The purpose ofthis monograph is to answer the question, "Did th e United States

Army use AirLand Battle at th e operational level to win th e Persian Gulf War?"

This research studied th e planning an d execution, at the operational level, of

Desert Shield/Desert Storm to determine ifth e U.S. Army did us e the operational model

ofAirLand Battle to achieve victory in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. he research only

focused on th e Army performance an d did not address in detail the Joint aspect of

military operations in th e Persian Gulf War.

The criteria for analysis was based on selective AirLand Battle imperatives

defined in FM100-5, Operations, dated M ay 1986. nsure unity ofeffort, Concentrate

combat power against enemy vulnerabilities, an d Anticipate events on th e battlefield were th e three AirLand Battle imperatives used as evaluation criteria. hey were selected

from th e complete list ofAirLand battle imperatives discussed in th e manual because

they focus on issues called to question on rather AirLand Battle was used to win the

Persian Gulf War.

Th e study ofDesert Shield / Desert Storm revealed that the U.S. Army did use the

three AirLand Battle imperatives ofensure unity of effort, concentrate combat power

against enemy vulnerabilities, an d anticipate events on th e battlefield as a basis to

conduct the GulfWar. Mistakes were made in applying these imperatives, however, the

ground offensive was planned an d conducted in accordance with th e Army's AirLand

Battle doctrine.

he AirLand Battle doctrine that was developed during th e decade following th e U.S. defeat in Vietnam, and is an application ofclassic twentieth-century

maneuver theory for mechanized forces.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Topic age

I. ntroduction

Introduction, Background and Significance

Purpose and Methodology

II. valuation Criteria

Introduction to CriteriaEnsure Unity ofEffortConcentrate Combat Power Against Enemy Vulnerabilities 0 Anticipate Events on the Battlefield 1

III. Analysis OfMilitary Actions During Operations Desert Shield And Desert Storm 12

Ensure Unity ofEffort 2 Concentrate Combat Power Against Enemy Vulnerabilities 6 Anticipate Events on the Battlefield 4

IV. Conclusion 1

Introduction 1 Ensure Unity ofEffort 1 Concentrate Combat Power Against Enemy Vulnerabilities 4 Anticipate Events on the Battlefield 5

Endnotes 8

Bibliography 5



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

At the very heart ofwarfare lies doctrine. t represents th e central beliefs

fo r waging war in order to achieve victory. octrine is ofth e mind, a network of

faith an d knowledge, reinforced by experience, which lays a pattern for th e

utilization ofmen, equipment, an d tactics. t is fundamental to sound judgement. General Curtis LeMay

Introduct ion , Background and Signif icance In the first three months of 1991, th e armed forces ofan unparalleled United

Nations coalition attacked an d destroyed th e core ofIraq's military forces. his military

action freed the geographically small bu t oil-rich state ofKuwait from Iraqi occupation

an d control. he military actions of 7 August 1990 to 16 January 1991 (Operation Desert

Shield) and those of 17 January to 3 March 1991 (Operation Desert Storm) conducted by

United States Central Command (CENTCOM) were the military aspects ofth e strategic

response by th e United States, Saudi Arabia, an d their coalition allies to the Iraqi

aggression an d occupation ofKuwait.

Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, (1986) set th e doctrine that the U.S. Army

took to th e Persian Gulf in August 1990. he preface ofFM 100-5 (1986) made explicit

the function ofthis manual was to serve as "the Army's principal tool ofprofessional

self-education in th e science an d ar t ofwar... ."3 t was a guide for Army commanders on

how to orient an d prepare their military force before the outbreak ofa conflict, project

those forces into a theater, plan an d conduct operations, an d redeploy those forces

1



to prepare for future operations. he 1986 version ofFM100-5 explains th e role of

doctrine in th e U.S. Army.

FM 100-5 is the Army's keystone warfighting manual. t explains how Army

forces plan an d conduct campaigns, major operations, battles an d engagements in conjunction with other services an d allied forces. t furnishes the authoritative

foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition,

professional education, an d individual an d unit training. t applies to Army forces

worldwide, bu t must be adapted to th e specific strategic an d operational requirements ofeach theater. While emphasizing conventional military

operations, it recognizes that Army forces must be capable ofoperating

effectively in an y battlefield environment, including low intensity conflict an d on

th e nuclear an d chemical battlefield.4

Before this century, the U.S. military doctrine was implied rather than set down.

In fact, it was no t until after World W ar I that th e nature an d purpose ofdoctrine was

fixed in America as a genuine sub-class ofmilitary knowledge. ll ofthis changed after

Vietnam through th e ne w Training an d Doctrine Command (TRADOC). new vision of

the Army led by General William E. DePuy's training initiatives, particularly th e

initiation ofth e Army Training an d Evaluation Program, was making doctrine to

important to ignore. ollowing th e Arab-Israeli W ar of 1973, the focus shifted even more

to th e role ofdoctrine an d provided justified reason to thoroughly review U.S. doctrine in

the light ofweapon technology developments uncontaminated by th e Vietnam

experience.5

In its evolutionary development, doctrine, in th e U.S. Army, is an authoritative

an d formal declaration ofhow th e Army as a military organization intends to fight. he

purpose ofdoctrine is to unify or synchronize th e individual efforts ofmembers ofan

organization in the performance oftheir collective tasks. t guides training, organization,

an d acquisition. eneral William E. DePuy, the first commander ofth e Army's Training



an d Doctrine Command (TRADOC), gave a good explanation ofmilitary doctrine.

DePuy wrote:

The development an d evolution ofdoctrine and its inculcation, mostly in th e

minds an d hearts ofth e officer corps, are th e life thread and th e pulse ofth e fighting services. y definition an d natural law, doctrine is institutional in

character. octrine an d the institution which it nourishes, an d in turn, on which

it feeds, are exactly coextensive. here is no doctrine outside the institutional

walls—nor ca n the institution creep outside th e doctrine which is its rationale....[Doctrine] is th e mainspring behind th e development ofeffective

fighting forces.6

In general, military doctrines have always been an expression oftime an d

environment. Any armed force operates in accordance with a conception ofwar that ha s

been formed as a consequence of its history, th e state ofmilitary knowledge available at

the time, th e material an d technical assets at hand, th e objectives to which the force

expects to be committed, and, certainly not least, th e caliber ofthose who must attempt to

give it life in battle."7 owever, experience has shown that military forces must strike a

balance between th e past an d future if they are to be prepared for their next war. he

U.S. Army proclaims that th e doctrine established by the 1986 version ofFM100-5,

Operations, attained this balance. eneral Robert Scales, in his book Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in th e Gulf War, claims that th e Army's AirLand Battle war-fighting

doctrine applied during Desert Storm, "not only survived the initial clash ofarms but, in

fact, continues as a viable foundation for th e development offuture war-fighting

doctrine."8 irLand Battle doctrine was able to do this because it was a vision of

futuristic possibilities rather than focused solely on th e present Army organization and

equipment.



Many senior military leaders have stated that th e U.S. Army's swift victory in

Desert Storm proved that AirLand Battle doctrine was effective. hey have also used

this as a validation of the developmental process used to produce th e doctrine, educate

and train soldiers an d units, develop leaders, and research, acquisition an d develop

material. olonel David A. Fastbend, a member ofth e FM 100-5 (1986) writing team

stated, "The 1986 FM100-5 represented th e culmination ofa line ofdoctrinal

development that began with the 1976 edition. t was tested - an d passed triumphantly -

in th e Persian Gulf War."9 eneral Starry in a speech at Gettysburg has stated, "the

American Army had discovered th e uses ofdoctrine, an d how those uses had helped to

make th e Army oftoday. nd he recounted how, as he watched with th e rest ofus th e

war in th e Persian Gulfunfold, he thought to himself, 'it all worked'."10

A testament to th e confidence th e Army had in AirLand Battle doctrine in th e

aftermath of its application in th e Gulf W ar ca n be seen in th e first postwar successor

manual, th e 1993 edition ofFM100-5. his new manual, published under th e leadership

ofthe Vllth Corps Commander during th e war, General Fred Franks, as the TRADOC

commander, retained much ofth e AirLand Battle principles from th e 1986 manual.11

Have we learned the right lessons from Desert Storm as it pertains to doctrine

development? Did we use AirLand Battle during Desert Storm at the operational level or

did we simply conduct our military actions as author Russell Weigley calls th e

"American way ofwar"?

Purpose and Methodology The purpose ofthis monograph is to answer the question, "Did th e United States

Army use AirLand Battle at the operational level to win the Persian Gulf War?"

4



This research studied th e planning an d execution, at th e operational level, of

Desert Shield/Desert Storm to determine ifth e U.S. Army did use th e operational model

ofAirLand Battle to achieve victory in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. he research only

focused on the Army performance an d did no t address in detail th e Joint aspect of

military operations in the Persian GulfWar. he JC S Publication 1-02 definition of

Operational Level ofW ar was used in conducting this research. CS Publication defines

th e Operational Level ofW ar as ,

"The level ofwar at which campaigns an d major operations are planned,

conducted, an d sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or

areas ofoperations.

ctivities at this level link tactics an d strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve th e operational objectives, initiating

actions, an d applying resources to bring about an d sustain these events. hese

activities imply a broader dimension oftime or space than do tactics; they

ensure th e logistic an d administrative support oftactical forces, an d provide th e

means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic

objectives."13

The criteria for analysis was based on selective AirLand Battle imperatives

defined in FM100-5, Operations, dated M ay 1986. nsure unity ofeffort, Concentrate

combat power against enemy vulnerabilities, an d Anticipate events on the battlefield

were th e three AirLand Battle imperatives used as evaluation criteria. hey were selected

from th e complete list ofAirLand battle imperatives discussed in the manual because

they focus on issues called to question on rather AirLand Battle was used to win th e

Persian Gulf War.



