Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 17-56-The Deep Battle against the West

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 17-56-The Deep Battle against the West

The western leaders face a real dilemma; on the one hand dealing with the consequences of to long force reduction: the `peace dividend after the fall of the Warsaw Pact, on the other dealing with Russia’s latest `Hybrid Warfare introduced in the field. But also still not able how to deal with the- where I warned for some time age - the Phenomena of the Caliphate declared; clear vision and comprehensive strategy still lacks. But foremost social-liberal politics blinds them from seeing the growing instability threat coming home. Cees

“This is due to the lack of political will on the part of the West. The Russian government has repeatedly called on joint efforts to combat Islamic State. All attempts have failed, unfortunately. It could be motivated by the personal ambitions of certain leaders.”

“I do not think there is a direct link between Islamic State and the Taliban movement. But any terrorist threat, no matter where it comes from, should be responded to with certain pre-emptive actions. Such actions are effective only if they are well coordinated. The meeting of CSTO members was a step in the right direction.”

The head of Al Nusrah Front, Abu Muhammad al Julani, has released an audio message addressing Russia’s role in the Syrian war. Julani depicts Russia as being “Eastern Crusaders,” calls for reprisal attacks inside Russia, says the jihadists should attack Shiite villages, and argues that groups fighting the Assad regime shouldn’t seek assistance from the West or countries throughout the region.

Is there a Taliban-ISIS double threat to Russia? While international attention has focused on Russian military operations in

Ukraine and Syria, Moscow has also been involved in a flurry of diplomatic and security initiatives to address the growing instability in northern Afghanistan.

Dmitry Polikanov, member of the board of the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies in Russia, an independent think tank, “Right now, Barack Obama has proclaimed the necessity to provide more weapons to the Syrian rebels. As we know, recently such armaments were transferred from the rebels to the terrorist groups; this would eventually hamper the operations conducted by Russia.” “This is due to the lack of political will on the part of the West. The Russian government has repeatedly called on joint efforts to combat Islamic State. All attempts have failed, unfortunately. It could be motivated by the personal ambitions of certain leaders.”

Despite a barrage of Western criticism over Russia’s attacks, which are allegedly targeting the Syrian opposition instead of ISIS, Russia’s military officials and observers insist the air strikes are proving effective so far.

In the face of such a decisive move by Russia, U.S. President Barack Obama announced a strategic plan to launch a general offensive on the de facto capital of ISIS, the north-eastern Syrian city of Raqqa.

Meanwhile, the second anti-ISIS coalition-in-the-making, comprising Russia, Iran, and Iraq along with Damascus, is showing its own resolve to emerge as a new force against ISIS.

While international attention has focused on Russian military operations in Ukraine and Syria, Moscow has also been involved in a flurry of diplomatic and security

1The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see. –Winston Churchill

Cees de Waart: CdW Intelligence to Rent Page 1 of 13 01/05/2023

mailto:[email protected]


initiatives to address the growing instability in northern Afghanistan.But its moves to bolster regional security are more than just a response to local security concerns. Russia has a broader strategy that could leave it as the dominant security actor across much of Eurasia.Even before the shock of the Taliban occupation of Kunduz in late September, Russian officials were concerned about the fragile security situation in northern Afghanistan, including the rise of Islamic State in northern Afghanistan and its potential spread to Central Asia and thence to Russia’s large Muslim community. As if to emphasise the domestic threat, on October 12 Russian police announced that they had uncovered a terrorist plot in Moscow apparently involving a group of Central Asian militants.Insecurity in Afghanistan may pose a potential security threat for Moscow, but it is being seized upon as a major geopolitical opportunity. Against a backdrop of failed Western policies across much of Russia’s southern flank, Moscow is moving quickly to fill a security vacuum in the region. It is strengthening existing alliances to consolidate its hold over former Soviet republics in Central Asia and reshaping the security dynamics of the region around its own favoured security groupings – the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).The first step has been a series of meeting with Central Asian leaders, all on the front line in case of renewed Afghan insecurity. A meeting between Russian president Vladimir Putin and Emomali Rakhmon, the president of Tajikistan, led to promises of more attack helicopters to bolster the existing Russian military based in the country, which has become the hub of a well-developed defence system against cross-border infiltration.

