AIRWORTHINESS CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WORKSHOP · AIRWORTHINESS CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WORKSHOP Abu Dhabi ... contract Airworthiness Review activity to an approved CAMO. ... • Performance

General Civil Aviation Authority

AIRWORTHINESS CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

WORKSHOP Abu Dhabi

01 NOV 2016

AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145 OMAR MUSA

Senior Airworthiness Inspector

AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145

CONTENTS: The MORC SCHEME – Update:

AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145 MORC SCHEME – Update: (19th May 2016) - Regulations – Published in Section B Part V Chapter 3 – CAR 145

Approved Maintenance Organisation

- Preparation for Implementation: – Target July 2016 Procedure – AWP-73 published. Form AWF-MORC-001 ( Maintenance Organisation Review Certificate) + NDA Form AWF-MORC-002 (Maintenance Organisation Review Certificate-

Statement) E-Services – PH – MORC AS Application GCAA Q-Pulse – Creation of Sub-Group for MORC-AS personnel

- Training Package - GCAA will provide training to qualify/authorised

MORC-AS


MORC SCHEME: MORC-AS TRAINING

GCAA Training for MORC- AS completed on 31/5 to 01/6/2016 11 Nominated person from 4 approved organisations

Following GCAA Interviews: 8 successfully candidates issued with MORC-AS 1 withdrawn & 2 failures

Another training planned before the end of the 2016

AIRWORTHINESS CAR 145 MORC SCHEME: Implementation of MORC – Facing challenges: Extending the Q-Pulse Audit Module access to MORC-AS (outside GCAA) – to

generate Audit report Tackling issues such as allocation Q-Pulse access (Licensing), allocation PW/Username, access by

MORC-AS on the operators IT system, limitation of access by organisation MORC-AS access, selection of Regulation, completion of reports etc.

Q-Pulse Audits – completed “simulation audits” by selected MORC-AS – On going

Enabling CAR 145 e-Services access to MORC-AS/operator (CAR 145 AMO applications). To enable assignment of MORC Task to MORC-AS Tackling CAR 145 e-Services changes/ redesign IT architecture - ongoing

AW CAR 145 started to assign MORC-AS Task outside the system


MORC SCHEME: Temporary Revision to CAR 145 Regulations: (Pending approval with PRP):

AMC 145.70 MOE

Introduce Para 3.17 – MORC Procedure (If applicable)


MORC SCHEME: MORC Technical Committee - Planned MORC TC meeting

To report & update progress Discuss relevant implementation issue:

Feedback from Training of MORC-AS Enhancing communication with individual MORC-AS “Commercial pressure” affecting MORC-AS


MORC SCHEME:

ICAO Working Paper: MORC Scheme has been chosen as one of the GCAA projects pesented to

ICAO assembly. Purpose - Sharing of innovative idea amongst member states for the benefit of

the other CAA and their industry.


01 Nov 2016

ACC meeting 01Nov. 2016 CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO

ACC meeting 01NoAv. 2016 CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO

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CAR-M Presentation to Air Operators & CAMO

Recent Changes in Airworthiness Forms

Maintenance Over Run

Certification Privileges Exceedance

Airworthiness Review Responsibility

VORSY Implementation.

Impending Significant Requirement

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1. CAME/MOE Compliance Check List- AWF-AMA-001

2. CAME Compliance Check List- AWF-AMA-003

3. CAMO Audit Check List- AWF-AMA-004

4. Aircraft Maintenance Program Check List- AWF-AMP-001

5. Application for Reservation of Reg. Mark & Mode S code - AWF-COR-001

6. Aircraft Delivery Check List - AWF-COR-003

7. Aircraft Delivery Filing Check List - AWF-AFC-001

http://eaudit.gcaa.ae/QPulseDocumentService/Documents.svc/documents/active/attachment?number=AWF-88










https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/GCAA%20ePublicaton%20Documents/GCAA%20Forms/Airworthiness/AWF-AMA-004%20-%20CAMO%20Audit%20Checklist%20Rev%2004.pdf

























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8. Certificate of Airworthiness for Export - AWF-COA-009 9. Application for De-registration - AWF-COR-010 10. Deregistration Check List -AWF-COR-008 11. Aircraft de-registration Check List enforcing IDERA letter–AWF-COR-008a 12. Certificate of De-registration -AWF-COR-009 13. Application for Confirmation of Registered particulars in A Certificate of

Registration- AWF-COR-011 14. Payment request – Airworthiness - AWF-IPD-004





















https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/GCAA%20ePublicaton%20Documents/GCAA%20Forms/Airworthiness/AWF-COR-009%20-%20DE-REGISTRATION%20CERTIFICATE%20REV.3.pdf










https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/GCAA%20ePublicaton%20Documents/GCAA%20Forms/Airworthiness/AWF-IPD-004%20-%20PAYMENT%20REQUEST-AIRWORTHINESS%20REV%20%203.pdf





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Regulation: CAR M.201 (a) The owner shall ensure that no flight takes place unless the aircraft is maintained in an airworthy condition. Non Compliance: Airworthiness Over Run

Unsafe Operation

Airworthy Envelope

Non-airworthy Operation

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Consequence: • Operating non-airworthy aircraft. (ie The C of A is invalid)

Risk 1. Legal action as the operational requirement is violated

Risks: 2. Insurance Certificate is invalid and as a result;

a)Financial liability in the event of any incident/accident, as the insurance is invalid b) Company reputation jeopardized

Conclusion: Maintenance Over Runs are not acceptable.,

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Regulation : Privileges of AME License specified in CAR 66.20 Violation : Instances of Maintenance certification beyond the privileges

of AME License have been observed. Risk: Un-Airworthy Aircraft (ie The C of A is invalid) Enforcement Action: Any certification beyond the privileges granted, shall be liable to disciplinary action and likelihood of loss of license of those involved.

Certification Privileges Exceedance

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Regulation: CAR-M, entrusts the responsibility of complying with Continuing Airworthiness requirements with the Operator. This includes the Airworthiness Review of Aircraft, which otherwise was being done by the GCAA.

Benefit: CAR-M provisions allow Air Operators the flexibility to conduct their own Continuing Airworthiness compliance.

Conclusion: GCAA proposes that all Operators obtain Subpart I privilege / contract Airworthiness Review activity to an approved CAMO.

Suggested Timeframe (open for discussion)

Air Operators- 06 Months

Flight Training organization : 12 Months

Airworthiness Review Responsibility

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Regulation: VORSY is a requirement under CAAP-57

Compliance: • Organization need to encourage voluntary reporting either through

the VORSY process or company’s internal reporting system.

