All the Brains I can borrow

8/9/2019 All the Brains I can borrow

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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 4 1

Al l stat ements of fact, opi ni on, or a nal ysis expr essed i n t hi s arti cle ar e th ose of the

auth or. Nothi ng in the arti c le should be constru ed as assert in g or i mpl ying U S gov-

ern ment endorsement of an art ic le’s factual statements and in terpr etati ons.

Intelligence in Another Era

All the Brains I Can Borrow: Woodrow Wilson

and Intelligence Gathering in Mexico, 1913–15Mark E. Benbow

A mere t w o w eeks before Woo-

drow Wilson became president

of the U nited S ta tes, Mexico’s

Gen. Victoriano Huerta over-

th rew his count ry’s elected

president , Fr a ncisco Madero,

who would later be assa ssi-na ted. Wilson w as concerned

because he feared that foreign

policy issues might prove a dis-

tra ction from the domestic

reform measures he w an ted to

pass th rough Congress . In fa ct ,

dur ing th e period 1913–15,

Mexico was one of Wilson’s

ma in foreign policy concerns,

an d a f ter J une 1914 it w as sec-

ond only t o the wa r in E urope.1

Thr oughout th is period, Wil-

son struggled not only with

forming a policy t owa rd Mexico

but more fundament ally with

learning wha t w as ha ppening

in Mexico’s revolution. Wilson

did not believe he could trust

his usua lly primary source of

informat ion, th e Depart ment of

St a te. Instea d of relying on dip-

loma tic report ing, Wilson cob-

bled togeth er a n etw ork of

formal a nd informa l sources to

observe a nd r eport on event s.

In t he process, Wilson’s efforts

illustra te some of the difficul-

ties presidents fa ced wh en

ga th ering int elligence for poli-

cymaking before a more forma l

intelligence-ga th ering st ruc-

ture wa s esta blished with the

Coordinator of Information in

1941. 2

Confronted with the revolu-

tion in a neighboring count ry,Wilson h a d t o judge nu merous

parties in an ever-changing

poli t ica l and milita ry s i tua tion

a s each fa ction vied for support

inside Mexico a nd from t he

Un ited Sta tes . In th is paper , I

will examine th e types of intel-

ligence Wilson used t o evalua te

events in M exico, th eir limita -

tions an d their s trengths, and

how Wilson ident ified a nd dea lt1 The tit le is dra wn from Woodrow Wilson,“Remarks to the National P ress Club,”

20 March 1914 in Arthur Link, ed. , The

Papers of Woodrow W il son . (P rinceton,

NJ : P rinceton U niversity P ress, 1979)

29:363. Herea fter r eferred to a s P WW fol-

lowed by volume and page numbers. The

full quote reads, “ I not only use a ll the

brains I ha ve, but a ll I can borrow.”

2 The office was created by Franklin

Roosevelt in J uly 1941. Hea ded by Will-

iam J . Donovan, it wa s a civilian off ice

at ta ched to the White House. It wa s suc-

ceeded by the Office of St ra tegic Services

(OSS) in 1942.

“Wilson’s efforts to cobbletogether informationabout Mexico’s

revolution illustratesome of the difficultiespresidents faced whengathering intelligencebefore a more formalintelligence-gathering

structure was

”established.


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Woodrow Wilson’s Intelligence System

2Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 4

President Wilson considered any information coming from the embassy in Mexico City to be tainted.

with bias among his sources. I

w ill also examine h ow Wilson

evaluat ed the information from

his var ious informants . I n

short, how did Wilson, a s a con-

sumer of intelligence, deal w ith

th e issues norma lly present ed

to intelligence collectors and

analys ts?

Of the nu merous types of

intelligence, or “INTs,” a s t hey

a re recognized by th e Int elli-

gence Commun ity t oday, some,

such a s MASINT (Measur e-

ment And Signa tures Int ell i-

gence) rely on t echnology t ha t

did not exist in 1913 while oth-

ers, IMINT (Ima gery I nt elli-

gence) a nd S IG INT (Signa ls

In telligence) w ere of limit ed use

during the crisis in Mexico.

SIGINT was used for counterin-

telligence purposes durin g t hisperiod, a nd it would be useful

aga in lat er , in 1916 during P er-

shing’s int ervention to ca tch

P an cho Villa , but i t w as of l it-

tle value in supportin g th e

political an alysis Wilson needed

during 1913–15. The other

ma jor INTs, HU MINT (Hum a n

Intelligence) and OSINT (Open

Source Int elligence) both played

important roles in Wilson’s

informal int elligence network.B ut h ow useful were these

ty pes of sources, an d how reli-

a ble did they prove to be for

Wilson? 3

HU MINT w a s Wilson’s most

va lua ble source. Tra ditionally,

president s before Wilson

received t heir informa tion

about overseas events through

the St at e Depar tment. This

took the form of reports from

amba ssadors , ministers , an d

consuls. Consuls w ere often U S

citizens a lready living over-

seas, usua lly for business pur-

poses, ra ther tha n foreign

service professionals. Consuls

received stipends, official titles,

an d report ed on events in their

3 Today, I MINT commonly br ings to min d

satellite photography, but it a lso includes

ground photography, wh ich was w ell

within 1913 technological capabilities.

However, it wa s normally used by the

War D epartment for ta ct ical planning in

which Wilson did not engage.

regions a nd promoted US busi-

nesses in their a rea.

Ca bles sent by US diplomat s

in Mexico City a nd by consuls

around t he country were

received in t he Sta te Depart -

ment , then locat ed in the Exec-

utive Office Bu ilding next t o

the White House. In t he depart-

ment t hey w ould be ha nd-car-

ried to the geographical

divisions with in th e building

a nd t o th e Division of Informa -

tion, a predecessor of the cur-

rent B ureau of Intell igence and

Research. If judged t o be of suf-

ficient importa nce, a cable

could th en be forwa rded to th e

secretar y of s tat e or to a n

undersecreta ry, or even to th e

president.4

The ma ny conflicting pers pec-

tives flow ing int o Wash ingt on

from U S representat ives in

Mexico during the crisis only

clouded the president’s view ofevents there. The ambassador

an d the consuls al l ha d their

own interpreta tions of wh at

wa s ha ppening. Some praised

Huerta . Others lauded the revo-

lutionar ies , known as the “C on-

stitutionalists.” As a result,

P resident Wilson cam e to dis-

tru st much of th e diploma tic

reportin g from Mexico. But he

especia lly distrust ed the

reports of his amba ssador .

