Ammianus and the Late Roman ArmyAuthor(s): G. A. CrumpSource: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1st Qtr., 1973), pp. 91-103Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4435317Accessed: 29/06/2009 08:09

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AMMIANUS AND THE LATE ROMAN ARMY

As depicted in many studies of the later Roman Empire, the military sys- tem perfected by Constantine seems more tightly organized than any other in antiquity.' Larger than the earlier imperial army, the forces of the fourth century comprised a complex and varied array of tactical and organizational units. To direct them the emperors created a new scheme of command, re- lieving the civil functionaries of military duties and multiplying the types of non-commissioned and commissioned officers. Delviing into this mass of ranks and regiments to clarify certain features of the system, modern schol- ars have viewed it as a rigid bureaucratic organization which permitted little admiinistrative flexibility.

To some extent, the sources for the late army encourage such a formula- tion. The abundant evidence of the Theodosian Code, the Notitia Dignitatum, and a sizable body of inscriptions largely illuminates the formal organization

This essay has had a long history before its appearance here. Much of the material was taken up in a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation presented to the University of Illinois early in 1969. The current article is a slightly expanded version of a paper which I read at the convention of the Southern Historical Association in October, 1969. For helpful advice in the several stages of its preparation, I wish to thank Professor Chester G. Starr of the University of Michigan, Profes- sors Revilo P. Oliver and Richard E. Mitchell of the University of Illinois, Professor Jill N. Clas- ter of New York University, and Professor Doctor Karl Stroheker for the editors of Hisioria.

I Robert Grosse's authoritative treatment of the army reflects greater awareness of its flexible organization than most other works: R&mische Milidrgeschichte von Gallienus bis zum Beginn der by- zantinischen Themenverfassung (Berlin, 1920). Other general studies are Theodor Mommsen, "Das romische Militarwesen seit Diocletian," Hermes, XXIV (1889), 195-279; Ernst Stein, Histoire du Bas-Empire, Vol. I trans. Jean-Remy Palanque (Amsterdam, 1968), 72-73, 122-124; A. H. M. - Jones, Thje Later Roman Empire: A Social Economic and Administrative Survey (Norman, Oklahoma, 1964), especially I, 607-686. On the origin of the essential feature of this system - the separation of the army into distinct reserve and frontier commands - there has been considerable debate. The most persuasive view, attributing the innovation to Constantine, is found in Denis van Ber- chem, L'Armie de Diocl6iien el la Reforme Consiantinienne (Paris, 1952). See also E. Nischer, "The Army Reforms of Diocletian and Constantine and their Modification up to the Time of the Notitia Dignitatum," J. R. S., XIII (1923), 1-55; and Norman H. Baynes, "Three Notes on the Reforms of Diocletian and Constantine," J. R. S., XV (1925), 201-208. For the argument that Diocletian initiated the comitalenses, see H. M. D. Parker, "The Legions of Diocletian and Constantine," J. R. S., XXIII (1933), 175-189; William Seston, Dioclitien et la TMrachie: I Guerres et Reformer (284-300) (Paris, 1946), 302-308; and Seston, "Du Comitatus de Diocl6tien aux Comitatenses de Constantin," Historia, IV (1955), 284-296.

92 G. A. CRUMP

of the armed forces - the prescribed duties of officers, the conventional chain of command, the regular status of generals; it provides few insights into thc administrative adjustments and compromises which may have characterized the system in operation.2

Yet reflection suggests that the rulers of the fourth century probably did modify the structure. It is a well recognized fact that armies seldom function strictly in accordance with their tables of organization, but in the years after 337 unusual flexibility prevailed. Bowing to foreign threats and internal dis- sension, the emperors tested and refined the system of Constantine to deal with the exigencies of rapidly changing situations. Such recurrent crises in- hibited their strict adherence to the formal regulations of military organiza- tion. Thus the army operated in ways which many primary and secondary works fail to describe.