CHAPTER 2

EVALUATION CRITERIA

The Army's doctrine is the starting point for all operations. n a particular situation, the Army commander applies doctrine to bring his elements into harmony. Army doctrine must be flexible enough to enable the commander to improvise to meet the requirements ofthe specific case. Doctrine unifies the disparate elements ofthe Army toward a common, effective result -decisive victory.

General Gordon R. Sullivan

Chief ofStaff ofthe Army14

Introduction to Criteria. The chaos ofcombat will place a premium on the initiative, spirit cohesion, and

mental and physical preparedness ofsoldiers and their units. he U.S. Army can meet its

challenge -to preserve the peace and security, and provide for the defense ofthe United

States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and Possessions, and any areas occupied by the

United States; support national policies; implement national objectives; and overcome

any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security ofthe

United States.15 n order to do this it will depend on three essential components. irst, it

will depend on well-trained soldiers and leaders with character and determination.

Second, the Army must have weapons and supporting equipment sufficient for the task at

hand, and finally, sound well-understood doctrine for fighting.16

The years between 1968 and 1986 may be characterized as a period when the U.S.

Army moved from a tactical paradigm based on the experiences ofWorld War II to one

based on the realities ofarmored warfare as it was reflected in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.



The doctrinal shift w as significant. om e have even argued that th e shift was

revolutionary.17 he doctrinal development an d debate, which started in 1973 and

continued throughout th e period, helped to prepare th e Army for late twentieth century

armored warfare. he developments are evident in succeeding editions ofFM100-5,

Operations, th e Army's capstone document. ublished four times during th e period,

three ofth e editions vary greatly from each other. hey are th e 1968 edition, the 1976

edition ("Active Defense"), an d th e 1982 edition ("AirLand Battle"). he most radical

changes occurred in the 1976 and 1982 editions. hese tw o editions differed

dramatically from th e previous, almost standardized model based on th e American

experience in World W ar II.

The doctrine in th e 1986 edition ofFM100-5 w as also entitled "AirLand Battle."

It was essentially an updated version of the 1982 edition that confirmed the general

correctness ofthe earlier edition. t also reflected new knowledge about operational art

an d clarified misconceptions about AirLand Battle doctrine an d that th e "basic thrust of

AirLand Battle was on the mark."18 he world view or view of future war an d future

threat changed little in the new publication. owever, in response to th e requirement to

support more contingency operations, the ne w manual recognized th e need for a greater

capability to deploy forces from th e United States to a "hot spot" around th e world.

The new manual addressed campaign planning in more detail. t placed greater

emphasis on operational art an d sustained multi-engagement operations within a theater

ofoperations.19 irLand Battle reflects th e dynamics ofcombat power, the structure of

modern warfare, an d th e application ofth e classical principles ofwar to present-day

battlefield requirements. t recognizes th e inherently three-dimensional nature ofmodern

7



warfare. irLand Battle doctrine recognized that modern warfare is likely to be fluid an d

nonlinear. herefore, it took an enlarged view of th e battlefield, stressing unified air,

ground, an d sea operations throughout the theater.

The 1986 edition stressed th e importance ofoperational art. t stated, "if

successful, strategy achieves national an d alliance political aims at th e lowest cost in lives

an d treasure. perational ar t translates those aims into effective military operations and

campaigns."20 he authors defined operational art as "the employment ofmilitary forces

to attain strategic goals in a theater ofwar or theater ofoperations, through th e design,

organization, an d conduct ofcampaigns an d major operations."

2 1

AirLand Battle doctrine describes th e Army's approach to generating an d

applying combat power at the tactical an d operational levels. t is based on securing or

retaining th e initiative an d exercising it aggressively to accomplish the mission. The

best results are obtained when powerful blows are struck against critical units or areas

whose loss will degrade th e coherence ofenemy operations in depth....The pace must be

fast enough to prevent him from taking effective counteractions."22 he tenets of

AirLand Battle are:

" * > nitiative - setting or changing the terms ofbattle by action

"^ gility -th e ability of friendly forces to ac t faster than th e enemy

^ epth -extension ofoperations in space, time, an d resources

Synchronization - arrangement ofbattlefield activities in time, space an d

purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at th e decisive point2 3

According to FM100-5, while th e tenets characterize successful AirLand Battle

operations, th e imperatives prescribe essential operating requirements an d apply to all

8



military operations. hey are vitally necessary an d historically valid for success on th e

modern battlefield.24 he 1986 edition took th e Combat Imperatives from th e 1982

edition, renamed them AirLand Battle Imperatives, an d increased th e imperatives from

seven to ten. he three AirLand Battle imperatives to be used as evaluation criteria are:

Ensure unity ofeffort, Concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities, an d

Anticipate events on th e battlefield. he author chose AirLand Battle imperatives as

evaluation criteria instead ofthe four tenets ofAirLand Battle because much research has

already been completed to determine if th e tenets were employed during Desert Storm.

The imperative ofensuring unity ofeffort, as an evaluation criterion, dominated th e

research because of its complexity and importance on operational decisions made during

Desert Storm.

Criteria Def ined . FM100-5 (1986) was th e official keystone warfighting manual for th e U.S. Army

when it deployed for Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. his monograph used th e

doctrinal definition ofth e three selected AirLand Battle imperatives as found in FM100-5

(1986).

Ensure Unity ofEffort Defined

Commands must not only ensure unity ofeffort within their own organizations,

but must also promote it with supporting an d supported elements as well as with other

service or functional components an d allies. fundamental prerequisite for unity of

effort within military organizations is an effective system ofcommand which relies upon

leadership to provide purpose, direction, an d motivation; emphasizes well-understood

common doctrine, tactics, an d techniques; an d takes effective measures to limit th e

9



effects offriction. perational level commanders set conditions for battle by

synchronizing ground, ai r an d sea maneuver an d by attacking th e enemy throughout the

theater ofoperations.

The commander, through his plan for a military operation must establish hi s

intent, concept ofoperations, an d responsibilities ofsubordinate units. he commander

must effectively communicate them so the are clear an d understood by everyone in th e

organization. he concept ofoperations should thoroughly coordinate ground an d air

support plans. he commander always designates a main effort an d all other military

actions throughout th e force are conducted to ensure th e success ofth e main effort.

Commanders must understand th e purpose oftheir operation so they ca n ac t decisively,

confident that they are accomplishing their superior commander's intent.25

Concentrate Combat Power Against Enemy Vulnerabilities Defined

Military organizations must seek ou t th e enemy where he is most vulnerable to

defeat. o know what his vulnerabilities are, commanders an d staffs must study th e

enemy, know an d take into account his strengths, find his inherent vulnerabilities, an d

know how to create new vulnerabilities which ca n be exploited to decisive effect.

Having identified and created enemy vulnerabilities, th e commander must have th e

mental an d organizational flexibility to concentrate combat power to reach points of

enemy vulnerability quickly without loss ofsynchronization. perational planning must

stress flexibility, concentration against enemy center ofgravity while protecting th e

friendly center ofgravity, synchronized joint operations, an d aggressive exploitation of

tactical gains to achieve operational results.26

10



Anticipate Events on th e Battlefield Defined

Operational ar t requires extensive vision, a detailed understanding ofth e

relationship ofmeans to ends, the ability to anticipate, an d effective joint an d combined

cooperation. perational commanders must also anticipate shifts in direction of

operations an d focus his organization to react faster than th e enemy.

FM100-5 guides the Army on how to orient an d prepare for an anticipated

conflict an d how to conduct operations once the operation begins. he commander and

his staffmust anticipate th e enemy's actions an d reactions an d must be able to forecast

how operations may develop. t is essential to anticipate what is possible an d likely an d

prepare for those possibilities. nticipating events an d foreseeing the shape of

possibilities days or weeks in th e future are th e most important skills to possess.

Anticipation an d foresight are essential to turning inside the enemy's decision cycle and

maintaining th e initiative.27

1 1



CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS OF MILITARY ACTIONS DURING OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD

AND DESERT STORM

Ensure Unity of Effort Countless minor incidents -the kind you ca n never really foresee -

combine to lower the general level ofperformance, so that on e always falls far

short ofhe intended goal. ron will power can overcome this friction; it

pulverizes every obstacle, bu t ofcourse, it wears down the machine as well. Carl von Clausewitz, On War28

Th e conduct ofmilitary affairs in Southwest Asia was marked by the particular

positive integration ofpolitical an d military actions almost from the start ofth e crisis.

The Bush administration consistently maintained a clear understanding ofboth political

an d military objectives. everal factors led to this smooth integration. ne important

factor was General Powell's, Chairmen, Joint Chief of Staff, close interaction between

Secretary ofDefense Cheney an d General Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief (CINC)

Central Command (CENTCOM). nother factor was th e ability ofmilitary

commanders' staffs an d planners to watch in real time through Cable News Network

(CNN) President Bush an d th e Secretary Cheney announce essential policy decisions.

This pattern ofdeveloping military objectives based on policy announcements initially

helped to ensure unity ofeffort an d was maintained consistently throughout Desert Shield

and Desert Storm.29

12



After th e Iraqi invasion, President Bush was quick to identify and articulate th e

American national security policy objectives related to th e crisis. he objectives were:

(1 ) The immediate an d unconditional withdrawal ofIraqi forces from Kuwait; (2 ) The

restoration ofth e legitimate government ofKuwait; (3 ) The re-establishment an d

maintenance ofth e security an d stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and (4 )

The safety an d protection ofAmericans an d American nationals abroad.30 iven force

distribution, Secretary Cheney and General Powell understood that they could no t

immediately ac t upon th e more aggressive military parts ofthese four national objectives.

The Secretary ofDefense realized he could act immediately to contain Iraq an d defend

against further Iraqi aggression and therefore Secretary Cheney and General Powell

translated these political objectives th e same day into three limited military objectives.

These were (1) to deter further Iraqi aggression, (2 ) to improve Saudi Arabian military

defense capabilities, an d (3 ) to defend Saudi Arabia.31 he reliance on nonmilitary

means to achieve or effect the declared national goals accounts for th e difference between

the two lists.