The U S a mbassa dor in Mex-

ico City, H enry L a ne Wilson,

was a conservative Republican

4 The United Sta tes mainta ined approxi-

mately 20 consulates in Mexico during this

period.

P resident Wilson (seat ed) wit h his pri-vat e secretar y, J oseph Tumulty , a keygat ekeeper in passing informa tion tothe president . (© Bett mann/CORB IS)


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and an appointee of Wilson’s

predecessor, William How a rd

Taft. Ambassador Wilsonstrongly advocated US recogni-

tion of th e Huerta government.

He a lso actively a ssis ted th e

plotters who overthrew Presi-

dent Ma dero in Februa ry 1913.

Wi l son ’ s “Con f i den t i a l

Men”

J us t three days a f ter Pres i-

dent Wilson wa s inaugura ted

on 4 Mar ch 1913, th e New York World published a front pa ge

story revealing Ambassador

Wilson’s role in H uert a ’s coup.

The World wa s the president’s

strongest supporter in t he press

and i t wa s the newspaper he

most t rust ed. The World 's

report reinforced the presi-

dent’s decision to delay recogni-

tion of Huert a ’s government ,

despite the a mbassa dor ’s s tr en-

uous lobbying. Also as a resultof the World’s report s, P resi-

dent Wilson considered any

informat ion coming from t he

U S emba ssy in Mexico to be

ta inted .5

Presented with conflicting

informa tion a nd distrust ful of

State reporting, Wilson looked

for more reliable sources. First

he tu rned t o a r eport er, Will-

iam B aya rd Ha le, who had been

5 In retrospect , the World’s reporting on

Ambassador Wilson’s activities was accu-

rat e, notwit hsta nding his denials . Com-

pare New York Wor ld , 7–9 March 1913

wit h Alan Knig ht’s discussion of events in

The M exican Revolut ion, Volum e I, Porf i r -

ian s, L iberal s and Peasants (Lincoln: U ni-

versity of Nebraska P ress, 1986), 484–90.

an Episcopalian priest . H a le

wr ote for th e progressive jour-

na l Worl d's Wor k and had w r i t -

ten Wilson’s campaign

biogra phy in 1912. Ha le would

become the first of several

reporters, or “confidentia l men,”

picked t o go to Mexico to get t he

“exact fa cts.” The president

asked Ha le to “tour” the Lat in

American states—even though

he spoke no Spa nish—“ostensi-

bly on your ow n hook” and

report “just w ha t is going on

down there.”6

Ha le reached Mexico City on

24 Ma y, a ccompanied by

rumors tha t he wa s there to

investigate the New York

World’s reports. H a le denied

the rumors and claimed tha t he

wa s only th ere to research a

series of ma ga zine ar ticles.

P resident Wilson a lso issued a

s ta t ement denying tha t H ale

wa s investigat ing Ambassa dor

Wilson’s role in the coup. The

type of information Hale

reported t o the president indi-

6 Woodrow Wilson to William Bayard

Ha le, 19 April 1913, P WW 27:335. Un be-

knownst t o Wilson, H ale w as employed by

the J apa nese government in a n effort to

influence American press coverage ofJ apan . (J essie Lyon, “Diplomatic Rela-

t ions Betw een the United S ta tes , Mexico,

and J apa n: 1913–1917,” [Ph.D. disserta-

tion, Cla remont College, 1975], 6–7, 19.)

This relat ionship did not appear t o have

affected Ha le’s reporting on Mexico, how-

ever. See Lar ry H ill , Em issari es to a Revo-

lu tion: Woodrow Wi lson’s Executi ve

Agents i n M exico. (Baton Rouge: Louisi-

ana Sta te U niversity P ress, 1973), 25–26.

cated t ha t he probably did seek

informa tion a bout Ambassa dor

Wilson’s role in the February

1913 coup, but the president

a lso sought informa tion on

Huerta ’s legit imacy.

Ha le sent his f irst r eport to

th e P resident Wilson on 18

J une 1913. His conclusions con-

firmed Wilson’s worst fears.

P resident Ma dero wa s over-th rown in a coup begun by

those opposed to his reforms.

The coup w ould ha ve fa iled if

G en. Huerta , Madero’s own

comma nder , had not betra yed

him. To make ma tt ers worse,

Huerta acted only because he

ha d the a ctive support of

Ambassador Wilson. Hale’s

report indicat ed tha t the offi-

cial US representa tive, in fact ,

Hale confirmed Woodrow Wilson’s worst fears…[the coup lead-er] acted only because he had the active support of US Ambas-sador Wilson.

The US a mba ssa dor to Mexico, HenryLane Wilson. (© CORB IS)


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The ambassador sought to undermine the Wilson administration’s policy by trying to create the specter of armed intervention.

ha d enga ged in a plot a gainst

an elected government a nd w as

directly responsible for the

coup’s success. As H a le wr ote,

Th ere was not a moment dur - in g [the coup] w hen i t w oul dnot ha ve been possibl e to endthe distr essing sit uati on [and]pu t a stop to th is un necessar ybloodshed by a ster n w arn in gfr om t he American embassy to

th e tr ait or ous army officer sthat the Uni ted States wouldcoun tenance no methods butpeacefu l constit ut i onal ones… . Pr esident M adero was notbetr ayed an d ar rested by h isofficer s un ti l i t h ad beenasser ted t hat th e Ameri canambassador had no objecti on.