Among the surviving documents of the fourth century, only the Res Ges- tae of Ammianus Marcellinus furnish what is needed to fill the gaps in modern knowledge of military procedure: an extensive historical narrative detailing the actions of specific officers and units. Although this account of Roman affairs from A. D. 353 to A. D. 378 lacks a systematic depiction of military institutions as such, the author often mentions key units and person- nel in reporting the widespread warfare of the age. Of such matters Ammi- anus could write from firsthand acquaintance with the war machinery since, while a young man, he served for an undetermined period as an aide to Ursi- cinus, the magister equitum et peditum per Orienter.3 In his official duties and

perhaps later as a private citizen, he traveled widely over the empire, observ- ing the army and meeting many of the men responsible for its maintenance and direction. Out of the information which these experiences provided and which he incorporated into his history, the references to individual officers offer an especially fruitful object for investigation. From these entries come many of the facts which he relates about the organization of the fourth-cen- tury army, for the passages refer not merely to the men themselves, but to

their ranks, their duties, and sometimes to their units as well. By carefully ex-

amining this evidence, I intend to show how the emperors manipulated the

military organization to meet the requirements of imperial defense. The Res Gestae offer no better instance of the liberties which an Augustus

might take with the structure of the army than the life of Ammianus' own

general Ursicinus. At the beginning of the historian's account, Ursicinus held the post of magister equitum etpeditum per Orientem, which had been creat-

ed by Constantius II as an extension of a rank originally devised by his fa-

I For a brief survey of the sources, sce E. Nischer, "Die Quellen fur das spatromische Heerwe-

sen," A.J. P., LIII (1932), 21-34. 3 Henry T. Rowell, Ammianus Marcellinus Soldier-Historian of the Late Roman Empire (Semple

Lectures, University of Cincinnati, 1964), 22-26 offers a recent summary of the evidence.

Ammianus and the late Roman Army 93

ther.4 Constantine had fashioned a large central reserve distinct in function and terminology from the units assigned to the network of forts along the frontier. Contingents of this reserve, called first comitatenses and later some- times palatini or pseudocomitatenses, were intended to act as an army of cam- paign backing up the relatively fixed garrison forces, known as lirnitanei or ri- penses. To assist him in command of the mobile arm, the emperor then creat- ed two new generalships, a magisterpeditum heading the infantry and a magis- ter equitum, the cavalry. He probably planned for only two such officers in each division of the Empire, but later conditions upset that system. Al- though Constantine's scheme presupposed that the field army operate as a unit, his successors were ultimately constrained to detach some elements from the main body to guard permanently dioceses most open to attack. In charge of each regional force the rulers set a third kind of magister, who os- tensibly differed from the originals in several respects. Leading all types of corps, this magister equitum eventually came to claim the title magister equiitum et peditum (or even later magister militum) though his power was limited to the troops stationed in his sector. The older magistri, now distinguished by the rubric in praesenti or praesentalis, wielded authority over the local officers and continued to direct the regiments of comitatenses and palatini accompanying the emperors.5 By the end of the fourth century, Gaul, Thrace, and IJMyricum as well as the Orient had permanent masters, but the careers of Ursicinus and other marshals mentioned by Ammianus demonstrate that these posts were still temporary in the period which he described.

Following the death of the Caesar Gallus in 354, Constantius summoned Ursicinus and his staff to Milan for conference and assigned a count named Prosper to oversee the military affairs of the Orient.8 W'hile the consultation was progressing, however, word reached the court that the Frankish magister peditun praesentalis Silvanus, who was campaigning in Gaul against the Ger- mans, had been proclaimed emperor. At the report of the usurpation, Con- stantius dispatched Ursicinus (still holding the position of master for the Orient) to the rebellious army with orders to gain the pretender's confidence and then to assassinate him at first opportunity; this mission accomplished, Ursicinus assumed Silvanus' place as chief of the operations in Gaul.7 For several months, therefore, the general's position did not conform to any pre- cise scheme of command; he held titular leadership on one front, while ac- tually heading the forces on another. This unusual arrangement can be ex-

4 Amm., xiv. 9. 1-3. 6 Grosse, Rimische Miliiargeschichfe, 180-188; Jones, Later Roman Empire, 1, 97-100, 124-125;

Mommsen, Hermes, XXIV, 260-264; Stein, Histoire du Bas-Empire, 1,72-73,122-123. It has been argued that all magistri were of essentially equal rank: Alexander Den-iandt, "Magistri militum," R-E, Supp. XII (1970), 572-573.

