Alexander Bligh

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The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participant in the Political System of the KingdomAuthor(s): Alexander BlighSource: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp. 37-50Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/163308

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 17 (1985), 37-50 Printed in the United States of America

Alexander Bligh

THE SAUDI RELIGIOUS ELITE (ULAMA) ASPARTICIPANT IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEMOF THE KINGDOM

THE COMPOSITION OF THE ULAMAThe Ulema are the power that holds the Sultan and his people together-the medium ofcontrol. But they seldom meddle in politics.'

This premise was expressed by Ameen Rihani, an Arab traveller, in 1928,before either Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz became king or Najd and its dependenciesbecame the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.Was Rihani correct in his conclusion? Is he right today? This article willendeavor to explore the term ulama in the Saudi context in the twentieth cen-tury. Later, an attempt will be made to discuss the participation of Saudi ulamain a number of key cases in the history of Saudi Arabia.The house of Saud along with the house of Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab,the founder of the Unitarian movement, were parties to a unique coalition inthe eighteenth century. The coalition embraced the Unitarian movement, orWahhabiyah, founded in the mid-eighteenth century, and members of the Arabnoble house of Saud of Najd. (The disciples of Muhammad b. CAbdal-Wahhab,usually referred to as Wahhabis in Western writings, prefer to be called Unitar-ians owing to their emphasis on the oneness of God.) Thus, if any kind of specialSaudi nationalism exists, it has two pillars: the tribal-aggressive house of Saudand the religious-zealous house of al-Shaykh Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab(in short: al-Shaykh family, Al al-Shaykh). While the house of Saud providesthe kingdom with its strength and maintains continuity, the al-Shaykh familyhas the religious-moral authority legitimizing the government.This successful partnership, with the military-tribal element which has existedfor about two centuries, was the main source of the strength of the religiousleaders who belong mostly to the al-Shaykh family. In addition, the close rela-tionship between the two noble houses has, over many generations, producedmany hundreds of marriages.While the process of sanctioning the deeds of the house of Saud has beengoing on since the eighteenth century, the ulama has undergone sociologicalchange. First and foremost there has been a gradual decline in the number of Ibn'Abd al-Wahhab's descendants serving in high religious positions.? 1985 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/85/010037-44 $2.50


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38 Alexander BlighPrior to the creation of a formal body of ulama in 1971, one of the ways todetermine an alim was by definition: one of ten to fifteen Najdi and Hijazi

religious judges unofficially headed by the Grand Mufti in Riyadh. In a broadersense the term refers to the scores of religious office-holders in the various reli-gious courts. For the purpose of this paper, only the top fifteen ulama will beexamined. They are divided into two main groups: the high position-holders anda separate group of about ten ulama residing in Riyadh who assist the Saudikings.Another method used to determine the size of the ulama is to examine familystructure. The impression given by the semi-official biographies of Saudi ulamain the twentieth century is that most of them were of al-Shaykh family origin inthe first decade of the kingdom. But the family did not have an uninterruptedflow of young descendants. Unlike leading figures of the house of Saud, membersof the religious family generally did not have more than one wife, or at the mosthad two. Hence the number of sons was considerably less than that in the houseof Saud. Furthermore, a whole branch of the family was exiled to Egypt duringMuhammad 'Ali's campaign in the Arabian peninsula in the late 1810s. Descen-dants of this branch never returned to Saudi Arabia and many of them still livein Egypt.These two factors, the low number of marriages and the expulsion, contrib-uted to a gradual decline in the number of living descendants of Muhammadb. CAbdal-Wahhab. Recently a third reason has compounded the problem: theexistence of Al al-Shaykh members who have not wished to become ulama.Some, like General CAbd Allah b. CAbd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh, chose amilitary career;2others chose a political career, as did 'Abd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh, who became an extreme Nasserite politician3in the early 1960s.These defections from the rank and file of Ibn CAbdal-Wahhab's descendantsmight indicate that throughout the existence of Saudi Arabia no Al al-Shaykhmember could automatically be considered as a potential alim. Other evidencesupports this assumption. The British Foreign Office "Personalities in SaudiArabia" of July 1, 19394 lists the "most notable of the descendants of the founderof Wahhabism": 'Abd Allah b. Hasan-alim in Mecca; Muhammad b. 'Abdal-'Aziz, Saudi administrator, and from 1932 assistant to the heir designate,Saud b. 'Abd al-'Aziz. The report then notes the existence of another branch ofthe family ('Abd al-Latif) without specifying its exact role in the religiousestablishment.In addition to these two ulama, the report mentions5 a third--Abd Allahb. Blayhid. Although not of Al al-Shaykh origin, he served as qadi of Meccaafter it was captured by 'Abd al-'Aziz, and in January 1926became chief qadi ofthe Hijaz. In 1928 he resigned his post and returned to Hail, his original resi-dence in Najd.This short biography along with the few details concerning the two Al al-Shaykh members might indicate that as early as the 1930s and the beginning ofthe 1940s, the high religious posts were no longer the sole domain of Ibn CAbdal-Wahhab's descendants.The trend of numerical decline further deepened in the 1940s. Owing to theshrinking number of new Al al-Shaykh offspring, the number of intermarriages