Ha le concluded tha t “ thou-

sa nds of Mexicans believe tha t

the Ambassador acted on

instr uctions from Wash ingt ona nd looked upon h is retent ion

under t he new American P resi-

dent a s a m ark of approval ,

blaming the United Sta tes for

t he cha os int o wh ich [Mexico]

ha s fa l len.” 7

Ha le also revealed how the

am bassa dor sought t o under-

mine the Wilson administra-

tion’s policy by t rying to creat e

th e specter of ar med interven-tion by suggesting th at Wil-

7 A Report by William Ba yar d Ha le,

18 J un e 1913, P WW 27:536-552. Ha le’s

sources included American businessmen

in Mexico Cit y, members of the Mexican

government , a nd several members of the

US embassy sta ff . Not a ll of his sources

wer e identified. See H ill, 25–29.

son’s policies would inevitably

lead t o a w a r in Mexico. More-

over, H ale reported, Amba ssa-

dor Wilson was noisily

at ta cking P resident Wilson’s

administra tion ca lling i t “a

pack of vicious fools.” As for

Huerta , Ha le described him a s

“an a pe-like old man … said to

subsist on a lcohol” 8 a nd inter-

ested in h olding power only for

th e abuses th e position allowedhim t o inflict. 9

Suspecting w ha t t he reporter

wa s doing, Amba ssa dor Wilson

at ta cked Ha les’ report s in

embassy ca bles to Wa shingt on.

Fa lling back on th e tactic he

used aga inst Mad ero in his

messages to the Taft adminis-

tration, the ambassador

at ta cked his a dversary’s

[Ha le’s] sa nity : “His mindappea rs to me to be unevenly

balan ced.” Furt hermore, th e

amba ssador continued, w hile

“some” [like Ha le] w ere try ing

to describe Madero a s “a ma r-

tyr t o democra tic ideals,” th e

former Mexica n president ha d

actua lly been corrupt a nd

robbed his ow n government,

8 There is n o direct evidence of the rea c-

t ion William J ennings B rya n, Wilson’ssecretary of s ta te a nd a dedicated prohibi-

t ionist , might have ha d to this line. Ha le

may ha ve aimed his s ta t ement a t the sec-

retary, knowing it w ould influence his

view of Huerta .9 William Ba yar d Hale to Ben Da vis , 15

J uly 1913, PWW, Ser ies 2; cable from Wil-

liam B aya rd Ha le, 15 J uly 1913, PWW,

Series 2; Hale, “Memoran da on Affairs in

Mexico,” 9 J uly 1913, P WW 28:31.

emptying the country ’s t rea-

sury. The a mba ssa dor con-

cluded one of his messa ges byclaiming tha t “a l l of the true

a nd secret h istory of [Ma dero’s]

brief rule in Mexico and prior

th ereto is known t o no one but

to me.” 10

On t he basis of Ha le’s report s,

P resident Wilson reca lled

Amba ssa dor Wilson in m id-J uly

1913 to confer w ith him a nd

Secretary of Sta te B rya n. The

amba ssador arr ived in Wash-ington rea dy to persona lly lobby

the a dministrat ion t o extend

formal recognit ion t o Huerta ’s

regime. Wilson a nd B rya n lis-

tened for a n hour to the man

th e president once ca lled “th at

unspeaka ble person.” As he

spoke, Ambassador Wilson real-

ized tha t h is audience wa s only

giving him cursory attention,

a nd he resigned soon after t he

meeting. His resignation leftNelson O’Sha ughnessy a s t he

US representa tive in cha rge at

the embassy. However,

O’Sha ughnessy wa s a lso on

fr iendly terms with Hu erta ,

an d his reporting remained

ta inted in th e president’s esti-

ma tion, a lthough Wilson con-

sidered him “honest,” if

somewha t biased.11

10 Henr y L an e Wilson to Woodrow Wilson,

1 J uly 1913, WWP , Ser ies 2.11 Woodrow Wilson to Clevela nd H oadley

Dodg e, 21 J uly 1913, PWW 28:58; Wood-

row Wilson to E llen Axson Wilson, 25 J uly

1913, P WW 28:85; Hen ry L a ne Wilson,

Dipl omat ic Episodes in M exico and Ch i le

(New York: Doubleda y, P age & Co. 1927),

312–14; Wilson to B rya n, 3 J uly 1913,

P WW 28:22.


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The material Wilson received was a blend of analysis and rawdata. His representatives not only told him what they had learnedbut also included their judgments and recommendations.

Ha le remained in Mexico,

report ing first from Mexico Cit y

an d then from Consti tut iona l-is t t err itory in n orthern Mex-

ico, unt il J a nua ry 1914.

Ha le had been joined in

August 1913 by J ohn Lind, a

former governor of Minnesota

an d member of the U S H ouse of

Representatives. Like Hale,

Lind spoke no Spanish a nd car-

r ied s trong Pr otesta nt, an ti-

Ca th olic prejudices into t he

overwh elmingly Ca th olic Mex-ico. Unlike Ha le, however, Lind

wa s empowered to negotiate

with Mexican officials. Wilson

ha d instructed Lind t o press

Huerta ’s government for “a n

immediat e cessat ion of fighting

thr oughout Mexico,” an “ea rly

an d free election” in w hich all

part ies could part icipat e, a

promise from Huerta not to be a

can didate, and an a greement by

all par ties to respect t he results

of th e election. In r eturn , the

United States promised to rec-

ognize the new ly elected gov-

ernment . The Huert a r egime

met w ith Lind but refused to

a ccede to Wilson’s dema nds . 12

Lind left Mexico Cit y for th e

port of Veracruz, w here he con-

12 Instr uct ions to J ohn Lind, 4 August

1913, P WW 28:110-111; see a lso a copy ofLind's instructions with edits in Wilson's

hand , Ray S. B aker Pa pers , LC. Lind ’s

instruct ions w ere leaked to the press,

apparent ly f rom with in the St a te D epart -

ment , an d appeared in print before Lind

ar rived in Mexico. See Th e New York

Times , 5 August 1913. Reporter s at the

t ime had easy access to Stat e Depart ment

offices and often fr eely read cables from

overseas; H ill, 90–93.

t inued to gat her informat ion

a nd report t o Wa shingt on. Lind

sent his reports t o Wilson via

official cable chan nels. His

report s were a mixture of

HU MINT a nd OS INT. Lind’s

dat a came from huma n sources,

including some w ho did not

wish t o be ident ified, an d from

th e Mexica n press. Lind a lso

met with diplomats of other

count ries anxious to pass th eirimpressions of Mexico to Wa sh-

ington.

Lind wa s prone to trying t o

influence policy by suggesting

courses of action; seeking to

direct, in a ddition to informing.

