American Conservatism in the Modem Era Chris $chwandt

American Conservatism in the Modem EraChris $chwandt

Christopher Schwandt is a second-year MA student at San Francisco StateUniversity and is particularly interested in social and political history of theUnited States since World War IL He completed his BA degree at UC SantaBarbara, taught high schoolfor three years, and earned an MA degree in

Education at the University of Colorado at Boulder. He hopes to enter a PhDprogram in US. History nextyear to continue studying the conservative

movement and twentieth-century American politics.

Historical interpretations of American conservatism depend upon thesocial and political contexts in which they are written. When mid-twentieth-century scholars wrote about conservatism at a time of a liberal consensus in thepost-World War II era, they considered the ideology to be radical, backward,marginal, and a product of social anxiety. New Left historians of the 1 960s and1970s, on the other hand, never recognized conservatism as a separatemovement, but conflated it with “corporate liberalism.” In their view, abusiness-dominated political order emerged in the Progressive era, prevailedduring the New Deal, and continued into the post-World War II years. Afterconservatism surged with the 1964 Barry Goldwater presidential campaign,many historians interpreted it to be a predominantly white social and cultural“backlash” to the era of black civil rights. They assumed that conservatismexpressed only temporary frustrations and was not sustainable. But as RonaldReagan stepped into the White House in 1981, historians had to reconsider theirinterpretation of conservatism once again and began to acknowledge it as a long-term movement. As American politics and culture shifted rightward, scholarssought answers for how, why, and when this movement had begun.

Alan Brinkley asserted in 1994 that conservatism was an “orphan” ofhistorical scholarship.2 In a response, almost twenty years later, Kim PhillipsFein surveyed the burgeoning historiography of conservatism.3 Her expansiveessay made four points apparent. First, the body of research on conservatism hadgrown tremendously from the time Brinkley wrote in 1994. According toPhillips-Fein, few could dispute that “{oJver the past two decades it has been oneof the most dynamic subfields in American history, the subject of dozens of

Alan Brinkley, “The Problem of American Conservatism,” American Historical Review(April 1994): 412—413.2 Ibid., 410.

Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” The Journal ofAmericanHistory (December 2011): 723.

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journal articles, books, and dissertations.”4 Second, the range of historicalscholarship on conservatism diversified. She acknowledged multiple genres ofconservative history that included political, social, cultural, religious,intellectual, regional, business, and so forth. Third, questions of longevity andorigin became central to the study of conservatism. Historians variously claimedthat the conservative movement began in the post-World War II era, during theNew Deal, or even before World War I. Fourth, the question of conservativetriumph or failure also emerged in the field. Scholars were conflicted about howsuccessful conservatives had been in achieving their social, cultural, andpolitical goals.

This paper attempts to synthesize the multitude of historical works onconservatism by examining four general interpretations scholars have applied toit since 1945. The movement has been interpreted variously as: 1) a radicalpopulist reaction; 2) a racial and cultural backlash; 3) a bottom-up social-political movement, and 4) an elite mobilization of resources and ideas. Eachsection considers the nature of the historical perspective, seeking to explain itsunique characteristics, and how it differed from other interpretations. Theproblem of origin is considered; when and where did these scholars believeconservatism began? The assumptions scholars made about the success, failure,or prospects of conservatism are also compared. Finally, after examining thesefour interpretations, I suggest a “single-issue” approach to studyingconservatism based on the notions of “symmetry” with liberalism and“longevity” of specific conservative social, political, and cultural issues.

Radical RightDaniel Bell edited a book of collected essays in 1955 called The New

American Right, in which scholars criticized conservatives for being extreme,irrational, and anxious about their social status. This work responded to thethreat of McCarthyism by defending modernity, rationality, and moderation. Arevised second edition, released in 1963 with the title The Radical Right,commented on the subsequent development of the tense divisions betweenconservatives and moderates within the Republican Party. Richard Hofstadter,David Riesman, Talcott Parsons, and others renewed their arguments that arapidly changing American culture and psychological tensions over social status,created in a time of postwar prosenty, fueled the Right’s extreme opposition toCommunism and the New Deal. Bell, for example, claimed the Radical Rightwas a small minority who “fear[ed] the erosion of its own social position, thecollapse of its power, [and] the increasing incomprehensibility of [the modem]world.”6 Although these postwar scholars did not imagine any long-term successof conservatism, they were the first to consider its historical origins.

“Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” 723.David Plotke, “Introduction to the Transaction Edition (2001),” in The RadicaiRight,

ed. Daniel Bell (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), xii—xiv.6 Daniel Bell, “The Dispossessed,” in The Radical Right, ed. Daniel Bell (NewBrunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 2.

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American Conservatism in the Modem Era 143

These historians saw the Right as rooted in the traditions of popularmass movements and reactionary responses to modernity. They connected it topopulism in the 1 890s and the followers of father Charles Coughlin in the1930s.7 By acknowledging a psychological relationship to these earliermovements, they rejected the notion of any spontaneous, isolated developmentof conservatism. Instead, these scholars recognized a long history of theAmerican Right by associating it with what they considered to be other status-driven, reactionary, and irrational movements. Conservatism’s antecedents laywithin the broader history of populism, psychosis, and mass hysteria.

According to these historians, the fear among conservatives that theUnited States was losing the Cold War contributed significantly to the Right’sgrowing opposition to liberals and moderates. Bell, for example, acknowledgedspecific incidents, such as the stalemate in Korea and the Bay of Pigs fiasco inCuba, as particularly important in strengthening the voice of conservatism.8 Itwas an intense loathing of Communism, further expressed by Joseph McCarthyin the 1 950s, which empowered the Right more than any other issue. Althoughthey never considered it to be an organized movement, scholars believed thatMcCarthyism fully embodied conservatism. Furthermore, by the 1960s, theyrecognized extreme groups, such as the John Birch Society, the Minutemen, andthe anti-Communist evangelical “schools,” as representing the American Right,arguing that these organizations received support from businessmen and themilitary in spreading anti-Communist propaganda.9

Interestingly, these scholars did not foresee the beginning of anysignificant long-term conservative movement. Bell, however, cautioned that theRadical Right had some potential of gaining power if the international situationdestabilized. Writing in 1962, he warned that if Vietnam, Laos, Bolivia, orVenezuela fell to Communism, the rightwing could gain more influence withinthe Republican Party.’° Other than this possibility, they generally dismissedconservatives as marginal and inconsequential.

Cultural BacklashHistorians began taking conservatism more seriously after the

perceived breakdown of the “liberal consensus” in the 1960s and 1970s. By themid-l98Os, they started looking at the conservative Right in terms of a popularreaction against New Left radicalism and a splintering of the New Dealcoalition. Scholars claimed that black power, antiwar protesters, feminism, gayrights, and the counterculture all provoked a backlash within mainstreamAmerica, challenging the widespread support of liberalism.” This backlashsubverted the liberal order in the late 1960s and the Democratic Party begansplitting apart as white working- and middle-class voters gradually shifted to the

David Plotke, “Introduction,” in The Radical Right, xv.8 Bell, The Radical Right, 4.9Thid.,4—5.

Ibid., 44.‘ Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” 726.

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right. Most of the literature on conservatism between 1985 and 1995 focused onthe social and cultural factors of this breakdown, particularly the significantroles of race, class, and gender. 12

Ronald Formisano and Dan Carter wrote important works from this“cultural backlash” perspective. Carter’s 1995 monograph focused particularlyon race and established the mid-1950s as the beginning of the conservativemovement. He claimed that an “angry revolt” of the Southern White Citizens’Council movement began in Mississippi a few weeks after the Supreme Court’sBrown v. Board ofEducation decision in 1954, and spread to Alabama with therecruitment of 80,000 members.’3

‘Whereas Carter’s narrative placed the mid-century South at the centerof the new conservative movement, Ronald formisano and other “culturalbacklash” historians focused elsewhere. Formisano examined the Boston antibusing campaign of the 1970s, suggesting that the conservative movementspread much later in the North. Other historians, meanwhile, also acknowledgedorigins in northern, white, working-class neighborhoods of the 1 960s—inresponse to racial politics, sexual liberation, counterculture, and antiwaractivism.’4 Mostly, they recognized the significance of middle- and working-class white backlash, and understood the 1960s and 1970s as the beginning ofthe modern conservative movement.

These historians also focused on conservative political strategies, suchas a grassroots defense of racial privilege or top-down political messaging aimedat white voters. Formisano, for example, used the term “reactionary populism”to assert that the anti-busing movement arose from ordinary citizens who “drewupon a widespread sense of injustice, unfairness, and deprivation of rights.”6The irony was lost, however, among the protestors, who relied on civil rightsactivists as models for their own strategies.’7 Formisano also acknowledgedclashing symbols, such as a longhaired, counterculture youth wearing a peace-sign necklace, but holding an explicitly racist black effigy. Thesecontradictions implied an irrational movement, divorced from theory orideology, but grounded in anger and despair.