• Organization’s internal reporting process shall NOT replace the VORSY reporting system.

• The Organization must ensure that all staff are to be made aware of VORSY.

• VORSY features and requirements to be made part of the training syllabus of the Organization.

Monitoring: Record of VORSY Training will be verified during Audits.

VORSY Implementation

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Regulation: ICAO Annex -6, Part 1, EASA NPA 2013-26

Requirement: FDR shall have securely attached an automatically activated ULB operating at a frequency of 37.5 kHz, operating for a minimum of 90 days.

Applicability: International Commercial Air Transport Airplane.

Effective date:

• ICAO- Not later than 01 January 2018.

• EASA - Not later than 01 June 2018.

• GCAA will be inline with EASA decision.

GCAA will issue an NPA and operators will need to respond accordingly

Impending Significant Requirement

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Thank You

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AMMROC – An Overview

November 2016

Thomas L Holmes Jr VP Aviation Quality & Safety Standards

Legal Notice

This presentation is provided with the express understanding that it contains technical, business, and/or financial information which is disclosed in confidence; and no disclosure or use of the information in any media is permissible without the prior written consent of AMMROC (Advanced Military Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul Center) LLC. This material is provided for informational purposes only, and AMMROC (Advanced Military Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul Center) LLC and its affiliates make no warranty, representation, or guarantee with respect to the information contained herein, or the results of the use of, or reliance on, such information.

© COPYRIGHT 2016 AMMROC (ADVANCED MILITARY MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND OVERHAUL CENTER) LLC

© AMMROC 2016 - Proprietary and Confidential 13

AMMROC at a glance

14

Established in 2010

Highly Skilled & Educated Workforce

Industry Leading Standards

Capability on 30+ Platforms

Uniquely Positioned

World Class, Dedicated Facilities

Commitment to Excellence

Versatile and Reliable

A World Class Partnership

Established in 2010

Certifications • Lockheed Martin

Approved Service Center

• Multiple OEM certifications and licenses

• ISO 9001 / AS9110 Compliant QMS

• ISO 14001 Compliant

• OHSAS 18001 Compliant

• UAE GCAA Approval

© AMMROC 2016 - Proprietary and Confidential

Purpose

Pioneering new technologies

• AMMROC was formed to provide industry best maintenance service and support for national and international customers Air Forces across the SAMENA region with world class facilities and highly skilled educated workforce


Operating Infrastructure • Established infrastructure • Standardized operating

procedures • Performance management and

reporting • End state: Robust and

sustainable system

Program Management Teams

Information Technology and Facilities Infrastructure

Automated KPIs: visual platform tracking for serviceability, availability, sortie completion, deployments and war reserves

SCM system: inventory accuracy, forecasting, provisioning, engineering and material analysis

Certifications: personnel attainment, training, and course development

Operational Availability

Maintenance Operations

Supply Chain

Management

Engineering &

Capabilities

Human Capital

Technical Training

Quality, Processes & Procedures

Infr

astr

uctu

re

Perf

orm

ance

M

anag

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t Ta

rget

© AMMROC 2016 - Proprietary and Confidential 16

Capabilities Snapshot

• Established capability

• Proven capability and value pricing

• Strategic OEM alliances providing world class capability

• Servicing 7+ national Air Forces within the region Engine Services

Modifications & Upgrades

Component Services

Aircraft Services

Capability on 30+ Platforms


Military Aircraft Heavy Maintenance / Repair & Overhaul / Modifications Existing capabilities

• Aircraft Services (Bases & MRO Facility) – Flight Line Maintenance – 1st and 2nd Line (O & I Level) – Light & Heavy Depot Maintenance for 15+ platforms – Lockheed Martin certified C-130 / L-100 / F-16 Block 60 service center

• Engine Services – Repair & Overhaul

• GE F110 • GE CT7-9C • GE T700-701C/D • R-R Adour 861 & 871 • Snecma M53-P2 Module 07 • PT-6A and PT6T

• Component Services – Repair & Overhaul of Components for various types of military aircraft

• Strategic OEM partners • Hydraulics, pneumatics, wheels & brakes, flight controls, avionics, electrics,

landing gear components, fuel components (multi-platform)

• Modifications and Upgrades – For a variety of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft

• Mid Life Upgrades and Structural Life Extension Programs • Routine modifications and updates from Service Bulletins, TCTOs


Capability on Over 30 Platforms

Grob 115 – Training

PC-7 – Training

PC-21 – Training

King Air – Cloud Seeding

MRTT – Refuel/Transport

C-130 – Airlift

CN-235 – Airlift

Da-42 – Vip

Avanti II – VIP

Seeker – VIP

C-17 – Airlift

Hawk 102 – Training

Hawk 61 – Target Towing

MB339 – Air Display

Skyhawk – VIP

F-16 – Air Defence

Mirage – Air Defence

MPA – Maritime Patrol

King Air – Special Mission

AW109 – Special Mission

AW139 – Special Mission

AS550 – Special Mission

CH-147 – Special Mission

AS350 – Special Mission

Cessna 208 – Special Mission

AT802 – Special Mission

Dash-6 – Special Mission

UH-60 – Special Mission

Bell 407 – Training

AH-64 – Attack

AS332 – Naval Operations

AS656 – Maritime Patrol

AS365 – VIP

AW139 – SAR


AMMROC CAR 145 - Horizon

• Contracted AMMROC as their Approved Maintenance Organization.

• AMMROC holds CAR 145 Approval No. UAE.145.0047 for Bell 206 helicopters.

• Bell 407 helicopters also maintained in accordance with CAR 145, but release to service is a non-CAR 145 RTS.

• Maintenance provider to Horizon for 3 years.

• Horizon International Flight Academy is located in Al Ain.

• An approved flight training organization specializing in helicopter flight training.

• Operate a fleet of civil registered Bell 206 Jet Rangers and a fleet of military registered Bell 407 helicopters.

Al Ain MRO Developing a World Class Facility


ACC Meeting - 01Nov. 2016

Organization Risk Scope-ORS

Organization Risk Scope- ORS

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Agenda

Introduction

Objective

Method

Risk Calculation

Implementation of ORS

Interfacing

Organization Risk Scope - ORS

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Risk Based Oversight:- Risk-based Oversight (RBO) is a way of performing oversight, where planning is driven by the risk profile and execution, besides ensuring compliance, focuses on the management of operational risks.