6 Amm., xiv. 11. 4-5. 7 Amm., xv. 5. 17-31.

94 G. A. CRUMP

plained easily. Since the ruler had not yet instituted a local command for Gaul, he simply entrusted the military responsibility for the diocese to whichever magister was available - first to the praesentalis Silvanus and then to the temporarily free Ursicinus. When the Augustus reorganized the Gallic leadership in preparation for the campaigning season of 356, he corrected this anomaly and, in the process, created another. To recapture the support which the popular Silvanus had enjoyed, the emperor raised his cousin Jul- ian to the rank of Caesar and granted the young man nominal authority over the troops of the Rhineland. The real power he vested in a man named Mar- cellus, who became the first magister equitum etpeditum per Galliam. Although the latter effectively superseded Ursicinus, Ammianus' general was not per- mitted to return to his Eastern duties; instead Constantius ordered him to re- main with the Gallic army until it had completed the summer's expedition against the barbarians.8 Unfortunately, Ammianus does not specify the role which the extra general played in this fighting, and the other sources provide no help in illuminating the exceptional situation.

An analogous episode later in the general's professional life suggests that he may have acted as an adviser during his last months on the Rhine. At the end of 356, Constantius finally allowed Ursicinus to return with his staff to his official post on the Syrian frontier, where he stayed until his recall for ap- pointment as magisterpeditum in 359.9 Having relinquished the command of the Eastern army to Sabinianus, an incompetent with little military experi- ence, he was journeying to Milan when he received new orders. A sudden in- vasion by the Persians had forced Constantius to take extraordinary meas- ures: while Sabinianus retained the formal military authority in the Oriental department, Ursicinus was to return to supervise the actual conduct of oper- ations.10 On the basis of a later passage in the Res Gestae (xx. 2. 1), Demandt has argued that the second set of instructions also conferred upon the gener- al his new rank of commander of the infantry.loa Yet this interpretation seems at odds with Ammianus' earlier statement (xviii. 5. 5) suggesting that Ursicinus would receive the post after his arrival at the court. Since these

8 Amm., xv. 8. 1-18; xvi. 2. 8. Although Ammianus provides no hint that the Caesar was a

mere figurehead, both Eunapius and Julian make it clear that the primary responsibility for the

campaign of 356 rested with Marcellus: Eunapius, FHG, IV, F. 8a; Julian, Letter to the Athenian

Council and People, 277 D-278 A. Amm., xvi. 10. 21; xviii. 5. 5. 10 Amm., xvii. 6. 5-7. ioa RE, Supp. XII, 572-573. Demandt points out that Ammianus' words, "post Amidae op-

pugnationem Ursicinum ad commilitium principis ut peditum magistrum reversum, (successisse enim eum Bar-

bationi praediximus)," suggest that Ursicinus was already magister peditum when he arrived at the

court after the fall of Amida. But the "praediximus" clearly refers the reader back to xviii. 5. 5,

where the use of the future participle indicates that the appointment would take effect on his re-

turn. In these passages, Ammianus' usage has simply not been precise enough to permit a firm

conclusion.

Ammianus and the late Roman Army 95

two entries cannot be reconciled, it is impossible to determine whether he served in the campaign as magister equiitum vacans or as rnagister peditmpraesen- talis. In either case, the arrangement prevented the rrmore seasoned officer from acting without the approval of his superior and reduced him to the po- sition of mere adviser, bearing the responsibility for the defenise of Syria but lacking the power to exercise that responsibility.1'

This burdensome task thus crowned a series of irregular assignments which cannot always be cxplained satisfactorily. Amm.ianus firmly believed that Constantius distrusted Ursicinus and had used even the promotion to magister peditum as a device to inhibit the general's activities.'2 Perhaps the emperor contrived the unusual commissions in Gaul and the Orient as subtle schemes to exploit the talents of an experienced officer while depriving him of potentially dangerous powers. For the purposes of the present study, it suffices to note that the Augustus never hesiLated to rnodify the system of command if conditions seemed to demand it.

The rulers might even abolish some posts temporarily. While Ursicinus was assisting Sabinianus in the Eastern war, the office of magister peditum, which he was to have entered, may have remained unoccupied.13 Although the Notitia Dignitatum suggests that the emperors tended to retain the net- work of regional commands after the formation of the Gallic generalcy in 356, military conditions did prompt changes in the scheme. Demandt has pointed out, for example, that the department of Illyricum was seemingly without a leader for some time during the reigns of Julian and Jovian. Am- mianus relates that the former ruler had, at some point, transferred Jovinus from the post in that diocese to the command of the G'allic forces, but nei- ther the Res Gestae nor any of the other sources mentions his replacement. Jovinus, Demandt has suggested, may have been responsible for supervising both fronts.l1a Although the absence of specific evidence precludes a final conclusion, such an arrangement was certainly possible, in view of the flexi- bility of organization which prevailed in the military structure. Ammianus' account of the provisions for sharing the imperial powers made by Valenti- nian and Valens in 365 reveals additional innovations in the uppermost lev- els of the army.14 While we might expect that the division of the Empire be- tween two legitimate Augusti would occasion some changes, it is surprising that the disposition of forces created an imbalance between the high com- mand in the East and that in the West; Valens received one more magister

