AMERICAN TRAGEDY

'Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War

DAVID KAISER

THE BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England

2000

VID KAISER

of the Second World War

se of Sacco and Vanzetti ung)

from Philip II to Hitler

_eague Pennant Race

I

;

No W

ar in L

aos *

37

No W

ar in Laos January—

June 1961

"Let the w

ord go forth," John E K

ennedy declared in his inaugural ad-dress on January 20, 1961, ". . . to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new

generation of Am

ericans, born in this century, tem

pered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our

ancient heritage, and unwilling to w

itness or permit the slow

undoing of those hum

an rights to which this nation has alw

ays been comm

it-ted." A

nd indeed, Kennedy's cabinet and staff w

ere composed alm

ost entirely of m

embers of w

hat is corning to be called the "GI generation,"

born roughly between 1901 and 1924, and shaped by the critical de-

cades of their youth.' Having fought the S

econd World W

ar as soldiers, they looked forw

ard to taking over the strategic direction of the Cold

War. K

ennedy himself had begun a calculated pursuit of the presidency

imm

ediately after the Second W

orld War, in 1946, w

hen he ran for C

ongress in metropolitan B

oston. In Novem

ber 1960 he had narrowly

defeated another GI, R

ichard Nixon, despite N

ixon's advantage of rep-resenting the incum

bent party in an era of peace and prosperity. 2 K

ennedy's father, a highly successful businessman and a prom

inent m

ember of the R

oosevelt administration, had originally prom

oted his son's political career. H

aving failed himself to achieve high elected of-

fice, Joseph P. K

ennedy had initially put his hopes in his oldest son, Jo-seph Jr., but Joe Jr. had died on a highly dangerous m

ission in Europe

during the Second W

orld War. H

is second son, Jack, had abandoned thoughts of an academ

ic career and stepped into his brother's shoes af-ter the w

ar. Elected to the H

ouse in 1946 and the Senate in 1952, he

emerged after 1956 as a leading presidential contender. H

e had traveled w

idely and spoken often on foreign policy, most notably in 1957, w

hen

a Senate speech expressing sym

pathy for the cause of the Algerian re-

bels had won w

orldwide attention, especially am

ong emerging nations

in the Third W

orld. Kennedy had announced a sw

eeping domestic pro-

gram during the 1960 cam

paign, but he certainly came into office m

ore concerned w

ith foreign than domestic affairs, and he im

mediately

found himself facing crises on several fronts.

Although K

ennedy was P

resident for only three years, he remains the

most com

pelling Am

erican political figure of the second half the twen-

tieth century. The atm

osphere of his presidency; his shocking and still hotly debated assassination; a steady stream

of revelations about his personal life; an apparently inexhaustible m

arket for fantastic rumors

about his life, his death, and his career; and the subsequent lives of his brothers, his w

idow, his children, and his nieces and nephew

s have all kept his m

ystery alive, but they have also obscured the man, and the

President, that he actually w

as. Only in the last ten years has the relea

— —

of extensive docum

entation enabled us to follow his foreign policy in

detail.' The picture that em

erges is far more com

plex than the image

most older A

mericans rem

ember. O

n the one hand, Kennedy, as m

any observers im

mediately understood, w

anted great things both for him-

self and for his country. On the other hand, he w

as a brilliant natural diplom

at who enjoyed the details of foreign policy and w

ho was fre-

quently more sensitive to the dangers of rash action than the contem

po-raries he chose as his leading subordinates. N

owhere w

as this differ-ence m

ore apparent than with respect to S

outheast Asia.

During the first four m

onths of the Kennedy adm

inistration the Lao-

tian crisis competed for center stage w

ith the crisis in the Congo, w

here P

remier P

atrice Lum

umba's death w

as announced on February 13, and

the worsening confrontation w

ith Cuba, w

hich climaxed in the disas-

trous invasion at the Bay of P

igs in the third week of A

pril. Meanw

hile, Y

uri Gagarin m

ade the first orbital flight around the Earth; F

rench gen-erals in A

lgeria tried and failed to overthrow C

harles de Gaulle; free-

dom riders w

ere beaten in Alabam

a; and the United S

tates, the Soviet

Union, and B

ritain failed to make any progress on a nuclear test ban.