Between November 1990 an d February 1991, CENTCOM an d Army Forces

Central Command (ARCENT) developed th e concept ofoperations for th e ground

campaign using two corps. eneral Schwarzkopfmodified the ARCENT concept of

operations to conform to his vision ofth e execution ofth e battle in several briefings held

with ARCENT during this period. s force build up began to present more aggressive

military options, an d as it appeared that non-military measures would not be successful,

CENTCOM began developing offensive plans. chwarzkopfs staff developed six new

13



primary military objectives for the conduct ofth e air and ground campaigns. he

objectives were:

1 . ttack Iraqi political-military leadership and command an d control.

2 .

ain an d maintain air superiority. 3. ever Iraqi supply lines. 4 . estroy known nuclear, biological an d chemical production, storage an d

delivery capabilities. 5. estroy Repulican Guard forces in the Kuwaiti Theater ofOperations.

6. iberate Kuwait City.32

While developing offensive courses ofaction General Schwarzkopfmade some

critical decision early in the military decision process that helped focus his planners. s

early as 18

September 1990, in Schwarzkopfs initial offensive guidance, everyone

understood that a frontal assault into th e teeth ofth e Iraqi defense was to be avoided at all

cost. is guidance to avoid an attack into th e Iraqi's strongest defenses called for an

indirect approach to reach an d destroy Saddam's operational center ofgravity.

Schwarzkopf identified and communicated Iraqi's first military center ofgravity, an d

CENTCOM's main objective, as th e Republican Guard. he Republican Guard had

pulled back from Kuwait to southeastern Iraq and constituted a theater reserve to conduct

th e decisive counterattack once th e coalition forces were tied down in th e forward

defenses.33

Later in th e process, General Schwarzkopf further articulated his intent as

follows: "Maximize friendly strength against Iraqi weakness an d terminate offensive

operations with th e {Republican Guard) destroyed an d major U.S. forces controlling th e

lines ofcommunications in the KTO."34 he air campaign would focus on achieving th e

first three objectives singularly, and join with th e ground forces to achieve th e last three.

The ground campaign would focus on achieving th e last three objectives. hese

14



decisions made in early January 1991 were especially important to th e theater planning.

They allowed th e entire military force to focus on achieving th e CINCs intent an d

objectives. nc e General Schwarzkopfapproved th e ground concept ofoperations and

scheme ofmaneuver on 8 January, it did not change substantially through execution.

O n 14 November 1990, Schwarzkopfheld what was probably his most important

briefing ofth e war from the stand point ofcommunicating the commander's intent: he

gave an overview ofth e concept ofoperations to all U.S. Army commanders down to the

division level, he specified destruction ofth e Guard as th e objective ofthe overall

campaign, assigned VII Corps th e main attack mission, an d se t mid-January as th e time to

be ready to execute th e "Great Wheel" maneuver. s Dr. Swain stated in his book Lucky

War, "This briefing an d subsequent conferences and briefings ensured and extraordinary

degree ofunity ofeffort in th e U.S. offensive. he selection an d clear articulation ofth e

command's military objective may well have been Schwarzkopfs greatest contribution

as theater commander, for it produced a harmony ofaction rare in complex operations."

From th e 14 November briefing onward, planning fo r th e offensive proceeded at

all levels with continuous dialogue and negotiation. rom this time on, what had been up

to this point a closely held planning process grew simultaneously vertically an d

horizontally in an environment in which each commander, from division level an d above,

had heard th e concept ofoperations from the CINC himself.

One ofth e most important factors that stand ou t in th e Desert Storm planning

process is that th e plan was th e result ofa process, no t an event, an d not "fathered" by

an y on e person. he Third Army military planning process was marked by continuous

discussion. ialogue took place between CENTCOM above an d subordinate corps an d

15



support command staffs below and horizontally within ARCENT staff. he ground

operational planning involved a planning process of iterative debate from th e bottom to

top.37 As described in th e book, Lucky War, "The process, best characterized as a series

of"negotiations" was more important than th e written products, for it was th e process

that ultimately produced no t just direction bu t the detailed understanding at every level of

how th e battle would be fought."38 his built a single concept in th e minds ofall

commanders, a critical element of successful synchronization oftheir incongruent

activities.

Initially, th e responsibility for developing th e offensive plans had been given to a

team offour School OfAdvanced Military Studies (SAMS) graduates that were brought

together specifically to become General Schwarzkopfs future operation planners. nc e

th e CINC was satisfied that he understood what each ofhis components must do , he

transferred planning responsibility for Army operations to Third Army. hird Army's

staff structure was still immature, so Schwarzkopfplaced this planning team under th e

supervision ofThird Army's Commander, Lieutenant General Yeosock an d his G3 ,

Brigadier General Arnold. his solution to Third Army's personnel problems was both

blessing an d a curse in disguise. sing th e same principle planners augmented with

Third Army staffpersonnel would certainly ensure unity ofeffort between CENTCOM's

plan and Third Army's plan. owever, it also ensured that a fresh set ofeyes an d minds

were not utilized to analyze th e details ofthe plan at another level. More importantly, it

left Schwarzkopfwithout a planning staffto look at the current operation and plan for th e

offensive an d continue to ask, "What will happen next?'. his lack offuture operations

planners stunted the development of sequels -major operations that follow the current

16



operation. lans for these are based on th e possible outcomes (victory, stalemate, or

defeat) associated with th e current operation or plan.39 A task that SAMS students are

specifically trained an d educated to do.

Upon initial deployment to Saudi Arabia, on e ofGeneral Yeosock's biggest

challenges was how to build a team within the coalition that eventually Third Army

would control. n 13 August 1990, under th e authority ofth e Joint Military Committee,

he established the Coalition Coordination Communication Integration Center (C3IC).

This organization w as created to achieve unity ofeffort between the Saudi an d American

militaries.

s a former Program Manager,

Saudi Arabian National Guard (PMSANG),

Yeosock realized that during operations in an allied state, ground forces bear a unique

burden. merican forces must live in, train, an d conduct military operations on land that

belongs to another nation, Saudi Arabia, an d do so without undermining th e legitimacy of

th e host nation government whose security is th e reason for their presence. 3 IC would

initially help Third Army organize host nation support and later along with a network of

liaison teams develop into an organization that contributed greatly to ensure unity of

effort.

The C3IC helped to hold up a fragile coalition that did not benefit from an y long

term agreements like those in NATO or even Korea. his ne w Coalition was starting

from scratch, without status-of-forces agreements or Standard Operating Procedures,

C3IC provided on avenue to solidify th e Coalition. his role w as critical. t protected

what Schwarzkopf identified as th e Coalition's friendly center ofgravity, th e Coalition

itself.40

17



In November an d December 1990, Third Army established two additional

elements ofth e headquarters to ensure Yeosock's concept was communicated an d

understood -a mobile command post (CP) an d seven liaison teams designed to be

shadow staffs. Yeosock's intent for th e mobile CP was as an alternate command post, a

base for expediters -that is, informed representatives ofth e commanders, who could go

an d see what was happening, clarify guidance, synchronize current operations, an d

provide timeliness feedback to th e commander -who could untangle immediate

problems. he mobile CP freed Yeosock an d his G3 to focus on future operations.

Third Army also created liaison teams to

send to adjacent an d subordinate

headquarters. he concept for th e teams was similar to that ifth e C3IC organization.

The liaison teams were not just used as messengers, bu t instead used as a means to

influence th e way allies conducted their planning an d to even act as a shadow staffto

assist them in complex staffwork. nother important function that th e teams provided

was to provide first hand information that Yeosock could no t have otherwise received

du e to distance. he leader ofth e teams also acted as "directed telescopes" -th e eyes

an d ears ofth e commander.41 hese team leaders reported directly to Yeosock's

executive officer twice a da y during th e conduct ofth e battle. t th e end ofDesert

Storm, Lieutenant General Yeosock called the liaison teams on e ofthe three chiefreasons

for success in th e Operation.42 he mobile CP and liaison teams not only helped to

ensure unity ofeffort within their own organization, bu t also promoted it with supporting

an d supported elements as well as with other service an d functional components an d

allies.

18



Once Third Army expanded to tw o Corps, Yeosock recognized th e need to

synchronize th e plans ofboth corps. rom 2 7 to 30 December Third Army commanders

an d selected members of their staffs conducted a M ap Exercise (MAPEX). eneral

Arnold, the ARFOR G3 intended this MAPEX to be a wargame, however, because ofthe

number ofpeople that attended it, an d the subordinate commanders desires, the MAPEX

turned in to a series ofmutual briefings. uring these briefings, the commanders raised

issues, and th e staffs would hold sessions to work ou t th e solutions. ny issue that could

no t be solved was identified as an outstanding issue an d was worked ou t by commander

conferences at a later date.

43 his MAPEX was a useful means to help ensure unity of

effort among Third Army's units an d to clarify or at least identify an y outstanding

problems. t also provided an excellent tool to prepare Third Army's staff an d Corps

commanders before briefing General Schwarzkopf, an d later General Powell and

Secretary Cheney on Third Army's plan ofattack.

As the CENTCOM CINC, General Schwarzkopfhad enormous authority an d

responsibility. When appointed, a CINC's tw o primary warfighting commanders that can

be designated are a Joint Force Land Component Commander an d a Joint Force Air

Component Commander. ac h has overall operational control ofallocated forces.

During Desert Storm, however, General Schwarzkopfretained th e role ofJoint Force

Land Component Commander for himself. his decision will be discussed later in detail.

Norman Schwarzkopfs personality an d his command climate had an impact on

how Third Army and its subordinate Corps understood and executed th e ground

campaign. he composite picture ofthis physically dominant figure is on e ofa complex

man with "raw courage an d an overriding ambition, bu t with a hair-trigger, explosive

19



temper that often got him into trouble."44 Schwarzkopf was "a terror as a boss, often

furious when unhappy or dissatisfied."45 e consistently reinforced his reputation as

"Stormin' Norman." eneral Carl Vuono, th e Army Chief of Staff, considered him on e

ofthe most "difficult, stubborn an d talented men in the Army."46 chwarzkopfhad an

uncommon combination ofcommand experience that spanned decades an d included

Vietnam an d Grenada. hat experience, commented Colonel Douglas Craft, "combined

with a superior intellect permitted him to understand the totality ofunified op s an d their

link to th e strategic and political goals ofth e coalition nations."47

Schwarzkopfs relationship with Lieutenant General Yeosock was ambivalent.

