Amc-machakuy Runa

8/20/2019 Amc-machakuy Runa

1/17

Birgit Daiber and Frangois Houtart (ed.)

A POSTCAPITALIST PARADIGM:

THE COMMON GOOD OF HUMANITY


2/17

Rosa Luxemburg Foundation Brussels Office 2012

[email protected], www.rosalux-europa.info

A postcapitalist Paradigm: The Common Good of Humani ty

Published by Rosa Luxemburg Foundation Brussels

W W W . rosa I ux-europa. i nfo

Layout; Edition Lit.europe, Berlin

Printed and bound by Motiv Offset

With Support of the Republic of Germany

http://www.rosalux-europa.info/http://www.rosalux-europa.info/


3/17

4 Indigenous Peoples of the Americas

AN ESSAY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE

INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS:

THE POETICS OF SUMAK KAWSAY

ON A GLOBAL HORIZON

ARMANDO MUYOLEMA

Frangois Houtart's article "De los bienes comunes al Bien Comun de la

Humanidad" ("From the common goods to the Common Good of Hu

manity") visualises some emancipatory lines on the horizon of change

in what is historically a time of risk and hope for humanity. The Utopian

features of the emancipation project have their roots in current collective

experience as much as in what Gerald Postema calls "prophetic mem-

ory":’'’2the critique emerging as the counter-image of hegemonic en-

actments.The last few decades have seen the growth of a significant

critical understanding of capitalism as a way of life based on the profit

economy, the free market and the exploitation of man and nature. From

a purposive standpoint, the need to move from the idea of "common

goods" towards a global coexistence based on the Common Good ofHumanity is an imperative of civilization that implies imagining new fun

damentals of collective life. In this undertaking, the invocation and frag

mentary resonance of non-western civilizations is notable. For someone

who grew up and was educated in a cross-cultural context becoming

less and less remote from the ideas of scientific knowledge, it is fasci

nating to witness that the growing global preoccupation with the preser

vation of humanity invokes the participation of just such civilizations. But

it is even more surprising to learn that this preoccupation implies a

search for global solutions in the cultural sources that have historically

lain under the "civilizing" siege of the West; in cultural pluralism and the

potential for the transculturation of concepts, objects and ways of life

See Gerald Postema. "On the Moral Presence of Our Past". McHill Law Journal.

36:4(1991). p. 118.

293


4/17

now promoted under the umbrella of interculturalism. In the face of this

new sensibility towards subordinated modes of life, any critical approach

from an Andean pacha’'*^ - a locus of enunciation situated in the Andes

- must not only wonder at the cross-cultural spread of concepts such

as Pachamama (Mother Earth) and sumak kawsay (Good Living) but also

ask itself if we are seeing a genuine retreat of scientific and philosophical

Enlightenment or a process of Enlightened appropriation of "subjugated

knowledge" in its Foucauldian sense.

Within this framework, Houtart poses important theoretical and practical

questions related to the definition of the Common Good of Humanity

(henceforward CGH). The fundamental idea underlying his reflections is

that the CGH is not limited to a conception of the "common goods" ofsocieties as assets of humanity. On the contrary, the conceptualization

of CGH focuses on life in its essentials and the social forms that guar

antee its reproduction, which implies the challenge of imagining the pro

duction and reproduction of life on a global scale on bases of collective

coexistence radically distinct from those dominant today. For Houtart,

the definition of CGH is not a point of departure but rather a human proj

ect whose full realisation invites all humanity, in its unity and cultural di

versity, to participate in its construction. It is therefore a challenge in

diverse senses for which the theoretical formulation, its institutional

forms on different scales, and the creation of new collective subjectivi

ties to sustain it, would only be rendered possible by the task of imag

ining the world in which we live otherwise. To this end, Houtart proposes

re-thinking the fundamentals of collective life on the basis of the follow

ing elements: a) our relationship with nature, b) the production of life, c)

collective (political) organisation and d) our reading of reality. His text of

fers important contributions on each of these elements, and this is

According to several lexicographical and historical sources. Pacha is the Andean

concept, in Quechua and Aymara, that means space-time, world, cosmos; see Gra-

matica y arte nueva de la lengua gene ral de todo e l Peru : llamada lengua Qquichua

o lengua d el Inca (Cabildo: Vaduz-Georgetown, 1975 [1607]); Shimiyuk Diccionario

Kichwa - Espanol/ Espanol- Kichwa (Quito: Casa de la Cultura Nucleo de Sucum-

bios, 2008).