Introduction


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Introduction


00.5

11.5

22.5

33.5

44.5

5

ORP

ROS

SMS

ORS

AUDIT

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Introduction

Organization Risk

Profiling

Organization Risk Scope

Risk Based

Oversight


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Introduction


Organization Risk Profiling

Organization Risk

Scope

• Review & Update ALL Org. Profile

• Classify ALL Org. and determine audit frequency

• Execute audit as per

frequency

• Aggregate all data from all

sources

• Calculate the RI for Each Scope item

• Analyze the RI and Strengthen the monitoring

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ORS is a tool to identify risk in the aviation industry through data evaluation and apply a focused approach to eliminate / control risks.


Organization Risk Scope

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Organization Risk Scope Program- ORS

• Support State Safety Program.

• Identify the weak compliance area in the UAE Aviation Industry, using audit finding data.

• Strengthen the Safety and Airworthiness Standards

through enhanced monitoring.

• Contribute to measure effectiveness of the SMS.

Objectives:

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Define a model of ORS that will identify

• specific risky areas of an Organization

• Systemic issues for an Organization

• Systemic issues in the UAE total aviation Industry

Draw a threshold level for each organization to classify the risk level.

Strengthen monitoring of the identified high risk area

Methodology Organization Risk Scope - ORS

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RI

V3 V2 V1

Findings

Multiplication Factor

Methodology

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Risk Severity factoring:

• To moderate effect of different level of finding

on risk calculation, each finding is biased by a multiplication factor (MF) based on finding level.

• MF for Level 1 finding = X

• MF for Level 2 finding =Y

• MF for Level 3 finding = Z

Risk Severity

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V1= 𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐 𝒐𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝑨𝑨𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑨𝑨 𝑬𝑬𝒇𝒇. 𝑪𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏.𝟑𝟑𝟑𝟑 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝑵𝑵 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 𝑶𝑶𝑵𝑵𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒐𝒇𝒇 𝑮𝑮𝑵𝑵𝑨𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝑻𝑻𝒐𝒐𝒕𝒕𝑨𝑨𝑻𝑻 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 𝒇𝒇𝑨𝑨𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝑨𝑨𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑨𝑨 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝑵𝑵𝑨𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝑶𝑶𝑵𝑵𝒇𝒇𝑨𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇

V2= 𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐 𝒐𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 𝑨𝑨𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑨𝑨 𝑬𝑬𝒇𝒇.𝑪𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪 𝑨𝑨𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟑.𝟑𝟑𝟑𝟑 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝑵𝑵 𝑨𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝑶𝑶𝑵𝑵𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇

𝑮𝑮𝑵𝑵𝑨𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝑻𝑻𝒐𝒐𝒕𝒕𝑨𝑨𝑻𝑻 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐 𝑨𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒐𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝑨𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝑨𝑨𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑨𝑨 𝑨𝑨𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 𝑶𝑶𝑵𝑵𝒇𝒇𝑨𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇

V3 = 𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐 𝑶𝑶𝑵𝑵𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒕𝒕𝑨𝑨𝒉𝒉𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒐𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵 𝑨𝑨𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑨𝑨 𝑬𝑬𝒇𝒇.𝑪𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪 𝑨𝑨𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟑.𝟑𝟑𝟑𝟑

𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐 𝑨𝑨𝒇𝒇 𝑶𝑶𝑵𝑵𝒇𝒇𝑨𝑨𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒇𝒇𝒐𝒐𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇

V1 takes the value of 1/ 0 depending on the value is above or below

the threshold V2 & V3 are common to all Org.

Method Specific

Global

Global

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RISK INDEX (RI)

RI = 𝑉𝑉1x4 + 𝑉𝑉2x2 + 𝑉𝑉3x1

This method ensure that “Specific” and “Global” variable do not contribute to the same level by an weightage for risk calculation

Depending on complexity of activity GCAA has decided V1 threshold different for different Organization.

Risk Calculation

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Risk Index RI Description

0

V1=0, Area which is not specific to the Org.; V2=0, Area which consumed less than 8% of the GCAA's manpower; V3=0, Area which is affecting less than 15% of ALL Org.

1

V1=0, Area which is not specific to the Org.; V2=0, Area which consumed less than 8% of the GCAA's manpower; V3=1, Area which is affecting more than 15% of ALL Org.

2

V1=0, Area which is not specific to the Org.; V2=1, Area which consumed more than 8% of the GCAA's manpower; V3=0, Area which is affecting less than 15% of ALL Org.

3

V1=0, Area which is not specific to the Org.; V2=1, Area which consumed more than 8% of the GCAA's manpower; V3=1, Area which is affecting more than 15% of ALL Org.

4

V1=1, Area which is specific to the Org.; V2=0, Area which consumed less than 8% of the GCAA's manpower; V3=0, Area which is affecting less than 15% of ALL Org.

5

V1=1, Area which is specific to the Org.; V2=0, Area which consumed less than 8% of the GCAA's manpower; V3=1, Area which is affecting more than 15% of ALL Org.

6

V1=1, Area which is specific to the Org.; V2=1, Area which consumed more than 8% of the GCAA's manpower; V3=0, Area which is affecting less than 15% of ALL Org.

7

V1=1, Area which is specific to the Org.; V2=1, Area which consumed more than 8% of the GCAA's manpower; V3=1, Area which is affecting more than 15% of ALL Org.

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• Map risk index of Org . using Q-Pulse audit data.

• Define the threshold and identified high risk area in each organization.

• Strengthen monitoring of high risk area through emphasize during regular audit, to capture effectiveness of preventive action.

Implementation

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•

Implementation –RI Chart (Before moderation) Scope

CAR M.101 Scope 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.201 Responsibilities 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 5 1 5 1 5 5 1 1 5 1

CAR M.301 Continuing airworthiness tasks 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 1 5 1 5 5 1

CAR M.202 Occurrence reporting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.302 Aircraft Maintenance programme 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 7 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

CAR M.303 Airworthiness directives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0

CAR M.304 Data for modifications and repairs 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0

CAR M.305 Aircraft continuing airworthiness record system 5 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 5 1 5 5 5 1 5 1

CAR M.306 Operator's technical log system 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 1 5 1

CAR M.307 Transfer Of Aircraft Continuing Airworthiness Records 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.401 Maintenance data 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 5 5 1 5 1

CAR M.402 Performance of maintenance 5 1 5 1 1 1 5 5 1 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 5

CAR M.403 Aircraft defects 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 5 5 1 1 1 1

CAR M.501 Installation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.502 Component Maintenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.503 Service life limited components 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 CAR M.504 Control of unserviceable components 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4

CAR M.601 Scope 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.602 Application 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.603 Extent Of Approval 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.604 Maintenance Organisation Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.605 Facilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.606 Personnel requirements 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.607 Certifying Staff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CAR M.608 Components, Equipment And Tools 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.609 Maintenance Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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•

Implementation- RI Chart

Scope

CAR M.101 Scope 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.201 Responsibilities 1 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 1 1