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The Saudi Religious Elite as Political Participant 39with the house of Saud declined dramatically. A careful study of the Saudigenealogical tree will reveal that almost no intermarriagesbetween young Saudiprinces of the reigning branch and girls of Al al-Shaykh origin have taken placesince the 1940s. Thus the descendants of Al al-Shaykh have been losing groundon two levels: their representation in top religious positions has been decliningand their personal access to the house of Saud has been reduced.Their declining number within the top ulama is further demonstrated in twolists of Saudi ulama from 1957 and 1962.6 Aside from some minor personnelchanges between the two dates the structure has remained intact: out of twelveleading ulama only three were of the Al al-Shaykh. But they held the three mostimportant positions: Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, his deputy, and the Head ofthe Committees for Public Morality in Saudi Arabia.

This low representation of the al-Shaykh family was also apparent in March1964: Twelve ulama signed a fatwa (judicial religious opinion) transferringpowers from King Saud b. CAbdal-'Aziz to his brother and heir designate,Faysal b. CAbdal-'Aziz.7 Only three out of the twelve were of Al al-Shaykhorigin, again in the same positions. The death of the Grand Mufti, Muhammadb. Ibrahim b. 'Abd al-Latif Al al-Shaykh, in late 19698 further reduced therepresentation of Al al-Shaykh members. It also prompted institutional changeswithin the ulama. In late 1971, King Faysal announced the creation of the"Council of Senior Ulama."9 For the first time a permanent forum was broughtinto being to serve the King in his future need for religious authorization andapproval.In a sense, the council marked the end of the Al al-Shaykh era in Saudihistory. It comprised seventeen members, only one of whom was a descendant ofMuhammad b. CAbdal-Wahhab (Ibrahimb. Muhammad, to be appointed JusticeMinister in October 1975).The gradual disappearance of Al al-Shaykh members from religious careersdoes not mean a total absence of the family in Saudi politics. Owing to thefamily's traditional support of the house of Saud, members of the family havebeen appointed by Kings Faysal and Khalid to ministerial positions. Three Alal-Shaykh members, for instance, are serving in the present government (mid-1981): 'Abd al-Rahman b. 'Abd al-'Aziz Al al-Shaykh, Minister for Agricultureand Water,born 1944,a Ph.D.; Hasan b. 'Abd Allah b. Hasan Al al-Shaykh, Min-ister of Higher Education, born 1933, son of a former chief qadi of Saudi Arabia,of very strong religious educational background; and Ibrahim b. Muhammadb. Ibraham Al al-Shaykh, Justice Minister, and formerly a leading alim.It seems that the two latter appointees were nominated by King Khalid inorder to give some representation to the ulama and at the same time compensatethe Al al-Shaykh for the decline in their power. However, the first-mentionedminister is a young Saudi technocrat whose only connection to the ulama is hisfamily origin.

This survey of the al-Shaykh family leads to the conclusion that it no longerenjoys a significant impact on the shaping of policies by Saudi ulama. Membersof the family are now spread throughout the Saudi military and civil services,but pretty much on the merit of their own qualifications. Thus it seems that theAl al-Shaykh pillar of the ancient Saudi coalition is gradually disintegrating.


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40 A lexander BlighTHE ULAMA AS CONSULTANTS TO THE HOUSE OF SAUD

The diminution of the al-Shaykh family does not necessarily mean the disap-pearance of the Saudi ulama class. It should be borne in mind that Saudi Arabiais a theocratic unitarianstate. Its national ideology is based on the strictest schoolof Sunni Islam, the puritan Hanbali school. The ulama, being the highest reli-gious authorities, are at least theoretically in charge of interpreting Islam andthus supposedly are the dominant power in Saudi politics. However, the King isthe current head of the Unitarian movement and has much more political powerthan the ulama. Even the high standing of the Saudi ulama in the Muslim worldbecause of their responsibility for the Muslim holy places in the Hijaz does notgive them power equal to that of the Saudi kings.Furthermore, not sharing political responsibilities with the King, the ulamahave been free to choose the most extreme positions open to them because theyare not responsible for implementing their ideas. This trend has been demon-strated many times during the twentieth century. For example, in line with theiropposition to every innovation considered by the ulama to be unlawful (bid'ah),they voiced strong disapproval of telegraph and radio in the 1930s.'0'Abd Allahb. Hasan Al al-Shaykh, one of the leading ulama, did not hesitate to argue withFaysal b. 'Abd al-'Aziz, Viceroy of the Hijaz, over the use of radio." In fact, thisalim had so many grievances against the religious conduct of 'Abd al-'Aziz andhis sons that he considered joining an opposition campaign against the King.The question of radio was later resolved by a compromise: Radio would be usedonly for news and recitation of the Quran.A similar incident, not of major importance but significant enough to manifestthe difficulties of the ulama in adjusting to innovations, occurred in late 1939 inconnection with efforts to build a new modern Saudi army. The new chief-of-staff, Muhammad Tariq al-Ifriqi, who had been hired by King 'Abd al-'Aziz,decided to use bugles in military parade and to dress his soldiers in tight uniformpants.2 These two decisions outraged the ulama because, in their opinion, theywere contradictory to the spirit of Islam. But finally they were overruled by theKing.Another encounter, in late 1942, was much more in the nature of a politicalconfrontation. A British report'3 praising 'Abd al-'Aziz for his pro-Allied lean-ings during World War II says:His ['Abd al-'Aziz] religious advisers, the Ulema of Najd, criticised him for his distressover General Rommel's advance into Egypt, saying, that he, a Moslem, was endangeringhis health and reducing himself to a mental state, which was causing him to neglect hisduty, over a quarrel between unbelievers.'Abd al-'Aziz did not change his policy of cautious support of the Allies as aresult of this criticism. Instead he explained to the ulama what, in his opinion,their political misconceptions were.Thus the whole episode vanished without any impact on Saudi politics. But itdemonstrates that though the Saudi ulama were free to voice their political opin-ions, as long as these did not agree with the King's they had no chance of being