Often, he was critical ofYeosock in front ofhis CENTCOM staff.48 Nevertheless, he

chose to leave Yeosock in command ofThird Army when given th e opportunity to

replace him with Lieutenant General Waller after a ten-day absence for surgery in

February.49 When Schwarzkopfwas angered, he often leaped down th e chain of

command an d over supervised division commanders.

As Third Army commander, Lieutenant General Yeosock was th e Army

Component Commander or CENTCOM. is headquarters was tasked with support of

contingency operations in th e region. eosock became acquainted with Schwarzkopfs

personality an d temper through a previous assignment as his deputy when Schwarzkopf

was th e Army Deputy Chiefof Staff for Operations. his did allow him to see through

Schwarzkopfs temperamental outbursts an d get th e information he needed. n an

attempt to avoid direct confrontation, he used th e Third Army staffpersonnel -primarily

Brigadier General Steve Arnold, his operations officer -to interact with Schwarzkopfon

20



a daily basis. eosock used personal access for private conversations an d disagreements

with th e CINC.50

In The Generals' War, Gordon an d Trainor criticized Yeosock's lack of

dynamism and quiet command style.

He had been assigned to head 3rd Army precisely because the Army had not

expected a Middle East War. unning third Army was a job the Army doled ou t to

officers on th e verge ofretirement. eosock seemed to acknowledge the limited

skills he brought to th e job. e feared Schwarzkopfs temper an d often sought to get

Waller to run interference for him on minor issues. eosock also deferred to his

Corps commanders on strategy an d tactics, each ofwhom reinforced th e conservatism

ofCENTCOM's stragey.51

The reluctance ofYeosock to confront Schwarzkopfan d his propensity to avoid frequent

conflict significantly influenced the command environment.

The blend ofYeosock's personality, command style, an d th e roles he chose to fill

as third Army commander significantly shaped th e two-corps fight. eosock defined his

role as "unencumbering" the tw o corps so that they could concentrate on training and

fighting. e sa w himselfas a problem solver rather that a field commander.52 Dr. Swain,

in "Lucky War": Third Army in Desert Storm, captures Yeosock's overall command

climate:

Restructuring th e Army HQ had to accord with a fundamental beliefon the

part ofYeosock that as a commander he commanded tw o corps commanders, not tw o

corps. e believed his principal role was ensuring the sustainment ofth e force and

allocation ofthe force multipliers no t otherwise accessible to th e corps, especially

logistics, air power, an d intelligence... eosock was determined to deal only with

major issues an d only with large units. o long as ARCENT, as th e operational headquarters, could assign missions, allocate forces, se t objectives and boundaries,

conduct deep fires, an d monitor progress, it was in Yeosock's view, synchronizing

the operations ofthe tw o corps.5

The CENTCOM an d Third Army command environments reflected their

commanders' character an d personalities. Where Schwarzkopfwas mercurial, forceful,

21



an d dynamic," noted Dr. Swain, "Yeosock was thoughtful, thorough, an d circumspect."54

The Third Army commander sa w himself as a facilitator, while Schwarzkopfwas an

aggressive hands-on commander. Where Schwarzkopfwas direct, Yeosock could be

ambiguous. hese factors, an d th e factors ofcommand relationship, discussed next, led

to what Clausewitz called friction -th e "countless minor incidents -th e kind you can

never really foresee - combine to lower th e general level ofperformance, so that on e

always falls far short ofhe intended goal.55 his friction led to a break in unity ofeffort

during Desert Stonn. his break is noticeable at least twice, once in th e timing ofth e

Vllth Corps attack an d again when CENTCOM announced th e cease-fire.

Late in th e evening of2 6 February (G-Day + 2 ), Lieutenant General Fredrick

Franks, Commander ofVII Corps, delayed th e movement ofhis Corps ground offensive

operations du e to ba d weather, limited visibility conditions, physical exertion, limited

enemy contact an d the lack ofaccurate intelligence on Iraqi troop movements. eneral

Franks decided no t to continue his night attack despite being told by General

Schwarzkopfthat VII Corps must continue to move. eneral Schwarzkopfan d General

Franks had a different perspective as to what th e other should have done. or General

Schwarzkopfsitting in Riyadh, the choice was easy, continue to move an d attack.

However, General Franks, th e executor ofth e plan, was faced with the uncertainty ofnot

knowing th e location ofIraqi forces an d th e safety ofhis soldiers. hese were concerns

that factored in his decision to halt VII Corps' movement.56 he spatial difference

between th e tw o generals affected th e degree of friction each encountered, which ultimately influenced their decisions and relationship.

22



The announcement and transition to a halt ofoffensive operations and cease-fire

is another good example where CENTCOM's endeavor to ensure unity ofeffort failed.

The difficulty on 2 8 February was that it was not enough to ask ifthe president's strategic

military objectives had been accomplished. t also mattered politically how U.S. forces

were postured when they stopped offensive operations and what were the Coalition's

expectations for the Iraqi forces south ofthe Euphrates. Yet, once the decision to halt

offensive military actions was made, clear military guidance did not follow the political

declaration ofthe cease-fire.

Events on the ground drifted, with field headquarters inventing their ow n

interpretations ofthe situation. Major points ofconfusion occurred during the on-again,

off-again cease-fire order, selection and occupation ofa site for the cease-fire talks, and

what exactly were the rules ofengagement and intent ofthe Commanders at the

C O operational and tactical level.

Another problem area in unity ofeffort that developed in Desert Storm was the

issue ofGeneral Schwarzkopfs decision to act as the CINC and the Land Component

Commander (LCC). he coalition had already grown to a multinational, Joint Service

force under the shared control ofCENTCOM and the Saudi prince, Lieutenant General

Khalid bin Sultan. he Saudi's had insisted on commanding all Arab forces. Years of

NATO exercises and numerous standard agreements dealing with doctrine and training

with British and French forces posed fewer problems for integration. Yet, the need to

maintain unity ofcommand, and therefore ensure unity ofeffort ofthe entire force, called

for the establishment ofa land component commander in charge ofall ground forces.

23



As th e commander ofthe Vllth an d XVIIIth U.S. Corps, Lieutenant General

Yeosock, Third Army commander was pushed in between th e Corps commanders an d th e

CINC. ne ofth e greatest impediments to the organization an d employment ofThird

Army was th e lack ofa coherent Army doctrine in 1990 for Army level ofcommand.

FM100-5 only discussed Corps level an d below operations.59 o complicate th e matter

worse, Third Army staffing was minimally manned du e to th e deployment policy of

prioritizing for movement combat power elements first an d keeping logistical and

command and control resources deployment to a "minimum essential force" level.

"From 15 August until 9 October, th e ARGENT force structure was in a constant

state offlux as guidance on minimum essential force deployment, authority to mobilize

Reserve Components, an d strategic lift constraints were all balanced against a notional

C+90 force."60 nly 3 46 ofth e anticipated 82 5 officers an d enlisted personnel called for

by the Table ofOrganization an d Equipment were deployed when th e decision was made

to deploy a second Corps in order to gain an offensive capability. hird Army had to

recreate itself into a headquarters designed for operational an d strategic offensive. major restructuring ofThird Army's stafforganization took place in November an d

December to meet this challenge.61

When General Schwarzkopfmade th e tough decision to retain th e land

component commander responsibilities for himself, with Lieutenant General Waller as

his primary assistant for ground combat operations he created a command environment of

contusion. e made this decision for three reasons. ne, th e American forces straddled

th e Arab Corps, which made a unified command difficult. wo, he appears to have

lacked confidence in Lieutenant General Yeosock. hree, he egotistically believed he

2 4



personally was th e only commander who could orchestrate Allied, Arab, an d American

units.62

Under this command relationship, Schwarzkopfwas within his rights as th e LCC

to going directly to th e Corps commanders with orders. owever, it w as expected for th e

U.S. Corps commanders to deal directly with Yeosock. eosock had to compete with

Lieutenant General Horner, th e Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), th e

Arab command, an d the Marines for Schwarzkopfs (as th e CINC) attention. This

rather convoluted arrangement went against th e principles of simplicity an d unity of

command, an d certainly hindered the ability of th e coalition to ensure unity ofeffort.

The U.S. Army did us e th e AirLand Battle imperative ofensure unity ofeffort as

a basis to plan and conduct Desert Shield an d Desert Storm. he initial positive

integration ofpolitical an d military objectives, th e collaborative planning process, an d

command an d control facilitators (mobile CP, C3IC, an d liaison teams) employed by

Third Army exemplified how th e imperative was applied. he friction created by the

different leadership styles and General Schwarzkopfs decision to accept th e

responsibility ofbeing the CINC an d LCC are examples ofmistakes that detracted from

the endeavor to provide unity ofeffort.

25



Concentrate Combat Power Against Enemy Vulnerabil it ies The first thing for a Commander in Chiefto determine is what he is going

to do, to see ifhe has th e means to overcome th e obstacles which th e enemy ca n

oppose to him, and, when he has decided, to do all he ca n to surmount them.