Crisis and opportunity Putin also took time out of his birthday celebrations in Sochi to meet Almazbek Atambayev, the president of Kyrgyzstan, a country that has become the linchpin of Russia’s security strategy in the region. Until 2014 Kyrgyzstan hosted a US airbase, but as I explored in a recent paper, Russia has been remarkably successful in ousting the Americans and turning Kyrgyzstan into a dependable ally in the region.If Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are relatively relaxed about an enhanced Russian military presence, the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, is instinctively allergic to talk of renewed Russian influence and pulled out of the Russian-led CSTO in 2012.Now the northern Afghan crisis offers an opportunity to bring Uzbekistan back into Moscow’s embrace. A delegation from the Russian MOD, led by deputy minister Anatoly Antonov, has recently paid the country its first high-level visit since 2007.There was no coverage of the Russian visit in Uzbekistan’s heavily censored press. Instead, the newpapers led on a summit with neighbouring Turkmen president, Gurmanguly Berdymukhamedov. The two presidents both have serious security concerns about Afghanistan, but both want to manage them without Russian assistance. Both states have appalling human rights records, limiting the potential for Western aid, and it may be hard to refuse Russian offers of help if unrest grows along their borders with Afghanistan.

Friends reunited Afghan officials have also been in Moscow, seeking assistance. Vice-president and Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, has sought to revive old ties during a recent visit, also paying a side visit to the influential Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, to share experiences of “fighting terrorism”. If the Afghan situation worsens significantly, Dostum offers the potential for Moscow to build up a further band of loyal forces in the north of Afghanistan, in an effective re-run of its Taliban-era support for the Northern Alliance.Other Afghan government officials attended a conference of SCO members and observers on Afghanistan in Moscow. The chief of Russia’s general staff, first deputy defence minister, Valery Gerasimov, took time out to give a speech that highlighted the failure of





US policy in the Middle East, leaving little doubt that Moscow now sees Afghanistan through the same geopolitical prism as it frames Syria. Russian intelligence officials regularly claim that IS is part of a broader US plot to destabilise Central Asia and Russia from the south.Still, there is no appetite for Russia to get involved in Afghanistan in the way it has in Syria. There are still bitter memories of the humiliating Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. But an anti-IS stance in the region provides Russia with the opportunity to consolidate its presence in Central Asia and become the centre of new alliances in the region – with SCO partners such as China, and with Iran – and to sponsor anti-Taliban and anti-IS forces in northern Afghanistan.More intriguingly, some Russian officials see Moscow’s new strategic initiatives in Syria and Afghanistan as a chance to carve out a significant role in a wider region. State Duma speaker, Sergei Naryshkin, has been talking of a “Greater Eurasia”, linking Russia not only to former Soviet republics, but more widely to a range of allies in Syria, Iran, India and China.This may be just another of Russia’s historical spatial fantasies for now, but in a rapidly changing international environment, Moscow will try to use its dominance in Central Asia as a first step towards shaping a new regional security order.

TROIKA REPORT: Is there a Taliban-ISIS double threat to Russia?9 October 2015 SERGEY STROKAN, VLADIMIR MIKHEEVRIR presents its weekly analytical program TROIKA REPORT, featuring a look at three of the most high-profile recent developments in international affairs.

Troika Report: Ukraine, Syria and ISIS1. Russia’s double track: Escaping the impasse on Ukraine and SyriaRussia’s air strikes on what it says are ISIS targets inside Syria have raised the stakes in Moscow’s policy of engaging the West in what it claims is a joint fight against Islamic terrorists. The move has also sent confusing signals over the possibility of re-engaging the West in multi-faceted cooperation, from political dialogue to trade, a partnership ruptured by the war of sanctions over Moscow’s role in the Ukraine conflict.However, the heating up of the situation in Syria comes at the same time as the cooling of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine, which appears to be the product of concerted diplomatic efforts by the leaders of Ukraine, Germany, France and Russia to ensure the implementation of the Minsk peace accords signed back in February.The summit of the four nations, which took place in Paris at the end of last week, was remarkably devoid of name-and-blame rhetoric, with few if any accusations targeting Moscow as the apparent protector of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. The discourse of the four leaders could be summed up in two observations: “None of the articles of Minsk have been respected completely” (Angela Merkel) and the admission that some progress has been made on the military aspects of the Minsk accords (Francois Hollande).But the key message of the Paris summit hangs on the premise that there is no sign of advancement on the crucial element of the agreement, political reform. In essence, the reforms amount to amending the Ukrainian constitution to accommodate the insistence of Donetsk and Lugansk on a special status with guarantees of the observance of human rights, e.g. the rights of ethnic – Russian –minorities.Besides, Germany and France have said the timeline for the implementation of the Minsk agreements can be extended, which gives all sides a little more breathing space.The link between the cautious progress on the Ukrainian front and Russia’s air strikes on