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The Saudi Religious Elite as Political Participant 41materialized. Moreover, the Unitarian ulama, despite their isolation from main-stream Sunni Islam, shared the pro-Axis tendencies of Muslim leaders. In thiscontext, Rashid 'Ali al-Kaylani of Iraq, the Mufti of Palestine, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and prominent Saudi ulama shared the same belief, that only the Axiscould guarantee the future of Islam. However, it should be emphasized that theonly source for the 'Abd al-CAzizepisode are the British documents. A definiteconclusion has to be drawn that the ulama did not share any positive feelingstowards the Allies. Whetherthey were pro-German or not is left open.With the end of World War II and the gradual decline in the health of KingCAbdal-'Aziz, the ulama had fewer opportunities to comment on the moderniza-tion process that Saudi Arabia was undergoing. The attention of Saudi politi-cians, ulama included, shifted to the succession rivalries. King 'Abd al-'Aziz diedin 1953 and was succeeded by his son, the heir designate Saud. Not long afterthe change, Faysal, with the help of loyal princes, began to move against Saud.The ulama played a part in this feud, as will be discussed. But until Faysal tookover in 1964, the ulama did not voice any opinion concerning the course ofSaudi policies. They were much more interested in the preservation of the Saudisystem in the face of Saud's incompetence and Egyptian President Nasser's sub-version. Thus they were a party to efforts by leading Saudis to cover up disputesand to maintain a united front against the political threats.This chapter came to an end with the accession of Faysal. In November 1964he came to power and began to implement his modern ideas, most of them theresult of experience accumulated outside the Middle East.Despite the fact that King Faysal's maternal grandfather was an alim, he wasnot liked by the ulama. They disliked the (irreligious) way of life he had shownin the 1930s, and the modernization he wanted to introduce to Saudi Arabia inthe 1960s. In the early 1960s when he had full executive powers under KingSaud, a confrontation between Faysal and the ulama developed over the installa-tion of a television broadcast system in the kingdom. This subject was not new tothe ulama. They had blocked discussion of it for many years,l5just as they hadopposed the introduction of radio in the 1930s. The results were identical in bothcases. Despite the ulama's argument that it is immoral to produce an image ofthe human body, Faysal (then heir designate) issued a decree in 1963authorizingthe construction of television stations in Jedda and the Hijaz, and in Riyadh, thecapital.16The decree was issued without consulting the Saudi ulama, which promptedangry but futile reactions. For the first time the ulama took to the streets ofRiyadh. In September 1965 demonstrators in Riyadh tried to storm the televi-sion station. In what was later described by Arab newspapers as an "abortiveIslamic coup d'etat,"'7the police and internal security forces fired on the demon-strators. Some of them were killed, among them Khalid b. Musacid b. 'Abd al-CAziz,a nephew of King Faysal, who vigorously sided with the religious zealotsin their fight against television. It might be of interest to note that the assassin ofKing Faysal, Faysal b. Musa'id b. 'Abd al-'Aziz, was a full brother of the princekilled in 1965. Reports from Riyadh'8 said that the assassin was a "religiousfanatic" who wanted to avenge the killing of his brother. The assassination did


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42 Alexander Blighnot dissuade Saudi Arabia from initiating regular television broadcasts in 1967-196819during Faysal's reign.