Carter also affirmed the fury of white backlash, but examined the rolesof both Southern segregationists and their political leaders. He considered theinterplay of these two political forces: popular pressure to maintain Southernsegregation and George Wallace’s demagoguery of the issue. Taking note of the

12 Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making ofthe Conservative Movementfromthe New Deal to Reagan (New York: W.W, Norton, 2009), 323.‘ Dan T. Carter, The Politics ofRage: George Wallace, the Origins of the NewConservatism, and the Transformation ofAmerican Politics, 2” ed. (Baton Rouge:Louisiana State University Press, 2000), $ 2—84.14 Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands, 323.‘ Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” 726.16 Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960sand 1970s (Chapel Hill: The University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1991), 172.‘ Ibid., 138.“Ibid., 144.

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political fallout from Alabama Governor Jim Folsom’s “insufficient” attackagainst integration, Wallace committed himself to taking full advantage ofpopular sentiment for perpetuating racial segregation. National legislation, likethe Civil Rights Act of 1957, provided the fuel to launch his political career.19Southern White opposition to racial integration and federal intervention wasoverwhelming, and Wallace fully capitalized on this, directing the movementwith anti-communist rhetoric, regularly “red-baiting” his opponents, andconflating civil rights with communism.2° Furthermore, Wallace used racistlanguage to address white, working-class Northerners during his brief 1964presidential campaign, and they “embraced him with the same adoration thatmarked his passage among the masses of white Alabamians.”2’ Carter suggestedthat these racial and anti-communist messages, combined with Wallace’scriticism of bureaucracy, taxation, and intrusive federal government, laid thefoundation for the political strategy of the modem conservative movement.

Finally, “cultural-backlash” historians, like the “Radical-Right”scholars, gave little consideration to the overall successes or failures ofconservatism. Writing predominantly in the 1980s and 1990s, with a limitedperspective, perhaps they assumed conservatism only temporarily succeeded inbreaking up the New Deal coalition, but did not believe it would have any long-term consequences. For instance, although Dan Carter recognized that Nixon,Reagan, and the modern Republican Party inherited the legacy of Wallace’s“politics of rage,” which included attacks on the federal government, divisivelanguage, and condemnation of welfare recipients in order to win elections, hedid not acknowledge the deep political power they harnessed to reformgovernment. 22 In other words, scholars at this time examined how conservativesdefeated the liberal coalition, but not how they built their own forward-thinkingsocial movement.

Forward MovementHistorians recognized the endurance of the conservative movement

after the mid-l990s and began looking at how it emerged at the grassroots level.Reagan’s reelection in 1984, the Republican takeover of the House ofRepresentatives in 1994, and the general rightward political shift from the late1 970s through the 2000s encouraged scholars to take a long view of thehistorical development of conservatism.23 No longer could they attribute itssuccess merely to cultural backlash but, rather, had to reconsider its roots, base,and growth. The historical setting of its origins shifted from the Deep South andnorthern working-class neighborhoods to white middle-class suburbs.

Rick Perlstein and Lisa McGirr produced significant studies focused onthe making of a forward-looking conservative movement through social and

19 Carter, The Politics ofRage, 97.20 Carter, The Politics ofRage, 158—159.21 Ibid., 208.22 Ibid., 472—474.23 Phillips-fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” 726.

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political activism. McGirr considered the suburban neighborhoods of OrangeCounty to be the foundation for modem conservatism. Her work recognized the1950s as the birth of the movement, but traced the “conservative ethos” backeven further into the history of Southern California’s social, economic, anddemographic identity.24 She described postwar Orange County as moralistic,business-friendly, anti -communist, racially homogenous, middle-class, and pro-defense. With a conservative intellectual and organizational base established bythe 1950s, the stage was set for middle-class, white residents to coalesce aroundthe fight against communism and liberalism. McGirr asserted that whitebacklash to social issues did not occur until the late-1960s, implying that it couldnot have been the impetus for the movement that began earlier in the decade.This challenged previous “cultural-backlash” narratives, which championedblue-collar cultural reactionaries as the force of conservatism. Rather, accordingto McGirr, the movement began earlier in suburban neighborhoods, and onlylater won support from disappointed, white workers.

McGirr not only changed the setting of the conservative movement tosuburbia, but also acknowledged different political strategies. Undermining thesignificance of racism and working-class backlash, she affirmed the importanceof white, middle-class political activism in response to the “communistmenace.” Her narrative claimed that the grassroots conservative movementbegan with the purging of the local school board because of suspectedsubversive activities. It continued with the political campaigns of two staunchcold warriors: Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential bid and Ronald Reagan’s1966 gubernatorial victory. McGirr suggested that once local activistsestablished themselves in Orange County through anti-communist organizing,other conservative issues took hold within the movement. Subsequent crusadesintroduced Proposition 14 to repeal the Rumford Fair Housing Act, Proposition13 to limit local property taxes, and Proposition 6 to allow school boards to firehomosexual teachers. Although these later elements of cultural backlash existed,anti-communism was the initial engine behind the broad conservative agenda ofthe Orange County “suburban warriors.”

Rick Peristein placed the origins of the conservative movement in theearly 1960s. Although he acknowledged some of the earlier historical roots—organizations, journals, political networks—he began his narrative withClarence Manion’s 1959 attempt to recruit Goldwater for a presidential run.Ending the story after Goldwater lost the 1964 presidential election, Perlsteindetailed this intense five-year period of conservative mobilization in more thanfive-hundred pages. He made a strong case for bottom-up mobilization byhighlighting the significance of students of Young Americans for Freedom(YAF), members of the John Birch Society (IBS), and residents of the OrangeCounty suburbs. Furthermore, he suggested that almost all conservative activistsof the early twenty-first century had their roots in the 1964 Goldwater campaign,

24 Lisa McGfrr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (PrincetonUniversity Press, 2001), 15.

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and that this experience was what ultimately brought conservatives to power inthe 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.25

Although Peristein ended the story with Goldwater’s defeat in 1964, itwas clear that he viewed the conservative movement as ultimately successful.The purpose of his book was to explain the origins of the conservative victories,which began soon after the 1964 presidential election and continued all the wayinto the 2000s. He questioned how so many pundits could have been so far off inpredicting the collapse of the conservative movement immediately afterGoldwater’s loss. Unlike the “radical right” and “cultural backlash” historians,Perlstein and the “forward movement” school of conservatism identified thelong-term success of the Right.

In fact, most historians of this school assumed a conservative victory inthe end. McGirr acknowledged the New Right’s role in reconfiguring Americanpolitics of the twentieth century.26 Like others, she ended her story with RonaldReagan’s presidential election in 1980, suggesting that it represented theultimate triumph of conservatism. Rather than understanding conservatism as“the politics of despair and working-class reaction, these scholars saw it as aforward-looking, sophisticated, and politically creative force in Americanlife.”27 This is not to say that “forward movement” historians sympathized withthe political Right, but instead of interpreting it marginally as “radical” or short-lived as a “backlash,” they wrote about it as being significantly influential andgenerally victorious in the second part of the twentieth century.

Elite MobilizationHistorians have also acknowledged elite contributions to the

conservative movement. Similar to the “forward movement” interpretation,these scholars focused on deeper roots, political organizations, and electoralsuccesses of modem conservatism. But they used a top-down approach tohighlight the involvement of businessmen, intellectuals, religious leaders, andother influential figures in establishing the movement’s foundation. Think tanks,social institutions, and political networks merged ideas, media, and money toform the basis of conservative ideology. Important works by George Nash andKim Phillips-fem exemplifi this perspective of “elite mobilization.”

Both of these authors established the origins of the conservativemovement years before either the “cultural backlash” or the “forwardmovement” historians. As suggested by the book’s subtitle, Kim Phillips-fein’sInvisible Hands. The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Dealto Reagan traced the beginning of the conservative movement back as far as theNew Deal reforms of the 1930s. She claimed that elite businessmen—whosepolitical and economic dominance of the 1920s became seriously challenged bythe New Deal—initiated the spread of conservative ideals in the 1930s to

25 Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking ofthe AmericanConsensus (New York: Nation Books, 2009), xii—xiii.26 McGirr, Suburban Warriors, 273.27 Phillips-fein, “Conservatism: A State of the field,” 727.

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combat what they saw as an encroaching federal government and a threateninglabor movement.

George Nash, on the other hand, suggested that no conservativemovement existed until after World War II, but he affirmed the existence ofintellectual roots before this time. He recognized Friedrich Hayek’s 1944 work,The Road to Serfdom, and the other Austrian economists who wrote in the early-twentieth century as the “libertarian” intellectual foundations of the modernconservative movement.28 Similarly, Nash considered Richard Weaver, EricVoegelin, Leo Strauss, and Russell Kirk, among others, as the intellectual basefor what he termed “traditionalism.”29 The third pillar of conservatismacknowledged by Nash was vehement “anti-Communism,” represented byauthors such as Eugene Lyons, freda Utley, and William Henry Chamberlain.30Many of these intellectuals wrote important works before 1945, and a coherentconservative view emerged by the late 1 940s. Hence, Nash regarded 1945 as theapproximate beginning of the intellectual conservative movement.