Despite an initial flurry of interest, V

ietnam rem

ained a relatively mi-

nor issue throughout this period and rarely intruded upon the horizon of the A

merican public, but L

aos brought the nation to the brink of w

ar and raised critical issues about Am

erican goals and strategies in S

outheast Asia.

Publicly the clim

ax of the Laotian affair occurred at K

ennedy's tele-

AM

ER

ICA

N T

RA

GE

DY

* 2

54

fully

explain

ed, b

ut S

tate info

rmed

Lodge o

n S

eptem

ber 1

2 th

at it w

ou

ld co

ntin

ue."

In a press conference on Septem

ber 12 the President took hum

orous dig

s at his tw

o m

ain p

rosp

ective cam

paig

n o

pponen

ts, Govern

or N

el-son R

ockefeller and Senator B

arry Goldw

ater, expressed opposition to lo

ng-ran

ge sch

ool b

usin

g to

achiev

e racial balan

ce, and p

ush

ed fo

r ratificatio

n o

f the test b

an. T

hen

he to

ok a n

ew an

d b

alanced

line to

-w

ard the Diem

government, m

aking clear that he still believed it had to change:

What helps to w

in , the war, w

e support; what interferes w

ith the war ef-

fort, we oppose. I have already m

ade it clear that any action by either governm

ent which m

ay handicap the winning of the w

ar is inconsistent w

ith our policy objectives. This is the test w

hich I think every agency and official of the U

nited States governm

ent must apply to all of our actions,

and we shall be applying that test in various w

ays in the coming m

onths, although I do not think it desirable to state all of our view

s at this time.

... In some w

ays I think the Vietnam

ese people and ourselves agree: we

want the w

ar to be won, the C

omm

unists to be contained, and the Am

eri-cans to go hom

e.

Ken

ned

y h

ad p

ut h

is finger o

n th

e critical issue: w

heth

er South

Viet-

namese—

Am

erican agreement on objectives could also lead to agree-

ment on strategy sufficient to continue an allied effort." L

odge, who im

mediately refused yet again to open talks w

ith Diem

until D

iem had to ask him

for something, 2 ° w

as now engaged in an all-

out war w

ith MA

CV

and the Saigon C

IA station. H

arkins now argued

that the war w

as being won, not lost, and, echoing D

iem, characterized

both the Buddhist and student m

ovements as "w

ell-organized, covertly led

Co

mm

un

ist trick[s]" u

nd

ertaken

in resp

on

se to C

om

mu

nist m

ili- tary

failure." T

he am

bassad

or an

d th

e gen

eral also arg

ued

ov

er the

significan

ce conversatio

ns in

which

both

Thuan

and B

ig M

inh ex

- pressed

their d

espair o

ver th

e situatio

n, an

d th

e Em

bassy

indep

end-

ently expressed the opinion that the political crisis was bound to affect

the w

ar effort." L

odge o

n F

riday

Sep

tember 1

3 also

wro

te Rusk

con-

fiden

tially, ask

ing

for th

e replacem

ent o

f CIA

Statio

n C

hief R

ichard

-son, w

hom he now

regarded as a symbol of A

merican support for D

iem

and N

hu, b

y L

ansd

ale, who co

uld

superv

ise a chan

ge o

f govern

men

t. M

cCone violently rejected this suggestion, offering to replace R

ichard-

The C

oup *

255

son, but arguing that the agency had no confidence in L

ansdale what-

ever, an

d co

mplain

ing th

at "this w

hole th

ing w

as built u

p b

y h

im

[Lansdale] through R

ufus Phillips."" H

alberstam reported serious dis-

agreem

ents am

ong th

e Am

erican co

mm

unity

on S

unday

, Sep

tember

15.24 The S

tate Departm

ent, at Kennedy's request, had asked L

odge to keep disagreem

ents out of the papers, but Lodge regarded leaking as an

amb

assado

rial prero

gativ

e." Mean

wh

ile, Mad

ame N

hu

's attacks o

n

the United S

tates made daily new

s, and Monday's papers reported that

she planned to visit the United S

tates. B

y Monday, S

eptember 16, H

ilsman had prepared drafts of tw

o al-ternative cables for L

odge, one a "reconciliation track" and the other a "p

ressures an

d p

ersuasio

n track

," and a d

raft letter from

Ken

ned

y to

D

iem." A

fter two m

ore d

ays o

f ExC

om

meetin

gs, a teleg

ram d

rafted

by Bundy gave L

odge authority to suspend Am

erican aid to use as he saw

fit to try to bring about a long series of changes. These included a

forthcoming attitude by D

iem tow

ard those who had opposed him

, the release and toleration of B

uddhist and student activists, "full latitude of expression" for the press, an end to police operations against the non-C