11 Amm., xix. 3.1-3. 12 Amm., xiv. 11. 2-4; xviii. 5. 4-5. Demandt contends (RE, Supp. XII, 571) that Ursicinus,

as the first man to serve as magister equilum outside the court, held a completely exceptional post. "I See note lOa above; Wilhelm Ensslin, "Zum Heermeisteramt des spktr6mischen Reiches. II

Die magisiri militum des 4. Jahrhunderts," Klio, XXIV (1930), 109-110. 8a& RE, Supp. XII, 582-583. 14 xxvi. 5. 2-3.

96 G. A. CRUMP

(Lupicinus miagister eqiitum et peditum per Orientem) than his elder brother. Had he followed the earlier pattern, Valentinian would have assigned two praesentales plus regional generals for Gaul and Illyricum. Yet Ammianus mentions only two magistri in all, Jovinus and Dagalaifus. Originally, I ac- cepted Ensslin's view that the post at the head of the Gallic department had been suspended.'5 Demandt's recent work has persuaded me, however, that one of the offices in the court, probably that of magisterpeditum, remained un- filled.l&a Since Valentinian planned initially to make his headquarters in Gaul, there would still be a sufficient number of generals, with one praesental- is and one departmental commander, to conduct the defense. Thus, the only independent army left in the western half of the Empire was that usually en- trusted to the mastcr of soldiers for Illyricum. But, as Ammianus informs us, the mnan who led this force, Equitius, was "nondum magister sed comves." We can only speculate why the rulers had not elevated this officer to a higher rank. Shortly before, Equitius had been a rival candidate for the throne against Valentinian, and the senior emperor, though willing to trust his former com- petitor with the leadership of the Danubian armies, may have been reluctant to permit such a persorp the prestige of the title magister without a prior test of loyalty."6 If Valentinian desired such proof, it was not long in coming. A few months after the division of the imperial forces, the usurper Pro- copius raised a revolt in Constantinople. Equitius' position in Illyricum was pivotal, lying as it did between the rebels and the forces of the Augustus in Gaul. It was he who first received word of the sedition spreading through Thrace and apprised Valentinian of the impending daneer. To coui'ter the insurrection, the ruler promoted Equitius to the full rank of magister, in which he subsequently served creditably.'7

Suspension of regional commands was practicable, for the three types of magistri could perform the same tasks despite ostensible differences in their duties. Although the theory of command called for one praesentalis to lead the cavalry of the court and the second, the infantry, they often combined these functions in practice. When an Augustus found it necessary to commis- sion one of his marshals to conduct independent operations in some distant corner of the Empire, the general would certainly direct all of the troops tak- ing part in the campaigil.8 For instance, the master of horse Theodosius, fa-

"I Ensslin, Klio, XXIV, 123; E. Nischer, "Das r6mische Heer und seine Generale nach Ammi-

anus Marcellinus," Hermes, LXIII (1928), 437. i5a RE, Supp. XII, 591. 16 Amm., xxvi. 1. 4. 17 Amm., xxvi. 5. 8-11. For Equitius' operations against Procopius, see Amm., xxvi. 7. 11-12;

xxvi. 10. 4. 18 A. E. R. Boak, "Roman Magistri in the Civil and Military Service of the Empire," Harvard

Studies in Classical Pbilology, XXVI (1915), 121-123; Otto Seeck, Geschichte des Untergangs der Anti-

ken Welt, 2nd ed. rev. (Stuttgart, 1966 = 1921), II, 87; Wilhelm Ensslin, "Zum Heermeisteramt des

Ammianus and the late Roman Army 97

ther of the future emperor, won distinction in North Africa leading both horse and foot.19 A few years earlier, when Valentinian dispatched Dagalai- fus and Jovinus in turn to counter German incursions into Gaul, both men supervised the same mixed forces.20 These and other examples show that a general's supposed duties did not limit the emperor's power to put a man's talents to fullest use, the needs of the state transcending any inclination to maintain administrative regularity.