Not only did the “elite mobilization” school tend to take an early viewof conservative origins, but they focused on top-down movement strategies.Phillips-Fein acknowledged that businessmen initially supported organizationssuch as the American Liberty League (ALL), National Association ofManufacturers (NAM), and the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) toset the groundwork for a struggle against labor unions, economic regulations,and the emerging welfare state. She examined how businessmen laid thefoundation for conservative ideology through intellectual societies, think tanks,magazines, radio, churches, and anti-communist organizations. And shedescribed the strategies businessmen implemented to fight labor unions, supportpolitical campaigns, defend free enterprise, create a “moral majority,” and,finally, elect Ronald Reagan.

Rather than the strategies of elite businessmen, Nash recognized thesignificance of intellectuals in merging libertarianism, traditionalism, and anti-Communism into one conservative ideology. The character of conservatism wasthe “fusion” of these three intellectual strains.31 Similar to the web charted inPhillips-Fein’s Invisible Hands, he traced the roles that organizations, journals,books, and institutions had in consolidating and passing down theseconservative principles. Though, Nash privileged the exchange of specific ideasmuch more than networks, associations, or alliances. Claiming that The NationalReview and The Modern Age were the most significant journals, while Kirk’sThe Conservative Mind and Barry Goldwater’s The Conscience of aConservative were two of the most important books, Nash analyzedconservative intellectual publications from 1945 through the early 1970s. Heassumed discussions within these sources to be the foundation of the movement.

28 George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America, Since 1945(New York: Basic Books, 1976), 5—10.29Thid.,36.

Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement, 86—88.31 Ibid.,174—175.

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Similar to historians of “forward movement” conservatism, “elitemobilization” scholars highlighted the success of the conservative movement inthe l970s and 1980s. Phillips-fein’s work climaxed with Reagan’s 1980presidential victory in the final chapter, titled “the Market Triumphant.”32 Theimplication was that this success should be attributed to elite interests more thanto popular social-political mobilization. This view did not deny the importanceof grassroots activism, but emphasized the efforts of businessmen to spread free-market ideology.

Nash also ignored the popular base of conservatism, but acknowledgedit as an intellectual movement ahead of his time. Conservatives still had verylittle national power in 1976, when his book was first published. The tax revoltsof the late 1970s had not yet occurred, Democrats controlled both houses ofCongress by wide margins, and few imagined Ronald Reagan, or any otherconservative, could ever become president. Like other historians, Nashwitnessed the breakdown of the liberal consensus in the late 1960s and early1970s. However, he considered conservatism to be an intellectual and politicalforce—not merely a “cultural backlash.” This does not mean that he sawconservatism as triumphant, but he did end his study with a sense of possibilityfor conservative success.

Nash and Phillips-Fein both focused on the top-down delivery of ideasto shape the foundation of conservatism. Business- and intellectual-conservatismexplained a central question regarding the merging of libertarianism withtraditionalism. furthermore, both historians considered conservatism a“movement,” downplaying or ignoring social and cultural backlash. Theiremphasis on elites, ideas, and institutions meant that “reactionary populism” wasrelatively absent from their analysis.

ConclusionGiven that historical context continues to change, ‘it is worth

considering whether there is a need for new and more relevant interpretivemodels by which to study American conservatism. One might suggest a fifth“single-issue” framework related to the concepts of “symmetry” and“longevity,” which were discussed by Phillips-fein in 2011. In response,Wilfred McClay agreed that the study of conservatism should be moresymmetrical with liberalism.33 This means that liberalism should not beprivileged in the historical record. Many historians have seen the twentiethcentury as a gradual liberalization of public policy until the conservativemovement disrupted this process in the late 1960s with the breakdown of theliberal consensus. One aspect of acknowledging symmetry between liberalismand conservatism, however, is to see them in constant opposition to one another.In other words, conservatism should not be considered an abnormal turn in the

32 Phillips-Fern, Invisible Hands, 236.u Wilfred M. McClay, “Less Boilerplate, More Symmetry,” The Journal ofAmericanHistory (December 2011): 745.

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course of history, but should be recognized as one side of an ongoing strugglebetween two ideological forces.

One problem of an asymmetrical analysis has been that scholars look atthe Right as an overarching movement, but often examine the Left in terms ofindividual movements. Leftist movements, including civil rights, feminism, gayrights, and environmentalism, each have their own historiography. But the Rightalso has its own unique movements, which should be considered morethoroughly: gun rights, tax revolts, anti-abortion, school choice, and so forth.Symmetry, therefore, might be better achieved by studying singular movements,with less attention placed on broad-based conservatism.

Along with symmetry, Phullips-Fein raised the issue of longevity in heressay on conservatism as a field of study. In response, Martin Durham suggestedthat defining conservatism too broadly, by including the Ku Klux Klan of the1920s or the followers of Charles Coughlin in the 1930s, “makes the term‘conservative’ too amorphous to be useful.”34 Lisa McGirr’s essay, on the otherhand, praised historians for regularly “not[ing] the importance of the deeperroots of conservative religiosity, free-market ideas, isolationism, andantiradicalism” that preceded the postwar conservative movement.35 Mosthistorians may agree that the modem conservative movement began after WorldWar II, even if historical roots previously existed, but there is still the questionof how to approach these “deeper trends.” I suggest looking at long-termperspectives, but on specific issues. In other words, dig deep and narrow.Examining the historical arguments concerning taxation, government spending,and economic regulations could be useful in understanding deeper roots ofconservatism without confusing the meaning of the ideology. In the finalanalysis, a “single-issue” framework to investigate the long-term disputesbetween liberals and conservatives over singular concerns would effectivelyaddress problems of symmetry and longevity, not to mention, bring morerelevant history to the matters of today.

Martin Durham, “On American Conservatism and Kim Phillips-fein’s Survey of theField,” The Journal ofAmerican History (December 2011): 758.

Lisa McGfrr, “Now that Historians Know So Much about the Right, How Should WeBest Approach the Study of Conservatism?” The Journal ofAmerican History (December2011): 769.

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Bibliography

Bell, Daniel, editor. The Radical Right. 3fh ed. New Brunswick: TransactionPublishers, 2002.

Brinkley, Alan. “The Problem of American Conservatism.” The AmericanHistorical Review. (Apr. 1994): 409—429,“Conservatism as a Growing Field of Scholarship.” The Journal ofAmerican History. (Dec. 2011): 748—751.

Carter, Dan T. The Politics ofRage.’ George Wallace, the Origins ofthe NewConservatism, and the Transformation ofAmerican Politics. 2’ ed.Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000.

Critchlow, Donald T. “Rethinking American Conservatism: Toward a NewNarrative.” The Journal ofAmerican History. (Dec. 2011): 752—755.

Durham, Martin. “On American Conservatism and Kim Phillips-Fein’s Surveyof the field.” The Journal ofAmerican History. (Dec. 2011): 756—759.

formisano, Ronald P. Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the1960s and 1970s. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,1991.

Lassiter, Matthew D. “Political History beyond the Red-Blue Divide.” TheJournal ofAmerican History. (Dec. 2011): 760—764.

McClay, Wilfred M. “Less Boilerplate, More Symmetry.” The Journal ofAmerican History. (Dec. 2011): 744—747.

McGirr, Lisa. Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right.Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.“Now That Historians Know So Much about the Right, How ShouldWe Best Approach the Study of Conservatism?” The Journal ofAmerican History. (Dec. 2011): 765—770.

Nash, George. The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America, since 1945.New York: Basic Books, 1976.

Perlstein, Rick. Before the Storm.’ Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking oftheAmerican Consensus. New York: Nation Books, 2009.

Phillips-Fein, Kim. Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movementfrom the New Deal to Reagan. New York: W.W. Norton, 2009.“Conservatism: A State of the Field.” The Journal ofAmerican History.(Dec. 2011): 723—743.“A Response.” The Journal ofAmerican History. (Dec. 2011): 771—773.

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Doubling-Down on a Bottle ofGin:An Analysis of the Trial of Harry Brolaski as aRepresentation of the Growth ofCrime and Corruption in San Francisco during theProhibition Era

Russell L. Weber

Russell L. Weber will be graduating with a Master ofArts in United StatesHistoiyfrom San Francisco State University in May 2014. Russell’s research

interests include how the classics influenced theformation ofthe early Americanrepublic and the cultural history ofAmerican comic books.