omm

unist opposition, cabinet changes, the surfacing of the Can L

ao party, the repeal or am

endment of D

ecree Law

10, and, if possible, the departure of both N

hus from S

aigon or Vietnam

. Lodge prom

ptly com-

men

ted th

at nearly

every

one o

f these su

ggestio

ns w

ould

certainly

strike D

iem as politically suicidal, but R

usk and McN

amara w

anted a fin

al try."

The P

resident, who had refused sim

ply to decide between L

odge and H

ilsman

on o

ne sid

e and M

cNam

ara and T

aylo

r on th

e oth

er, still hoped to bridge the gap betw

een them, and also to deal w

ith growing

doubts about the military situation. O

n Septem

ber 16, Halberstam

had once again reported that recent V

iet Cong attacks show

ed that the stra-tegic ham

let program w

as overextended in the Ca M

au peninsula and q

uo

ted an

Am

erican th

at the g

overn

men

t refused

to co

rrect the situ

a-tio

n. K

enned

y h

ad im

med

iately ask

ed M

cNam

ara how

accurate th

e story w

as." Then, rather than bring L

odge home for consultation, K

en-ned

y o

n S

eptem

ber 1

7 ask

ed M

cNam

ara and T

aylo

r to v

isit Saig

on

themselves to survey the situation, both "in term

s of actual progress of operations and of need to m

ake effective case with C

ongress for contin-ued

pro

secutio

n o

f the effo

rt." Lodge co

mplain

ed th

at the m

ission

would

underm

ine A

merican

policy

and later fo

und it "in

conceiv

able

Note

s to P

ages 2

42-2

52 * 5

30

port p

robably d

id n

ot p

rove

anyth

ing b

eca

use

no o

ne tru

sted h

im. S

ee

ibid

., 22.

85.

Ibid

., 32, 3

3.

86.

Ibid

., 46. F

or so

me re

aso

n th

e te

legra

m d

escrib

ing th

ese

conve

rsatio

ns

did

not g

o o

ut u

ntil S

epte

mber 2

. 87.

FR

US, 1961-63, 11, 35.

88.

This co

mes fro

m K

rula

k's reco

rd, U

.S.-Vietnam

Relations, X

I, pp. 5

40-

544. S

ee a

lso F

R U

S, 1

961-6

3, IV

, 37.

89.

Gib

bons, T

he U.S. G

overnment a

nd the V

ietnam W

ar, II, p. 1

61.

90.

FR

US

, 1961-6

3, IV

, 43.

91.

Chase

and L

erm

an, K

enned

y and th

e Press, p

p. 4

85-4

86 (e

mphasis

added).

9. T

he C

oup, A

ugust–

Nove

mber 1

963

1. U

.S.-Vietnam

Relations, III, IV

.b.4

, p. 4

2.

2. F

R U

S, 1961-63, IV, 5

4, 5

6, 5

7, 6

3, 6

6, 7

0. H

ilsman su

ggeste

d to

Lodge

that h

e u

se th

e th

reat o

f a c

ongre

ssio

nal a

id c

ut-o

ff in h

is ta

lks w

ith

Die

m.

3. Ib

id., 4

4. A

lthough G

eoffre

y Warn

er, in

"The U

nite

d S

tate

s and th

e F

all

of D

iem

, Part II: T

he D

eath

of D

iem

," Austra

lian O

utlo

ok 2

8, n

o. 4

(1

974), p

p. 3

-17, p

ublish

ed a

n a

ccount o

f this co

nve

rsatio

n b

ase

d u

pon

d'O

rlandi's d

iary, th

e F

RU

S edito

rs have

still dele

ted th

eir n

am

es.

4.

FR

US

, 1961-6

3, IV

, 58, 60.

5. Ib

id., 7

2.

6. Ib

id., 7

7.

7. Ib

id., 7

6.

8.