In th e spring of 1914, Lind

urged Wilson to intervene mili-

ta r i ly in Vera cruz, a ssuring

Wilson t ha t U S t roops would be

greeted a s liberat ors. Wilsonusually disregarded such sug-

gestions and concentra ted on

the informa tion his agents

reported.

Vera cruz proved t o be an

exception, how ever. Wilson

a ccepted Lind’s judgment th a t

“To dispose of th e present regu-

lar a rmy w ill be a n easy ta sk. I f

th e officers in comma nd ‘break

ra nks’ a nd sa y ‘shoo’ th ey willscat ter a nd never be hear d of

aga in except as inmat es of ja i ls

an d a lmshouses,” a nd t he presi-

dent a uthorized a n occupat ion

of Veracruz. When Mexican

civilians resisted t he occupa-

tion, which resulted in the

deat hs of 19 America ns a nd

several h undred Mexicans, Wil-

son wa s shocked. After th a t

experience, he viewed such

a na lysis more skeptica lly , a nd

Lind’s influence wa s sha rply

curtailed. 13

Oth er Sou r ces

Wilson’s other “confidential

men” w ere openly known t o beUS representatives, despite

some like Ha le, who acted

under a th in cover story. They

a ll solicited informa tion from

official and unofficial sources

alike, meeting with Mexican

governm ent officials a nd r evo-

lutiona ry leaders as well as

with unofficial supporters and

opponents of the Huerta

regime. The mat erial th ey sent

to Wilson w a s a blend of an aly -sis an d raw dat a . His represen-

ta tives not only told him wha t

they ha d lear ned but also

included their judgment s an d

sometimes recommendat ions

for action.

Wilson did n ot rely solely on

his confidentia l men. He a lso

13 J ohn Lind to the Secretary of Sta te, 4

November 1913, Lind P a pers, Reel 2; Lindto B rya n, 24 Februa ry 1914, PWW 29:287

An official count w as n ever ma de of Mexi-

can casua lt ies . Under the hot Veracruz

sun, both sides disposed of the dead as

quickly a s possible. The Americans piled

Mexican dead in public squar es near the

docks, and burned them. Robert E . Quirk,

An A ffai r of Honor: Woodr ow Wilson and

the Occupat ion of Ver acruz (New York:

Nort on, 1967), 53.


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Wilson used all his sources to search for consistent elements in a plethora of information to eliminate his own uncertainties.

sought informa tion from busi-

nessmen a nd fr iends with con-

ta cts in Mexico. He read

un solicited r eports from people

trying to influence his policies.

H e received a flood of ma il from

ma ny un officially credent ialed,

self-credentia led, an d non-cre-

dentialed representatives, all

a imed at ga rnering Wilson’s

support for the Mexica n leader

of their choice. P otentia lly use-ful ma teria l flooded t he White

House mail room along w ith a

profusion of cra nk ma il. The

president’s secreta ry, J oseph

Tumult y, sort ed through it a ll

an d forwa rded a la rge represen-

ta tive sa mple to Wilson. 14

Wi l son ’ s Ana l y t i c a l M et h od

Wilson used a ll th ese sourcesto sea rch for consistent ele-

ments in a plethora of informa -

tion to elimina te his own

uncerta inties about w hich Mex-

14 Some of the crank ma il can still be found

in Wilson's papers with his notes on them.

These provide the best evidence tha t he ha d

perused some of the letters himself. It is

likely Tumulty gave him selected ma terial

as enterta inment a s well as to improve the

president’s perspective on Mexico. See for

exam ple, Sidney A. Wither bee to Wilson,10 November 1913; With erbee to Wilson,

14 November 1913, both in WWP Series 4,

Ca se 95. Witherbee, who may have been an

entrepreneur with interests in the country,

tried unsuccessfully to convince Secretary

of Sta te B rya n to send him t o Mexico to kill

Huerta . There were also wa rnings to the

president about a conspiracy by the pope,

protestants, Ma sons, or J ews, depending on

the writer’s personal prejudices.

ica n revolutiona ry fa ction to

support. H e believed t ha t pieces

of truth would fi t together a s a

wh ole. The tr ick wa s to tea se

the facts from the propaga nda

an d l ies in a rudimenta ry form

of content a na lysis. As he noted

in ea rly 1915,

Th in gs tha t ar e not so do notma tch. I f you hear enough of

th em , you see there is no pat - ter n w hat ever ; it is a crazyqui l t, wh ereas the tr uth alw aysmat ches, pi ece by pi ece, wi thoth er par ts of th e tr uth . Noman can li e consistentl y, andhe cann ot l ie about everyt hi ngif he tal ks to you t oo long. Iwoul d guar ant ee th at if enoughl i ars talk ed t o you, you w ouldget t he tru th ; because th e par tsthat t hey did n ot in vent w oul dmat ch each oth er , and t he partsthat th ey did in vent w oul d not

ma tch one another. Tal k l ongenough, t herefore, and see th econn ecti ons cl ear ly enough ,and you can patch togeth er th ecase as a wh ole. I had some- wh at th at exper ience aboutM exico, and t hat was about th eonly way i n wh ich I l earn edanythi ng that w as tr ue aboutit , for th er e had been vi vidim aginati ons and m any spe- cial in terests whi ch depictedth in gs as th ey wi shed m e tobel i eve them to be.15

This sortin g of informa tion for

consistency a pplied to t he press

as w ell a s to the ma il Wilson

15 Woodrow Wilson, “An Address t o th e

United S tat es Cham ber of Commerce,” 3

Februa ry 1915, PWW 32:180. Em pha sis

in the original.

received. H e distrust ed much of

the Washington press corps. As

he wrote to a fr iend in S eptem-ber 1913,

Do not beli eve anythi ng your ead i n t he paper s. If you r eadth e papers I see, th ey ar e ut terl yuntrustworthy .… Read th e edi - torial page and you wi l l knowwhat you wil l fi nd i n the newscol um ns. For unl ess th ey aregrossly careless th e tw o alw ayssuppor t each oth er . Their lyi ngis shamel ess and col ossal! 16

Wilson held the press of Will-iam Ra ndolph Hears t in par t ic-

ular contempt. The Hea rst

papers were a mong the loud-

est of those try ing t o inf luence

Wilson’s Mexico policy, wit h

th e New York American a n d

the San Fr ancisco Exam i ner

leading t he wa y. These papers

regular ly brandished lurid

headlines t o discredit t he Con-

sti tutionalis ts , accusing them

of a w ide ran ge of a trocit ies ,including mur der , looting a nd

ra pe. At one point, H earst ’s

New York American published

photos of children playing on a

beach in B r i t i sh Honduras–

photos tha t h ad or ig ina l ly

appeared in the N ew York Tr i -

bune in 1912–with a caption

falsely cla iming th ey w ere chil-

dren in Mexico lined up to be

shot by revolutionaries, “proof

of a n a lmost unbelievable s ta teof barbarity.” Wilson ignored

such report s . He ha d l i t t le use

for Hea rst , but th e s tor ies con-

ta minat ed the public deba t e

an d so ma y ha ve inf luenced

16 Wilson to Mar y Allen Hulbert , 21 Sep-

tem ber 1913, PWW 28:311.