Prohibition, the national ban on the “manufacture, sale, ortransportation of intoxicating liquors within.. .the United States,” was achievedthrough the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment to the United StatesConstitution on January 16, 1919, and, at the time, was considered one of theprogressive movement’s greatest moral achievements. Over the course of the1920s, however, the American people underwent an ideological metamorphosisthat led to the re-classification of Prohibition as a conservative movement. Thisre-definition culminated in the repeal of national prohibition through ratificationof the Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution on December5, 1933.2 During this fourteen-year gap, the American people entered into aperiod of extreme moral and legal ambiguity concerning the consumption ofintoxicating beverages. The Eighteenth Amendment legally allowed theconsumption of alcohol after January 16, 1920, yet it classified the purchase orsale of any type of alcoholic beverage after that date as a federal crime. National

While The Eighteenth Amendment was ratified on January 16, 1919, the legalenforcement of Prohibition did not go into effect until one year later on January 16, 1920.For a full copy of the Eighteenth Amendment see The Constitution of the United States ofAmerica: The Bicentennial Keepsake Edition, (New York, Bantam Books, 1987), 71 orany other full length printing of the U.S. Constitution. The Volstead Act was also passedin 1919, which placed the enforcement of national prohibition within the Department ofthe Treasury, not the Department of Justice; Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen, APatriot’s History ofthe United States: From Columbus’s Great Discovery to the War onTerror (New York: Sentinel, 2004), 529.2 The Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, was ratifiedon December 5, 1933. It is interesting to note that the Twenty-first Amendment was theonly U.S. Constitutional Amendment to be ratified by state conventions, not statelegislatures. James A. Monroe, Hellfire Nation: The Politics ofSin in American History,(New Haven, New Jersey: Yale University Press, 2003), 342.

Doubling Down on a Bottle of Gin 153

prohibition was supposed to help America return to its moral roots and eradicatethe alcohol-fueled sin and crime that had plagued the nation during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The Eighteenth Amendment, however,did not solve these issues of immorality or criminality in America and insteadrather inadvertently created a new wave of crime and corruption thatimmediately and ferociously afflicted America in 1 920s—a trend that wasexemplified by the trial of San Francisco-Bay Area bootlegging mastermind,Harry Brolaski.

Historian Paul A. Carter argues that both moral complexity andambiguity complicated the United States’ prohibition movement after theratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, since both the “drys” and the “wets”believed they were protecting the sanctity of American freedom and liberty.3According to Carter, the “drys,” believed that Prohibition could liberate theworking class from the “illusions.., conveyed by alcohol,” and thus protect themoral sanctity of the American people.4 Conversely, the “wets” argued thatProhibition infringed upon an individual’s “personal liberty” to drink alcoholand was an example of the United States federal government encroaching uponthe freedoms of its citizens. Kenneth D. Rose briefly explores the criminalityand inefficiency of the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment in thedrenched San Francisco, arguing that the critical factor leading to Prohibition’sfailure in the West Coast city was the inability of federal Prohibitionenforcement officers, in conjunction with the U.S. Coast Guard, to successfullypatrol the San francisco—San Mateo—Half Moon Bay coastline and prevent thesmuggling and bootlegging of illegal alcohol.5

James A. Monroe places his examination of Prohibition within abroader historical context by explicitly analyzing how the relationship betweenmorality and politics during the Progressive Era allowed, and practicallyensured, a rise in crime in America during the 1920s and unintentionallyempowered the demon of vice that many prohibitionists wished to slay.6Through his examination of temperance, Monroe skillfully explains that theprimary motivation of the “drys” was their belief that the absence of alcohol inAmerican society would protect the working class from committing immoralactions while intoxicated.7 Though Monroe astutely argues that the “drys” werecompletely inaccurate in their prediction that Prohibition could lead America toa moral rejuvenation because its ratification not only “constmct[ed] a crime,”

“Drys” were Americans who supported national prohibition whereas “wets” were thoseAmericans who opposed a national ban on the consumption of alcohol. Paul A. Carter,“Prohibition and Democracy: The Noble Experiment Reassessed,” The WisconsinMagazine ofHistoiy 56, no.3 (Spring, 1973): 189—190.‘ Paul A. Carter, “Prohibition and Democracy: The Noble Experiment Reassessed,” TheWisconsin Magazine ofHistory 56, no. 3 (Spring, 1973): 189—201.Kenneth D. Rose, “Wettest in the West: San Francisco & Prohibition in 1924,”

Cat(fornia History 65, no.4 (December, 1986): 286, 290—292.6 Monroe, Hellfire Nation, x.

Ibid., 312—315.

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154 Russell L. Weber

but also almost “immediately delivered a crime wave” that the federalgovernment neither expected nor was prepared to contain.8

Due to the massive historical scope of Hellfire Nation, Monroe is onlyable to provide a brief and general summary of the crime and corruption thatspread across America because of the 18th Amendment and therefore, because ofits brevity, is unable to analyze how this instantaneous crime wave arose in thehighly saturated San Francisco-Bay Area. Even though Rose’s article focuses onSan Francisco during its height of bootlegging and corruption, because hisanalysis is limited to 1924 he overlooks the evolution of San Francisco’s newintoxicating crime wave, which arose under Harry Brolaski’s leadership duringthe 1920s. Harry Brotaski—reformed gambler, author, financial broker, andformer mayor of Redondo Beach, California—was federally indicted on October10, 1920. Brolaski was charged with intent to violate the Volstead Act, alsoknown as the National Prohibition Act, for the alleged transportation and sale oftwenty barrels of whiskey from a U.S. bonded warehouse located at 671 SecondStreet, San Francisco.9 After his indictment, which occurred less than a year intoAmerica’s national prohibition experiment, Brolaski would become the star ofone of the most extensive trials for violating the Volstead Act that San Franciscowould ever experience.

In order to fully understand the response of local newspapers to the trialof Harry Brolaski, it is necessary to identif’ not only the attitudes of SanFranciscans towards national prohibition in 1920, but also how those attitudesmanifested in the actions that many San Franciscans took to protect themselvesfrom the fallout of living in a “dry” nation. San Franciscans did not waste thegrace period between the ratification and enforcement of national prohibition,and many of them, like so many other Americans, began to prepare and “stockup” on their alcohol supplies.’0 In fact, many families chose to continue thepractice of making their own wines and ciders throughout the Prohibition era,since alcohol produced for private consumption was technically still legal underthe Eighteenth Amendment.’1

An example of the flexibility the federal government allowedconcerning the manufacture of alcohol for personal consumption can be found ina U.S. prohibition policy that U.S. Commissioner of the Internal RevenueService (IRS), William S. Williams, enacted on October 13, 1920. Only threedays after the indictment of Harry Brolaski, Williams telegrammed Justice S.Wardell, an IRS Collector for California, and informed him that families could

Ibid., 325, 328.“Booze Ring Chiefs Named,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 10, 1920, 1—2. “U.s.

Arrests Broker; Two more Sought,” San Francisco Examiner, October 10, 1920, 1.10 It is important to remember that the Eighteenth Amendment opens with “[ajfter oneyear from the ratification of this article,” thus implying that even prohibitionist legislatorsunderstood that the transition of Anierica from a “wet” to a “dry” nation would be a slow,gradual process. The Constitution of the United States ofAmerica: The BicentennialKeepsake Edition, (New York, Bantam Books, 1987), 71.

“200 Gallons of Home Made Wine Allowed,” San Francisco Examiner, October 13,1920, 1.

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legally produce two hundred gallons of wine and cider per year for privateconsumption tax-free and “without [any] regard to their alcoholic content.”2Perhaps the most revealing aspect of this proclamation was that any family whoproduced more than the legally allotted two hundred gallons of wine and ciderwould not have their excess alcohol confiscated, but simply would have to pay a“32 cents a gallon” tax. This disregard for the quantity of alcohol that Americansprivately produced and consumed serves as evidence that at least some, if notmany, federal officials and American politicians were more concerned with theprofitability of national prohibition than with the morality and safety of theircitizens.