CAR M.301 Continuing airworthiness tasks 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1

CAR M.202 Occurrence reporting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.302 Aircraft Maintenance programme 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

CAR M.303 Airworthiness directives 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.304 Data for modifications and repairs 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.305 Aircraft continuing airworthiness record system 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 1

CAR M.306 Operator's technical log system 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

CAR M.307 Transfer Of Aircraft Continuing Airworthiness Records 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.401 Maintenance data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.402 Performance of maintenance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

CAR M.403 Aircraft defects 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1

CAR M.501 Installation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.502 Component Maintenance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.503 Service life limited components 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.504 Control of unserviceable components 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4

CAR M.601 Scope 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.602 Application 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.603 Extent Of Approval 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.604 Maintenance Organisation Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.605 Facilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.606 Personnel requirements 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.607 Certifying Staff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.608 Components, Equipment And Tools 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CAR M.609 Maintenance Data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


GCAA Enhanced

audit based on RI

Training to enhance

standardization Review

of Regulat

ions

Operator

Airline proactive

action

Continual assessment

through Audits

Organization with

identified Risk Area

Immediate Long-term

Implementation

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


When Risk Index identified is ≥ 5

• The risk profile of each organization will be

shared by the PI in order to proactively initiate

review and appropriate actions by the operator.

• For the next GCAA audit, PI shall schedule at

least 01 additional day to focus on the risk areas.

• During the audit, the PI shall review the actions

taken by the operator based on his risk profile.

When RI is ≤ 4, actions to be taken at the

discretion of the PI

• PI and Operator to make note of any possible

Implementation

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

ORS methodology may, in future, be fed with other sources of data other than audit data eg;

• ROSI

• VORSY

• Internal audits

• External audits


Other sources

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

s s


Thank You

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Organization Risk Scope

Program- ORS

SMS Enhancement Working Group

An open forum for approved organizations to propose and recommend potential improvements to the SMS implementation programme, and possible amendments to CAR X

Nadia Algosaibi SMS Manager, Etihad Airways Engineering [email protected]

• NEW ALoSP SPI: Maintenance Error • Safety Promotion

SMS Enhancement Working Group

3rd Meeting: 25th August 2016

47

NEW ALoSP SPI: Maintenance Error

• Brain storming session conducted at the 2nd SMS Enhancement Working Group, 8th May

• GCAA identified this SPI as an Airworthiness AloSP parameter

• Industry to assist GCAA in establishing target value for this ALoSP by including it as an SPO for 2016 Quarter 4

‘Maintenance Error’ • An SPI with agreed alert levels and targets for 2017 • In accordance with CAR-X which required an established safety performance monitoring

and measurement system

48


Agreed Elements Maintenance error will be limited to the below items only

– Installation Failure – Servicing Failure – Repair Failure

– Fault Isolation/Test/Inspection failure – Foreign Object Damage/Debris – Airplane/Equipment Damage

• 2016 Q4: All organizations to include it as an SPO in their SMS Report • 2017: It will form part of GCAA Airworthiness ALoSP in 2017

49

Installation Failure Servicing Failure Repair Failure Fault Isolation/ Test/Inspection

Failure

Foreign Object Damage/ Debris

Airplane/ Equipment

Damage Equipment/part not installed

Not enough fluid (e.g. component or structural repair)

Did not detect fault Tooling/equipment left in aircraft/engine

Tools/equipment use improperly

Wrong equipment /part installed

Too much fluid Incorrect Not found by fault isolation

Debris on ramp Defective tools/equipment sued

Wrong orientation Wrong fluid type Unapproved Not found by operational/ functional test

Debris falling into open systems

Struck by/against

Improper location Required servicing not performed

Incomplete Not found by task inspection

Other Pulled/pushed/drove into

Incomplete installation Access not closed Other Access not closed Fire/smoke

Extra parts installed System/equipment no deactivate/reactivated

System/equipment not deactivated/reactivated

Other

Access not closed Other Not found by part inspection

System/ Equipment not reactivated/ deactivated

Not found by visual inspection

Damaged on remove/replace

Technical log oversight

Cross connection Other

Mis-rigging

Consumables not used

Wrong consumables used

Unserviceable part installed

Other

50


• SPI formally proposed at 3rd SMS Enhancement Working Group, 25th August

SPI: Maintenance Error • Line Maintenance: Maintenance Error per Departure • Base Maintenance: Maintenance Error per Productive Man Hours If an organization holds GCAA approval for both line maintenance and base maintenance, both are required and reported to GCAA

• Quarterly report in 2017 to be submitted to GCAA • Organizations to outline mitigation taken to reduce the number of events • [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

Safety Communication Provide lines of communication at all stages of SMS implementation

• Improving safety performance by communicating lessons learned • Distributing safety procedures in the organisation • Raising awareness of potential hazards and risks • Fostering a learning and ongoing reporting culture

Safety Promotion

safety bulletins, safety notices, posters, newsletters, training, emails, intranet, briefings and workshops

52

Safety Reporting Briefings • Ensure all staff are fully aware of the SMS and the SMS processes • Explain reasons for the procedures • Introduce reporting and investigation procedures • Introduce the event forms and IT systems • Provide examples of a recent report, its investigation and the lessons learnt

⁻ Convey safety critical information ⁻ Explain why particular actions are taken

Safety Communication: Safety Briefings

53

Safety Communication: Safety Briefings Advantages of Briefings • SMS team see the reaction from staff • Opportunity for staff to ask questions and get them answered immediately • Instant feedback regarding questions and other discussion issues • Helps prevent misinterpretation • Suitable for staff with limited computer aptitude

Challenges • Staff availability at scheduled briefings • Does not manage the ‘quality’ of reports

Next Stage of Briefings

SMS Enhancement Working Group An open forum for approved organizations to propose and recommend potential improvements to the SMS implementation programme, and possible amendments to CAR X

Nadia Algosaibi SMS Manager, Etihad Airways Engineering [email protected]

Thank-you

ROSI Management & Processing

Update

Eng. Khalid Saud Al Humaidan

Senior Specialist – Safety Policy & Regulation

Airworthiness Consultative Committee Meeting

Abu Dhabi

1 Nov 2016

Presentation Content

• Current Safety Intelligence & Management activities

• ROSI management

• ROSI workflow

• ROSI electronic form fields

2

3

What is Safety Intelligence ?