In the television incident as in the preceding three cases, the Saudi kings over-ruled the Unitarian ulama. These episodes may serve to illustrate the traditionalopposition of the ulama to modernization in the kingdom. Besides the questionof harming religious values, the various innovations could contribute to the crea-tion of a new class of leaders, not of religious origin, and thus give rise to adirect threat to the ulama.RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THE KINGDOM

At the level of consulting the kings on religious issues the ulama have presentedconservative views and have been overruled. But have they had any channels foraffecting daily life in the kingdom? In other words, what state institutions arerun by the ulama?Two official channels are usually used by the ulama: the weekly meetings withthe King,20and a very complicated mechanism of adjudication, exclusive educa-tional institutions, and control of private police. The unofficial channel, which israrely discussed in the literature because of lack of material, is the daily en-counters of a declining number of religious leaders with their relatives within theroyal family. It may be hard to prove, but the tribal manner of personal politicsand family decisions may well suggest that this is the real level of political coop-eration between the princes and the ulama. However, little is known about theweekly meetings with the King, either. It seems as though they are formal ses-sions which are used to discuss the commonly known and agreed upon aspects ofproblems which arise in the kingdom.Formally, daily life in Saudi Arabia is handled by the courts and the educa-tional system. Since the establishment of the kingdom in 1926, both of theseinstitutions have been highly influenced by the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia.21Although not following the traditional adjudication procedure, the Unitariancourts have a clear hierarchy. There are regional courts located in almost everytown and governorship; their decisions may be appealed to two higher religiouscourts (al-Mahkamah al-Shar'iyah al-Kubra), either in Mecca or in Medina.These courts are administered by the Chief Qadi in Mecca (Ra'is al-Qudat). Thehead of this pyramid is the Grand Mufti who resides in Riyadh.22This judicialsystem suggests that the Grand Mufti is the senior alim in Saudi Arabia, thatsecond in importance is the chief qadi in Mecca, and then follow all the remain-ing judges and religious personalities.The education system, although not organized hierarchically, still has as itsmain purpose the spread of religious studies. Most of the prominent positions,including the ministerial positions (since 1960), are traditionally held by al-Shaykh family members.If these two systems are intended to run the kingdom along religious lines, thethird arm of the religious leaders is supposed to enforce this way of life. TheMutawi'ah, the religious police, arrest people behaving in contradiction toIslamic religious law.23They act upon a broad definition of their responsibilities


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The Saudi Religious Elite as Political Participant 43and may, therefore, find religious aspects in most of the crimes committed inSaudi Arabia. The Mutawi'ah has been described as "the most reactionary ofthe religious governmental bodies in Saudi Arabia."24A survey of the tools of the religious leadership gives the false impression thatit is the most organized and one of the most powerful political bodies in SaudiArabia. The Saudi decision-making process is concentrated in two concentriccircles: the senior princes (King, heir designate, second deputy to the prime min-ister and sometimes the defense minister), and the Saudi cabinet. The ulama arenot represented in the former, but their participation in the cabinet, a new crea-tion, should be closely examined. The first government was established in 1953.25In every council of ministers since 1960 members of the ulama have been present,and most prominent among them members of Al al-Shaykh.During these years, none of the important portfolios dealing with guidingnational policies has ever been manned by an alim. No alim has ever served asprime minister, or as minister for foreign affairs, national economy, defense andaviation, health, interior, communications, petroleum, etc. Saudi ulama have atdifferent times occupied the following positions: ministers of education, of highereducation, and of justice. In other words, ulama within the government con-tinued their line of activity, but with reduced independence because they weresubject to the prime minister.The appointment of the first Saudi minister of justice is typical in this context.Shaykh Muhammad Al Harkan was appointed to the post on September 23,1970, by a royal decree of King Faysal,26this being in fulfillment of a promisemade by Faysal27in November 1962 to create that portfolio. In a sense, Harkanwas replacing the Grand Mufti who had died in 1969. Faysal did not appoint asuccessor; instead, in 1970 he carried out his plan to create a new ministry ofjustice. It might be said that the responsibility for definitive interpretation of theSharicah (Muslim law), which had been the prerogative of the Grand Mufti, wasthen being transferred outside the religious system. This responsibility became apart of the new justice ministry reporting to a higher authority. The GrandMufti, on the other hand, did not have to report to anyone, and his decisionswere final. In this respect the establishment of the justice ministry was anotherblow to the political strength of an independent religious authority.The subjugation of the higher religious authority to the prime minister and thefact that every government since 1960 has included two ulama have yet anothermeaning. Not only were ulama in charge of justice and education, but since the1960s these were the two important fields undergoing major change. It may sug-gest that in return for permission to run their own systems, the ulama had toaccept the policies set by King Faysal and later on by King Khalid. King Faysal,in a number of press interviews,28mentioned the ulama's support for his moder-nization plans. Probably this approval could not have come had it not been theprice for the survival of the ulama as participantsin the Saudi political scene.This apparent deal seems to have benefited the al-Shaykh family most of all.With their number diminishing among the rank and file of the ulama, the familyapparently retained some of their past influence over their fellow ulama throughthe two ministerial positions which they hold in the present government, justice