Politics or the exigencies of defense could also prompt the Augusti to abandon the conventional order of promotion in selecting men for the top levels of the service. Predictably, the regional iaagistri were most commonly forwarded from Count of the Domestics or from the sizable group of comnites of the second class who acted as lieutenant commanders of the mobile re- serve.2' To fill the rank of praesentalis, the ruler might turn again to these counts or to soldiers like Ursicinus who had proven themselves as leaders of a diocese.22 Yet the history of Ammianus discloses that the emperors might choose less experienced men as marshals. In discussing the retirement of Ur- sicinus in 360, for example, the author notes that the general's replacement, Agilo, had been promoted from tribune of the Centiles and Scutarii "imnmodico saltu."23 Whether personal influence or exceptional competence had recom- mended the fortunate subaltern shall never be known, but in other instances the situation left no choice. A ruler uncertain about his standing could not count on support from high-ranking officers who might have followings of their own. When - in preparation for revolt - Julian rejected the officers sent him by Constantius, he picked at least one replacement who was less distin- guished but miore reliable. Nevitta, his rna,gister equituvr, had formerly held the modest position of praepositus of a cavalry unit.24 At his election in 363, Jovian moved to strengthen his regime by relieving Jovinus, a tested leader, and substituting for him Malarichus, a retired commander of the Gentiles; as Ammianus perceived, a man with few prospects would recognize his obliga-

spatromischen Reiches. I Die Titulatur der magistri mili/um bis auf Theodosius I.," Klio, XXIII (1929), 306; Grosse, Romiscbe Mili/drgescbichte, 182, 184-185; Mommsen, Hermes, XXIV, 260-263.

"9 Amm., xxix. 5. 4; for an account of the campaign, see Amm., xxix. 5. 1-56. 20 Amm., xxvii. 2. 1; cf. Nischer, Hermes, LXIII, 437; Ensslin, Klio, XXIV, 123. See also

Amm., xv. 5. 2; xv. 11. 2; xxvii. 8. 2. 21 Counts as lieutenant commanders: Amm., xxvi. 5. 3, 11; xxvi. 7. 5; xxxi. 16. 8. Counts of the

Domestics: Amm., xiv. 11. 4; xxi. 9. 7; another possibility is Theodosius: Amm., xxviii. 3. 9; Nischer, Hermes, LXIII, 452-453.

22 Counts as lieutenant commanders: Amm., xxix. 1. 2; xxiii. 3. 5; xxxi. 11. 1. Counts of the Domestics: Amm., xviii. 3. 6; xvi. 11. 2. Regional masters promoted to pracsentalis: xx. 2. 1; xvi. 10. 21; xxvii. 6. 3. Nischer made Dagalaifus magister equi/umpraesenialis first (Klio, LXIII, 442), but see Ensslin, Klio, XXIV, 120-121. See note 15a above.

23 Amm., xx. 2. 5. 24 Amm., xvii. 6. 3; xxi. 8. 3.

7 Historia XXII/1

98 G. A. CRUMP

tion to the emperor more readily.25 In these cases, conditions dictated that a subordinate officer would be preferablc to one who had earned loftier rank.

Indeed, when the needs of the Empire or the interests of the ruler re- quired, even the most fundamental principles of organization could be set aside. Although the separation which Constantine effected between the civil and military branches of imperial government constituted a distinctive fea- ture of the fourth-century bureaucracy, the division was ignored in 354, when a group of bandits from the mountains of Asia Minor suddenly belea- guered Seleucia, the metropolis of the province of Isauria.28 Seeing this stra- tegic city menaced along with its garrison of three legions, the Caesar Gallus decided to send out a relief force. The conduct of such an expedition should have fallen to the master of soldiers for the Orient, but, as the Res Gestae in- form us, that officer was detained elsewhere at the critical moment. Since the emergency called for immediate action, the Caesar instructed Nebridius Comes Orientis to gather the available troops from the vicinity of Antioch and proceed to raise the siege.27 The office of this commander makes the epi- sode noteworthy. Though doubtless a person with some experience in cam- paigning, Nebridius held a post with civil rather than military responsibili- ties, the Count of the Orient being charged with the administrative and judi- cial duties ordinarily entrusted to the vicar of a prefect.28 But the threat to Seleucia had prevailed upon Gallus to disregard Nebridius' civilian status.