“Safety Intelligence” is the organizational capability to

manage a systematic and continuous process to

collect key operational data, translate it to

meaningful information, to learn or understand, or

to deal with new or trying situations, as well applying

knowledge to achieve the expected outcome in an

efficient way for managing safety risks

4

Search for precursors of accidents

“See it coming”

Risk Based Oversight“Know where to look”

Need for intelligence, assembly of data and serious analytical

capacity

5

What is Safety Intelligence ?

knowledge gained through the analysis and study of available data and

information

knowledge on safety performance

knowledge on Safety Issues

6

The Cycle

Identify Safety Issues

Assesmentof Safety

Issues

Definition of Safety

Actions

Implementation & follow

up

Safety Performance Monitoring (assurance)

Safety Risk

Portfolio

7

Safety Issue Identification

Analysis of MOR/VOR Data

Emerging Safety Issues based on safety research

Analysis of Audit/Inspection

Data

Analysis of operational data

(FDM/Radar/Health Monitring)

Safety Issue Assessment

Scope

Causes

Consequences

Risk Controls

Risk Assessment

Safety Action

Programming and

Implementation

Decision on Actions

Impact assessment, prioritization

Follow-up of implementation

Safety Performance

Indicators relevant for measuring efficiency of

actions

Indicators relevant for monitoring the

safety issue

8

Intelligence Sources

Safety Research &

Study

Reliability

FDM AHM Audits

Occurrence Reporting

Safety Recommend

ations

International Exchange & Sharing

ATM Data

9


Prior to 2010, GCAA didn’t have a mandatory occurrence system proportionate with the

size and the complexity of the UAE Civil Aviation System

Current occurrence reporting system was introduced in 2010

The evolution we’re bringing is:

• ROSI Management transfer from the SRM “ Safety Risk Management “ section to the

Aviation Safety Affairs Sector

• Management of occurrences is being dealt with dedicated subject matter experts

• ROSI have already undergone enhancements, and will undergo further

developments.

10

11


Safety Occurrence Management Team

Composed of SME’s from FO, AWR & ANA domain. The group will be the central

point for receipt of Occurrence Report.

SME’s composed of various domains:

• Airworthiness

• Flight Operations

• Air Navigation & Aerodrome

• Air Navigation & Aerodrome

12


CAAP 22 occurrence examples will be divided in to two categories

Category 1

Category 1 reportable incidents are occurrences which were deemed to be critical

and required to be notified to the GCAA within 24 hours and routed to Inspector

and the Safety Occurrence Management Team within 72 Hours.

Category 2

Category 2 reportable incidents are occurrences which are were not considered as

Category 1 and are to be reported to the GCAA within 15 days from date of

occurrence with an investigation/initial investigation report as necessary

13


Category 1 Occurrences

GCAA will get notified on Category 1 occurrence within 24 hours

Occurrence to be submitted to the GCAA within 72 hours.

ASAS Occurrence Management Team will monitor opened occurrence reports

periodically

Once occurrence enquiry/follow up is completed by Inspector, Occurrence

Management Team will close the occurrence.

14



-Organization Inspector wont get notified

-Occurrence will be routed to Safety Occurrence Management Team.

-Investigation report is to be submitted to the GCAA within 15 days from date of

occurrence

-Operator may elect to consider the report as initial investigation report and

investigate further as necessary.

-Final report within 45 days. Further extension can be agreed with GCAA.

-The team will make a technical judgment in case occurrence requires to be further

followed up by Inspector.

-Inspector wont be assigned occurrence unless Safety Occurrence Management

Team determines the need to. For ex, no sufficient info by operator.

15


Introduction of new fields for cause, preventive and corrective actions

16


Risk Area & ALoSP SPI. Field currently visible to GCAA only

For the Airworthiness domain:

Maintenance interval exceedanceMaintenance error

17


Standardization of state of occurrence field

Standardization of From and To fields

18


Thank You

Avisa Gulf Aviation Advisory Service & Consultancy.

Commercial, Operations & Technical.

56

Developing a Reliability Programme to Support the AMP for Small Fleet.

57

MAIN POINTS OF THIS PRESENTATION:

1. To review & obtain an understanding on the requirements of an AMP as per the UAE

CARs.

2. To review & obtain an understanding on the requirements of a Reliability Programme

as per the UAE CARs.

3. To consider the most effective & applicable method of developing a Reliability

Programme for a small fleet of aircraft (Commercial, Private or Business aircraft.)

4. To consider ETOPs implications in Reliability Programmes.

58

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (AMP) CAR M.302 AMC to CAR M.302 Aircraft Maintenance Programme AMC to CAR M.302 (a) Aircraft Maintenance Programme AMC to CAR M.302 (d) Aircraft Maintenance Programme Compliance AMC to CAR M.302 (f) Aircraft Maintenance Programme - Reliability Programmes.

• Revisions to the approved programme should be raised by the operator, to

reflect changes in the Type Certificate holder’s recommendations, modifications, service experience, or as required by the GCAA.

• Reliability programmes form one of the important methods of updating

approved programmes.

59

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (AMP) The AMP is developed with the function of ensuring that the continued integrity & airworthiness of design is maintained to the same level of resistance to failure of the initial airworthiness in the Type Certificate. The OEM with the NAA & Operators develop the MRBR using MSG3 analysis to identify the tasks & instructions for continued airworthiness of the type. The MRBR is developed in to an MPD then the Operator develops their AMP with local conditions in consideration. On going validity of the AMP is required to be conducted by the Operator.

60

AIRWORTHINESS & MAINTENACE

You can not improve the level of airworthiness & resistance to failure of the initial type design, you can only conduct tasks & procedures that maintain the initial level of resistance to failure of type design. The MRBR`s purpose is to continuously maintain the level of resistance to failure & airworthiness of the initial type design. To improve the level of airworthiness & resistance to failure modifications can raise the initial resistance to failure & can then raise the continued airworthiness of the initial type design.

61

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (AMP) REVIEW 1. Each task in the AMP should be applicable & effective.

1. Applicable means the system or component exists & derived correctly from MSG3. 2. Applicable means the task type is correct, DVI, GVI, FUC, OPC, NDT etc. 3. Effective means the task has real purpose & is detecting failures.

2. Each task interval should appropriate in its unit of measure & its interval

time. 1. UOM: a/c cycles, engine cycles, landings, flight hours, calendar time, 2. Time interval with consideration to the MSG3 analysis & failure data.

62

IMPORTANCE OF RELIABILITY

• The purpose of a reliability programme…

1. To support the AMP tasks as being effective & applicable. 2. To support the AMP tasks intervals as being effective &

applicable. 3. To identify missing AMP tasks. 4. To identify aircraft & component design defects. 5. To identify Human factors affecting the reliability or the

operation or maintenance of the aircraft. • Training, manuals, procedures, processes etc.