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44 Alexander Blighand higher education. Yet, even these two last strongholds are not secure in theirhands. The justice ministry was held from September 23, 1970 until October 13,1975 by a non-al-Shaykh alim (Muhammad 'Ali Harkan), which may indicatethat the present al-Shaykh justice minister could again be replaced by an alimoutside the family. As for the education portfolio, this position has been down-graded as well. Since October 13, 1975, the family, through Hasan b. CAbdAllahal-Shaykh, has been in charge of higher education only. Since most of the stu-dents in a developing country such as Saudi Arabia are under the supervision ofthe education ministry rather than the ministry of higher education, this all addsup to less influence for the ulama and the al-Shaykh family over the basic train-ing of young Saudis.All in all, the Saudi governments of the 1960s and 1970s representa decline inthe political force of the ulama class. It seems that the price for their politicalsurvival was the concession that their highest leaders would become ministers,and hence lose their independence in Saudi politics. But did they really havemuch to lose?As we have seen, their opinions on major developments in the kingdom havebeen rejected. But had they ever actively participated in the Saudi politicalmechanism, and if so, what were the results? Was their participation in line withthe interests of the house of Saud, or did they advocate particular religiousinterests?

DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF ULAMA IN THE SAUDI POLITICAL PROCESS

The beginning of the twentieth century found the house of Saud in exile inKuwait. CAbdal-Rahman b. Faysal, defeated by the house of Rashid in 1891,was the head of the family. By virtue of this position he was the Imam, thecurrent head of the old coalition between religion and state, between Al al-Shaykh and Al al-Saud. In spite of his title he was in a sense a shepherd withouthis flock, a political and religious ruler without a realm. Not only did he lack akingdom, but the religious-political coalition with the Unitarian ulama had beenshaken.A name to be remembered in this context is that of 'Abd Allah b. CAbdal-Latif (born ca. 1849), a grandson of Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab.29 Thisalim pursued a religious course of studies. Around 1887, when 'Abd al-CAziz,the son of 'Abd al-Rahman (the future king of Arabia), reached the age of seven,'Abd Allah b. CAbd al-Latif was hired as a private instructor for the youngprince. This might indicate that CAbdAllah b. CAbd al-Latif enjoyed a goodreputation as a religious scholar and a confidant of the house of Saud. Addingthis to his family ties, he might be defined as a senior alim of his time. Yet theyear 1891, along with military and political defeats, brought about another sur-prise:the positions taken by 'Abd Allah b. CAbdal-Latif.30The official Saudi biographies of Unitarian ulama report that upon the cap-ture of Riyadh in 1891, the Rashidi Amir Muhammad b. CAbdAllah asked CAbdAllah b. CAbdal-Latif to move to Hail, the Rashidi capital. The alim did so and


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The Saudi Religious Elite as Political Participant 45agreed to serve the new Rashidi master of Najd. In 1892 he returned to Riyadh,still occupied by the Rashidis, and continued his religious activities until 1900. Inthat year, during the first attempt of the Saudis to capture Riyadh, the alimsided with the Rashidi defenders and helped in defending the town.The capture of Riyadh by CAbdal-'Aziz's forces in January 1902 caused achange of heart in 'Abd Allah b. 'Abd al-Latif. Immediately upon the capture ofthe town he gave the oath of allegiance (hay'ah) to the new ruler.'Abd al-'Aziz, as he did with other people, refrained from punishing his formertutor and by the well-known alim. On the contrary, 'Abd al-CAziz, then theHakim of Najd, asked the alim for his daughter's hand. The daughter, Tarfahal-Shaykh, later had one male offspring, Faysal (born 1906), the fourth son of'Abd al-'Aziz. Faysal, the common descendant of the houses of Saud and al-Shaykh, was brought up by his mother. At the time of her sudden death inc. 1912, Faysal left the royal court to continue his education with his maternalgrandfather, 'Abd Allah b. 'Abd al-Latif.These events of the years before the re-establishment of the Saudi kingdomhad special significance for the al-Shaykh-Saud coalition. A conclusion whichmight be drawn is that the main concern of 'Abd Allah b. 'Abd al-Latif as asenior member of the ulama class was the preservation of the Unitarian move-ment. His cooperation with the house of Rashid suggests that his assumptionwas that the destruction of the house of Saud, even temporarily, would not meanthe disappearance of the religious movement. Hence the collaboration with theenemies of the house of Saud essentially meant that the religious elements of thecoalition would carry on their ideas. This attitude of the senior Saudi alim onceagain indicates that he was primarily concerned with his religious beliefs; theycame even before loyalty to the house of Saud.These relations in the beginning of the Third Saudi state, along with the sup-pression of the Ikhwan movement (1928-30), which had religious overtones, cutinto the political importance of the ulama. As has already been indicated, therehas never been a confrontation between the ulama and the house of Saud inwhich the former won.Such confrontations were avoided by King 'Abd al-'Aziz, who tried to main-tain the facade of the old coalition despite the ulama's political decline. Thisfacade, it seems, was intended primarily to imply full cooperation among themajor forces loyal to the Saudi regime. The ulama probably recognized theirfragile position and, even when they had grievances, tried to keep in pace withthe King.This attitude can be found in some events of the mid-1930s, which involvedKing 'Abd al-'Aziz, his heir designate Saud b. 'Abd al-'Aziz, and a brother ofthe King named Muhammad.Saud was appointed to his position in May 1933. Muhammad, an old compan-ion since the capture of Riyadh in 1902, felt insulted. He had long been pressingfor some role in 'Abd al-'Aziz's administration, without success. In 1935, afteryears of disappointment and waiting, he tried to build a political pressure group.Being married to a daughter of a tribal chieftain, Muhammad had some tribalbacking for his grievances, but he lacked a still more important element; that is,