Statistics on these legal and private stockpiles of alcohol in SanFrancisco, as across much of the United States, are lost to history since therewas no mechanism within the federal government to record the amounts ofalcohol Americans privately produced and consumed. In fact, one of the onlyreasons there are any records of the amount of alcohol individuals owned duringthe Prohibition era is because the Eighteenth Amendment explicitly states thatall transportation of alcohol was illegal, thus requiring the federal government tocreate a legal loop-hole within the Volstead Act for the transportation of “legal”liquor. Anyone who legally purchased liquor prior to the enactment of nationalprohibition or produced it within the privacy of his or her own home and wishedto transport it from one private residence to another had to obtain an officialpermit from the U.S. Internal Revenue Office of the Federal TreasuryDepartment, which gave the individual temporary exemption from theEighteenth Amendment.13 It is through the surviving copies of these federaltransportation permits that one can gain insight into the rationale behind thisextremely popular trend of alcohol stock piling.14

The initial intentions of the individuals requesting these permits totransport alcohol seem fairly genuine. San Franciscan D. Ferrari requested tomove three barrels of wine for personal consumption, which he probably

12 Ibid.13 There are two collections of “Applications for Permit Under the National ProhibitionAct” that will be referenced within this paper. The first is “S.F. Prohibition: Permits,1920—1922” which is located at the San Francisco History Center/Book Arts & SpecialCollections Center, housed in the Civic Center Branch of the San Francisco PublicLibrary. The second is “Prohibition Permits: 1920, 1922: MS 3998/1” which is located atthe North Baker Research Library, housed in the California Historical Society, SanFrancisco. Throughout the rest of this paper individual permits will be designated bytheir official serial numbers (located on the top right corner of the permit), the date theywere issued, and of which collection they were included (San Francisco Historical CenterCollection or North Baker Research Library Collection). Please note that the quantity ofthese permits is finite, with only fifteen total between both collections. Additionally, it isimportant to note that to prevent fraudulent transportation, these permits could only beissued by the San Francisco Federal Prohibition Director and many of these permits wererequired to be returned to the San Francisco Customs House to be destroyed after theirusage, as seen in “Calif-C-6696,” December 4, 1920, North Baker Research LibraryCollection.14 “Calif-C-934,” March 29, 1920, San Francisco Historical Center Collection.

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hoarded or made himself prior to January 16, 1920, from his primary residenceat 475½ Vallejo Street to 417 Greenwich Street, a distance of less than onemile. A. lannarone petitioned to move twenty gallons of wine from his primaryresidence at 545 Minna Street to 567 Filbert Street likely for similar reasons.’6 Itis highly probable that both men, knowing that national prohibition was coming,decided to legally stock-up on alcohol or produce it themselves so that theywould be able to enjoy a glass of wine with their dinner without becomingfederal criminals. Due to the implementation of these transportation permits it isclear that flexibility and tolerance towards the consumption of alcohol in SanFrancisco was an essential characteristic of the enforcement of Prohibitionduring its early years.

The frequency and quantity with which the San Francisco FederalProhibition Director issued these permits, however, seems counter-intuitive topreventing the consumption of alcohol—the ultimate goal of Prohibition—and isillustrative of San Franciscans’ attempts to take advantage of the federalgovernment’s flexibility and tolerance towards alcohol possession, ensuring thattheir ability to consume liquor was not infringed upon during the foreseeabledrought. As of November 24, 1922, 10, 774 federal permits under the NationalProhibition Act were issued for the legal transportation of liquor within the cityof San Francisco.’7 While the information on these permits does not specifywhether this numerical tally is for permits issued solely for the San Francisco-Bay Area or for the entire state of California, it is clear that San Franciscanswere hardly ready to give up their ability to consume intoxicating beverages. Itis possible to discern traces of corruption and bootlegging through the carefulstudy of one permit, issued on October 4, 1920, only days prior to the indictmentof Harry Brolaski. This permit gave 0. F. Giffin permission to transport 691bottles of liquor, which was an extremely vague description of the alcohol beingtransported in comparison to the information usually required and included onthese permits.’8 Furthermore, Giffin petitioned to transport this high volume ofalcohol approximately twenty miles, from 19 Sixteenth Avenue, San Francisco,to 310 Chapin Avenue, Burlingame, a potentially suspicious distance for anyonewho planned on using this alcohol for personal consumption.’9

Whether or not the multitude of permits issued through the SanFrancisco Federal Prohibition Director’s office unintentionally promotedbootlegging within the San Francisco-Bay Area, it is safe to assume that by theindictment of Harry Brolaski on October 10, 1920, there was evidence of

‘ “Calif-C-4447,” June 14, 1920, San Francisco Historical Center Collection.16 “Calif-C-962,” March 30, 1920, San Francisco Historical Center Collection.Interestingly, this permit lists no specific reason as to why A. Jannarone wished totransport this alcohol from one location to another.‘ “Calif-C-10,774,” November 24, 1922, North Baker Research Library Collection.‘ “Calif-C-6071,” October 4, 1920, San Francisco Historical Center Collection.Assuming that the average bottle Giffin was transporting was the traditional “fifth,”which is a 25.6 fi. oz. bottle, then Giffin would have transported approximately 138.2al1ons of liquor from San Francisco to Burlingame.

“Calif-C-6071,” October 4, 1920, San Francisco Historical Center Collection.

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enough bootlegging within the San Francisco-Bay Area that the San FranciscoChronicle felt confident in labeling Brolaski the “mastermind of the [SanFrancisco] bootleggers.”2° When considering Brolaski’s colorful background,however, it is not surprising that the Chronicle gave him such a grandiose title.In 1911, Brolaski wrote a tell-all book of his years as a professional gambler,entitled Easy Money—Being the Experiences of a Reformed Gambler—AllGambling Tricks Exposed.2’ Within his semi-autobiographical, work Brolaskicondemned the gambling “association” in which he participated, stating that hisultimate goal was to “warn.. others away from the pitfalls” he fell into as ayouthful gambler.22 Furthermore, Brolaski seemed to genuinely admonish thegambling trade, stating that no one should ever trust a gambler since “not oneprofessional gambler.. .is at all times absolutely square” with whom he or sheinteracts.23 An undertone of pride, however, can be detected within Brolaski’swriting, one that is especially clear when he states that, in his gambling prime,he was “probably as good as the best of [gamblers].”24 Either way, the rest of hisbook remains true to its title, with Brolasid spending much of his time not onlyanalyzing the cons of the race track, where he began his gambling career, butalso revealing the secrets of many traditional gambling games such as poker,roulette, and the slot machines.25

Interestingly, sometime between the 1911 publication of Easy Moneyand 1918, Harry Brolaski transitioned the skills he had obtained as a gamblerwinning backroom poker games to winning political elections, specifically asmayor of Redondo Beach.26 However, on October 14, 1918, the Redondo Boardof Trustees voted the expert gambler out of his mayoral post because, accordingto the Board, Brolaski’s constant traveling prevented him from giving “cityaffairs the amount of attention they required.”27 While this seems like a validclaim from the Redondo Board of Trustees, what is fascinating is that a slightlydifferent interpretation of this charge surfaced exactly two years later, whenBrolaski was indicted in San Francisco. The Los Angeles Times, reporting on theformer Redondo Beach mayor, explained that Brolaski’s migration from Los

20 “Booze Ring Chiefs Named,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 10, 1920, 1—2.21 Harry Brolaski, Easy Money—Being the Experiences ofa Reformed Gambler—AllGambling Tricks Exposed (Monroe, Georgia: Walton Press, 2009).22 Ibid., 10.23 Ibid., 9.24 Ibid., 9—10.25 For Brolaski’s account of his race track days see Brolaski, 124 ff. For his exposé onthe cheats of the most common gambling games see Brolaski, 256 ff.26 Harry Brolaski in 1918 was wanted by New York police for his involvement in anembezzlement scam. Brolaski claimed that this was a political smear campaign toprevent his re-election as mayor of Redondo Beach, thus implying that Brolaski wasalready mayor. However, it is probable that Brolaski was involved in some capacity withthis embezzlement scam since he was a broker in New York, who seemingly never gaveup his gambling ways. “Political Job, Says Brolaski,” Los Angeles Times, April 2, 1918,112.27 “Oust Mayor Brolaski,” Los Angeles Times, October 15, 1918,111.

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Angeles to San Francisco was the result of his removal as the mayor of RedondoBeach. The paper attributed Brolaski’s dismissal to his inability to “give properattention to the city’s business,” thus reaffirming the claims of the Board ofTrustees.28 Yet, the article also implied that there may have been an additionalreason that the former mayor was ousted: Brolaski had not fully left his life ofgambling and vice behind, as he had claimed within the pages of Easy Money,and it was his gambling habits that were preventing him from performing theduties of his job.29

It is uncertain whether or not Brolaski continued to dabble in the worldof corruption during his time as mayor. However, it is possible that Brolaski’schoice to move to San Francisco after his expulsion from the mayor’s office wasinfluenced by his past career as a gambler. According to Brolaski, San Franciscowas not only nicknamed the “New York’ of the Pacific Coast,” but it also“furnished more sport and thrilling incidents along gambling lines than NewYork or Chicago.”3° With this in mind, it makes sense that a former gambler,now down and out of the political game, would turn to a city that was “infestedby gamblers of all descriptions.” 1 Therefore, if Brolaski did move to SanFrancisco to facilitate his return to a life of gambling and corruption, Prohibitiongave Brolaski the perfect opportunity to do so.