63

IMPORTANCE OF RELIABILITY

• With out a reliability programme in place you can not show…

1. Are the AMP tasks effective & applicable. 2. Are the AMP tasks intervals effective & applicable. 3. Are we missing AMP tasks. 4. Do we have aircraft & component design defects. 5. Do we have Human factors affecting the reliability or the

operation or maintenance of the aircraft. • Training, manuals, procedures, processes etc.

64

THE 4 ACTIONS OF A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME

• The 4 Reliability Actions;

1. Data collection; 2. Data analysis; 3. Corrective action; 4. Data storage & retrieval.

65

RELIABILITY DATA SOURCES Reliability programmes can get data from a few sources in the daily operation of the aircraft,

On the Flight Line: The Technical Log – PREPs: Pilot Reports

• In flight defects • Walk Round defects

– MREPs: Maintenance Reports • Component failures • Oil uplift • Findings during operation

These are all originated out side of the AMP`s scope

66

RELIABILITY DATA SOURCES Reliability programmes can get data from a few sources in the daily operation of the aircraft,

On Maintenance: The Non Routine Card • Detected as a result of an AMP task

These are all originated from with in the AMP`s scope

67

RELIABILITY TECHNIQUES

Line Operation:

1. STATISTICAL BASED RELIABILITY. 2. EVENT BASED RELIABILITY. 3. ENGINE CONDITION TREND MONITORING. 4. OIL UPLIFT MONITORING.

1. Engine oil 2. APU oil 3. Hydraulic oil

68


Flight Line:

1. STATISTICAL BASED RELIABILITY. 2. EVENT BASED RELIABILITY. 3. ENGINE CONDITION TREND MONITORING. 4. OIL UPLIFT MONITORING.

1. Engine oil 2. APU oil 3. Hydraulic oil

69


Maintenance Engineering: 1. Non Routine Cards & Findings

1. Linked to the parent AMP task. 2. Found with no parent AMP task.

2. Component removals & shop reports 1. No Fault Found NFF

3. AD & SB analysis 1. Addressing type design faults & giving improvements

4. Modification analysis & their Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA)

1. STC`s, Part 21 etc.

70

ADDITIONAL RELIABILITY for ETOPs

1. Inflight Engine Shut Downs. 2. APU Starts. 3. ETOPs Sensitive ATA Events.

71

A SIMPLE RELIABILITY PROGRAMME

A simple reliability programme with 4 aspects to it. 1. Line Reliability 2. Maintenance AMP Reliability 3. Engine / Systems Condition Trend Monitoring 4. Component Reliability Monitoring

72


With fleets of the same type of less than 6 aircraft, statistical analysis & alert setting is difficult. Event Based reliability of Flight Line PREPS & MREPS. 1. review finding. 2. review corrective action. 3. monitor reoccurrence confirming route cause addressed. 4. consider AMP tasks. 5. consider Human Factors. 6. store in its ATA-Sub ATA. 7. Report in a 3 monthly report.

73


Reliability Monitoring of Maintenance Events: NRC`s. 1. review NRC`s & ensure correct reference & link to AMP task. 2. review corrective action. 3. monitor reoccurrence confirming route cause addressed. 4. Monitor if the AMP task have before had NRC`s linked to it. 5. consider AMP tasks as being effective & applicable. 6. consider AMP task interval as being effective & applicable. 7. consider Human Factors. 8. Store NRC linked to its AMP task. 9. Report in a 3 monthly report.

74


Reliability Monitoring of Engine Condition & Oil Up lift. 1. review Tech Log & NRC`s for oil uplift. 2. review if there is a trend of oil consumption. 3. consider Human Factors. 4. issue maintenance action special work order if required. 5. monitor ECTM reports for events. 6. report in a 3 monthly report.

75


Reliability Monitoring of Components. 1. review every component removal for reason. 2. review corrective action. 3. consider Human Factors. 4. review shop report confirming the failure root cause. 5. issue maintenance action special work order if required. 6. Report in a 3 monthly report.

76

IMPORTANCE OF RELIABILITY & ITS ROLE IN THE ARC

When completing an ARC, the Reliability programme should be reviewed for being established, correctly followed & events being addressed. If there is no Reliability Programme in place at all, we never know if the AMP effective & if we are really developing the AMP to operators conditions & environment, also we are ignoring very important in operational information that will lead us to maintenance or operational actions to maintain the airworthiness of the initial type design or to even improve it.

77

Thank you for listening & participating.

Dr Mark J Pierotti MBA. FRAeS. IEng.

Email: [email protected] Mobile:+971508128600

www.avisagulf..aero

78

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.avisagulf.aero/

79

.

80

Background

• Final report of AAIS case AIFN/0016/2012 • Maintenance error related incident • Report identifies a number of Contributing Factors • Makes Safety Recommendations

81

Relevant contributing factors

• The effect of fatigue on the engineer’s decision making process due to his shift pattern of working an average of 8.5 hours a day for 32 days continuously.

• Lack of guidance provided by the GCAA and the operator, on the effect of shift duty times and the management of risk associated with fatigue.

82

.

Safety recommendations.

GCAA should; • Issue guidance to the industry regarding man-hour

methodology, duty times, including maximum days on duty, working hours, shift patterns, working beyond normal duty times, minimum rest between shifts and rest days.

• Issue guidance to the industry for workers involved with safety sensitive jobs regarding fatigue risk management.

83

.

Way ahead?

In advance of a possible regulatory amendment GCAA intends, by end of November 2016, to publish a Safety Alert outlining recommendations regarding Aircraft Maintenance Engineer’s duty times. Additionally, when an organisation elects not to fully adopt the published recommendations, Appendix 1 to the Safety Alert will detail the requirements for and guidance on, the implementation of an acceptable Fatigue Risk Management Scheme.

84

.

What is fatigue?

A physiological state of reduced mental or physical performance capability resulting from sleep loss or extended wakefulness, circadian phase, or workload (mental and/or physical activity) that can impair an individual’s alertness and ability to perform safety related duties. (ICAO manual for Regulator’s).

85

.

Safety Alert Likely Recommendations

• Shifts longer than 12 hours should be considered undesirable. • Shifts should not be extended by overtime to longer than 13

hours. • A minimum rest period of 11 hours between shifts should not

be compromised by overtime. • When designing shift schedules the number of days off

between shifts must be considered. After more than 2-3 days on night shift , several days of rest time may be required to recuperate/alleviate sleep debt and fatigue.

• Engineers should be given at least 28 days notice of schedule.

86

.

• Absolute maximum of seven successive work days before a break of at least two rest days.

• (7 successive 12 hour days may not be acceptable, 7 successive 7/8 hour days may be).

• Absolute maximum of 60 accumulated hours before a break of at least two rest days.