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46 Alexander Blighclose ties with the al-Shaykh family. Thus in January 1935 he left Riyadh forMecca to marrya daughter of the chief qadi in Mecca, CAbdAllah b. Hasan.

With this political act, Muhammad's family embraced not only the two pillarsof Saudi society-the house of Saud and the religious leadership-but the tribalgroup as well. Apparently, Muhammad was second only to CAbdal-'Aziz inseniority within the family and thus had a legitimate claim to join CAbdal-'Aziz'sadministration. However, stubborn in his resistance, 'Abd al-'Aziz began tocrack the newly forged family coalition at its weakest link, the one with the leastpolitical importance: the alim. The King tried to reconcile CAbdAllah by yield-ing to some of his demands for personal promotion. In August 1935 the Kinggranted 'Abd Allah full powers as chief qadi in Mecca and assigned him chargeof the Committee of Virtue,3' a sort of religious police in charge of ensuringobedience to religious ways of life. This step was taken despite the opposition ofthe King's son, Faysal. Furthermore, CAbdAllah b. Hasan was successful in get-ting the King's permission to disallow the use of radio, except for the purpose ofhearing daily news and recitation of the Quran.Thus 'Abd al-CAziz countered the possibility of Muhammad's gaining powerwith concessions and conciliation, not removal from office. This approach, whilesecuring the loyalty of the alim, also ensured continuous denial of Muhammad'swishes.The change of heart on the part of 'Abd Allah b. Hasan might again be attrib-uted to his wish to secure the survival of the Unitarian movement and the posi-tion of its ulama. Had he sided longer with Muhammad, it could have cast ashadow on the old coalition with the Saudi rulers, whereas siding with the King,then at the height of his success, might have brought benefits to the ulama.Two lines of approach can be identified: first, for the second time in a politicalconflict, a leading alim sided with the winner, letting himself be pursued by aleading politician. Second, the ulama's survival instinct for the Unitarian move-ment is so strong that this might be defined as their strongest motivation.These features reappearedin a later crisis, the question of how to remove KingSaud gently from office. The King came to power upon the death of his father,CAbdal-CAziz,in November 1953. Not long after his accession, he was found tobe an incompetent and extravagant person. In 1958 his policies drove SaudiArabia to the brink of bankruptcy.33Faysal, his half-brother, came to the rescueand balanced the growing financial deficit. Saud's continued insistence on direct-ing Saudi policies led to two crises, in 1960 and 1962. In neither did the ulamaplay any role.The last crisis, that of March-November 1964, witnessed some participationof the ulama. The crisis began with some Islamic overtones. Saud's sons distrib-uted a message in March 16, 1964, asking Faysal to returnfull responsibilities totheir father.34They described King Saud as the Imam of the Muslims, but theirappeal did not motivate Faysal to give up the powers transferredto him by thefamily in March 1962. A reaction came from some senior members of the houseof Saud who convened a session of princes and ulama.35First, they decided todethrone Saud, but later they reversed their opinion in favor of leaving him in


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The Saudi Religious Elite as Political Participant 47office in return for fulfilling a few conditions. Saud refused to accept this pro-posal, and a final decision was made to reaffirm Faysal's responsibilities and totransferto him whatever authority Saud still enjoyed.The ulama did not play a major role in shaping the decision. They said thatthey would adhere to past resolutions regarding the rivalry.36In addition, theyadvised Saud to accept the conditions and stay in power,37again a policy ofmaintaining the status quo in order to avoid instability and risks to the state andthe religious movement.With their advice rejected, the ulama on March 25, 1964, issued a fatwadeclaring that Saud would become a figurehead while the effective ruler wouldbe Faysal.38Their decision was endorsed at a March 29 gathering of some sev-enty leading princes who supported the fatwa.39 The next day the government ofFaysal adopted the two decisions.40At first sight it seems that the ulama took the initiative here, but this was notthe case. The Saudi ulama never took sides in Saudi politics before the emer-gence of a clear winner. Their decision was apparently prompted by someagreement with the assembled princes that the ulama, for purposes of religiouslegitimacy, would first issue a fatwa and then the princes would publicly endorseit. The ulama also took part in the talks in October-November 1964 prior to thefinal dismissal of King Saud. Again, it seems that the princes did most of thedebating and made their decision, and only then did the ulama voice their opin-ions, unsurprisinglyidentical to those of the princes.41It should be noted that various Westernreports42 onveyed the impression thatduring this crisis the ulama played a role equal to that of the princes and thecabinet. This description, as has been demonstrated hitherto, is not accurate.With their diminishing influence and shrinking numbers, the ulama were nomore than a rubber stamp for the Saudi princes' decisions. A supporting obser-vation in this context is that when the question of succession came up again in1977, no ulama participation in the deliberations was even mentioned.43While the events described above were purely political, this was not the case inNovember 1979, when a group of armed men took control of the holy mosque inMecca. Desecrating the holiest site in Islam was obviously a religious matter. Butdid the Saudi ulama act individually or as a group?The ulama appeared indecisive throughout the crisis. Furthermore, the ulamaof 1979 worked under an increasing burden of dissatisfaction among religiouselements in Saudi Arabia, which in its turn might have contributed to theirparalysis.Reports from Saudi Arabia44prior to the attack indicated that secret groupsunder religious slogans, including segments of the army, were being formed inthe kingdom. Leaflets were distributed in Saudi Arabia calling on the royal fam-ily to returnto the true Unitarian way. It should be rememberedthat at the sametime the Ayat Allah Ruhollah Khomeini was at the peak of his success in Iran.All of this indicates that the Saudi ulama did not completely side with theSaudi government. Staying aloof from what was happening might have consti-tuted another major step in their gradual decline.