On October 11, one day after Brolaski’s own arrest, his supposedsecond-in-command, Douglas Newton, was arrested on the same charges asBrolaski, while simultaneously an arrest warrant was issued for Harry C.Murphy, a possible third partner within the Brolaski bootlegging ring.32Brolaski, however, did not passively accept Federal District Attorney Frank M.Silva’s attack on his and his possible associates’ reputations. In response toDouglas Newton’s arrest, Brolaski quickly began his counterattack againstSilva, claiming that the charges for violating the Volstead Act were purely“political.”33 Interestingly, Brolaski’s charge against Silva created a strikingparallel to the political attacks that had been leveled against the former RedondoBeach mayor during the 1918 mayoral election.34 Brolaski boldly challengedboth Federal authority and Silva’s credibility in the San Francisco Chronicle byquestioning why neither he nor the current San Francisco Federal ProhibitionDirector, Edward Kenny, were looking into the fifty-one barrels of whiskey andgin that went missing from a federal bond warehouse during the Democratic

28 It is interesting that this 1920 article states that Brolaski was voted out as mayor ofRedondo Beach on November 14, 1918, one month later than the original article from theLos Angeles Times. “Brolaski is Arrested,” Los Angeles Times, October 10, 1920, 1, 3.29 “Brolaski is Arrested,” Los Angeles Times, October 10, 1920, 1, 3.° Brolaski, Easy Money, 233.31 Ibid. 232.32 “Retailers in Booze Net,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 12, 1920, 1,4.

“Brolaski Seeks Showdown on 51 Barrels of Booze Democrats Drank,” San FranciscoChronicle, October 13, 1920, 1—2.

“Political Job, Says Brolaski,” Los Angeles Times, April 2, 1918, 112.

EX POST FACTO


convention in San Francisco several months prior.35 One cannot help but wonderwhether these attacks against Silva’s credibility were Brolaski’s attempts to gainpublic support and sympathy for his upcoming trial.36

Regardless of his motivations in questioning the actions of the SanFrancisco Federal Prohibition Director, Brolaski’s bold gamble called attentionto the issue of whether corruption had already seeped into the fledglingorganization’s San Francisco office. While it is possible that Brolaski was tryingto defame Silva, there is also a chance that the position of San Francisco FederalProhibition Director had been corru?ted after Silva’s departure from the post,quite possibly by Brolasld himself. Justus S. Wardell, Collector of InternalRevenue for the Department of the Treasury, openly accused Glad Warburton, aclose friend of Brolaski, of allowing “irregularities” in the collection of liquor tooccur during her time as acting San Francisco federal Prohibition Director.38This speculative claim gains validity when one sees that Warburton signed theOctober 4, 1920, permit that allowed Giffin to transport his 138 gallons of liquorfrom San Francisco to Burlingame.39 Additionally, Warburton was in herposition for only three weeks, compelling one to questions why, after LorinHandley’s death, there was such a quick turnover rate in the office of the SanFrancisco Federal Prohibition Director.

Throughout the weeks leading up to the official start of the Brolaskitrial, Federal District Attorney Silva continually attempted to connect Brolaskiand his bootlegging ring to not only corruption in the office of the San FranciscoFederal Prohibition Director but also the “questionable” death of Lorin Handley,a former San Francisco Federal Prohibition Director who died in a car accidenton September 20’ l920.° Initially, Silva believed there was a good chance thatthe recently uncovered San Francisco bootlegging rings were connected to the“foul play” in former Director Handley’s death.41 Silva’s theory that Handley’sdeath was not caused by an accidental car crash was only strengthened when

“Retailers in Booze Net,” 1,4. “Brolaski Seeks Showdown on 51 Barrels of BoozeDemocrats Drank,” 1—2.36 Brolaski, 238 if. In this section entitled “Selling Tips,” Brolasld explains that in horseraces the winner is almostalways determined before the race begins. Therefore, “professional tip sellers,” those whoconsult on horse-race betting, are nothing but “guessers.” This implies that Brotaskiunderstands that selling what he is saying is just as important, if not more important, thanwhat he is actually saying.

The last permit to transport liquor that frank M. Silva signed was on June 14, 1920, forMr. D Ferrari. “Calif-C-4447,” June 14, 1920, San Francisco Historical CenterCollection.38 “Wardell Links Brolaski, Mrs. Warburton,” San Francisco Examiner, October 14,1920, 1. “Wardell accuses Mrs. Warburton,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 15, 1920,2.

“Calif-C-6071,” October 1920, San Francisco Historical Center Collection.40 “Lorin Handley is Killed in Auto Accident,” San Francisco Chronicle, September 21,1920, 1.41 “Hanley Slain by Booze Ring Asserts Sleuths,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 10,1920, 1.

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Handley’s driver, A.C. de Valle, publically stated that Handley’s car was forcedoff the road by another vehicle.42 In addition, Warburton was riding in the carwith Handley at the time of Handley’s death, a detail that Silva latched onto asproof that Brolaski was somehow involved in orchestrating the suspectedmurder, implying that Warburton was an “inside man” to ensure that the job gotdone.

Silva’s charge of “foul play,” while up to this point entirely speculative,gained credence when it was revealed that Handley had in his possession areceipt from the Burn’s Detective Agency for $500 for “services rendered” toHarry Brolaski.43 Brolaski forcefully responded to these charges and remainedvocal of his innocence on all fronts and claimed that, as a personal friend ofHandley, he had nothing to do with his tragic death and was as appalled andsaddened as anyone else. Furthermore, Brolaski boldly announced that he wasworking as a “confidential agent” of the San Francisco Federal Prohibitionoffice, under Handley’s direct supervision, implying that the personal receipt ofBrolaski’s found on Handley’s body was an expense Brolaski generated whileconducting his undercover investigation.45

Throughout the entire month of October, Brolaski not only defendedhis innocence when accused of orchestrating the death of his supposed friendLorin Handley, but also continued his personal attacks against D.A. Silva,attempting to utterly destroy the reputation of his future prosecutor. Without anyproof whatsoever, Brolaski reported to the San Francisco Chronicle that Silvaand current San Francisco Federal Prohibition Director Kenny took “two quartbottles of whiskey” with them on a trip to Los Angeles without the properpermit, thus subtly trying to accuse Silva and Kenny of the same crime thatSilva had charged Brolaski.46 Additionally, Brolaski claimed he had documentedproof that Silva, during his time as San Francisco Federal Prohibition Director,conspicuously allowed approximately 315 barrels of whiskey to be removedfrom a San Francisco bond warehouses between June 4 and June While theSan Francisco Chronicle and San Francisco Examiner often printed Brolaski’s

42 Thid.n “Handley Had Brolaski Bill When Killed,” San Francisco Examiner, October 22,1920, 2. According to the “Inflation Calculator” at the United States Bureau of LaborStatistics $500 in 1922 would equate to about $5,734.80 in 2012. The Bureau of LaborStatistics, “CPI Inflation Calculator,” http://www.bls.govldatalinflation_calculator.htm (accessed May 6, 2012).‘ “Brolaski in Limelight,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 17, 1920, 1—2.‘ “Brolaski Puts Questions to Dry Officials,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 22,1920,2.

Ibid.“Brolaski Tells Big ‘Booze’ Withdrawal,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 24, 1920,

2. According to the “Applications for Permit Under the National Prohibition Act” Silvawas the San Francisco Federal Prohibition Director from at least March 30, 1920 to June14, 1920 since Silva’s signatures are found on both of these permits. “Calif-C-962,”March 30, 1920, San Francisco Historical Center Collection. “Calif-C-4447,” June 14,1920, San Francisco Historical Center Collection.

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accusations against Silva, there is no indication that the editors of the Chronicleor Examiner were biased in defending Brolaski, implying that while corruptionmay have already entered the San Francisco Federal Prohibition Director’soffice after Silva’s departure, Brolaski and the pressure of Prohibition had notyet corrupted the San Francisco newspapers.

On November 3, 1920, Harry Brolaski, Douglas N. Newton, and JulesGamage, under the counsel of their defense attorney, Hugo Asher, pled notguilty to the charge of “conspiracy to withdraw liquor from a Governmentbonded warehouse” in the courtroom of Federal Judge Maurice T. Dooling.48The trial date was set for November 29, 1920 and both Silva and Asherimmediately began to prepare their cases.49 During this one-month periodbetween the entering of a formal plea of “not guilty” and the official trial date,one can see, yet again, “Brolaski the gambler” taking center stage, boldly andexcessively proclaiming that the federal government had no real proof of hisconnection to this illusive “bootlegging ring.”50 Additionally, Brolaski claimedthat because he had nothing to fear from Silva and his unequipped prosecutionhe would not flee to Mexico prior to the beginning of his trial, contrary topopular rumor.51 Perhaps Brolaski’s boldest action during the weeks leading upto his trial, and possibly the greatest “raise” the gambler made in his entirecareer, was to send out subpoenas to an extensive list of federal employees andoffice holders, including Senator James Phelan’s personal secretary, John D.Costello, and his own prosecutor, Federal District Attorney Frank M. Silva,summoning both men, along with a dozen others, as witnesses for his defense.52

Brolaski’s initial public actions to defame Silva’s credibility, both as afederal officer and as a prosecutor, reflect the skill of an expert gambler trying tobluff his opponent into folding before the final cards are dealt. What is evenmore fascinating is that Brolaski’s bluff, his attempt to “buy the pot” and scareSilva into dismissing the case, was almost successful. Initially, both Silva anddefense attorney Asher agreed, as of November 20, that the Brolaski trial should

48 “Three Indicted in Booze Quiz are Arraigned,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 4,1920, 1. Jules Gamage and Douglas N. Newton were officially indicted as associates ofHariy Brolaski on October22 and October 26, respectively. See “Gamage Named NewDefendant in Booze Case,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 23, 1920, 1; “Brolaski and4 Indicted,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 27, 1920, 1—2. Additionally, FederalMarshals were unable to obtain Harry Murphy and Gustav Schultes by the time of theofficial indictments and pleas, so D.A. Silva proceeded with his case against Brolaski,Newton, and Gamage. One of the last reports of these men’s whereabouts suggested thatMurphy was most likely hiding in Alaska and Schultes was still in Mexico, see “BrolaskiBusy Preparing for Liquor Trial,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 26, 1920, 5.