294


5/17

where I would also like to locate my contribution to reinforce, expand

and clarify some concepts that are closest to me through experience

and reflection. I will focus especially on elucidating the sense of the con

cepts of Pachamama and sumak kawsay in the light of their relationship

with what constitutes - and this is my argument - a broader conceptual

system, socially, culturally and historically situated in the Andes. The

thrust of this essay articulates an argument that moves from the local

to the global. Starting from a Kichwa tale from the Amazon, in which the

key elements for understanding the flow between the human and nature

are set out, I then propose a seminal conceptual elaboration of the no

tion of minkanakuy as the foundation of sumak kawsay. I also indicate

some of the cultural conditions and the practical range of the category

minkanakuy as regards the surprising cross-cultural spread of sumak

kawsay and the creation of a broad collective subjectivity capable of sus

taining a global alternative rooted in the Common Good of Humanity. I

conclude by very briefly drawing attention to some of the risks and chal

lenges involved in the use, diffusion and theoretical elaboration of con

ceptual categories of different cultural and linguistic origin.

The machakuy runa: the metaphor of becoming and the rupture^”

In Houtart's essay, the idea of defining what is understood by CGH, be

yond what is understood as "common goods", is fundamental to establishing its bases. This takes place within a new paradigm based on "the

profound union of human being", a dynamic social equilibrium between

people, genders and groups and the cultural reconstruction of the his

torical memory of peoples.

If "capitalism causes an artificial and mechanical separation between

nature and human beings", it would be useful to explore the historical

memory and anti-/non-capitalist praxis of non-western peoples who re-

machakuy - snake] runa - human being, man. The gender of the macha kuy runa

figure goes beyond the limits of established genders. With regard to the human

and, more strictly speaking, when it turns into a human, it appears to be masculine,

while as the ma chakuy runa, and with regard to the ants - its family too - it is femi

nine. In Spanish we use the feminine article la when referring to the runa being as

snake.

295


6/17

sist control of their collective imagination. This proposition implies, how

ever, a challenge to the political and theoretical imagination. If indigenous

cultures contain "foundational concepts" that "inspire contemporary so

cial thought and organisation", an obligatory question is how to take

those foundational concepts in an intercultural conceptual elaboration,

while at the same time demonstrating an ethical attitude of solidarity

that does not silence the voice of indigenous people. A necessary de*

parture point in this ethical attitude must be an awareness that concepts

such as sumak kawsay (good living), or Pachamama {Mother Earth), per

sistently cited in liberation discourse, cannot be fully understood outside

their cultural context, unconnected to a semantic and conceptual whole

of which they form a systemic part. This anxiety, it is worth clarifying, is

far removed from an essentialist attitude that seeks to defend a supposedly inaccessible conceptual purity. It is rather a matter of drawing

attention to a necessary sensibility towards what "to speak for" and "to

speak to" mean in terms of power and knowledge production. In fact,

the same condition of imagining and constructing something new de

pends on tackling the matter of translation not solely in technical-linguis

tic terms but above all in terms of culture and political relations.

Interculturalism, as it has been imagined by indigenous peoples, as

sumes an open horizon for the spread of cultural practices postulated

as their own^^^ while at the same time expressing the willingness to

learn from other peoples. The possibility for the transculturation of ideas

cannot ignore that they originate in practices, desires and expectations

that have a specific cultural and historical locus. I believe that one way

of entering the collective imaginations in which those practices and con

cepts are rendered meaningful is the universe of local oral narratives.

We will see briefly what such narratives can tell us by analysing a Kichwa

story.̂ '̂ ®

Dolores Cacuango, an indigenous leader from the north of Ecuador in the first

half of the twentieth century, put forward a fundamental proposition in the orienta

tion of the indigenous peoples' political project: "We're like the high moorland

grass that is cut and grows again; we’ ll sow the world with tall grass."