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48 Alexander BlighWhen the first news of the attack in Mecca reached Riyadh, the initial reactionof King Khalid was to consult the ulama, in order to get permission to usemilitary force to eject the attackers. The ulama hesitated and refrained from adefinite answer. Only after the assault had been underway for 36 hours did someulama allow the use of force.45The ulama did not voice approval or disapproval of the government's actionsduring the crisis. When everything was over, they gave a final signal of indeci-siveness, typical of their positions throughout the incident. On December 27,1979, the Supreme Council of Ulama issued a carefully worded announcementsaying that it had been asked whether a pilgrimage without performance of thetawf al-wada' (farewell circumambulation of the Ka'bah) was acceptable froma religious point of view. It seems that this question was on the minds of manypilgrims who were kept out of Mecca because of the attack.The ulama faced a dilemma. The pilgrimage had been performed for genera-tions with this tawaf and the ulama were incapable or unwilling to changeIslamic traditions. On the other hand, how could they void the pilgrimage andmanifest by that the failure of the Saudi government to keep Mecca a city ofpeace? These considerations led to the fatwa that the Muslims should "seek theadvice of those whom they trust in religious matters"46-in other words, no deci-sion. In terms of the political development of the ulama, the Mecca incidentmarked a new low point for the Saudi ulama and provided irrefutable proof oftheir political weakness.

CONCLUSIONThis examination of the political role of the ulama in twentieth-century SaudiArabia has revealed several developments. They represent the most dominantfeatures in the political behavior of the ulama.There is a continuing trend to keep the Unitarian movement alive. Thissurvival impulse has two aspects: abandoning the coalition with the house ofSaud when it no longer contributes to the well-being of the Wahhabiyah, andrefrainingfrom confrontations with the Saudi leaders on religious matters. In allthe cases examined above, the ulama yielded to the wishes of the Saudi kings orfamily.Descendants of Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the move-ment, are disappearing from the ulama ranks, implying a gradual decline in thesignificance of the Al al-Shaykh-Al al-Saud coalition, and less prestige amongSaudis for the ulama, because a commoner alim does not have a noble origin.The al-Shaykh family is now representedin the cabinet by two religious scholars,but this is more a sign of subjecting the family to the political system than ofrecognizing them as powerful Saudi leaders.This representation of the two Al al-Shaykh members in the council of minis-ters is only one indication of the abolition of the independence of the ulama.Another is the creation in 1970 of the ministry of justice instead of appointing anew Grand Mufti. All religious courts throughout the kingdom are now subjectto the political authority of the government through the justice ministry.


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The Saudi Religious Elite as Political Participant 49These changes in the status of the courts along with the sociological changesamong the ulama point to a gradual decline in ulama political power during the

twentieth century. Today their political power has literally evaporated.These tendencies spark two observations concerning the future of the Saudikingdom. First, there are no guarantees that when the political-religious coali-tion, Saud-al-Shaykh, is put to the test, the ulama will remain loyal. Their mainconcern is for the preservation of Islam, as they see it. They will probably col-laborate with whoever is in power and will be able to assure the well-being of theUnitarian movement and its ulama. Second, the decline in the political power ofthe ulama may suggest that they no longer represent religious elements in theSaudi population. This gap might produce a "revivalmovement" in Saudi Arabianot unlike similar such movements in other Middle Eastern nations.THE HEBREW UNIVERSITYJERUSALEM