Just as the leaders of the Roman army assigned officials to jobs that others regularly discharged, so they employed units in ways not prescribed by the formal theory of organization. The progress of the scholae of palace guards to the standing of elite troops encouraged the practice of using them in many pivotal actions. Although Constantine (or less probably, Diocletian) origi- nally devised these corps to protect his own person, by the middle of the fourth century their superior fighting ability had made it profitable to ex- pand their military role.29 In the pages of the Res Gestae these forces and their officers campaigned alongside the regiments of the line, undertaking a varie- ty of assignments which were far removed from their primary duty as body- guards.30 The honors attached to service in special units like these meant that the emperors and perhaps even superior officers could distribute places in

25 Amm., xxv. 8. 11; cf. xv. 5. 6. 26 Boak, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, XXVI, 118; Ensslin, Kl/o, XXIII, 306; Jones,

Later Roman Empire, 1, 608; Stein, Histoire du Bas-Empire, I, 70-71, 117; van Berchem, L'Armie, 100, 109. 27 Amm., xiv. 2. 16-20.

28 Jones, Later Roman Empire, I, 105; Otto Seeck, "Comites," RE, IV, 659-661; Stein, fist- oire du Bas-Empire, I, 113.

29 Jones, Later Roman Empire, I, 613-614; Mommsen, Hermes, XXIV, 221-225. 80 Anmm., xvii. 10. 5; xxi. 9. 6; xxiv. 4. 13; xxvi. 8. 2; xxvii. 2. 6; xxvii. 10. 12, 16; xxvii. 2. 6;

xxx. 1. 11; xxxi. 7. 4-5; xxxi. 8. 9.

Ammianus and the late Roman Army 99

the reg-iments as rewards either for distinguished conduct or for political fa- vors.31 The evolution of the protectores, which in sorme respects paralleled that of the other scholarii, illustrates this practice. Originally a guard-corps reserved for proven veterans, this body offered several benefits to its mem- bers, not the least of which was a close personal association with the emperor himself.32 Since such perquisites had to be limited to a privileged few, the na- ture and function of these troops gradually changed. On the one hand, the ranks were opened to young, unseasoned soldiers who were marked for one reason or another for advancement, so that the corps of protectores became a training ground for future officers. On the other hand, the presumed superi- ority of these officers led the emperors to diversify their responsibilities until they discharged a wide range of duties from simple police work to the tasks of junior staff members.33 These two developments typify the growth which characterized the fourth-century army following the initial reforms of Dio- cletian and Constantine.

Sometimes the demands placed upon the system of thlese two great states- men even affected the separation of frontier forces from the central army re- serve. As the Notitia Dignitatum attests, the limitanei and ripenses were perma- nently garrisoned in fortresses and fortress-cities distributed along the bor- ders of the Empire.34 The strength of these detachments and the measures taken to supply them have prompted scholars to suggest that they played ex- clusively a defensive role in the state's military plans. According to this view, only those contingents attached to the central command retained the freedom of movement necessary to carry out offensive operations. The division of the comitatenses into separate elements for certain dioceses abridged this freedom somewhat, but the regional armies could still move into different districts when needed.35 As the system was laid down under Constantine, therefore, two essentially dissimilar military arms were created: one, a relatively static defensive force and the other, a highly mobile striking force.36

Yet the changing conditions of the fourth century produced situations which belie this traditional interpretation. In some districts of the frontier, the ripenses and limitanei proved unable to provide adequate defense and thus

31 C. Th., vi. 24. 3. 32 Benefits were both economic and ceremonial: C. Th., xii. 1. 7, 14; vi. 24. 1, 2; vii. 20. 8; vii.

21. 3; vi. 24. 4; vii. 20. 5; xi. 18. 1; xxi. 1. 88, 153. Ranking protectors also enjoyed favors: C. Th., vi. 24. 7-11; vi. 25. 1.

33 Theodor Mommsen, "Protectores Augusti," Ephemeris Epigraphica, V (1884), 133-136. On the duties of protectors, see Jones, Later Roman Empire, I, 636-637.

84 N. D., Or. XXX-XLII; Oc. XXX-XLI. 8S In the war against Procopius, for example, both the army of Illyricum and the army of Oriens

left their normal stations: Amm., xxvi. 10. 4; xxvi. 8. 4. 86 See especially van Berchem, L'Armee, 100-101. For a contrary view, see Jones, Later Roman

Empire, I, 651.