targets in Syria is found in the roots of the refugee deluge flooding Europe. The sudden surge of thousands of frustrated Syrian and Iraqi citizens is a result of the crumbling security environment and law and order in these two countries, which now see one third of their territories under the control of militants from the Islamic State (ISIS) radical group.Are there any chances that putting the Donbass crisis on the back burner and achieving a modest military success in Syria could set the stage for a more meaningful cooperation with some Western powers? This is dismissed as wishful thinking by Vladimir Bruter, an expert from the Moscow-based International Institute of Humanitarian and Political Studies, who spoke to Troika Report:“It’s a premature even to consider such an option. The softer approach to the Syrian crisis by the continental European powers is not matched by their role in decision-making. The stance certain governments in Europe will take is conditional on the preliminary results of the Russian military operation in Syria.“If the results are positive, it will be taken into account in Europe. If the operation does not bear fruit in the near future, and becomes a protracted campaign, there will hardly be any changes in the foreign policy of European nations, with the likelihood that it will lean towards more rigidness, yet relative rigidness.“As for the United States, its position on the Ukrainian crisis is not likely to change at all, not in an election year, and will still amount to ‘keeping it burning’ while not inflaming it more.“In more general terms, the Paris summit has shown that Germany, France and Russia prefer to freeze the conflict in Eastern Ukraine so that it will not have the potential to erupt into hostilities. For Germany in particular, the refugee influx is of paramount importance and pushes the Ukrainian issue to the sidelines.”Supposedly, the discrepancy in the approach of the Anglo-Saxon nations and continental Europe is due to the way the Syrian crisis affects their interests. Might this help to precipitate the dismantling of the EU sanctions regime and abandonment of attempts to isolate Russia on the Western front, at least in Europe? Political analyst and public figure Sergei Stankevich, a senior expert with the Anatoly Sobchak Foundation, provided his view for Troika Report:“If Russia shows readiness for a full political settlement in Syria, the West could accept her as a partner in this respect. If Russia limits its activity to military strikes, neglecting political dialogue, I’m afraid it could bring more tension in Russia-West relations.”— If we witness, hopefully, some positive moves leading to normalization in Ukraine, meaning around the Donbass, and the weakening of ISIS in Syria as a result of Russia’s military actions, could we expect the re-emergence of areas of cooperation with the West?“Definitely. Two problems connected with the Ukrainian crisis were resolved at the Paris meeting: The Minsk agreements will not expire and will be in force for the next year, and the elections scheduled by separatists in Donetsk and Lugansk will not take place. The elections will be held only on the basis of a special law that President Poroshenko must now press through his parliament.”“The next year we might see a “de-escalation” of sanctions against Russia.”Moscow’s double-track policy seems to be aimed at slowly pressing for a political settlement in Ukraine by making the central authorities in Kiev start talking directly to the insurgents in the Donbass, and concurrently setting the stage for a similar conclusion of the civil war in Syria, but with preservation of the Alawite regime in Damascus, with Bashar al-Assad at its head or not. However, on the Syrian track, Moscow’s offer to form a wide coalition was not welcomed. It looks like the West finds itself at the same initial stage as it was in April 2014, when the





Ukrainian army launched its offensive against the self-proclaimed republics in the Donbass. At that time, the Minsk agreements and, in general, cooperation between Berlin, Paris and Moscow was still a distant prospect.Nevertheless, the two conflicts, Eastern Ukraine and Syria, despite their apparent differences, offer Moscow’s diplomacy a chance to engage the West. Whether this gamble succeed or not is the multi-billion dollar question.

2. Two coalitions against ISIS: What next for Syria?Militant Islamist fighters on a tank take part in a military parade along the streets of northern Raqqa province June 30, 2014. Source: Reuters.Despite a barrage of Western criticism over Russia’s attacks, which are allegedly targeting the Syrian opposition instead of ISIS, Russia’s military officials and observers insist the air strikes are proving effective so far.In the face of such a decisive move by Russia, U.S. President Barack Obama announced a strategic plan to launch a general offensive on the de facto capital of ISIS, the north-eastern Syrian city of Raqqa. The operation would involve deploying 20,000 Kurdish fighters and some 5,000 rebels representing the Syrian opposition, and be backed up with U.S. Air Force support.Obama’s initiative to launch major offensive on ISIS positions in Syria, not attempted

during more than a year of the existence of the U.S.-led coalition, has merely aggravated the rift between Moscow and Washington over the strategy of fighting ISIS. There are suspicions among Russian observers that the plan could be nothing more than a show of resolve and competence for the sake of “not being outdone” by the Russians.Meanwhile, the second anti-