NOTES

Author's note: This article was presented as a paper at the Middle East Studies Associationmeeting, Washington, D.C., November 6-9, 1980.'Ameen Rihani, Maker of Modern Arabia (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1928), p. 200.2al-Bildd, Saudi Arabia, November 10, 1970; al-Anwar, Lebanon, May 16, 1975; CUkdz,SaudiArabia, December 18, 1978;Saudi News Agency, July 9, 1979.3Muhammad Tawfiq Sadiq, Tatawwur al-hukm wa-il-idirah ft al-Mamlakah al-'ArabTyahal-Sucudlyah (Riyadh: Ma'had al-idarah al-cammah, 1965), p. 213. Sadiq says that CAbdal-RahmanAl al-Shaykh served as Minister of Agriculture from March 15, 1962 to October 31, 1962. See alsoal-Nahdr, Lebanon, January 1, 1963;al-Bilad, Saudi Arabia, June 16, 1967.4U.S. National Archives, RG 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, no. 44994; BritishForeign Office-Personalities in Saudi Arabia, July 1, 1939;revised 1943, p. 9.5Ibid.,p. 7.6Arabian American Oil Company, Directory of the Royal Family, Officials of the Government,Diplomats and Other Prominent Persons (Dhahran, Saudi Arabia). Second Edition 1957, pp. 48-53;Fourth Edition 1962, Chapter6.7al-Bildd, April 1, 1964.

8'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Abd al-LatTfAl al-Shaykh, Mashdhir culama' Najd wa-ghayruhum (Riyadh:Dar al-Yamamah, 1934:1974/75), p. 179.91bid.,p. 184.'OPublic Record Office, London, Foreign Office (PRO/FO) 905, Vol. 21: Secret-Minute sheet150/82 of August 26, 1935."Ibid.2PRO/FO 371, Vol. 24588, E482/482/25. Jedda Report, December 1939, para. 377.'3PRO/FO 371, Vol. 35167, E160/69/25. Jedda Report, December 13, 1942, para. 5.'4PRO/FO 905, Vol. 21. Unnumbered minute sheet, September 17, 1936.'5Douglas A. Boyd, "Saudi Arabian Television," Journal of Broadcasting, XV, I (Winter 1970-71),p. 73.'61bid.,p. 74.'7al-Difd, Jordan, September 23, 1965;al-Haydt, Lebanon, October 1, 1965.'8The Arizona Republic, Phoenix, March 26, 1975.'9Boyd, op. cit., pp. 74-5.


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50 Alexander Bligh20HermannF. Eilts, "Social Revolution in Saudi Arabia," pt. 1, Parameters Vol. 1, no. 1 (1971),p. 9; Umm al-Qura, Saudi Arabia, most of the issues, 1953-1964.21 His official title: al-Mufti al-akbar li-Mamlakah al-cArabiyahal-Su'Cudyahwa-al-marji' al-'ammli-'ulama' al-MuslimTn, Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Head of the ulama. ARAMCO, Directory, 1957,

p. 48.22ARAMCO, Directory, 1962, pp. 48-62. Cf. Gerald De Gaury, Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia(London: Barker, 1966). Appendix III. His charts pretend to describe the hierarchy as of 1966 butseem less accurate than those of ARAMCO.23Eilts,"Social Revolution."24U.S. National Archives/Department of State, Office of Intelligence Researchand Analysis. Intel-ligence Report, No. 7692: Background and Implications of the Conflict Within the Saudi RulingFamily (Washington, D.C., Division of Research and Analysis for Near East, South Asia, andAfrica, April 4, 1958).25CharlesW. Harrington, "The Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers," Middle East Journal, XII, 1

(Winter 1958), p. 1.26Daily Star, Lebanon, September 25, 1970.27MideastMirror, Lebanon, November 10, 1962.28Hindustan Times, India, January 18, 1965; Gazette de Lausanne, Switzerland, February22, 1965.29Muhammad Tariq al-Ifriq7, al-Dawlah al-Su'udTyah f. al-JazTrah al-'ArabTyah (Damascus:Matabi' al-Ahmar, 1944), p. 10;Al al-Shaykh, Mashihir, p. 134.30A1 l-Shaykh, Mashahir, pp. 130, 131.3'PRO/FO 905, Vol. 21. Minute sheet 150/83, "Extract from K.B.I.'s minute at 285/23 atAugust 25, 1935."32PRO/FO 905, Vol. 21. Secret minute sheet 150/82, August 26, 1935."Intelligence Report, No. 7692.34al-Havyt, Lebanon, March 22, 1964.35Ibid.,March 27, 28, 1964.36Ibid.,March 27, 1964.37Ibid.,March 29, 1964.38al-Bilad,Saudi Arabia, April 1, 1964.39al-Havat, April 1, 1964.40Ibid.41Cf.al-Jaridah, Lebanon, September9, 1964;al-Havat, October 31, 1964; Daily Telegraph, UnitedKingdom, November 17, 1964.42Scotsman, United Kingdom, November 12, 1964; Economist Foreign Report, United Kingdom,October 16, 1969.43Cf.Economist, United Kingdom, September 17, 1977.44EEconomistoreign Report, November 28, 1979.45Ibid.46SaudiGazette, Saudi Arabia, December 27, 1979.

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Alexander Bligh