NapoleonMaxim LXXTX

64

CENTCOM did clearly concentrate against th e Iraqi vulnerabilities when they

initiated th e Air Campaign ofDesert Storm. he Coalition's air power attacked the Iraqi

vulnerabilities by focusing on their centralized command an d control system that allowed

their air defense system to operate. hrough careful analysis, the JFACC staff

understood that if they could destroy the Iraqi Kari integrated air defense system they

could cause th e air defense system to become paralyzed an d disintegrate. o do this, they

concentrated the initial air attacks on th e command an d control nodes, th e sector an d area

operating systems, ofth e Iraqi air defense system. nce these were destroyed, th e

Coalition's air power gained freedom ofaction and destroyed th e Iraqi air defense

weapon systems a piece at a time.65

However, General Schwarzkopfs decision to assume th e responsibility as th e

LCC as well as th e CINC created another unintended problem. he problem was a break

in th e necessary close relationship between the LCC an d th e ground component's

battlefield coordination element (BCE). y doctrine, th e BCE is th e LCC's

representative at th e Joint Targeting Board. owever, since Schwarzkopfw as th e LCC,

an d Third Army had th e BCE as part oftheir organization there arose a serious

disconnect. he BCE served instead as the ARCENT's interface with Lieutenant General

Homer's staff, making it on e ofmany competing voices in th e daily targeting meetings.

Th e ARCENT BCE chief, Colonel Schulte, did not have daily access to the CINC's

2 6



briefings where Schwarzkopf would often modify or issue new guidance directly to the

Horner, the JFACC. his created a command relationship where the LCC's battlefield

coordination element was not kept current on the LCC's priorities.

The BCE plays a vital role in coordinating the deep battle in AirLand Battle

operations. his dysfunctional command relationship led to a problem in the ability of

ground commanders to obtain fixed-winged Air Force assets to attack enemy strengths

and create enemy vulnerabilities. he Army was dependent on the Air Force for the air

component ofAirLand Battle. ignificant air support was necessary for tactical and

operational success on the ground. n the context ofan operational construct such as

AirLand Battle, the idea ofusing deep fires, air and ground, simultaneous with close

battle as a means ofshaping future battlefield events was central to the concept of

operational art.67

Army AirLand Battle doctrine includes the concept ofbattlefield air interdiction

(BAI). BAI insures that the commander can concentrate effects to achieve overwhelming

combat power in one, synchronized battle. As defined in FM100-5 (1986), BAI is "air

interdiction attacks against targets which have a near term effect in the operations or

scheme ofmaneuver offriendly forces, but are not in close proximity to friendly

forces."68 These air support missions directly effect the immediate or impending ground

action, and serve to shape the battlefield in a way that is evident almost immediately, not

days down the road. he ground commander cannot rely solely on his organic fires to

halt the oncoming foe on this expanded and highly dynamic battlefield.

An interservice issue was present, whether a balance could be struck between the

doctrinal demands ofthe Army for integrated AirLand battle and the Air Force insistence

2 7



on centralized command an d decentralized execution. nder th e system present in 1990,

th e Army Corps could not give th e Air Force mission orders to accomplish a supporting

effort in its deep battle. nstead, th e Army must nominate discreet targets. his did not

fit th e Army's AirLand Battle doctrinal approach to warfighting as it is explicitly stated

in FM100-5 (1986) no r is it reflective ofa dynamic battlefield that presents fleeting

windows ofopportunity. rm y doctrine expected th e Air Force to provide force

application throughout the depth ofthe corps battlefield. he Army expected th e air to

ground engagements to be completely integrated into one, simultaneous battle.

The main problem w as that th e Army and Air Force were clearly at doctrinal odds

over the question ofair interdiction. octrinal differences between the Army an d Air

Force appeared to have been incompatible. llocating BAI to the corps was at odds with

th e Air Force desire to maintain centralized control of interdiction under th e JFACC. n fact, managing th e flow ofair traffic became so complex, that early on, Lieutenant

General Horner decided that targeteers would have only two categories ofoffensive air

available: air interdiction an d close air support. AI was deleted as a possible target

category."69

In particular, th e Air Force system required the Army to nominate targets seventy

tw o hours out, that in turn meant even longer lead times for target priority decisions by

th e Army, hindering agility. he requirement to nominate targets for th e Air Tasking

Order (ATO) was extremely difficult problem for the Army in th e Gulf War. ccording

to Major General Arnold, this process created a five-day cycle oftargeting which was too

slow an d bureaucratic for th e Army method ofoperations.70 Additionally, th e Air Force

required that targets are revalidated eight an d then again four hours prior to attack.

2 8



"Given an average ofon e hundred ten ARCENT-submitted targets per da y an d th e size of

th e area, managing th e effort to revisit each target was an almost impossible task." his

w as especially difficult given th e limited reconnaissance assets available to th e corps.

Both agility an d synchronization appear to be excluded when th e corps

commander does not own the air missions and therefore cannot divert them based on an

evolving battle. Most importantly, th e ability to concentrate overwhelming combat

power simultaneously throughout the depth ofth e enemy w as seen as crucial to th e Army

corps commanders ability to effectively shape the battlefield and force the enemy to

conform to his will through decisive battle.

RCENT found that less than fifty percent

oftheir requested targets even made in on th e ATO. The result was an immediate

outcry from the corps commanders who, having lost their ability to designate BAI targets,

still expected to [be able to ] influence the general interdiction effort to conform with the

corps plan to shape th e battlefield."72 his inability to focus th e interdiction effort in th e

corps deep battle was a sever handicap ofth e commanders ability to create an d execute

decisive battle.

At th e same time, there is support for th e Air Force argument. f th e deep battle

forward ofth e Fire Support Coordination Line is strictly th e focus ofth e JFACC then the

entire interdiction effort becomes synchronized into a coherent deep operation. ikewise,

if th e interdiction capability w as constantly parceled out to the corps commanders as

BAI, then th e CINC places at risk his ability to mass airpower for decisive operational

effects. his dichotomy was th e fundamental difference between th e Army an d Air Force

views ofhow to create enemy vulnerabilities that th e Coalition could concentrate combat

power against to achieve successful results.

2 9



From D-day, 17 January 1991, to early February, very little air power was

devoted in the tactical preparation ofthe corps' battlefield. his became ofprimary focus

ofground commanders. he corps and division commanders became increasingly

concerned that they would be ordered into battle prior to them having the opportunity to

effectively shape the battlefield. By 1 February, ARCENT came to a consensus that

approximately nine days oftactical preparation would be required for a successful ground

attack. However, backward planning using this data was complicated from the fact that

no one knew when G-day would arrive. his caused the ground commanders to question

whether the CINC would reallocate his air assets in support ofground priorities in time to

allow them to create the enemy vulnerabilities they needed to shape the battlefield in

order to be successful.74

ARCENT was so concerned with this that on 18 February, Brigadier General

Arnold wrote as a cover letter for the ARCENT situation report:

AIR SUPPORT RELATED ISSUES CONTINUE TO PLAGUE FINAL

PREPARATION FOR TH E OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND RAISE DOUBTS CONCERNING OUR ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY SHAPE TH E BATTLEFIELD PRIOR TO INITIATION OF THE GROUND CAMPAIGN. . .ARMY NOMINATED TARGETS AR E NOT BEING SERVICED. FFORTS MUST BE TAKEN NOW TO ALIGN TH E OBJECTIVES OF TH E AIR AND GROUND CAMPAIGNS AND ENSURE TH E SUCCESS OF OUR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

75

On 19 February Schwarzkopf shifted the focus ofhis resources to preparing the

battlefield for ground operations. However, the anticipated requirement for nine days of

preparation was not to be realized. -day was later set as 2 4 February, providing only

five days offocused effort to shape the battlefield for ground corps commanders in order

to create vulnerabilities that they could concentrate their combat force against.76

30



When CENTCOM first briefed Lieutenant General Yeosock on their plan for

offensive action (17 October 1990), he raised concern on th e need to keep forces

concentrated in th e face ofth e unfavorable force ratios Third Army would confront. is

other concerns were the desirability ofa deception plan, th e need to keep th e east covered

adequately while his forces concentrated for an attack in th e west, an d the difficulty of

staging adequate logistic support in a timely fashion. n 2 1 October, Schwarzkopf

personally se t the operational objective ofth e attack as th e physical destruction ofth e

Republican Guard.77

Lieutenant General Franks, who would lead th e coalition's main attack, argued

time and again for what he believed were three essentials for success. hese were,

"relentless attack (no pauses once the operation was under way), maintenance of

concentration -hitting with a closed fist rather than open fingers -an d th e absolute need

for three heavy divisions at th e point of impact with the RGFC [Republican Guard Forces

Command]."78

Th e need for concentration meant a tightly controlled advance an d a corps attack

that moved deliberately north initially an d then turned east into the Republican Guard's

flank. he fist, the First an d Third Armored Divisions, joined after th e breach by the

First Infantry Division, an d th e Second Armored Cavalry Regiment, would have to move

under corps control to maintain concentration an d avoid fratricide. Maintaining balance

an d concentration would require a good deal ofthe corps' energy as it moved into battle.

This called for a highly disciplined, closely controlled maneuver, more commonly

referred to as "The Great Wheel."79

31



The words chosen by Vllth Corps staff in their order articulates Franks intent.

The order read:

The first phases ofour operation will be maximum forces moving toward the

RGFC with minimum casualties in minimum time. hese phases will be deliberate an d rehearsed....we will defeat forces to the east rapidly with an economy of force,

an d pass th e point ofmain effort to th e west ofthat action to destroy th e Republican

Guard Forces Command in a fast moving battle with zones ofaction an d agile forces

attacking by fire, maneuver, an d air. ombat service support must keep up because there will be no pause.

