Företagsekonomiska institutionenDepartment of Business Studies

Amalia C. Nilsson

A Lighter Shade of DarkExploring the Value Adding and Value Subtracting Effects of Headquarters Attention and Involvement in Subsidiary Activities

Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Lecture Hall 2(Hörsal 2), Ekonomikum, Kyrkogårdsgatan 10, Uppsala, Wednesday, 10 October 2018 at13:15 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The examination will be conducted in English.Faculty examiner: Ram Mudambi (Fox School of Business, Temple University ).

AbstractNilsson, A. C. 2018. A Lighter Shade of Dark. Exploring the Value Adding and ValueSubtracting Effects of Headquarters Attention and Involvement in Subsidiary Activities.Doctoral thesis / Företagsekonomiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet 197. 94 pp. Uppsala:Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. ISBN 978-91-506-2708-4.

Headquarters of multinational corporations are presented with a diverse range of stimuli thatinfluences the issues that they pay attention to and ultimately get involved in. However,headquarters have to prioritize since their attention and resources are limited, and theycannot pay attention to all issues and get equally involved in all subsidiaries. To stand outand attract attention and involvement, subsidiaries can use different issue selling tactics topresent headquarters with issues that are strategically important to the subsidiary. Whileheadquarters can add value to their subsidiaries by paying attention and getting involved insubsidiary activities, there is also a risk of headquarters making different prioritizations thanthe subsidiaries, and instead subjecting them to misguided involvement and value subtraction.Existing research tends to assume that the more attention a subsidiary receives, the betteroff it will be. However, I reevaluate this assumption, and complement existing research byexamining how subsidiaries experience headquarters attention and involvement, and the effectson subsidiary activities.

Data were collected at the subsidiary level, using interviews and a survey to capture thesubsidiary perspective of headquarters attention and involvement. More specifically, 115interviews were conducted with subsidiary managers of European MNCs based in Japan, andsurvey data was collected from 93 Japanese subsidiaries of European MNCs. The empiricalfindings highlight circumstances under which headquarters attention and involvement can addor subtract value from subsidiary activities. Furthermore, subsidiaries can highlight strategicissues during their issue selling efforts to attract headquarters involvement that has a beneficialimpact on subsidiary activities. I extend the parenting literature by developing an attention-based parenting typology and showing how misaligned priorities risk exposing subsidiaries tovalue subtraction rather than value added during headquarters involvement. This thesis alsocontributes to elaborating on the attention-based view by exploring mixed types and levels ofattention, as well as circumstances under which negative attention can be perceived as beneficialand value adding by subsidiaries.

By incorporating the attention-based view with the parenting literature and issue selling,this thesis extends our understanding of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, highlightscircumstances under which subsidiaries appreciate attention and involvement, and shows adarker side of headquarters’ parenting in which subsidiaries risk experiencing value subtraction.

Keywords: multinational corporation, headquarters-subsidiary relationship, attention-basedview, parenting, issue selling

Amalia C. Nilsson, Department of Business Studies, Box 513, Uppsala University, SE-75120Uppsala, Sweden.

© Amalia C. Nilsson 2018

ISSN 1103-8454ISBN 978-91-506-2708-4urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-354091 (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-354091)

Acknowledgement

I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has helped and supported me along the way. This journey would not have been possible with-out your continuous encouragement and support:

My supervisors Associate Professor Henrik Dellestrand and Professor Fran-cesco Ciabuschi Friends and colleagues at the department and those who participated in the Nord-IB program Colleagues who gave feedback at numerous conferences Professor Ulf Andersson for taking the time to be my opponent during my final seminar Family and friends for your continued support and interest in my research I owe special gratitude to Professor James Sallis for inspiring courses, expla-nations, and discussions about statistics, especially structural equation model-ing in LISREL. A special thank you goes to Felipe Monteiro, Affiliate Professor of Strategy at INSEAD, for all your help and support during my time at INSEAD. Thank you for interesting and thought-provoking discussions that have helped me develop as a researcher. Also, a special thank you to Professor Peter William-son for making my time at Judge Business School, University of Cambridge possible.

My research and the development of this thesis would not have been possible without the generous financial support of Berch & Bordström-fonder, Företagsekonomiska Institutionen, Uppsala University; Anna Maria Lundins Resestipendier, Smålands Nation, Uppsala; Handelsbankens Forsknings-stiftelser, Sweden; Scandinavia-Japan Sasakawa Foundation Grants, Sweden.

List of Papers

This thesis is based on the following papers, which are referred to in the text by their Roman numerals.

I Ciabuschi, F., Dellestrand, H., and Nilsson, A. C. (2015). (al-

phabetic order because of equal contribution) Value Generation in the Multinational Corporation. Book chapter in Rob Van Tulder, Alain Verbeke, Rian Drogendijk (red.) The Future of Global Organizing. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 39-56.

II Nilsson, A. C. Headquarters Involvement in Subsidiary Activi-ties: When and why do subsidiaries experience value subtrac-tion? A previous version of this paper was presented at the JIBS Paper Development Workshop at the Academy of International Business (AIB) 2017 Annual Meeting, Dubai, UAE.

III Nilsson, A. C. and Monteiro, F. Different Parenting Styles: Ex-

amining Supportive and Monitoring Attention from Headquar-ters to Subsidiaries A previous version of this paper won the Stra-tegic Management Society (SMS) Sao Paulo Special Conference 2018 Best Paper Prize and has been nominated for the Strategic Management Society (SMS) Annual Conference Paris 2018 Best Paper Prize.

IV Nilsson, A. C. and Dellestrand, H. Gauging subsidiary influence

and performance through strategic issue selling and the involve-ment of headquarters in subsidiary activities. A previous version of this paper has been accepted for presentation at the Strategic Management Society (SMS) Annual Conference, Paris, France, September 22-25, 2018.

Reprints were made with permission from the respective publishers.

Contents

Introduction ......................................................................................................... 9 Theoretical Background ............................................................................... 12 Research Gap ................................................................................................ 14 Purpose and Research Questions ................................................................. 17 Research Approach ...................................................................................... 20 

Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................... 22 Multinational Corporations .......................................................................... 22 

The Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationship in MNCs ............................ 23 Parenting Advantage .................................................................................... 25 Attention-Based View .................................................................................. 27 

Headquarters Attention ............................................................................ 29 Subsidiary Issue Selling ............................................................................... 32 The Need for Further Exploration ............................................................... 34 

Data and Methods ............................................................................................. 36 Do Headquarters Add Value in MNCs? ...................................................... 36 Research Context .......................................................................................... 37 

The Multinational Corporation ............................................................... 37 Relevance of the Japanese Context ......................................................... 38 

Research Methods ........................................................................................ 39 Multiple Case Study Research ..................................................................... 41 

Data Collection and Case Selection ........................................................ 41 Qualitative Data Analysis ........................................................................ 47 

Survey Research ........................................................................................... 48 Ethical Considerations.................................................................................. 50 Reflections on the Research Process ........................................................... 50 

Summary of the Papers ..................................................................................... 52 Paper I: Value Generation in the Multinational Corporation ...................... 52 Paper II: Headquarters Involvement in Subsidiary Activities: When and why do subsidiaries experience value subtraction? ..................................... 54 Paper III: Different Parenting Styles: Examining Supportive and Monitoring Attention from Headquarters to Subsidiaries ........................... 55 Paper IV: Gauging subsidiary influence and performance through strategic issue selling and the involvement of headquarters in subsidiary activities ........................................................................................................ 56 

Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 59 Implications for Theory ................................................................................ 59 

The Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationship in MNCs ............................ 59 Parenting and Value Added .................................................................... 62 Attention-Based View of the Firm .......................................................... 64 Subsidiary Issue Selling .......................................................................... 67 

Implications for Practice .............................................................................. 68 Why do Subsidiaries Still Feel Underappreciated? ................................ 68 Lost in Translation ................................................................................... 69 Consolidate Reporting Systems and Decrease Redundancies for Subsidiaries .............................................................................................. 71 Lack of Interest in Potential Benefits of Responding to Customer Requests ................................................................................................... 71 Benefits of Increased Local Responsiveness .......................................... 72 What is Preventing Headquarters from Embracing Subsidiary Ideas? .. 74 New Missions for Headquarters and Subsidiaries .................................. 75 

Limitations and Directions for Future Research ......................................... 77 

References ......................................................................................................... 80 

Appendix A ....................................................................................................... 87 

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Introduction

This thesis focuses on the effects of headquarters attention and involvement on subsidiaries’ relationships with their headquarters in multinational corpo-rations (MNCs). Headquarters attention involves the noticing and focusing of time and effort by decision makers on issues and answers (Ocasio, 1997). In the context of MNCs, headquarters involvement captures a behavioral mani-festation of attention since it is after time and effort have been spent focusing on issues and answers, that headquarters may decide to actively participate in and allocate resources to the subsidiaries’ activities (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012). Understanding subsidiaries’ perspective on when and how headquarters attention and involvement have a beneficial or detrimental impact on their activities is an area of great importance for indi-vidual subsidiaries, headquarters, and the overall MNC. This is especially im-portant since subsidiaries can play an important part in creating value for MNCs. The effect of headquarters attention and involvement on value added and value subtracted experienced by subsidiaries is rarely examined in exist-ing literature about MNCs, especially from the subsidiary perspective. Theo-retically, this thesis contributes to knowledge about the MNC and the head-quarters-subsidiary relationship (e.g., Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007; Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012; Kostova, Marano, & Tallman, 2016; Mudambi, Pedersen, & Andersson, 2014), the parenting literature (e.g., Goold, Campbell, & Alexander, 1994a), the attention-based view (e.g., Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ocasio, 1997), and subsidiary issue selling (e.g., Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, & Lawrence, 2001).

Subsidiaries have an important role in MNCs and can engage in value cre-ating activities such as competence development, knowledge transfer, innova-tive product development, and providing access to unique resources in their local market (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; Birkinshaw, Hood, & Jonsson, 1998; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). Headquarters can add value to subsidiary ac-tivities by allocating attention and actively getting involved and participating in subsidiary activities (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012). Attention and involvement can add value since headquarters managers make decisions about corporate strategy and resource allocations that can help subsidiaries act on various opportunities (Cyert & March, 1963; Monteiro, 2015). Additional ways that headquarters can add value to subsidiaries include knowledge transfer, synergy management, orchestration, and sharing of core

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competence (Bouquet, Morrison, & Birkinshaw, 2009; Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Nell & Ambos, 2013). However, there is also a risk for a darker side of headquarters attention and involvement, since it may be misguided at times and expose subsidiaries to a situation of value subtraction, such as increasing administrative work and hindering subsidiary activities.

Despite the risk of misguided, value subtracting headquarters involvement, subsidiaries can make important contributions to value creation in MNCs, making it critical for headquarters to pay attention and focus on adding value to their subsidiaries. Additionally, subsidiaries can also work to attract head-quarters attention and involvement, influence corporate strategy, and help shape their own role within MNCs by engaging in issue selling (Birkinshaw, 1997; Dutton & Ashford, 1993). Issue selling allows subsidiaries to present ideas and issues that they consider important, to attract headquarters attention and involvement (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). They can focus on different moves such as packaging, involving others in the selling process, and the tim-ing of their efforts as ways to make their issues stand out, since headquarters are exposed to a broad range of stimuli and the decisions made depend on what stimuli are presented and attended to (Dutton et al., 2001; Simon, 1947).

While this is an area that continues to attract scholarly interest (Menz, Kunisch, & Collis, 2015; Nell & Ambos, 2013; Ocasio & Joseph, 2018), we have a limited understanding of how subsidiaries are affected by different types and levels of headquarters attention. This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by examining the subsidiary perspective and how subsidiary ac-tivities are affected by headquarters attention and involvement. By subsidiary perspective I mean that the focus is on the viewpoints of subsidiary managers, how their subsidiaries operate, and the relationship with headquarters. This is subsequently reflected in the data collection, in which subsidiary managers served as key informants.

To elaborate on these theoretical concepts, an example based on interviews I conducted with subsidiary managers in Tokyo, Japan can help illustrate sev-eral of the themes represented in this thesis. VikingCorp, a Japanese subsidi-ary of a Swedish manufacturing MNC, was renovating a factory building on its site in Saitama, outside of Tokyo, and had decided to demolish an old build-ing to make space for a new one with improved earthquake resistance. Before the old building could be demolished, they needed to find a new location for the showers and locker room. After an investigation and numerous debates within the subsidiary, it was decided that the locker room would move to the second floor of the factory building, since it was primarily used before and after the factory workers’ shifts. However, this decision was short-lived and a Director at the subsidiary explained:

“This was questioned by one of the SVPs from the Swedish headquarters when they visited our site and said, ‘This is stu-pid. Why would you do it like this?’ We showed that we had

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done a lot of investigations, but the SVP just responded, ‘but we wouldn’t do this in Sweden.’”

Such statements showed the headquarters’ “lack of local knowledge, both from a cultural perspective of Japan, and also from the local culture that we have in this subsidiary” as described by a Director.

Following the visit by the Senior Vice President from headquarters, another investigation was initiated at the subsidiary and four people spent three weeks considering different options: “Again we came to the same conclusions that this is the best option for us. Eventually headquarters gave up and said, ‘ok then, let’s just go ahead with your plans and have it there.’” The Director described it as a challenging and demotivating situation since:

“headquarters never believes that we have our own experi-ence and knowledge about how to operate here. We have to prove it all the time, and it slows down the processes signifi-cantly when we have to do this for every single little bit that we want to do.”

The headquarters wanted to be involved in big as well as small decisions,

which made for a challenging situation for the subsidiary. The subsidiary man-agers’ expectation was that the headquarters would focus its attention and in-volvement on activities with greater value adding potential, such as expertise regarding ongoing divestments, product development, or developing and im-proving global production processes. However, time and effort were instead spent reexamining decisions with a primarily local impact.

The subsidiary managers became more selective in what they did and did not bring up to the headquarters. This was done partially because they wanted to focus the headquarters’ attention and involvement on tasks that had the greatest potential for the headquarters to add value, and also because there was not enough time during the meetings. They had monthly reviews with the headquarters via video conference, but usually encountered technical difficul-ties and lost precious time. A Vice President explained:

“[We] need to do a lot of ground work, preparation before presenting a decision to the headquarters. We have invested in video conference equipment, but you always lose 10-15 minutes operating these functions and when you only have 60 or 120 minutes, those 15 minutes become quite important, es-pecially when there are quite a few things that we have to go through and we only have this meeting once a month.”

Although the headquarters remained highly involved in the subsidiary’s ac-

tivities, one of the VPs admitted:

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“For good and bad you get a lot of focus from headquarters if you have a factory in France for instance. Right now, I can say that I’m quite happy to be far away from the headquarters because it gives me more freedom to actually work. Before it was tough because I got calls all day long asking, ‘What are you doing?’ ‘Are you on the right track?’ ‘Have you made all the actions that we agreed on?’ We had to officially ask the headquarters to give us time to actually do our job.”

While attempts to limit the headquarters’ involvement were partly by

choice and partly as a consequence of technical difficulties, the question re-mains if the subsidiary’s relationship with the headquarters would be different if the headquarters was less involved. Would the VikingCorp subsidiary feel frustrated and abandoned if the headquarters did not pay attention or get in-volved in its activities? Would they realize that the headquarters’ attention and involvement are beneficial, value adding contributions to their activities? Or would they become more efficient and productive with less attention and in-volvement from the headquarters?

This mini case is based on interviews that I conducted with subsidiary man-agers during my data collection process and highlights some challenges asso-ciated with the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. It relates to how head-quarters attention and involvement characterized by ignorance and a lack of knowledge (Ciabuschi, Forsgren, & Martín, 2012b) can hamper subsidiary ac-tivities. Furthermore, it shows that sometimes headquarters focus their atten-tion and involvement on seemingly local decisions and how this can distract both headquarters and subsidiaries. However, this case also highlights that subsidiaries still consider involvement beneficial and work to focus headquar-ters attention on certain issues by engaging in issue selling (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). I will elaborate more on these, and related themes throughout my thesis and show both beneficial and detrimental effects of headquarters attention and involvement.

Theoretical Background MNCs are complex, diverse, and dispersed organizations. The hierarchical po-sition of headquarters coincides with local autonomy possessed by subsidiar-ies that are typically located far away and control important linkages with local actors (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). There are multiple levels and hierarchies, as well as dispersed power that coexist within the federative MNC, creating unique managerial challenges (Andersson et al., 2007).

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Headquarters of MNCs have been portrayed as omniscient units, with hier-archical power that controls and monitors subsidiaries. They have been de-scribed as engaging in conscious and deliberate strategizing (Chandler, 1962; Porter, 1980), while the subsidiaries’ role was to implement headquarters di-rectives. This view has evolved, with headquarters increasingly taking on a value adding role, such as carrying out strategic planning, facilitating resource exchange within MNCs, and managing synergies (Chandler, 1991; Foss, 1997; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990).

The headquarters’ parenting role has become increasingly important to jus-tify its raison d'être. As a parent, the headquarters’ goal is to add more value to its subsidiaries than any other potential parent would, through activities such as synergy management, knowledge sharing, and facilitation of shared services (Goold & Campbell, 1991; Nell & Ambos, 2013). By adding value, headquarters achieve a parenting advantage, in that their corporate strategy helps form a MNC in which the subsidiaries together are worth more than if they were owned by a different parent or operating as standalone units (Goold et al., 1994a). Although the parenting literature tends to focus on headquarters adding value, scholars have also acknowledged the risk of headquarters de-stroying value, due to damaging influence, appointing inappropriate manag-ers, or excessive corporate overhead costs (Campbell, Goold, & Alexander, 1995a).

It becomes a balancing act for headquarters to fulfill their parenting role, while minimizing the risk of destroying value. The situation is further compli-cated by the rising influence and power of subsidiaries. The role of subsidiar-ies has also developed, with research increasingly recognizing them as respon-sible for competence development and contributing to the firm’s competitive advantage (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Narula, 2014; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). Being internationally dispersed with access to diverse resources, knowledge, and capabilities situated in different local environments helps sub-sidiaries develop and contribute value to the MNC (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Furthermore, operating close to customers and suppliers in foreign markets enable subsidiaries to contribute with knowledge sharing, best practices, and innovation development (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Birkinshaw & Hood, 2001; Hedlund, 1986).

The complexity of MNCs, together with the challenges of headquarters and increasing influence of subsidiaries, has created questions regarding head-quarters’ abilities to add value to their subsidiaries. In extreme cases, head-quarters have been described as “groping in the dark” as they suffer from not just knowledge and information processing limitations, but also an unaware-ness of their limitations (Ciabuschi, Forsgren, & Martín, 2011b; Denrell, Arvidsson, & Zander, 2004). The sheer ignorance perspective describes the headquarters as an outsider, with limited ability to understand and beneficially contribute to subsidiary activities (Ciabuschi et al., 2011b). This suggests that the headquarters is just one player among many competing for influence and

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power within the MNC (Forsgren, Holm, & Johanson, 2005). Such circum-stances open up for a more active role for subsidiaries to shape and guide headquarters involvement in issues and opportunities of strategic importance to them, instead of passively receiving top-down directives.

With the importance of subsidiaries in MNCs, and the imminent risk of headquarters destroying, rather than adding value when getting involved, it is important to further develop our understanding of how headquarters involve-ment (or lack thereof) affects subsidiaries. For this thesis, the MNC will be considered as follows: While the headquarters is in a hierarchical position, with the responsibility of making strategic decisions and allocating resources to the entire organizations, it is not the sole possessor of power within the federative MNC (Andersson et al., 2007; Hedlund, 1986). Subsidiaries are im-portant in shaping the relationships with their headquarters, and some even have considerable autonomy as they compete for mandates and influence their role (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). However, some subsidiaries still depend on their headquarters for approval, resources, and cooperation to pursue local ac-tivities. Power is redistributed within the MNC, since it is difficult for any one person or group to be all-knowing within the globally dispersed organization. This can create tension between headquarters and international subsidiaries concerning autonomy and influence (Andersson et al., 2007; Asakawa, 2001; Handy, 1992). To help develop our understanding of these themes, this thesis explores how different aspects of headquarters attention to and involvement in subsidiary activities contributes to or hinders subsidiary activities.

Research Gap The ability of headquarters to add value to subsidiaries continues to attract scholarly interest (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Menz et al., 2015; Nell & Ambos, 2013) and is a fundamental issue when managing MNCs (Goold, Campbell, & Alexander, 1994b). Such issues are especially challenging with internationally distributed subsidiaries that are locally embedded and able to influence strategic priorities. The headquarters’ ability to acquire and process all relevant information at the subsidiary level is limited; hence headquarters do not have a complete understanding of what is going on throughout the MNC (Holm, Johanson, & Thilenius, 1995).

Although it is challenging for the headquarters to have a complete under-standing of what is going on throughout the MNC, it still gets involved in subsidiary activities, with both beneficial and detrimental consequences (e.g., Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, & Martín, 2011a; Ciabuschi et al., 2012b). Previous research has mainly relied on survey-based studies to investigate the effects of headquarters attention and involvement (e.g., Ambos, Andersson, & Birkinshaw, 2010; Andersson, Buckley, & Dellestrand, 2015; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Yamin, Tsai, & Holm, 2011). However, a more granular

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approach (e.g., Monteiro & Birkinshaw, 2017) is needed to examine mecha-nisms involved in shaping subsidiaries’ experience of headquarters attention and involvement, and the effects on the headquarters-subsidiary relationship.

Headquarters involvement can facilitate knowledge sharing, synergy man-agement, and allocation of resources to enhance subsidiary performance (Chandler, 1991; Goold, 1996). Such value adding attempts constitute the headquarters’ parenting advantage, with emphasis on headquarters managers making decisions that improve performance in a way that subsidiary managers would not have achieved themselves (Goold et al., 1994a). Research suggests that headquarters’ have the potential to add value when there is an opportunity to improve subsidiary performance, and headquarters have the skills and re-sources to contribute, as well as adequate knowledge of the subsidiary (Goold, Campbell, & Alexander, 1998). This requires extensive knowledge of subsid-iary’s activities, which can be acquired through embeddedness in the subsidi-ary’s network (Nell & Ambos, 2013). However, previous research has shown that it can be challenging for headquarters to carry out their parenting ad-vantages with functionally and geographically dispersed subsidiaries since they may be unable to accommodate all the needs and opportunities available for different subsidiaries (Ciabuschi et al., 2011b; Goold & Campbell, 1998).

Furthermore, the main focus of the parenting literature has been on under-standing how headquarters can successfully achieve a parenting advantage and add value. Allocating attention is an important way for headquarters to achieve their parenting advantage and add value to subsidiaries (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Plourde, Parker, & Schaan, 2014), since headquarters man-agers decide on corporate strategy, and allocate resources that enable subsidi-aries to act on opportunities in their local environment (Cyert & March, 1963; Monteiro, 2015). The benefits of a sound corporate strategy and achieving a parenting advantage lie in the possibility of the headquarters’ ability to add value and ensure that its subsidiaries are worth more together than they would be as independent companies (Campbell, Goold, & Alexander, 1995b).

However, there is a risk of destroying value since headquarters can only allocate a limited amount of attention to each subsidiary. This makes head-quarters managers inherently less well informed about the subsidiaries’ activ-ities and needs than subsidiary managers themselves are. Headquarters’ ex-pectation to achieve a parenting advantage and adding value by making supe-rior decisions, despite liabilities of distance and a limited understanding of subsidiary activities is a challenge that deserves further investigation.