ISIS coalition-in-the-making, comprising Russia, Iran, and Iraq along with Damascus, is showing its own resolve to emerge as a new force against ISIS. The new coalition is setting up a coordination center in Baghdad to carry out reconnaissance and analysis, with the unit due to begin operation in the coming weeks.A newcomer to the second anti-ISIS coalition, led by Moscow, Iraq is making bold commitments. Seen as a U.S. client-state after more than a decade of American military presence in the country since the demise of dictator Saddam Hussein, Iraq has pledged to become more active in fighting ISIS and provide intelligence data to Iran, Syria, and Russia.Meanwhile, the international reaction to Russia’s military actions ranges from total rejection (Saudi Arabia and Turkey) to cautious admittance of possible cooperation (France) and an attitude of benign neglect (the United Arab Emirates).Unexpectedly, the Emirates welcomed Russian involvement, saying that they had no reservations about it. A senior official in Abu Dhabi, quoted by French daily Le Figaro, said if the Russians manage to weaken the ISIS and al-Nusra radical groups, it would be considered by the UAE as “positive.” Moreover, the country are not even concerned if Russia’s steps end up prolonging the rule of Bashar al-Assad: “We have no problem in cooperating with Russia,” said the unnamed official, “but not with Iran.”





On the whole, since Moscow got involved in the Syrian conflict the changes in the configuration of political alliances and loyalties have accelerated. Still, this does not pave the way for a truly wide and comprehensive alliance.The two anti-ISIS coalitions are not entirely on speaking terms, despite top-level liaison between Russian and American military officials. There is enough rhetoric in the air to suggest that the two alliances are in competition with each other, each de facto claiming supreme legitimacy as the principal anti-ISIS force.Could this vanity fair hamper the fight against ISIS and other radicals that are jeopardizing regional stability? Dmitry Polikanov, member of the board of the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies in Russia, an independent think tank, provided a comment for Troika Report.“It could lead to uncoordinated efforts and, moreover, to clashes between members of different coalitions — not deliberately but unintentionally. I assume that it would be better for both coalitions to have a pact preventing harm being inflicted upon one another. Russia and the U.S. should have an agreement to make their actions more… wise, I would say.“Right now, Barack Obama has proclaimed the necessity to provide more weapons to the Syrian rebels. As we know, recently such armaments were transferred from the rebels to the terrorist groups; this would eventually hamper the operations conducted by Russia.”— ISIS is identified as a global threat, as a global challenge. It requires global efforts to eradicate this danger. Why is there no coordination between Russia and the West at this critical point?“This is due to the lack of political will on the part of the West. The Russian government has repeatedly called on joint efforts to combat Islamic State. All attempts have failed, unfortunately. It could be motivated by the personal ambitions of certain leaders.”— Can at some point in time one of the coalitions proclaim itself the winner?“Actually, there can barely be a winner in this war. It would be dangerous to claim to be the victor. ISIS, like many other terrorist organizations, is a network organization. It is practically impossible to achieve complete victory. I think it would be more reasonable to speak about the process but not the result. The goal of Russia and its allies and the U.S.-led coalition should be to minimize the combat potential of ISIS.”Basically, the undeclared competition between the two coalitions will determine not so much the winner over ISIS but the new pecking order in the region.For the United States it is becoming a matter of re-instating its credentials as the time-honored provider of security for the Middle East. For Russia, it is about securing a pro-Moscow regime in Damascus, establishing privileged relations with the rising regional power, Iran, and also coming back into global politics as an assertive agent to be reckoned with.Despite this drastic discrepancy in strategic interests, the over-arching goal for both is evident: ISIS has no place in the civilized world.3. Is there a Taliban-ISIS double threat to Russia and Central Asia?





Afghan government forces in the city of Kunduz, October 5, 2015. Source: Zuma / TASSThe sudden deterioration of the regional security environment prompted Tajik President Emomali Rahmon to fly urgently to Sochi to meet Russian leader Vladimir Putin and discuss, among other things, the strengthening of “bilateral military-technical cooperation” and additional effective measures to make the southern border with Afghanistan as impregnable as possible.Meanwhile, Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of Russia’s Chechen Republic, met with Afghan Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum. After the meeting Kadyrov voiced the opinion that Russia should provide substantial assistance to Afghanistan in blocking the advance of the Islamic State (ISIS) radical militant group, which is now targeting this region too.However, Moscow-based experts with a career in security services, diplomacy and academic studies have conflicting views on the likelihood of Russia’s readiness to go one step further than its current pre-emptive preparations and get directly involved in assisting the Afghan government to fight off the Islamist militants. There is also no consensus on the level of security threat to Russia and Central Asia from the expansion of ISIS jihadists’ outreach to Afghanistan.So how serious is the threat of the Taliban consolidating control of an area in the vicinity of Russia’s Central Asian allies? Alexei Malashenko, a security expert at Moscow's Carnegie Center, claims the danger is being exaggerated.“I think it is no threat to Russia. Moreover, it is no threat to Tajikistan as well; its real challenges are coming from within the country. I do not envisage the Taliban attacking Tajikistan; they do not have the force to do it.”“The Taliban is preoccupied with its own, domestic, Afghan affairs.”However, this opinion is disputed by another expert. Troika Report approached General Vyacheslav Trubnikov, former First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, and former ambassador to Afghanistan, for his insight into the matter. Should the recent victories by the Taliban convince and persuade Moscow that it is better to act pro-actively than retro-actively by enhancing security along Central Asian borders?“My personal opinion is that the situation in Afghanistan has never been calm or stable. Russia and its allies under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) are well aware of these dangerous developments inside Afghanistan. The recent CSTO summit paid due attention to these developments. It is essential for all the CSTO member states to be always on the alert.“I do not think there is a direct link between Islamic State and the Taliban movement. But any terrorist threat, no matter where it comes from, should be responded to with certain pre-emptive actions. Such actions are effective only if they are well coordinated. The meeting of CSTO members was a step in the right direction.”— Given the air strikes currently being carried out by Russia in Syria, is there a possibility that a similar operation could be undertaken in Afghanistan?