I will use Kichwa to refer to the dialectal variant Ecuadorian Kichwa, and

Quechua when referring to the whole linguistic community.

296


7/17

In the 1970s, in the early days of oil exploration, an interesting collection

of stories appeared, gathered from among the Kichwa communities of

the Ecuadorian Amazon All of the stories are oral in origin and provide

an account of the forms of life and of the relationship between the

human and the non-human, of the flux between those worlds which inother cultural contexts are depicted as separate and opposed spheres.

In the narrative universe we are dealing with, animals become human

and vice versa.

The act of becoming dissolves the borders between culture and nature.

Faced with the transculturation of concepts such as sumak kawsay, it

seems fitting to turn the gaze to those stories as a hermeneutic and

epistemological option that seeks to exercise control over the endoge

nous senses of those now nomadic concepts, wandering across differ

ent cultural borders. One of the stories is the "Machakuy runa", the

snake-woman, from the collection referred to above.

The story is an account of a failed amorous relationship. A young hunter

in the middle of the jungle observes "ukuy" ants, a culturally significant

variety, carrying away the feathers of the birds that he had hunted; the

maytus (sheaths) from his first hunting days also disappear. When he is

returning home, a beautiful young girl appears on the way; she asks for

something to eat and declares her love for the young man, saying her

family would look favourably on their setting up a home together. The

young hunter gladly accepts her proposal, takes her home and they start

a family. Every weekend the young girl's father comes to visit them,

drinks chicha (a maize or cassava liquor) and goes back to the jungle.

One day, before going into the jungle, the young hunter advises his wife

to drink chicha to her father and treat him well, while for her part the

young girl warns him not to harm a snake if he sees one on the way

back from the jungle because it is her father. The father comes to visit

as usual and. in contrast to previous occasions, drinks too much chicha;

Juan Santos Ortiz de Villalba. Sacha Pacha. E l mun do de la selva.

Quito: CICAME, 1994.

297


8/17

then he goes off. The young hunter, returning honne, comes across an

enormous snake sleeping on the road, which - without thinking - he

hits with a branch until he realises that chicha is coming from one of its

wounds. When he gets home, his wife notices a strange attitude in her

husband and intuits that something has happened with her father; she

takes her daughter in her arms and runs into the jungle. There she finds

the lifeless body of her father, the machakuy runa. Sobbing, she takes

him to the ukuy ants' house. Soon her husband arrives and demolishes

the ants' house in an attempt to take her home, although his wife re

peatedly implores him not to do it because they are her family. The

young hunter, who loves his wife very much, persists in demolishing

the ants' house as he tries to get her back, but does not achieve his aim:

his wife turns into a ukuy ant and disappears, together with his daughter,into the depths of the labyrinth that is the ants' house. The hunter re

turns home, inconsolable, without his wife and without his daughter.

What might this story have to tell us about the collective imagination of

the Amazon peoples in a historical time marked by the advent of oil ex

ploration and growing environmental concerns?

Without attempting a detailed interpretation, it can be taken as a possi

ble way into understanding a different collective way of life. Thus, the

first thing that stands out is a symbiosis between spheres that the West

defines as nature and the social world; that is, not only in the sense that

nature is where social life is reproduced but that it is a continuum that

includes nature as an integral part of social life.

In effect, the young creature who appears on the road is an ant (ukuy)

who becomes a woman in order to live with the young hunter.^'^® The

relationship that unfolds in the human sphere lasts by virtue of respect

for the norms of the relationship with nature. In this sense, the story

also embodies a normative universe, not just in the sense of a simple

system of rules, but fundamentally as the world in which the rules live

Here we make use of the concept of becoming without further elaboration; for a

theorisation of this concept it is important to refer to Deleuze y Guatari. MU Mese -

tas (Valencia: Pre-Textos, 2002).

298


9/17

and acquire meaningJ'^® While the young woman lives in the human di

mension of nature, her father moves between these two spheres of life.