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reports Wilson received from

other sources. 17

Throughout the crisis, th e

nota ble exception to Wilson’s

at t i tude toward th e press

rema ined the New York Worl d .

Wilson w rote t o the World’s

publisher, Ralph Pulitzer, in

1914,

L et m e say th at ever y day Iopen t he edi tor ia l p age of theWorld expecting to fin d wh at Ido, a real vi sion of th in gs as

th ey ar e.

Wilson a lso held the S pring-

field (Ma ssachuset ts) Republi-

can in high regard. S ecreta ry

Tumult y pa sted together long

sheets wit h selected editorials

an d stories from other newspa -

pers for Wilson’s reading. B ut,

while Wilson discounted much

of the press coverag e on Mex-

ico, a sma ll group of reporters—

perceived to be accurate—werecalled to Wa shingt on for per-

sonal int erviews w ith Wilson.

In t his select group wa s World

reporter J ohn Reed, wh o met

Wilson in 1914 to give t he pres-

ident his f irst h an d impres-

sions. Reed emphasized t he

revolution as a justified fight

aga inst powerful landowners

an d a corrupt Ca tholic Church,

an d he painted Pa ncho Villa in

a very positive light. Wilsontold his ambassa dor to Brita in

17 New York American , 22 December

1913: 2. The original photo appear ed in

the New York T r ibune , 1 S eptember 1912,

sect ion 2. Details of this hoax appeared in

Ferdinand Lundberg, Im per i al H earst : A

Social Biography. (New York: E quinox

Cooperat ive P ress, 1936), 221.

to rea d R eed’s a rt icles on Mex-

ico because he “ha d it right .”18

Much less reliable a s sources

for Wilson w ere America n bus i-

nessmen wh o tended to back

wh ichever faction posed t he

least threa t t o their property or

wh ichever faction their busi-

ness riva ls opposed. For exa m-

ple, American mine owners, t he

dominan t U S business in Mex-ico, genera lly favored P a ncho

Villa because h e contr olled

much of the ar ea in wh ich U S-

owned mines were located a nd

he ha d promised to protect t he

mines so long a s th eir own ers

adva nced him large “loa ns.”

The Phelps-Dodge Corpora-

tion, h ea ded by Wilson’s good

friend from P rinceton, Cleve-

lan d Dodge, however, favoredVenustia no Carra nza, hea d of

the C onsti tut iona lis ts , as did

Sa muel G ompers an d the

American F ederat ion of Labor.

American oil interest s a lso pre-

ferred Ca rra nza, w ho con-

tr olled man y of the oil-

producing a reas in n ortheast

Mexico. They a lso hoped to ben-

18 Wilson t o Ra lph P ulitzer, 2 Ma rch 1914,

quoted in Arth ur Link, Woodr ow Wi lson:Th e New Fr eedom (P rinceton: Prin ceton

Un iversit y P ress, 1956), 83–84. Wilson a lso

seemed to have liked the New York

Eveni ng Post . See J ames D. Start t , Wood-

row Wi lson an d th e Press (New York: Pa l-

gra ve-Ma cMillan , 2004), 17. Wilson to

Walt er H . P age, 18 May 1914, PWW 30:42.

J erry W. Knudson, “J ohn Reed: A Reporter

in Revolutionar y Mexico.” Journal i sm Hi s-

tory 29, 2 (Sum mer 2003): 60-61.

efit i f Carra nza ousted Huerta ,

who ha d th e backing of r ival

British oil companies. The

expatriate American business

commun ity in Mexico City sup-

port ed Huert a , but Wilson

lar gely ignored th em beca use

he did not t rust a nyone who

support ed Huerta . No signifi-

cant int ernat iona l business

group supported a nother con-testa nt for power, Emilian o

Zapa ta , most likely beca use he

cont rolled a region in wh ich

there wa s no s ignif ican t U S

business interest.19

Although Wilson did n ot t rust

report ing from businessmen

wit h int erests in Mexico

beca use of their biases, he did

Wilson did not trust reporting from businessmen with interests inMexico because of their biases.

Venustiano Ca rran za , the leader ofthe Consti tu t ional is ts . (© Bett -ma nn/CORB IS )


8/16



read some of th e report s busi-

nessmen sent t o him or to his

cabinet members, particularly

if they came from men w ith t ies

to political a llies or to P rince-

ton.

One P rincetonian business-

man, J ohn Sil l iman, a ctua lly

enlisted a s a representa tive. Sil-

lima n ha ppened to be vice con-sul in Coahuila a nd had known

Ca rra nza before the revolution.

U nfortu na tely for Wilson, his

old colleague w a s a less-th a n-

perfect choice. Sillima n w a s

timid a nd spoke Spa nish so

poorly tha t Ca rra nza n ever took

him seriously. Some of Ca r-

ra nza’s sta ff began calling the

envoy “silly man.” In a t least

one ca se, Ca rra nza ma de Silli-

man read one of Wilson's mes-

sages in Spanish to embarra ss

him. Nonetheless, Wilson kept

him in his position, not w a nting

to humiliat e him with a reca ll.

Wilson judged tha t S illiman wa s

doing a ca pable job just passing

messa ges back and forth . The

19 William K. Meyers, “Pa ncho Villa a nd

the Mult inat ionals : United Sta tes Mining

In terests in Villista Mexico, 1913-1915,”

Journal of L at in Am er ican Studies , 23

(1991):347; Robert L. Daniel, “The Friend-ship of Woodrow Wilson an d Clevela nd H .