“Up to now we have not received a request from the Afghan government to enter an agreement specifying collective actions. Unlike in Syria, whose legitimate government requested concrete assistance from Russia.”In any case, the capture of the strategic city of Kunduz by Taliban fighters, later pushed out by Afghan security forces, marks an escalation of the civil war in a country that has not seen stability for almost 40 years. The Taliban is on the march. What kind of a security threat is the Taliban for Central Asia? Georgy Mirsky, professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow and one of Russia’s leading experts on Middle East affairs, had the following to say to Troika Report:“There are various Islamist organizations — we should not focus only on the Taliban and al-Qaeda — there is Islamic State there and others. They are Sunnis but of different ethnic backgrounds: Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Pashtuns, etc. If there is a rebellion somewhere in Tajikistan, the rebels can reckon on arms supplies from Afghanistan because after NATO forces leave there will be an awful lot of weapons around. Some of these weapons may be transferred by local Tajiks and Uzbeks to underground organizations inside Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.”— What countermeasures would it make sense for Russia to take in a pro-active mode?“I met these kinds of people back in 1995, and they told me that their real and ultimate goal will be… Kazakhstan, and then [the Russian republics of] Tatarstan and Bashkiria. They would not achieve this goal. But the point is that they are ready to kill and die for this to happen. Russia should put up a barrier to prevent such incursions.”The resurgence of the Taliban, after displaying a higher degree of military operational skill during the attack on Kunduz, as well as reports that some of its units are merging with or being subjugated by ISIS militants, adds uncertainty to the fate of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and to the preservation of a secular regime in Kabul.The international jihadist forces now assembling in Afghanistan are a destabilizing factor for the entire region. This sounds an alarm bell for Russia and its allies in Central Asia, which sooner or later will force them to undertake pre-emptive action.

Head of al Qaeda’s Syrian branch threatens Russia in audio messageBY THOMAS JOSCELYN | October 13, 2015 | [email protected] | @thomasjoscelynThe head of Al Nusrah Front, Abu Muhammad al Julani, has released an audio message addressing Russia’s role in the Syrian war. Julani depicts Russia as being “Eastern Crusaders,” calls for reprisal attacks inside Russia, says the jihadists should attack Shiite villages, and argues that groups fighting the Assad regime shouldn’t seek assistance from the West or countries throughout the region. He also offers bounties of several million Euros to anyone who kills Bashar al Assad or Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.Julani’s 21-minute audio message, which was released online yesterday, is entitled “The Russian Intervention – The Last Arrow.” It has been translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.Julani argues that Russia has not come to fight the Islamic State, as it claims, but is instead targeting the Jaysh al Fateh alliance, which is led by Al Nusrah and its close jihadist ally, Ahrar al Sham. Jaysh al Fateh delivered successive blows to the Assad regime since the beginning of the year and this is the reason Russia intervened, according to Julani.It is well known “that the [Islamic] State group does not threaten the presence of the [Assad] regime, for the places controlled by the State group do not touch the depths of the regime,” Julani says, according to SITE’s translation. “No wonder then that it began its bombardment by targeting the factions of Jaysh al Fateh and the factions that were in direct confrontation with the regime forces, and by striking the safe villages, killing women and children, continuing what has been done by the criminal regime.”