“Three Indicted in Booze Quiz are Arraigned,” 1.“Brolaski Rises to Remark He Won’t Be Beat,” San Francisco Chronicle, November

18th 1920, 4.‘ Ibid.52 “Office-Holders Subpoenaed in Brolaski Case,” San Francisco Chronicle, November22rn1, 1920, 1.

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oniy take at maximum “two days.”53 Yet on November 24 Assistant UnitedStates Attorney Benjamin F. Geis requested from Judge Dooling a continuanceof the trial date from November 29 to December 7, due to Geis’s personalillness.54 Not only did this action infuriate Asher, who claimed he was neverformally informed or consulted on this continuance, it also leads one to questionhow affective Brolaski’s public claims—his “bluffs”—were in weakening themorale of Silva and the federal prosecutors. for almost two months Brolaski hadconfidently represented himself to the San Francisco public as a man who wasmischarged, misunderstood, and taken advantage of by a system that held thesingular goal of denying Americans the freedom to buy, transport, and,indirectly, drink alcohol. It seems likely that Brolaski, the expert gambler, mayhave forced Silva and his fellow federal prosecutors to question their ability tosuccessfully gain a conviction against the “king” of the San Franciscobootleggers.

Asher and Brolaski appeared in court on November 29, as originallyscheduled, demanding the trial proceed as planned, yet Judge Dooling upheldthe continuance he approved for Geis and the prosecution, thus preventing thetrial from beginning until December 755 This continuance, however, may have,initially, been more damning than helpful in strengthening D.A. Silva’s caseagainst Brolaski. The delay in the Brolaski trial forced those governmentofficials who Brolaski subpoenaed to “sweat,” prompting some to beg Brolaskito “lay off,” fearful of what information mighty come to light if they wereforced to take the stand.56 Again, what is intriguing about the fears of men likeJohn 0. Costello, possibly the most politically charged name on Brolaski’ssubpoena list, is that, up to this point, Brolaski had provided no concrete proofof the claims he made in regards to his innocence, his service under Handley asa covert federal prohibition agent, or his ability to defame the reputations ofthose federal officials and office-holders he had subpoenaed. Whether or not aguilty conscience is what fueled the initial fears of these federal officials, it isclear that Brolaski had an uncanny skill of reading and manipulating—a skillthat he was able to perfect during his time as a professional gambler, conman,and politician.

The level of power and control that Brolaski believed himself to haveduring the days leading up to his trial was further reflected in his cocky andarrogant participation in the December 4 performance of the local play, “Have ALittle Indictment of Your Own.” In the Chronicle’s brief analysis of Brolaski’s

“Federal Officials Turn Hands Towards Preparing Testimony for Harry BrolaskiHearing,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 21, 1920, 8.s “Brolaski to Fight Postponement of Liquor Case,” San Francisco Chronicle,November25, 1920, 1.

“Bourbons Flag Brolaski S.O.S. to ‘Lay Off,” San Francisco Chronicle, November30, 1920, 1.56 Ibid“ “Have a Little Indictment of Your Own” was a popular satire of the Federalgovernment’s prosecution of bootleggers that illustrated the ridiculous nature of thegovernment’s futile attempt to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment via the Volstead Act.

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involvement in the play, the writer of the column depicted Brolaski as having anonchalant, almost careless attitude towards his trial, showing full confidencethat the people of San Francisco would defend him from this gross injustice andfalse accusations. Beyond the confidence that Brolaski displayed during thisplay, the performance and popularity of the play itself give insight to the slowlyfermenting disdain towards national prohibition among San Francisco residents,bootleggers or not.58 Even though many San Franciscans still consideredthemselves law-abiding citizens, it is during the weeks leading up to theBrolaski trial that one can begin to see San Franciscans becoming more hostiletowards the enforcement of Prohibition. This hostility was both subtlyexemplified and explicitly foreshadowed in a letter written to the San FranciscoChronicle, by “A Friend.” In this letter, the author bitterly forewams that whilealcohol was still attainable in 1920, “three years” later it would cost “a longpurse” to purchase even a single drink simply because San Francisco’s alcoholsupply would run out—an idea that many San Franciscans would not havebelieved possible in 1920, since many thought Prohibition would not survive ayear, let alone an entire decade.59

Jury selection for the Brolaski Trial began on December 7 and wascompleted on December 8, thus beginning the twelve-day trial to determinewhether or not Brolaski truly was the “mastermind” of the San Franciscobootlegging ring. 60 In fact, the San Francisco Chronicle and the San FranciscoCall & Post made it clear that although Newton and Gamage were on trial withBrolaski, Silva’s prosecution strategy was aimed at proving Brolaski’s guilt asthe head of the San Francisco Bootlegging Ring, and then condemning Newtonand Gamage through guilt by association.6’

Silva’s prosecution greatly relied on the testimony of three men: FredH. Anderson, Dr. B. 0. Heinrich, and Dr. George F. Brackett. Fred Andersonwas a low level criminal and whiskey runner who had quite possibly the mostdamning evidence against Brolaski. Anderson testified that he was involved inminor bootlegging, specifically running booze to Reno under contract for JulesGamage and, indirectly, Harry Brolaski.62 Additionally, Anderson stated thatBrolaski, Newton, and Gamage often held conversations conceming “whiskey

Also, it is important to note that by the time Brolaski participated in this play, SanFrancisco audiences were being treated to a daily performance. “Bootleggers Stage Play‘Not Guilty,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 5thi, 1920, 3.58 “Bootleggers Stage Play ‘Not Guilty,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 5, 1920,3.

“The Supply Will Run Out,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 4, 1920, 22.60 “First Day of Brolaski Trial See Jury Incomplete,” San Francisco Chronicle,December 8,1920,1.61 “Brolaski Goes Under Hot Fire by Prosecution,” San Francisco Chronicle, December9, 1920, 1—2. “BrolaskiPledge Booze Aid, Says Witness,” San Francisco Call & Post, December 8, 1920, 2.62 Ibid., 1—2.

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and how to bootleg it.”63 Prior to one of his whiskey runs to Reno, Andersonsaid that Brolaski told him that if anyone tried to stop him he should “shoot toki1l.M Assistant defense attorney Maxwell McNuff’s cross-examination ofAnderson, however, did not help Brolaski’s defense. Due to McNutt’s poorquestioning, the cross examination allowed Anderson to confirm his associationwith Gamage and Brolaski and allowed him to reassert that he was, without adoubt, one of the many men running booze for Brolaski and his “bootleggingring” on the west coast.65

Dr. Heinrich, a professor of chirography at U.C. Berkeley, testified forthe prosecution that the signature of a man named “George A. Brooks” on afederal liquor withdrawal ermit, originally held by Anderson, was a forgerythat Gamage had penned. The importance of Heinrich’s testimony was toprovide documented proof that Anderson did in fact interact with Gamage andwas not simply fabricating his testimony. Finally, the prosecution closed itsattack on Brolaski with the testimony of Dr. Brackett, who claimed that Brolaskiopenly offered him management of the bootlegging traffic in the San Joaquinterritory between Stockton and Bakersfield for a price of $5,000 to “start the ballrolling.”67 This price, according to Brackett, was reduced from the initial$50,000 price tag Brolaski initially had wanted to charge Brackett.66 Throughthis single testimony, Silva had not only successfully connected Harry Brolaskito the San Francisco-Bay Area bootlegging ring, but also provided reasonableevidence that Newton, who was present during this meeting between Brackettand Brolaski, was Brolaski’s right hand man. Brackett’s testimony ended Silva’sprosecution on a high note, successfully providing anecdotal evidence thatBrolaski was not only the “mastermind” of the San Francisco-Bay Areabootlegging ring, but also had his hand in bootlegging across California andmuch of the west coast.