87

.

Background to recommendations:

• Extracted from Appendix P to UK CAA CAP 716 (Aviation Maintenance Human Factors).

• CAP 716 published in 2003 contains a detailed study of the effect of working hours on human performance and limitations.

• Used as a benchmark for other authorities in adopting a standard for shift work and working hours.

• Prepared by Dr Simon Folkard, Body Rhythms and Shiftwork Centre, University of Wales, after extensive review of published academic literature with respect to the impact of various aspects of work hours on health, sleep, fatigue and safety.

88

.

Fatigue Risk Management Scheme

When a Fatigue Risk Management Scheme is implemented, the organisation should establish, document and maintain the FRM scheme as an integral part of its Safety Management System.

89

.

Fatigue Risk Management scheme-requirements:

(a) incorporate scientific principles and knowledge; (b) manage the operational risks of the organisation arising from fatigue of

personnel on an ongoing basis; (c) ensure that actions necessary to effectively mitigate the organisation’s

risks arising from fatigue are implemented promptly; (d) provide for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the

mitigation of fatigue risks; (e) be supported by the organisation’s just culture policy to ensure

confidence in reporting fatigue related hazards; (f) include a set of procedures that aim to ensure that personnel involved in

aircraft maintenance are appropriately rested and fit to perform their duties safely.

90

.

Thank you for your attention.

Questions?

Manufacturing Organization Approval

16th Airworthiness Consultative Committee Meeting

1st November 2016

Andek Heshamuddin – Engineering Safety Inspector

Vision for MOA Stimulate growth of UAE’s aviation supply chain:

92

• Catalyzes the setting up of new organization that starts with

manufacturing of non critical components with no airworthiness impacts

• Segregates critical and non-critical component manufacturing approvals that encourages focus for business operations

• Expands business opportunities through supports of not only specific organization, but also for other organization through subcontract manufacturing

• MOA is a new evolving concept

MOA Scope

• Components for UAE-registered aircraft only • Non-critical components with no airworthiness impacts

– Examples: small plastic components, seat covers, carpets, side panels – Expansion of the list shall be considered on case to case basis

Organization:

93

• Organization within the physical boundaries of UAE

Components Manufactured:

Scopes

94

CAR 145 CAR Part 21 Subpart G

CAR Part V Chapter 6 (MOA)

Maintenance Organization Approval

Maintenance of aircraft

and components for UAE registered aircraft, with varying categories plus limited fabrication for

aircraft maintained

Production Organization Approval

Production organization showing conformity of

products, parts and appliances with applicable

design data

Manufacturing Organization Approval

Simple non-critical

component manufacturing for UAE registered aircraft

only

MOA Eligibility

• Any person or organization is eligible to apply for manufacturing under MOA regulation (Part V Chapter 6)

95

• Application shall be made in a form and manner established by the GCAA and shall include; the Exposition Manual, Scope of Approvals applied and the payment of applicable fee

MOA Quality Management System A Quality System is required:

96

• And shall be formally documented: – Has established and able to maintain a quality system to ensure conformity to

applicable design data and is in condition for safe operation

• As formal documentation for outlining control procedures for: – Organizational changes – Processes compliance and control – Materials and products conformity to approved data

• As an independent quality assurance function to monitor compliance, and adequacy of the documented procedures

MOA Exposition Manual

• Organizational capabilities and scope of approval • Details of quality system and procedures • Description of products and processes control • Amendment procedures for organizational and process changes

Organization Setup:

97

• Management commitment • Organization chart showing chain of responsibilities • Certifying personnel • Facility setup

Process Setup:

MOA Form 299

98

MOA – Airworthiness Release Form 299

• Organizational data • Released component information • Endorsement and certification details

99

• Certification of conformity to the approved design data and for condition of safe operation

Contents:

Completion Instruction: • Provided in the MOA regulations

Advantages: MOA vs CAR 21 Subpart G

The MOA Regulations are introduced with the intent of:

100

• The Manufacturing Organization Approval regulations are applicable to manufacturing of simple non critical components only.

• The MOA requirements have been simplified compared to CAR 21 Subpart G, where CAR 21 Subpart G are more comprehensive and cater for all kind of manufacturing

• It is envisaged that MOA will be an intermediate step towards acquiring CAR 21 Subpart G approval (POA)

Advantages – MOA vs CAR 21 Subpart G

Minimal setup and operating cost due to:

101

• Simpler components requires less complex processes and facility • Fewer certifying personnel with overlap of non conflicting roles

permissible • Minimal migration cost as existing facility can and will be able to be used


Minimal setup time and approval time:

102

• Simpler initial facility setup compared to POA setup, speeds up operational readiness

• Less migration cost from CAR 21 Subpart G and CAR 145 categories • Minimal organizational setup compared to POA (minimal manpower & certifying

staff) • More focus on operational requirements, further leads to increase productivity


Allows gradual expansion of facilities and operational undertakings.

103

• Lower initial setup cost • Organizational capability can be expanded along with management awareness of

approval requirements • Expansion of facility and undertaking can be made in stages with no hold up of

operations • Operational track records further assist in building better reputation with customers

and Authority

MOA Certification Implementation (1/2)

• Expected implementation by end of the year • Already receiving applications, three applications being processed

Potential organizations:

104

• New organizations • Part 145 Approval Holders

Expected Timeframe:

MOA Certification Implementation (2/2)

• Fabricate within scope of CAR 145 is only permitted • Any fabrication beyond the provision of CAR 145 will be considered for

transfer to MOA • Identifying CAR 145 approved organizations carrying out manufacturing

beyond CAR 145 provisions • Discussion with CAR 145 organizations for moving to MOA • Agreeing on time frame to move such CAR 145 organizations to MOA on

case by case basis

105

Existing Fabrication under CAR 145:

Questions / Discussion

106

New Concept For Safety Occurrence

Report Management

Eng. Khalid Saud Al Humaidan

ASAS Safety Occurrence Management ICAO’s GASP

Short Term

2017

• Requires effective Implementation of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) related to the State’s approval, authorization, certification and licensing processes

Mid-Term

2022

• Requires States to move from a compliance-based oversight approach to one which begins to proactively manage risks globally through the identification and control of existing or emerging safety issues

Long-Term

2027

• Requires the introduction of advanced safety capabilities that increase capacity while maintaining or enhancing operational safety margins and manage existing and emerging risks

ASAS Safety Occurrence Management

Current Safety Intelligence Activities

• Acquire effective storage, analysis and assessment of safety data

capabilities.

The enhancement will enable the GCAA to proactively identify,

assess and mitigate identified safety issues in the UAE civil aviation

system .