A common al Qaeda talking point is that the US is part of an anti-Sunni alliance with Iran and Shiites throughout the Middle East. Julani repeats this claim in his speech. “It is no secret to anyone how Iran and its parties from among the Rafidha [Shiites] of Iraq helped the Americans in occupying Iraq, and quickly the Americans delivered Iraq on a golden platter to Iran,” he says.Russia’s support for this axis will not change matters, however, according to al Qaeda’s man. The war in Syria “will make Russia forget the horrors they faced in Afghanistan,” Julani threatens, referring to the Afghan War in the 1980s. He argues that Russia’s airstrikes are “no different” from the Assad regime’s in terms of accuracy or efficacy.Julani urges the “mujahideen in the Caucasus to distract” Russia’s attention from the war in Syria whenever possible by killing Russians in their home country, including soldiers. “If the Russian soldier kills from the masses of [Syria], kill from their masses. And if they kill from our soldiers, kill from theirs,” Julani says, according to SITE. “One for one. We will not be the ones who begin.” The infighting between various factions must come to a stop, Julani argues, so that the jihadists can focus on “breaking” the “Eastern and Western Crusader campaigns.” And the jihadists should mobilize on “all the fronts” throughout Syria in response. “All must start a large battle on the most sensitive areas for the regime, and the battle must be escalated and the Nusayri [Shiite] villages in Latakia targeted.” Latakia is a coastal province that has long been a stronghold for the Assad family. “I call upon all the factions to gather the largest possible amount of shells and rockets and strike the Nusayri [Shiite] villages every day with hundreds of rockets, just as the cursed ones do in the cities and villages of the Sunnis,” Julani says, according to SITE. “Make them taste some of the torture of our people. If they leave the villages and cities of the Sunnis, we will leave them alone and will not attack, for he who treats others the same as he treats himself is not unjust.” Here, Julani is likely discussing the Sunni jihadists’ strategy of attacking Shiite civilian areas in order to force the Assad regime to refrain from attacking predominately Sunni areas. Al Nusrah, Ahrar al Sham and other Sunni jihadist groups have employed this strategy throughout the year by, for example, attacking Shiite villages in northern Syria until Assad, Iranian forces, and Hezbollah lay off of areas in the south where Sunnis, including jihadists, are cornered. Jaysh al Fateh has effectively used this plan to free civilians and some fighters stationed in Zabadani, a small city close to the border with Lebanon. Julani warns other groups in Syria to avoid seeking assistance from “the Western states and the regional states,” saying it will only bring more “humiliation and shame.” Julani does not address this warning to any specific parties, but he could be referring to Al Nusrah’s ally, Ahrar al Sham, which receives assistance from Turkey and Qatar. Al Nusrah itself has likely received support from Gulf nations, Turkey and other actors at times. In fact, al Qaeda ideologues have explicitly condoned such arrangements, arguing that it can advance the jihadists’ cause. Al Qaeda has even said it is permissible on theological grounds to receive support from Iran, which is currently the Sunni jihadists’ foe in Syria and elsewhere. So, while Julani may openly decry this practice, it is one al Qaeda has repeatedly deemed to be acceptable. Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Islamic State ‘Terrorist Suspects’ in Moscow Rented Apartment From GRU Colonel Muscovites were surprised by news reports of a thwarted terrorist attack (Lenta.ru, October 11) planned by militants with ties to the so-called Islamic State (IS). Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) said two people taken into custody testified that they were preparing a terrorist attack on the Russian capital’s public transportation system and that they were IS members. The militants reportedly planned to attack either the subway





system or an airport in Moscow. Later, on the morning of October 11, it became known that the security services had detained 10 to 15 suspects. Most of the detainees were citizens of Central Asian countries (Interfax, October 11). The next day, the Interfax news agency announced that three of the arrested individuals were Syrian citizens (Interfax, October 12). Moreover, an explosive device confiscated in Moscow reportedly resembled the one used in the terrorist attack in Ankara, Turkey, on October 10. The Russian authorities’ thinly veiled message was that Ankara and Moscow are threatened by the same forces and that Moscow should be invited to join the common fight against terrorism. The FSB might have been praised for its success in uncovering the terrorist plot in Moscow had the organization’s history not raised doubts about the official Russian version. The landlady of one of the suspects said that a colonel of the GRU (the Main Intelligence Directorate, the Russian military’s intelligence service) from Chechnya named Said rented the apartment in February 2015 along with his wife Sabina and their little daughter. Said went to Turkey on vacation in September and handed over the apartment keys to his nephew Musa (Lenta.ru, October 13). Thus, the apartment was rented out to a GRU colonel. According to the investigators, after Colonel Said gave his apartment keys to Musa and traveled to Turkey in September, his nephew immediately started setting up a workshop for building a bomb (Mk.ru, October 12). Musa reportedly went on to hire an impressive group of supporters, including three citizens of Central Asian countries and a resident of Kabardino-Balkaria. These Islamists also, apparently, used the apartment, located at 5 Strelbishchensky Pereulok, in Moscow, as a hostel (Kommersant, October 12). It is unclear how they managed to turn the apartment into a hostel to host 10–15 people in the two to three weeks after Said left with his wife and daughter for their vacation destination. After the suspects were arrested, Said’s wife, Sabina, reportedly telephoned the police. Strangely, the investigators were not interested in the details of the family who were renting the apartment. The owner of the apartment, a 59-year-old identified only as Andrei R., is also a member of the Russian military, who works for the 190th financial department of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s military representative office. Another amusing detail about this story is how the criminal plot was supposedly uncovered. A female living in the building reported her neighbors after she overheard them mentioning the word “detonator” when they spoke in a language that she could not understand on the staircase. Investigators assumed that word “detonator” does not exist either in Chechen or Arabic. The identities of the suspected Chechens—Mohmad Mezhidov, Elman Ashaev and Aslan Baisultanov—also raise questions. Aslan Baisultanov was mentioned in connection with the special operation against the rebels in Grozny on October 8, when Ramzan Kadyrov said someone by that name was among the rebels killed in the Grozny incident. Later, Aslan Baisultanov’s name was dropped from the official news reports, but reappeared on October 11 in connection with the Moscow incident (Tvrain.ru, October 13). Investigators say that on October 3, Baisultanov received orders to carry out a bomb attack in Moscow. Someone named Shamil Chergizov reportedly gave Baisultanov a detonator