New

York T

imes, S

ept. 9

, p. 1

; Chase

and L

erm

an, K

enned

y and th

e P

ress, pp. 4

87-4

88; F

RU

S, 1961-6

3, III, 8

0.

9. R

eports b

y Col. B

ryce F

. Denno, Ju

ly 19; L

t. Col. R

ichard

Pow

ell, S

ept.

9; B

rig. G

en. D

elk O

den, S

ept. 9

; and C

ol. W

ilbur W

ilson, III C

orp

s ad-

viser, S

ept. 1

1, a

ll in N

ew

man p

apers, JF

K.

10. F

R U

S, 1

961-6

3, IV

, 82 (K

rula

k's report) a

nd 8

3 (m

eetin

g o

f Sept. 1

0).

See a

lso K

rula

k's ow

n re

cord

of th

is meetin

g, T

aylo

r papers, N

DU

, box

50.

11.

Acco

rdin

g to

Kru

lak's re

cord

, Mendenhall w

ent fu

rther, sa

ying th

at h

e

and T

rueheart a

gre

ed th

at th

e w

ar co

uld

not b

e w

on u

nder th

e D

iem

gove

rnm

ent.

12. N

one o

f the th

ree n

ote

-take

rs at th

e m

eetin

g re

cord

ed th

is rem

ark, b

ut it

has fo

und its w

ay in

to se

vera

l subse

quent h

istorie

s and w

as re

cently co

n-

firmed b

y P

hillip

s h

imself. It m

ay b

e s

ignific

ant th

at K

rula

k's

record

om

its Harrim

an fro

m th

e list o

f particip

ants. T

he n

ext d

ay K

rula

k, coun-

tera

ttackin

g, g

ave

Bundy a

rath

er u

nco

nvin

cing m

em

o a

ttem

ptin

g to

re-

fute

what P

hillip

s had sa

id a

bout th

e situ

atio

n in

Long A

n p

rovin

ce. JF

K,

Note

s to P

ages 2

52-2

57 * 5

31

NS

F, V

N, b

ox 1

99. K

rula

k's mem

o a

cknow

ledged 3

8 a

rmed a

ttacks a

nd

256 to

tal in

cidents in

volvin

g stra

tegic h

am

lets in

Long A

n p

rovin

ce.

13. F

RU

S, 1

961-6

3, IV

, 85.

14. Ib

id., 9

3. O

n R

usk's ro

le in

the C

hin

a W

hite

Paper se

e W

arre

n I. C

ohen,

Dean R

usk (Toto

wa, N

.J., 1980), p

p. 3

9-4

1.

15. FR

US, 1

961-6

3,1

11,8

6.

16. Ib

id., IV

, 88, 8

9; N

ew Y

ork Tim

es, Sept. 1

1, p

p. 1

, 42.

17. FR

US, 1

961-6

3, IV

, 93, 9

4.

18. Ib

id., 9

7.

19. C

hase

and L

erm

an, K

ennedy and the Press, p

p. 4

90-4

96.

20. F

RU

S, 1961-6

3, IV

, 102, 1

11.

21. F

RU

S, 1961-6

3, IV

, 96.

22.

Ibid

., 130, 1

34, 1

36, 1

38, 1

39.

23.

Ibid

., 104, 1

20. T

his re

al-life

incid

ent a

ppears to

be th

e o

rigin

of S

ey-

mour H

ersh

's fanta

stic story th

at K

ennedy a

sked L

ansd

ale

to g

o to

Sai-

gon a

s CIA

statio

n ch

ief to

arra

nge D

iem

's assa

ssinatio

n—

a sto

ry which

th

e re

cord

make

s clear is w

ithout fo

undatio

n. I in

form

ed H

ersh

—w

ell

befo

re th

e p

ublic

atio

n o

f his

book—

that th

e W

hite

House c

ale

ndar

show

s that L

ansd

ale

neve

r saw

Kennedy d

urin

g 1

963. S

ee H

ersh

, The

Dark Side of C

amelot, p

p. 4

26-4

28.

24. N

ew Y

ork Tim

es, Sept. 1

5, p

p. 1

, 4.

25.

See M

ccklin, M

ission in Torm

ent, pp. 2

22-2

23.

26. See F

RU

S, 1961-6

3, IV

, 114, fo

r cable

s th

at g

enera

lly fo

llow

ed

Hilsm

an's p

apers.