7*

100 G. A. CRUMP

were reinforced by contingents drawn from the field armies.37 During the Persian war of 357 to 358, for example, the Eastern command sent legiones comitatenses to strengthen the threatened points of the Euphrates frontier.38 Scholars have long recognized that this modification of Constantine's system took place, but Ammianus Marcellinus reveals that the limitanei could also abandon their customary defensive duties in the middle years of the fourth century. Among the generals who accompanied Julian on his expedition into Persia in 363 was a leader of the limitanei, Secundinus dux of Osrhoene.39 Al- though Ammianus does not list the units comprising the invasion force, we may reasonably assume that the frontier garrisons commanded by that officer were pressed into service for the campaign, an all-out effort requiring the use of every available man.

In this instance, the identification of Secundinus with a specific province makes it clear that he was a general of the frontier; in other cases, however, confusion between the title dux and the common noun meaning "leader" presents difficulties in discovering troops of ripenses. Nischer identified Ter- entius, who carried out important duties in the East under Valens, as duke of Armenia because Ammianus twice calls the man dux.40 But the activities of Terentius seem more consistent with Ensslin's view that he was a coeyeS.41 Greater uncertainty prevails about the position of the Illyrian leader Frigeri- dus, who played a prominent role in the maneuvering preliminary to the batt- le of Adrianople. While ambiguous epigraphical evidence lends some weak support to the label of duke which Ammianus attaches to him, two scholars have argued that he held the much higher rank of miagister militum per Illyri- cUm.42 In my opinion, conclusive proof is lacking. One must take care, how- ever, not to assign Frigeridus a higher post simply because he led a large and relatively effective force; the evidence cited above shows that emergencies like the Gothic rebellion could prompt the Romans to employ the limitanei in offensive operations. The situation in Thrace roughly paralleled that in Isau- ria mentioned earlier; Nebridius may well have drawn frontier troops into the makeshift army which relieved Seleucia.43 Though some specific points of evidence remain tentative, therefore, a general conclusion seems warrant- ed; limitanei and comitatenses could compaign together in offensive operations under unusual circumstances.44

a7 Jones, Later Roman Empire, I, 608-609. as Amm., xviii. 9. 3; xx. 6. 8; xx. 7. 1; cf. A. Muller, "Militaria aus Ammianus Marcellinus,"

Pbilologus, N. S. XVIII (1905), 576-578. 3a Am., xxiv. 1. 2. 40 Nischer, Hcrmts, LXIII, 449, n. 7; Amm., xxvii. 12. 10; xxx. 1. 2. "I "Terentius," RE, Scr. 2, VA, 1, 593-594. '" Amm., xxxi. 7. 3; CIL, III. 3761, 10676; Nischer, Hermes, LXIII, 446-447; Ensslin, Klio,

XXIV, 132. '" Amm., xiv. 2. 20. 4" Cf. Jones, Later Roman Empire, I, 649-651; II, 1036-1037.

Ammianus and the late Roman Army 101

In respect to the relationship between branches of the army, then, the work of Ammianus Marcellinus paints a different picture than that outlined by sources which depict only formal organization. The implications of this fact for the investigation of fourth-century military institutions are signifi- cant, since many scholars have based their studies heavily upon documents like the Theodosian Code and the Notitia Dignaitatun. Too often modern insti- tutional histories of the Dominate describe the militar) establishment as an unvarying apparatus which allowed no adjustment to contingencies. A thor- ough reading of Ammianus Marcellinus reveals that this conception of in- flexibility may obscure the true workings of the army after Constantine.

The controversy surrounding the historian's own service career exempli- fies the way in which the view of a rigid organization cain restrict modern un- derstanding of events. In attempting to reconstruct Ammianus' professional life, students of his history have long been puzzled by the uneven attention which he devotes to his personal activities. Frequent references furnish a moderately detailed account of the author's duties from 353 to 359, when he served on the staff of Ursicinus; indeed, his narrative of the Eastern war of 359 forms a memoir of his own experiences. Following that story, however, Ammianus suddenly ceases to recount incidents in his career. His use of the first person in reporting Julian's expedition in 363 attests that he participated in that operation, but with this exception we know of no later campaign in which Ammianus saw action.45

Pressed to explain the relative abundance of personal information for some periods and the relative scarcity for others, historians have usually pos- tulated that Ammianus was discharged from the army after the retirement of Ursicinus in 360. But this view poses a problem: if the protector domesticus re- signed in 360, how did he come to accompany Julian three years later? To answer this question, some have conjectured that Ammianus volunteered for special duty out of respect for the young emperor, while others have theo- rized that he continued to serve in some out-of-the-way post in the inter- val.46 Underlying these two explanations is the assumption that no officer could be a member of the Roman armed forces and remain unassigned for such a long period.