In the course of confirming Brolaski ‘s leadership of the San FranciscoBootlegging Ring, however, Silva also managed to defame the reputation ofLorin Handley through the testimony of John L. Considine, one of Silva’s“lesser” witnesses. Considine, one of the supervising prohibition agents of thePacific Coast, testified that Handley had introduced him to Brolaski and referred

63 “Brolaski Said ‘Shoot to Kill,’ Is Testimony,” San Francisco Examiner, December 10,1920, 1.64 Ibid

“Booze Secrets Bared in Trial of Brolaski,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 10,1920, 1—2.66 Handwriting on Booze Permit Brings Denial,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 11,1920,5.67 “Brolaski’s Defense Opens Today in Bootleg Case,” San Francisco Chronicle,December 14, 1920, 13. Note, $5,000 in 1920 is equivalent to$57,348 in 2012. TheBureau of Labor Statistics, “CPI Inflation Calculator,”http://www.bls.gov/datalinflation_calculator.htm (accessed May 6, 2012).68 Thid

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to Brolaski as a valuable “source of information.”69 Considine’s testimonyaffectively tarnished the reputation of Handley, whose friendship with Brolaskiwas now confirmed, and therefore put into question all of the work Handley didas San Francisco’s Federal Prohibition Officer. Interestingly, an articlepublished in the San Francisco Examiner over a month before Considine gavetestimony in the Brolaski Trial corroborated suspicions of Handley’s corruption.In this article, the Examiner reported that Newton had offered Brackeft the rightsto the San Joaquin bootlegging territory for the price of $50,000, yet openlystated that Newton was not just delivering the message for Harry Brolaski, butfor Lorin Handley as well. ° Thus, the information that Brackett gave to theExaminer confirmed Considine’s testimony—that Brolaski managed to gainsway over, or possibly corrupt, Handley, who was either a silent partner inBrolaski’s bootlegging ring or, at the very least, was willing to go to extrememeasures to protect an ally.

This exposure of Handley’s personal corruption in relation toBrolaski’s bootlegging ring continued when Asher called Costello to the witnessstand. Costello informed the jurors that Handley had ordered him to tip offTaft’s Café, a local liquor hotspot, about an upcoming raid by San FranciscoProhibition agents.7’ However, after Costello’s testimony, the defense’s strategytook a drastic shift and began to crumble before the jurors’ eyes. Asher’s nextcritical witness was the Chief Clerk of the Board of Supervisors, Jack Dunnigan.In what seemed like an almost haphazard, frantic attempt to save his client fromimprisonment, Asher tried to get Dunnigan to agree that the distribution ofbooze in San Francisco was not the fault of Brolaski, but rather the fault ofineffectual state and federal governments.72 Finally, Asher allowed Brolaski andGamage to take the stand, which was probably the most detrimental part of thedefense’s case. Neither Brolaski nor Gamage provided any of the shockingreveals that Brolaski had promised in the months leading up to the trial; in fact,both men’s testimony consisted of them denying all accusations with which theywere charged by the prosecution’s witnesses.73 Whether or not arrogance led tothis poor response by Asher and Brolaski, their inadequacy during the trialallowed Silva to successfully call Brolaski’s bluff. Testimony ended onDecember 16 and Judge Dooling placed the fate of Brolaski, Newton, andGamage in the hands of the jury.74

69 Ibid., 13.70 “Booze ‘Right’ Offered Him, Says Doctor,” San Francisco Examiner, November 5,1920, 2.‘ “Costello Admits Tipping Booze Raid to John Tait,” San Francisco Chronicle,December 15, 1920, 1. “Defense in Booze Case Fights on ‘Writing,” San FranciscoCall and Post, December 15, 1920, 1.72 “Dunnigan Paid Booze Tax,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 16, 1920, 1—2.

“Brolaski Says He Handled No Whiskey,” San Francisco Examiner December 15,1920,2.“ “Jury Locked Up for Night in Booze Case,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 17,1920, 1—2.

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After about forty hours of deliberation, on December 19, the SanFrancisco Chronicle reported that the jury found both Harry Brolaski andDouglas N. Newton guilty of violation of the Volstead Act, yet acquitted JulesGamage of the same charges.75 In fact, it was reported that the primary reasonthat the jury took so long in deliberation was a 10—2 split over Gamage’s guilt,implying that there was never any doubt as to the guilt of Harry Brolaski. Thejury’s decision is especially perplexing since Newton was convicted andGamage was set free. Although Dr. Brackett’s testimony insinuated thatNewton was Brolaski’s most important confidant, he was never directlyimplicated in the ring’s bootlegging activities on the same level that Anderson’stestimony had implicated Gamage. On December 22, Judge Dooling sentencedHarry Brolaski and Douglas N. Newton to the maximum two years in prison,fining Brolaski $10,000 and Newton $5,000 for conspiring to violate theVolstead Act. 76 Due to Brolaski’s lengthy appeals, however, he did not serve hissentence until the United States Supreme Court refused to hear his case on April10, 1922. Humorously, Brolaski simply replied that the federal government wonthat round and, as a “good sport” he would peacefully serve his prisonsentence.

V/bile it is difficult to ascertain the full ramifications of Brolaski ‘s trialon the San Francisco bootlegging culture, it is clear that convicting andimprisoning the “mastermind” of the San Francisco ring did not end bootleggingat all. Judge Dooling’s statement that the Brolaski trial was the only prohibitioncase that had San Franciscans betting on the outcome foreshadows thecorruption that would consume San Francisco throughout Prohibition.78 Notonly does Dooling’s claim suggest that, in 1920, there were plenty of peoplebesides Harry Brolaski who were violating the Eighteenth Amendment, it alsoimplies that since Prohibition went into effect on January 16, 1920, lawenforcement officials and public servants, like D.A. Silva and Judge Dooling,noticed an obvious increase in vice and corruption in San Francisco, not thedecrease that prohibition supporters originally promised. Therefore, it is notsurprising that crime and corruption increased in the years following theBrolaski trial, especially since, as “A Friend” predicted in the San FranciscoChronicle, booze became more difficult to legally procure, leading individuals

“While the decision was made on December 18, 1920, both the Chronicle and Examinerreported it on December 19, 1920. “Jury Renders Verdict After Long Deadlock,” SanFrancisco Chronicle, December 19, 1920, 1—2. “Brolaski and Newton are Found Guilty,”San Francisco Examiner, December 19, 1920, 1,76 “Prison Term and Fine Given to S.F. Booze King,” San Francisco Chronicle,December 23td, 1920, 1. Note, $5,000 in 1920 is equivalent to$57,348 in 2012 and$10,000 in 1920 is equivalent to $114,696 in 2012. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, “CPIInflation Calculator,” http://www.bls.gov/dat&inflationcalculator.htm (accessed May12, 2012).“ “Harry Brolaski Must Go to Penitentiary, Pay $10,000, Says Federal Supreme Court,”San Francisco Chronicle, April, 1 1922, 3.“ “Jurors Free Gamage and Newton is Convicted,” San Francisco Call & Post,December 18th 1920, 1.

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to go to greater lengths to obtain intoxicants. The trial of Harry Brolaski is anexcellent example of how national prohibition did not establish the idealizedmoral perfection of America, but rather placed the American people on a long,dangerous road of crime and corruption that would not begin to subside untilDecember 5, 1933, when Americans wisely ended their moral crusade againstalcohol and repealed prohibition through the passage of the Twenty-FirstAmendment.

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Bibliography

Primary Sources

The Bureau of Labor Statistics. “CPI Inflation Calculator.”http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (accessed May 6,2012).

The Constitution of the United States ofAmerica: The Bicentennial KeepsakeEdition. New York, Bantam Books, 1987.

Los Angeles Times. October 2, 1918—October 15, 1920.San Francisco Call & Post. December 8, 1920—December 18, 1920.San Francisco Chronicle. October 10, 1920—April 11, 1922.San Francisco Examiner. October 10, 1920—December 19, 1920.“S.F. Prohibition: Permits, 1920-1922.” San Francisco History Center/Book Arts

& Special Collections Center, Civic Center Branch of the SanFrancisco Public Library.

“S.F. Prohibition: Prohibition Permits: 1920, 1922: MS 3998/1.” North BakerResearch Library, California Historical Society, San Francisco Branch.

Secondary Sources

Carter, Paul A. “Prohibition and Democracy: The Noble ExperimentReassessed.” The Wisconsin Magazine ofHistory 56, no. 3 (Spring,1973): 189-201.

Monroe, James A. Hellfire Nation: The Politics ofSin in American History.New Haven, New Jersey: Yale University Press, 2003.

Rose, Kenneth D. “Wettest in the West: San Francisco & Prohibition in 1924.”California History 65, no. 4 (December, 1986): 284—295.

Schweikart, Larry and Michael Allen. A Patriot’s History of the United States:From Columbus ‘s Great Discovery to the War on Terror. New York:Sentinel, 2004.

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Documents

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