Previous research has primarily focused on positive attention, that is, the extent to which headquarters recognize and acknowledge a subsidiary’s con-tribution to the MNC as a whole (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008: 579), with the underlying assumption that the more attention subsidiaries receive, the better. However, in addition to their focus on positive attention, Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) also recognize the existence of “negative forms of atten-tion,” in the form of “corporate control – that is, procedures undertaken by

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headquarters managers to monitor and evaluate subsidiary activities” (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008: 586). With limited research about negative at-tention (recent exceptions are: Ambos et al., 2010; Conroy & Collings, 2016), we know little about how it is manifested, whether and under what circum-stance it is actually perceived as negative by subsidiaries, and whether it has a negative impact on the headquarters-subsidiary relationship.1

Additionally, existing research has not explored whether headquarters con-currently devotes positive and negative attention, and what effect this has on subsidiaries. Ambos et al. (2010) show that positive attention increases sub-sidiary influence while negative attention, or headquarters monitoring as they label it, decreases subsidiary autonomy. Although this is a rare example of a study that examines different types of attention, it falls short of considering the relationship between positive and negative attention, and the implications of receiving both types of attention simultaneously on subsidiary activities.

The allocation of attention is a strategic choice for headquarters since it is a scarce, yet critical and sought-after resource for subsidiaries (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Hansen & Haas, 2001). It is impossible for headquarters to allocate high levels of attention to all subsidiaries. However, we have a limited understanding of decisions to allocate different types and levels of attention among subsidiaries, and how such choices affect subsidiaries’ perception of their relationship with their headquarters.

Previous research has shown that positive attention increases subsidiary in-fluence, and negative attention reduces subsidiary autonomy (Ambos et al., 2010). Subsidiaries receiving limited or no attention tend to suffer from the “liability of internal isolation” and have lower performance than subsidiaries that are not isolated (Monteiro, Arvidsson, & Birkinshaw, 2008). However, we know less about the relationship between these different types and levels of attention, and how such a relationship affects subsidiary activities and per-formance.

Allocating attention helps the headquarters identify opportunities where it has skills, resources, and the knowledge to get involved and improve subsidi-ary performance, which contributes to achieving the parenting advantage (Goold et al., 1998). However, the discussion about adding value tends to fo-cus on value at the firm level, with limited consideration for how subsidiaries experience headquarters attention and involvement, despite them being di-rectly affected by it (Ambos & Mahnke, 2010). It is worth acknowledging that different actors and stakeholders within MNCs can have different perspectives on value, and it is likely that headquarters and subsidiaries experience value differently. Therefore, it is important to explore these different perspectives to

1 For the sake of consistency with previous research, the label “negative attention” is initially used to describe monitoring and controlling types of attention. A more nuanced perspective on this type of attention, and specific contingencies where it can be perceived as negative or posi-tive, are conceptually developed and empirically shown with research conducted for this thesis.

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better understand value within MNCs, and the research in this thesis focuses on examining the subsidiary perspective.

Although subsidiaries are influenced by headquarters, they are also able to determine strategic priorities both at the subsidiary and MNC levels. They can engage in issues selling, which is behavior directed toward affecting others’ (in this case headquarters’) attention to and focus on issues (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). Engaging in issue selling serves as stimuli to the headquarters to pay attention and take action, and to allocate time and effort to selected issues within the MNC (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1947). By presenting issues and opportunities of strategic importance, subsidiaries seek to trigger a reaction from their headquarters and stand out from other subsidiaries in the MNC.

Developing our knowledge about how subsidiaries can use issue selling to trigger headquarters attention and involvement that have beneficial, rather than detrimental effects on subsidiary activities is important for our under-standing of the subsidiary role. Exploring the relationship between issue sell-ing and headquarters attention and involvement helps expand our understand-ing of how subsidiaries can gain support for their activities and how headquar-ters allocate their attention across different subsidiaries and issues. Together, these are important aspects that contribute to our broader understanding of the dynamics of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship.

Considering the challenges that headquarters face, we have a limited un-derstanding of how different types and levels of attention affect subsidiary perceptions of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. Furthermore, it is im-portant to develop a better understanding of how subsidiaries are affected by misguided headquarters involvement that is taking place under liabilities driven by distance and a limited understanding of subsidiary activities. Exam-ining how subsidiaries can use issue selling to encourage headquarters to take an active role to beneficially affect subsidiary activities, and how this affects subsidiary influence and performance, is an important contribution to our un-derstanding of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, and how subsidiaries can guide headquarters towards achieving their parenting advantage.

Purpose and Research Questions The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effect of headquarters attention and involvement on subsidiaries’ perception of their relationship with head-quarters. Furthermore, I seek to understand when and how manifestations of headquarters attention have a beneficial or detrimental impact on subsidiary activities. Investigating these aspects contributes to our understanding of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, the attention-based view of the MNC, and headquarters’ parenting role. Considering the subsidiary perspective in-creases our knowledge about how they experience headquarters’ actions, which is especially important since subsidiaries contribute to value creation in

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MNCs. More specifically, subsidiaries that have a strategic role have been found to create value through knowledge and competence development, as well as technological and market development that can be disseminated to other subsidiaries (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Frost, Birkinshaw, & Ensign, 2002). Furthermore, subsidiaries that gain expertise in a particular function or activity increase their potential value to other units and shape stra-tegic behavior within the MNC (Andersson & Forsgren, 2000; Kogut & Zander, 1996).

Headquarters are in a position to coordinate subsidiary activities, but man-agers’ limited information processing capacity makes it challenging to add value. Although attention is a critical resource, it is scarce, and headquarters cannot provide high levels of it to all subsidiaries (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Hansen & Haas, 2001). Previous research has shown that positive at-tention contributes to increased subsidiary influence (Ambos et al., 2010), and leads to higher subsidiary performance in combination with high levels of sub-sidiary strategic choice (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). Negative attention has, however, been shown to reduce subsidiaries’ autonomy and limit their ability to integrate into the local market (Ambos et al., 2010; Andersson et al., 2007). Additionally, research on headquarters involvement shows that it can have a negative impact on the efficiency of subsidiary innovation development and transfer (Ciabuschi et al., 2012b; Ciabuschi, Martín, & Ståhl, 2010), but pos-itively affect the impact of innovations’ effect on subsidiary competencies (Ciabuschi et al., 2011a). While headquarters involvement in the innovation development and transfer processes can reduce efficiency because additional actors increase coordination costs and reduce transfer routinization (Ciabuschi et al., 2012b; Ciabuschi et al., 2010), involvement in subsidiary innovation development contributes extra resources, increased legitimacy, and compe-tence development for the subsidiary (Ciabuschi et al., 2011a).

Previous studies have primarily relied on survey-based research to investi-gate the effects of headquarters involvement on subsidiary activities. This the-sis takes a more exploratory approach as I seek to examine mechanisms in-volved in explaining how headquarters attention and involvement affects the value added or subtracted experienced by subsidiaries, and their relationship with headquarters. Exploring the phenomenon further provides a better under-standing of different mechanisms contributing to beneficial and detrimental effects highlighted by previous research. With this in mind, the following re-search question is posed: Research Question 1: How does headquarters attention and involvement af-fect the headquarters-subsidiary relationship? As previous research shows, headquarters attention and involvement can have beneficial and detrimental effects on the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. To further examine the impact of headquarters on subsidiaries, I explore the value added or subtracted experienced by subsidiaries and how this affects

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their perceptions of their relationship with the headquarters. By examining subsidiaries’ perception of headquarters’ attention and involvement, this the-sis seeks to highlight how those on the receiving end experience headquarters actions. Considering the subsidiary perspective is especially important when headquarters have a limited understanding of subsidiary activities, and how their allocation of attention and involvement affects such activities. This helps develop our understanding of the potentially beneficial and detrimental effects that headquarters can have on the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. There-fore, I pose a second research question: Research Question 2: How do subsidiaries experience value added and value subtraction when headquarters pay attention to, and get involved in, subsidi-ary activities? Answering the overarching research questions posed helps achieve the pur-pose of this thesis, in terms of examining the impact of headquarters attention and involvement on subsidiaries’ perception of their relationship with head-quarters. This is done with help of the four papers included in this thesis. Re-search Question 1 is answered with the help of Papers II, III and IV, as they examine different aspects of how headquarters attention and involvement af-fect the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. Papers II and IV examine head-quarters involvement and show its beneficial and detrimental consequences for the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. Paper III focuses on different types and levels of attention, and their varying effects on the relationship be-tween headquarters and subsidiaries. Together Papers I, II and IV address Re-search Question 2. Paper I investigates value creation in MNCs and the head-quarters’ value adding potential to subsidiaries’ value creating process. Paper IV tests the impact of headquarters involvement on subsidiary influence and performance, contributing to our understanding of how headquarters affect the value added experienced by subsidiaries. To examine value subtraction expe-rienced by subsidiaries, I conducted a comparative case study in Paper II. Ta-ble 1 presents an overview of the included papers.

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Table 1. Overview of Research Questions in the Four Papers

Title of Paper Research Approach

Research Focus and Questions

I Value Generation in the Multina-tional Corporation Conceptual

Investigating themes related to value generation within MNCs and examin-ing distinctions between value crea-tion and value added.

II

Headquarters Involvement in Subsidiary Activities: When and why do subsidiaries experience value subtraction?

Qualitative

When and why do subsidiaries expe-rience value subtraction from head-quarters involvement, and what are the consequences thereof?

III

Different Parenting Styles: Ex-amining Supportive and Moni-toring Attention from Headquar-ters to Subsidiaries

Qualitative

Whether, when, and how do different types and levels of attention affect the way subsidiaries perceive their re-lationship with headquarters?

IV

Gauging subsidiary influence and performance through strate-gic issue selling and the involve-ment of headquarters in subsidi-ary activities

Quantitative

How can subsidiaries guide head-quarters’ involvement and how does this impact subsidiary performance?

By answering these research questions, I contribute to our understanding of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship by explaining circumstances under which subsidiaries appreciate headquarters attention and involvement as well as show a darker side fraught with friction and tension. I contribute to the parenting literature by developing an attention-based parenting typology and by showing how misaligned priorities risk exposing subsidiaries to value sub-traction, rather than value added, during headquarters involvement. This thesis also adds to the attention-based view by exploring mixed types and levels of attention, and circumstances under which negative attention can be perceived as positive and value adding. Using survey data in a structural model, I con-tribute to the issue selling literature by testing and showing that by engaging in issue selling that highlights strategic issues, subsidiaries are able to attract value adding headquarters involvement.

Research Approach Different analytical points of departure were used to examine the research questions from various perspectives, such as conceptual, qualitative, and quantitative research approaches. The use of multiple approaches is particu-larly helpful to develop a rich, in-depth understanding of the research phe-nomenon, in a more comprehensive way than is possible with a single method (Creswell & Clark, 2007). This thesis relies on the combination of established

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theories and literature in international business and strategy research for its theoretical anchoring, including: the parenting literature (Goold et al., 1994a), attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997), and issue selling (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). These are further developed in the Theoretical Framework chapter. Additionally, the qualitative and quantitative methods used for data collection and analysis are detailed in the Data and Methods chapter, followed by a summary of the four papers that comprise this thesis in the Summary of the Papers chapter. Implications for theory and practice are discussed in the Conclusion chapter, as well as limitations of this research that open up for interesting directions for future research. Finally, the four papers are included.

This thesis is based on a compilation of papers, an approach that has al-lowed me to receive constructive feedback from leading scholars in my re-search area at conferences, and various seminars and workshops. The individ-ual papers, as well as my overall approach to the research process, has greatly benefitted from receiving continuous feedback. It has helped me gain confi-dence in the relevance of my research, while acknowledging that there are shortcomings and limitations to be handled during the learning processes of developing as a researcher. I have also had the privilege of collaborating with several leading scholars within my area of interest, which has helped me, and my research evolve before being compiled in this thesis.

The overall purpose of the research project that this thesis is a part of was already established before I joined. The broad framework was already deter-mined, but my specific research focus evolved during my time as a Ph.D. stu-dent. Given the focus of the project, I began by conceptually exploring value generation in MNCs, and found that existing research had examined both value added and value creation without clearly distinguishing the concepts. My efforts to differentiate between how value is added and created within MNCs resulted in Paper I. To move to an empirical focus, I began interview-ing subsidiary managers to develop a deeper understanding of the subsidiary perspective. Papers II and III were developed based on the interviews and ad-ditional secondary data sources. They respectively explored subsidiaries’ ex-perience of misguided headquarters involvement, and the emergence of atten-tion-based parenting styles. Building on ideas that emerged from the inter-views, I conducted a structural equation model analysis in Paper IV to exam-ine how subsidiaries focusing on strategic issues when issue selling can trigger headquarters involvement, and in turn how this affects subsidiary influence and performance.

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Theoretical Framework

I complement existing research with my study of the effect of headquarters attention and involvement on the headquarters-subsidiary relationship (e.g., Andersson et al., 2007; Kostova et al., 2016), by incorporating the attention-based view (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ocasio, 1997) and the parenting literature (Goold et al., 1994a). Building on previous research about the head-quarters-subsidiary relationship, I examined how headquarters’ parenting, at-tention, and involvement affect the potential value added and subtracted ex-perienced by subsidiaries. MNCs are complex organizations, which makes ex-ploring these themes especially interesting, given the challenges associated with managing a group of subsidiaries with varying goals, knowledge, and preferences (Cyert & March, 1963). The situation is further complicated by the dispersed and diverse nature of MNCs since subsidiaries can engage in issue selling efforts (Dutton & Ashford, 1993) to attract and guide headquar-ters attention and involvement towards areas that the subsidiaries consider im-portant. Working to incorporate these different frameworks will help enhance our understanding of the impact of headquarters attention and involvement on the value added and value subtraction experienced by subsidiaries in their re-lationship with headquarters. The following sections present key theories and existing research to highlight the framework used for the analyses conducted in this thesis.

Multinational Corporations Organizations are distinct from other social systems and institutions, since they are concerned with the coordination of individual and group actions, as well as the cross-level relationships between individuals, groups, organiza-tions, and the environments that influence their joint survival (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007). Furthermore, organizations have an internal de-cision making and communication structure, with the hierarchical authority, possessed by headquarters, resulting in vertical specialization of decision making (Gavetti et al., 2007; Simon, 1947).

Managerial and organizational processes, such as the routines and patterns of decision making and current practices, make up MNCs’ core capabilities and shape their advantages (Forsgren, 2017). These processes are especially

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complex in MNCs since they are globally dispersed and functionally diverse groups of units with a headquarters and distinct national subsidiaries (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). Although the headquarters is in a hierarchical position and tends to be responsible for strategic decision making and allocating resources, power is also dispersed throughout the MNC, with subsidiaries having access to unique knowledge and resources in their local market (Andersson et al., 2007). Subsidiaries are internationally spread out, at different geographic, cul-tural and linguistic distances from the headquarters (Ambos & Ambos, 2009), and with varying sets of competencies, resources, and mandates.

Headquarters consist of top-level management, and are the organizational unit in the MNC that coordinates activities carried out by the subsidiaries (Chandler, 1991; Foss, 1997). Multiple forms of headquarters can co-exist within MNCs, such as corporate, divisional, and regional headquarters (Birkinshaw, Braunerhjelm, Holm, & Terjesen, 2006) conducting administra-tive (loss preventing) and entrepreneurial (value adding) roles (Chandler, 1991). The role of the MNC headquarters is unique and firm-specific (Foss, 1997), meaning that their activities cannot be outsourced and no other actors within the MNC occupy the hierarchical position that the headquarters does. A central task for headquarters is coordinating subsidiary activities and re-sources (Holm et al., 1995), as they perform a knowledge directing function by coordinating where to selectively get involved in at the subsidiary level (Foss, 1997). However, in line with the Carnegie School, headquarters man-agers are constrained by their information processing ability, yet attempt to add value. At the same time, subsidiaries can use bottom-up processes to in-fluence headquarters’ decision making (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1947).

The challenges faced by MNC headquarters, compared to those in domestic companies, are amplified when they have to allocate attention and resources to their subsidiaries (Levy, 2005). Therefore, it is important to study the head-quarters-subsidiary relationship to better understand the different decision-making processes involved in MNCs and how they are affected by the tension between global integration and local responsiveness.

The Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationship in MNCs Research on the headquarters-subsidiary relationship has evolved from pri-marily relying on the headquarters’ perspective, focusing on organizational structure and formal control systems (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989), to greater emphasis on the complexities involved with managing an international organ-ization. This includes a shift in focus from administrative control and hierar-chical structures to a more dynamic perspective that considers strategic and intellectual dimensions such as local strategies, subsidiary roles, and bottom-up and lateral knowledge flows (Kostova et al., 2016). Subsidiaries are recog-nized for their strategic importance and more collaborative models of man-

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agement, including metanational (Doz, Santos, & Williamson, 2001), trans-national (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989), and heterarchical (Hedlund, 1986) have been proposed. The headquarters-subsidiary relationship is further compli-cated by competing forces of global integration and local responsiveness (Doz & Prahalad, 1984).

The headquarters is conceptualized as a group of top managers who are responsible for making decisions, forming strategies and engaging in activities for the entire organization (or at least large parts of it) (Collis, Young, & Goold, 2007). Headquarters can add value to subsidiaries through two related, but different types of parenting; namely an administrative, loss preventing function and an entrepreneurial, value adding function (Foss, 1997). The ad-ministrative role seeks to control opportunistic behavior, monitor subsidiary performance and utilization of allocated resources, while the entrepreneurial role is about synergy management, knowledge sharing, determining long-term strategies, and allocating resources accordingly (Chandler, 1991; Nell & Ambos, 2013). It is essential that headquarters have sufficient understanding of the resources needed to help subsidiaries realize identified opportunities (Goold et al., 1998). Otherwise headquarters risk misinterpreting subsidiary capabilities, which can result in inaccurate evaluation of possible synergies (Goold & Campbell, 1998). Headquarters can increase their understanding and reduce such risks by spending time collecting and processing information about their subsidiaries (Goold et al., 1994b), which can be done through mon-itoring.

Subsidiaries are considered MNC units through legal ownership and con-trol but are located outside of the domain of headquarters. Their importance and strategic role continues to receive scholarly attention as they are recog-nized as a source of competence development and value creation for MNCs (e.g., Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Kostova et al., 2016).

The range of activities occurring in the organization of potential interest for the headquarters makes managing the MNC complex and challenging. It is difficult for headquarters to pay attention to all business activities at the sub-sidiary level. Subsidiaries are considered units that are able to prompt involve-ment and have some discretion over strategic decisions. Although subsidiaries are influenced by headquarters, they can also determine strategic priorities at both the subsidiary and MNC levels. Accordingly, this shows the need for subsidiaries to sell issues of strategic importance to headquarters to get their attention and trigger involvement (Ambos et al., 2010).

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Parenting Advantage How headquarters add value to subsidiaries is a fundamental issue when man-aging the MNC (Goold et al., 1994b). The benefits of a sound corporate strat-egy and achieving a parenting advantage lies in the headquarters’ ability to add value and ensure that its subsidiaries are worth more together than as in-dependent companies (Campbell et al., 1995b). For headquarters to achieve their parenting advantage, their influence should help subsidiaries make better decisions than they would on their own, and the activities carried out by head-quarters should also be more cost efficient than if they were conducted by the subsidiaries (Goold et al., 1998).

Subsidiaries create value through their knowledge and competence devel-opment, access to unique resources, and direct interaction with customers, generating revenues and profits for the MNC. The headquarters can influence subsidiary activities and add value by improving the business plans and budg-ets, facilitate synergies between subsidiaries, provide competent and efficient central functions and make wise strategic decisions for the MNC as a whole (Campbell et al., 1995a). Additionally, the headquarters can add value through its parenting influence when there is an opportunity to get involved and im-prove subsidiary performance, it has the appropriate skills and management processes needed to realize the opportunity, and has sufficient understanding of the critical success factors to avoid destroying value through inappropriate influence (Goold et al., 1994b).

Based on these ways of developing a parenting advantage, Goold and Campbell (1987) and Goold et al. (1994a) developed a framework of three strategic management styles. For their categorization of the three management styles, they focus on the roles of planning influence and control influence ex-ercised by headquarters. Planning influence is about the headquarters’ top-down involvement in subsidiaries’ strategy proposals, and is determined by the organizational structure, review processes, and allocation of resources (Goold & Campbell, 1987). Control influence involves how headquarters re-act when subsidiaries do not meet the specified targets, and the frequency of monitoring subsidiary activities (Goold & Campbell, 1987). Using these two dimensions, Goold et al. (1994a) develop three management styles: Strategic planning, strategic control, and financial control. In the strategic planning style, the parent operates closely with subsidiaries in developing strategies and emphasizing long-term goals. According to the financial control style, the par-ent relies on the subsidiary to develop plans and strategies, but maintains tight control focused on short-term profitability (Goold et al., 1994a). Although el-ements of these two parenting styles are reflected in the findings of this thesis, the strategic control style of parenting is most similar to what I have observed in my research. The strategic control style occurs when subsidiaries are re-sponsible for proposing strategies, plans, and ideas, and the parent checks the appropriateness and then endorses ideas and proposals considered important,

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and regularly monitors subsidiary performance and pays attention to strategic milestones (Goold et al., 1994a).

The parenting literature has also identified two other related, but different, types of parenting functions that can help headquarters add value to subsidi-aries: an administrative, loss-preventing function and an entrepreneurial, value-adding function (Foss, 1997). The administrative parenting role seeks to prevent losses, control opportunistic subsidiary behavior, and monitor sub-sidiary performance, while the entrepreneurial role strives to add value through synergy management, knowledge sharing, developing strategies, and allocating resources (Chandler, 1991; Nell & Ambos, 2013).

These roles are closely related since monitoring subsidiary activities can help headquarters access important knowledge about the subsidiary that sup-ports decisions about strategy development and resource allocations (Chandler, 1991). To achieve its parenting advantage it is essential that the headquarters adequately understands the resources needed to help the subsid-iary realize its potential (Goold et al., 1998). Without a sufficient understand-ing, the headquarters risks misinterpreting subsidiaries’ capabilities and inac-curately evaluating possible synergies (Goold & Campbell, 1998). By spend-ing time monitoring subsidiary activities and processing information about subsidiaries, headquarters can increase their understanding and reduce the risk of misguided involvement that destroys, rather than adds value (Goold et al., 1994b).

The parenting literature focuses on how headquarters can add value to sub-sidiaries to make up for the costs they incur. There are expensive overhead costs, funded by subsidiaries’ value creation, suggesting that headquarters’ value added must be greater than the incurred costs to justify their existence (Goold et al., 1994a). Much of the literature explicitly or implicitly assumes that headquarters’ knowledge situation is adequate to make rational choices about their involvement and contributions to subsidiaries’ innovation pro-cesses (Forsgren & Holm, 2010). The expectation is that headquarters can se-lect subsidiaries and relevant activities to support and get involved in, based on their strategic importance for the MNC. When headquarters possess rele-vant expertise to support and enhance subsidiary activities, they can improve subsidiary performance (Campbell et al., 1995b; Egelhoff, 2010).

However, the headquarters’ ability to add value to subsidiary activities and the effect of attention and involvement are far from clear (Forsgren & Holm, 2010). Various scholars have questioned headquarters’ knowledge situation and the extent to which they have access to the resources and competence needed to add value to subsidiary activities (e.g., Ciabuschi et al., 2011b; Ciabuschi, Forsgren, & Martín, 2017; Forsgren & Holm, 2010; Tsoukas, 1996). A knowledge situation characterized by sheer ignorance (Ciabuschi et al., 2012b) or radical uncertainty (Foss, 2002; Tsoukas, 1996), in which the headquarters suffers from uncertainty because knowledge is socially embed-ded, rather than entirely controlled by any one actor or unit within the MNC,

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makes it difficult for the headquarters to successfully carry out its parenting role. Instead, this opens up for a risk of value destruction.