80

Vllth Corps initial plan directed the entire corps to pass through a breach to be

conducted by th e First Infantry Division in th e Iraqi defensive line. owever, as th e

corps conducted more reconnaissance an d they became more intimate with the terrain in

their sector, they identified an abrupt end to th e Iraqi defensive line. he defense an d

supporting obstacles stopped about forty kilometers from Vllth Corps boundary with

XVm corps. Vllth Corps modified their plans so that th e tw o armored divisions an d

armored cavalry regiment, th e core ofthe iron fist, would advance around th e end ofth e

Iraqi defensive positions bu t within their boundary with XVIII corps. The end run was

to be a tight squeeze. t required Third Armored Division to move in a column of

brigades with a fifteen-kilometer front." he First Armored Division, left ofth e Third,

had a front ofonly twenty-five kilometers.81 his maneuver avoided th e deliberate

defense an d complex obstacles ofth e Iraqi front line and allowed Vllth Corps to create a

vulnerability in the enemy defensive system. Vllth Corps found, in Jomini's words, a

way "to obtain by free and rapid movements th e advantage ofbringing th e mass ofth e

troops against fractions ofthe enemy;... to strike in th e most decisive direction."82

During Desert Storm, th e AirLand Battle imperative ofconcentrating combat

power against enemy vulnerabilities was applied. he disconnect between th e Army's

32



AirLand Battle doctrine and the Air Force doctrine did hinder the ground commanders'

ability to attack the enemy's strength and create new enemy vulnerabilities. he lack of

control over BAI limited their ability to shape the battlefield in preparation for the ground

attack. However, the Coalition's air power did attack the Iraqi's integrated air defense

system's vulnerable centralized command and control system and caused it to become

paralyzed. Also, the ground attack, specifically the Vllth Corps planned "Great Wheel"

with its iron fist was an excellent example ofconcentrating combat power against a

small, but very decisive fraction ofthe enemy's system.

33



Anticipate Events on th e Battlefield Defined In th e Book ofProverbs it is written, "Where there is no vision, th e people

perish."...Vision, th e ability to anticipate th e course of future events, is what keeps th e Army steady on the course.

83

It is th e responsibility ofplanning headquarters like CENTCOM and Third Army

to anticipate possible threats to national security within their areas ofresponsibility and to

develop a plan that will allow th e U.S. to protect its vital interests. eneral Schwarzkopf

was on e ofth e first to anticipate how th e changing world environment might refocus th e

Army's strategic focus from Europe back to his area ofresponsibility. his changing

environment was brought about by th e end ofth e Cold War, the Berlin Wall coming

down, an d in 1988 th e end ofthe Iran / Iraq war. With an enormous, well equipped Iraqi

military force, Schwarzkopfrealized that th e Iraqis were now th e most serious threat to

stability in th e Middle East.84

For CENTCOM, this ne w environment meant shifting its focus from opposing a

Soviet offensive through Iran, th e most likely threat envisioned from 1983 to 1989, to a

more regional threat, a theoretical Iraqi attack against its weak, oil rich neighbors in th e

south. n November 1989, General Schwarzkopfdirected that the plan addressing a

possible Soviet invasion ofIran, Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90, be quickly revised

to reflect an Iraqi invasion ofKuwait and Saudi Arabia. his plan was made

CENTCOM's number on e priority. n December Schwarzkopfrequested an d was

granted permission to change th e scenario for th e biennial Joint Chiefs of Staffwar game

from a focus on a vanishing Soviet threat to defense ofKuwait an d Saudi Arabia.85

In January 1990, CENTCOM began to prepare war plans based on th e Iraqi threat

to th e Middle East region. hese plans would be co-developed and used by third Army

34



an d formed th e basis ofth e exercise, Internal Look, scheduled for July 1990. lso,

during January, General Schwarzkopfappeared before the Senate Armed Forces

Committee an d testified that "Iraq is no w the preeminent military power in th e Gulf, and

It is assuming a broader leadership role throughout th e Arab world. raq has the

capability to militarily coerce its neighboring states should diplomatic efforts fail to

produce the desired results."86

Schwarzkopfwas not th e only commander that anticipated this change.

Lieutenant General Yeosock also anticipated the developing situation an d as early as

March 1989, directed Third Army to coordinate with th e Army Concepts an d Analysis

Agency to conduct a war game simulation ofthe existing war plan for the Arabian

Peninsula. his war game was called Persian Tiger 89 an d was focused to determine ifa

significantly larger and heavier force was needed than had been predicted. ersian Tiger

resulted in tw o significant findings. irst, it was determined that U.S. forces would not

be able to deploy to the region in time ifth e deployment started at th e commencement of

hostilities. econdly, th e war game determined that a larger an d heavier force was

87 required to accomplish th e mission satisfactorily.

Between January and July 1990, CENTCOM, Third Army, an d XVII Corps

developed draft plans for th e new contingency. nited States Forces Command began

selecting units to meet th e requirements established by th e draft plan. heir higher

headquarters visited these units and a dialogue ofbriefings and discussions was started to

develop the draft plan into a more coherent document.

This prewar planning proved very useful and helped to guide CENTCOM an d

Third Army at th e initiation ofDesert Shield. clear demonstration ofthe planners

35



ability to anticipate future contingency requirements is clearly demonstrated in

CENTCOM's strategy statement that was developed as part ofthe draft plan. he

strategy that drove Third Army's operational planning an d future exercises was described

as:

The USCENTCOM regional contingency strategy to counter an intraregional threat initially seeks to [secure] U.S. an d allied interests through deterrence. hould deterrence fail, th e strategy is to rapidly deploy additional U.S. combat forces to assist

friendly states in defending critical ports an d oi l facilities on th e ARABIAN

PENINSULA. nce sufficient combat power ha s been generated an d th e enemy has

been sufficiently attrited, th e strategy is to mass forces an d conduct a

counteroffensive to recapture critical port an d oil facilities which may have been

seized by enemy forces in earlier stages ofconflict.88

This strategy is very close to the strategy ofdeter, defend, an d counter-offensive

eventually used by CENTCOM during the GulfWar.

In mid-July, Third Army and other CENTCOM component planners deployed on

an exercise to test their newly developed plan. hird Army called this exercise Internal

Look an d it was conducted from 2 3 to 2 8 July 1990. nternal Look was a joint exercise

with all services an d component commands fully integrated an d participating in th e

exercise. ieutenant General Yeosock used Internal Look as an opportunity to

demonstrate to General Schwarzkopfthat additional heavy forces an d air defense systems

were needed to adequately defend against th e anticipated Iraqi threat.89

O n 4 August 1990, Yeosock was alerted by Schwarzkopfan d later given th e

mission to start Third Army's deployment to Saudi Arabia. he Third Army commander

went to work building his team using Internal Look an d th e troop list that had been

drafted for the exercise as his base game plan. he experience ofInternal Look was

extremely useful bu t ARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 was still in draft format. nternal Look

36



had mostly focused on combat force requirements. t did also help logisticians to realize

that a deployment to this region would heavily depend on Saudi host nation support. he

time-phased force and deployment data from the draft plan was a good start but would

• 90 require manual modification, ad hoc decision making and last minute improvisation.

U.S. Central Command and Third Army did successfully anticipate the

contingency that occurred. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, a draft plan for just such a

contingency did exist. CENTCOM and Third Army were able to respond much more

promptly than would have been possible otherwise. or six months before their

deployment, Third Army and XVII Corps staffs had analyzed the problems involved in

this contingency. Yeosock had succeeded in increasing the heavy forces and Patriot

missiles allocated to the plan.91

There are numerous other examples ofCorps and Division commanders and staffs

anticipating events on the battlefield and carefully preparing their units to meet the

challenges that would face them. Before CENTCOM completed the draft offensive plan

for Desert Storm, Lieutenant General Gary Luck, the XVIII Corps commander, instructed

his staff and subordinate commanders to concentrate on developing plans for an offensive

operations into Kuwait. He instructed them to make the plans generic in nature so the

basic aspects ofthe plan could be applied to any offensive operational design Third Army

developed. his resulted in battalion commanders within the brigades starting the

• 2 military decision making process and developing base operations plans.

The Vllth Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Franks, had recognized the

operational implications ofthe collapse ofthe Soviet Union and refocused the Corps

training plan on movement to contact and attack from the march. his contrasted greatly

37



with th e European General Defense Plan scenario ofa linear forward defense that had

dominated Army planning since en d ofth e Vietnam War.93

Additionally, as early as August 1990, Vllth Corps had started preparation for

Desert Storm. ensing the true impact ofth e situation in th e Middle East, Franks alerted

a small group of is planning staffand started to work on a plan to meet th e challenges of

deploying units from Vllth Corps to Saudi Arabia. hortly afterwards th e 4 - 2 2 9 * Attack

Helicopter battalion from th e 11th Aviation brigade was alerted to deploy to th e desert.

Even after th e 4 -229 * was dropped from deployment considerations, it reconfirmed

Frank's beliefan d caused him to focus even more ofhis staffs time on a non-European

battlefield. ieutenant General Franks anticipated th e prospect ofrotating other units

with those already in th e Middle East should the deployment last much longer.94

Likewise, th e deployment ofthe First Infantry Division stationed at Fort Riley,

Kansas, came as no surprise to its commander, Major General Thomas Rhame. e ha d

correctly anticipated th e need for additional units to deploy to Saudi Arabia. ecause of

his foresight, he had trained his division for several months on breaching operations an d

desert combat during several rotations at the National Training Center. hame

understood that much could be done to prepare his unit even ifhe was unsure ofth e

specific mission his unit would be given. Much ofhis training would influence th e

eventual role he would be assigned as part ofVllth Corps attack in Desert Storm. irst

Infantry Division was eventually assigned the mission to conduct a breach across th e

complex obstacles between the eastern flank ofVllth Corps an d th e Iraqi western

defensive front.95

38



Clearly one aspect ofDesert Storm that was not anticipated by CENTCOM or

Third Army was the victory that would be achieved after just one hundred hours of

ground combat. he decision by the President after consultation with Generals Powell

and Schwarzkopf to announce a cease-fire seems to have caught both CENTCOM and

Third Army by surprise. he research indicated that no one at the operational level had

anticipated or planned what the military conditions should be at the end ofthe ground

battle. urprisingly, Franks queried the Third Army staff on 8 February after a rehearsal

ifanyone had "thought about how it all was supposed to look on the ground when it was

over."96 ranks believed it was above his responsibility to determine this.

On 9 February, after a briefing to the secretary ofdefense, Secretary Cheney

asked Lieutenant General Franks the same question. here was still no answer from

anyone at the briefing. Drawing a conclusion from the confusion that was described

earlier in this paper on the events that happened when the cease-fire was announced on

2 8 February, it would seem that the complex problem ofwar termination would be one

detail not well thought out by the strategic or operational leadership.