The young hunter enjoys this relationship through the generous gesture

of sharing his food with the young woman and respect for her father. It

is important to draw attention here to this act of reciprocity, which wewill return to below. This symbiosis becomes more complex if attention

is paid to the "kinship network" established between the ukuy ants, the

machakuy runa, the young wife and her daughter: the girl establishes a

profound link between the human and nature, in its diversity of life

forms, incompatible among themselves from a viewpoint outside the

universe represented in the tale.

This coexistence, which seems solid to begin with, ends abruptly in

tragedy. The young hunter, on severing the life of the machakuy (runa),

causes a rupture in the process of becoming that guarantees the har

monic culture-nature continuum. The tragedy is that this happens with

out there being a deliberately destructive intention. On the contrary, the

destruction of the ants' house to get his wife back constitutes a singular

event that prompts reflection on the general relationship between or

ganisms and their mutual environments and, in particular, on gender re

lations, paying more specific attention to the value of the feminine voice

within a social order in which the masculine monologue reigns. In thecontext of the story, the ability to discern and heed the feminine voice

is put to the test; it is a condition for maintaining a harmonic relationship

in a social world which includes and extends the social sphere with the

non-human, ignoring her voice leads to rupture. The hunter's forgetting

of the warning issued by his wife before he goes out hunting cannot be

understood in any other way. But even more serious is his destruction

of the ants' house without heeding his wife's outcries. It can be inferred

from the story that the young hunter loves his wife and wants her back,

but his deafness and the centrality of his ego end up destroying not only

On the relationship between the law and narrative, see Robert Cover's sugges

tive article, "Nomos and Narrative", in Narrative, Violence, and the Lav/. Martha

Minow, Michel Ryan and Austin Sarat, eds. (Ann Arbor; The University of Michigan

Press, 1995).

299


10/17

his home but the close relationship between the human order and na

ture embodied in his wife and her kinship network integrating the human

and non-human worlds. Love boils over, forgets its transitory nature and

becomes an act of destruction and self-destruction.

In this interpretation, a central concept for visualising the dissolution of

borders between the human and the non-human is, as already indicated,

that of becoming which, in Deleuzian code relating to material bodies,

is defined by reference to the ways in which these can become other.

We know that we are playing with problematic concepts that have pre

cision within a cultural history and complex intellectual tradition. Thus a

deeper comprehension of the knowledge entailed in the story should

ponder an alternative epistemology that puts the categories culture-na

ture, human-non-human under suspicion, and explores the ways in

which the locus of the runa (machakuy-runa) is understood, lived and

imagined with regard to its vital surroundings. However, the nature of

the present work does not permit such an exercise. But I would like to

point out that a normative universe can be perceived in the body of the

story, the rupture of which triggers the tragic outcome of the events.

With which, it can be flagged up that cultural entities do not exist with

out institutional forms and normative universes, and that their prescrip

tions do not exist outside the narratives that locate and give them

meaning. Bearing this schematic approach to the tale in mind, we will

go on to explore forms of reciprocity within Andean tradition and from

them the process of epistemological invention of the sumak kawsay. It

is important to remain aware of two aspects: first, the reciprocal act that

leads to the founding of a family, a broad and complex system of kinship

between the hunter and the young woman which underlies their way

of life; and second, that the story, far from depicting a romantic vision

of the Kichwa world, ends in tragedy, demonstrating the fragility of the

relationships represented therein.

minka/minkanakuy as the foundation of sumak kawsay

Houtart does a good job of describing the depth and implications of the

global crisis of capitalism. His text summarises some of the many critical

voices that prove the unfeasibility of intra-systemic solutions and devel-

300


11/17

ops some programmatic lines for what could be a new paradigm of

human coexistence with a global reach. This effort must be collective

and the imagination must play a fundamental role. So the concept of

sumak kawsay is invoked, from a politically and epistemologically open

standpoint, as a "foundational" and "inspirational" principle, making useof a category that has enjoyed a notable success in the political debate