Headquarters can destroy value by implementing inappropriate strategies, setting invalid objectives, and appointing unsuitable managers (Goold et al., 1994a). There is an increased risk of destroying value if decision makers (at headquarters) and those affected by the outcomes (at subsidiaries) have dif-ferent priorities and interests. While destruction suggests damage to the point at which something can no longer exist or be repaired, this thesis focuses on value subtraction as a less severe occurrence of inappropriate headquarters parenting. The risk of value subtraction is a counterpoint to the potential value added by a headquarters. This follows from the suggestions that headquarters staff tend to be “less expert, less cost-effective, and less responsive” than the subsidiaries (Goold et al., 1994a: 188). Although headquarters may suffer from knowledge limitations compared to their subsidiaries, headquarters can pay attention to subsidiary activities as a way to improve their knowledge sit-uation and ability to add value.

Attention-Based View Attention is the focus of the mind on one of several possible stimuli, meaning withdrawing concentration from some things to more effectively address oth-ers (James, 1925). It concerns the ability of the human brain to focus on certain information for further interpretation, while ignoring other information. The concept of attention has been divided into three components: alertness, selec-tivity, and processing capacity (Posner & Boies, 1971). In an organizational setting, this refers to the issues that top managers at headquarters consider important and focus on (Ocasio, 1997). Filtering mechanisms are used to at-tenuate input, since top managers cannot pay attention to all issues in the en-vironment (Cyert & March, 1963; Posner & Boies, 1971). When selecting stimuli to attend to, it is difficult for managers to focus on more than one stim-ulus or idea at the same time. Otherwise, attention oscillates between the stim-uli (James, 1925). It is important to acknowledge the limits of attention allo-cation, which can easily be overlooked when considering a single decision, but the challenge becomes more prominent when presented with multiple choice opportunities (March & Olsen, 1979). This limited cognitive ability to process all available stimuli contributes to the limits of rationality (Simon, 1947).

The attention-based view of the firm elaborates on the notion of attention as a broad construct that regards “noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focus-ing of time and effort by organizational decision-makers” on issues in the form of problems, opportunities and threats in the environment, and answers such as action alternatives to address the issues (Ocasio, 1997: 189). It suggests that the behavior of an organization depends on top managers’ attention allocation

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to issues, since attention contributes to how and what organizations make de-cisions about (Cyert & March, 1963; Ocasio, 1997). Top managers need to pay attention to issues of strategic importance for the organization to maintain its competitive advantage and profitability (Bouquet et al., 2009; Levy, 2005). However, they are faced with the challenge of paying attention to strategically important issues, while ensuring that their attention span is diverse and recep-tive to issues that may gain strategic importance in the future to not miss out on valuable opportunities (Rerup, 2009).

Attention research highlights the cognitive dimensions, and the attention-based view seeks to incorporate structural dimensions of attention allocation decisions made by headquarters managers. By managing the flow of infor-mation and communication channels, such structural dimensions influence how top managers allocate their attention towards issues (Ocasio, 1997). En-gaging with procedural and communication channels allows top managers to identify issues and consider their strategic importance and possible answers (Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005).

Similar to the three components of attention (alertness, selectivity, and pro-cessing capacity) presented by Posner and Boies (1971), there are three asser-tions made by the attention-based view to explain top managers’ attention al-location (Ocasio, 1997). These assertions build on and complement earlier work within the Carnegie School.

First, the behavior of a firm is affected by top managers’ focus of attention, since this affects how and what the firm makes decisions about (Gavetti et al., 2007; Simon, 1947). Managers can only focus on a select number of issues and answers, and the issues that gain attention determine the direction of the firm.

Second, the context in which managers are situated influences their atten-tion allocation. Situated attention suggests, for example that a manager’s hi-erarchical position within the organization determines their access to infor-mation and decisions, both of which affect the attention pattern of the organi-zation (March & Olsen, 1979). The attention allocation can change over time, since managers are likely exposed to a variety of information as they encoun-ter different situations, as well as procedural and communication channels. In MNCs, this becomes especially challenging since headquarters are responsi-ble for multiple subsidiaries with various issues that they consider important.

Third, the structural distribution of attention is based on the contexts in which managers find themselves, which in turn depend on how rules, re-sources, and relationships within the firm regulate the distribution of, and ac-cess to issues, answers, and decision makers (Ocasio, 1997). The different structural positions held by top managers highlight that issues and answers are valued differently throughout the firm. It is important to note that subsidiary managers can create stimuli, by selling issues that they consider important to affect the structural distribution of attention, since the values and relevance of

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various issues are not the same throughout the firm (Dutton, 1986; Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1947).

Ocasio (2011) introduces three different types of attention: attentional per-spective, attentional engagement, and attentional selection. Attentional per-spective is related to alertness, since it is conceived as the cognitive structures that allow for awareness and focus to selected stimuli over time (Ocasio, 2011). In the attention-based view applied to MNCs, it is comparable to visi-ble attention, in which subsidiaries receive recognition from headquarters, and to relative attention in terms of the attention received by subsidiaries com-pared to other subsidiaries within the organization (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). Attentional engagement is about the process of intentional allocation of time, energy, and effort to selected environmental stimuli (Ocasio, 2011). Within the research stream applying attention to the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, attentional engagement is reflected in supportive attention, which is about the resources provided by headquarters to add value to subsidiaries (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). Attentional selection usually results from the interaction between attentional perspective and attentional engagement, and concerns the particular issues that top managers decide to focus on, at the ex-pense of other issues (Ocasio, 1997).

Headquarters Attention The notion of attention dates back to Simon (1947) and Cyert and March (1963), and explains how organizational adaptation is affected by attention (Ocasio, 2011). Attention is grounded in cognitive psychology and relates to bounded rationality, in which the brain selects certain information to focus on, while ignoring other information (e.g., Posner & Boies, 1971). In MNCs, headquarters’ organizational attention, in terms of issues and action alterna-tives that are attended to, generates a strategic agenda and guides headquar-ters’ resource allocations (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). Such a situation becomes especially challenging when headquarters are tasked with making decisions about ideas that are formulated elsewhere in the organization and channeled to them in different forms of communication (Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2007). The attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997) has increasingly been applied to studies of MNCs and the headquarters-subsidiary relationship (e.g., Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) to explore the effects of attention on MNC (Bouquet et al., 2009) and subsidiary performance (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010).

Headquarters’ information processing capacity is limited, and they cannot focus on too many ideas and activities at the same time (James, 1925; Ocasio, Laamanen, & Vaara, 2018). Subsidiaries often compete with each other for attention, since it is a scarce, yet crucial resource (Birkinshaw, Bouquet, & Ambos, 2007; Hansen & Haas, 2001). Both headquarters and subsidiaries ben-efit from promising subsidiaries receiving attention. It provides an opportunity

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for headquarters to learn from competent subsidiaries (Nell, Ambos, & Schlegelmilch, 2011) and gain a competitive advantage (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986). Additionally, subsidiaries gain influence and can use the attention as a channel for development (Ambos et al., 2010; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996). More specifically, subsidiary managers, work to influence and increase the focus of decision makers’ attention on their issues (Monteiro, 2015). They can engage in issue selling in the form of providing stimuli to evoke different re-sponses, such as affecting headquarters’ attention allocation and focus on ideas and opportunities of importance to the subsidiary (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; March & Simon, 1958). The identified opportunities, threats, projects, and processes that the headquarters pay attention to and get involved in by dedicating time and effort forms the MNC’s “pattern of organizational atten-tion” (Ocasio, 1997: 188). This organizational attention in turn, develops the firm’s strategic agenda through the issues that are focused on and resource allocations that are made within the MNC (Gavetti et al., 2007; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005).

Headquarters attention and involvement are limited, and managers can be-come overwhelmed and suffer from impaired decision making when allocat-ing excessive attention to understanding the international market (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Bouquet et al., 2009; Simon, 1947). Such impaired deci-sion making may hamper MNC performance (Bouquet et al., 2009). Other studies suggest that attention can improve headquarters’ decision making and firm performance, since it increases headquarters’ understanding of subsidiar-ies, their market with customers and suppliers, and their competitive environ-ment (Venaik, Midgley, & Devinney, 2005).

Since headquarters managers affect corporate strategy and resource alloca-tions, which enable subsidiaries to act on identified opportunities (Cyert & March, 1963; Monteiro, 2015), allocating attention serves as a critical re-source that can add value to subsidiary activities (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Plourde et al., 2014). Most of the research applying the attention-based view to understanding MNCs and the headquarters-subsidiary relationship (e.g., Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Bouquet et al., 2009; Plourde et al., 2014; Stevens, Moray, Bruneel, & Clarysse, 2015) focus on what is called positive attention, or, the extent to which headquarters recognize and acknowledge a subsidiary’s contribution to the MNC as a whole (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008: 579), with the assumption that the more attention received, the better.

Three sub-constructs have been developed to describe how positive atten-tion unfolds: (1) relative attention refers to the attention received vis-à-vis other subsidiaries; (2) supportive attention takes the form of resources to ena-ble the subsidiary’s development; and (3) visible attention refers to media recognition communicated to stakeholders (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). Since attention is a limited, headquarters can-not attend to all subsidiaries equally. Therefore headquarters prioritize atten-tion, which explains the use of the term ‘relative’ (Levy, 2005; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). This has been described as a zero-sum game, whereby an increase

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in attention for one subsidiary tends to decrease attention for another. Atten-tion is ‘supportive’ when it results in the allocation of discretionary resources to subsidiaries as a means for development (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). It can be seen as a way of adding value (Chandler, 1991; Goold et al., 1994b) as well as a way for subsidiaries to stay connected with headquarters (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). It can take the form of bonuses for subsidiary managers, investment in local opportunities, headquarters’ interest in local markets and products, and the diffusion of best practice from a subsidiary (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Conroy & Collings, 2016). Attention is ‘visible’ when it involves explicit recognition that the subsidiary receives in media intended for stakeholders (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). It signals what topics the head-quarters is attending to, or who is viewed more favorably within the organiza-tional network, and raises the subsidiary’s profile with external stakeholders (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010).

Several studies have highlighted the beneficial and value adding aspects of attention, but subsidiaries do not necessarily consider it desirable. Previous research has identified “negative forms of attention” which involve “corporate control – that is, procedures undertaken by headquarters managers to monitor and evaluate subsidiary activities” (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008: 586). It also includes control of subsidiary budgets and resource allocations (Ambos et al., 2010). Frequent communication and reporting are additional control mecha-nisms that can be implemented to restrain subsidiary autonomy (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). By limiting subsidiaries’ autonomy there is a risk that sub-sidiary managers become demotivated by their lack of decision-making rights and inability to act in the local market (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986; Krühler, 2012).

However, research on management of the MNC has highlighted that cor-porate control can have beneficial consequences and serve as an integrative mechanism. Frequent communication and reporting can enhance information processing and improve coordination, which are both essential in complex or-ganizations such as MNCs (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991, 2000; O’Donnell, 2000). Additionally, communication flows among subsidiaries provides op-portunities to connect decentralized attention among dispersed organizational units (Gavetti et al., 2007; Simon, 1947). Such coordination and information flows become especially important in MNCs since headquarters decision mak-ers tend to make their decisions based on information collected at other parts of the organizations and relayed to them in various forms of communication (Cyert & March, 1963). Corporate control is also beneficial for MNCs as they tend to have various projects simultaneously around the world, making it im-portant to ensure that their research and development (R&D) activities are well coordinated and integrated to avoid duplication of investments (Ambos & Schlegelmilch, 2007).

Although previous research has acknowledged negative attention (Ambos et al., 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Conroy & Collings, 2016), there is limited research examining its implications on subsidiaries and to what extent

32

it actually has negative consequences. Furthermore, existing research has not investigated the impact of subsidiaries concomitantly receiving both positive and negative attention. Although Ambos et al. (2010) investigated the effects of positive and negative attention on subsidiaries, they did not explicitly ex-amine the relationship between the different types of attention. By considering the relationship between positive and negative attention, I examined the dy-namics and potential feedback between the different types of attention as well as how such a relationship affects subsidiary activities.

Additionally, existing research has primarily been conducted in low-con-text cultures (e.g., Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Conroy & Collings, 2016), meaning a context in which communication explicitly exchanges information and ideas, while nonverbal communication is less significant. To further de-velop our understanding of mechanisms involved in how headquarters atten-tion is received by subsidiaries, it is valuable to examine attention in a high-context culture, in which the context of communication is important, long-standing personal relationships are valuable and face-to-face communication is more significant than written communication (Money, Gilly, & Graham, 1998; Pascale, 1978). The difference between high- and low-context cultures can potentially affect the mechanisms involved in shaping subsidiaries’ expe-rience of headquarters attention.

It is important to note that I have used the label negative attention for the sake of consistency with previous research. During the course of my research I conceptually develop and empirically show (in Paper III) a more nuanced perspective on this type of attention, relabeled as monitoring attention. This implies active engagement from headquarters, and is distinct from formalized, automatic monitoring. This corresponds well with existing research, in which negative attention and monitoring are captured in terms of frequency of head-quarters’ reviewing subsidiary actions and decisions (Ambos et al., 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008).

Subsidiary Issue Selling Issue selling is closely connected to attention, since it is about how subsidiary managers (or middle managers) can use different strategies to attract head-quarters attention (or that of top managers) (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). It is about a stimulus that works to direct attention to certain aspects of interest at the exclusion of competing aspects that risk influencing choice in a different direction (Simon, 1947). More specifically, issue selling is concerned with “individuals’ behaviors that are directed toward affecting others’ attention to and understanding of issues” (Dutton & Ashford, 1993: 398). By using differ-ent selling tactics, subsidiaries highlight issues of strategic importance to them, as they try to attract headquarters attention and involvement, and play a role in determining the focus of organizational attention and future strategy

33

(Bishop, Webber, & O'Neill, 2011; Cyert & March, 1963; Gammelgaard, 2009; Ling, Floyd, & Baldridge, 2005).

Engaging in issue selling enables subsidiaries to bring together ideas and opportunities that they have detected in ways that seek to focus headquarters attention and invite involvement. Subsidiaries can conduct issue selling by focusing on three different moves: packaging, involvement, and timing (Dutton et al., 2001). Such moves are especially important since headquarters managers are exposed to a great deal of busyness and different stimuli, and their decisions largely depend on which stimuli are presented (Simon, 1947).

It is important for subsidiaries to package their issues by actively promoting and connecting the issues to other issues within their MNC, since attention is scarce (Dutton et al., 2001). Subsidiaries can enhance the packaging by con-ducting an internal search, identifying internal needs and constraints to align the framing, or packaging, of the issues they are presenting (Monteiro, 2015). Headquarters managers tend to pay attention to issues that are of greater value and relevance to the MNC (Ocasio, 1997). By packaging the issue in a way that demonstrates how it links to existing needs within the MNC, the subsidi-ary will likely reduce uncertainty and resistance, and be able to attract head-quarters’ attention (Monteiro, 2015). The subsidiary is then able to guide headquarters attention toward strategically important issues, increasing head-quarters’ knowledge about subsidiary activities, and in turn, attracting value adding involvement.

In addition to packaging issues to catch headquarters’ attention, subsidiar-ies need to choose whom to involve in their efforts. Actively promoting and connecting the issue to existing issues and goals help subsidiaries highlight the relevance and larger scope, at which point involving other subsidiaries in the efforts may be important. The impact of the issue selling efforts can be further enhanced by involving other subsidiaries in its efforts (Dutton et al., 2001). The issue appears more credible and relevant to the headquarters if the subsidiary can match it with, and incorporate the support of specific internal actors (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Monteiro, 2015). Therefore, the prospect of headquarters attention is likely to increase.

Financial and strategic factors may also need to be considered. It is less likely that the headquarters will engage with an issue that requires a significant investment if the MNC is suffering financially. Similarly, the headquarters is less likely to be overly committed to a suggested acquisition if the strategic focus is organic growth. Demonstrating such awareness of how the subsidiary fits in and serves the purpose of the MNC will benefit the subsidiary by de-creasing headquarters resistance.

Although the issue may be packaged in a relevant way, and involvement by others may be achieved, the timing may be wrong. To successfully influ-ence headquarters attention and involvement through issue selling, subsidiar-ies need to have a sense of when it is appropriate to push an issue or when it is more suitable to wait. Previous research shows that the level of accumulated

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support throughout the organization, expectations for action regarding the is-sue, and the level of convincing facts available were common aspects of tim-ing used when judging when to go ahead with issue selling efforts (Dutton et al., 2001).

Foreign subsidiaries are established as a way for MNCs to access diverse and novel knowledge from their local networks (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986). However, paradoxically, opportunities presented by foreign subsidiaries risk being met with resistance (Monteiro, 2015). Well-executed issue selling ef-forts help subsidiaries highlight important opportunities and needs, increasing headquarters knowledge about their activities. This way headquarters can tar-get their involvement in a beneficial way, related to the subsidiaries’ goals and needs, increasing the value added potential of the involvement.

The issue selling literature has primarily focused on the antecedents of is-sue selling in terms of the motives of subsidiary managers to share strategic issues with headquarters managers, and the issue selling process in terms of selling moves and tactics used (Ling et al., 2005). Therefore, this thesis seeks to complement earlier research by examining the consequences of issue sell-ing and how the types of issues highlighted by subsidiary managers affect headquarters attention and involvement.

The Need for Further Exploration MNCs are complex organizations with internationally dispersed activities. Headquarters are responsible for coordinating subsidiary activities and re-sources (Holm et al., 1995). However, headquarters managers are constrained by their limited information processing ability, making it challenging to add value when getting involved in subsidiary activities. This also raises questions concerning headquarters’ ability to achieve a parenting advantage and make strategic decisions to allocate resources and improve subsidiary performance. However, subsidiaries can use bottom-up processes, such as issue selling to influence headquarters attention and involvement (Cyert & March, 1963; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Simon, 1947).

Despite such challenges, previous research suggests that positive headquar-ters attention is a crucial resource for subsidiaries (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Hansen & Haas, 2001). Yet, headquarters involvement can have both beneficial and detrimental consequences for subsidiary innovation activities (e.g., Ciabuschi et al., 2011a; Ciabuschi et al., 2012b). These varied findings speak to the demanding situation faced by MNC headquarters, which are am-plified since they have to allocate attention and resources to functionally di-verse and globally dispersed subsidiaries (Levy, 2005). Therefore, it is im-portant to study the headquarters-subsidiary relationship to understand differ-ent decision-making processes in MNCs and how they are affected by the ten-sion between global integration and local responsiveness. However, few

35

studies have examined the impact of headquarters attention and involvement on subsidiaries’ perception of their relationships with headquarters.

By incorporating the attention-based view (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ocasio, 1997) with the parenting literature (Goold et al., 1994a) I seek to com-plement earlier research and contribute to our understanding of how headquar-ters attention and involvement affects subsidiaries and their relationships with headquarters in MNCs, and the value added and subtracted experienced by subsidiaries. Examining these themes within the headquarters-subsidiary rela-tionship is especially valuable, due to the enhanced complexity of managing functionally diverse and globally dispersed subsidiaries, and the challenges associated with managing a group of units with goals, knowledge, and prefer-ences that vary across countries and continents (Cyert & March, 1963). Fur-thermore, although the headquarters possesses hierarchical authority, it has limited knowledge about what goes on throughout the organization. Its deci-sions tend to be based on information transferred from the subsidiaries (Cyert & March, 1963). Such complex conditions make it especially interesting to examine the headquarters-subsidiary relationship and how it is affected by headquarters attention and involvement.

36

Data and Methods

This chapter presents the data and methods used to address the research pur-pose of this thesis and analyze the research questions posed. First, I present the overall research project within which this thesis is encompassed, followed by the research context selected for this study. This is followed by a presenta-tion of the multiple research methods used, including multiple case study re-search, qualitative data analysis, and survey research used to collect data that was analyzed using structural equation modeling. This chapter concludes by discussing ethical considerations and reflections on some challenges encoun-tered during my research process.

Do Headquarters Add Value in MNCs? This thesis is part of a larger research project, which had already been initiated before I joined. The project focused on investigating headquarters value added and how this affects subsidiary value creating activities in MNCs. Although the headquarters’ role in MNCs has been extensively discussed in the litera-ture, its ability to add value by getting involved in subsidiary activities has received limited attention despite the complexities and interdependencies be-tween corporate actors. The relevance of this issue is reinforced by research observations that headquarters often score relatively low in terms of their value adding contribution to subsidiary activities (Ambos & Mahnke, 2010). Headquarters’ contributions and involvement can even increase the risk of detrimental effects on subsidiary performance (Tran, Mahnke, & Ambos, 2010) and knowledge transfer efficiency between subsidiaries (Ciabuschi et al., 2011b; Yamin et al., 2011).

Within this research project, I had the opportunity to develop my research focus during my time as a Ph.D. student. The project focused on survey-based research, but I began my research process by conceptually exploring head-quarters’ value adding potential and subsidiaries’ value creating activities, since existing research did not provide a clear distinction between the concepts which were frequently used interchangeably. To further develop the subsidi-ary perspective on the headquarters’ potential to add value, I conducted in-depth interviews with subsidiary managers, followed by the collection of sur-vey data.

37

Research Context The Multinational Corporation This thesis focuses on MNCs and understanding the impact of headquarters at-tention and involvement on the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, and the value added and value subtracted experienced by subsidiaries. MNCs provide an interesting research context since they operate in several environments and face complex and diverse factors such as numerous employee nationalities, floating exchange rates, language differences, and multiple time zones (e.g., Chang & Taylor, 1999; Roth & Kostova, 2003). Complex organizations, such as MNCs, provide rigorous opportunities to develop and further expand theories by incorporating new explanatory variables and mechanisms (Roth & Kostova, 2003).

It is challenging for headquarters to have complete overview of what goes on throughout their dispersed and goal-disparate organizations since their ability to obtain and process information is limited (Holm et al., 1995). This leaves room for subsidiaries to influence headquarters attention and involvement in their ac-tivities. Therefore, the combination of subsidiaries increasingly gaining influ-ence and recognition for their value creating role within MNCs, and the chal-lenges headquarters face in managing such complex organizations make for an interesting empirical setting to explore the headquarters-subsidiary relationship (Roth & Kostova, 2003).

Multiple types of headquarters, and their coexistence, have been discussed in existing literature, such as divisional, functional, regional, and corporate head-quarters (Birkinshaw et al., 2006), which carry out administrative and entrepre-neurial functions (Chandler, 1991; Foss, 1997). When collecting data, respond-ents specified which headquarters was most relevant for them in terms of stra-tegic development and resource allocations. Although many respondents men-tioned having a regional headquarters, they picked the corporate headquarters as most relevant when discussing different aspects of the headquarters-subsidi-ary relationship.2

Subsidiaries are recognized for their contribution to firms’ competitive ad-vantages (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001), and serve as the unit of observation for this thesis. Data collection was carried out at the subsidiary level to help develop our understanding of how subsidiaries experi-ence headquarters attention and involvement. Limited previous research has ex-plored the impact of headquarters attention to, and involvement in subsidiary activities (Ocasio, 2011). Therefore, focusing on the subsidiary perspective helps develop our understanding of how subsidiaries experience headquarters involvement and their perception of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship.

2 While the focus during data collection was on the corporate headquarters, future research would benefit from further investigating the role and function of regional headquarters and why they were circumvented.

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Top subsidiary managers, together with other managers closely involved in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, were the main informants during the data collection. Subsidiary managers are directly involved in local subsidiary activities, so they are also familiar with the impact of headquarters involve-ment on such activities (e.g., Andersson, Dellestrand, & Pedersen, 2014). Sub-sidiary managers’ perceptions are used, since such managers have demon-strated important skills, knowledge, judgement, and the capability to make critical decisions for the subsidiary (e.g., Nell & Ambos, 2013). Furthermore, since they are part of the day-to-day business, local respondents are in a fa-vorable position to adequately assess the impact of headquarters involvement on subsidiary activities (Collis et al., 2007). Using the perception of subsidiary managers is beneficial, given the purpose of this thesis and its research ques-tions, since it allows for an understanding of how headquarters attention and involvement affects the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, as well as the value added and subtracted experienced by subsidiaries.