Clearly leaders and their staffs can not afford to be inundated by current events and

stop anticipating what will be required oftheir organization next. ieutenant Colonel

(LTC) Hal Moore's experiences at la Drang Valley, in Vietnam was a good example of

how leaders must anticipate events on the battlefield. ne ofthe earliest major

engagements in the Vietnam conflict was fought by the 1st

Battalion, 7th Cavalry, led by

LTC Moore. his battle occurred in the la Drang Valley, and is better known as the

battle of "LZ XRAY". During the fight, several staff officers observed LTC Moore,

occasionally, to withdraw from the chaos ofrunning the battle. After the battle, during a

39



debriefing, when questioned about these periods ofwithdrawal, Moore said that he had

been reflecting. he method LTC Moore used to reflect was to ask himself three

questions: 1 ) What is happening?, 2 ) What is not happening?, and 3) What can I do to

influence the action?.97 By asking himself the first two questions, LTC Moore was better

able to anticipate what might or might not happen next. By reflecting on these answers,

"he was able to open his mind to broader opportunities, to see the full range ofhis

• R options." These options developed into the answer to his third question. More

importantly, this is where history shows that the leader at all levels can start to understand

how he can gain or regain the initiative, and will allow him to become proactive and

reactive versus being controlled by events and solely reactive.

Clearly one event that was not anticipated and planned for in detail was the

military's tactical and operational endstate. General Schwarzkopf and Lieutenant

General Yeosock failed to anticipate, visualize, plan, and communicate what the military

conditions should have been at the end ofthe ground battle. However, identifying the

need for and developing OPLAN 1002-90 and conducting the Internal Look exercise

clearly demonstrated that CENTCOM and Third Army applied the AirLand Battle

imperative ofanticipating battle events. XVIIIth and Vllth Corps' and 1st Infantry

Division's actions prior to and during Desert Shield provided other examples ofmilitary

commanders anticipating battlefield events and preparing their units for them.

40



CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

The starting point for the Army's preparation for war is doctrine. t not only tells how we can fight and win on the battlefield, but it also guides designing and modernizing our forces. ur AirLand Battle doctrine describes ho w we can defeat the enemy, but it can only work when it is carried out all the way down to the level of the individual soldier and his weapon.... he Army's war-fighting doctrine is

entitled AirLand battle in recognition ofthe need for total integration ofthe combat power ofall Services in modern war.

General Carl E. Vuono Chief ofStaff ofthe Army"

Introduction The study ofDesert Shield / Desert Storm revealed that the U.S. Army did use the

three AirLand Battle imperatives ofensure unity ofeffort, concentrate combat power

against enemy vulnerabilities, and anticipate events on the battlefield as a basis to

conduct the Gulf War. Mistakes were made in applying these imperatives, however, the

ground offensive was planned and conducted in accordance with the Army's AirLand

Battle doctrine. he AirLand Battle doctrine that was developed during the decade

following the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, and is an application ofclassic twentieth-century

maneuver theory for mechanized forces.

Ensure Unity of Effort The conduct ofmilitary affairs in Southwest Asia was discernible by an initially

smooth integration ofpolitical and military actions almost from the beginning. he ever-

41



presence ofCNN, assisted operational commanders' staffs in theater to receive guidance

immediately and therefore react to it instantaneously. his practice was instrumental in

maintaining both the cohesion ofthe alliance and ensuring that a unity ofeffort among all

forces in the field. However, as discussed earlier, not anticipating or planning what the

military conditions should be at the end ofthe ground battle did result in a breakdown of

unity ofeffort towards the end ofDesert Storm.

General Schwarzkopf early decisions on critical issues, identification ofthe Iraqi

operational center ofgravity (and the coalitions main objective), and widespread

communication ofhis intent with all ofhis commanders greatly helped to ensure unity of

effort with all forces within the coalition. His "most important meeting" on 14

November 1990, caused the planning process to grow horizontally and vertically in an

environment in which each commander had heard the CINC's concept for operations

from Schwarzkopf himself.

Planning was a multi-echelon iterative process highlighted by dialogue between

all levels ofcommand. he planning process was punctuated by a series ofevents,

guidance given, planning sessions, discussions, and confirmation briefs in which the

entire command structure developed their understanding ofSchwarzkopf s concept.

Third Army's effective use ofliaison teams and their C3IC resulted in the

formation ofinformation systems that helped reduce what Clausewitz termed uncertainty,

and ensured unity ofeffort during both planning and execution ofDesert Storm.

Certainly, AirLand Battle doctrine, especially its deep attack aspects, presented one of the

greatest challenges ever in the development ofeffective command and control. A

fundamental characteristic ofthe type of leadership inherent in AirLand Battle doctrine is

42



that all operations, at every echelon, must proceed from a full understanding ofth e

commander's intent. elping to establish, clarify, an d gain commitment to th e

commander's intent was an essential function fulfilled by Third Army's liaison teams.

Third Army's Liaison teams and C3IC enabled Lieutenant General Yeosock an d

his staff to anticipate an d assess situations rapidly. apidly an d accurately obtaining vital

battlefield information specifically requested by Yeosock enabled him to respond quickly

an d decisively in many situations. he vertical an d horizontal liaison functions ofthe

systems also had tremendous command and control implications in th e area of

synchronization ofoverall operations an d clearly helped to ensure unity ofeffort in

Operation Desert Shield an d Desert Storm

"Schwarzkopfs greatest shortcoming w as his inability to take an elevated view of

the battlefield, to recognize an d accept th e presence of friction in execution an d "noise"

in th e information system"100 ne cause of this shortcoming may have been his

acceptance ofth e additional role ofLCC. An additional headquarters, or allowing Third

Army to ac t as the land component, with an Arab co-commander for Arab forces, might

have provided a simpler chain ofcommand, reduced confusion, and helped to better

ensure unity ofeffort

Clearly, General Schwarzkopfunderstood that on e person or team could not be

responsible to execute the current mission an d plan for future operations. e

demonstrated that understanding when he asked for, an d received, a "special planning

team" to plan future operations for CENTCOM. is decision to ac t as CINC an d LCC

resulted in his becoming so focused on the current fight an d did no t allow him to plan for

the achievement ofan operational an d strategic endstate that would obtain th e national

43



objectives. his clearly proved to be an instance where th e AirLand battle imperative of

ensure unity ofeffort was no t achieved.

Concentrate Combat Power Against Enemy Vulnerabil it ies Desert Storm followed th e Jominian tradition ofachieving victory by th e

successive destruction of fractions ofth e enemy's force by masses ofyour own. s

articulated by J.F.C. Fuller, th e benefit ofmechanization ha d to do largely with th e ability

ofmechanical transport to concentrate forces rapidly against more vulnerable an d more

decisive areas.101

AirLand Battle doctrine, as described in FM100-5 (1986) states:

The object ofall operations is to impose our will upon the enemy.. . .To do this

we must throw th e enemy offbalance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction, follow-up rapidly to prevent his recovery and continue operations

aggressively to achieve th e higher commander's goals. he best results are obtained when powerful blows are struck against critical units or areas whose loss will degrade

th e coherence ofenemy operations in depth.102

This clearly describes the operational maneuver conducted by the coalition, especially

XVIII Corps deep an d rapid penetration and Vllth Corps "Great Wheel".

The conditions necessary to create th e decisive battle should have resulted from a

mutually supporting effort ofth e air an d ground forces. owever, in Desert Storm,

during th e establishment ofconditions necessary for th e battle, th e JFACC drove the

interdiction plan. ccording to AirLand Battle, an d supported by th e imperative to

concentrate against enemy vulnerabilities, once th e battle began (including th e time

needed to shape th e battlefield), th e corps commanders responsible for th e ground battle

should have been given an apportionment ofBAI to integrate directly into his battle plan.

This only occurred five days before start ofground operations, versus th e 9 days ofBAI

44



required by Lieutenant General Franks. uring th e battle phase, th e corps commander

must be able to synchronize al l aspects ofhis concept, to include deep attacks. his will

allow him to concentrate his attack on existing vulnerabilities and create new enemy

vulnerabilities to attack.

The air/ground operating system must fully exploit the agility an d responsiveness

ofth e emerging information systems to attack targets based on near real-time

intelligence. ikewise, the system must be able to help corps commanders develop

decisive battles based on rapidly appearing changes on th e battlefield.

Anticipate Events on th e Battlefield

One ofThird Army's major successes in th e account of its part in th e GulfW ar

was its anticipation ofthe contingency to fight on th e Arabian Peninsula. When Iraq

occupied Kuwait, CENTCOM, Third Army an d XVIII Corps had planned for just such a

contingency. hey were therefore able to respond much more rapidly. he Internal Look

exercise conducted by Third Army was the culmination ofpeacetime analysis an d

planning. esert Shield was an initial response to th e crisis in th e Middle East based on a

set ofcircumstances an d missions developed during Internal Look an d OPLAN 1002-90.

Clearly on e aspect ofDesert Storm that was no t anticipated was th e conditions

necessary for th e war's termination. What w as absent was a clear an d common vision of

how U.S. forces should be distributed on th e ground to facilitate the inevitable transfer of

th e conflict's focus an d energies back to the political arena. ndoubtedly, th e U.S. failed

to anticipate this event at th e strategic, operational and tactical levels ofwar. s

described by Cohen an d Gooch in their book Military Misfortunes, in this instance, th e

45



U.S. clearly demonstrated "the inability to foresee an d take appropriate measures to deal

with an enemy's move, or a likely response to a move ofone's own."103

Conclusion Desert Storm commanders an d staffs did use th e three AirLand Battle imperatives

ofensure unity ofeffort, concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities, an d

anticipate events on th e battlefield as a basis to conduct th e GulfWar. he American

Army was organized an d equipped for defense ofEurope and not for a great offensive

operation on th e Arabian Peninsula. Mistakes were made and many positive and negative

lessons were learned that allowed the Army to further develop AirLand Battle doctrine.