both within and without its social, cultural and linguistic context in the

Andes. The spread of this concept is, without doubt, significant. The con

ceptual wealth attributed to sumak kawsay includes, among other things,

a "sense of life", a "communal ethic", the "relationship with nature", the

"attainment of a full life", the "ought-tobe of the Plurinational State", a

"paradigm", a "political project" (see Simbaha, Acosta, Davalos, Tortosa,

Santos). The convergence of these elements would lead to the estab

lishment of a radically different civilization. The depth and reach attrib

uted to the notion of sumak kawsay suggest that it would come to

institute a state of affairs representing an authentic alternative to capi

talism as a social and historical system that is today markedly in crisis

and decline. What catches the attention in the use and spread of this

category (in its cross-cultural epistemological course) is, however, the

scant conceptual development as regards its cultural and linguistic

sources, and the social praxis that it relates to and describes. This search

is not a sterile but a necessary exercise when we consider that everyconcept forms part of a semantic field and a conceptual system that

makes it not just a matter of linguistic translation but, as part of a histor

ically located philosophical and cultural system, a different conception

of the world. Such a consideration should take us back to its linguistic

and cultural origin, to engage in an epistemological dialogue with differ

ent actors from the community of origin. A basic question in this dia

logue stance ought to be: beyond the literal translation of sumak kawsay

as good living, is there an ancestral genealogy existing as a hard philo

sophical category in the Andean cultural context? Are there other An

dean (Kichwa-Aymara) concepts underlying or forming a system with

that of sumak kawsay which could lead to the formulation of a new par

adigm of human coexistence? I am convinced in my supposition that a

Kichwa-speaker would answer in the affirmative. If sumak kawsay is a

301


12/17

"state of things" or a "political project" seeking the attainment of a full

life (a harmonic and balanced state of things), it is logical to wonder

about the principles and forms of social coexistence that make such a

state of affairs possible. Do those elements exist within the Andean lin

guistic-conceptual corpus and in its social praxis? I would like to answeraffirmatively and consider how, for example, notions of solidarity, of so

cial transformation, of reciprocity, of poverty and wealth, of relating to

the environment, of relating to experience and time, of the person and

of the collective are codified in the Quechua/Kichwa language. In this

perspective, 1would like to put forward at least a schematic approxima

tion of the widespread praxis of the minga in different Andean scenarios,

both urban and rural, and show how this practice articulates a different

social outlook that suggests a complementary conception of the individ

ual and the collective, and leaves visible the constituent elements that

sustain the networks of solidarity and the formation of the collective.

First off, it is necessary to point out that no Quechua/Kichwa dictionary,

past or present, contains an entry assigning meaning to the compound

phrase sumak kawsay. Each of the words appears and is defined sepa

rately. Sumak means «pretty, beautiful, lovely, nice», while kawsay

means «life, to live». The combination of the two concepts, possible in

daily communication, does not denote an extraordinary epistemological

status in the way that other concepts such as pacha (space-time),

pachakutik (profound transformation in the order of things) etc. do. It is

not an ancestral category but an epistemological invention sustained by

the ecological struggles occupying a world in crisis and refers to a whole

set of practices that make up the Andean way of life. It is an interstitial

concept, the power and legitimacy of which lie, however, in its capacity

to become a life option through its rootedness in the practices which

define the Andean way of life, such as the minga and the practical and

conceptual field associated with it.

302


13/17

Minga is a mutual practice which simply calls for collective work. In this

sense, people talk of "minga to mend the community school", of "minga

decoration of the city" or even, of "Global minga".^^°The essential sense

in such cases is collectively to look after an asset of common interest.

It effectively amounts to the combination of a collective will to preservea public good, or rather we could say, what are conceived of as "com

mon goods", on different social and geographical scales. This is the

sense underlying the proliferation of working practices generically des

ignated by the word minga. We can speak of a global minga to achieye

the declaration of the Common Good of Humanity. However, consid

ered in its sociocultural context, minga is a much more complex institu

tion with deep historical roots and multiple dimensions: social and

economic, ecological and ritual, political and normative. Etymologically,

it comes from the Kichwa verbal root minka-^^’ which means «to en

trust)), «to take care of something)). From this point of view minka des

ignates collective work, though not just any collective work but that

which is done as an act of solidarity, be it towards a person, a family or

a larger community. Community and individuality include the relationship

with the place and other forms of life living there, as we saw in the tale

of the hunter. Nor is this a question of just any kind of solidarity: the

practice of minka goes beyond the sense of solidarity understood as a

momentary adhesion to the cause of others. On the contrary, the act oftaking care of something implies responsibility to look after it, a respon

sibility that makes sense in the construction of the social, such as in re

lationships and interactions that transcend the human (the ukuy ants,

the machakuy runa). Minka entails a normative and continuous social re

sponsibility derived from assuming the care of something or someone

as a permanent mode of coexistence. Thus, on the everyday social level.