• Translation of Safety Data to valuable Safety Information is an

enabler for taking Risk Based Decisions for targeting of oversight of

areas of greater concern or need.


What is Safety Intelligence and how is it connected to GCAA MOR

system ?

• Is knowledge gained through the analysis of available safety data

• Is knowledge on safety performance

• Is knowledge on Safety Issues

The knowledge gained via a robust intelligence system can enable the GCAA to perform its State Safety Management functions


“Safety Intelligence” is the organizational capability

to manage a systematic and continuous process

to collect key operational data, translate it to

meaningful information, to learn or understand,

or to deal with new or trying situations, as well

applying knowledge to achieve the expected

outcome in an efficient way for managing safety

risks

ASAS Safety Occurrence Management “ A CAA 10 Milestones’ Map” , presented by the GCAA at the ICAO High Level Safety

Conference, Montreal, Feb 2015

1 • Establishment of Key partnerships with key institutional and industry stakeholders

2 • Implement performance-based regulations on safety management and data protection

3

• Re-design organizational structures to integrate RBO & PBO into the SSOS CE-8

4 • Upgrade and improve the State safety reporting programme to be harmonized with international standards

5 • Development of the necessary human resources to fulfill new positions and competencies

6 • Development of multi-source safety data processing and analysis capabilities

7 • Development of data modeling capabilities to asses operationally significant safety risks

8 • Agreement on safety performance indicators and safety performance targets for key industry stakeholders as well as for the State

9 • Definition of criteria for risk and performance based oversight of industry

10

• Definition of procedures and mechanisms for risk and performance based oversight


Identify Safety Issues

Assessment of Safety Issue

Definition of Safety Actions

Implementation & Follow Up

Safety Performance Monitoring (Assurance)


Intelligence cycle starts at the Identification of Safety Issues.

Enablers for identification:

1. MOR

2. VOR

3. Audits

4. Inspections

5. FDM/Reliability

6. Other


Status in 2010 Vs Now

Prior to 2010, GCAA didn’t have a mandatory occurrence system

proportionate with the size and the complexity of the UAE Civil

Aviation System

Current occurrence reporting system was introduced in 2010

But what we need is to,,,

ACT

Current Occurrence Management Process


Objective of ASAS Safety Occurrence Management:

Enhance the capabilities of the GCAA´s Occurrence Reporting System to become a key contributor for the management of risk in the framework of the UAE´s State Safety Program and Safety Intelligence

• Support for the establishment of an adequate regulatory framework

• Development and introduction of standard protocols for reports management

Process


Goals:

• Ensure reports are efficiently processed.

• Classify events as per ECCAIRS classification

• Coordinate multi-decipline events

• Quality Assurance

• Asses analysis reports to monitor trends and safety performance

• Highlight safety concerns derived from Occurrence data to decision makers


Safety Occurrence Management Team

Composed of SME’s from FO, AWR & ANA domain. The group will be the central point for receipt of Occurrence Report.

Airworthiness Representative

Flight Operations Representative

Air Navigation & Aerodrome Representative

Air Navigation & Aerodrome Representative


Taking in to account historical data of occurrences assigned to ASAS in 2015.

ANA: 5442

AWR: 447

FO: 1415

For ANA, figure includes AOP, ATC , BWI occurrences

SMO Team is expected to receive “ as a minimum “ following No of occurences per month.

• ANA: 453 / Month

• AWR: 38 / Month

• FO: 118 / Month

Occurrence Classification

CAAP 22 Occurrences will be regrouped to two categories as following:

In order to increase the efficiency of ASAS Occurrence Report Management,,

Category 1 incidents which were deemed to be critical and required to be notified to the GCAA and routed to concerned department Inspector and the Safety Occurrence Management Team within 72 Hours (For info and immediate safety intervention by Inspector as necessary)

Category 2 incidents which were not considered as Category 1, GCAA will require an investigation report (IR) to be submitted within a given time (15 days)



Department Inspector will get notified on Category 1 occurrence “ similar to current workflow “ within 72 hours

Occurrence will be allocated to Inspector and ASAS Occurrence Management Team within 72 hours.

ASAS Occurrence Management Team will monitor opened occurrence reports periodically

Once occurrence enquiry/follow up is completed by Inspector, Occurrence Management Team will do the Quality Check of the occurence.


Category 1 Occurrences – Examples

Operation of Aircraft:

- Take-offs, rejected take-offs, landings or attempted landings on a closed, occupied or incorrect runway.

- Critically low fuel quantity or inability to transfer fuel or use total quantity of usable fuel.

- Loss of control (including partial or temporary loss of control) from any cause.

- Depressurization

Aircraft Technical:

- Damage to or defect exceeding allowed tolerances of a structural element which failure could reduce the structural stiffness to such an extent that the required flutter, divergence or control reversal margins are no longer achieved.

- Loss of any part of the aircraft structure in flight.

- Leakage of hydraulic fluids, fuel, oil or other fluids which resulted in a fire hazard or possible hazardous contamination of aircraft structure, systems or equipment, or risk to occupants.

- Flameout, shutdown or malfunction of any engine.


Category 1 Occurrences – Examples

Air Navigation Service Provider:

- ASMI CAT A, B, C, D

- Loss of Runway separation CAT A, B, C, D

Aerodromes:

- Runway incursion CAT A, B, C, D

- Maneuvering area Excursion CAT A, B, C, D

- Runway operation incident



- Organization Inspector wont get notified

- Occurrence will be routed to Safety Occurrence Management Team.

- Investigation report will be submitted to the GCAA within 15 days from date of occurrence

- Operator may elect to consider the report as initial investigation report and investigate

further as necessary.

- Final report within 45 days. Further extension can be agreed with GCAA.

- The team will make a technical judgment in case occurrence requires to be further followed

up by Inspector.

- Inspector wont be allocated occurence unless Safety Occurrence Management Team

determines the need to. For ex, no sufficient info by operator, operator exceeding closing

date.


Category 2 Occurrences Examples

Operation of Aircraft:

- Laser incident

- Wake turbulence encounters (depends on severity)

- Aircraft Ground Handling and Servicing

Technical:

- Failure or defect of passenger address system resulting in loss or inaudible passenger address system.


What We Need From You

- An effective internal reporting system

- Conduct adequate investigations backed up by Root Cause Analysis

- Assess and mitigate emerging risks

- Classify incidents in line with GCAA’s classification protocol


What We Expect

ASAS Safety Occurrence Reporting

We believe by this, the UAE will have an efficient system which will be able to acquire quality data and produce valuable information which will positively contribute in enhancing aviation safety.

Your Thoughts

Process


Thank You