Dodge,” Mid-Amer ica 43 (1961):190–91;

Gr egg Andrews, Shoul der to Shoul der?

Th e Ameri can Federat i on of Labor, T he

U ni ted States, and t he Mexican Revolu -

ti on, 19 10–1924 (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1991), 34; Samuel

Gompers, Seventy Y ear s of L ife and L abor:

An Autobiography (New York: August us

M. Kelly, 1967) 2: 311–13.

St at e Depa rtment , however, did

send a tra nslator to work with

him.20

The US m ili ta ry wa s nota bly

a bsent from Wilson’s list of

int elligence collectors. Their

role, in th e president’s mind ,

wa s to plan t he ta ctical deta i ls

of the milita ry operat ions t hey

were ordered to underta ke.

An importa nt exception wa s

G en. Hugh Scott, comma nder of

the Army’s S outhern Depart -

ment . Wilson consult ed S cott ,

but only about Villa a nd Ca r-

ra nza , especially since Scott

ha d met Villa several t imes.

Wilson chose not t o ta p Scott’s

superior, S ecreta ry of Wa r

Lindley G a rrison, an officer th e

president did not know w ell.G arr ison wa s chosen for t he

cabinet position only because

Wilson’s secretary, Tumulty,

knew G a rrison from service in

the New J ersey s ta te govern-

ment. G arr ison t urned out t o be

a voca l haw k favoring milita ry

intervention in cabinet meet-

ings, basing his comments a nd

report s on informa tion he

received from officers stationed

along t he U S-Mexican border.Garrison soon realized, how-

ever, t ha t Wilson did n ot often

ta ke his a dvice on foreign pol-

20 Hill, 210–14. Silliman was promoted to

full consul in 1914; M exican Heral d , Mex-

ico City an d Vera cruz, 28 April 1914: 1;12

May 1914: 1; 13 May 1914: 1.

icy questions. The secretary of

wa r , l ike the generals he man -

aged, w as consigned to t acticalan d a dministrat ive issues on

Mexico. 21

Another exception wa s S ecre-

ta ry of the Navy J osephus

Da niels , who wa s a member of

Wilson’s inner circle. 22 Wilson

knew him w ell an d because

Da niels , unlike G a rr ison, wa s

not a n int erventionist, Wilson

trust ed his judgment. In a ddi-

tion, because th e United S ta tesmaint a ined a na val presence in

Mexican port s, a pra ctice begun

by P resident Taft , Da niels wa s

getting informa tion from na vy

officers on t he scene. 23

Wilson ha d a strict view of his

cabinet’s role, and he expected

its members to s ta y with in the

well-defined bounds of their

depart ments. Thus, in keeping

diploma tic and stra tegic init ia-tives in his office, even mem-

bers Wilson t rust ed were

isolat ed from decisionma king

on Mexico—and thus of no

intelligence value t o the presi-

dent. For exam ple, he com-

plained to his fia nce, Edit h

G a lt , th at his son-in-law , Secre-

ta ry of the Treasu ry Willia m

McAdoo, wa s tr ying t o influ-

21 Robert L an sing t o Woodrow Wilson, 31August 1915, PWW 34:385; Wilson t o

La nsin g, 31 Augus t 1915, PWW 34:388;

Richard D. Cha llener, Adm ir als, General s

and Am eri can For eign Policy, 1898–1914

(Pr inceton: Pr inceton U niversity P ress,

1973).22 Daniels had been a leader in Wilson’s

1912 presidential election campa ign.23 Wilson to Mrs. Ga lt, 23 J une 1915,

P WW 33:446.

Wilson had a strict view of his cabinet’s role, and he expected its members to stay within the well-defined bounds of their de- partments.


9/16



ence his M exica n policies,

wh ich w ere, in t he president’s

words, “none of his business.”Only Secretar y of Sta te Brya n

an d, to a lesser extent, Da niels

a dvised Wilson on Mexico.

B ryan wa s included because US

policy t owa rd Mexico wa s in his

portfolio of du ties.

IM IN T an d S IG IN T , L e sser

P l a ye r s

Types of int elligence oth ertha n HU MINT an d OSINT ha d

only minor roles in informing

Wilson’s policies. I MIN T w a s

limited to ground photogra phy

used a s ta ctica l intelligence for

the mili tary . 24 In prepara tion

for possible a rmed int ervention

in 1914, th e US Na vy sent offic-

ers int o Mexico to photogra ph

bridges and ra i lways. One

Ma rine officer even pa ssed him-

self of f as a US businessmanwriting a guide book for Mexico

City an d received a t our of the

Mexica n P residential P ala ce

and its defenses. These mis-

sions played no role in White

House decisions.25

24 Aerial photography wa s possible and

wa s under development in E urope, but it

wa s not used in Mexico. For a history of

its development, see Terrence J . Finn e-

gan , Shoot in g the Fr ont : Al l ied Aer i al

Reconnai ssance and Photographi c Inter- pr etati on on th e Western Fr ont—Worl d

War I (Washington, D C: Nat ional Defense

Int elligence College Pr ess, 2006).25 Legendary Marine off icer Smedley Butler

played the businessman in Mexico City. In

effect, he was an early non-official cover officer.

The ground photographs of the areas around

Tampico and Veracruz are in the Office of Naval

Intelligence files, Lot 2428, Library of Congress,

Prints and Photographs Division.

SIG INT played an importa nt

part , but i t wa s largely a coun-

terintelligence tool, used to

monitor th e a ctivities of foreign

intelligence services in the

Uni ted S ta t es. I t wa s l imi ted a t

th e time to ta pping telephone

lines a nd t elegraph cables, a nd

intercepting w ireless ra dio com-

mun ica tions. SIG INT, in con-

tra st t o Wilson’s HUMI NT a nd

OSI NT, cam e mostly t hroughoff ic ial chan nels, rat her th an

th rough t he informal ones Wil-

son h a d established.