27.

The te

legra

m is ib

id., 1

25; o

n th

e m

eetin

gs, se

e 1

13, 1

15, 1

20n.

28. N

ew Y

ork Tim

es, Sept. 1

6, p

. 2; F

RU

S, IV, 1

17. H

alb

ersta

m se

em

ed to

quote

from

Phillip

s's June re

port o

n th

e stra

tegic h

am

let p

rogra

m a

s a

whole

, which

no o

ne in

the W

hite

House

had e

ver se

en.

29.

Ibid

., 124, 1

25. T

o H

arrim

an's

horro

r, Rusk in

itially

desig

nate

d n

ot

Hilsm

an b

ut U

. Ale

xis Johnso

n, th

e D

eputy U

nderse

creta

ry for P

olitica

l A

ffairs a

nd R

usk's rig

ht-h

and m

an, a

s the S

tate

Departm

ent re

pre

senta

-tive

. 30.

See FR

US, 1

961-6

3,1

V, 1

26, a

nd S

aig

on 5

57, S

ept. 2

2, N

ew

man p

apers,

JFK

. 31.

McN

am

ara

mem

o, D

D, 1

982, 4

46B

; US

OM

mem

o, S

ept. 1

, JFK

, NS

F,

VN

; Halb

ersta

m a

rticle, S

ept. 1

6, 1

963.

32.

Also

p a

lso to

ok a

partin

g sh

ot a

t the yo

ung S

aig

on p

ress co

rps b

efo

re h

is departu

re, b

lam

ing th

em

, in p

art, fo

r Die

m a

nd N

hu's

unfo

rtunate

view

s. See A

lsop's columns, W

ashington Post, S

ept. 1

6, 1

8, 2

0, 2

3.

33. F

RU

S, 1961-6

3, IV

, 143.

34.

See M

aneli, W

ar of the Vanquished, p

p. 1

40-1

52.

35.

About s

ix m

onth

s la

ter M

ichael F

orre

sta

l told

his

ora

l his

tory

inte

r-vie

wer th

at K

ennedy h

ad a

lways h

oped th

at D

iem

mig

ht m

end h

is ways.

JFK

•

Notes to

Pag

es 25-3

6 *

506

rigged. Phoum

i referred to his cousin Sarit by the courtesy title "U

ncle," w

hich many A

mericans erroneously interpreted literally.

41. Ibid., 354, 355. 42. Ibid., 373, 375, and m

.s., pt. 2, 476. 43. S

ee ibid., 367, 377, 379, 384, 391, and m.s., pt. 2, 438, 505.

44. Ibid., 396, 397, 398, 399, 400. 45. Ibid., 415, 416, 418. 46. Ibid., 421, 426, 429, 430, 431, 432, 434, 444. 47. Ibid., 438, 349, 440, 446, 447, 448, 450. 48.

Ibid

., 462, 463, 464. 49. Ibid., 467, 469, 472, 473, 474, 476. 50. Ibid., 486, and m

.s., pt. 2, 675. 51. Ibid., 487. 52. Ibid., 485, 490. 53. Ibid., 492. 54. Ibid., 493, 495. 55.

Ibid., 497. 56. Ibid., m

.s., pr. 2, 690. 57. A

deletion occurs at this point in the record. 58. Ibid., 498 (em

phasis added). 59.

FR

US, 1961-63, X

XIV

, 1, 2. 60. ibid., 3. 61. A

ccounts of the meeting by K

ennedy himself; G

en. Wilton P

ersons, and H

erter are ibid

., 7, 8

, 9. S

ee also F

red I. G

reenstein

and R

ichard

H.

Imm

erman, "W

hat Did E

isenhower T

ell Kennedy about Indochina? T

he P

olitics of Misperception," Journal of A

merican H

istory, Sept. 1992,

pp. 5

68-5

87, w

hich

inclu

des n

otes b

y C

lark C

lifford

and R

obert

McN

amara.

62. See S

trauss and How

e, Generations, pp. 247-260.

63. See the recent book by M

arc Trachtenberg, A

Constructed P

eace: The

Makin

g o

f the E

uro

pea

n S

ettlemen

t, 1945-1

963

(Princeton, 1999),

pp. 146-200. 64. S

ee Eisenhow

er's mem

o to Dulles, S

ept. 8, 1953, FR

US, 1952-54, II, pt.

