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Akamai vs. Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Distributed Denial of Service Service Akamai Technologies Akamai Technologies & & Carnegie Mellon Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

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Page 1: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Akamai vs. Akamai vs. Flash Crowds andFlash Crowds and

Distributed Denial of Service Distributed Denial of Service

Akamai Technologies Akamai Technologies

&&

Carnegie MellonCarnegie Mellon

Bruce Maggs

Page 2: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

OutlineOutline

• AkamaiAkamai

• Content Delivery on 9/11Content Delivery on 9/11

• Impact of the “Slammer” WormImpact of the “Slammer” Worm

• FirstPointFirstPoint

• SiteShieldSiteShield

Page 3: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Akamai Services and ProductsAkamai Services and Products

http://http://www.google.comwww.google.com

http://http://www.yahoo.comwww.yahoo.com

http://http://windowsupdate.microsoft.comwindowsupdate.microsoft.com//

http://http://www.apple.com/quicktime/qtv/mwsf04/www.apple.com/quicktime/qtv/mwsf04/

http://http://www.CRITICAL.govwww.CRITICAL.gov

Page 4: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Akamai’s Platform for Delivering Akamai’s Platform for Delivering Content and ApplicationsContent and Applications

Akamai Serversat Network Edge

ContentProviders

EndUsers

NAP

NAP

Page 5: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Current Installations

Network Deployment Network Deployment

15000+Servers

1000+Networks

65+Countries

Page 6: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Content Delivery Using AkamaiContent Delivery Using Akamai

<html><html><head><head><title>Welcome to xyz.com!</title><title>Welcome to xyz.com!</title></head></head><body><body><img src=“<img src=“<img src=“ <img src=“ <h1>Welcome to our Web site!</h1><h1>Welcome to our Web site!</h1><a href=“page2.html”>Click here to enter</a><a href=“page2.html”>Click here to enter</a></body></body></html></html>

http://www.xyz.com/logos/logo.gifhttp://www.xyz.com/logos/logo.gif”>”>http://www.xyz.com/jpgs/navbar1.jpghttp://www.xyz.com/jpgs/navbar1.jpg”>”>

Embedded URLs are Converted to ARLsEmbedded URLs are Converted to ARLs

akak

Page 7: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

End User

Akamai DNS ResolutionAkamai DNS Resolution

Akamai High-Level DNS Servers

10g.akamai.net

1

Browser’s Cache

OS

2

Local Name Server

3

xyz.com’s nameserver

66ak.xyz.comak.xyz.com

77a212.g.akamai.net

9915.15.125.6

16

15

1120.20.123.55

Akamai Low-Level DNS Servers

12 a212.g.akamai.net

30.30.123.5 13

14

4 xyz.comxyz.com .com .net Root

(InterNIC)10.10.123.555

akamai.net

88

select cluster

select servers within cluster

Page 8: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Content Delivery on 9/11Content Delivery on 9/11

• Akamai’s network had capacity for all Akamai’s network had capacity for all content providers requesting servicecontent providers requesting service

• Total bits served on September 11 Total bits served on September 11 was approximately 3.5 times normalwas approximately 3.5 times normal

• Traffic was higher on September 12Traffic was higher on September 12

• (But not as high as January 7, 2002)(But not as high as January 7, 2002)

Page 9: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

News Site A – FreeFlow TrafficNews Site A – FreeFlow Traffic

Page 10: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

News Site A – FreeFlow StreamingNews Site A – FreeFlow Streaming

Page 11: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

News Site B – EdgeSuite TrafficNews Site B – EdgeSuite Traffic

Page 12: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

News Site B – FreeFlow TrafficNews Site B – FreeFlow Traffic

Page 13: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

News Site B – FreeFlow StreamingNews Site B – FreeFlow Streaming

Page 14: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Portal A – FreeFlow trafficPortal A – FreeFlow traffic

Page 15: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Sports Site A – FreeFlow trafficSports Site A – FreeFlow traffic

Page 16: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Steve Jobs KeynoteSteve Jobs Keynote

Page 17: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Impact of Sapphire/Slammer WormImpact of Sapphire/Slammer Worm

•Web site performance severely impacted

•Congestion in core of Internet

•Significant route flapping

Page 18: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Military Web Site - PerformanceMilitary Web Site - Performance

AFB response times on 01/25/2003

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

0:00

1:45

3:15

4:45

8:15

9:45

11:0

012

:30

14:0

015

:45

17:1

519

:00

20:1

521

:45

23:1

5

Time (GMT)

mS

ec

Akamai Origin

Page 19: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

71 content providers; 17 agents71 content providers; 17 agents

Download Failure Rates on 01/25/2003

02468

1012141618

0:45

3:15

5:15

6:45

8:15

9:45

11:0

012

:15

13:4

515

:00

16:1

517

:45

19:0

020

:15

22:1

523

:45

Time (GMT)

Fai

lure

Per

cen

tag

e

Akamai Failure Percentage Origin Failure Percentage

Page 20: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Military Web Site - ReliabilityMilitary Web Site - Reliability

Download Failure Rates (AFB)

0102030405060708090

100

00:0

002

:45

05:0

009

:15

11:4

514

:00

16:4

519

:15

21:1

5

Time (GMT)

Fai

lure

Per

cen

tag

e

Page 21: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

VideoVideo

Page 22: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Aggregate Routing ActivityAggregate Routing Activity

11:30 PM EST Friday

Page 23: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Routing Activity by NetworkRouting Activity by Network

11:30 PM EST Friday

Page 24: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

DOS attacksDOS attacks

•Coordinated attacks

•From multiple compromised machines

•On website or upstream

•Goal – to overwhelm

•Hacker-based e.g., – Microsoft, Yahoo!