SI G INT tu rned out t o be espe-

cia lly useful in th e spring of

1915 in preventin g H uerta ’s

ret urn to Mexico from exile in

Spain, to w hich he ha d f led in

J uly 1914. The G erma ns, eager

to embroil the U nited St at es in

a w a r wit h Mexico, court edHuerta . In February 1915, a

G erman na val of f icer , Capta in

Fra nz von Rintelen, visited

Huerta in Spain a nd offered to

back him in a count errevolu-

tion. Encouraged by fighting

then underw ay betw een Villa

and Ca rranza , Huer ta agreed to

consider t he idea an d w ent t o

New York, landing on 12 April

1915. His r eception by a crowd

of Mexican supporters bol-

stered t he former dicta tor’s

plans. He wa s greeted by

adm irers everyw here he went.

The a tmosphere, a t lea st in the

exile community, seemed to

favor his return. 26

Treasu ry S ecreta ry William

McAdoo's men t a pped G erma n

a nd Austr ian diplomat ic tele-

phones in Wa shingt on and New

26 George J . Ra usch, J r . , "The Exi le and

Dea th of Victor iano Huerta , " Hispanic

Am eri can H istor ical Review 42

(1962):134–35.; Fra nz R intelen von

Kleist , The Dark Invader : War t ime Remi

ni scences of a Ger ma n N aval In tell i genceOff icer (London: Lovat Dickson, 1933),

175–77. Capt ain Rint elen claims t o have

wa lked up to Huerta in a New York hote l

lobby and int roduced himself , but his

self-aggrandizing memoirs are mislead-

ing. It is more likely he met Huert a in

Spa in w hile a rra nging passage to the

United Sta tes .

SIGINT play an important part, but it was largely a counterintelligence tool, used to monitor the activities of foreign intelligenceservices in the United States.

Gen. Victoriano Huerta(center) on his a rriva lin New York Cit y.(Bett mann/CORB IS)


10/16



York an d relayed th e reports to

Wilson. These reports focused

more on t he a ctivities of G er-

ma n an d Austr ian diploma ts

a nd th eir possible complicity in

sabota ge in t he Uni ted S ta tes

th a n t hey did on Mexico, but

th ey did include informa tion

about G erman plotting in Mex-

ico.27

B y 24 J une 1915, mista kenly

thinking he had sha ken pursu-

ers , Huerta boarded a t rain in

New York bound for Sa n Fra n-

cisco, sw itching la ter to one for

El P a so. At t he same t ime,

Villa’s representa tive in Wa sh-

ingt on report ed t o th e Wilson

administration that numerous

former Huert is ta officers w ere

on their way to El P aso from

places of exile in th e Un ited

St at es . The next day, U nited

Sta tes marsha ls a r res ted

Huerta as he s tepped from his

tra in in Newma n, Texas, only a

few miles from th e border. S up-

porters wa iting in a ca r to dr ive

him a cross th e border w ere also

arrested. 28

27 Ba rbara Tuchman, The Zimmerman

Telegram (New York: Dell Publishing,1963), 77–80; Rausch, 134–37; Henry

Landau , The Enemy Withi n: The Inside

Story of Germ an Sabotage in Ameri ca

(New York: G. P utn am 's Sons, 1937), 48–

49.28 Ra usch, 138–39; New York Wor ld , 28

J une 1915: 1; Henry Thay er Mahoney a nd

Marjorie Locke Mahoney, Espionage in

M exico: Th e Tw enti eth Centur y (San Fr an-

cisco: Austin & Winfield , 1997), 96–99.

Officials in El P a so kept Pr esi-

dent Wilson in formed t hrough

frequent cables . Zach La ma r

Cobb, th e U S customs collector

there, had built a small intell i-

gence network of his own,

including ra ilroa d employees.

These s ources reported

Huerta’s movements, which

Cobb relayed to Wa shingt on.

Cobb also orga nized th e group

tha t a rrested Huerta . Once

Huerta wa s a rrested, Wilson

ordered the J ustice Depart-

ment t o deta ined him and keep

him from r eturn ing t o Mexico,

orders th e depa rtm ent followed

until Huerta ’s death in custody

from complicat ions of alcohol-

ism. 29

SI G INT th us provided “action-

able” informa tion a boutHuerta ’s plott ing just a s H ale’s

HU MINT ha d given the presi-

dent t he informa tion he needed

to dismiss a U S a mbassa dor .

Wilson’s ot her sources provided

less definitive informa tion.

Some reports improved his

aw a reness of key issues, most

notably land reform. However,

much of the reporting simply

ma de him caut ious in choosing

one factional lead er over

an other. In his notes to Secre-

ta ry of St at e Brya n, Wilson

29 J ohn F. Chalkley, “Zach Lama r Cobb,”

Southw estern Studies No. 103 (El P aso:

Texa s Western P ress, 1998), 29–34; Wil-

son to Rudolp Forster, 28 J une 1915 and

Wilson to William B au chop Wilson, 5 Ju ly

1915, P WW 33, 456, 473.

demonstra ted a wil l ingness to

recognize whichever revolution-

ary faction could demonstratetha t i t ha d gained Mexican pub-

lic support .

Wi sh i n g f o r Mo r e

I n f o rma t i o n

How ever, until lat e 1915 th e

informat ion Wilson wa s receiv-

ing could not h elp him come to

a conclusion. For exa mple, Wil-

son once complained t ha t U S

consu ls reportin g from Mexico

“sent me only a small bat ch of

‘flimsies’ [telegrams printed on

very thin pa per] a nd th ey con-

ta ined nothing but m ultiplied

details—an d very sma ll deta i ls

at tha t—of the cha os tha t is

Mexico.”

In a ll likelihood, Wilson’s

ambivalence was also influ-

enced by th e effort s of th ose

vyin g for power in Mexico. The

Mexicans were well aware of

Wilson’s actions and each politi-

cal a nd milita ry faction did its

best to influence his interpreta -

tion of event s, th rough lobby-

ing, personal contacts, and in

the U S press. Huerta ha d con-

siderable support in th e United

States, especially among busi-

ness lead ers, but Wilson’s n ega-

tive opinion of Huerta was

f irmly set . Carra nza a nd Villa ,however, both h ad fa irly sophis-

ticat ed public relat ions cam-

paigns aimed at t he United

St at es and t he White House.