45 For a summary of the evidence, see Wilhelm Ensslin, Zur Gescbicbtsscbreibung a I Weltansebauung des Ammianus Marcellinus, Klio, Beiheft XVI (1923), 3-5.

46 Two scholars have taken the lead in arguing that Ammianus continued to serve from 360 to 363; E. A. Thompson, The Historical Work of Ammiantus Marcellinus (C ambridge, 1947), 11, and "The Historical Method of Ammianus Marcellinus," Hermathena, LIX (1942), 64-66; M. L. W. Laistner, The Greater Roman Historians (Berkeley, California, 1947), 143. The conven- tional views are best expressed by Rowell, Ammianus Marcellintus, 24-25. One scholar believes that Ammianus remained a soldier as late as 371: Max Budinger, Ammianus Marcellinus und die Eigenart reines Geschichtswverkes, in Denkscbrifen der kaiserlichenAkademie der Wissenschaften, XLIV (1896), Abh. V, 26.

102 G. A. CRUMP

But can such a supposition be accepted in light of the flexibility which pre- vailed in other spheres of military procedure? A twentieth-century Euro- pean army with its advanced level of organization might conform to this rule, but many military systems of the past have not. Barely 200 years ago, gentlemen and nobles supplying the bulk of the officer corps in Western na- tions enjoyed wide freedom within the service. Russian aristocrats of the eighteenth century were obligated in theory to fight for the Czar as long as age permitted; in practice, however, they might actively take the field only in a few vital campaigns, spending the rest of their lives in personal pursuits.47 The story of the famous British admiral of the 1700's, George Brydges Rod- ney, offers an even closer analogy. Throughout his naval career, Rodney spent many years without assignment to specific duties and even served at in- tervals in Parliament. Although he held the post of Admiral of the White Fleet, highest rank in the imperial navy, he languished in Paris during most of the American revolution, all the while soliciting the Admiralty for a com- mand which was not granted. It was not until a French friend advanced him funds to pay his debts, thereby enabling him to go back to England and press his suit personally, that he could return to active duty.48 Ammianus' position as a curialis may not have been far different. According to the Theo- dosian Code, a protector domesticus might gain his post either by seniority or through favoritism.49 Since the historian joined the staff of Ursicinus as a young man, we must concJude that he received his appointment in the latter way, as befitted a man of his class. This illustrates how a person with a prop- er background could win privileges which might be denied to others. In the same way, he might have been excused from active military duties for an in- definite span of time, left to engage in his own activities until a major expedi- tion like the invasion of Persia demanded that all available officers be reacti- vated. Such an irregularity seems quite possible considering the fluidity which Ammianus reveals in the procedures of the later imperial army.

By teaching us that the organization could be modified, his work fulfills one service which the inscriptions, the codes, and the Notitia Dignitatuni do not perform. These other sources reveal abundant details of the formal mili- tary structure, but only a conventional historical narrative, like that of Ammi- anus Marcellinus, can depict the late Roman army in operation. Without this account, we would infer that the military reforms of Constantine established a rigidly bureaucratic system which was seldom altered. In the pages of the

47 Marc Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility (New York, 1966), 23.

48 Alfred T. Mahan, Types of Naval Offcers drawn from the History of the British Navy with Some Account of the Conditions of Naval Warfare at the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century, and of its Subsequent Development during the Sail Period (London, 1904), 156, 158, 175-177, 179, 185.

" C. Th., vi. 23. 4. For privileges, see note 32 above.

Ammianus and the latc Romani Army 103

Res Gestae, however, the Roman leaders manipulated this system to cope with the challenges of the age. For military and sometimes political reasons, officers were shifted freely from formal posts to extraordinary assignments; troops were employed as needed, regardless of their normal duties. Of the changes, Ammianus provides a very brief glimpse, but it suffices to reveal a vitality and responsiveness in the later Roman army which has hitherto gone unsuspected.

Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge G. A. Crump