Relevance of the Japanese Context Examining the impact of headquarters attention and involvement in subsidiar-ies’ relationships with their headquarters in a context with well-established subsidiaries that are expected to have an important role in their MNCs, pro-vides a valuable research setting. Studying subsidiaries in an important market provides great circumstances to capture subsidiaries that are engaged in learn-ing, knowledge transfer, and competence development, which are all relevant and important aspects for subsidiary value creation (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). This allowed me to investigate subsidiaries engaged in value creation, and how different aspects of headquarters involve-ment affect these activities. It is also relevant to examine subsidiaries located in a host market that is considerably different from the headquarters’ home country to capture potential effects of cultural and country differences. A con-text with such characteristics contributes to the theoretical analysis in this the-sis, since subsidiaries are expected to have an important role in their MNCs. Therefore, headquarters should also be cautious about their involvement to ensure a well-functioning organization.

Japan is a context that encompasses these characteristics and data for this thesis was primarily collected from top managers of subsidiaries located in Tokyo. The focus was on Japanese subsidiaries of MNCs with headquarters in Sweden and Europe. Japan is an interesting research context since it is tech-nologically advanced with the world’s third largest economy, making it an important market. A presence in the Japanese market gives MNCs access to valuable customers, while facing tough competition from both Japanese and other international companies. This provides an environment in which subsid-iaries are likely to engage in learning and competence development, and in turn value creation, making them an important part of their MNCs.

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It is a particularly relevant context to study Swedish manufacturing firms and their subsidiaries, which make up a large part of this study. Many of the Swedish MNCs have a long history in Japan, establishing subsidiaries decades ago and having been present via distributors or other arrangements for even longer. They tend to have a reputation of developing innovative, high-quality products that are appreciated by the demanding Japanese customers. While Japan is an important market and subsidiaries can be expected to have a sig-nificant role in their MNCs, there are also indications that other markets may be gaining in interest and attracting more of headquarters attention.

During the course of my research, Japan’s relevance was reinforced by findings about manifestations of attention in high- and low-context cultures. Previous research on headquarters attention has primarily been conducted in low-context cultures (e.g., Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Conroy & Collings, 2016; Greve, 2008), in which communication is used to exchange information and ideas, verbal messages tend to be explicit, while nonverbal elements are less significant, and disagreements are depersonalized. To further develop our understanding of attention, it is valuable to use a high-context cultural setting to examine if different factors and mechanisms emerge as important. In a high-context culture, the context of communication is important to understand the intended meaning of the message. When, how, where, and by whom some-thing is said can be more important than what is actually (Money et al., 1998). Long-standing personal relationships are important, and face-to-face commu-nication is valued over written communication (Pascale, 1978). Such differ-ences in the extent of explicit and implicit communication, and interpretation of the message make it likely that the mechanisms involved in shaping sub-sidiaries’ experience of headquarters involvement and attention vary across low- and high-context cultures. Examining headquarters attention and in-volvement in a high-context culture is beneficial for broadening our under-standing of the mechanisms involved in shaping subsidiaries’ experience and relationship with the headquarters.

Examining headquarters attention to Japanese subsidiaries is also interest-ing given Japan’s lowering international status compared to Chinese subsidi-aries for example. For a long time, Japanese subsidiaries enjoyed high status, and several of those included in this study remain a top-five or top-ten market in their MNCs. However, it is also noticeable that other markets are gaining importance, which may result in Japanese subsidiaries feeling a sense of iso-lation or jealousy vis-à-vis other subsidiaries.

Research Methods To achieve the purpose of this thesis and answer the research questions posed, it was important to utilize a broader spectrum of methods, so both qualitative and quantitative research methods were used in the papers that make up this thesis. The various methods helped me develop a richer understanding of a

40

complex research phenomenon and allowed for more breadth and depth than a single method alone could provide (Creswell & Clark, 2007). Furthermore, the different methods complement and supplement each other, as they provide different analytical tools to understand the phenomenon. I conducted multiple case studies, relying mainly on interviews with subsidiary managers, together with archival data sources, for Papers II and III. The qualitative approach en-abled me to broadly explore the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, allow-ing different mechanisms to emerge over the course of multiple rounds of in-terviews. Additionally, I collected survey data that I analyzed using structural equation modeling in LISREL in Paper IV. This quantitative approach enabled me to examine and test the relationships between different concepts.

To gain a broad understanding of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, I conducted face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with subsidiary managers from a range of MNCs in Japan. The findings from the initial interviews were used to conduct additional rounds of interviews to develop the multiple case studies used for Papers II and III, as well as inform and update the survey before distributing it to subsidiary managers.

The different forms of data collection helped address different aspects of the research phenomenon. Table 2 presents an overview of the progression of the data collection and paper development. Qualitative methods were used for Papers II and III, since the research questions were more exploratory, while a quantitative approach was used in Paper IV, as it builds on earlier findings and tests different relationships. It is worth mentioning that the project was in-tended to primarily focus on the survey-based research. However, modifica-tions were made during the data collection processes, in light of emerging re-search interests, as well as a greater response from managers to participate in interviews than initially expected.

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Table 2. Progression of data collection and paper development

Conceptual Paper (Paper I) Conceptual paper disentangling the concepts of value added and value creation within MNCs.

Multiple Case Study (Paper II) Multiple case study based on four Japanese subsidiaries of Swedish manufacturing firms. In-depth interviews conducted to understand the challenges associated with headquarters in-volvement in subsidiary activities.

Multiple Case Study (Paper III) Comparative case study based on five Japanese subsidiaries of Swedish manufacturing firms. In-depth interviews conducted to understand the subsidiary perspective on headquar-ters allocating mixed levels and types of attention.

Survey Research (Paper IV) Data collected using a survey sent to managers of Japanese subsidiaries of European MNCs. Survey questions focused on subsidiaries’ perceptions of the headquarters-subsidiary rela-tionship and headquarters involvement.

Multiple Case Study Research I used a comparative case approach to collect the qualitative data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Case studies enabled the development of a more compre-hensive understanding of complex social relationships, making it an appropri-ate approach for underexplored research phenomena (Graebner, 2009; Yin, 2014).

Data Collection and Case Selection In total, 115 interviews were conducted with subsidiary managers in Tokyo, during two phases of qualitative data collection. Table 3 provides an overview of all the conducted interviews. The initial phase was exploratory and took place in January 2015. I conducted in-depth, face-to-face interviews with top subsidiary managers of 35 European MNCs in Japan, from a range of indus-tries (manufacturing, shipping, medical equipment, pharmaceutical and lux-ury retail) to learn more about the subsidiaries’ perception of the headquarters’ role and gain a deeper understanding of the benefits and challenges associated with the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. Although only a subset of the 35 subsidiaries underwent further investigation and a deeper analysis during Phase Two, all 35 subsidiaries and interviews conducted during Phase One are represented in Table 3.

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The interviews during Phase One provided an overview of my research phenomenon and helped inform me about themes of interest. The diverse range of interviews contributed to a broader understanding of the headquar-ters-subsidiary relationship, and allowed me to select parts of the empirical material to pursue further during additional rounds of follow-up interviews.

Table 3. Overview of conducted interviews

Company HQ location Industry Interviewed managers Number of interviews

1

Swedish Chamber of Commerce

General Manager 1

2* Sweden Manufacturing President & Representative Direc-tor, Director of Operations, Divi-sion Manager, CFO, HR Director

10

3* Sweden Manufacturing

Representative Director, CFO, Seg-ment Manager I, Segment Manager II, Asia Marketing Coordinator, Ad-ministrative Leader, Sales Support Manager

10

4* Sweden Manufacturing

President & Representative Direc-tor, Director & VP, VP, VP of Communication, Department Man-ager Business Development, Project Manager, Division Controller

11

5* Sweden Manufacturing CFO, (new) CFO, Sales Director, Sr. Manager, HR Director, Master Technician

11

6* Sweden Manufacturing Representative Director & Presi-dent, General Manager, CFO, Mar-keting Manager

8

7* Sweden Manufacturing Sr. VP I, Sr. VP II, CFO, Director I, Director II, Director III

7

8* Sweden Manufacturing President, R&D Director, R&D Manager, Project Manager R&D, Engineering Integration Manager

5

9 Sweden Manufacturing CFO, HR Director, Sr. Management Advisor 4

10 Sweden Manufacturing Representative Director & General Manager 1

11 Sweden Manufacturing President 1

12 Norway Manufacturing General Manager, Chief Engineer R&D

2

13 UK Manufacturing President & CEO 1

14 Denmark Analytical solutions

President & Representative Direc-tor, Application Manager 2

15 Norway Reverse vending

President 1

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16 Norway Logistics

Head of Region East Asia, Head of Trade I Head of Trade II, Head of Sales, Head of Operations, Port Op-erations Assistant

7

17 Germany Logistics Managing Director, Operations Manager

2

18 Denmark Logistics Managing Director 1

19 Sweden Logistics General Manager Procurement Asia Pacific

1

20 Sweden Home appliances

Head of Region Japan and Korea 1

21 Sweden Telecommuni-cation Sales Director 1

22 Sweden IT systems Managing Director 1

23 Sweden Education President 1

24 Sweden Medical equipment

President & Representative Direc-tor, CFO, Director I, HR Director, Sr. Advisor

7

25 Sweden Medical equipment

HR Director, Controller 1

26 Denmark Pharmaceutical

President & Representative Direc-tor, VP Finance & Legal, Sr. Man-ager of Strategic Development, Di-rector I

6

27 Denmark Pharmaceutical President & Representative Direc-tor, VP R&D, HR Director 3

28 Italy Luxury fashion President & Representative Director 1

29 Italy Luxury fashion Flagship Store Manager 1

30 Italy Luxury fashion COO 1

31 Italy Luxury fashion President & CEO 1

32 Switzerland Luxury watch brand Representative Director & CEO 1

33 France Cosmetics VP R&D Asia Pacific Operations 1

34 France Gourmet foods Country Manager 1

35 Greece Jewelry President & CEO Asia Pacific 1

Total interviews: 115

* Denotes subsidiaries that underwent a deeper analysis, according to the selection criteria described below and constitutes the data in Papers II and III.

The interview questions were generally broad, and open-ended to encourage interviewees to elaborate on their answers (Yin, 2014). This was also in line with the exploratory nature of the research during Phase One. The interviews lasted for an hour on average. I started the interviews by explaining my re-search topic and the purpose of the interviews. The managers were then asked to describe their professional background and tenure at the MNC to establish

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their profiles. This also helped ensure that those I was interviewing had con-tact with the headquarters and were in a position to inform me about my re-search topic. Examples of the main questions that I asked during the initial interviews include: “What does the headquarters do when it gets involved?” “What effect does headquarters involvement have on your subsidiary activi-ties?” “What are benefits and challenges associated with headquarters in-volvement?”

Several themes of interest emerged during the interviews conducted during Phase One, which I pursued further in a subset of the initial 35 subsidiaries. Managers described both benefits and challenges associated with headquarters involvement, as well as receiving mixed (positive and negative) attention from headquarters. These themes were explored further in seven subsidiaries during multiple rounds of interviews during Phase Two of the data collection.

The selection of the seven subsidiaries to pursue further during Phase Two was based on theoretical sampling (Yin, 2014) to capture variance in terms of how subsidiaries experienced headquarters involvement (Paper II), and the level and type of attention that the subsidiaries received (Paper III). The sub-sidiaries were selected because the themes of interest were present during the initial phase of interviews, limiting the group of subsidiaries from which to select. Several subsidiaries were of interests and willing to participate in ad-ditional interviews.3 To minimize variance in areas that were not of primary interest for the analysis, the selected subsidiaries all have their headquarters in Sweden, are within the manufacturing industry, and had sales and produc-tion mandates in Japan, with some also having R&D. This allowed the analy-sis to focus on variance in the themes of interest, rather than being distracted by variance from other characteristics. The manufacturing industry was espe-cially interesting because most of the interviewed subsidiaries had sales and production mandates, which suggests they had a more advanced role in their MNCs compared to other interviewed Japanese subsidiaries in the shipping or luxury retail industries, for example, which primarily focused on sales. Both the medical equipment and pharmaceutical industries are strictly regulated, limiting the freedom of their subsidiaries to act in the host market and influ-ence the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. With such factors in mind, in addition to the presence of the research themes of interest, the seven subsidi-aries described in Table 4 underwent further analysis during Phase Two of the data collection process.

Multiple cases were used in Papers II and III, since they enable a broader investigation of the research questions and allows for complementarities and comparisons between the cases, which helps expose nuances that enhance the-ory development (Eisenhardt, 1991; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Multiple managers with different roles were selected in each subsidiary to better under-

3 See Paper III for an example of how several of the initial 35 subsidiaries are mapped according to the findings, showing their relevance despite not being selected to participate in Phase Two.

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stand how they were affected by headquarters attention and involvement. The-ory development was enhanced by multiple interviews conducted on several occasions. More specifically, Phase Two consisted of multiple rounds of fol-low-up interviews with subsidiaries, in which the themes of interest were pre-sent, and managers were willing to participate in additional interviews. Face-to-face follow-up interviews were conducted in April 2015 and August 2016, and additional Skype interviews were conducted in May 2017. These inter-views enabled me to ask more specific questions about emergent themes and develop a deeper understanding of the subsidiaries’ experiences of headquar-ters attention and involvement.

Paper II provides a more detailed explanation of case selection and the in-terviews with the four subsidiaries (Companies 3, 5, 7, and 8) that experienced value subtraction, as well as the findings. The subsidiaries are intentionally diverse in their characteristics. They vary in type of ownership, and MNC and subsidiary size. However, they are all in the manufacturing industry, with headquarters in Sweden. The differences are intentional and allows for con-structive variance and interesting comparisons between subsidiaries with a range of knowledge, capabilities and recognition within their MNCs (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991).

The subsidiaries included in the exploration of different types and levels of headquarters attention are Companies 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, and a more detailed explanation of the case selection as well as findings can be found in Paper III. The subsidiaries vary in age but are all well-established and have been in Ja-pan for at least 10 years. They all belong to Swedish manufacturing firms with a global reach. The subsidiaries all have sales and production mandates, apart from Jupiter, which also has a R&D mandate.

All interviews were audio recorded with the interviewees’ consent and later transcribed. Several of the managers were interviewed on multiple occasions to help reduce potential biases. Interviewees’ anonymity was emphasized to encourage openness and candidness of their answers (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011; Graebner, 2009). Archival sources, such as annual reports, press re-leases, and newspaper articles were used to support and compare answers from the interviews.

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Tab

le 4

. Des

crip

tion

of c

ase

firm

s an

d da

ta fr

om P

aper

s II

and

III

Ch

arac

teri

stic

s

Com

pan

y 2

(Nep

tun

e in

Pap

er

III)

Com

pan

y 3

(Ep

silo

n in

Pap

er I

I an

d V

enu

s in

Pap

er

III)

Com

pan

y 4

(Ju

pit

er in

Pap

er I

II)

Com

pan

y 5

(Gam

ma

in P

aper

II

and

Sat

urn

in P

aper

II

I)

Com

pan

y 6

(Mer

cury

in P

aper

II

I)

Com

pan

y 7

(Lam

bd

a in

Pap

er I

I)

Com

pan

y 8

(Zet

a in

Pap

er I

I)

Ind

ust

ry

Man

ufac

turi

ng

Man

ufac

turi

ng

Man

ufac

turi

ng

Man

ufac

turi

ng

Man

ufac

turi

ng

Man

ufac

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47

Qualitative Data Analysis I used multiple techniques to increase the trustworthiness of the qualitative data collection, such as granting anonymity, within-subsidiary triangulation, multiple interviews with several managers, and multiple iterations of data analysis moving between data and theory (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I wrote case stories and triangulated interview data with additional data sources (Jick, 1979).

The data was coded using NVivo 10 and analyzed in an iterative manner, moving between data, literature, and theory to refine my findings, while relat-ing them to existing theories and elaborating my findings (Arora et al., 2016). Existing research on both headquarters involvement (Ciabuschi et al., 2011a; Ciabuschi et al., 2012b; Dellestrand, 2011), and attention (Ambos et al., 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) primarily relied on survey-based research for data collection. Since such methods do not capture the details of the mecha-nism involved and the nuances of headquarters involvement and different types and levels of attention, I analyzed the interviews broadly, without a pri-ori hypotheses in mind, but with existing literature as inspiration.

To analyze subsidiaries experiencing value subtraction for Paper II, I fo-cused on identifying occasions when subsidiaries discussed challenges or ex-pressed concern or frustration regarding headquarters involvement. The find-ings were triangulated with other interviews conducted within the same MNC, site visits, and annual reports, whenever possible. I focused on instances when managers felt demotivated or mentioned their subsidiary suffering from op-portunity loss. Managers also discussed how misaligned priorities with head-quarters and ill-fitting standardization contributed to such an experience. The data analysis process sought to identify instances of friction in the headquar-ters-subsidiary relationship and explain subsidiaries’ experience of headquar-ters involvement at such times.

Paper III examines subsidiaries receiving different types and levels of at-tention. Previous studies have measured attention but relied on methods that did not capture subsidiaries receiving varying levels of positive and monitor-ing attention, nor how this affected subsidiaries. Therefore, my coding was inspired by the attention literature, while remaining open. I coded the inter-views broadly to capture previously overlooked insights. The attention litera-ture drew my focus to comments by interviewees about receiving recognition, support, and resources from headquarters, as well as occurrences of reporting, reviewing, and control exercised by headquarters.

To analyze positive attention, I identified instances when managers dis-cussed their subsidiaries receiving resources and support (tangible and intan-gible) and headquarters taking an interest in learning about the subsidiary. Headquarters’ visits emerged from the data as an important source of recog-nition and support, which was not highlighted by previous research. Managers also discussed situations in which headquarters monitored and controlled cer-

48

tain activities, and these were coded as monitoring attention. Rules and rou-tines for getting headquarters’ approval for different decisions were also con-sidered monitoring attention if they required active engagement from head-quarters, rather than formalized, automatic processes. This is in line with pre-viously used measures of negative attention, which focused on the frequency of headquarters reviewing subsidiary actions such as operating expenditures, budgeting, and strategic business plans (e.g., Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008).

First order, in vivo codes were developed for both studies, based on the expressions used by managers to develop a detailed representation of the data. In an iterative process, the first order codes were further informed by theoret-ical concepts reflected in the data. Second-order themes were created by grouping thematically similar and reoccurring codes. During the final stage, the first order codes and second order themes derived from the data were care-fully reviewed together with existing literature and emerging findings to en-sure that the identified dimensions represent the data (e.g., Conroy & Collings, 2016).

Survey Research The survey was constructed during multiple project meetings and went through iterations of feedback from both academics and business managers before being distributed. This was largely completed before I joined the pro-ject as a Ph.D. student, but I had the opportunity to modify aspects of the sur-vey based on my research interest and themes that emerged from initial inter-views. The distributed survey included themes capturing headquarters’ re-source allocations and value added to subsidiaries, knowledge transfer from both headquarters and subsidiaries, headquarters’ benevolence, and subsidiary issue selling, influence and performance. The questions were primarily an-swered using a Likert type scale.

Japanese subsidiaries of European MNCs made up the target population for this survey. More specifically, the survey was distributed to Japanese subsid-iaries of MNCs headquartered in Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Nether-lands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. All these countries are located in the northern part of Europe. Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the Nether-lands are all relatively small, while Germany and the UK are among the largest countries in Europe.

The selection of subsidiaries was made based on membership in the respec-tive countries’ chambers of industry and commerce in Japan. However, mem-bership is open to a broad range of companies, hence Japanese companies and companies with headquarters located in countries other than that of the cham-ber were excluded from the sample. Furthermore, financial service companies were also excluded.

49

Subsidiary managers served as respondents, which is an advantage since they are directly involved in the local subsidiary activities and are more famil-iar with the local impact of headquarters involvement (e.g., Andersson et al., 2014). Additionally, subsidiary managers tend to have demonstrated im-portant skills, knowledge, judgement, and the capability to make critical deci-sions for the subsidiary by the time they are appointed to senior positions (e.g., Nell & Ambos, 2013). Although self-reported assessments may contain errors, subsidiary managers involved in the day-to-day business are in a favorable position to explicitly evaluate headquarters (Collis et al., 2007: 399).

The survey data was collected in three rounds, in April 2015, May 2016, and May 2017. Many of the surveys were distributed in paper form, together with a stamped envelope, to the members of the Scandinavian chambers dur-ing interviews and other occasions during the initial round of data collection in 2015. When I distributed the surveys in paper form, I had met the respond-ents for an interview relating to the qualitative data collection process, giving me an opportunity to explain the research project and the purpose of the sur-vey. None of the managers wanted to complete the survey at that time, so I left it and a stamped envelope for them to complete and return at their con-venience. The response rate for the paper surveys was almost 100 percent.

The later rounds consisted of an online survey and an introduction email containing the link to the survey (hosted via Google Forms) that was distrib-uted to the respondents. The email introduced me as a Ph.D. researcher at Uppsala University, together with others involved in the project. It also ex-plained the purpose of the survey and emphasized the anonymity of the results. To improve the response rate, follow-up reminders were sent after the initial survey distribution. Although the response rate was high, there was reluctance, and several of those who did not complete the survey expressed concerns re-garding the survey being hosted via a non-university sponsored link and the information requested being too sensitive.

In total, 182 subsidiaries from the different chambers of commerce re-ceived the survey. The total sample analyzed included 93 Japanese subsidiar-ies, with an overall response rate of 51 percent. The response rate across the members of the different chambers varied from a low of 41 percent (Denmark) to a high of 68 percent (Sweden). A majority of the respondents were subsid-iary executive officers, while the remaining respondents were financial, mar-keting, sales, or production managers, all of whom closely interacted with their headquarters. I obtained answers from multiple managers in most sub-sidiaries, and subsequently performed t-tests between answers from managers within a subsidiary on selected items and found no significant difference be-tween answers. Consequently, the analysis builds on multiple answers from most subsidiaries that were averaged for each item. The data quality is rela-tively high, with missing values at 5 percent or less. Multiple imputation in LISREL 8.80 was used to replace missing values with means due to the small sample size.

50

The collected survey data was used to write Paper IV. The data was ana-lyzed using a structural equation model and a LISREL analysis testing the relationships between subsidiary issue selling, headquarters involvement, and subsidiary influence and performance.

Ethical Considerations To the best of my knowledge, I have complied with established ethical norms for conducting research for this thesis. All interviewees and survey respond-ents were informed about the research being conducted and how their answers would be used (i.e. primarily for academic publications), enabling respondents to provide informed consent before participating (Diener & Crandall, 1978). Survey respondents received an introductory letter with the survey, providing an explanation of the data collection process as well as privacy assurance that no individual or firm-specific information would be disclosed in the publica-tions. All participation was voluntary, and neither interviewees nor respond-ents received any financial incentives to participate in the study. Participating managers and companies were offered anonymity, hence pseudonyms are used for company names and only titles are used to describe interviewees (see Papers II and III).

My Ph.D. studies and data collection were partly financed by several ex-ternal sources, the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation, the Berch & Borgström Fund, the Anna Maria Lundin Travel Grant, the Sasakawa Foun-dation, which I disclose in all academic output (i.e. conference papers and journal submissions) associated with this data, and state that the findings have not been influenced by the funding received (Bryman & Bell, 2011).