1, pp. 460-463, and many com

ments by E

isenhower during N

SC

meet-

ings reported in the same volum

e. 65. G

eorge F. K

ennan, Mem

oirs, 1950-1

963 (B

oston, 1972), pp. 185-187.

2. N

o W

ar in L

aos, Janu

ary—Ju

ne 1961

1. S

trauss and How

e, in Generations, pp. 261-278, date the birth years of

this generation as 1901-1924, but in my opinion m

any Am

ericans born in the 1901-1904 period are m

ore typical of the previous Lost genera-

tion. 2. T

he accusation that Dem

ocrats actually stole the election—now

a tenet

Notes to

Pag

es 37-4

3 *

507

of Republican dogm

a—has little evidentiary basis. A

detailed study of th

e voting in Illinois in 1960 concluded that Kennedy w

on that state fairly, and even a shift of Illinois to the R

epublican column w

ould not have changed the result. S

ee Edm

und F. K

allina Jr., Courthouse over

White H

ouse: Chicago and the P

residential Election of 1960 (O

rlando, 1988).

3. T

he author of the most recent sensational best-seller devoted to K

ennedy m

ade a calculated and avowed decision to ignore that docum

entation, w

ith results of predictably dubious validity: Seym

our Hersh, T

he Dark

Side of Cam

elot (Boston, 1997); see also H

ersh, "May-Z

elikow C

on-fidential," D

iplomatic H

istory 22, n

o. 4

(Fall 1

998), p

p. 6

54-6

61, in

w

hich Hersh explicitly discounts archival sources.

4. FR

US

, 1961-63, XX

IV, 10, 12; V

III, 11; and see CM

-85-61, JFK

, NS

F,

Countries, L

aos: General, 2/16/61-2/19/61.

5. H

arold W. C

hase and Allen H

. Lerm

an, eds., Kennedy and the P

ress: T

he New

s Conferences (N

ew Y

ork, 1965), p. 25. 6. F

R U

S, 1961-63, XX

IV, 13. K

ennedy apparently kept no record of this talk in the W

hite House. T

he farcical aspects of Laotian politics and the

peacefu

l character of the people im

mediately struck m

ost observers in L

aos, and also emerged in various press reports, even those of T

ime m

ag-azine, despite its generally tough line against A

sian Com

munism

. See,

e.g., Tim

e, Feb. 3, 1961.

7. Isaiah B

erlin oral history, JFK

. 8. F

RU

S, 1960-6

3, X

XIV

, 14, 1

5. D

eptel 8

40 to

Vien

tiane, ib

id., 1

5.

Charles "C

hip" Bohlen, the form

er ambassador to M

oscow w

ho had be-com

e a special assistant to Rusk, proposed the approach to M

oscow.

9. ibid., 17, 20.

10. Ibid., 19.

11. P

rince Sihanouk of C

ambodia had refused even a personal appeal from

K

ennedy, leading the New

York T

imes of F

eb. 26 (sec. 1, p. 16) to brand the P

resident's "first serious venture into personal diplomacy" a failure.

12. E

dward J. M

arolda and Oscar P

. Fitzgerald, T

he United States N

avy and the V

ietnam C

onflict, ❑ (W

ashington, 1986), p. 60. 13. T

he March 9 m

eeting is FR

US, 1960-63, X

XIV

, 25; see also a March 3

meeting and its results, ibid., 22. T

he agreed military m

easures included an airlift of 14 M

arine helicopters, their crews, and m

aintenance person-nel to U

dorn, Thailand, on the L

aotian border. See M

arolda and Fitzger-

ald, The N

avy and Vietnam

, II, pp. 60-61. 14. F

RU

S, 1960-63, XX

IV, 31.

15. N

o contemporary m

inutes of this meeting have com

e to light, but see Ar-

thur M. Schlesinger Jr., A

Thousand D

ays (Boston, 1965), pp. 332-333,

and Edw

in 0. Gu

thm

an and Jeffrey S

hulman, eds., R

obert Kennedy: In

His O

wn W

ords (New

York

, 1988), pp

. 246-248. 16.

On

Rostow

's role see Mon

tague K

ern, P

atricia W. L

evering, and Ralph