and components for making an improvised explosive device (IED). Together with Ashaev, Baisultanov brought the materials to Moscow on a train and stored them with Mezhidov in the apartment on Strelbishchensky Pereulok (Zona Media, October 13). These details prompted Kadyrov to expand his claims (Tvc.ru, October 13): he said that Chechen law enforcement agents helped prevent the attack in Moscow because they found Baisultanov’s passport in Grozny, where Chergizov, the organizer of the attack, was killed (Instagram.com, October 13). Some sources close to the investigation believe the suspect from Kabardino-Balkaria, Elbrus Bittirov, was the organizer of the attack (Interfax, October 13), but little is known about Bittirov thus far. Three days after the thwarted attack in Moscow, the authorities still had not given the names of the Central Asians and Syrians who allegedly plotted the attack. Journalists were also surprised that only ten FSB officers escorted the three Chechen suspects to Lefortovo prison instead of the special vehicles typically used for especially dangerous suspects. Several journalists noted that the court hearing was also quite loosely guarded, and that anyone from the street could have entered the room, which is highly unusual for Russian court trials (Radiovesti.ru, October 13). Two of the three suspects started to confess right at the hearing and the judge had to interrupt them, saying that he only was considering whether they needed to be detained for the duration of the investigation. The timing of these purported Islamic State actions in Russia, which took place in the North Caucasus and Moscow simultaneously, suits Russian interests: indeed, Moscow needs such “terrorist attacks” against the backdrop of its military intervention in the Syrian conflict on the side of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Russia needs to convince the world that Moscow is under threat and that it has to fight international terrorism alongside other countries. Such an attack would be the best way to prove that Russia is being targeted by the Islamic State because of Russian strikes against the IS in Syria. Moscow is trying to do everything in its power to force the West to stop ignoring it and consider it an equal partner in the anti-terrorism fight, as it was in 2001 after the September 11 attacks. --Mairbek Vatchagaev The Multi-Faceted Reality of Italian Foreign Fighters in Ukraine The clumsy attempt, in mid-September, of an Italian man to allegedly join pro-Russia separatist forces in Ukraine’s eastern region of Donbas, reignited the issue of Western “volunteers” fighting in this worn-torn country. The would-be Italian combatant for the self-styled separatist “people republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk was arrested by the Ukrainian Border Guard Service on September 19, and released a few days later (Ukraine Today, September 20; Il Mattino, September 25). Italian fighters in Ukraine fill the ranks of both warring parties: military units loyal to the government in Kyiv and Moscow’s proxy armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk. In the absence of official numbers, journalistic investigations speak of perhaps half a dozen Italian nationals fighting on either side of the conflict (Corriere.it, February 12; Corriere della Sera-Sette, February 20). These are relatively low figures that, nonetheless, outnumber those of Italian fighters engaged in the Syrian war, which is perceived as a more dangerous threat to Italy than the Ukrainian conflict. Italy’s Ministry of Home