Reflections on the Research Process The survey data collection process presented significant challenges, mainly related to the design, length, and distribution of the survey. The first page of the survey requested personal information about the respondent, and contact information for the respondent and their managers. Such detailed information made several potential respondents uncomfortable, despite my assurance that the information would be anonymized when analyzed and presented. The use of an online survey hosted by Google Forms due to the lack of a university hosted survey tool raised additional concerns among potential respondents re-garding anonymity, access to the survey answers, and my credibility as a re-searcher. One manager, who declined to participate in the survey replied to my invitation email detailing his concerns as such:

51

“Due to identity/confidentiality/social engineering risks there is no way I would answer this kind of survey. It just asks for way too much information that could be used in a damaging way, especially considering this is just an email and an online form (not even hosted or linked on an official university page.) Please understand social engineering is an actual risk for companies. I hope this feedback helps you in your research.”

A consideration for future research is to distribute the survey without request-ing detailed personal information from the respondents, since it may be con-sidered invasive and deter managers from participating.

Distributing the survey via headquarters is another consideration to encour-age managers to participate when the research has been endorsed by headquar-ters. However, this presents a double-edged sword since research supported by the headquarters may increase subsidiaries’ willingness to participate, but it also risks having the researcher perceived as a “headquarters spy” (Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen, & Tahvanainen, 2002: 621). I contacted sub-sidiary managers directly for both the survey research and the interviews to minimize the risk of being perceived as relaying information to the headquar-ters.

It was relatively easier to arrange interviews than to get respondents for the survey. However, finding a balance between following the interview questions and being open to new ideas that emerged during the interviews was challeng-ing. At times, the managers had a preconceived idea of what they wanted to share and thoughts that they wanted to discuss, however when these signifi-cantly differed from my intention with the interview it was challenging to keep the focus without dismissing aspects that the interviewee considered more im-portant. Although there were some challenges during the interviews, the man-agers who agreed to be interviewed were in general willing to share and spend time discussing my research. Many of them expressed interest in the topic and highlighted its importance. Top subsidiary managers, especially expats are of-ten isolated, in that they do not have colleagues in the subsidiary to discuss certain concerns with and have difficulty relating to headquarters managers, since they are far away both geographically and in terms of responsibilities. Therefore, the interviews sometimes resembled therapy sessions, with the managers opening up and providing rich data during longer interviews, appre-ciating an attentive listener (Welch et al., 2002). While their time and open-ness were greatly appreciated, it increased the challenge of balancing the structure of the interview between prepared questions and remaining open to ideas that emerged throughout the interviews, as well as analyzing the inter-views and identifying aspects of relevance for theory development.

52

Summary of the Papers

This chapter presents a summary of the four papers included in this thesis. The papers were specifically ordered based on their research focus. Paper I pro-vides a conceptual overview of value generation in MNCs by distinguishing between value added and value creation taking place within MNCs. The em-pirical papers that follow focus on different ways that headquarters can add and subtract value from subsidiary activities. Paper II explores the effects of misguided headquarters involvement in subsidiary activities and highlights when and why subsidiaries experience value subtraction. Paper III examines headquarters’ parenting styles that emerged from different types and levels of attention being allocated to subsidiaries. While Papers II and III are qualita-tive, Paper IV is based on a structural equation model, with a LISREL analysis of survey data. It examines the effect of subsidiary issue selling on headquar-ters involvement, and how this affects subsidiary influence and performance. Table 6 provides an overview of the main findings of the four papers.

Paper I: Value Generation in the Multinational Corporation MNCs are complex, internationally dispersed, and goal-disparate organiza-tions with influence distributed among different units. As markets become in-creasingly competitive, it is important for MNCs to generate value. Both head-quarters and subsidiaries are responsible for contributing to value generation, albeit they may do so in different ways. This builds on the notion that it is possible to discern two separate concepts that relate to value generation, namely value creation and value added. These concepts are often used inter-changeably (sometimes even in the same paper), without a clear distinction as to what they de facto reflect or what their underlying mechanisms of value creation and value added might be. This book chapter seeks to disentangle differences in the unit and level of analysis, as well as differences in the ter-minology to highlight that they are distinct phenomena with separate features and characteristics, which makes it problematic to use the concepts as syno-nyms.

Based on a set of assumptions regarding headquarters-subsidiary relations, conceptual arguments related to value generation are developed. Teasing out the differences between the concepts becomes important, as it leads to a fuller

53

understanding of what headquarters do in different situations and what the headquarters-subsidiary relationship entails for value generation.

Characteristics inherent to value adding activities make them suitable to be carried out by headquarters, while the value creation process is more appro-priately conducted by subsidiaries. The phenomena can be further distin-guished by focusing on differences between the meaning of adding and creat-ing. On the one hand, ‘to add’ is a verb that means “to join (something) to something else so as to increase the amount, size, importance, etc.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017). This corresponds well with the conceptualization of value adding activities as activities that seek to add something to something else to positively contribute to the value creation process. On the other hand, ‘to create’ is a verb that means “to bring into being, cause to exist; esp. to produce where nothing was before” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017). This definition is in line with the conceptualization of the value creation process, which is about ensuring that the final product or service is worth more than the individual parts. This is captured by the term ‘create’ since it is about caus-ing something to exist that did not previously exist in that form. Value creation is more complex than adding multiple parts together in a beneficial way since it is about combining parts to create value that did not previously exist.

Overall, net positive value is created for MNCs when the benefits of the value creation process outweigh the related costs, including those of the value adding activities conducted. Due to the differences in the concepts, as well as the unit and level of analysis, differentiating the concepts is important to add analytical power, open up new avenues for research, and more thoroughly un-derstand headquarters’ role and function, as well as the headquarters-subsidi-ary relationship in MNCs.

In this chapter, we argue that value adding activities tend to be conducted by headquarters, but are dependent on varying knowledge situations of head-quarters, while the value creation process tends to occur at the subsidiary level. Establishing differences between the concepts enables increased analytical power when analyzing complex organizations such as MNCs and can provide a greater understanding of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. Value adding activities are some of the most important tasks performed by headquar-ters, which is why they are the focus of this chapter. Increasing our under-standing of the differences between the concepts allows for a more detailed description of headquarters, as well as when and how headquarters involve-ment at the subsidiary level can improve subsidiary performance. Further-more, it allows for a closer look at the roles and functions of the different units, and how they contribute to value generation in MNCs.

54

Paper II: Headquarters Involvement in Subsidiary Activities: When and why do subsidiaries experience value subtraction? Subsidiaries are recognized for competence development and their potential to create value for MNCs (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, & Nilsson, 2015; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001), which are essential for firms to sustain their competitive advantage (Narula, 2014). To encourage subsidiaries’ value creating activities, headquarters can become involved and initiate activities such as knowledge sharing, synergy management, strategic decision making, and the utilization and allocation of resources to pursue such strategies to enhance subsidiary and MNC performance (Chandler, 1991; Goold, 1996). Such value adding efforts constitute headquarters’ parenting advantage, which is focused on headquarters’ potential to add value to their subsidiaries through management capabilities, sharing resources, and synergy management (e.g. Foss, 1997; Goold et al., 1994b; Nell & Ambos, 2013).

Headquarters’ parenting advantage can add value when headquarters see opportunities to improve subsidiaries’ performance, sufficiently understand the subsidiaries’ business, and have skills and resources to contribute (Goold et al., 1998). Such involvement requires extensive knowledge of subsidiary activities, which can be gained through embeddedness in the subsidiary net-work (Nell & Ambos, 2013). However, with subsidiaries functionally and ge-ographically dispersed, it can be challenging for headquarters to achieve their parenting advantage, because they may not be able to accommodate the needs of, and opportunities available to different subsidiaries (Ciabuschi et al., 2011b; Goold & Campbell, 1998).

Although previous research has shown both beneficial and detrimental consequences of headquarters involvement (e.g. Ciabuschi et al., 2011a; Ciabuschi et al., 2012b), this paper focuses on understanding when and why subsidiaries experience misguided headquarters involvement and what the consequences may be. I used an inductive, qualitative study to explore in-stances in which tension occurred in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship and illustrate how subsidiaries experience value subtraction. Previous research has mainly relied on survey-based studies when investigating the effects of headquarters involvement. By using a more granular approach (e.g. Monteiro & Birkinshaw, 2017), I was able to examine mechanisms involved in shaping the subsidiaries’ experience of headquarters involvement.

I identified two specific forms of value subtraction – demotivation and op-portunity loss – and illustrate how each of these manifests in subsidiaries. This research begins to fill a gap in terms of empirical work examining value sub-traction by showing that misguided headquarters involvement can hamper subsidiary activities and demotivate managers. These concerns are critical, as tension and problems in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship will affect

55

performance if subsidiaries are dissatisfied with their headquarters. With sub-sidiaries making important contributions to MNCs’ competitive advantage (e.g. Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001), problems in their relationship with headquarters can nega-tively affect both subsidiary and MNC performance if they cannot carry out their activities. Therefore, it is important to better understand when and why subsidiaries experience value subtraction.

Paper III: Different Parenting Styles: Examining Supportive and Monitoring Attention from Headquarters to Subsidiaries Headquarters and their ability to add value to their subsidiaries is a research topic that continues to receive increasing scholarly interest (Nell & Ambos, 2013). One key way that headquarters add value is by allocating attention to subsidiaries, which has been shown to increase their performance (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Plourde et al., 2014). Attention is a scarce and important resource, since the focus of headquarters managers affects corporate strategy and subsidiaries’ resource allocations and ability to act on opportunities (Cyert & March, 1963; Monteiro, 2015).

Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008), and most subsequent research (e.g. Bouquet et al., 2009; Plourde et al., 2014), has focused on positive attention, described as the extent to which headquarters recognize and acknowledge a subsidiary’s contribution to the MNC (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008: 579). This stream of literature explicitly or implicitly assumes that the more positive attention a subsidiary receives, the better.

Despite their exclusive focus on positive attention, it is important to note that in their original work, Bouquet and Birkinshaw also explicitly acknowledge the existence of “negative forms of attention” characterized as “corporate control – that is, procedures undertaken by headquarters managers to monitor and evaluate subsidiary activities” (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008: 586). Yet, we do not know whether and under what circumstances subsidiaries perceive negative attention as such, nor whether it has a negative impact on their relationships with headquarters. There is very limited research examin-ing negative attention, how it is manifested, and what effects it has on subsid-iaries (recent exceptions are: Ambos et al., 2010; Conroy & Collings, 2016). More importantly, scholars have so far neglected to explicitly examine whether headquarters concomitantly devote positive and negative attention, and how this affects subsidiaries.

It is very plausible that subsidiaries simultaneously receive a mix of posi-tive and negative attention, similar to how parents likely give a combination of supportive and monitoring attention to their children to balance encourage-

56

ment with control to guide their children’s development. Therefore, it is im-portant to investigate whether, when, and how different types (positive/nega-tive) and levels (high/low) of attention affect how subsidiaries perceive their relationships with headquarters.

In order to examine this, we used a more granular research design (e.g., Monteiro & Birkinshaw, 2017) to observe the possible coexistence of positive and negative headquarters attention to subsidiaries. As much as annual reports and surveying subsidiary CEOs have been very useful to show the effects of positive attention on performance (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008), we chose to investigate this phenomenon through a quali-tative multiple case study. By triangulating secondary data with field observa-tions and multiple interviews in five subsidiaries of Swedish MNCs in Japan, we were able to develop a more detailed understanding of the different facets involved in the (often simultaneous) manifestation of support and monitoring by headquarters to subsidiaries.

The main theoretical contributions of this paper are to the attention-based view (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ocasio, 1997), and the parenting litera-ture (Goold et al., 1998; Nell & Ambos, 2013). First, it provides a more nu-anced understanding of positive attention and its effects on subsidiaries. Ad-ditionally, highlights circumstances under which monitoring attention can be perceived as positive by subsidiaries, showing that it can have beneficial im-plications if combined with high levels of positive attention. Second, building on these effects, we take an inductive approach to identify five types of par-enting in an attention-based parenting typology – Satisfying, Hyper-attentive, Abandoning, Hindering, and Custodian.

Paper IV: Gauging subsidiary influence and performance through strategic issue selling and the involvement of headquarters in subsidiary activities Research on MNCs have found that subsidiaries actively shape their own roles, as well as influence corporate strategies (e.g., Ambos et al., 2010; Birkinshaw, 1997; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). In fact, an MNC can be viewed as a network of units resembling a loosely coupled organization (Andersson et al., 2007), in which subsidiaries strive to gain influence over their own operations, as well as the operations of others. At the same time, certain subsidiary structures and processes drive headquarters involvement in subsidiary activities (Cavanagh, Freeman, Kalfadellis, & Cavusgil, 2017; Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012). This builds on the observation that headquar-ters need to keep informed about the needs and resources dispersed throughout MNC networks, which trigger headquarters’ actions (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001). Headquarters are active players in the MNC arena as they respond to

57

stimuli, pay attention to selected issues, and get involved in subsidiary activi-ties (Andersson et al., 2007; Simon, 1947).

Headquarters’ involvement is a way of concretizing attention allocation and allows for empirically capturing and analyzing the elusive and abstract concept of attention (Ocasio, 1997, 2011). There have been multiple calls for research on the application of the attention-based view of the firm (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2011; Bouquet et al., 2009; Ocasio, 2011). This paper attempts to fill that gap. Investigating headquarters’ involvement addresses the call for research about specifying the meta-construct of headquarters’ attention in that “research investigating the unique qualities of effective global leaders should broaden its focus to include their concrete attention practices, rather than fo-cusing solely on the particular cognitive tendencies they demonstrate in stra-tegic decision-making activities” (Bouquet et al., 2009: 124). Furthermore, Rugman and Verbeke (2001) link attention as a generic concept to parental involvement, by which headquarters can recognize and support promising subsidiaries. This is especially important since internally isolated subsidiaries rarely engage in knowledge sharing activities and risk having a lower perfor-mance than other subsidiaries (Monteiro et al., 2008). Thus, involvement cap-tures headquarters’ actual behavior. In doing so, organizational behaviors, pri-orities, and concerns are addressed, which are quintessential themes for stud-ying organizations (Gavetti et al., 2007; Ocasio, 1997; Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994). Despite a recent scholarly interest in headquarters involvement (e.g., Ciabuschi et al., 2017; Decreton, Dellestrand, Kappen, & Nell, 2017), there is a lack of research investigating how subsidiaries can encourage head-quarters to take an active role in subsidiary level activities and how this affects subsidiary influence over MNC decisions and subsidiary performance. I seek to fill this gap by analyzing the outcomes of headquarters involvement trig-gered by subsidiary issue selling.

I show that subsidiaries can engage in issue selling and trigger headquarters involvement when they focus on communicating issues of strategic im-portance. Furthermore, headquarters involvement directly increases subsidi-ary influence over corporate investment decisions and improves their perfor-mance compared to competitors. This helps improve our understanding of how subsidiaries can gain influence within MNCs, which in turn has a positive effect on subsidiary performance. Furthermore, my findings suggest that head-quarters involvement, in terms of resource allocations, as well as close inter-action and cooperation with subsidiaries, has a stronger effect on subsidiary performance than subsidiary influence does.

58

Tab

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atin

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emes

rel

ated

to

val

ue g

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atio

n w

ithi

n M

NC

s an

d ex

amin

e di

stin

c-ti

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betw

een

valu

e cr

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on

and

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e ad

ded.

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cept

ual

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n V

alue

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val

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h he

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rs a

nd s

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diar

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are

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onsi

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for

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ribu

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to M

NC

val

ue g

ener

atio

n bu

t do

so

in d

iffe

rent

way

s. D

iffe

renc

es b

etw

een

the

conc

epts

of

val

ue a

dded

and

val

ue c

reat

ion,

and

ass

ocia

ted

activ

itie

s an

d pr

oces

ses

are

exam

ined

. Fin

ding

s su

gges

t tha

t val

ue a

ddin

g ac

tivit

ies

tend

to b

e co

n-du

cted

by

head

quar

ters

and

con

trib

ute

to s

ubsi

diar

y va

lue

crea

tion

pro

cess

es.

II

Hea

dqua

rter

s In

volv

emen

t in

Sub

sidi

ary

Act

ivit

ies:

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n an

d w

hy d

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bsid

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es e

x-pe

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ce v

alue

sub

trac

tion

?

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n an

d w

hy d

o su

bsid

iar-

ies

expe

rien

ce v

alue

sub

trac

-ti

on f

rom

hea

dqua

rter

s in

-vo

lvem

ent,

and

wha

t are

the

cons

eque

nces

ther

eof?

Qua

lita

tive

Mis

guid

ed in

volv

emen

t G

loba

l sta

ndar

diza

tion

M

isse

d op

port

unit

ies

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otiv

atio

n V

alue

sub

trac

tion

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guid

ed h

eadq

uart

ers

invo

lvem

ent r

isks

exp

os-

ing

subs

idia

ries

to v

alue

sub

trac

tion

. Inv

olve

men

t ch

arac

teri

zed

by m

isal

igne

d pr

iori

ties

and

glo

bal

stan

dard

izat

ion

expo

ses

subs

idia

ries

to v

alue

sub

-tr

acti

on in

the

form

of

oppo

rtun

ity

loss

and

dem

oti-

vati

on, w

hich

exp

oses

lim

itat

ions

in th

e he

adqu

ar-

ters

par

enti

ng r

ole

and

crea

tes

tens

ion

in th

e he

ad-

quar

ters

-sub

sidi

ary

rela

tion

ship

.

III

Dif

fere

nt P

aren

ting

Styl

es:

Exa

min

ing

Sup

port

ive

and

Mon

itor

ing

Att

enti

on f

rom

H

eadq

uart

ers

to S

ubsi

diar

ies

Whe

ther

, whe

n an

d ho

w d

o di

ffer

ent t

ypes

and

leve

ls o

f at

tent

ion

affe

ct th

e w

ay s

ub-

sidi

arie

s pe

rcei

ve th

eir

rela

-ti

onsh

ip w

ith

head

quar

ters

?

Qua

lita

tive

Pos

itiv

e at

tent

ion

Mon

itor

ing

atte

ntio

n H

eadq

uart

ers-

subs

idia

ry

rela

tion

ship

Sub

sidi

arie

s re

ceiv

e di

ffer

ent t

ypes

and

leve

ls o

f he

adqu

arte

rs a

tten

tion

and

an

atte

ntio

n-ba

sed

par-

enti

ng ty

polo

gy is

dev

elop

ed. M

ost i

nter

esti

ng is

th

e fi

ndin

g th

at n

egat

ive

atte

ntio

n, in

com

bina

tion

w

ith

posi

tive

atte

ntio

n is

con

side

red

bene

fici

al b

y su

bsid

iari

es.

IV

Gau

ging

sub

sidi

ary

infl

u-en

ce a

nd p

erfo

rman

ce

thro

ugh

stra

tegi

c is

sue

sell

-in

g an

d th

e in

volv

emen

t of

head

quar

ters

in s

ubsi

diar

y ac

tivi

ties

How

can

sub

sidi

arie

s gu

ide

head

quar

ters

’ in

volv

emen

t an

d ho

w d

oes

this

impa

ct

subs

idia

ry p

erfo

rman

ce?

Qua

ntita

tive

Sub

sidi

ary

issu

e se

llin

g H

eadq

uart

ers

invo

lvem

ent

Sub

sidi

ary

infl

uenc

e Su

bsid

iary

per

form

ance

Sub

sidi

ary

issu

e se

llin

g fo

cusi

ng o

n st

rate

gic

issu

es

driv

es h

eadq

uart

ers

invo

lvem

ent,

whi

ch h

as a

pos

i-ti

ve e

ffec

t on

subs

idia

ry in

flue

nce

over

cor

pora

te

inve

stm

ent d

ecis

ions

and

bus

ines

s pe

rfor

man

ce.

59

Conclusion

This concluding chapter presents theoretical implications for understanding the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, and contributes to the parenting lit-erature, the attention-based view, and subsidiary issues selling. These impli-cations are based on findings in the four papers summarized in the previous chapter. I then present managerial implication of my research findings, which are primarily based on the findings in the four papers, but also influenced by the larger set of interviews conducted during the initial, exploratory data col-lection phase. It is a conundrum that managers still seem to be dealing with challenges described by research conducted during the 1980s and 1990s, and I discuss important aspects for headquarters and subsidiary managers to con-sider to address this situation. Finally, I end this chapter by discussing research limitations of this study, which open up for interesting areas of future research.

Implications for Theory The Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationship in MNCs This thesis contributes to the literature by examining challenges and opportu-nities involved in managing a complex organization such as a MNC, with col-lective entities that form an internal decision making and communication structure (Gavetti et al., 2007). More specifically, this thesis examines the headquarters-subsidiary relationship from the subsidiary perspective. Exam-ining this is especially interesting in light of the conflicts and tensions that can exist within MNCs when subsidiaries identify with their own goals and values, rather than those of the entire MNC (Gavetti et al., 2007; Simon, 1947).

By examining the effects of headquarters attention and involvement on sub-sidiary activities, a deeper understanding of the headquarters-subsidiary rela-tionship emerges, highlighting circumstances under which active headquarters are appreciated, as well as elucidating a darker side of the relationship fraught with frictions and tensions. Attention requires the headquarters to notice and allocate time and effort to issues and answers (Ocasio, 1997). For MNCs, headquarters involvement in subsidiary activities represents a behavioral man-ifestation of attention. It is only after headquarters have paid attention by spending time and effort on subsidiary issues that they may decide to get in-volved in subsidiary activities by actively participating in, allocating resources

60

to, and interacting and cooperating with their subsidiaries (Dellestrand & Kappen, 2012). Examining when and how headquarters attention and involve-ment benefit or hamper subsidiary activities is important for our understand-ing of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship.

A contribution to the headquarters-subsidiary relationship literature is showing a darker side of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. I am able to untangle underlying mechanisms involved in subsidiaries experiencing value subtraction in the forms of missed opportunities and demotivated man-agers from headquarters involvement characterized by misaligned priorities and global standardization (as shown in Paper II). This highlights instances that are less severe than value destruction (Goold et al., 1994a), but still of concern for subsidiary performance. Value subtraction becomes especially concerning when we consider the importance of subsidiaries as a source of value creation for MNCs (e.g., Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001).

Misguided headquarters involvement can be considered a manifestation of subgoal conflicts and differentiation within organizations since subsidiary managers tend to identify more with the values of their subsidiary than the organization as a whole (Gavetti et al., 2007; March & Simon, 1958). Demo-tivated managers can have negative consequences for subsidiaries’ perfor-mance in terms of reducing managers’ incentives and output. Awareness of the consequences of conflicting interests, and how subsidiary managers are affected by headquarters involvement contributes to our knowledge of when and how conflicting interests may reduce organizations’ abilities to coordinate action among their groups (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947). However, an even more important part of understanding misguided headquarters in-volvement and value subtraction is the contribution of insights regarding how MNCs retain their abilities to induce cooperation, despite conflicting interests and goals (Gavetti et al., 2007). By examining the consequences of misguided involvement, I increase our understanding of value subtraction compared to value destruction (Goold et al., 1994a). I also show that even if value subtrac-tion presents an opportunity cost, it is still considered less than the perceived value added of being part of the MNC (Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2007). The subsidiary managers may feel frustrated, yet remain within the MNC, suggesting that the benefits of MNCs and headquarters are greater than the opportunity costs presented by misguided involvement.