The U.S. Army needs to conduct additional research in several areas. ne area

that should be researched more fully is th e decision to allow Arab forces to liberate

Kuwait City. his research must go beyond th e obvious political ramifications ofthe

requirement that symbolically allowed Arab forces to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces.

A detailed study should be done to fully understand the effects that combat had on the

allied Arab Forces morale an d th e ramifications those effects had on the U.S. decisions.

These effects and decisions are essential in the wake ofth e believe that U.S. forces will

for th e most part, conduct al l future military actions as part ofa coalition.

In addition, th e Army should conduct more extensive research on th e effects that

battle had on leaders an d units, especially in th e area of fratricide. r. Swain proposes, in

his book "Luck War" Third Army in Desert Storm, that the occurrence and concern over

fratricide caused operational an d tactical commanders to impose restrictions to th e extent

that these restrictions subordinated th e operational plan. hese fratricide avoidance

4 6



measures created opportunities for the Iraqi's to attack and cause numerous casualties,

luckily the Iraqi's did not identify these opportunities or were unable to pursue them.

47



Notes

1 Carl E. Vuono, Collected Works of the Thirty-First Chiefof Staff, United States

Army, ed. Douglas D. Brisson (Washington, D.C., date unknown), 131.

2 Richard M . Swain, Lucky War:" Third Army in Desert Storm, (Fort Leavenworth,

KS: U.S. Army Command an d General College Press, 1997), 1-2.

3 U.S. Department ofth e Army, FM 100-5, Operations Washington, D.C., M ay

1986), i. ereinafter, FM 100-5 (1986).

4 Ibid., i.

5 Roger J. Spiller, In the Shadow ofthe Dragon: Doctrine an d th e U.S. Army After

Vietnam," The Journal of th e Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies vol.

142, no 6 (December

1997), 41. 6 General William E. DePuy, "Unification: How Much More?," in Army 1 1 (April

1961): 30-38. eprinted in Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy, 36.

7 Spiller, 41.

8 Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in th e Gulf

War, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command an d General College Press, 1994), 107.

9 Colonel David A, Fastabend, "FM100-5,1998: Endless Evolution," in Army (May

1997): 46-57 .

10 Spüler, 52-53.

11 Richard M . Swain, "AirLand Battle," Paper awaiting publication an d in

possession ofth e author), 34 .

Russell Weigley refers to th e "American w ay ofwar" as a national style of

warfare, defined by its characteristically attritional inclination even in those instances when a more strict application ofviolence may have been more appropriate. ussell F.

Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and

Policy, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press), xvii-xxiii.

Jomt Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary ofMilitary and

Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C., Amended through 12 January 1998), 316.

14 Gordon R. Sullivan, Gordon R. Sullivan: The Collected Works 1991-1995,

(Washington, D.C., 1995), 92 .

48



15 Internet, "Army Mission and Vision", URL www.army.mil/mission_vision.htm,

June 1998, 1.

16 FM

100-5

(1986),

5.

17 John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of

Army Doctrine 1973-1982, TRADOC Historical Monograph Series. ort Monroe, VA:

Historical Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), 13-14. Also, see

Spiller, 52 , an d Richard M . Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art an d the U.S.

Army," in The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War, ed. B.J.C.

McKercher an d Michael A. Hennessy, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 148.

18 Huba Wass de Czege, U.S. Army Command an d General StaffCollege,

Memorandum by Colonel Huba Wass de Czege for Reviewers ofFM 100-5, dated 1 July

1985, Subject: The Nature an d Reasons for Changes in This Edition, in archives ofU.S.

Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, KS, file CGSC 86,

SAMS-0019,p.2.

19 Richard M . Swain, Tilling th e Void: The Operational Art an d the U.S. Army," in

The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War, ed. B.J.C. McKercher an d

Michael A. Hennessy, (Westport, CT : Praeger Publishers, 1996), 164.

20 FM 100-5 (1986), 9.

2 1 Ibid., 10.

22 Ibid., 14 .

2 3 Ibid., 15-17.

24 Ibid., 2 2 - 2 3 .

2 5 Ibid., 2 2 - 2 3 .

26 Ibid., 14-15; 2 3 - 2 4 .

27 Ibid., 2 3 .

2 8 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans, an d ed. Michael Howard an d Peter Paret,

(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 119.

29 Swain, Lucky War", 32 .

4 9



30 Conduct of th e Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Vol. 1 (Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Department ofDefense, April 1991), 1-6.

31 Swain, Lucky War", 31-32 .

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Appendices A-S

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department ofDefense, 1992), 1:18. lthough not listed here,

Central Command planners assumed as implied objectives th e destruction ofan Iraqi

offensive capability an d a consequent restoration ofa regional balance ofmilitary power. See Swain, Lucky War", 78.

33 Scales, 128-131.

34 Conduct of th e Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Vol. 1,231 an d

Robert A. Sterling, Desert Storm: The War th e Coalition Almost Lost, Research Project

(Newport, Rhode Island: Naval W ar College, 1993), 12 .

35 Swain, Lucky War", 90-91.

36 Scales, 13 7 an d Swain, Lucky War", 73 , 91-92.

37 Swain, Lucky War", 103,127.


39 U.S. Department ofth e Army, FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics,

(Washington, D.C., September 1997), 1-139.

40 Scales, 12 2 and Swain, Lucky War", 54-55.

41 Gary B. Griffin, The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element ofEffective

Command, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command an d General Staff College Press, 1991), 1-2.


43 Scales, 14 0 an d Swain, Lucky War", 74 , 110.

44 Bruce Palmer, "But it Does Take a Leader: The SchwarzkopfAutobiography," in Parameters, vol. XXIII, no.l (Spring 1993), 2 2 .

Douglas Craft, Strategic Studies Institute Report: An Operational Analysis of th e Persian GulfWar, (Carlisle Barracks, PA : U.S. Army W ar College, 1992), 10.

46 Bob Woodward, The Commanders, (New York: Simon an d Schuster, 1991), 2 87 .

50



47 Craft, 10.

48 Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, (Boston:

HoughtonMifflin Company, 1993), 2 4 8 .

49 H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn 't Take a Hero, (New York: Banton Books,

1991), 446 .

50 Scales, 46-49.

51 Michael R. Gordon an d General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The

Inside Story of th e Conflict in th e Gulf War, (New York: Little Brown an d Company,

1995), 300-301.

52 John J. Yeosock, "Army Operations in th e GulfTheater", in Military Review, 71,

no. 9 (September 1991), 3-15.


54 Ibid., 19 .

55 Clausewitz, 119.

56 Scales, 261-290 .


58 Ibid., 280-307 an d Scales, 308-316.

59 Swain, Lucky War", 17 , 2 0.

60 Ibid., 40-42 .

61 Ibid., 21 -27 .

62 Steve Arnold, Key Decisions for Desert Storm, 1 August 1991. Memorandum for

the Commanding General Third Army. Notes in possession ofauthor. lso available

from the personal papers ofDr. Richard Swain, School ofAdvanced Military Studies, Command and General College, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 1 .

63 Scales, 140-141.

64 Bonaparte Napoleon I, Napoleon and Modern War; His Military Maxims,

(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company, 1943), 103.

51



651 am indebted for this insight to Major Joel Westa, Air Force Student, School of

Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 7 April 1999.

66 Scales, 180.

61. Swain, Lucky War", 184-185.

68 FM 100-5 (1986), 49.

69 Swain, Lucky War", 178.

70 Scales, 178-180.

71 Swain,

Lucky

War",

178-180.

7 2 Ibid., 180.

73 Thomas A. Keaney an d Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary

Report, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 235-251 .


75 Message, 170300Z FEB 91, FM COMUSARCENT MAIN//DT//, MSGID /

SITREP / USARCENT / D + 32 / FEB//, PERID/170300Z/ TO:180300Z,

GENTEXT/COMMANDER'S EVALUATION/, 17 , quoted in Swain, Lucky War", 189.

7 6 Swain, Lucky War", 189.

7 7 Ibid., 82-83 an d Scales, 131.


79 Ibid., 117.

80 HQ, VII Corps, OPLAN 1990-2, Operation Desert Saber, 13 January 1991, 5-6, as

quoted in Swain, Lucky War", 210-211.


82 Antoine Henri Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. Captain G. H. Mendell an d

Lieutenant W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1862; reprint, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, n.d.), 299.

52



83 John A. Wickham, Jr., Collected Works of th e Thirtieth Chiefof Staff, United

States Army, (Washington, D.C., 1988), 301.

84

Swain, Lucky War", 4 .

85 Scales, 43 an d Swain, Lucky War", 4 .

86 Statement ofGeneral H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief, United

States Central Command," in United States Senate, Hearings Before th e Committee on

Armed Services, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, 12 December 1989; 2 3 ,

24,25,26, 30 January; 2 , 6, 7 , 8,21,22 February; 7 March 1990 (S. Hrg. 101-70),

608,626, as quoted in Swain, Lucky War", 5.


88 HQ, ARCENT, COMUSARCENT OPLAN 1002-90 (Draft), 16 July 1990,4, as

quoted in Swain, Lucky War", 7.

89 Scales, 44 .

90 Ibid., 4 4 , 58 an d Swain, Lucky War", 35, 39.

91 Swain, Lucky War", xv.

92 Scales, 125-126.

93 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in th e GulfWar: Deployment

an d Preparation for Desert Storm," Military Review 72 (January 1992), 4 .

94 Scales, 133-134.

95 Scales, 136-137.


97 Gordon R. Sullivan an d Michael V. Harper, Hope is Not A Method, (New York:

Random House, 1996), 46-47 .

98 Ibid., 47 .

99 Vuono, 24 ,135 .


53



101 Brain Holden Reid, J. F. C . Fuller: Military Thinker, (New York: Saint Martin's

Press, 1987).

102 FM 100-5 (1986), 14.

103 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, (New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1990), 27.

54



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