I refer to a rallying cry formulated in English: Global Minga in Defense of M other

Earth and H er Peoples, O ctobe r 12-16, available at: http://intercontinentalcry.org/

global-minga-in-defence-of-mother-earth-and-her-peoples/

The orthographical difference is to differentiate the use of the word in Spanish

and Kichwa. In the context of Spanish it is written minga; while in the Kichwa con

text it is written minka-, the verbal root or action to which other meanings can be

added by using suffixes; the hyhen indicates this semantic opening.

303

http://intercontinentalcry.org/http://intercontinentalcry.org/


14/17

when you arrive at someone's house it is normal to say, almost sponta

neously, "wasiyuk, minkachiway" - literally, "owner of the house, take

care of me, look after me"; clearly, the responsibility of the host goes

beyond receiving them in their home. The praxis of minka has evolved

and assumed different forms throughout the Andes. Although minka is

usually distinguished from other forms of reciprocity^^^ it can be af

firmed that conceptually it is the general framework within which other

forms are defined and acquire meaning.This general conceptual

framework is apparent if we consider the minka- in relation to the recip

rocal -naku-: minkanakuy: «to care for one another». The concept of

minkanakuy thus designates a normative act of social responsibility that

is not discharged in the voluntarism of a momentary gesture of solidarity.

Quite the contrary, it is the conceptual and philosophical foundation that

sustains all forms of solidarity between people, between individuals and

the community, and between political communities - human and more

broadly non-human. It is clear that the multiple human relations that de

rive from the practice of minkanakuy are fundamental in collective life

in the Andes, relations that cannot be understood outside of the territory

or inhabitation of a place, a pacha. We can say that the practice of min

kanakuy, ((looking after one another)), does not refer only to collective

work, but to the weave of relations that make up the collective; the

sense, texture and durability of society. It is in this weave of relationships

that work, exchange (ranti ranti), political matters, ritual and the manner

in which a place is inhabited acquire meaning. Minka as a generalised

practice, etched in the collective imagination, constitutes the cultivation

of relationships as something worthwhile, even beyond the possession

of goods. Still at odds with the market mediated by monetary transac

tions, the spirit of minka resists in parallel; and when negotiating trans

actions and interactions, outside of money. From this perspective it can

be understood, for example, why the conception of poverty in the An

dean world does not refer to the lack of goods but rather fundamentally

’ 2̂ For a more (detailed analysis of the forms of reciprocity and exchange in the Pe

ruvian Andes, see the work of Enrique Mayer and Giorgio Alberti, eds. Reciprocidad

e intercambio en los Andes peruanos (Lima: lEP, 1974),

There are forms of reciprocity such as ayni, rantipak. maki-manachi, etc.

304


15/17

to the lack of social relationships. A poor person is a wakcha, which is

to say, someone who is socially isolated or bereft. Private property is

not a central element in individual happiness, though neither is submis

sion to a state apparatus guaranteeing collective life. We cannot elabo-

rate this assertion in detail here, but suffice to point out that it is theenjoyment of the gifts of nature and of human creations in terms of shar

ing them with others that frames and gives substance to the practices

of minkankuy; wealth is not possession of things but the networks of

the social relationships that are defined by the individual and collective

responsibility to look after one another, to take care of others, or to en

sure that the other lives well. The practice of minkanakuy is by definition

opposed to competition, to the logic of homo economicus who, facing

the flow of merchandise, thinks only of himself. In this respect, ! insist

that minkanakuy, the supportive practice of taking care of one another,

of looking after each other mutually, cannot be confused with charity or

philanthropy. To live in terms of minkanakuy is to negate the economy

of profit and accumulation; in conceiving of wealth as social relation

ships, minkanakuy implies the protection of the individual so they don't

become a wakcha, a person short of social relationships and socially

bereft. The essence of pleasure - of individual enjoyment - is, according

to Slavoj Zizek, good collective living: pleasure as a constituent element

of social being that implies mutual care.