The finding that headquarters involvement characterized by misaligned pri-orities and global standardization can expose subsidiaries to opportunity loss and demotivate managers, highlights challenges in the headquarters-subsidi-ary relationship. It also supports a more pessimistic view about headquarters’ ability to achieve a parenting advantage and efficiently allocate resources be-tween projects and subsidiaries. It also questions the headquarters’ role as an orchestrator, its ability to ensure value creation and capture (Dhanaraj &

61

Parkhe, 2006), and raises concerns about the headquarters’ knowledge situa-tion. Headquarters can be ignorant and lack adequate knowledge about sub-sidiary activities since they are not operating at the subsidiary level. This may challenge headquarters’ decision making abilities (Bower, 1986). Since knowledge is context specific, especially in dispersed MNCs, no one has a complete overview. This makes it challenging for headquarters to acquire knowledge and even realize what knowledge to seek (Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, & Holm, 2012a; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Subsidiaries may comply with the headquarters’ detrimental involvement, even if they realize the consequences and are experiencing value subtraction because they accept the headquarters’ hierarchical position as legitimate and its right to issue commands and deter-mine strategy (Mudambi, 2011). Headquarters may also have managed to ef-fectively communicate to their subsidiaries that there are times when value subtraction for some subsidiaries is acceptable to achieve overall value gener-ation for the MNCs. With this in mind, subsidiaries may continue to partake in collective action, as long as the benefits from cooperating within the MNC are greater than the opportunity costs of value subtraction (Gavetti et al., 2007).

Although Paper II examines a darker side of headquarters involvement, such as value subtracting consequences experienced by subsidiaries, it is also important to recognize a brighter side of the headquarters-subsidiary relation-ship. Headquarters involvement that is guided by subsidiary issue selling is found to have a beneficial impact on subsidiary influence and performance (as described in Paper IV). Subsidiary issue selling provides headquarters with a better understanding of how and where to target their involvement in issues that the subsidiary considers important. Doing so may reduce underlying lia-bilities driven by distance and a limited understanding of subsidiary activities that contribute to the value subtracting involvement by headquarters (as de-scribed in Paper II).

My findings show that headquarters involvement, when guided by subsid-iary issue selling, increases subsidiary influence over corporate investment decisions and improves subsidiary business performance (as described in Pa-per IV). Previous research suggests that subsidiaries receiving resources and gaining influence are also more likely to gain different types of mandates (Birkinshaw, 1996) and become recognized as a center of excellence (Holm & Pedersen, 2000). Furthermore, my findings support a federative view of the MNC, and a headquarters-subsidiary relationship characterized by distributed influence since no one person or unit within the MNC is all knowing or om-niscient (Andersson et al., 2007; Handy, 1992).

With influence distributed throughout the MNC, there is intra-MNC com-petition for resources and a risk of subsidiaries overselling the value of their projects and activities (Mudambi, 1999). This makes it increasingly challeng-ing and important for headquarters to efficient allocate resources. The head-quarters, with an overview of the MNC is in a superior position to facilitate

62

synergies and efficiently allocate resources, even if it means taking resources away from some subsidiaries to give more to other projects and subsidiaries (Lamont, 1997). It is important for headquarters to be responsive to bottom-up efforts such as issue selling as a means to gain knowledge about subsidiary activities and understand where headquarters involvement has the potential to add, rather than subtract value.

Parenting and Value Added I extend our understanding of headquarters’ parenting role by developing an attention-based parenting typology and by examining a darker side of parent-ing in the form of value subtraction. Exploring the effects of subsidiaries re-ceiving mixed attention enabled me to develop an attention-based parenting typology (as presented in Paper III) consisting of: Satisfying headquarters, which provides mainly positive attention; Hyper-attentive headquarters, which leaves subsidiaries feeling overwhelmed with positive attention; Aban-doning headquarters, which provides low levels of attention and almost seems to forget the subsidiary; Hindering headquarters, which smothers subsidiaries with excessive monitoring and control; and Custodian headquarters, which provide a combination of high positive and monitoring attention, which the subsidiary considered beneficial.

The development of this attention-based parenting typology complements the entrepreneurial and administrative parenting roles (Chandler, 1991; Foss, 1997). The entrepreneurial role of determining long-term strategies and allo-cating resources accordingly is related to supportive attention, which is fo-cused on resource allocations to subsidiaries (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Foss, 1997). To engage in strategic planning and synergy management as part of its entrepreneurial role (Chandler, 1991; Goold & Campbell, 1998), head-quarters allocate attention to intra-firm opportunities and dependencies. The interrelatedness between attention and parenting suggests that headquarters providing high levels of supportive attention are likely carrying out their en-trepreneurial, value adding parenting role as well.

There are also similarities between the administrative role and monitoring attention. The administrative role is focused on loss prevention, by monitoring subsidiary performance and the use of resources. This role provides both in-centives and sanctions for subsidiaries (Chandler, 1991). Headquarters taking on the administrative role are also likely to provide their subsidiaries with high levels of monitoring attention.

In addition to complementing the administrative and entrepreneurial roles, the attention-based parenting typology complements the strategic control par-enting style (Goold et al., 1994a). Strategic planning and financial control styles are also identified by Goold et al. (1994a), but the strategic control par-enting style is most similar to the custodian parenting style. Subsidiaries are responsible for proposing strategies, plans and ideas, while the parent checks

63

the appropriateness and supports ideas considered important. Furthermore, the parent regularly monitors subsidiary performance and checks on strategic milestones, which resembles the high positive and monitoring attention of the custodian parenting style.

Although previous research has identified multiple parenting styles, it is not obvious that these constitute the best way to describe and categorize head-quarters’ role and function. Attention has been described as a form of parental involvement during which headquarters recognize and support promising sub-sidiaries (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). By incorporating the attention-based perspective when developing the parenting typology, I integrated a previously underexplored aspect of how headquarters can carry out their parenting role and add or subtract value to their subsidiaries. Attention constitutes an im-portant resource for subsidiaries to increase their influence and performance, making it a valuable consideration for the parenting role and its effects on the value added experienced by subsidiaries. Incorporating an attention perspec-tive also sheds light on a darker side of parenting, since several of the parent-ing types identified highlight the challenges involved in parenting and the pos-sibility of too much or too little attention hampering subsidiary activities in different ways.

Focusing on the subsidiary perspective when developing the parenting ty-pology is an important contribution, since much of the parenting literature fo-cuses on the headquarters perspective and what the managers think they do. Incorporating the subsidiary perspective allows for the consideration of how subsidiaries receive headquarters attention and involvement. It helps to better capture the outcomes of headquarters’ parenting activities and elaborates our understanding of the mechanisms involved and the consequences of headquar-ters’ actions as experience by subsidiaries.

My findings about subsidiaries benefitting from a parenting style that com-bines high levels of both positive and monitoring attention resonates with sim-ilar arguments made in the corporate governance literature. Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) developed a paradoxical approach to corporate governance, advocating the simultaneous need for control and collaboration. Embracing and balancing discipline and a collaborative approach to strategic formulation creates a paradoxical perspective that facilitates learning and adaptation (Lewis, 2000; Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). High performing teams are helped by the functional coexistence of trust and conflicts, since trust facilitates col-laboration while conflict stimulates critical feedback to drive learning (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). The suggested need for simultaneous control and collaboration to help facilitate self-correcting governance struc-tures resonates well with the finding of benefits associated with the custodian parenting style.

Although the parenting view assumes that headquarters add value and work to ensure that subsidiaries perform better than they would as standalone enti-ties or under the stewardship of a different parent (Goold et al., 1994a), there

64

is also an underexplored, darker side of parenting. The findings of this thesis contribute to our understanding of such a darker side by examining how sub-sidiaries experience misguided headquarters involvement that is characterized by a limited understanding of subsidiary activities. Misguided headquarters involvement burdened by misaligned priorities and global standardization, risks subtracting value by demotivating managers and impeding subsidiary activities.

With MNCs seeking to achieve cooperation among subsidiaries that have a variety of interests and goals, each subsidiary can only receive a limited amount of attention (Gavetti et al., 2007; March & Simon, 1958). The parent is inherently less informed about subsidiary activities than the subsidiary it-self4, which makes it challenging for the headquarters to perceive better strat-egies in a fraction of the time devoted by subsidiary managers (Goold et al., 1994a). Therefore, headquarters are likely to make decisions that correspond to the context that they are embedded in, based on the information and stimuli that are presented to them through different forms of communication (Gavetti et al., 2007). This suggests that despite making decisions that subtract value from specific subsidiaries, value may be added to others and generate overall value for the MNC. In such a situation, it becomes important for headquarters to clearly communicate their decisions and explain the importance of overall value generation for the MNC even with some subsidiaries experiencing value subtraction.

Attention-Based View of the Firm Existing research examining headquarters attention has primarily focused on positive attention and contributed by showing that headquarters attention is influenced by organizational and environmental factors (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008, 2011), the legitimacy of subsidiary issue selling (Conroy & Collings, 2016), and expatriate managers (Plourde et al., 2014). Receiving positive attention also increases subsidiaries’ influence within MNCs and im-proves both subsidiary and MNC performance (Ambos et al., 2010; Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Bouquet et al., 2009). Positive attention has been the focus of most research applying the attention-based view to the headquarters-sub-sidiary relationship in MNCs, even though Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) and others (e.g., Ambos et al., 2010; Conroy & Collings, 2016) have acknowl-edged “negative forms of attention” in terms of headquarters monitoring sub-sidiary activities. Existing research has largely overlooked the effect of such monitoring attention, especially the impact of receiving a combination of pos-itive and monitoring attention (see Ambos et al., 2010; Conroy & Collings, 2016 for recent exceptions). The multiple case study presented in Paper III 4 Unless we assume that headquarters are omniscient, or subsidiaries are incompetent, which is not the case in this thesis. Instead this thesis assumes bounded rationality by both headquarters and subsidiaries.

65

examines this scenario and allows for investigating the relationship between positive and monitoring attention.

Conducting a multiple case study to capture subsidiaries receiving different types and levels of attention highlights important differences in the situations and challenges they faced. Examining the combination of positive and moni-toring attention allows for identifying different mechanisms that would not be as apparent and identifiable if I was studying only one type of attention. It also makes it possible to examine the relationship between the different types and levels of attention which was not investigated by Ambos et al. (2010) when they examined the impact of positive and monitoring attention on subsidiary influence and autonomy, respectively. By examining the combination of sub-sidiaries receiving positive and monitoring attention, and the relationship be-tween the two, I am able to show that, for example, receiving low positive attention has a different effect on the subsidiary if combined with high or low monitoring attention. Such different effects are difficult to capture when stud-ying the different types of attention separately. Given the empirical findings, I could tease out different mechanisms of how various types and levels of at-tention affect the headquarters-subsidiary relationship.

This thesis contributes to the attention-based view (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ocasio, 1997) by elaborating our understanding of positive attention and showing the different impacts of monitoring attention. The findings con-firm the existing notion of benefits associated with positive attention and de-velop it further by elaborating on when and how positive attention is beneficial for subsidiaries. Receiving positive attention contributes to subsidiaries get-ting increased support, resource allocations, and dedication from headquar-ters, which helps them pursue their activities and capture customers. Head-quarters visits are an important form of positive attention that is underexplored in previous research.

Previous studies have primarily relied on survey-based research and ar-chival data, hence using a multiple case study allows for a more detailed ex-ploration with more in-depth insights. Additionally, this approach helped highlight the subsidiary perspective. It has been suggested that headquarters attention has a curvilinear relationship with MNC performance since in-creased attention to international issues risks burdening headquarters manag-ers, hampering their decision making (Bouquet et al., 2009). However, by ex-ploring this from a subsidiary perspective, it becomes apparent that excessive positive attention, also known as hyper-attention (Bouquet, Barsoux, & Levy, 2015) can hinder subsidiary activities since significant time is spent accom-modating the needs of headquarters, at the expense of carrying out subsidiary activities.

Research within the attention-based view tends to assume that the more attention subsidiaries receive, the better. However, findings in this thesis sug-gests a need to reevaluate such an assumption and consider the possibility of varying types and levels of attention having both beneficial and detrimental

66

effects on subsidiaries. Attention is a scarce, yet important resource for sub-sidiaries (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Hansen & Haas, 2001), but the find-ings in this thesis suggest that excessive attention, positive or monitoring can serve as a burden, rather than a resource. Much in the same way that head-quarters managers only have limited cognitive ability to attend to the stimuli presented to them, subsidiaries can become overwhelmed by the implications of receiving excessive attention.

The findings in this thesis also suggest a need to consider the quality, rather than quantity of attention, since it is not obvious that receiving more attention is beneficial, even if it is positive attention. Rather it shows that subsidiaries appreciate quality attention, such as visits or support where the knowledge exchange is high and headquarters gain understanding for how to contribute to subsidiary activities.

This notion of quality attention, rather than quantity is also relevant for the reinterpretation of negative attention that is presented in Paper III. The multi-ple case study reexamines the effect of negative attention and highlights cir-cumstances under which it has a negative and a beneficial effect on subsidiar-ies. These findings allow for reinterpreting negative attention as monitoring attention since that more closely captures its nature. Reinterpreting negative attention in this way reduces the negative connotation since it is not obvious that negative attention, which has been used to describe monitoring and con-trolling types of attention inherently has negative consequences. It is im-portant to note that monitoring attention implies active engagement from headquarters, and is distinct from automated, formalized monitoring routines.

Headquarters monitoring attention is considered beneficial when it enables subsidiaries to inform headquarters about their situation, and in turn receive increased support. It is important to note that the negative connotation of mon-itoring was not evident when subsidiaries received it in combination with pos-itive attention. As seen in the case company Saturn (presented in Paper III), negative attention was desired since the managers considered it important to receive directives from the headquarters and have an established process to follow. The case company Jupiter highlighted the importance of receiving high levels of mixed attention, since they positively reinforce each other and add value to the subsidiary.

The rich qualitative data collected in a high-context culture such as Japan is an additional contribution from this thesis, since previous research has mostly collected data in low-context Anglo-Saxon settings (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Conroy & Collings, 2016; Greve, 2008). In Japan, the con-text of communication, such as when, how, where, and by whom something is communicated, can be as important, if not more so, than what is actually said (Money et al., 1998). Additionally, long-standing personal relationships are valued, and face-to-face communication is important (Pascale, 1978). When studying attention in this context, it became evident that visits by head-quarters are an important part of supportive attention and provide an especially

67

strong signal of subsidiaries’ importance to local customers and suppliers. Such contextual factors are less important in low-context cultures, where most previous research on attention has been carried out (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Conroy & Collings, 2016; Greve, 2008).

Subsidiary Issue Selling Existing literature on subsidiary issue selling primarily consists of theoretical or qualitative work. This thesis complements and extends previous research by testing these concepts using survey data in a structural model. In addition to the empirical contribution, the findings elaborate on an outcome of subsid-iary issue selling in terms of headquarters involvement and its effects on sub-sidiary influence and performance. This shows the importance of engaging in issue selling focused on strategic issues for subsidiaries to attract beneficial headquarters involvement. My findings highlight the benefits of subsidiaries presenting headquarters with stimuli related to issues considered important by the subsidiary, since headquarters managers have a limited ability to process all the busyness and information they are presented with (Simon, 1947). The benefits associated with subsidiaries actively using their channels of commu-nication to sell issues of strategic importance to headquarters as a means to direct their attention are reiterated by my findings.

Issue selling is relevant in MNCs since it can help bring subsidiaries’ issues to the fore of headquarters managers’ attention (Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2007). This is particularly important since headquarters managers have a limited attention span, and the decisions made partially depend on the order in which issues are presented to the headquarters (March & Simon, 1958).

My findings reinforce the notion of a federative structure with influence distributed throughout MNCs and suggest issue selling as a means for subsid-iaries to affect their own influence over corporate decisions and business per-formance. Such efforts can also contribute to subsidiary evolution since using issue selling to trigger headquarters involvement develops both subsidiaries’ choices and headquarters’ assigned role for subsidiaries (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998).

Issue selling can serve as a helpful tool for subsidiaries in the internal mar-ket system, when faced with intense intra-firm competition for attention, re-sources, and influence. As attention is central to subsidiaries maintaining an influential position within MNCs, and more attention to certain issues inevi-tably results in less to others, issue selling can attract quality involvement that helps develop subsidiary business. Redirecting headquarters attention towards emerging trends and developments in subsidiaries’ local environments is im-portant and is a prerequisite for subsidiary influence and autonomy (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Ocasio, 2011).

68

Subsidiaries have to work hard to legitimize key issues to help portray themselves as committed corporate citizens that play by the rules of the cor-porate game (Conroy & Collings, 2016). This is in line with my findings since issue selling focused on strategic content, such as strengthening MNC strat-egy, strengthening the subsidiary position within the market, and issues that are important for the long term, helps attract headquarters involvement. Link-ing issue selling to MNC strategy and long-term goals helps portray the sub-sidiary as a committed corporate citizen that is invested in the MNC, making it more likely to gain attention and benefit from headquarters involvement.

Implications for Practice During the research for this thesis, I conducted 115 interviews with subsidiary managers working for European MNCs in Japan. I was surprised to find that many of the managers shared experiences similar to those described in exist-ing literature. I became interested in finding out why MNCs, with decades of experience in Japan and other international markets still faced many of the same challenges as described by research conducted during the 1980s and 1990s. In this section, I highlight managerial implications of my research and make suggestions for both headquarters and subsidiary managers.

Why do Subsidiaries Still Feel Underappreciated? Subsidiary managers working for European MNCs in Japan expressed frus-tration and discontent over headquarters’ lack of attention to the effect of time differences, fluctuating exchange rates, benefits of responding to customer re-quests, importance of translating documents, training sessions and reporting systems, and inefficient redundancies that leave subsidiaries feeling isolated and underappreciated. Perhaps headquarters’ attention is reduced the further away the subsidiary is located. Similarly, subsidiary managers felt that they missed out on valuable information and insights that were more readily avail-able to their colleagues at headquarters, or in nearby subsidiaries. Distant sub-sidiaries did receive information from their headquarters, but managers still felt they were missing out. As the Director of Purchasing for a leading Euro-pean automotive company in Japan explained:

“We normally get the information, but it’s not the same get-ting it in an email as actually listening to it and hearing it. Information, the longer it travels, the more it loses on the way.”

Even with advanced communication technology, such as cutting-edge

video conference equipment, various email functions, chat programs, and file

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sharing platforms aiming to make distance insignificant, the challenge of how to allocate attention and successfully share information and knowledge within large international companies persists. While technology may aid in transfer-ring and sharing information, knowledge is more difficult to transfer. Simi-larly, explicit knowledge, which can more easily be written down, codified and articulated, is more easily transferred. However, the challenge becomes evident when dealing with tacit, informal knowledge that is held in peoples’ minds and is difficult to write down and share. With much of business reliant on tacit know-how, it is especially important for companies to ensure its suc-cessful transfer, despite the associated challenges.

Although the intention of communication technology is to better connect globally dispersed people, such technologies may instead render people feel-ing isolated and disconnected from the other parts of the company, which can be counterproductive and hamper value creation across the organization. For example, it reduces headquarters’ visits to their distant subsidiaries, which is a valuable and appreciated form of attention. Such a situation risks enlarging the cultural gap that may already exist and contributing to continued misun-derstandings between headquarters and subsidiaries. As the COO of a Euro-pean luxury retail company in Japan noted:

“Instruments like video conferences or enhanced communica-tion tools, mobile phones somehow have made people closer, but they have reduced the opportunity of actually visiting a country and experiencing a country. …Before they were com-ing here and seeing the stores on their own. Of course, it’s more cost effective but it is less culturally effective I would say.”

Lost in Translation Managers often expressed frustration with the lack, or poor level of transla-tions they received from their headquarters. This applied to documents, re-porting systems, and training sessions, leaving subsidiary managers disap-pointed and unable to take advantage of some of the knowledge shared by the headquarters. Subsidiary managers felt isolated because the European subsid-iaries often received this information in their local language. The lack of head-quarters attention to the needs of their subsidiaries may create internal isola-tion and exclusion from knowledge transfer within MNCs, and in turn under-performance compared to other subsidiaries.

Although documents can be more accurately translated locally, it still takes time and effort, and is an added cost for the Japanese subsidiaries, that the European subsidiaries do not bear. However, the bigger concern is about trans-lating the reporting systems and internal training programs. The trouble with the reporting systems arises when, for example sales engineers, who primarily work in Japanese with Japanese customers, cannot use the company’s invoice

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system, since it cannot handle Japanese written characters. Headquarters ex-pects the subsidiaries to comply with and use the companies’ systems, leaving the subsidiaries feeling misunderstood and at times ignored, since headquar-ters do not take into consideration the language differences.

What might appear to be a minor concern, can actually create a significant hindrance for the subsidiary. Additionally, it can leave managers feeling as though their work is marginalized because of the headquarters’ lack of under-standing and consideration for the challenges created by a system that is not suitable for the local language.

Another situation in which the lack of translation can leave the subsidiary feeling forgotten is during internal training programs, which are usually con-ducted in English. Although many of the companies in this study use English as their working language, not everyone within the subsidiaries are fluent enough to attend training sessions in English and comprehend the message as intended. Some companies required subsidiary employees to attend training sessions, regardless of their level of English proficiency, while others con-ducted language tests before admitting managers to more specialized training programs. Although both approaches have their benefits, they risk alienating subsidiary employees and managers, excluding them from important infor-mation and relevant training.

A more inclusive approach used by some of the subsidiaries focused on ‘training the trainer’. The headquarters was responsible for organizing the in-itial training session, which the local trainer would attend and then return to Japan and hold a local training session in Japanese. Depending on the type of training and the level of autonomy of the subsidiary, some trainers were also able to adjust the content to make it more suitable for Japanese business cul-ture and laws. The President and Representative Director of a leading Euro-pean electric equipment company in Japan explains how they successfully im-plemented this approach:

“We can identify one person who will take charge in the coun-try. They might go to get trained with a whole lot of countries and then come back here and train the trainer. Because very often we need to translate it to Japanese and because if you get [someone from HQ] that comes here and is trying to go to one of our companies in Mishima [in rural Japan], it becomes difficult because of the language, the English language is not the best. So, you have what we call superusers, who will go and do the training and then we translate the documentation and then cascade it down in proper training to Japanese. Oth-erwise it will go over their head and it will be completely wasted.”

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Consolidate Reporting Systems and Decrease Redundancies for Subsidiaries In large MNCs, headquarters often lack an overview or inventory of the tasks and reports it asks subsidiaries to carry out. This can become especially evi-dent in matrix organizations, in which different departments might request similar reports to be submitted for review. Insufficient coordination within headquarters can overload subsidiaries with reports and information to send, taking time away from valuable meetings with customers and other responsi-bilities. Such an overload of monitoring risks subjecting subsidiaries to value subtraction if it creates work inefficiencies and distracts and demotivates man-agers from carrying out their main business activities, such as pursuing cus-tomers.

Several subsidiaries also submitted various data using Excel files and other types of manual reporting via emails, which was inefficient and increased the risk of files and information getting lost. The Vice President for Asia and the Pacific for a European company in the air-treatment business explained the overwhelming situation in his subsidiary:

“We have a finance system, but the problem is that in addition to that, there are so many Excel files that are used…There was always a request [from HQ] for complementary information to be submitted, but who uses that? ...Everything was to be reported to the headquarters. Every sales engineer was sup-posed to report everything they did. At headquarters they said, ‘it only takes half an hour per month’, ‘sure, but they also have 37 other things that are supposed to be reported, that also only take half an hour a month, so sorry, he doesn’t have time to go visit any customers this week because he needs to complete all the reports.’”

Consolidating reporting systems and reducing redundancies can free up time

for subsidiaries to engage in market research, pursuing new customers, ex-panding business with existing customers, and providing feedback on product improvements based on customer feedback. It also provides headquarters with an overview of the information and knowledge transferred from subsidiaries which can help highlight potential synergies among the dispersed subsidiaries.