Ca rra nza ha d a press off ice in

New York and Washingt on D C,

wh ich issued regular releases to

reporters a nd t o members of

Because Wilson insisted on concrete information before acting,he was frustrated by the lack of definitive information.


11/16



Congress. Villa encoura ged

report ers, like Reed, w ho ga ve

him favora ble coverag e, a nd hismilita ry t rain included a press

car in wh ich reporters could

sleep and ea t. He a lso a llowed

th em to use the Mexica n t ele-

gra ph syst em, often free of

charge, to contact newspapers

at home.

B eca use Wilson insisted on

concrete informa tion before act-

ing, he wa s frustra ted by the

lack of definitive reporting. Ashe would tell Edit h G a lt, “The

fact is , I never have had a ny

pa t ience w ith ‘ifs’ a nd conjec-

tura l ca ses. My mind insis ts

a lwa ys upon w ai t ing unt i l

something a ctually does ha p-

pen a nd then discussing wha t is

to be done about th a t . ” 30

Wilson’s frust ra tion wit h t he

lack of actionable intelligence is

neither hard to understand not

uncommon to presidents, a s

they and other policymakers

often expect a nd dema nd more

from int elligence tha n it can

deliver. 31 To be fa ir t o Wilson’s

sources, it w a s not u nt il 1915

tha t a ny fa ction in Mexico

30 Wilson to Mrs. G alt , 17 August 1915,

P WW 34:231; Quoted in Rober t W.

Tucker, “An Inn er C ircle of One,” The

Nat i onal In terest 51 (1998): 25; See Revo-

lut i on by H eadl i ne and Mark T. Gilder-hus, Dipl omacy and Revolut ion: U .S.-

M exican Relat i ons und er Wi lson and Car-

ranza . (Tucson: Un iversity of Arizona

P ress, 1977), 6.31 See Richar d Betts , En emi es of In tell i -

gence: Knowl edge and Power in Am eri can

Nat i onal Secur i ty (New York: Columbia

University P ress, 2007) and a review of

the book in this issue by Nicholas D uj-

movic.

ga ined enough domina nce to

legitimat ely ea rn U S recogni-

tion.

La ck of definitive judgment s

on Wilson’s part reflected the

lack of a s ta ble reali ty on the

ground. B y la te summ er 1915,

however , i t wa s clear t ha t Ca r-

ran za led th e most powerful

revolutionary faction, and, in

October 1915, Wilson extended

recognition to Carranza’s gov-ernment.

An Assessm en t o f Wi l son ’s

System

In th e end, Wilson’s system

produced mixed results, wit h

more problems tha n w ould be

accepta ble in a professiona l-

ized system. Wilson received a

lot of good informat ion, pa rt icu-

lar ly from America n r eport ers

in Mexico and fr om the U S con-

suls who ha d built persona l ties

to Mexico’s revolutionary lead-

ers. Wilson did t rus t some offi-

cia l S ta te Depar tment

reportin g, but only from sources

th a t seemed to him to be a ccu-

ra te .

The informa lity of Wilson’s

system ma de his method cum-

bersome, but, possibly worse,his approach to assessing the

reliability of reports by deter-

mining its consistency with

other facts was itself unreli-

able. As futur e int elligence fail-

ures would demonstrate,

Wilson w a s w rong t o believe

tha t only the trut h could be

consistent . Fa lsehoods we now

know can a lso seem logica l an d

factu a lly consistent if key con-

tra dictory informa tion remains

unknown, ignored, or analyzed

on the basis of faulty a ssump-

tions.

Fortu na tely for Wilson, his

init ia l assumption that

Huerta’s government lacked

popular su pport r elat ive to th eConsti tutionalis t revolutiona r-

ies wa s based on accura te infor-

mation—including the New

York Wor ld ’s reporting—and so

provided a firm foundat ion for

judging lat er informat ion. The

qua lity of the World’s reporting

helped Wilson. In hindsight it

appears t o have been a ccurate

in compar ison t o oth er ma jor

US newspapers , the Hearst

chain in pa rticular . Ha d Wil-

son based his judgments on th e

reporting of Ambassador Wil-

son or on th e Hearst new spa-

pers, his system w ould ha ve

served only to reinforce errone-

ous assumptions.32

Wilson t a pped sources tha t

were diverse, decent ra lized,

a nd w ith dif ferent kinds of

expertise. B eca use of th is vari-

ety , no one source could domi-

na te Wilson’s thinking a nd he

wa s able to a void the tra ps of

groupthink. Because Wilson’s

policies were st ill formin g, he

also heard different viewpoints

about the Mexican factions,

32 Hi ll, 189–92, 212–15.

In the end, Wilson’s system produced mixed results, with moreproblems than would be acceptable in a professionalized system


12/16



a lthough h e did ignore most of

Hu erta ’s supporters. The end

result of this informat ion flow

ma y ha ve been chaotic, but i t

ga ve Wilson a wide ra nge of

opinions and information.

Wilson wa s a lso sensitive to

th e proclivity of his sources to

suggest policy. Although he

sometimes took tha t a dvice—

a s he did Lind’s urging t o

occupy Veracruz in early

1914—in general, Wilson dis-

missed the policy suggestions

of his report ers.

After World War I ended, Wil-

son took an other a pproa ch to

gathering intelligence and cre-

at ed a new organ ization, the

Inq uiry, to pull togeth er infor-

ma tion and provide ana lysis on

the issues raised at the Ver-sailles Peace Conference. The

Inquiry consisted of area

experts—including members of

the mili tary, a cademics, and

report ers—w ho knew t he differ-

ent regions and populations

affected by the w ar .

In esta blishing the Inq uiry,

Wilson elected to use a more

formal st ructure of int elligence

collection a nd a na lytic exper-

tise tha n h e had employed in

try ing to understa nd Mexico.

The Inquiry wa s disbanded

immediat ely a f ter th e Ver-

sailles conference ended, but it

demonstra ted tha t Wilson ha d

learned from his efforts to

underst a nd events in Mexico,

including t he lesson tha t for-

eign informa tion ha d to come

from more pla ces th an th e

usual S ta te Depar tment chan-nels.33

❖ ❖ ❖

Wilson learned from his efforts to understand events in Mexico,including the lesson that foreign information had to come from more places than the usual State Department channels.


13/16



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