Without departing very far from our analysis, it is easy to discern that

the praxis of the minka is an institution that articulates the social and

the economic, the ritual and the political, the personal with the collective.

And we are not speaking of essences or archaic forms in which Andean

societies articulate the many practices of human action, but of knowl

edge, of practices, of a normative universe and of an ought-to-be ethic

that sustains and gives meaning to social and societal relationships. It

is imperative to point out that, far from being a reificatory idealisation,

these forms of reciprocity have been or have come into being historically

in both symmetrical and asymmetric practices, that they have been ac

tivated in varying degrees to generate surpluses; that they are forms of

social relation historically transformed by contact with other socioeco-

305


16/17

nomic and political systems, and that their ethical bases are being un

dermined. All the same, their contents, the forms and the normative uni

verse of these practices can be explored with the aim of regaining,

reconstructing and reinventing them in the light of present and future

needs and expectations. This needs to be a critical exercise of theoretical imagination and of historical commitment to deny any attempt at

conceptual reification. It also implies a political and epistemological

struggle against the denial of contemporariness that capitalism deploys

against ail forms of criticism of its cultural fundamentals. The concept

of sumak kawsay, as imagined in political discourse, is a recent inven

tion, it is a category that cites a way of life that needs to sink its roots

into the practices of minkanakuy underlying the modes of production

and multiple relations of collective life in the Andes. Otherwise, it runs

the risk of ending up domesticated and reduced to its aesthetic dimen

sion, and subsumed in the capitalist symbolism of cultural democracy.

The idea of the Common Good of Humanity, as formulated by Houtart,

poses many questions and challenges. In my view its very definition

could lead to misunderstandings. If it is a radically different collective

way of life which humanity should reach, I do not understand why we

should call it the Common Good of Humanity, in a historical time of

grotesque global political impostures. The military interventions with the

destruction and death that came in their wake in Iraq, Afghanistan and

Libya, in the name of liberty, democracy and the "protection of civilians",

illustrate how socially and politically desirable concepts can be appropri

ated and used by the imperial powers. For its part, the United Nations,

with its immovable power structures, has demonstrated not only its in

effectiveness in preventing wars but also something much more wor

rying: its usefulness for legitimising the military interventions of the big

powers at a global level. The Common Good of Humanity series shows

us a form of declaration to which this discussion certainly aspires, but it

is much more important to work on the creation of new collective sub

jectivities that move away from the liberal ethos that sees individuals in

perpetual competition among themselves and from the collectivism that

distorts the solidarity-based liberty of minkanakuy.

306


17/17

In the immediate world political context, the construction of a collective

way of life to replace capitalism is a political imperative of humanity.

However, at a time of historical transition, we can only foresee advances

at the edge of what our imagination can make out. Thus, Houtart's dis

course abounds with NGOs, alliances between nations, internationalconventions, a series of initiatives already under way - still marginal,

perhaps, but with potential to make change viable at a time of historical

transition. What is novel and encouraging is the search for civilising el

ements and paradigms in the memories and local practices of (indige

nous) peoples, which also represents a work of recovery, of invention

and open and systematic elaboration. A work of elaboration that implies

an intercultural practice that learns how to ask and to learn from others,

before unleashing the imagination.

In conclusion, we have tried to give a historical and cultural foundation

to the invention of sumak kawsay as a concept referring to a way of life

historically situated in the Andes, based on the practice of minka, col

lective work implying the normative principle of social responsibility to

care for one another. The question of its meaning and utility on different

social and geographical scales remains open, not only because of the

particular historical context in which it arose, but also because of the le

gitimacy that other ways of life might complement and even oppose itwith. The same goes for the complexity of societies on the global scale,

defined to different degrees by technological development. The trans-

culturation of objects, of ideas, of ways of life is so important, as is the

ability to listen and to learn from others.

307

Documents

Amc-machakuy Runa