Lack of Interest in Potential Benefits of Responding to Customer Requests Japanese customers are known for their high expectations of product quality, which can be considered both a burden and a blessing. It is the subsidiaries’ responsibility to engage in the local market, identifying important market trends and sharing such knowledge with headquarters. The knowledge and

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market data on consumers and competitors that flow from subsidiaries to headquarters are considered some of the most important contributions by sub-sidiaries to their companies. However, headquarters are not always interested in incorporating this information.

Many subsidiaries face resistance when making requests of their headquar-ters about product improvements, despite the requests initially coming from customers with experience using the products. Quality improvement requests made by Japanese subsidiaries are often met with comments that it would be too expensive and an unnecessary cost, since the products are selling well around the world already. However, companies that listen and take advantage of the opportunities to use the insights from technologically advanced custom-ers, who are usually leading in their industries, seem to benefit. Headquarters can learn from customers, since they are testing and using the products on a more detailed and applied level than the producer company itself.

Managers explained that it can be challenging to gain customers’ trust, but once a relationship has been established, the customers are interested in im-proving the products for themselves, which can create benefits for the produc-ing company as well and help solve weaknesses that remain, even after intro-ducing a product to the market. The President and Representative Director of a Swedish manufacturing firm in Japan explained:

“When you’re in, when you have passed that [market entry barrier], then you can actually learn some from that, you learn more about your own products, you can improve things. Plus, [the product] is often very well tested, very well gone through so it’s much less risk of anything going wrong later on. …I have learnt a lot from our Japanese customers, about our own products and sometimes solved weaknesses.”

Solving weaknesses and finding improvements to incorporate into the next

product generation can help headquarters advance products in unanticipated ways, and open up new, unexpected business opportunities in different mar-kets. This highlights the important benefits of listening to and incorporating subsidiary feedback from customers, rather than disregarding such ideas and requests.

Benefits of Increased Local Responsiveness Increased local responsiveness would allow subsidiaries to better meet the needs of their local customers and could also lead to improved products for the global market. Despite reluctance from headquarters to locally adapt prod-ucts, many subsidiaries consider it beneficial to offer products and services tailored to the needs of their local customers. Subsidiary managers explained that it would help them appeal to customers, and their sales would increase. The President and CEO of the Japanese subsidiary of an Italian luxury brand

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explained that incorporating locally adapted products would not hurt the brand, which was the headquarters’ argument for product standardization. In-stead, the company would benefit, since it could appeal to local customers who might not be interested in standardized products because of local trends. However, he also noted that there should be a combination, with the majority of the products stemming from more standard products.

“I think there should always be a mix, they say that out of 100 percent of the products that you sell in the market, 70 percent can be guided by headquarters and 30 percent can be really local adaptations. If I need a shoe heel of 3.5 cm because Jap-anese ladies don’t want to wear a 7 cm heel or 9 cm heels, but the office ladies normally wear a 3.5 cm heel, please do the 3.5 cm. These kinds of adaptations don’t really change the image, but are smart, tactical adjustments that can give you more commercial strength. It will not affect the brand image because it’s still 70 percent of your global corporate image, but that 30 percent could generate good business.”

The benefits of local ideas are not limited to the subsidiary, but can also

result in solutions that are valuable for the firm as a whole. Subsidiaries can develop innovative solutions to problems that headquarters are not aware of, making it important for headquarters to listen to and learn from distant sub-sidiaries.

The VP of Communication for a Japanese subsidiary of a European robot-ics company explained that a reporting tool developed by a business unit within the subsidiary helped that unit perform 30 percent better than it had the previous year. Previously, sales engineers would need to return to the office to report their customer visits by using Excel or Word files, which was time consuming and disorganized. By developing and using a more integrated ap-plication in their smartphones, the sales engineers could report customer in-formation right after their meetings, and avoid having to go back to the office before the next meeting. The information was all in one place, rather than in various Excel and Word files. This made it more efficient for those reporting, as well as for the managers evaluating the information. The VP of Communi-cation called it a success and explained that it would soon be rolled out to the entire subsidiary as well as the headquarters.

“We used to do business updates or visit reports in Excel or Word, but now it’s all integrated… Your manager can trace whatever you are doing. You don’t have to come back to the office and sit at your desk in front of the PC to get a report; you can just do this while you are waiting for the train through your smartphone. So, it’s very much handy now... Our sales engineers can spend more time with customers. It’s a good

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cycle. They’re doing good, 30 percent better than last year. This is very much a successful case, and I think the whole or-ganization will move to this way. The reporting burden is go-ing to decrease.”

The headquarters did not realize the amount of time needed for the report-ing within the Japanese subsidiary, but through the efforts of the subsidiary, a new tool was developed to help address a situation that existed throughout the MNC.

Subsidiaries can also help develop new products based on market requests, which can then be globally incorporated. The R&D Director for the Japanese subsidiary of a European food packaging company explained that they have worked closely with Japanese customers several times to develop new and innovative package solutions for chilled products. Japan has a large chilled food and beverage market, especially with vending machines being very pop-ular and spotted on most street corners in Tokyo selling drinks and food. When relevant, these products and packaging solutions have been transferred glob-ally and sold by subsidiaries in other countries. Since the Japanese subsidiary is leading within the MNC in chilled development, transferring the packaging solutions has been beneficial and helped other subsidiaries attract new cus-tomers, increasing their sales.

What is Preventing Headquarters from Embracing Subsidiary Ideas? International subsidiaries are tasked with scouting the local market for oppor-tunities and ideas to enhance the business, both locally and for the whole MNC. Operating in different environments exposes subsidiaries to new sce-narios that can be used to develop old and new products and services. Yet, many subsidiaries meet significant hurdles when making suggestions to their headquarters, and face resistance.

Subsidiaries may encounter resistance if headquarters do not appreciate the importance of the local market. If headquarters do not consider the local mar-ket significant enough to influence their decisions, it becomes difficult for subsidiaries to gain support for their ideas. Complacency and a satisfaction with the current state of the company prevents the headquarters from embrac-ing subsidiary ideas that deviate from the existing norms and standards within the MNC. Headquarters’ sense of need for an influx of outside ideas is lacking, which hinders subsidiaries from developing. Such a situation prevents MNCs from benefitting from the infusion of new and innovative ideas that subsidiar-ies can identify by operating in an environment that is very different from that of the headquarters’.

Headquarters may also suffer from a limited understanding of the im-portance of the adaptations. Subsidiaries of international firms are globally dispersed, operating in diverse environments and cultures, which means that

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customer expectations of the products and services vary greatly. However, headquarters may not be as attuned to such nuances as the subsidiaries that are operating in these markets and may therefore resist subsidiary ideas. A Swe-dish manufacturer of dehumidifiers tried to sell its products in Japan and China, despite being designed for Swedish climate. Japan and China both have significantly more humid climates than in Sweden, so the dehumidifiers were poorly suited for the Japanese and Chinese markets. However, the headquar-ters did not permit changes to the products due to the fear of losing scale in production and not appreciating the importance of the differences. The Presi-dent of the Japanese subsidiary explained that several of their customers were experiencing problems, and in one critical case, a dehumidifier caught on fire in a customer’s factory. Fortunately, no one was injured, and the damages were contained. However, it was a dangerous way to finally get headquarters’ attention and extra resources to adapt the products to better fit the more humid climates in Japan and China.

A lack of interest in subsidiaries’ ideas can also stem from headquarters not realizing the benefits of listening to and embracing such opportunities. Headquarters may not recognize the importance of the opportunities pre-sented, nor how they can contribute to various synergy effects or the compa-nies’ competitive advantage. The investments (both time and resources) may seem to outweigh the potential benefits, making headquarters hesitant and re-luctant. Subsidiaries would benefit from being more proactive in communi-cating their ideas, and their benefits, not just for the subsidiary itself, but for other subsidiaries and the overall company.

Concern for disruption of the brand image might also contribute to the headquarters’ reluctance to accept subsidiary ideas for local adaptation. Large MNCs with subsidiaries scattered around the world understandably want to maintain brand consistency and may favor standardization to achieve econo-mies of scale during their production process. With a headquarters that wants to minimize deviation and ensure global consistency of products and services, it can be challenging for subsidiaries to be responsive to their local market. However, it is important for subsidiaries to explain how they will manage lo-cal adaptation while retaining the global brand image, as well as how such a combination will strengthen their local position and relationship with custom-ers. When applicable, the subsidiaries can also emphasize the relevance and benefits of incorporating the adaptation into other markets.

New Missions for Headquarters and Subsidiaries Even with advanced technology and instant updates, subsidiaries appreciate headquarters’ visits and face-to-face meetings, which enhance knowledge sharing, and make up a key advantage for MNCs. Visits can increase head-quarters’ understanding of subsidiaries’ reality, help headquarters recognize the challenges created when missing a proper translation of a reporting system or training program, and make headquarters appreciate the implications of the

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time difference. It is important for headquarters to ensure that knowledge and routines are passed on to new managers when they are introduced to the teams working with globally dispersed subsidiaries. Even if the company has signif-icant experience operating internationally, new team members may not, which risks creating inefficiencies for the subsidiaries. The visits and close interac-tion between the headquarters and its subsidiaries also facilitates a dialogue based on respect, which is critical to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome and a developing relationship.

Companies that just rely on the practices used at the headquarters, without consideration for global differences, risk marginalizing subsidiaries, leaving managers frustrated and demotivated, and treading through inefficiencies. Capturing the benefits of listening to international customers and reducing in-efficiencies, frustration, and demotivation of subsidiary managers will take time but can open up for unexpected business opportunities, both through product improvements and freeing up time for managers to pursue innovative business opportunities.

It is important for headquarters to be receptive and responsive when eval-uating subsidiary ideas, but it is also critical that subsidiaries work to promote their ideas. Subsidiaries fight for headquarters’ attention and in large compa-nies, this competition can be among hundreds of subsidiaries around the world. Headquarters’ attention is limited, making it essential for subsidiaries to promote their ideas in ways that help headquarters understand why they are beneficial and necessary for the subsidiaries, as well as the MNCs. Connecting the local idea to larger projects or suggesting synergy effects by collaborating with other subsidiaries may help the headquarters understand the overall ad-vantages.

While this study was conducted in Japan, focusing on top executives work-ing for European MNCs, there is reason to believe that managers in similar situations will recognize the experience. It is likely that the same or similar challenges exist in headquarters-subsidiary relationships spanning different geographic constellations since transferring knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, remains difficult across distance.

Despite many MNCs having years of international experience, subsidiary managers still feel frustrated over the lack of understanding from their head-quarters. It seems strange that we are still in this situation, even though we have known about these issues for decades. Why does the paradox persist and what can we do about it? Headquarters should consider the importance of:

Recognizing the value of visits and face-to-face meetings to increase understanding of subsidiaries’ contexts, opportunities, and chal-lenges.

Ensuring proper introduction of new headquarters managers, to maintain routines and minimize the risk of introducing inefficien-cies.

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Appreciating and using global differences as an advantage during innovation and production development processes.

Being open to pursuing unexpected business opportunities that arise locally.

Ensuring knowledge retention when managers change positions and during organizational restructuring.

Subsidiaries should consider the importance of:

Being proactive in showing headquarters the value of the local market and the benefits of incorporating subsidiary ideas.

Highlighting advantages that headquarters and other subsidiaries can gain from their ideas and which potential problems the ideas solve.

Attracting headquarters attention through different communication channels.

Using face-to-face meetings whenever possible to increase headquar-ters’ understanding of the subsidiaries’ business and customers.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research While I have made an effort to explicate when and how attention and involve-ment affect how subsidiaries perceive their relationship with headquarters, and how this contributes to the value added or subtracted experienced by subsidi-aries, this study has a number of limitations. First, one should be cautious about making generalizations given the restricted sample of the case studies and the survey. I conducted several rounds of interviews, with most managers being interviewed multiple times, but future research could explore how mixed types and levels of attention affect subsidiaries’ perception of their re-lationships with headquarters over time, and if parenting styles change. A lon-gitudinal study would help contribute with a better understanding of the ante-cedents and consequences of headquarters attention over time and allow for investigating parenting styles potentially evolving.

Second, this thesis has explored dyadic headquarters-subsidiary relation-ships in several MNCs. It would be beneficial for future research to move be-yond the dyadic relationship to study multiple subsidiaries within the same MNC. This would allow for investigating the effect of subsidiaries’ own roles and actions, together with those of sister subsidiaries, on the allocation of headquarters attention. Including multiple subsidiaries within the same MNC in a longitudinal study would, in addition to making it possible to explore if and how parenting styles change over time, allow for comparing environments and how this may affect the required parenting style. My data were collected from subsidiaries based in Japan, hence investigating varying environments with varying levels of competition, may provide additional valuable insights.

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Investigating communication patterns between headquarters and subsidiar-ies, and how varying strategic vocabularies, rhetorical tactics and forms of talk and text (Ocasio et al., 2018) affect headquarters-subsidiary relationships and headquarters’ attention allocation provides another promising avenue for fu-ture research. This will help enhance our understanding of the extent to which units possessing a common vocabulary, or forms of talk and text, experience more efficient communication and how these patterns of communication in-fluence attention allocation and decision making within the organization (March & Simon, 1958: 166-168). Furthermore, communication channels contribute to the movement of information and stimuli from sources of origin to points of decision making, linking decentralized attention among units within the firm (Gavetti et al., 2007; March & Simon, 1958: 166-168). Ex-ploring such movement of information and communication patterns can help shed light on which stimuli reach headquarters’ attention and how subsequent decisions are made.

Moving beyond the dyadic relationship to include multiple subsidiaries, as well as different stakeholders, would open up for the possibility of examining when and how value is appropriated by different actors. Much like how value can be experienced differently by subsidiaries, it is likely that various stake-holders appropriate value in different ways, during different activities. There-fore, future research would benefit from exploring when and how value is ap-propriated by various MNC stakeholders.

Third, I followed previous research and focused on headquarters monitor-ing and control when studying negative attention. However, negative attention could also imply value destruction. To increase our understanding of negative attention, future research would benefit from exploring the extent to which headquarters attention can lead to value destruction and its potentially damag-ing effects on subsidiaries. Further investigation of value destroying involve-ment would also contribute to our understanding of a darker side of the par-enting role and allow for a more distinct separation between value destroying and subtracting involvement.

Fourth, the findings of this thesis provide only initial insights into how sub-sidiary issue selling triggers headquarters involvement, but highlight the im-portance of exploring the means available to subsidiaries to affect headquar-ters involvement and subsidiary influence in greater detail. Future research would benefit from exploring different forms of issue selling and their effect on headquarters attention and involvement in more detail to develop a better understanding of the bottom-up processes available to subsidiaries.

The themes explored in this thesis open up for future research opportuni-ties, such as further exploring the role and function of headquarters within MNCs. While the value adding role of the headquarters is often implicitly as-sumed, this thesis examines a darker side of headquarters activities that expose subsidiaries to value subtraction. Yet, more research is needed to better under-stand such actions. Headquarters may get involved in subsidiary activities for

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rent-seeking purposes to increase their own or other subsidiaries’ performance (Foss, Foss, & Nell, 2012) at the expense of the focus subsidiary. This calls for further investigation targeting headquarters and their decisions about at-tention allocation and involvement in subsidiary activities.

Another line of inquiry emerging from the work in this thesis is the internal market competition for headquarters attention and scarce resources. Previous research has focused on a dyadic headquarters-subsidiary relationship. How-ever, to better understand the issue selling moves that subsidiaries use, and the attention allocation and involvement decisions headquarters make, it is im-portant to consider MNCs in their entirety. This would allow for a broader, more dynamic understanding of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, by examining questions such as: How do headquarters make attention allocations given finite time and resources despite having a broad range of subsidiaries? How do subsidiary managers engage in issue selling in relation to other sub-sidiaries? How do headquarters attention and parenting styles develop over time? Additionally, it would be beneficial for future research to also consider the role of regional or divisional headquarters. Many of the subsidiary man-agers I interviewed mentioned being part of a regional structure within their MNCs, but described the regional headquarters as having a “nominal role.” Moving beyond a dyadic relationship structure to consider an MNC network structure would help enhance our understanding of different headquarters roles, attention allocation and parenting styles, as well as strategic manage-ment of MNCs.

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Appendix A

Headquarters – Subsidiary Value Creation and Value Added

Research conducted by Amalia Nilsson PhD Candidate at the Dept. of Business Studies, Uppsala University

amalia.nilsson@fek.uu.se Respondent Background information:

Headquarters’ name (HQ = unit that you directly report to)

Subsidiary’s name

Respondent’s name

Respondent’s title

Respondent’s email address

Respondent’s phone number

Respondent's country of origin

How many years have you worked within the MNC? (MNC = multinational company)

How many years have you worked within the subsidiary?

If you have worked at HQ, for how many years? At what departments? Has this been relevant for your current job?

Age of the respondent 25-34 35-45 46-55 56-65 66-...

Educational level of the respondent

High-school

Some college

Univer-sity de-

gree MBA PhD

Educational background of the respond-ent (e.g., Engineering, Business, Market-ing, etc.)

Functional background of the respondent (e.g., Finance, HR, Marketing etc.)

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Has the respondent:

Please evaluate each of the following statements: (1 = fully disagree; 7 =fully agree; DNK=do not know)

Company subsidiaries share close ties among them-selves

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

There is very little interaction among company subsid-iaries

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Relations among company subsidiaries are very close 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Company subsidiaries share frequent communications 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Company subsidiaries discuss common problems fre-quently

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

HQ frequently visits YOUR subsidiary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Subsidiary managers, from YOUR subsidiary fre-quently visit HQ

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

How often does HQ make local visits to YOUR subsidiary? _______________________________________________ Who (role/function) and how often do employees from YOUR subsidiary visit HQ? ______________________________________________ Name and contact information to the person(s) you report to at HQ: ______________________________________________

Study experience in another country YES NO

Experience in an international division YES NO

Worked as an expatriate within the company YES NO

Worked internationally within a different company YES NO

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HQ Role and Function 1. Evaluate the importance of the following effects of HQ’s resource allocation on YOUR subsidiary: (1= not important; 7= very important; DNK=do not know) Example: is the effect of HQ resources allocations on the replacement of outdated products/services within YOUR subsidiary not important/very important

Replacement of outdated products/services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Improvement of product quality/service quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Expansion of product assortment/assortment of services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Entering of new markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Increasing market share 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Increasing flexibility of production/services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Reduction of labor costs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Fulfillment of standards requirements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Fulfillment of government regulations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Mitigation of environmental damage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

2. With regard to HQ’s intervention, evaluate the following statements: (1=totally disagree; 7=totally agree; DNK=do not know)

HQ has allocated extra resources when necessary to our sub-sidiary

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

HQ has participated closely in our subsidiary operations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

HQ has taken important initiatives for developing our subsidi-ary business

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

HQ cooperation with our subsidiary has been characterized by frequent interaction

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

3. How does YOUR subsidiary perceive the impact of HQ on YOUR subsidiary's com-petencies in the following functions/areas: (-3= negative impact; 0= no impact; +3= positive impact; DNK=do not know)

Business strategy -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

New business creation -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

R&D -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

Marketing -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

New product development -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

Production processes -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

Technology -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

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4. How does YOUR subsidiary perceive the impact of HQ on YOUR subsidiary in terms of: (-3= negative impact; 0= no impact; +3= positive impact; DNK=do not know)

Increased sales -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

Production efficiency -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

Technological advancement -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

Innovativeness (Rate of innovation, speed of innovation)

-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

Organizational efficiency -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

Cost cutting -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 DNK

5. Please evaluate the importance of inflows from the HQ to YOUR subsidiary regard-ing the following types of knowledge: (1= not at all; 7= very much; DNK=do not know)

Market data on consumers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Market data on competitors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Marketing know-how 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Distribution know-how 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Technology know-how 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Purchasing know-how 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

6. Please evaluate the importance of outflows from YOUR subsidiary to the HQ regard-ing the following types of knowledge: (1= not at all; 7= very much; DNK=do not know)

Market data on consumers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Market data on competitors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Marketing know-how 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Distribution of know-how 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Technology know-how 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Purchasing know-how 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

7. To what extent does the HQ influence the major decisions affecting YOUR subsid-iary in the following areas: (1= no influence on decisions; 7= setting most decisions; DNK=do not know)

Setting of budgets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Major capital investments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Business strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

New business creation (including all new business: products/services, market segments etc.)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Marketing

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

91

8. Please evaluate the following statements: (1= not at all; 7= very much; DNK=do not know)

We often try to resist the initiatives of HQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK HQ initiatives cause delays in our operations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK HQ initiatives consume more resources than what is gained from them

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

We have difficulties in understanding HQ initiatives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK HQ looks out for what is best for the MNC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK HQ looks out for what is best for our subsidiary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK The interests of HQ are aligned with our interest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK HQ recognizes opportunities within the MNC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK HQ recognizes opportunities in our subsidiary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK HQ is steering the MNC in the right direction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK HQ adequately justifies its actions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK We can identify with the challenges that HQ is facing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK We feel that HQ has sufficient knowledge of our operations to intervene

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

9. When communicating with the HQ to get its support, YOUR subsidiary highlights issues that: (1 = fully disagree; 7 = fully agree; DNK=do not know)

Have a good earlier track record 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Are easily evaluated in a business plan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Have clear bottom line implications 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK We have a strong patent portfolio for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK We have received support for earlier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK HQ is familiar with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Strengthens the MNC strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Strengthens our position in important markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK We are profitable in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Have great profit potential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Have great potential to add novelty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Provide a focused solution 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Set the MNC on a clear path 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK We have competencies that require little adaptation when im-plementing them in the rest of the MNC

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

We have novel ideas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Provide HQ with a clear identification of outcomes for the re-source allocation

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

92

Relates to ongoing operations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Connects to other units’ operations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Are coherent with our operations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Have support throughout the MNC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Have support external to the MNC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Are connected to other units within the MNC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Are connected to external units 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Are important for the long term 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Unit Performance 10. Compared with other major competitors, how would you rate YOUR subsidiary’s performance over the last three years in the following areas: (1 = much worse; 7 = much better; DNK=do not know)

Marketing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Growth in sales 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Profitability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Market share 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Profit-to-sales ratio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Cash flow from operations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Return on investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

New product development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Market development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

R&D activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Overall performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

11. Please evaluate the following statements: (1= not at all; 7= very much; DNK=do not know)

Please evaluate how successful YOUR subsidiary has been in comparison to other subsidiaries within your organization in the last three years.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Please evaluate how successful YOUR subsidiary has been in comparison to competitors in the same line of industry and of about the same size in the last three years.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

Please evaluate to what degree YOUR subsidiary has achieved its most important goals in the last three years.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

93

12. What impact has YOUR subsidiary had on the development of competencies of other units within the MNC in the following areas: (1 = no impact at all; 7 = very high impact; DNK=do not know)

Research (basic or applied) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Production of goods or services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Marketing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Sales 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Logistics/distribution 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Purchasing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

13. To what extent has YOUR subsidiary influenced the MNC when it concerns: (1 = no influence at all; 7 = very high influence; DNK=do not know)

Corporate investments in production 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Corporate investments in R&D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Corporate introduction of new products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Establishment of new corporate units within its host market 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Establishment of new corporate units outside its host market 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Corporate acquisitions in its host markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Corporate acquisition outside its host market 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Corporate business volume 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Corporate competitiveness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK Corporate profitability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DNK

14. Is YOUR subsidiary considered to be a center of excellence

Yes

No

15. Does YOUR subsidiary have a mandate to (please select all applicable options):

Create

competencies

Exploit

competencies

Utilize the

competencies of others

Broker

competencies within the

MNC

94

Please feel free to provide any additional comments regarding new initiatives that you may consider important to strengthen your relationship with the HQ and that could enable the HQ to further help YOUR subsidiary increase value creation.