Affairs stated in September that there were ten Italian foreign fighters in Syria: five with single Italian citizenship and five holding dual nationality (TgCom 24, September 11; Interno.it, September 11). Italian foreign combatants fighting for the rebel movement in eastern Ukraine are all male individuals of different ages, often unemployed and in some cases with pending convictions at home. Some have military experience, while others lack of any formal armed training. Their core narrative is that they are helping a popular resistance against the “fascist” and “repressive” government in Kyiv, to supposedly stop it from perpetrating a “genocide” by indiscriminately shelling towns and villages in Donbas. Foreign fighters from Italy are most often members of ultra-leftist political groups (Il Fatto Quotidiano, June 11, 2014). But exceptions also exist: One Italian citizen who took up arms in eastern Ukraine turned out to be a supporter of Lega Nord (Northern League), an Italian political party that advocates the secession of northern Italy from the rest of the country, while another is a neo-fascist sympathizer. These individuals, despite their different backgrounds, fight together in the Moscow-supported rebel militias because they share a common loathing for the United States and its “imperialist” policy in Europe. In large part, they admire Russian President Vladimir Putin and praise Alexander Dugin, a Russian ultra-nationalist philosopher who promotes “Eurasianist” theories about the role of Russia as a bulwark against Washington’s domination of the globe. Like aspirant fighters from other countries, Italian nationals are encouraged by rebel recruiters to undertake “non-linear” travel to Donbas, so as to deceive the authorities of their own country and those in Kyiv. They usually reach the frontline through Russia, first arriving in Rostov with a tourist visa and then heading across the border to Luhansk and Donetsk by bus. Prospective foreign militiamen for the pro-Russia side are discouraged from traveling to Donbass through territory controlled by the Ukrainian government. Indeed, as the case of the Italian citizen blocked in Ukraine demonstrates, it is difficult and dangerous to try to reach eastern Ukraine from the west (Sputnik News, March 10). In the words of some Italian volunteers in Donetsk and Luhansk, recruitment is quite simple. Joining the rebel forces involves contact, via online social networks, with “solidarity committees” based outside of Ukraine. Once in Donbas, recruits are given a week of paramilitary training. Some Italian foreign fighters told Italian media outlets that, in summer 2014, they had been trained at a military camp near Luhansk under the supervision of Colonel Igor Girkin (a.k.a. Strelkov), the former commander of separatist forces in Ukraine’s east (La Stampa, September 15, 2014). In this training facility, they were given a uniform and then trained to use AK-47 machineguns and hand grenades. They also underwent psychological training to face the hardship of trench warfare (Il Giornale, April 4). For the most part, pro-Kremlin volunteers from Italy fight in the Vostok Battalion, one of the largest Russia-backed separatist militias in Ukraine; they do not receive a salary, only room and board. Some foreign combatants, including at least one Italian man, do not fight on the front line, but help with communication and propaganda as well as humanitarian assistance to local civilian populations (Il Giornale, September 22). Italians in the opposite camp of the conflict live in similar conditions. They fight in the Azov Battalion, an armed militia accused of Nazi sympathies, which is part of the





Ukrainian National Guard and under the control of Kyiv’s Ministry of Interior. They largely operate around the strategic Black Sea port city of Mariupol, one of the hottest fronts of the war (Vice Italia, June 12, 2014). These pro-Kyiv Italian fighters are driven by nationalistic or anti-Communist sentiments and can have links to Pravy Sektor (the Right Sector), the radical ultra-nationalist group that gained notoriety in Ukraine following the ousting of Viktor Yanukovych. Mostly, these fighter declare themselves Italian nationalists with a past in ultra-right-leaning political formations. They also share a common aversion to the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union; some also openly criticize the Ukrainian government. On this side of the conflict, the Internet is again the main means of recruitment. An important role is played by Italian and Ukrainian facilitators linked to the “Italia-Ucraina Maidan” association, which supports the Ukrainian government through fund-raising initiatives, online propaganda and the shipping of medicines and clothes to Ukrainian soldiers. Other Italian fighters reached Ukraine via the recruiting network managed by Gaston Besson, a well-known French mercenary who fought in Croatia and Bosnia in the 1990s. All foreign volunteers who join pro-Kyiv militias and armed formations like the Azov Battalion have to undertake a period of training in the Ukrainian capital city and receive a salary of $200 a month (Il Giornale, July 2, 2014). Italy is trying to halt the flow of nationals who go abroad to fight. An anti-terrorism law approved by the Italian government in February contains measures to deter Italian citizens from joining foreign armed groups. It also allows the authorities to clamp down on recruiters and financial backers as well as on websites that support their activities. Punishments range from three to ten years in prison, depending on the violation. Yet, the enforcement of these measures could face serious problems of interpretation. A major issue is that Italian citizens fighting in the Azov Battalion do so under the legal cover provided by the Ukrainian government—which does not apply to foreign volunteers on the separatist side. Another problem is the potential emergence of “ghost fighters.” The second Minsk ceasefire deal, signed in February 2015, mandates the withdrawal of all foreign armed formations and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory (UNIAN, February 12). Ultimately, Minsk Two may prompt some foreign fighters, including Italian nationals, to hide their identity and presence in Ukraine—thus further complicating current efforts to tackle the phenomenon of European going to fight in Ukraine. --Emanuele Scimia




Documents

Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 17-56-The Deep Battle against the West