•Voluntary sit-ins e.g., – World Economic Forum

Page 25: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

MicrosoftMicrosoft

Page 26: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

What is FirstPointWhat is FirstPoint

• Traffic management system for Traffic management system for mirrored websitesmirrored websites

• Directs browser to the optimal mirrorDirects browser to the optimal mirror

• DNS basedDNS based

• Application level anycastApplication level anycast

Page 27: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Why FirstPointWhy FirstPoint

• Content providers have mirrored Content providers have mirrored websiteswebsites

• Content providers only want to Content providers only want to offload embedded contentoffload embedded content

- ControlControl- SecuritySecurity- PerformancePerformance

Page 28: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Mapping ProblemMapping Problem

How to improve user experience?

Page 29: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

What is the Mapping ProblemWhat is the Mapping Problem

• Problem of directing requests to Problem of directing requests to servers so as to optimize end-user servers so as to optimize end-user experienceexperience

- reduce latencyreduce latency- reduce lossreduce loss- reduce jitterreduce jitter

• Assumption - servers are fineAssumption - servers are fine

• Applicable to 2 mirrors or 1500 Applicable to 2 mirrors or 1500 Akamai locationsAkamai locations

Page 30: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

AttemptAttempt

• Measure which is closerMeasure which is closer- Closeness changes over timeCloseness changes over time

• Measure frequentlyMeasure frequently- Bothers peopleBothers people- Too many to doToo many to do

~500,000 unique nameservers on any given day10 sec per measurement cycle

Page 31: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

IdeaIdea

• Topology Topology - relatively staticrelatively static- changes in BGP timechanges in BGP time- order of hours if not daysorder of hours if not days

• CongestionCongestion- dynamicdynamic- changes in round-trip timechanges in round-trip time- order of millisecondsorder of milliseconds

Page 32: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Topology Discovery - Proxy pointsTopology Discovery - Proxy pointsData exchange

Page 33: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Topology DiscoveryTopology Discovery

500,000 nameservers 500,000 nameservers

reduced to reduced to

90,000 proxy points (clusters)90,000 proxy points (clusters)

Page 34: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Congestion MeasurementCongestion Measurement

Problem - Still too many measurements to do. Problem - Still too many measurements to do. 90,000 measurements every 10s with 32B 90,000 measurements every 10s with 32B packets requires a few Mbps per mirror.packets requires a few Mbps per mirror.

Solution - Importance based samplingSolution - Importance based sampling

Page 35: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

CDF of End-user LoadCDF of End-user Load

CDF

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000

Number of Clusters

Load

Page 36: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Load EstimationLoad Estimation

500,000 nameservers 500,000 nameservers

reduced toreduced to

90,000 clusters 90,000 clusters

7,000 account for 95% end-user load! 7,000 account for 95% end-user load!

Page 37: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

Mapping Problem – Solved?Mapping Problem – Solved?

Maps built every 10s

Page 38: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

FirstPointFirstPoint

• Customers - how to tell?Customers - how to tell?- look for CNAME to akadns.netlook for CNAME to akadns.net

• Customers - who?Customers - who?- High traffic content providersHigh traffic content providers- Yahoo!, Microsoft, TicketMaster etcYahoo!, Microsoft, TicketMaster etc

• Price - don’t ask :)Price - don’t ask :)

• Competitors - whoCompetitors - who- one-of-a-kind serviceone-of-a-kind service- boxes: Cisco, F5, Foundryboxes: Cisco, F5, Foundry

Page 39: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

FirstPoint - other aspectsFirstPoint - other aspects

• Load-balancingLoad-balancing- estimate-basedestimate-based- feedback-based : https, snmp feedback-based : https, snmp - cost-based: 95/5cost-based: 95/5

• Fast cutout in case of failoverFast cutout in case of failover

• Highly fault-tolerantHighly fault-tolerant- hardware duplication, leader electionhardware duplication, leader election- overlay routing, BGP-based anycastoverlay routing, BGP-based anycast

• Integration with other servicesIntegration with other services- DOS/Load failoverDOS/Load failover

Page 40: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs
Page 41: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

SiteShieldSiteShield

Content provider’swebsite

Hacker!

Hacker!

Hacker!

AKAMAI

AKAMAI

AKAMAI

Page 42: Akamai vs. Flash Crowds and Distributed Denial of Service Akamai Technologies & Carnegie Mellon Bruce Maggs

SiteShieldSiteShield

•IP address of origin shielded

•Akamai can be attacked

•But Akamai will respond by •Diffusion – load balancing, &•Resurrection – reviving unpinned servers