Thank you for your time and contribution.

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15 Olson, Hans Christer, 1975, Studies in Export Promotion: Attempts to Evaluate ExportStimulation Measures for the Swedish Textile and Clothing Industries. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 10.

16 Wootz, Björn, 1975, Studies in Industrial Purchasing with Special Reference to Variations in External Communication. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 8.

17 Åkerblom, Mats, 1975, Företag i inflation. Uppsala: Research Report nr 7 (mimeo).

18 Johansson, Sven-Erik, 1976, Fåmansbolag. Uppsala: Research Report nr 1976:1. (mimeo).

19 Samuelsson, Hans-Fredrik, 1977, Utländska direkt investeringar i Sverige. (mimeo).

20 Lundberg, Lars, 1982, Från Lag till Arbetsmiljö. Malmö: Liberförlag. 21 Hallén, Lars, 1982, International Industrial Purchasing. Channels, Interaction, and

Governance Structures. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 13.

22 Jansson, Hans, 1982, Interfirm Linkages in a Developing Economy: The Case of Swedish Firms in India. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 14.

23 Axelsson, Björn, 1982, Wikmanshyttans uppgång och fall. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 15.

24 Sharma, Deo D., 1983, Swedish Firms and Management Contracts. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 16.

25 Sandberg, Thomas, 1982, Work Organizations and Autonomous Groups. Lund: Liberförlag.

26 Ghauri, Pervez, 1983, Negotiating International Package Deals. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr. 17.

27 Joachimsson, Robert, 1984, Utlandsägda dotterbolag i Sverige: En analys av koncerninterna transaktionsmönster och finansiella samband. Stockholm: Liberförlag.

28 Kallinikos, Jannis, 1984, Control and Influence Relationships in Multinational Corporations: The Subsidiary's Viewpoint. Application of the Resource Dependence Perspective for Studying Power Relationships in Multinational Corpora-tions. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 19.

29 Hadjikhani, Amjad, 1985, Organization of Manpower Training in International Package Deals: Projects Temporary Organizations for Transfer of Technology. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr. 21.

30 Klint, Mats B., 1985, Mot en konjunkturanpassad kundstrategi. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

31 Larsson, Anders, 1985, Structure and Change Power in the Transnational Enter-prise. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 23.

32 Lorendahl, Bengt, 1986, Regionutvecklings- och lokaliseringsprocesser: Beslut och handling i kommunal näringspolitik och industriell lokalisering. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 24.

33 Borg, Malcolm, 1987, International Transfers of Managers in Multinational Corporations: Transfer Patterns and Organizational Control. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 27.

34 Thunman, Carl G., 1987, Technology Licensing to Distant Markets Interaction Between Swedish and Indian Firms. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 28.

35 Hyder, Syed Akmal, 1988, The Development of International Joint Venture Relationships: A Longitudinal Study of Exchange of Resources, Control and Conflicts. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

36 Gunnarsson, Elving, 1988, Från Hansa till Handelshögskola: Svensk ekonom-undervisning fram till 1909. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 29.

37 Wallerstedt, Eva, 1988, Oskar Sillén. Professor och praktiker: Några drag i företagsekonomiämnets tidiga utveckling vid Handelshögskolan i Stockholm. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 30.

38 Smith, Dag, 1989, Structure and Interpretation of Income Models. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies

39 Laage-Hellman, Jens, 1989, Technological Development in Industrial Networks. Comprehensive Summaries of Uppsala Dissertations from the Faculty of Social Sciences nr 6.

40 Waluszewski, Alexandra, 1989, Framväxten av en ny mekanisk massateknik. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomiae Negotiorum nr 31.

41 Seyed-Mohamed, Nazeem, 1990, Structural Modelling of Business Relation-ships. Comprehensive Summaries of Uppsala Dissertations from the Faculty of Social Sciences nr 21.

42 Snehota, Ivan, 1990, Notes on a Theory of Business Enterprise. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

43 Hultbom, Christina, 1991, Intern handel: Köpar/säljarrelationer inom stora företag. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

44 Lindvall, Jan, 1991, Svenska industriföretags internationella företagsförvärv, inriktning och utfall. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

45 Levinson, Klas, 1991, Medbestämmande i strategiska beslutsprocesser: Facklig medverkan och inflytande i koncerner. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

46 Lee, Joong-Woo, 1991, Swedish Firms Entering the Korean Market Position Development in Distant Industrial Networks. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

47 Molin, Roger, 1991, Organisationen inom facket: Organisationsutvecklingen inom de till Landsorganisationen anslutna förbunden. Stockholm: Carlssons Bokförlag.

48 Henders, Barbara, 1992, Marketing Newsprint in the UK Analyzing Positions in Industrial Networks. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

49 Lampou, Konstantin, 1992, Vårt företag: En empirisk undersökning av några organisatoriska självuppfattningar och identiteter. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

50 Jungerhem, Sven, 1992, Banker i fusion. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen. 51 Didner, Henrik, 1993, Utländskt ägande av svenska aktier. Uppsala:

Företagsekonomiska institutionen. 52 Abraha, Desalegn, 1994, Establishment Processes in an Underdeveloped Country: The

Case of Swedish Firms in Kenya. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies. 53 Holm, Ulf, 1994, Internationalization of the Second Degree. Uppsala: Department of

Business Studies.

54 Eriksson, Kent, 1994, The Interrelatedness of Environment Technology and Structure: A Study of Differentiation and Integration in Banking. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

55 Marquardt, Rolf, 1994, Banketableringar i främmande länder. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

56 Awuah, Gabriel B., 1994, The Presence of Multinational Companies (MNCs) in Ghana: A Study of the Impact of the Interaction between an MNC and Three Indigenous Companies. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

57 Hasselbladh, Hans, 1995, Lokala byråkratiseringsprocesser, institutioner, tolkning och handling. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

58 Eriksson, Carin B., 1995, Föreställningar och värderingar i en organisation under förändring: En studie av identitetsuppfattningar inom konsumentkooperationen. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

59 Jonsson, Tor, 1995, Value Creation in Mergers and Acquisitions: A Study of Swedish Domestic and Foreign Takeovers. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

60 Furusten, Staffan, 1995, The Managerial Discourse: A Study of the Creation and Diffusion of Popular Management Knowledge. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

61 Pahlberg, Cecilia, 1996, Subsidiary - Headquarters Relationships in International Business Networks. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

62 Sjöberg, Ulf, 1996, The Process of Product Quality - Change Influences and Sources: A Case from the Paper and Paper-Related Industries. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

63 Lind, Johnny, 1996, Ekonomistyrning och verksamhet i utveckling: Ekonomiska rapporters utformning och användning när verksamheten flödesorienteras. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

64 Havila, Virpi, 1996, International Business-Relationships Triads: A Study of the Changing Role of the Intermediating Actor. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

65 Blankenburg Holm, Desirée, 1996, Business Network Connections and International Business Relationships. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

66 Andersson, Ulf, 1997, Subsidiary Network Embeddedness: Integration, Control and Influence in the Multinational Corporation. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

67 Sanner, Leif, 1997, Trust Between Entrepreneurs and External Actors: Sense-making in Organising New Business Ventures. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

68 Thilenius, Peter, 1997, Subsidiary Network Context in International Firms. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

69 Tunisini, Annalisa, 1997, The Dissolution of Channels and Hierarchies: An Inquiry into the Changing Customer Relationships and Organization of theComputer Corporations. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

70 Majkgård, Anders, 1998, Experiential Knowledge in the Internationalization Process of Service Firms. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

71 Hjalmarsson, Dan, 1998, Programteori för statlig företagsservice. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

72 Avotie, Leena, 1998, Chefer ur ett genuskulturellt perspektiv. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

73 Arnesson, Leif, 1998, Chefsrörlighet. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen. 74 Dahlqvist, Jonas, 1998, Knowledge Use in Business Exchange: Acting and Thinking

Business Actors. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies. 75 Jonsson, Eskil, 1998, Narrow Managemen: The Quest for Unity in Diversity. Uppsala:

Department of Business Studies. 76 Greve, Jan, 1999, Ekonomisystem och affärsstrategier. Uppsala:

Företagsekonomiska institutionen. 77 Roxenhall, Tommy, 1999, Affärskontraktets användning. Uppsala:

Företagsekonomiska institutionen. 78 Blomgren, Maria, 1999, Pengarna eller livet? Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska

institutionen. 79 Bäckström, Henrik, 1999, Den krattade manegen: Svensk arbetsorganisatorisk

utveckling under tre decennier. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen 80 Hamberg, Mattias, 2000, Risk, Uncertainty & Profitability: An Accounting-Based Study

of Industrial Firms’ Financial Performance. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies. 81 Sandberg, Eva, 2000, Organiseringens dynamik: Strukturskapande processer i ett

telematikföretag. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen. 82 Nordin, Dan, 2000, Två studier av styrning i kunskapsintensiva organisationer.

Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen. 83 Wedin, Torkel, 2001, Networks and Demand: The Use of Electricity in an Industrial

Process. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies. 84 Lagerström, Katarina, 2001, Transnational Projects within Multinational Corporations.

Uppsala: Department of Business Studies. 85 Markgren, Bertil, 2001, Är närhet en geografisk fråga? Företags affärsverksamhet och

geografi: En studie av beroenden mellan företag och lokaliseringens betydelse. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

86 Carlsson, Leif, 2001, Framväxten av en intern redovisning i Sverige: 1900-1945. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

87 Silver, Lars, 2001, Credit Risk Assessment in Different Contexts: The Influence of Local Networks for Bank Financing of SMEs. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

88 Choi, Soon-Gwon, 2001, Knowledge Translation in the Internationalization of Firms. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

89 Johanson, Martin, 2001, Searching the Known, Discovering the Unknown: The Russian Transition from Plan to Market as Network Change Processes. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

90 Hohenthal, Jukka, 2001, The Emergence of International Business Relationships: Experience and performance in the internationalization process of SMEs. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

91 Gidhagen, Mikael, 2002, Critical Business Episodes: The Criticality of Damage Adjustment Processes in Insurance Relationships. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

92 Löfmarck Vaghult, Anna, 2002, The Quest for Stability: A Network Approach to Business Relationship Endurance in Professional Services. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

93 Grünberg, Jaan, 2002, Problematic Departures: CEO Exits in Large Swedish Publicly Traded Corporations. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

94 Gerdin, Jonas, 2002, Ekonomisystems utformning inom produktionsavdelningar: En tvärsnittsstudie. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

95 Berggren, Björn, 2002, Vigilant Associates: Financiers Contribution to the Growth of SMEs. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

96 Elbe, Jörgen, 2002, Utveckling av turistdestinationer genom samarbete. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

97 Andersson, Maria, 2003, Creating and Sharing Subsidiary Knowledge within Multinational Corporations. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

98 Waks, Caroline, 2003, Arbetsorganisering och professionella gränsdragningar: Sjukgymnasters samarbete och arbetets mångfald. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

99 Bengtson, Anna, 2003, Framing Technological Development in a Concrete Context: The Use of Wood in the Swedish Construction Industry. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

100 Bäcklund, Jonas, 2003, Arguing for Relevance: Global and Local Knowledge Claims in Management Consulting. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

101 Levay, Charlotta, 2003, Medicinsk specialisering och läkares ledarskap: En longitudinell studie i professionell kollegialitet och konkurrens. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

102 Lindholm, Cecilia, 2003, Ansvarighet och redovisning i nätverk: En longitudinell studie om synliggörande och osynliggörande i offentlig verksamhet. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

103 Svensson, Birgitta, 2003, Redovisningsinformation för bedömning av små och medelstora företags kreditvärdighet. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

104 Lindstrand, Angelika, 2003, The Usefulness of Network Experiential Knowledge in the Internationalization Process. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

105 Baraldi, Enrico, 2003, When Information Technology Faces Resource Interaction: Using IT Tools to Handle Products at IKEA and Edsbyn. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

106 Prenkert, Frans, 2004, On Business Exchange Activity: Activity Systems and Business Networks. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

107 Abrahamsson, Gun & Helin, Sven, 2004, Problemlösningsarbete på låg organisatorisk nivå: Två studier om implementering respektive konkretisering av idéer om kundorderstyrd tillverkning. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

108 Wedlin, Linda, 2004, Playing the Ranking Game: Field formation and boundary-work in European management education. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

109 Hedmo, Tina, 2004, Rule-making in the Transnational Space: The Development of European Accreditation of Management Education. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

110 Holmström, Christine, 2004, In search of MNC competitive advantage: The role of foreign subsidiaries as creators and disseminators of knowledge. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

111 Ciabuschi, Francesco, 2004, On the Innovative MNC: Leveraging Innovations and the Role of IT Systems. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

112 Ståhl, Benjamin, 2004, Innovation and Evolution in the Multinational Enterprise. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

113 Latifi, Mohammad, 2004, Multinational Companies and Host Partnership in Rural Development: A Network Perspective on the Lamco Case. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

114 Lindbergh, Jessica, 2005, Overcoming Cultural Ignorance: Institutional Knowledge Development in the Internationalizing Firm. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

115 Spencer, Robert, 2005, Strategic Management of Customer Relationships: A Network Perspective on Key Account Management. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

116 Neu, Elizabeth, 2006, Lönesättning i praktiken: En studie av chefers handlingsutrymme. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

117 Gebert Persson, Sabine, 2006, Crash-Landing in a Turbulent Transition Market: A Legitimating Activity? Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

118 Persson, Magnus, 2006, Unpacking the Flow: Knowledge Transfer in MNCs. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

119 Frimanson, Lars, 2006, Management Accounting and Business Relationships from a Supplier Perspective. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

120 Ström, Niklas, 2006, Essays on Information Disclosure: Content, Consequence and Relevance. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

121 Grafström, Maria, 2006, The Development of Swedish Business Journalism: Historical Roots of an Organisational Field. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

122 Flöstrand, Per, 2006, Valuation Relevance: The Use of Information and Choice of Method in Equity Valuation. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

123 Windell, Karolina, 2006, Corporate Social Responsibility under Construction: Ideas, Translations, and Institutional Change. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

124 Wictorin, Bo, 2007, Är kluster lönsamma? En undersökning av platsens betydelse för företags produktivitet. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

125 Johed, Gustav, 2007, Accounting, Stock Markets and Everyday Life. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

126 Maaninen-Olsson, Eva, 2007, Projekt i tid och rum: Kunskapsintegrering mellan projektet och dess historiska och organisatoriska kontext. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

127 Scherdin, Mikael, 2007, The Invisible Foot: Survival of new art ideas in the Swedish art arena – An autoethnographic study of nontvtvstation. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

128 Landström, Joachim, 2007, The theory of Homo comperiens, the firm’s market price, and the implication for a firm’s profitability. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

129 Bjurström, Erik, 2007, Creating New Attention in Management Control. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

130 Andersson, Anneli, 2007, ”Vi blev antagligen för många”: Könskränkande behandling i akademisk miljö. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

131 Gunilla Myreteg, 2007, Förändringens vindar: En studie om aktörsgrupper och konsten att välja och införa ett affärssystem. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

132 Ersson, Sofi, 2007, Indicators in Action: Development, Use and Consequences. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

133 Pallas, Josef, 2007, Talking Organizations: Corporate Media Work and Negotiation of Local Practice. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

134 Novak, Jiri, 2008, On the Importance of Accounting Information for Stock Market Efficiency. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

135 Lundberg, Heléne, 2008, Geographical Proximity Effects and Regional Strategic Networks. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

136 Hallin, Christina, 2008, Subsidiaries as Sources and Recipients of Innovations in the Multinational Corporation. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

137 Sörhammar, David, 2008, Consumer - firm business relationship and network: The case of “Store” versus Internet. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

138 Karén, Mats & Ljunggren, Sten, 2008, Two Studies on Management Accounting Systems and Performance in Swedish Firms. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

139 Caesarius, Leon, 2008, In Search of Known Unknowns: An Empirical Investigation of the Peripety of a Knowledge Management System. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

140 Buhr, Katarina, 2008, Bringing Aviation into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Institutional Entrepreneurship at Windows of Opportunity. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

141 Kappen Philip, 2009, Technological Evolution in Foreign Subsidiaries: Among Average Joes, Superstars and the New Kids on the Block. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

142 Furusten, Kristina, 2009, Det förändrade kontraktet: Banker och företagskonkurser under 1990-talets finanskris. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

143 Shih, Tommy, 2009, Scrutinizing a Policy Ambition to make Business out of Science: Lessons from Taiwan. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

144 Blomkvist, Katarina, 2009, Technological Growth in the MNC: A Longitudinal Study of the Role of Advanced Foreign Subsidiaries. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

145 Fryk, Pontus, 2009, Modern Perspectives on the Digital Economy: With Insights from the Health Care Sector. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

146 Iveroth, Einar, 2010, Leading IT-Enabled Change Inside Ericsson: A Transformation Into a Global Network of Shared Service Centres. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

147 Dellestrand, Henrik, 2010, Orchestrating Innovation in the Multinational Enterprise: Headquarters Involvement in Innovation Transfer Projects. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

148 Ingemansson, Malena, 2010, Success as Science but Burden for Business? On the Difficult Relationship between Scientific Advancement and Innovation. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

149 Yang, Tao, 2010, The Effect of Guanxi on the Foreign Market Entry Process to China: The Swedish Case. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

150 Pourmand, Firouze, 2011, How do Small Firms Manage their Political Environment? A Network Perspective. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

151 Linné, Åse, 2012, China´s Creation of Biopharmaceutical Drugs: Combining Political Steering, Military Research, and Transnational Networking. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

152 Bay, Charlotta, 2012, Making Accounting Matter: A Study of the Constitutive Practices of Accounting Framers. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

153 Hartwig, Fredrik, 2012, Four Papers on Top Management's Capital Budgeting and Accounting Choices in Practice. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

154 Molin, Fredrik, 2012, The Art of Communication: Investigating the Dynamics of Work Group Meetings in a Natural Environment. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

155 Röndell, Jimmie, 2012, From Marketing to, to Marketing with Consumers. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

156 Lippert, Marcus, 2013, Communities in the Digital Age: Towards a Theoretical Model of Communities of Practice and Information Technology. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

157 Åberg, Susanne, 2013, Science in Business Interaction: A Study of the Collaboration between CERN and Swedish Companies. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

158 Figueira de Lemos, Francisco, 2013, A Political View on the Internationalization Process. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

159 Kang, Olivia, 2013, The Advantage Paradox: Managing Innovation Processes in the Multinational Corporation. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

160 Osowski, Dariusz, 2013. From Illusiveness to Genuineness: Routines, Trading Zones, Tools and Emotions in Sales Work. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

161 Lundström, Robert, 2013, Comparing Procurement Methods in Road Construction Projects. Influence on Uncertainty, Interaction and Knowledge. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

162 Tyllström, Anna, 2013, Legitimacy for Sale: Constructing a Market for PR Consultancy. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

163 Persson Ridell, Oscar, 2013, Who is the Active Consumer? Insight into Contemporary Innovation and Marketing Practices. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

164 Brännström, Daniel, 2013, Reporting Intellectual Capital: Four Studies on Recognition. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

165 Kao, Pao, 2013, Institutional Change and Foreign Market Entry Behaviour of the Firm. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

166 Poth, Susanna, 2014, Competitive Advantage in the Service Industry. The Importance of Strategic Congruence, Integrated Control and Coherent Organisational Structure: A Longitudinal Case Study of an Insurance Company. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

167 Arwinge, Olof, 2014, Internal Control in the Financial Sector: A Longitudinal Case Study of an Insurance Company. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

168 Safari, Aswo, 2014, Consumer Foreign Online Purchasing: Uncertainty in the Consumer-Retailer Relationship. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

169 Ljung, Anna, 2014, The Multinational Company and Society: A Study of Business Network Relationships in Latin America. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

170 Wallmon, Monika, 2014, A Manifesto for Anarchist Entrepreneurship: Provocative Demands for Change and the Entrepreneur. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

171 Gullberg, Cecilia, 2014, Roles of Accounting Information in Managerial Work. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

172 Lindahl, Olof, 2015, Influences on Transfer Effectiveness: An Exploratory Study of Headquarters Transfer of Capabilities to Subunits in the Multinational Corporation. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

173 Sundberg, Klas, 2015, Strategisk utveckling och ekonomistyrning: Ett livscykel-perspektiv, Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

174 Weinryb, Noomi, 2015, Free to Conform: A Comparative Study of Philanthropists’ Accountability, Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

175 Holmstedt, Matthias, 2015, L.M. Ericsson's internationalization in Africa from 1892 to 2012: A study of key factors, critical events, and core mechanisms, Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

176 Eriksson, Mikael, 2016, The complex internationalization process unfolded: The case of Atlas Copco’s entry into the Chinese mid-market, Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

177 Hadjikhani, Annoch, 2016, Executive expectation in the internationalization process of banks: The study of two Swedish banks’ foreign activities. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

178 Alimadadi, Siavash, 2016, Consistent Inconsistency: The Role of Tension in Explaining Change in Inter-organizational Relationships. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

179 Andersson, David E., 2016, The Emergence of Markets for Technology: Patent Transfers and Patenting in Sweden, 1819-1914. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

180 Kvarnström, Emilia, 2016, Institutionella samspel. Om möten mellan en kommersiell och en ideell logik. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

181 Bomark, Niklas, 2016, Drawing Lines in the Sand: Organizational Responses to Evaluations in a Swedish University. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

182 Haq, Hammad ul, 2016, The Unequal Playing Field: Headquarters’ Attention and Subsidiary Voice in Multinational Corporations. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

183 Jernberg, Signe, 2017, En högskola blir till: Beslutsteoretiska perspektiv på organisatoriskt varande. Uppsala: Företagsekonomiska institutionen.

184 Bai, Wensong, 2017, The Best of Both Worlds: The Effects of Knowledge and Network Relationships on Performance of Returnee Entrepreneurial Firms. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

185 Vural, Derya, 2017, Disclosing the Books: Evidence on Swedish Publicly Listed Firms' Accounting Disclosure Practices. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

186 Wagrell, Sofia, 2017, Drivers and Hindrances to Med-Tech Innovation: A device’s guide to the Swedish healthcare galaxy. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

187 Launberg, Anna, 2017, Creating Value from Science: Interaction between academia, business and healthcare in the Uppsala PET Centre case. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

188 Poblete, León, 2017, Rekindled Business Relationships: A study of the re-activation process of buyer-supplier relationships in the defence and security industry in Sweden. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

189 Crawford, Jason, 2017, Regulation´s Influence on Risk Management and Management Control Systems in Banks. Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

190 Lammi, Inti, 2018, A Practice Theory in Practice: Analytical Consequences in the Study of Organization and Socio-Technical Change, Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

191 Leite, Emilene, 2018, Complexity in the ‘Extended’ Business Network: A study of Business, Social and Political Relationships in Smart City Solutions, Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

192 Magnusson, Eva Maria, 2018, Complexity in the ‘Extended’ Business Network: A study of Business, Social and Political Relationships in Smart City Solutions, Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

193 Edlund, Peter, 2018, Constructing an Arbiter of Status: A Study of the European Research Council´s Emergence in the Field of Science, Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

194 Grant, Michael, 2018, Making Acquisitions, Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

195 Su, Cong, 2018, The Conundrum of Home-country Political Embeddedness: Impact on Reserve Knowledge Transfer in Emerging-market Multinationals, Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

196 Fischer, Christian, 2018, Business Intelligence through a sociomaterial lens: The imbrication of people and technology in a sales process, Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.

197 Nilsson, Amalia C., 2018, A Lighter Shade of Dark: Exploring the Value Adding and Value Subtracting Effects of Headquarters Attention and Involvement in Subsidiary Activities, Uppsala: Department of Business Studies.